From Indiscriminateness to Depersonalisation
BUREAUCRACY
Lianne Hooijmans
INTRODUCTION ... 2
1. MAX WEBER ON BUREAUCRACY ... 5
1.1WHAT IS BUREAUCRACY?... 5
1.2THE OFFICIAL ... 6
1.3WHY BUREAUCRATISATION? ... 7
1.4POWER AND RATIONAL AUTHORITY ... 9
1.5INFLUENCES ... 10
2. BUREAUCRACY AS FORM OF GOVERNMENT ... 12
2.1RATIONALITY... 13
2.2EFFICIENCY ... 15
2.3LEGALISM ... 17
2.4NEUTRALITY AND TRUST ... 18
2.5THE LIBERAL CRITIQUE ... 19
2.6THE NEED FOR CONTROL ... 22
3. BUREAUCRACY AS INSTRUMENT OF GOVERNMENT: THE BUREAUCRATIC MENTALITY... 24
3.1IRRATIONAL OFFICIALS... 25
3.2 MEDIOCRE OFFICIALS ... 27
3.3BOURGEOIS OFFICIALS ... 28
3.4OFFICIALS WORKING IN THEIR OWN INTEREST ... 30
4. BUREAUCRACY AS LOCUS OF POWER ... 32
4.1RATIONALIZATION AND INESCAPABILITY:FROM WEBER TO FOUCAULT ... 33
4.2ROBERT BROWN:BUREAUCRACY IS SELF-PERSISTING ... 35
4.3 LUKÁCS ON RATIONALITY AND DEPERSONALISATION... 37
4.4THE SYSTEM IN CONTROL... 39
5. EQUALITY, CONTROL AND THE PARADOX OF BUREAUCRACY ... 41
5.1VALUE AND RATIONALITY ... 41
5.2BUREAUCRACY:APARADOX? ... 44
6. HABERMAS AND BUREAUCRACY ... 47
6.1TECHNOCRACY ... 47
6.2COMMUNICATIVE ACTION,JURIDIFICATION AND THE LIFEWORLD ... 48
6.3IDEOLOGY AND BUREAUCARCY ... 49
6.4APOSSIBLE ESCAPE FROM THE PATHOLOGY OF BUREAUCRACY ... 50
CONCLUSION ... 53
Introduction
Today, bureaucracy is the dominant administrative system governing any large institution, whether public or private. Although in public opinion bureaucracy has a negative connotation to it, the underlying values are still widely supported in modern societies. The demand for equal and indiscriminate treatment seems to push for an extension of rules and regulations that are similarly applied in similar cases. However, bureaucracy is also widely criticised, not only in public opinion but also in philosophy. This critique is directed, partially, at the depersonalization of the individual in procedures. Bureaucracy seems to leave the individual in uncertainty and surrendered to the whims of the bureaucratic system on which they can exercise no influence. However, this depersonalisation seems to be just the result of the demand for indiscriminate procedures. There seems to be a tension within bureaucracy between its promises and its practical outcome, its intentions and its unwanted effects.
At the same time, it is by no means clear what bureaucracy actually is or how it could be conceptualised. For some authors, bureaucracy is incontestably connected with state government. However, there is disagreement whether this connection is necessary or inherent to government rule. Many authors regard bureaucracy as a phenomenon of western modernity, although forms of organized (state) administration were also present in pre-modern times and outside the western-Europe. The public opinion tends to focus on the role of the ‘bureaucrat’, the official within a bureaucratic organisation, and connects certain characteristics to them which mainly have a negative ring to them. Bureaucrats are considered lazy, rule-fetishists and disconnected from the reality of the life of their clients. Bureaucracy is considered to have a relationship with law and legislation, written documentation and regulations. Also, it is deemed to be rational modus operandi for large organizations and connected to technological advancement. To reiterate the words of Martin Albrow: “Bureaucracy has normally been a term in a wide variety of theories about modern society. It has been linked with the growth of tertiary occupations, with the differentiation of social functions, with the alienation of man from work, with the growth of oligarchy and with a general process of rationalization. It has been an element in many more restricted theories about rules, hierarchy, communication, participation and decision making in a wide variety of organizations. But there has been no consistent linking of particular concepts of bureaucracy with particular theories.”1
This observation makes it difficult to work analytically with the concept of bureaucracy. However, it might be worthwhile to reconsider bureaucracy and the role it plays in modern western societies. Most of the conceptualisation of bureaucracy have been performed in the early 20th century and during the 70s and 80s. After that, bureaucracy as a
central concept of thought has disappeared from philosophy and social-political theory. This might be because originally bureaucracy was connected to government, but since the 80s government influence was limited and substituted by the workings of the free market. However, large insurance companies and banks are still deemed bureaucratic and contemporary authors still use the term ‘bureaucracy’ in various manners and to various ends, seemingly without paying attention to definitions. In administrative studies and managerial sciences the concept of bureaucracy is still widely in use with regard to overhead and ‘customer experience’. Also, the use of the term bureaucracy has not seized in public debate concerning subjects ranging from health-care systems to customer services of telecom providers.
For this reason it might nevertheless be profitable to investigate how exactly this feeling of alienation, dehumanisation or depersonalisation that people experience in bureaucratic procedures can arise. The question is furthermore how this relates to the underlying goals or values of the bureaucratic organisation that are broadly supported in modern western societies, such as equal treatment and accuracy. In short; how does bureaucracy establish the shift from indiscriminateness to depersonalisation?
In order to even come near an answer to this question there will first be an exploration of the various concepts and criticisms of bureaucracy. This will start with a discussion on the conceptualisation of bureaucracy by Max Weber, including his characterisations of bureaucracy and the bureaucratic official. This will function as a conceptual basis for the rest of the chapters. After that, the thesis will go into various other conceptions and criticisms of Weber by means of the conceptual division of Kamenka et al. in Ideas and Ideologies: Bureaucracy, distinguishing between three uses of ‘bureaucracy’ namely, a form of government, an instrument of government (accompanied by the bureaucratic mentality) and the real locus of government-power.2 The discussion of bureaucracy as a form of government
will include a further discussion on Weber including rationality, efficiency and legalism with regard to bureaucracy. Also, the central liberal critique of bureaucracy by John Stuart Mill and Ludwig von Mises will be discussed. In chapter 3 the bureaucratic mentality is explored on the
2 Eugene Kamenka and Martin Krygier , Bureaucracy : the career of a concept, London : Edward Arnold
basis of the critique provide by sociologist Robert Merton, liberal Friedrich Hayek and the Marxist approach to bureaucracy. After that bureaucracy as a locus of power will be elaborated upon in three very different ways; the relationship between Weber and Foucault with regard to power and bureaucracy, the fundamental critique of the self-persistence of bureaucracy by Robert Brown and the connection between capitalism, rationality and depersonalisation by György Lukács. In chapter 6 there will be a brief discussion on how rationality and value or normativity relate in Weber’s work on bureaucracy. Then it will be argued that there seems to be a paradoxical relation within bureaucracy between what it aims to achieve and it actual effects. In this chapter the criticisms of chapters 2, 3 and 4 are taken together and put in the perspective of Weber’s characterization of bureaucracy. In chapter 6 the perspective of Jürgen Habermas on bureaucracy might provide additional insight in the dynamics of bureaucracy and a possible way out of the sketched paradox.
