MASTER THESIS
POLITICAL SCIENCE
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
THE AUTONOMY OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL
ORGANISATIONS IN POLITICALLY SALIENT
CIRCUMSTANCES
A CASE STUDY OF THE OPCW IN SYRIA
Name: Björn Brusse
Student Number: 0417351
Supervisor: Dr. Julia Fleischer
3
Table of Contents
Chapter 1 - Introduction ... 4
Chapter 2 - Theory: conceptualising autonomy from a PA
perspective ... 7
2.1 A preference for delegation? ... 9
2.2 Complicating delegation ... 10
2.3 The costs of delegation ... 12
2.4 Outcome: IGO autonomy in world affairs ... 14
Chapter 3 - Research design & methods: analysing autonomy ... 14
3.1 Research design: qualitative case study and the PA approach ... 15
3.2 Methods: structuring data collection ... 17
Chapter 4 - Empirical analysis: the autonomy of the OPCW ... 19
4.1 A history of the establishment of the OPCW ... 20
4.2 Benefits of delegating tasks to the OPCW ... 24
4.3 The shape of the organisation ... 27
4.4 Cooperation between the UN and the OPCW ... 33
4.5 OPCW autonomy in routine circumstances ... 34
4.6 The Syria case: why states delegated tasks to the OPCW ... 36
4.7 IGO autonomy in politically salient circumstances ... 42
Chapter 5 - Conclusion ... 44
4
Chapter 1 - Introduction
Political science, and most specifically the study of International Relations, has taken a step forward in the 21st century when it comes to assessing the role of international organisations (IOs) in world politics. One of the central questions that has been posed is why states decide to delegate authority to IOs, allowing them to fulfil tasks on the behalf of those states, with a certain degree of autonomy (Abbott & Snidal, 1998; Koremenos et al., 2001; Nielson & Tierney, 2003; Hawkins et al., 2006; Brown, 2010). The aim of the current text is to gain insight in why and how states delegate authority to an intergovernmental organisation (IGO) within politically salient circumstances, paying specific attention to the autonomy that states grant the IGO. This will be attempted via a study of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), with regard to the organisation’s tasks in the elimination of chemical weapons of Syria.
The OPCW is a treaty-implementing IGO that was created to fulfil the tasks set out in the provisions of the CWC1. Adherence to the convention’s obligations must lead to the global elimination of chemical weapons and contribute to cooperation in the field of peaceful use of chemistry. At this point in time the OPCW’s most visible actions indeed involve the abovementioned endeavors with regard to the removal, destruction and complete elimination of the chemical weapons capabilities of Syria. The current mission, conducted in cooperation with the United Nations (UN), has been in existence since October 2013.
An early objection to the alleged use of chemical weapons in Syria was on 20 August, 2012, when US president Barack Obama held his ‘red line’ speech, in which he argued that movement or use of chemical weapons in Syria would lead to consequences for those responsible (NBC News, 2012). When there again were mentions of alleged use of these weapons on 21 August, 2013, the situation became complex. Especially after Secretary of State John Kerry on 9 September, 2013, proposed that to avert a strike ‘[Assad] could turn over […] his chemical weapons to the international community in the next week […] and allow a full and total accounting for that […]’ (Kerry, 2013). After these events a US-Russia joint framework was established in September 2013, which led to the ongoing mission to oversee and verify the destruction of the chemical weapons program of Syria. The OPCW was delegated authority to fulfil this task, in cooperation with the UN. This mission followed up
1 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and
5
on a previous mission undertaken by the UN in cooperation with the OPCW and World Health Organisation (WHO), which was established by the UN Secretary- General in March 2013, following the so-called Secretary- General mechanism (UNGA, 1987).
The events hitherto put forward an interesting puzzle. The Syria crisis became an issue of political sensitivity, as major powers argued about the steps to be taken with regard to the civil war and towards the Assad regime. At the same time, amidst this ‘high politics’
environment, an IGO is delegated authority to fulfil a task within a complex of preferences and uncertainty. Why do states grant authority to an IGO in such sensitive circumstances? Closely linked to this question, and of specific interest for the current study, is the question how much autonomy an IGO receives in a policy area that relates to security issues. Simply put, the question I intend to answer is how the degree of autonomy of the OPCW can be explained, as it fulfils the tasks that states have delegated to the organisation with regard to the elimination of chemical weapons capabilities of Syria. In order to answer this question, I will first analyse delegation in routine circumstances. I will subsequently analyse the delegation of tasks in the Syria case. Delegation in both circumstances is then compared, making it possible to explain the degree of autonomy of the OPCW in the latter case, which I conceptualiseas an instance of re-delegation in politically sensitive
circumstances.
Comparing these instances of delegation thus contributes to an understanding of state considerations when delegating tasks in the area of security politics. This may then assist in a better understanding of the role of IGOs in world affairs. Methodological considerations, on which I will elaborate in the applicable chapter, lead me to focus on the principal side of the equation, thus paying more attention to the considerations of states than on the actual behaviour of the organisation.
Answering the question takes place by focusing on variation in independent variables extracted from the Principal Agent approach, which has already been applied to studies of delegation to IOs and IGOs (Hawkins et al., 2006; Vaubel, 2006; Grigorescu, 2010: 872). The approach argues that rational considerations of a delegating actor (the principal) affect the degree of autonomy of the actor to whom a task is delegated (the agent). The measures to control the agent’s behaviour also affect this autonomy. If an agent for example has stringent reporting duties, its autonomy is smaller than when these obligations would not exist. In this study, states party to the CWC are considered the principals, while the OPCW is seen as the agent. The sub-questions that guide my research are as follows, and are based on the independent variables proposed by the PA approach: What are the benefits when
6
delegating tasks to an IGO? How do states cope with preference heterogeneity and power? How do they weigh the costs of probable undesired agency behaviour and the costs of installing mechanism of control? Taking into account these variables, leads to an establishment of autonomy.
These sub-questions will be answered by concentrating on the two abovementioned instances of delegation. Firstly, I will look at the history of the prohibition of chemical weapons and the negotiations that led to the establishment of the OPCW. Attention will be given to the autonomy of the different bodies of the organisation. Special emphasis is placed on the degree of autonomy of the Technical Secretariat of the organisation when it comes to verification and inspection of compliance. Secondly, I will analyse the delegation of tasks to the OPCW in the Syria case. The puzzle and research question point to the expectation that in politically salient circumstances re-delegation takes place, affecting the degree of autonomy of an agent, since states reweigh the costs and benefits of delegation, and must cope with the multitude of preferences and distribution of power.