1. Max Weber on Bureaucracy
Many social and political philosophers have touched upon the concept of bureaucracy in their theories but only few have focused exclusively on bureaucracy as a single concept. Most notably, Max Weber has written extensively about bureaucracy in the early 20th century in his
influential essay ‘Bureaucracy’. He saw bureaucracy as the most efficient and rational way of organizing a modern society, and key to what he calls the ‘rational-legal authority’. However, he also sees the dangers of it, limiting individual freedom and trapping human life in a ‘soulless iron cage’ of bureaucratic, rule-based and rational control.3 Weber’s analysis of bureaucracy
will form the conceptual basis for the following chapters because many authors use, criticise or refer to Weber when speaking about bureaucracy. Since Weber discusses both the benefits and the pitfalls of a bureaucracy, including the tension between indiscriminateness and depersonalisation, it offers many keystones for elaboration and discussion. Moreover, Weber has managed to make up an explicit list of characteristics of a bureaucracy which makes it easy to distinguish the various lines of critique and discussion.
In this chapter Weber’s main chapter on bureaucracy in Wirtshaft and Gesellschaft will be explored and explained. First the concept of bureaucracy and corresponding characteristics that Weber provides will be discussed. Furthermore the characteristics and position of the official will be elaborated upon. Next, there will be a discussion of the reasons and context Weber poses for the bureaucratization of society. Then there will be a brief sketch of the connection between rational authority, power and bureaucracy in Weber’s work, but this will be explained in more detail in chapter 2. In conclusion there will be a short elaboration on the main influences of Weber’s work in order to understand the theoretical context and his relation to Hegel.
1.1 What is bureaucracy?
Weber starts his chapter on bureaucracy in Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft with a characterization of modern bureaucracy. This conceptualisation will be an important reference point in the following chapters. Bureaucracy is first of all based on the principle of official jurisdictional areas, which are generally ordered by laws or administrative regulations. The regular activities
3 Weber, Max, in Weber's Rationalism and Modern Society. Edited and Translated by Tony Waters and Dagmar
of the bureaucratic system are labelled as official duties and assigned to officials which have the authority to give commands regarding these activities. The duties are strictly delimited by rules concerning the coercive means which may be at the disposal of the officials. There is a form of methodical provision for the fulfilment of these duties and exercise of the corresponding rights.4 The second principle that forms the modern bureaucracy is the principle
of office hierarchy and the channel of appeal. The system of supervision of lower officials by higher officials creates the possibility of appealing in a regulated way to the superior authority. The office hierarchy is monocratically organized; responsibilities and government can be traced to one official. In a bureaucracy the management is based upon written documents (‘the files’). 5 Furthermore, office management presupposes thorough training and specialization of
the officials and official activity also the full working capacity of these officials. Lastly, the management of the office follows general rules, which are stable, exhaustive and which can be learned. Knowledge of these rules represents a special technical expertise which the officials possess.
1.2 The official
Weber has also made an analytical conceptualisation of ‘the official’ in a bureaucracy. This characterisation will form an important basis for discussing the various critiques of ‘the bureaucratic mentality’ in chapter 3. According to Weber, the official is a person of vocation (Berufsmensch) who has received certain training or examinations in order to be employed. The office holding is not considered ownership of a source of income nor payment in exchange for the services. Rather, the entrance into ‘office’ is considered “an acceptance of a specific duty of fealty to the purpose of the office in return for the grant of a secure existence.”6 This
form of loyalty is not connected to a person, as was in feudal times, but rather is devoted to impersonal and functional purposes. The official attains a degree of social esteem and his social position is protected by prescription about rank order. For example, for state officials there are special prohibitions of the criminal code against ‘insults to the office’ or ‘contempt’ of state authorities. Also, the possession of educational certificates, usually necessary for qualification for office, enhances the social position of the official. The official is often appointed for life. This is usually not seen as a right of the official, but merely serves the purpose of guaranteeing
4 Weber, Max. Economy and Society. Edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (1978), p. 956 5 Ibid. p. 957
a strictly impersonal discharge of specific office duties. Connected to this is the fact that salaries of officials are based on function or ‘rank’ rather than wage in terms of work done. 7
The officials do have some discretion in their tasks. General norms are held to play primarily a negative role, as barriers to the creative and positive activity of the official. This ‘freely’ creative administration does not constitute a realm of free, arbitrary action and discretion, of personally motivated favour and valuation. The rule and the rational pursuit of ‘objective’ purposes, as well as devotion to this, would always constitute norms of conduct.8
1.3 Why bureaucratisation?
Next to simply describing bureaucracy a phenomenon Weber also goes into the reasons why bureaucracy could take in such dominant place in modern societies. According to Weber one cause for the rise of bureaucratisation has been the quantitative extension of administrative tasks. As states and enterprises grow, and centralisation increases, there is more need for administrative tasks. However, Weber says, a direct link between the degree of bureaucratization and upscaling is probable but not inevitable. 9 Bureaucratisation is more
strongly stimulated by an intensive qualitative expansion of the administrative tasks, which include cultural, economic and technological developments. Due to an increase in wealth, the standard of living is elevated which makes for an increasingly subjective indispensability of public, inter-local and thus bureaucratic provisions for the most varied wants which previously were either unknown or were satisfied locally or by the private economy. Also, the increasing demand of society accustomed to absolute pacification for order and protection in all fields exerts an influence in the direction growing intensity and complexity of bureaucratic tasks.10
For Weber the decisive reason for the advance of the bureaucracy has always been its purely technical superiority over any other form of organization. “Precision, speed, unambiguity, knowledge of the files, continuity, discretion, unity, strict subordination, reduction of friction and of material and personal costs” are brought into an optimum point in a bureaucracy.11 But most of all, bureaucratisation offers the possibility for the application of
the principle of specializing administrative functions according to purely objective considerations. An objective discharge of business, or performance of tasks, is engaged in 7 Ibid. p. 963 8 Ibid. p. 979 9 Ibid. p. 970 10 Ibid. p. 972 11 Ibid. p. 973
calculable rules and ‘without regard for persons’. The modern society demands the calculability of results. And in a full developed bureaucracy, love, hatred and all purely personal irrational and emotional elements, which escape calculation, are eliminated from official business. In Weber’s words “Bureaucracy develops the more perfectly, the more it is ‘dehumanized’”.12 The official then, becomes the personally detached and strictly objective
expert.