As will be made clear in the empirical analysis, certain provisions of the CWC are altered in order to cope with the specific circumstances of the Syrian civil war whilst others are upheld. The research findings point out that states anticipate a need for more stringent reporting and monitoring mechanisms when the political relevance of an issue becomes larger. Furthermore, there are some empirical findings that point to the importance of the relationship between the UN and other IGOs, which is of interest (Trapp, 2014: 23). Especially this last finding is of importance to the study of delegation, as it poses further questions regarding how the relationship between IGOs must be assessed on a theoretical level.
This research intends to contribute to existing literature that assesses the role of IGOs in world politics. This study can give more insight into the delegation of authority and the degree of autonomy of an IGO in politically salient circumstances. With regard to the workings of the OPCW, this study may also be of interest. There are for example studies focusing on the implications of the CWC for international law (Dunworth, 2008; Fry, 2010; Trapp, 2014). This thesis differs from studies of law, as it pays specific attention to the rational considerations of states when delegating authority. However, it must be taken into account that this study focuses on what might be considered a highly idiosyncratic case, which may pose problems to the generalizability of the findings to other cases.
Apart from the scientific dimension of this study, it may also contribute to the
7
interest? The developments in Syria may contribute to understandings the relevance and political importance of IGOs in this field.
The buildup of this thesis is as follows. Firstly, I will present the argument of the PA approach. I will focus on the variables that it hands me in conducting my research. Secondly, the employed research design and methods are presented. The most important sources I use are documents: official documents as well as secondary literature. I triangulate the findings from the document analyses with findings from an interview with a state representative to the OPCW. The empirical analysis is then outlined. I summarise my findings in a conclusion.
Chapter 2 - Theory: conceptualising autonomy from a PA perspective
The purpose of this chapter is to present an analytical framework in order to analyse the autonomy of the OPCW. The framework is built upon the Principal Agent (PA) approach. This approach has traditionally been applied to analyse delegation by US Congress, but has been lifted over national borders in recent years, and into the global arena (Pollack, 2002: 200). The approach conceptualises the relationship that emerges when an actor (or a group of actors), based on rational considerations, decides to delegate authority to another actor. Within the framework the delegating actor is called the principal, while the other actor involved is identified as the agent. Importantly, an outcome of (re-)delegation is a degree of autonomy for the agent (Hawkins et al., 2006: 8, 12).
The merit of the PA approach is that it allows the researcher to systematically assess the weighing of costs and benefits prior to initial delegation, and analyse why and how re-delegation takes place. In this chapter I will assess which variables are in play when states consider delegating tasks to IGOs in the first place, and establish how subsequent variation in relevant variables affect re-delegation, and thus, the autonomy of the IGO. It is of analytical importance to take into account that within an IGO a chain of delegation exist. This means that the decision-making body or bodies of the organisation function as the principals of the administrative/technical organs. I will assess that this chain of delegation may in fact be affected by re-delegation.
Before I present the application of the PA approach in the international realm, I will elaborate on its basic assumptions in the abstract. Firstly, the PA approach assumes that delegating actors are rational, and will attempt to pursue their preferences taking into account the costs and benefits involved. This means that the actor who wants to have a task fulfilled or
8
seeks to reach a certain goal must calculate if the gains of doing the task by itself are higher than when it would choose to delegate the task to some other actor. If the latter option would yield higher gains, the abovementioned relationship comes into being (Kiewiet & McCubbins, 1991: 2; Bergman et al., 2000: 257; Hawkins et al., 2006: 7). There exists a multitude of benefits, but costs may emerge from several sources as well. If the benefits grow, then the threshold of acceptable costs will be higher as well. Similarly, when the benefits of delegation become smaller, the acceptable costs will also be lower. If this is the case, then the probability of delegation is smaller, in favor of other ways to reach a certain goal (Hawkins et al., 2006: 13).
Secondly, and of importance for the weighing of the costs and benefits by the
delegating actor, the potential agents are also rational actors, who attempt to follow their own preferences (Pollack, 2002: 209). The rationality of the agent then leads to what in the PA approach is called agency losses, incurred by the principal (Hawkins et al., 2006: 9). These losses emerge because the agent may deviate from the goals of the delegating actor. In order to curb the agent’s tendency to stray from the aims of the principal, the latter must establish costly mechanisms of control. The costs of these mechanisms must not outweigh the benefits, or contradict these benefits. Apart from the benefits and costs as independent variables affecting delegation, the PA approach also proposes other variables that affect the likelihood and outcome of delegation. These factors include preference heterogeneity and the
distribution of power among states (Hawkins et al., 2006: 13).
The abovementioned variables affect agent autonomy, the dependent variable of focus of my study. Relying heavily on prior work by Hawkins et al. (2006), the definition of
autonomy I employ is as follows: ‘Autonomy is the range of potential independent action available to an agent after the principal has established mechanisms of control […]’ (Hawkins et al., 2006: 8). This does not mean that autonomy is identical to undesired, or ‘slacking’, behaviour, although autonomy indeed gives the agent space to pursue such actions. Closely linked to autonomy is the concept ‘discretion’. Again following Hawkins et al., discretion is the establishment of the goal of the principal which the agent should pursue, without
specifying the means the agent should employ to reach that goal. While autonomy is an inevitable outcome of delegation, discretion is a deliberately and purposefully incorporated aspect of the contract between the principal and agent (Hawkins et al., ibid).
In order to produce an analytical framework, with which can be attempted to analyse the autonomy of the OPCW, I will now systematically lay out the variables that the PA-approach hands the researcher interested in delegation and IGO autonomy in world affairs. I
9
will elaborate on the benefits of delegation first, followed by the importance of preference heterogeneity and power distribution among states as well as other complicating factors, and finally point out the costs involved with delegation.
2.1 A preference for delegation?
The benefits of delegation are manifold. The literature emphasises the need for specialisation, because in a complex world it can be beneficial for states to create an IGO, or delegate tasks to an existing IGO in order to reap the benefits of that organisation’s specialised abilities regarding a certain policy area (Pollack, 2002: 207; Hawkins et al., 2006: 13-14). This means that efficiency also could be enhanced (Brown, 2010: 142). Providing highly technical or otherwise specialist information is an important aspect of specialisation (Pollack, 2002: 208). To give an example from domestic politics: a legislative actor, for example, cannot know all aspects of the areas for which it is entitled to devise laws. Neither can it fulfil all tasks that are inherent to making sure the laws it has enacted are indeed being followed. Classic studies of US congress’ delegating behaviour give examples of this notion (McCubbins & Schwartz, 1984: 169; Epstein & O’Halloran, 1999: 7). Logically, the benefits of specialisation are enhanced when the desired tasks are to be done for a prolonged period of time (Hawkins et al., 2006: 14). Similarly, another actor can have more legitimacy than states acting in a certain policy area. Also, the prospects of political costs of doing a task may evoke the need to
delegate (Epstein & O’Halloran, 1999: 4).