Weber emphasises that in the modern administration of justice, the idea of a ‘law without gaps’ is under great attack.13 The judge should not become a bureaucratic machine
which mechanically spills forth verdicts. In the field of law there are areas in which the bureaucratic judge is directly held to ‘individualizing’ procedures by the legislator. Democratisation demands for ‘equality before the law’, moving away from patrimonial domination. This demands for legal guarantees against arbitrariness and formal and rational objectivity of administration.14 But the tendency not to speak of other impulses and emotions
will cause the substantive justice oriented toward some concrete instance and person to bureaucratise as well. The individuality of the case will however, unavoidably collide with the formalism and the rule-bound, cool bureaucratic administration.15
Bureaucratic organisations usually come into power on the basis of a levelling of economic and social differences. This is typically the case in modern mass democracies, which are contrasted to the democratic self-government of small homogeneous units. The abstract regularity of the exercise of authority is the result of the demand for ‘equality before the law’ in the personal and functional sense. Privilege and doing business ‘from case to case’ are rejected.16 Weber suggests that democratization does not necessarily mean an increasingly
active share of subjects in government. Rather, what changes is the way in which the executive leaders are selected and the measure of influence which the demos is able to exert upon the content and the direction of administrative activities by means of ‘public opinion’.17
Democracy in this sense, derived from the ‘equal rights’ of the governed, has the goal to prevent the development of a closed status group of officials in the interest of a universal accessibility of office and the minimization of authority of officials in the interest of expanding the sphere of influence of public opinion as far as possible. An important aspect is that this 12 Ibid. p. 975 13 Ibid. p. 979 14 Ibid. p. 979 15 Ibid. p. 980 16 Ibid. p. 983 17 Ibid. p. 985
implies the levelling of the governed in the face of the governing and bureaucratically articulated group, which in its turn may occupy an autocratic position. The next paragraph will go into how power, both governmental and in a broader sense, is exerted within a bureaucracy.
1.4 Power and Rational Authority
Bureaucracy as a social structure that is among ‘the hardest to destroy’, according to Weber.18
Bureaucracy is the typical means of transforming social action into rationally organised action. Therefore, bureaucracy was and is a power instrument for those who controls the bureaucracy apparatus since it it’s an instrument of rationally organising authority relations. Under otherwise equal conditions, rationally organised and direct action is superior to every kind of collective behaviour and social action opposing it. The system of domination resulting from a perfect bureaucratised administration is practically indestructible. Also, the individual official cannot get out of the bureaucratic apparatus since he is chained to his activity in his entire economic and ideological existence. Often, they are only small cogs in a ceaselessly moving mechanism which assigns to him a fixed route. “The individual bureaucrat is, above all, forged to the common interest of all the functionaries in the perpetuation of the apparatus and the persistence of its rationally organized domination.”19 And if the bureaucratic apparatus stops
working, this results in chaos which is difficult to master improvised replacements of the governed. Increasingly, the material fate of the masses depends upon the continuous and correct functioning of the ever more bureaucratic organizations.
Since bureaucracy focusses on the rationality and specialism of expert officials, this has far reaching effects on education, Weber argues. The examination for expertise, also outside the strictly bureaucratic structures, results in changing views towards the nature of education and personal culture (Bildung). In the light of democratisation, there is both fear for the rise of a specific status group due to education, but also hope for opportunities to gain status of an official.20 The goal of education in a bureaucracy is specialized training in some expertise rather
than cultivation of quality of life conduct. Weber suggests “this struggle affects the most intimate aspects of personal culture.”21
18 Ibid. p. 987 19 Ibid. p. 988 20 Ibid. p. 1000 21 Ibid. p.1002
Of course, Weber is not the first who identified the movement from towards a more rationalized society in which power relations become more complex. The next paragraph will demonstrate which authors have influenced his work and this might give further insight in the workings of Weber ‘s conceptualisation of bureaucracy.
1.5 Influences
Weber’s work on bureaucracy is influenced by sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies. He wrote in the late 19th century about how Gemeinschaft evolved into Gesellschaft. Gemeinschaft rests on kinship, shared locality or ideology, on natural and traditional leadership and the sense of an organic community in which every member is recognized as a specific person, carrying with him all his social relations, his context, status and ties. The Gesellschaft on the other hand is a society of atomic individuals standing in relation to each other as abstract right- and duty bearing individuals, held together by contracts and commercial exchange under the rule of an abstract, depersonalized, impartial legal system. Max Weber then, seems to see a new development from Gesellschaft to the bureaucratic-administrative paradigm in the modern age, in which laws become increasingly regulations distinguishing between citizens and between their activities in terms of social policies and social consequences, substituting specific status for abstract right, providing concrete security instead of abstract autonomy. 22 This does not
only involve the ‘governed’ or ‘client’, but also the officials themselves.
In “A Debt Unpaid—Reinterpreting Max Weber on Bureaucracy” Scott A. Gale and Ralph P. Hummel discuss the relationship between Hegel’s work on the civil service and Weber’s work on bureaucracy. There explore to what extend Weber has been influenced by Hegel. They argue that there is a firm portion of Weber’s work that comes directly from Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, however, he never cites him. Elements of bureaucracy such as division of labour, office hierarchy, officials as trained experts, the use of the full working capacity and the existence of general rules, all seem to be derived from Hegel’s account of the civil service.23
Their explanation for the fact that Weber does not acknowledge Hegel’s influence, is that he does not want to adhere to the ‘World Spirit’ of Hegel. “ For Weber, history is not the judge of the world, men are.”, they say, meaning that Weber sees mankind as the prime constituting
22 Eugene Kamenka, Martin Krygier et al. , Bureaucracy : the career of a concept. London : Edward Arnold
(1979), p. 130
23 Gale, Scott A. Hummel, Ralph P. “A Debt Unpaid—Reinterpreting Max Weber on Bureaucracy”. In
factor.24 It might be no coincidence he is mainly seen as a social scientist, suggesting that
interactions between human beings themselves give meaning to the world instead of a world spirit actualizing itself among men.
Gale and Hummel analyse how Hegel and Weber would react differently to a particular claim in civil service / a bureaucracy. For Hegel, the civil service would be the mediating institution between the state, advocating the universal interests, and the member of the civil society, pursuing subjective interests. The civil servant also has a the ask of educating the individual about “the fact that subjective interest find their objective satisfaction most fully by pursuing the universal interest of the state.”25 Weber on the other hand seems to view the state
as an institution with the monopoly of legitimate force in a territory.26 Bureaucracy is then not
about educating the civil society but simply about control. Gale and Hummel ask rightly “But is this all there is to Weber?”27
Thus, in order to understand the concept of bureaucracy it is important to understand the way Weber, or any other theorist, looks at the state and what role bureaucracy plays in that respect. This chapter has provided a basis for conceptualisation of bureaucracy and its connection to various other notions and concepts. In order to be able to further understand the theories of bureaucracy and its function in society, the conceptual division of Kamenka et al. in Bureaucracy, might come in handy. They distinguish between three uses of ‘bureaucracy’ namely, a form of government, an instrument of government (accompanied by the bureaucratic mentality) and the real locus of government-power.28 Weber discusses all three forms of
bureaucracy, not always distinguishing them clearly nor discussing the cohesion between them. In the following chapters, the critiques of bureaucracy by other authors will be ordered according to these three forms. There will also be room for further elaboration on Weberian conceptions of bureaucracy.
24 Ibid. p. 413 25 Ibid. p. 415
26 Weber, Max. Economy and Society. Edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (1978), p. 54 2727 Gale, Scott A. Hummel, Ralph P. “A Debt Unpaid—Reinterpreting Max Weber on Bureaucracy”. In
Administrative Theory & Praxis, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Sep., 2003), p. 416
28 Eugene Kamenka and Martin Krygier , Bureaucracy : The Career of a Concept. London : Edward Arnold
2. Bureaucracy as Form of Government
Bureaucracy is first and foremost associated with government. The Oxford Dictionary also defines bureaucracy as “A system of government in which most of the important decisions are taken by state officials rather than by elected representatives.” The position of the state official will be discussed in the next chapter but the characteristics of the system that bureaucracy is considered to be will be discussed here. The five characteristics of bureaucracy Weber started his chapter with are a good start for the exploration of bureaucracy as a form of government. These are in short: i) official jurisdictional areas (division of labour), ii) hierarchy, iii) written documentation, iv) trained experts working full capacity, and v) general rules.
For bureaucracy as a form of government, the early distinction Helen Constas saw between two conceptions of bureaucracy Weber uses, might be of good use for clarification. She brings forward fundamentally different types of bureaucracy as form of government brought forward by Weber. First there is “a legal-rational staff functioning within a pluralistic power structure” and second there is a “totalitarian organization resulting from the institution of charisma in a bureaucratic direction”.29 She links the later form of bureaucracy to the social
structure of the Soviet Union considering it to be “bureaucracy as an end in itself, that is, totalitarian bureaucracy”. The first conception, on the other hand, is “bureaucracy as a means, that is, democratic bureaucracy”.30 Even though the distinction between ‘democratic’ and
‘totalitarian’ might not be as straight forward as Constas imagined it to be, for now it is important to emphasize that bureaucracy as a form of government in the following chapter will be discussed in the legal-rational sense, rather than the totalitarian type based on charismatic authority. It is this the bureaucracy in that sense that still has a prominent role in modern society and therefore deserves our attention.
In this chapter, first there will be an elaborate discussion of the concept of rationality in Weber and the way it relates to bureaucracy, due to legal-rational authority that is connected to bureaucracy. Next, efficiency as possible aim of bureaucracy as form of government will be touched upon, and also how this relates to Weber’s conceptualisation of bureaucracy. Furthermore there will be a discussion on the relationship between legalism and bureaucracy, as the two are often connected and intermingled. After that there will be a brief mention of the alleged neutrality of bureaucracy as form of government and how bureaucracy relates to public
29 Constas, Helen. Max Weber's Two Conceptions of Bureaucracy. American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 63, No.
4 (Jan., 1958), p.400
trust. To conclude there will be an elaboration what I call the ‘liberal critique of bureaucracy’, including the theoretical approaches of John Stuart Mill and Ludwig von Mises to bureaucracy. Both authors connect bureaucracy with state government and state-interference, and allude to a conception of bureaucracy as form of government, therefore they are discussed in this chapter.
2.1 Rationality
Weber proposed that bureaucracy enabled the exercise of legal-rational authority. The authority of a bureaucratic government would then be necessarily rational.31 It is, as Albrow suggests,
not very clear whether all the characteristics of bureaucracy are related to rationality. Weber considers rationally regulated action to be ‘Gesellschaftshandeln’. This is social action that is “(1) meaningfully oriented toward rules which have been (2) established rationally with a view toward the expected behaviour of the ‘associates’, and insofar as (3) the meaningful orientation is indeed instrumentally rational on the part of the actor.”32 This is derived from Weber’s theory
of social action. There are four types of social action: instrumentally rational, value-rational, affectual, and traditional action.33 The difference between instrumentally rational and value
rational action is that instrumentally rational action is determined by expectations of the behaviour of the environment, “these expectations are used as ‘conditions’ or ‘means’ for the attainment of the actor’s own rationally pursued and calculated ends”34. The value rational
action on the other hand, is determined by the conscious belief in the value for its own sake of some ethical, aesthetic, religious or other form of behaviour, independently of its prospects of success.35 Important is that rational social action is not determined by specials affections,
feelings of emotions nor by ‘ingrained habituation’.
It is significant that for an action to be rational, it is not necessary that it is directed at an outcome or effect. “The meaning of a value-rational action does not lie in the achievement of a result ulterior to it, but in carrying out the specific type of action for its own sake.”36 The
value-rational action is however distinguished from the affectual action because it is self-conscious in the formulation of the values governing the action and there is ‘consistently
31 Albrow, Martin. Bureaucracy. Macmillan London (1970), p.63
32 Weber, Max. Economy and Society. Edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (1978), p.1376 33 Ibid. p.24-26
34 Ibid. p.24 35 Ibid. p.24 36 Ibid. p.25 (3)
planned orientation of its detailed course to these values’. An example is an action of a person who regardless of possible cost to himself would act to put their convictions into practice and to do what is required by ‘duty, honour, the pursuit of beauty, a religious call, personal loyalty...’37
For the instrumentally rational action it is important that the end, the means and the secondary results are all rationally taken in to account and weighted. “This involves rational consideration of alternative means to the end, of the relations of the end to the secondary consequences, and finally of the relative importance of different possible ends.”38 The relation
between instrumental rational action and value rational action comes in a variety of ways. First, “the choice between alternative and conflicting ends and results may well be determined in a value-rational manner.” But also, the alternative ends could be taken as given subjective wants and be arranged in a scale of consciously assessed relative urgency. However, Weber suggests that “from the latter point of view, however, value-rationality is always irrational”. He suggests that the more the value to which action is oriented is elevated to the status of an absolute value, the more ‘irrational’ in this sense the corresponding action is. For the more unconditionally the actor devotes himself to this value for its own sake, such as duty, ‘the less he is influenced by considerations of the consequences of his actions’. 39 But Weber also affirms “the orientation
of action wholly to the rational achievement of ends without relation to fundamental values is, to be sure, essentially only a limiting case”.