Delegation can also be preferred in order to avert suboptimal outcomes. Streamlining policies in order to avert undesired outcomes via a coordinating agent is one example. States also delegate authority to a collaboration improving agent, in order to curb the tendency to submit to individually preferred actions, which would lead to suboptimal outcomes. In such areas, an IGO may be provided with resources and authority to fulfil a task itself, or states may implement certain internationally agreed upon policies nationally, after which the agent is granted authority to supervise behaviour and collect and disperse information on state compliance (Hawkins, 2006: 15-16).
Connected to the benefits of averting suboptimal outcomes, and especially regarding collaboration, is the demand for credible policy commitment (McCubbins & Schwartz, 1984: 169; Pollack, 2002: 207; Hawkins et al., 2006: 18-19). The rationale behind this is that states want to delegate certain tasks to an agent that will hold on to more extreme preferences than the principals, which will prohibit the principals from adhering to short term (electoral)
10
demands (Pollack, 2002: 208). The pursuit of long term goals will thus be accounted for. Such agents will have high levels of discretion, and changing the contract’s terms should also be made difficult or otherwise costly, in order to keep credibility upheld (Hawkins et al., 2006: 19).
When states would like to promote collective decision making, they might delegate tasks to an agenda setting agent. The aim is to avert a continuous cycling of policies, and make sure progress is made possible by steering the members of the organisation in the most preferred direction (Hawkins et al., 2006: 17).
The need for dispute resolution by an arbitrating agent with high autonomy could also be beneficial to principals (Hawkins et al., 2006: 17). This notion is again coupled to
uncertainty about the world around us, and the impossibility of knowledge about future situations that may arise in a relationship between states. For this reason states will decide to delegate authority to an agent that may interpret rules and their applicability in future
disputes, which substance cannot be anticipated entirely a priori.
The last benefit of delegation I mention here is the desire of states to lock-in certain mechanisms that make sure the persistence of a certain degree of power. This can be done via institutional rules. A group of actors will, by doing this, ensure that their preferences are upheld over a longer period of time. A classic example is the United Nations Security Council (Hawkins et al., 2006: 19-20).
2.2 Complicating delegation
Benefits of delegation in the international realm interact with state preferences and relative state power (Hawkins et al., 2006: 6). In order to explain the degree of autonomy of an IGO, these variables must be taken into account.
Firstly, streamlining of preferences is highly important prior to delegation by a ‘collective principal’. A ‘collective principal’ comes into being when several actors exist within one principal. In world affairs, the collective principal consists of the states who have established a contract with an IGO, for example (Nielson & Tierney, 2003: 247; Hawkins et al., 2006: 20). The establishment of common policy and commitment should lead to shared expectations within the collective principal. Nielson and Tierney argue that as the amount of actors in a collective principal grows, the more difficult it becomes to coordinate an agent, but that institutional rules should be used to cope with this problem (Nielson & Tierney, 2003: 24).
11
Secondly, states want their ‘real’ power to be reflected within the contract with the IGO. The reflection of the power distribution in world affairs is often operationalised in the form of the decision making rules within the applicable institution. More powerful states will most likely demand a degree of prevalence when it comes to decision making influence, in order to be willing to delegate. If this demand is not met, these more powerful states will have an ‘outside option’ which may be more rational to them than delegating authority to an IGO (Nielson & Tierney, 2003: 249; Haftel & Thompson, 2006: 258; Engström, 2011: 214). Interestingly, it could then be expected that post-hoc veto power correlates with ex ante discretion granted to an agent (Pollack, 2002: 213). Similarly, when a policy area matters for relatively weaker states, they will prefer delegation to an international organisation, as without it they would have less influence on world affairs (Hawkins et al., 2006: 22; Elsig, 2011: 505). At the same time, when powerful states have structured an IGO to suit their needs, it is important that they do not make adherence unattractive to others, whose participation is of interest to these more powerful states (Abbott & Snidal, 1998: 8).
When preference heterogeneity and differences of power within the collective
principal are large or grow, and are not mitigated by decision making rules, the likelihood of delegation becomes lower (Hawkins et al., 2006: 23). Specifically, when the actions of an IGO become more important for powerful individual member states, the willingness to
delegate tasks to an IGO may be affected (Hawkins et al., 2006: 14). The amount of discretion of an agent and mechanisms of control installed may thus vary per issue area, and per
importance of the tasks for (individual) member states (Epstein & O’Halloran, 1999: 5; Pollack, 2002: 209; Reinalda & Verbeek, 2011: 88). Again, when there is a need for institutional change, but the organisational rules require consensus or if veto rights are incorporated in the decision making structure, the possibility to alter a contract is also more difficult.
Apart from the existence of collective principals within which preferences and power may diverge, there are other factors that complicate the act of delegation in world politics. Nielson and Tierney argue that it is possible that an agent has multiple principals, meaning that the agent has separate contracts with distinct principals, who do not need each other’s consent to alter their respective contracts with the agent (Nielson & Tierney, 2003: 247). This means that an agent can receive different impulses from different principals, affecting their autonomy.
Another factor complicating delegation is the so-called chain of delegation. This chain emerges when a principal has an agent, which in turn is the principal of another agent, and so
12
forth (Bergman, 2000: 257; Nielson & Tierney, 2003: 250; Vaubel, 2006: 126). The logic of costs and benefits as it has been laid out above, is applicable to every level of the chain of delegation (Pollack, 2002: 215). Every principal faces the same problems, and every agent has its own preferences that it will try to pursue in face of the constraints imposed to him. In the OPCW, and other IGOs as well, there are several bodies which all have their respective tasks and obligations. Often there are decision making bodies consisting of representatives of the member states of the organisation, and technical departments, or secretariats, consisting of international civil servants that fulfil administrative or technical tasks. It is important to lay bare this chain of delegation, as the autonomy of each body contributes to the understanding of the IGO’s autonomy as a whole.
2.3 The costs of delegation
Another group of variables of importance for assessing agent autonomy, are the costs associated with delegation. These costs for the principal are a result of agency problems, the tendency of an agent to pursue its own preferences and the mechanisms of control that the principals can install to cope with these. Since the preferences of the principal and the agent are almost never entirely similar, this may lead to an agent furthering its own goals, thereby displaying behaviour undesired by the principal (Kiewiet & McCubbins, 1991: 5; Epstein & O’Halloran, 1999: 8; Hawkins et al., 2006: 24; Reinalda & Verbeek, 2011: 100).
At the same time, a PA relationship will involve information asymmetry. The delegation of authority to another actor implicates that an agent may selectively collect and report information (Brown, 2010: 143), leading to the agent having more information than the principal regarding the area the agent is fulfilling the task in, and regarding the action that the agent itself is undertaking (Kiewiet & McCubbins, 1991: 25). The problem is larger in areas where specialisation is one of the most important factors of delegation. This may result in agency slack: either reducing effort (shirk) or straying from the principals preferences and undertaking action in support of its own preferences (slippage) (Hawkins et al., 2006: 8). The probability of this behaviour is a counterweight to the benefits of delegation.