Another important division concerning rationality is the difference between formal and substantive rationality in economic actions. The formal rationality is used “to designate the extent of quantitative calculation or accounting which is technically possible, and which is actually applied”.40 The substantive rationality is “the degree to which the provisioning of
given groups of persons with goods is shaped by economically oriented social action under some criterion of ultimate values, regardless of the nature of these ends”. While the formal rational actions are expressed in numerical and calculable terms and thereby un-ambiguous, the substantive rationality on the other hand is full of ambiguities. The substantive analyses do not restrict themselves to note the purely formal fact that action is based on ‘goal-oriented’ rational calculation with the technically most adequate available methods. Applying “certain criteria of ultimate ends, whether they be ethical, political utilitarian, hedonistic, feudal,
37 Ibid. p. 25 38 Ibid. p.26 39 Ibid. p.26 40 Ibid. p. 85
egalitarian or whatever, and measure the results of the economic action, however formally ‘rational’ in the sense of correct calculation they may be, against these scales of ‘value rationality’ or ‘substantive goal rationality’”.41 This may also involve elements of social justice
and equality. These however, only evolve around the outcome of the economic action. In addition, it is possible to judge from an ethical, ascetic or aesthetic point of view the spirit of economic activity (Wirtschaftgesinnung) as well as the instruments of economic activity.
Albrow stipulates that it is the rationality of bureaucracy in Weber that has been widely discussed in the middle of the 20th century. He emphasis that the correct discussion is not about
why bureaucracy is rational, but how rationality relates to Weber’s concept of rational-legal authority.42 According to Albrow, Weber considered a rule to be rational if the intention was
to help the achievement of purposes (these were considered technical rules) or to realize values (these rules were considered norms). But also the procedure of applying rules to particular cases was considered to be a rational endeavour. This is illustrated when Weber discusses the rationality of bureaucracy: “Bureaucratic administration signifies authority on the basis of knowledge. This is its specifically rational character” and “Bureaucratic authority is specifically rational in the sense of being bound to discursively analysable rules”.43
To understand the rational-legal authority Weber deems fundamental for bureaucracy it is imperative to understand what Weber means by rationality. Government, according to Weber, exercises rational authority no only when its actions are directed to the achievement of purposes but also if they realise certain values, independently of the outcome of the action. This will be further elaborated upon in chapter 5 when the value of bureaucracy will be discussed. Rationality as important element of bureaucracy as form of government also connects it to the position of the (government) official in a bureaucracy. When the government acts rationally, it is actually the bulk of officials who perform rational actions. In chapter 3 there will be an elaboration of the position of the official.
2.2 Efficiency
In the 18th century, in the wake of the industrial revolution, administrative reform was often
discussed in terms of mechanics. In a way, bureaucracy was approached as if it were a machinery, made up of different parts, namely the officials. For example Auget de Montyon
41 Ibid. p. 85-86
42 Albrow, Martin. Bureaucracy. Macmillan London (1970), p.63 43 Ibid. p.129 and p.141
suggested that “we must apply to the composition of social power the general rules of mechanics”. He devotes part of his work to the position of the official and he advocated that administration should be a proper discipline to be studied.44 In this analogy, not only a sort of
rational objectivity is presupposed, there is also the element of efficiency emerges with regard to bureaucracy.
Albrow emphasizes that the connection between rationality and efficiency in bureaucracy is not clear-cut for Weber.45 A perfectly rational formal system might operate in
ways that defeat the purposes and values which animated it, thereby failing to be rational in a material sense. An example is that bureaucrats might arrogate the highest positions in the state for themselves, contrary to their duty and the rational purpose of the bureaucracy. But even technical formal rationality is not necessarily connected to efficiency, according to Albrow. Calculability, predictability and stability were implied in the technical formal rationality. But technical rules alone are not sufficient to achieve the purposes of an organization. According to Albrow, the term efficiency was foreign to Weber and it simply did not have a place in his theory of bureaucracy. He argues that also the idea of value-rationality is more than comprising efficiency, because it involves a series of ends and means.46
Albrow suggests that formal rationality is connected to efficiency by means that both relate to calculability.47 He affirms that correct calculation, whether numerical or logical, is at
the heart of Weber’s idea of formal rationality. Also, efficiency is commonly measured through the calculation of costs, time or energy, and these calculations determine what level of efficiency has been reached. However, for formal rationality, calculability is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the attainment of goals.
Other theorists, specifically sociologists and economists, have less issue with connecting bureaucracy with efficiency. Peter Blau defines bureaucracy in his work Bureaucracy in Modern Society as “organization that maximizes efficiency in administration”48. Sociologists Francis and Stone state that “the term bureaucracy refers to that
mode of organizing which is peculiarly well adapted to maintaining stability and efficiency in organizations that are large and complex”. Bureaucracy as form of government might as well include efficiency as a goal, that is to achieve other aims in a manner that minimizes energy,
44 Eugene Kamenka and Martin Krygier , Bureaucracy : The Career of a Concept. London : Edward Arnold
(1979), p. 18
45 Albrow, Martin. Bureaucracy. Macmillan London (1970), p.64 46 Ibid. p.65
47 Ibid. p.65 48 Ibid. p.65
time and money spend. Of course efficiency in itself cannot be the only goal of a bureaucratic organization, since it encloses the achievement of the purpose or aims of that organization. Therefore, bureaucracy as a form of government can include efficiency as a value or working mode, but not as the central aim of government. In that sense it is different from rationality.
2.3 Legalism
In line with the 19th century mechanical analogies for administration in government, a profound
legislative framework was set up in various European countries. Legislation was treated as one of the most important means of implementing administrative reforms and institutions were assessed on the basis of criteria traditionally applied to bodies of law.49 The legal-rational
model required simplicity, clarity and order. There were rules that specified how functions were to be performed and there was recorded inspection and reporting as an instrument of control.
In Weber the rational-legal authority is one form of authority, existing next to other organizational forms such as ‘charismatic authority’ and ‘traditional authority’. Bureaucracy however, relies on rational-legal authority. This authority is based on that ‘a person giving order was acting in accordance with his duties as stipulated in code of legal rules and regulations.50 According to Weber, there were other beliefs on which the rational-legal
authority depended. The first is that the legal code can be established and can claim obedience from the members of a society/organization. Next to that, the law is a system of abstract rules which are applied to particular cases. The administration looks after the interests of the society/the organization within that law. It is also important the one exercising authority obeys the impersonal order of the system. Fourth, the member of the society/organization obeys the law qua member. And last, obedience is due to the impersonal order which has granted the functionary authority and not due to the person himself. 51 These beliefs on which the
legal-rational authority rests are not surprisingly partially similar to the characteristic of a bureaucracy. A bureaucratic administration can thus further strengthen the belief in legal-rational authority of the government.
49 Eugene Kamenka and Martin Krygier , Bureaucracy : The Career of a Concept. London : Edward Arnold
(1979), p. 19
50 Albrow, Martin. Bureaucracy. Macmillan London (1970), p. 40 51 Ibid. p.43
The emphasis on legalism in bureaucracy as form of government is also connected to the transition of Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft Tönnies has described and Weber has been influenced by. In law, there was a movement from status to contract, and in the bureaucratic-administrative paradigm described by Weber there is a movement from private law to public administration, creating ever-increasingly specialized regulations and bodies of law. Kamenka et al. argue that although laws and regulations have always played a role in societies, “it is their relative weight, the strength of their claim to centrality or overriding validity, that vary.”52 In
the modern bureaucracy, the laws and regulations play a more and more all-encompassing role, sometimes referred to as the ‘juridification’ of society.
2.4 Neutrality and Trust
Another element of bureaucracy as a form of government is the idea that the administrative organization of society could be politically neutral or a-political. In the 19th century,
revolutionary social theory believed that politics commonly understood would be irrelevant and transcended in the new society. In the post-revolutionary society, there would also be a need for non-political forms of administration.53 This is also strongly connected to analogy of
the mechanical organization. This same idea is present in the fact that officials are appointed and not elected, and the fact that there are elaborate rules on which they act. The official is in this way unable to make a political choice and are to be held accountable to their superiors and not directly to the citizens.54
Since the early modern times, the has been a switch in the way theorists thought about government and administration. Administration used to be seen as a concern for the ruler. Government administration was regarded as a public concern and the purposes which officials served were public purposes which had to be served well.55 Even though the people were
largely still excluded from participation in politics and government, the administration was to be exercised on their behalf. This is also where a relation of trust between ruler and people is stipulated and government came to be seen as a ‘public trust’. According to Kamenka et al. this development is important for the concept of bureaucracy in two ways; first, there is a move
52 Eugene Kamenka and Martin Krygier , Bureaucracy : The Career of a Concept. London : Edward Arnold
(1979), p. 34
53 Ibid. p. 35
54 Albrow, Martin. Bureaucracy. Macmillan London (1970), p. 51
55 Eugene Kamenka and Martin Krygier , Bureaucracy : The Career of a Concept. London : Edward Arnold
from an ‘authority of origins’ to an ‘authority of ends’, and second, the idea of government as trust came increasingly to be put to the service of the welfare, prosperity and happiness of the citizens. This means that governments of states were beginning to be assessed in terms of success in achieving public goals rather than in terms of their genealogical or divine claims, and “this criterion of assessment placed demands on, and turned attention to, the machinery for achieving these goals”.56
Trust however, can also be interpreted in a less optimistic manner. Albrow suggests that bureaucracy in the 18th century was also considered to be administrative techniques which
‘filled the gap left by the lack of trust between rulers and ruled’.57 There was a need for control
of the government by the people, in order to check whether the aforementioned trust was done justice and the public needs were served properly. Bureaucracy in that way succeeded “in extending the principle of subordination, which was basic to its own development, from its own organism to the subject population, to conglomerate them gradually into masses, in which people only counted as numbers, deriving value not from their selves, but from their positions.”58 Also, paradoxically, in modern democracies, the rulers in government are chosen
by the public. However, the official exercising power on behalf of the government is not democratically chosen. The situation of a lack of trust in the democratically chosen government thus puts the control, and thereby the power, into the hands of officials who are appointed and not chosen. This alludes to the observation that the politicians are mistrusted to a greater extent than the rational procedures of the bureaucracy. We will come back to this tension in chapter 6.
2.5 The Liberal Critique
The lack of trust in government might be considered central to what I call the liberal critique of bureaucracy. Both John Stuart Mill and Ludwig von Mises have agitated against bureaucracy as a way of enlarging government interference. However, both Mill and Von Mises, in very different ways, also acknowledge the benefits of a bureaucratic administration. In this paragraph the liberal critique of first Mill and then Von Mises will be discussed.
John Stuart Mill has referred to bureaucracy in his various works on government interference. Interpreters have suggested that Mill was, contrary to his contemporaries, less
56 Ibid. p. 14
57 Albrow, Martin. Bureaucracy. Macmillan London (1970), p.20 58 Ibid. p.20
interested in the differences between England and Europe. He did not see bureaucratization as an indication of continental over-government but as a description of a way of governing.59 He
says in Representative Government (1861): “the work of government has been in the hands of governors by profession; which is the essence and meaning of bureaucracy”. Mill’s criticism of bureaucracy therefore relates to the domain of bureaucracy as form of government.
Mill is principally advocating against over-government and objecting to government interference. Bureaucracy can be dangerous as it has the potential for adding unnecessarily to governmental power. Another danger is that all talent, intelligence and professionalism will be collected within the growing bureaucratic system. People outside the bureaucracy would fail to be “accustomed to transact their own business…Where everything is done through the bureaucracy, nothing to which the bureaucracy is really adverse can be done at all”.60 Mill is
thus criticizing the potentially limiting character of bureaucracy.
Mill states further that “the disease which afflicts bureaucratic governments, and which they usually die of, is routine. They perish by the immutability of their maxims; and, still more, by the universal law that whatever becomes a routine loses its vital principle, and having no longer a mind acting within it, goes on revolving mechanically through the work it is intended to do remains undone”.61 Again, Mill is emphasizing that the bureaucratic government needs
opposition and continuous change or adaption to remain functioning adequately, warning for the effects of an all-powerful (bureaucratic) government.
Bureaucracy can be useful, however, and Mill is not dismissing it in its entirety. As an instrument of government, he thinks the specialization and professionalism can be of great benefit. Bureaucracy in that sense is prerequisite to good government. He suggests “if we would possess permanently a skilful and efficient body of functionaries… if we would not have our bureaucracy degenerate into a pedantocracy, this body must not engross all the occupations which form and cultivate the faculties required for the government of mankind”.62 Mill is thus
making a distinction between when bureaucracy can be useful (as an instrument) and when it might do harm (as form of over-government).63
A central dilemma for Mill is thus to reconcile the need for liberty with the need for skilled government: “to secure as much of the advantages of centralized power and intelligence
59 Eugene Kamenka and Martin Krygier , Bureaucracy : The Career of a Concept. London : Edward Arnold
(1979), p.30
60 Mill, John Stuart. Principles of Political Economy. New York (1885), p. 166
61 Mill, John Stuart. Considerations on Representative Government. London (1861), p. 246 62 Mill, John Stuart. Principles of Political Economy. New York (1885), p. 168
63 Kamenka, Eugene. Krygier, Martin. Et al. , Bureaucracy : The Career of a Concept. London : Edward Arnold
as can be had without turning into governmental channels too great a proportion of the general activity”.64 This dilemma is also present in later liberal thinkers.