There is a solution to the problem set out above, in the form of mechanisms of control. They are installed to constrain the behaviour of the agent and make sure that the agent will perform in line with principal preferences as much as possible (Epstein & O’Halloran, 1999: 9- 10; Hawkins et al., 2006: 23). The room for manoeuvre of the agent is constrained by these mechanisms, affecting its autonomy. Inevitably, installing these mechanisms is costly in itself,
13
and will require an amount of time and resources from the principal’s side in order to verify that the mechanisms of control indeed function properly. The mechanisms of control must not contradict the initial benefits of delegation. This would occur when the aim of delegation would be to enhance credibility, while the chosen mechanisms of control curb the freedom needed to fulfil this very task (Hawkins et al., 2006: 30). A distinction is made between ex ante and ex post mechanisms of control.
Ex ante mechanisms of control are the formal contract design and the selection and screening of agents. The contract design can either be heavily rule based, or allow for a grand amount of discretion. Rule based designs are explicit on not only what goals the agent should attain, but also how the agent is allowed to reach that goal. More discretion is expected in areas of high uncertainty (Hawkins et al., 2006: 27). The second ex ante mechanism is screening and selection. The aim is to select agents that reflect the preferences of the principals as closely as possible. This may take place on the institutional level and on the individual level. As creating IGOs can be costly, a choice from a pool of existing IGOs may be preferable, although this may again incorporate problems of preference overlap (Hawkins et al., 2006: 28-29).
Ex post mechanisms are provisions for monitoring of the agent and reporting by the agent, and institutional checks and balances (Kiewiet & McCubbins, 1991: 31- 34; Hawkins et al., 2006: 26). Specific attention towards the rational choice of monitoring and reporting has been paid by McCubbins and Schwartz. They argue, in their analysis of US congress behaviour, that congress rationally chooses mechanisms of control designated as fire alarms (decentralised) over police patrol (centralised) mechanisms. Congress will only be called to act when their supporters suffer from agency slack, and congress will then proceed by constraining the agency in question (McCubbins & Schwartz, 1984: 172). Hence, it is rational for congress to prefer fire alarms, thereby decentralizing oversight to third parties, instead of installing mechanisms of control that involve high opportunity costs (McCubbins & Schwartz, 1984: 166).
Institutional checks and balances can be attained via intra-agency checks, or by tasking different agents to fulfil a task with regard to the same policy. In the former circumstance bodies within an agent may check each other’s behaviour, while the principals may also check on issues the agent is dealing with as a whole. In the second circumstance, the expectation is that the opportunity to slack is reduced, as the information regarding real costs and actions will be more clear to the principal (Hawkins et al., 2006: 30).
14
punishing or rewarding the agent as a whole, or individual staff members within the agent for exhibiting undesired behaviour (Hawkins et al., 2006: 30).
2.4 Outcome: IGO autonomy in world affairs
The assumptions laid out above have led scholars to underscore that ‘runaway agents’ are acting in ways that further their own goals, instead of abiding to the preferences of the principal(s). With regard to the international realm, there is critique towards the behaviour of the bureaucracies of EU bodies, and economic and financial organisations (Vaubel, 1996: 195; Vaubel, 2006: 134). At the same time, many scholars have argued that this mass deviant behaviour is greatly exaggerated (Pollack, 2002: 201; Nielson & Tierney, 2003: 246; Elsig, 2011: 496). I follow these studies, arguing that the space within which an agent can move, the agent’s autonomy, is instead greatly shaped by the complex of grants of authority, state
preferences and power, and the mechanisms of control that the principal can install. This latter argument leads my investigation of the OPCW.
Focusing on the rationale of states leads me to look for instances which affect the autonomy of the OPCW. This means that I will first look at initial delegation to the OPCW, establishing how states weighed the costs and benefits of delegation, and how they cope with preferences and power. Subsequently, I will look at how these considerations affect the autonomy of the OPCW in the Syria case. I conceptualise this as an instance of re-delegation in politically salient circumstances. I expect that states reweigh the costs and benefits of delegating tasks to an IGO in these circumstances, and cope with preferences and power involved. This will lead to some change in the degree of autonomy of the organisation as a whole, and its bodies existing as a chain of delegation.
Chapter 3 - Research design & methods: analysing autonomy
In this part of the text I will lay out which research design I use, and how I will gather data, analyse the data and how I will enhance the validity of my research. The purpose is to connect the research question, theoretical considerations and the collection and handling of data (King et al., 1994: 13). This chapter is built up as follows: firstly, I will justify my choice for a case study research design. I will present the merits and problems of this design, how it helps me to answer my research question, and how it may be linked to other studies. Secondly, I will connect the research design to the choice of theory, and lay out some methodological
15
difficulties inherent to the study of delegation. Finally, I will present how I selected the sources of the data I used to answer the research question.
3.1 Research design: qualitative case study and the PA approach
In some of the literature discussing research designs, the case study is held in low esteem. The argument is that the case study is the least powerful design when it comes to testing theories, and estimating the strength of causal influence (Van Evera, 1997: 50). Stronger designs in this regard are the experimental method or large-n studies (employing quantitative research
strategies). However, the case studies has certain merits, which make it the preferred research design for answering certain research questions.
Firstly, the case study design helps the researcher in exploring a specific unit. This unit can be any phenomenon, delineated by time and/or space. Case studies are employed for studying grand events, like revolutions and wars, or the functioning of organisations or cities (Gerring, 2004: 342). It allows the researcher to gain insight in the peculiarities of a unit, and thus emphasise aspects other studies leave unaccounted for when employing other research designs.
Secondly, the case study research design is specifically suitable when the aim of research is to answer a question in order to assess how a certain theory works: how does x cause y (Van Evera, 1997: 66; George & Bennett, 2005: 21)? Furthermore, and in relation to this, the case study allows for understanding the complexities of a causal relationship, shedding light on for example which interacting variables are present and influencing the relationship between a designated x and y (George & Bennett, 2005: 22). If the researcher wants to answer such questions, a case study can be particularly valuable.
My research question is one for which a case study design would be preferred in order to be answered satisfactorily, taking into account the abovementioned merits of the case study (Van Evera, 1997: 54). The aim of my research is to establish the autonomy of the OPCW based on rational considerations of states.
As argued before, a case study is a research design that allows one to thoroughly study a single unit. Yet, this directly poses a problem. However historically interesting, delving headfirst into a mountain of data without some guidance will lead to analytical problems. How to find the way? Where to find the relevant data in seemingly endless heaps of potential sources? A researcher will need some structuring.
16
explicitly states which dependent variable is of importance, namely the autonomy of the OPCW. Secondly, the research is guided by the considerations of the theory one intends to use.
Theory helps to focus on important factors in the sources, and thus allows one to look in the right place in order to find data. A theory may be employed to hand the researcher relevant independent variables, which then may be found in the designated sources. King et al. argue that the world around us can be simplified by using a theory for guidance (King et al., 1994: 42). They point out that a theory can be used as a starting point, and that the
researcher should look for observational implications which are suggested by theory (King et al., 1994: 46).
A second problem emerges from the notion that a case studies entails too few
observations which prohibits the findings to be made solid. However, as Gerring argues and Nielson and Tierney pursue, the aim of the researcher should be to look for instances of the independent variable within the unit that is being focused on. In this way the amount of observations is increased (Nielson & Tierney, 2003: 252; Gerring, 2004: 343). This makes the findings, for the unit under scrutiny at least, stronger.
Thirdly, a critique of case study design is that it is difficult to generalise the findings of research conducted using this design (Van Evera, 1997: 53). Although one could argue that generalisation isn’t the primary goal of a case study, there are nevertheless ways to make a case study relevant beyond the unit that is being studied: by making it comparable to existing research, and by contributing to existing research.
The comparability of a case study can be enhanced by employing a ‘common language’, that is, using concepts and operationalisations that have been used in similar studies (Gerring, 2004: 347). This point is underscored by Mark Pollack, who argues that the use of PA concepts as applied to US congress need a higher level of abstraction, in order to be transferred beyond the context of US politics (Pollack, 2002: 216). I intend to use these concepts for assessing delegation relationships, and thereby make possible the comparison of my study to other studies of instances of delegation. As has become clear from the previous chapter, I build upon similar work of Hawkins et al. (2006). Of course, certain aspects of the OPCW as unit of analysis may be idiosyncratic, while others may be generalizable (Gerring, 2004: 345).
The contribution of case studies to other research designs emerges from a multitude of factors. Firstly, it helps by giving description and precision to certain concepts that are used by large-n studies, for example. Quantitative studies compare the causal strength of certain
17
variables, but lack the thoroughness that a case study does provide (King et al., 1994: 44; George & Bennett, 2005: 19). If large-n quantitative studies for example employ a model with many explanatory variables, but leave unaccounted for what these variables exactly entail in ‘real life’, a case study may contribute to understanding the workings of these variables (Haftel & Thompson, 2006: 270).
A second type of contribution is that a case study may be one study in a web of case studies that allow for understanding a greater whole. One could for example study an aspect of World War I, which then connects to other phenomena that are part of that event (King et al., 1994: 36). To put this in the context of my study, by assessing the degree of autonomy of the OPCW, and the rationale behind the delegation by states, we may understand more about the entirety of the Syria crisis.
To conclude, the case study design allows me to ‘know more about less’ (Gerring, 2004: 348). Yet, at the same time using this approach I hope to contribute to a larger group of studies in IGOs, which have applied other research designs, and thus provide the detailed description that is needed to complement large-n studies.
3.2 Methods: structuring data collection
I will now elaborate on how I collect data and how I handle the data in order to answer the research question. The questions I will answer are how the gathering of data is structured at the outset and which sources I intend to use for gathering data. The two methods employed are document analysis and the semi-structured interviewing.
The research question and theoretical framework guide me to look for observations that are implications of the independent variables. To recall, the assumption is that the autonomy of an agent depends upon the rational considerations of a principal, and is
influenced by variables like preference heterogeneity and power distribution. This leads me to look for instances where these variables’ values change. The method thus flows from the research question and theoretical framework (Rudestam & Newton, 2007: 100).
Fundamentally, I will look at the benefits of delegation involved when delegating tasks to the OPCW, and which measures of control were installed to control the organisation. Also instances where the divergence or convergence of preferences of (powerful) states become explicit will be analysed. I will select observations based on these variables. The quest is then to move towards the dependent variable (King et al., 1994: 226). Simply put, one builds from the theoretically informed x and argues forwards to the implied y.
18
Doing a study of delegation behaviour outside US context may be difficult, argues Pollack. He shows that finding relevant data regarding delegation behaviour of US congress is relatively easy, since there is a long tradition of gathering such information. There are many sources available to extract relevant data from (Pollack, 2002: 211). The trouble for a study like the current one, is that data either may be scarce, scattered or even unavailable. Also, when doing document analysis, it is more difficult to make a clear designation of the
‘population’ of which one intends to sample data from (Rudestam & Newton, 2007: 89). The question that remains, is how I selected subjects out of the population. In this case I was obliged to pursue in purposive selection, based on the values of explanatory variables (King et al., 1994: 139).
The direct study of the behaviour of an agent is problematic. Again, I follow the points made by Pollack. He argues that it is problematic to measure agency behaviour directly, because of observational equivalence. Case studies focusing on the dependent variables suffer from this problem, since the actions of an agent may indeed be the result of ‘runaway
behaviour’ or either an anticipation of the preferences of the principal (Pollack, 2002: 203). It is therefore that I want to focus on the independent variables, as this allows for understanding the conditions and mechanisms that have influence on the autonomy of an agent (Pollack, 2002: 201). I will look most notably at benefits, costs and the convergence or divergence of member state preferences, as well as institutional rules. To a large degree I will depend on the formal rules that are set out, which is comparable to the study of Nielson & Tierney of the World Bank (2003: 251).
While selecting sources, I have made use of four criteria put forward by John Scott that should enhance the trustworthiness of the documents selected. He outlines authenticity, credibility, representation and meaning. I will shortly summarise these four criteria. Firstly, authenticity assesses if the documents used are genuine, and aren’t falsified (Scott, 1990: 19). Secondly, credibility prompts one to be aware of deliberate distortions or biases existent in the document (Scott, 1990: 22). Thirdly, representation focusses on if the document is indeed representative for the population of documents that it comes from. Important here is also the question of availability, since certain documents with relevant information may be classified. This could lead to an ‘availability bias’ (Scott, 1990: 24). Finally there is the meaning
criterion, which points to the fact that the context within which the document is produced differs from the context in which it is analysed (Scott, 1990: 28).
Assessing these criteria, I have divided my document research into three categories. The first category holds official documents. I will make use of the documents provided by the
19
OPCW, such as reports of the different bodies, and statements by representatives. Obviously, the CWC itself holds a lot of information regarding many independent variables. In the convention the reporting duties as well as other mechanisms of control are provided, together with the benefits of states when adhering to the convention. Also institutional rules regarding the buildup of the organisation and the decision making rules of the different bodies are laid out in the CWC. Apart from OPCW documents, also UN reports, resolutions and other papers are used.