Most notably, Ludwig von Mises in 1944 started criticizing bureaucracy in his work Bureaucracy for it being too intrusive in the private sphere in Europe and the US. He continues on the same page with Mill, suggesting that government interference should be limited. Moreover, he illustrates nicely how in his eyes bureaucracy is inherent to government and should be held outside of the sphere of profit-seeking enterprises. He says that “Public administration, the handling of the government apparatus of coercion and compulsion, must necessarily be formalistic and bureaucratic”.65 He emphasizes the link between bureaucracy
and control of public administration that should not ‘slip out of the hand of the top executives and degenerate into the supremacy of subordinate clerks’ and ‘protect the citizen against despotic arbitrariness’.66 Next to that, it is inherent in that case that the official in a bureaucracy
does not want to run too high a risk, and prefers to be double sure. Von Mises connects this to the fact that the performance of the services cannot be checked by monetary profit or loss. Thus, for him, the absence of a market-structure in public administration is causing the need for control and further bureaucratization. Government and bureaucracy are in his eyes thus inherently connected.
Being a liberal, Von Mises pleads for less government interference and opposes to bureaucratization outside government. He says the capitalist market-structure is enough to establish success or failure and lead individuals to make rational choices.67 Government
control, and connected bureaucracy, are therefore not needed. A contrario, one could assume that bureaucracies thus aim to control success and failure and push individuals to make rational choices. His entire work titled Bureaucracy is actually more about opposing ‘the fanatical endeavours to transform the entire apparatus of production and distribution into a mammoth bureau’ and advocating against Leninist/socialist organization of government, than it is about bureaucracy as concept.68
What we can learn from the liberal critique of bureaucracy is, however, that bureaucracy as a form of government has the potential of enlarging government power and interference to the extent that the conduct of citizens is largely limited. Also, government based on ‘routine’ loses its ability to change its purposes or goals, and in a way, becomes all-powerful
64 Mill, John Stuart. Principles of Political Economy. New York (1885), p. 168
65 Von Mises, Ludwig. Bureaucracy. Yale University Press: New Haven. (1944), p. 122 66 Ibid. p. 122
67 Ibid. p. 123 68 Ibid. p. 123
without any room for opposition. However, Von Mises has pointed out that in absence of a market-incentive, government in the public sphere is deemed to be bureaucratic as it needs a way of controlling its officials to act rationally. According to Mill, bureaucracy as an instrument, enhancing professionalism and efficiency, can be beneficial as instrument of government.
2.6 The Need for Control
The bureaucracy as form of government relates to various values that can or ought to be pursued by the government, this includes rationality, for some efficiency, but also predictability of law. These values are based on the overarching idea that the government should rule in the benefit of citizens, since they rule on their behalf. This provides a legitimate claim for control of the government by the citizens, and this is also where public trust connects to bureaucracy. When the public trust is low and citizens fear they are treated unfair and unequal, there will be a greater demand for the characteristics of bureaucracy in government. This includes Weber’s characteristics such as general rules and laws, equal and impersonal treatment, trained expert officials and written documentation in order to enable checks. The demand for rational and ‘neutral’ procedures of bureaucracy will therefore be larger when there is low public trust in a society. Interestingly, it is exactly a lack of trust in government that is central to the liberal critiques of bureaucracy. Government interference should be limited because the government cannot be trusted in arranging society efficiently and effectively. There are no dynamics of profit and loss which make the government function adequately. The market however is automatically more efficient than the bureaucracy and therefore government interference should be as limited as possible.
In the next chapter another perspective on bureaucracy will be discussed, namely that of bureaucracy as instrument of government evolving around the person of the official and including the various criticisms. In many ways, the will be a conceptual overlap between bureaucracy as form of government and bureaucracy as instrument of government. For example, as said before, the rationality of bureaucracy relates to rational acts of individual officials. Also, despite his liberal critique of bureaucracy as form of government, Mill sees benefit in bureaucracy as instrument. The authors discussed in the next chapter however, specifically focus on the official and his functioning within the bureaucracy, including ‘the bureaucratic mentality’. This conceptual distinction will moreover be followed since much
critique of bureaucracy is directed at the official rather than the entire system of governance. In order to understand bureaucracy at the level of government, including the mechanism regarding indiscriminateness and depersonalisation, it is immanent to also understand the workings of bureaucracy at the level of the individual bureaucrat.
3. Bureaucracy as instrument of government: The Bureaucratic Mentality
Everyday discussions on bureaucracy often revolve around the position and person of the ‘bureaucrat’ or official, and their corresponding ‘mentality’. Weber has granted the following characteristics to the official in his conceptualization of bureaucracy. The official exercises a functional (rather than personal) rational pursuit of ‘objective’ purposes, as well as devotion to this.69 He loyal to his function, which he perceives as a duty. The official has, in line with the
characteristic of bureaucracy, fixed responsibilities and is subjected to a strict hierarchy of ranks. He is also highly skilled and has received specialist training. The position of official, including the rank, realizes a specific social esteem or position, including protection of against ‘insults to the office’. This characterisation might be good to keep in mind when discussing criticisms of the official and its ‘bureaucratic mentality’
To being with, in the development of the term bureaucracy in the end of the 18th and
beginning of the 19th century, bureaucracy was seen as rule or arrogation of power by officials.
It was first used in France where Mercier explained in 1789 in Le Tableau de Paris: “Bureaucracy is a word created in our time to designate in a concise and forceful manner the extensive power of mere clerks who in the various bureau of the ministry are able to implement a great many projects which they forge themselves or quite often find in the dust of bureau, or adopt by taste or by whim”. A German dictionary defined bureaucracy in 1813 as “The authority or power which various government departments and their branches arrogate to themselves over fellow citizens.”70 And similarly the earliest English use of the term refers to
“the bureaucratie or office tyranny by which Ireland had been so long governed.”71
There is much attention for the nature and working style of bureaucrats. It is not about the relationship between bureaucrats and civilians, but on what kind of people bureaucrats are and what are typically bureaucratic predispositions. It is also referred to as a group of people or a lifestyle, similar to aristocracy. In France, there is a long history of ridiculing the bureaucrat. Satire like “ Scenes de la vie bureaucratique” by Henry Monnier in 1835, depict the bureaucrat as not productive and Balzac insinuated that bureaucrats were mediocre and meddlesome.72 In Germany however, the critique was directed more at the subjective position
of the bureaucrat, criticizing the fact they were book-taught (“living in the printed, not the real
69 Weber, Max. Economy and Society. Edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (1978), p. 979
70 Kamenka, Eugene. Krygier, Martin. Et al. , Bureaucracy : The Career of a Concept. London : Edward Arnold
(1979), p.23
71 Ibid. p. 23 footnote 49 72 Ibid. p.24
world”73) and uninterested in the effects of their work for both the citizen as the state.74 In any
case, bureaucracy in the 19th century was understood as either administration by bureaucrats or
power by bureaucrats. And the bureaucratic mentality was criticized for cherishing a range of different vices including self-interested predispositions, laziness, inefficiency, over-conformity and mediocracy.