In order to further enhance the validity of my research I will make use of data triangulation as well (Rudestam & Newton, 2007: 114). This incorporates the use of several sources of data, and to compare these and thus enhance the trustworthiness of each (Guion et al., 2011: 1). However, since the Syria case is an ongoing event it will most likely be difficult to compare the data from these articles to other sources in order to verify the data.
I also use academic literature assessing the workings of the CWC and the OPCW. This allows me to compare the data supplied by the official sources and assess what has been written in these official documents and statements.
Thirdly, and especially with regard to the Syria crisis, I use articles, statements and reports that cover the processes the OPCW is involved in when it comes to the destruction of chemical weapons in that state. Since the work of the OPCW in Syria is ongoing, this has led to documents being released continuously, by the different OPCW bodies as well as by the UN. I have selected documents that are most relevant to the purpose of my study, looking at the variables laid out above.
Furthermore I will make use of methodological triangulation. This entails using different types of methods for gathering data (Guion et al, 2011: 2). The largest part of my study consists of document analysis, but by employing semi-structured interviewing, I use different methods with the aim to strengthen my findings.
Chapter 4 - Empirical analysis: the autonomy of the OPCW
This part of the text constitutes the empirical analysis of the autonomy of the OPCW. Firstly, I will present the initial delegation to the OPCW, taking into account the history of CWC negotiations and the establishment of the OPCW. The organisation’s shape will be outlined as well. After this, I will present an interpretation of the autonomy of the OPCW in routine circumstances. Subsequently, the delegation of tasks to the OPCW in the Syria case are
20
presented. When this is done, both instances of delegation will be compared, resulting in an assessment of the autonomy of the OPCW in Syria.
4.1 A history of the establishment of the OPCW
In January 1993 130 state representatives gathered in Paris to sign the CWC, the treaty that lays the groundwork for banning the use, trade and production of chemical weapons and promotes the peaceful use of chemistry. It entered into force on 29 April 1997. Following article VIII of the treaty, the states parties also established the OPCW, the organisation that should ‘achieve the object and purpose of [the] Convention, [and] ensure the implementation of its provisions’ (CWC, Art. VIII, para. 1). The creation of the OPCW was preceded by tasking a Preparatory Commission and Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS) to fulfil the tasks set out in the so-called Paris Resolution (Kenyon, 2007a: VII; OPCW, 1993).
Before the CWC came into existence, there have been many previous proposals to ban specific weapon types. Early attempts to ban certain classes of weapons can be found in the final years of the 19th century, in which the The Hague Convention of 1899 was concluded to prohibit the use of specific types of weapons. Among other regulations in the context of the laws of war, the use of weaponry that had the purpose to spread poisonous gas was prohibited (The Hague Convention, Art. 23)2.
Despite the existence of the conventions, in 2015 it will be 100 years ago that banned poisonous weaponry was first used, during World War I. The use of this type of weapons in the trenches may be the first instance of the use of chemical weapons in modern history. Poisonous gases fulfilled military-strategic tasks, and became one of the defining -and infamous- aspects of the war of 1914-1918.
Yet again, in the years after the Treaty of Versailles efforts were made to prohibit the use of the abovementioned weapons. This resulted in the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which banned the initial use of biological and chemical weapons against other states, but did not incorporate further restrictions (Geneva Protocol, 1925)3. The radical abandonment of an entire class of weaponry proved to be problematic, as states wanted to keep their right to strike back with equal methods, were they to be attacked by chemical or biological weapons (Robinson, 1998: 21; Kenyon, 2007b: 5).
2 In list of references as Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex:
Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land.
3 In list of references as Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other
21
These very early years of chemical warfare indicate that there is a ratio behind the use of chemical weapons. Industrial developments in the 19th century had contributed to chemical
weapons being able to be used on the battlefield. The development of the weapon type could lead to a tactical advantage (Robinson, 1998: 18). The use of gas in the trenches of World War I was of military strategic importance. The contours of deterrence come to the fore based on the idea that states want to have the ability to strike back with similar weaponry.
Although the attractiveness of chemical weapons waned in World War II, after the development of tanks and more modern types of arms, the Cold War era nevertheless showed a buildup of chemical weapons stockpiles, within and outside of the super power standoff (Kenyon, 2007b: 6). However, the progress in nuclear capabilities did affect the deterrent value of chemical weapons for the more powerful states (Robinson, 1998: 20).
The negotiations regarding the ban on chemical and other classes of weapons have been taking place since the end of World War II as well. The most important negotiations took place within the framework of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament. It developed into the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, Committee on Disarmament and Conference on Disarmament (the latter still being in existence today). Negotiations on a ban on chemical weapons and the procedures to achieve a convention have taken place within the context of these bodies (UNOG, no date).
Between the late 1960s and 1993 several documents, proposals and drafts have been issued. In these years also the first proposals for an international organisation with the authority to verify states’ compliance to the prohibition of chemical weapons came about (Kenyon, 2007c: 32). In 1975 the Biological Weapons Convention entered into force, which banned the development (not the use) of this class of weapons. The BWC did not establish an organisation, although in 2006 a small working group was created to assist states with
implementation (UNODA, no date). Importantly, the BWC did call for further negotiations to achieve a ban on chemical weapons (BWC, Art. IX).
In the 1980s, more developed states concluded that it would be irrational to proceed with chemical weapons. However, the gains of retaining chemical weapons capabilities may have been higher for developing states, for example regarding deterrence (Robinson, 1998: 22). An aim was to establish an agreement where all states would adhere to the same ideas. The CWC negotiations can be explained from a security standpoint, where benefits in terms of military and state security could be reached. The outcomes of the negotiations should lead to a positive answer to the question if the benefits of adhering to the CWC would outweigh the costs (Robinson, 1998: 17).
22
During the negotiations that followed up on the BWC a key point of contention was the issue of verification. The Soviet Union was reluctant to follow up on such a provision, since it posed significant threats to security and economic considerations (Kenyon, 2007b: 9). In 1984 an important milestone was reached when the Conference on Disarmament created the so called Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons which workings should result in a convention (Kenyon, 2007b: 9).
The US and the Soviet Union also proceeded in negotiations in subsequent years. Both states interacted on the matter, and ultimately established an agreement where they would exchange data on their chemical capabilities (Kenyon, 2007b: 10). Before that the US had also issued a draft CWC text, in which verification inspections were incorporated. Apart from merely involving states in the matter, chemical industry was also attracted.
After the use of chemical weapons by Iraq and the fall of the Soviet Union, the proceedings regarding a treaty continued. Chemical weapons were of low utility for Russia and the US (Batsanov, 2006: 341). Verification became less an issue between the former East - West blocs. However, the notion of so-called challenge inspections remained one of
political sensitivity. Also, some states wanted to preserve the right of retaliation in kind (Kenyon, 2007b: 11, 17; Mashhadi, 1992: 28).
In 1992 the draft treaty was forwarded to the UN, its depositary. In 1993 the signing of the CWC was opened, and with it the signing of a separate document: the Resolution
Establishing the Preparatory Commission for the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, or Paris Resolution. This resolution established the Preparatory Commission and PTS, that should do preliminary work in order to successfully create the OPCW and to, among other issues, create the guidelines for coping with the technical questions involved with verifying compliance, and to make sure that the OPCW could be established rapidly and effectively (OPCW, 1993: 2; Gargiulo, 1998: 153, 161; Kenyon, 2007b: 15). The proposal was that the Preparatory Commission and the PTS would be in existence until the first Conference of the States Parties (CSP), the principal decision making body of the OPCW (Dunworth et al., 1998: 184).
The Paris Resolution tasked the Preparatory Commission to create draft procedures and the agenda and budget for the first year of the OPCW, as well as elaborate on staffing procedures and requirements (OPCW, 1993: para. 1). The size and composition of the Technical Secretariat for example was being negotiated and shaped by the Preparatory Commission (Gargiulo, 1998: 160; Kenyon, 2007c: 34). The bodies should also work on other draft agreements and recommendations that were to be submitted to the first CSP for
23
approval (OPCW, 1993: para. 12). Some of these latter tasks were highly technical, as they involved establishing which type of equipment should be approved and what type of security measures should be undertaken during inspections. At the same time, some tasks were prone to be more politically sensitive, as they involved the procedures of inspections, coping with confidential information, and deadlines for states when submitting information (OPCW, 1993: para. 12).
The Preparatory Commission had a large amount of discretion during the negotiations (Kenyon, 2007c: 34). The Preparatory Commission and PTS consulted with each other and prepared documents and reconciled the different views of the participants (Kenyon, 2007c: 57). It was however mandated not to violate the balances struck during the Conference on Disarmament negotiations (Kenyon, 2007c: 37).
In order to reach its goals the Preparatory Commission established two working groups which in turn created expert groups, as it was allowed to do following the Paris Resolution (OPCW, 1993: para. 8(a)). The expert groups were tasked to report to its working group, which in turn was to report to the Preparatory Commission. Working Group A was to delve into administrative and organisational matters, whereas Working Group B was charged to fulfil matters regarding verification, technical issues and assistance (Dunworth et al., 1998: 172).
One of the principles was that each member state was allowed to participate in the working and expert groups (OPCW, 1993: para. 4). This however was a problem, simply because not all member states had enough resources to do so (Dunworth et al., 1998: 174). This lead to a fifty-fifty approach, in which fifty percent of the experts came from the Western European and Eastern European countries, as well as the US, Canada, Australia and New-Zealand and Japan, and the rest from other parts of the world. This was different from the proposed geographical balance, where all parts of the world should have had an equal share in experts. Technical expertise and the need for specialisation preceded over equal
representation (Kenyon, 2000c: 50- 51, 54).
As time was short, the aim was to reach decisions as soon as possible, but issues like coping with challenge inspections remained problematic (Dunworth et al., 1998: 178). Many states tried to use the Preparatory Commission negotiations to assess problems that remained after the Geneva negotiations, and these political issues in fact hampered the quick progress that was hoped to be an aspect of the Preparatory Commission (Dunworth et al., 1998: 183; Kenyon, 2000c: 63). The different representatives had different viewpoints, as many focused on how the CWC could impact as little as possible nationally.
24
As requested via the Paris Resolution, the first CSP session was to approve the decisions and recommendations of the Preparatory Commission (Kelle, 1998: 27). Many of the decisions were approved, while others remained unresolved. It turns out that most issues regarding financial matters and staff regulations were easily approved (OPCW Conference of the States Parties4, 1997: 2-3). The guidelines for inspection were the more intrusive aspect of the CWC, and many of such decisions and recommendations were not approved (Kelle, 1998: 33). These decisions were requested to be resolved during an intersessional period (OPCW CSP, 1997: 16). In this intersessional period so-called facilitators were tasked to resolve the outstanding issues and put them forward in the next Conference (Kelle, 1998: 29).
4.2 Benefits of delegating tasks to the OPCW
The preamble of the CWC outlines the aims of the convention, and stipulates what states seek to attain. Most importantly, there is the need for complete prohibition of the use of chemical weapons. Furthermore, the promotion of peaceful use of chemistry and the cooperation in and promotion of trade and development in the field of chemistry are presented (CWC, Preamble).
The CWC sets out certain mechanisms to ensure that these tasks are fulfilled, and the OPCW is the organisation that is to fulfil these tasks: ‘The States Parties to this Convention hereby establish the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to achieve the object and purpose of this Convention, to ensure the implementation of its provisions,
including those for international verification of compliance with it, and to provide a forum for consultation and cooperation among States Parties’ (CWC, Art. VIII, para. 1). The OPCW must thus achieve certain goals that are impossible for states to attain unilaterally (Batsanov, 2006: 341). By holding on to its extreme preferences, the aim of the OPCW is to make sure that universality is attained, meaning that all states become party to the CWC, resulting in a world-wide ban of chemical weapons (Kelle, 2013: 143). The OPCW is thus tasked to oversee that member states do not establish chemical weapons capabilities, although there may be short term benefits of accumulating a stockpile of such weaponry (Platteborze, 2005: 56; Fry, 2010: 46).
The elaborate monitoring capabilities of the OPCW make sure that it is highly difficult to develop prohibited chemical weapon capabilities (Brown, 2010: 146). The CWC is indeed the first treaty that holds provisions that oversees disarmament (Dunworth, 2008: 121). The
4 In the remainder of the text’s references, OPCW Conference of the States Parties will be abbreviated to
25
broad mandate of the OPCW when it comes to verification and routine inspection in the CWC’s Verification Annex (VA) is supposed to have a restrictive effect as well (Bothe, 1998: 6). The existence of challenge inspections underlines this restriction, since any state that is suspected of non-compliance may be inspected instantly (CWC, Art. IX, para. 8). The challenge inspections allow each state party to request an investigation of suspected non-compliance by another state party, making it one of the most important powers of the OPCW to verify compliance and make sure that states do not violate the treaty’s provisions. These verification mechanisms help to create trust among the states parties (Bothe, 1998: 11). Although the inspection and verification provisions are elaborate and can be qualified as being intrusive, there are many protective clauses as well in the treaty. States may decide which information they do not want to disclose, if they find it not relevant to the inspection (Fry, 2010: 59; Bothe, 1998: 7). The hope is that the verification provisions would lead to preventing the emergence of actual security conflicts (Bothe, 1998: 11).
At the same time, the fear that the intrusiveness of the CWC could impede the economic interests of member states is countered by explicit reference in the CWC that prohibit OPCW undertakings to impede economic interests, technological development or trade (see for example CWC, Art. XI, para. 2 (c)).