This criticism of the official with its bureaucratic mentality in literature and journalism echoes in the theoretical approaches and critiques of various authors. In this chapter there will be a successive discussion on the irrationality, mediocracy and bourgeoisie of the ‘bureaucrat’. First there will be a discussion of sociologists, most importantly Robert Merton, on the alleged rationality of the official and the way he will apply regulations. Next there will be a short note on how the liberal critique of bureaucracy, discussed in the previous chapter, can also be directed at the person of the official, with reference to Friedrich Hayek. Lastly, the Marxian critique will be discussed, regarding the official with its bureaucratic mentality as part of the bourgeoisie reaffirming their own position. There will also be a short digression regarding the Soviet bureaucracy under Stalin.
3.1 Irrational Officials
One of the most elaborate criticism of the conceptualisation of bureaucracy as put forward by Weber is directed to the claim of rationality. In his essay ‘Bureaucratic Structure and Personality’(1940), Robert Merton argues that a rational bureaucratic structure can easily bring on consequences that are detrimental for the pursue of an organization’s objectives.75 He
suggests that emphasis on precision and reliability in administration, might lead to a situation in which rules, in principle means to ends, will become ends in themselves. The office hierarchy and correspondent status might encourage the official to over-emphasise the office-virtues that he is supposed to embody, such as prudence, discipline and method.76 Also, there
is a considerable chance that the officials would develop group solidarity, which could make them oppose necessary change. He suggests officials have therefore a trained incapacity resulting in over-conformity. They rather act in their own interest and not for the benefit of the
73 Die Briefe des Freiherrn vom Stein and der Freiherrn von Gagern, 1813-1831 (Stutgart, 1833), pp. 90-92 74 Kamenka, Eugene. Krygier, Martin. Et al. , Bureaucracy : The Career of a Concept. London : Edward Arnold
(1979), p. 24
75 Merton, Robert K. “Bureaucratic Structure and Personality”. Social Forces, Vol. 18, No. 4 (May, 1940), p.
563
entire organization or society. Officials are social rather than rational beings.77 The structure
of a bureaucratic government might be theoretically rational, the practical application will involve irrational officials resulting in an irrational bureaucracy.
This critique does not stand alone, since already in 1928 a German jurist, Rudolf Smend, argued that Weber was wrongfully suggesting that administration could be a rational machine and that officials could be considered technical functionaries. He said: “'The judge and the administrative official are not etres inanimés. They are cultured (geistig), social beings, whose activity has a function within a cultural whole. It is defined by that whole, is oriented towards it, and in return helps to define the nature of that whole”.78 There is, thus a cultural
limitation to the rationality of a bureaucracy. The officials themselves, do not always act as rational as is expected from them within the bureaucratic system. Also, this alludes to the idea that a bureaucracy should be seen as part of a cultural and societal system that exercises power over any individual, including officials. Bureaucracy as a system of power will however be discussed in the next chapter.
Next to the irrationality of the official, Merton identifies another important issue concerning the position of the official in the bureaucratic organization. On the one hand, the official should have a formal rather than personal treatment of clients and avoid the suggestion of abuse of power. He says, “Conflict within the bureaucratic arises…when personalized relationships are substituted for the structurally required impersonal relationships”.79 However,
the dilemma arises because too great a compliance with statutes and rules are denounced as being overly bureaucratic. “Thus, with respect to the relations between officials and clientele, one [other] structural source of conflict is the pressure for formal and impersonal treatment when individual, personalized consideration is desired by the client.” There seems to be no escape from this dilemma, making the objections to the bureaucratic mentality inherent to the position of the official.
Moreover, in 1949 Reinhard Bendix argues in his “Higher Civil Servants in American Society” that the adherence to rules is impossible without the intrusion of general social and political values. In applying general rules to particular case, there is always a need for the judgement of the official.80 Also, there is a need to find a balance in the aforementioned
dilemma. Therefore, Weber’s indirect suggestion that officials can elude all responsibility for
77 Merton, Robert K. Social Theory and Social Structure. Glencoe, IL;Free Press. (1957). pp. 195–206. 78 Albrow, Martin. Bureaucracy. Macmillan London (1970), p.57
79 Merton, Robert K. “Bureaucratic Structure and Personality”. Social Forces, Vol. 18, No. 4 (May, 1940),
p.567
their actions since they act either out of technical necessity or in accord with instructions, is highly criticized. This implies that judgement can never be made objectively, based on rational calculability, but that there needs to be a weighing of values and norms in specific and concrete situations. In Weberian terms; that all rational acts in a bureaucracy are value-rational.
3.2 Mediocre Officials
Friedrich Hayek, a liberal economic thinker most known for the idea that there can be undesigned and unpredictable order, has also criticized bureaucracy. He relies heavily on the criticism of Von Mises, but directs this at the position and role of the official in a bureaucracy, or in his words a worker in ‘military organization’ (as opposed to a commercial organization).81
Hayek also emphasis the fact that in markets, people learn from mistakes since they directly experience the consequences. Due to the inevitability of mistakes, he denies that efficiency can ever be at its theoretical peak but people can approach it closely by relying on their self-adjusting capabilities. In bureaucracies however, functionaries are not directed towards avoiding mistakes, but avoiding budget cuts or disciplinary measures.82 If an official, or
worker in a planned economy, notices that his approach is failing, he will not divert his resources to better purposes as is done in a market-situation. Rather, the hierarchically higher official will cut his budget. “A mistake he ‘ought’ to have avoided is not his own affair, it’s a crime against the community and must be treated as such”.83 According to Hayek,
“bureaucratic structure makes new information a threat that needs suppressing”.84
The officials therefore, will only act in their own interest and are not in the position to improve themselves or their working procedures. This will create, contrary to what Weber suggested, a bureaucracy existing of mediocre procedures that will not be in the interest of the client or the organization (or state) as a whole. Also, this demonstrates that within the line of liberal critique of bureaucracy there is divergence; while Mill praised the professionalism and efficiency of bureaucracy as form of government, Hayek emphasises that the system of bureaucracy makes it impossible for the officials to ever attain that level of professionalism and efficiency. Elaborating on Von Mises, bureaucracy might be inevitably be the form of
81 Hayek, Friedrich. The Road to Serfdom, Chicago: University of Chicago Press (1944), p .132 82 Ibid. p.131
83 Ibid. p.130
84 Schmidtz, David, "Friedrich Hayek", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2017 Edition),