The OPCW assists in countering cheating, as it is covering all aspects of chemicals (Brown, 2010: 147). The CWC not only covers material solely suitable for producing
chemical weapons, but all chemistry. It makes it more difficult for states as well as non-state actors to obtain chemical material (Platteborze, 2005: 56). At the same time this makes the tactical deployment of chemical weapons impossible (ibid., 57).
States are all obliged to declare the same data, and the OPCW strives to reach uniformity in the methods of data provision by states parties (CWC, Art. X, para. 4; Fry, 2010: 56). The CWC calls for the establishment of National Authorities, which should enable states to cooperate more easily on matters relevant to the convention. Member states are also obligated to be transparent on their practices regarding protective measures, which the OPCW shall put in an open database (CWC, Art. X, para. 4-5), and on the process of their national implementation. The aim is to allow all states to make use of each other’s expertise (CWC, Art. X, 5; Kelle, 2013: 149). Apart from that states parties are requested to provide a program in which it is explicated how they will contribute to the organisation when it would ask them for assistance (CWC, Art. X, para. 7).
Although the behaviour of the member states with regard to chemistry is constrained, and the operations of the states are prone to be heavily scrutinised, the CWC leaves states
26
parties a lot of freedom when they want to resolve a dispute, or regarding any other topic that may be relevant to the convention. The CWC encourages them to do so in circumstances of for example suspected non-compliance, or on protective assistance (CWC, Art. IX, para. 2; CWC, Art. X; Bothe, 1998: 10). The origins of this may be political, since coming before the Conference may be confrontational. However, multilateralism would improve the credibility of the CWC (Batsanov, 2006: 344).
Although it is hoped of course that the verification and inspection mechanisms prevents the emergence of disputes, the CWC provides member states with the possibility to resolve disputes regarding compliance. The disputes are to be settled following the CWC, or either via the UN (CWC, Art. XIV, para. 1). In practice this means that states may consult bilaterally, or either via the organisation. With mutual consent, and by approval of the UN, the dispute may be proposed to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) as well (CWC, Art. XIV, para. 2). However, the organisation’s Executive Council shall remain informed on the progress of the matter. The CSP and Executive Council may also request the ICJ to give an advisory opinion. (Fry, 2010: 54). With regard to non-compliance, the OPCW may also sanction its members (CWC, Art. XII, para. 3).
The organisation has been very successful, as almost all states are party to the convention. The CWC tasks the OPCW to look beyond the states parties as well, however. The OPCW may actively approach non-states parties and engage with them in order to make them become parties to the convention (Batsanov, 2006: 341; Kenyon, 2007d: 64).
The threat of chemical weapons is different for different member states, however (Robinson, 1998: 18). Therefore it is important that the benefits of cooperation on for example technical development are also upheld. (Kelle, 2013: 158).
A topic of controversy during the third Review Conference (and prior, (Kelle, 2013: 147)) was the selection of facilities to inspect. Many member states want more transparency and understanding regarding the selection of those facilities. The third Review Conference tasked the Technical Secretariat to demonstrate the process of site selection to create more transparency regarding that issue (OPCW CSP, 2013a: para. 9.73).
Also, the somewhat controversial ousting of the first Director-General of the OPCW, may propose that the power of certain member states wins over the adherence to legal rules (Dunworth, 2008: 138; Collins & White, 2011: 12). Dunworth argues that in that case the much coveted independence of the organisation might have been at stake (Dunworth, 2008: 130).
27
are discussions about the future paths of the OPCW. Destruction budgets may be lowered in favor of the inspection of Other Chemical Production Facilities (OCPFs), as had been done in 2012 (Kelle, 2013: 147).
Proposals for the future of the OPCW have been conducted by a panel that worked in 2010 and 2011 on recommendations for the future of the OPCW. This Advisory Panel on Future Priorities of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons has proposed a multitude of factors that have been very influential on the outcomes of the third Review Conference (Interview with representative).
The recommendations of the Advisory Panel range from budgetary allocations, to the need for independence of the OPCW at large. The budget should focus on applications of Article X (Assistance) and Article XI (Development), whereas the independence of the organisation is necessary in order to keep it relevant and credible (OPCW Technical Secretariat, 2011: 27).
4.3 The shape of the organisation
Article VIII of the CWC established the three core bodies of the OPCW: the Conference of the States Parties , the Executive Council and the Technical Secretariat. The Conference and Executive Council are the decision making bodies, whilst the Technical Secretariat is tasked to fulfil administrative and organisational tasks. Most importantly, the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW is also demanded to verify compliance with the treaty via verifications of state declarations and on-site inspections (CWC, Art. VIII, para. 37). As such, the inspections division is part of the this body.
The CWC establishes a clear hierarchy between the three bodies of the organisation. The Conference oversees the Executive Council, which in turn oversees the Technical Secretariat. The CSP consists of all states parties to the convention, in which each state party has a vote. The OPCW functions as an organisation in which mostly ambassadors of the respective member states operate as representatives. They are expected to represent the member states’ preferences as closely as possible, as they further the foreign policy considerations of the states they represent (Brown, 2001: 148). It is therefore important to state that the Conference is tasked to oversee the actions of the Council as well as the
Secretariat, as it gives all states parties the possibility to oversee the tasks of the other organs (CWC Art. VIII, para. 20).
28
international law (CWC, Art. XII, para. 3). The CSP is also mandated to review developments relevant to the CWC. The CSP oversees the compliance with CWC provisions, and must foster cooperation for the peaceful use of chemistry. Also, the CSP must approve
recommendations of the Executive Council regarding extensions of deadlines, when states parties cannot meet the established ones (CWC Verification Annex5, para. 22, 26). The CSP must also take measures to make sure that compliance to the CWC is ensured, and that
situations that conflict with the treaty are redressed. For this, it should use the information the Executive Council provides it (CWC, Art. XII). The CSP is also responsible for the
appointment of the Director- General of the Technical Secretariat, and also elects the Executive Council members.
Decision-making in the CSP with regard to matters of substance should be done by reaching consensus, and voting can be postponed in order to reach said consensus. If after this deferral no consensus is reached, a 2/3 majority is needed. For matters of procedure, a simple majority of those representatives attending suffices (CWC, Art. VIII, para. 18).
Following the CWC, the Executive Council is the executive organ of the OPCW (CWC, Art. VIII, para. 30). The Council holds direct oversight of the Technical Secretariat, and functions as the body that oversees the general functioning of the organisation. The Council is accountable to the CSP, and must forward issues to the CSP when it is unable to reach resolutions on a matter. It must also submit the program and budget for the organisation to the CSP, which has been drafted by the Technical Secretariat prior to that (CWC, Art. VIII, para. 32(a)). The Executive Council shall also conclude agreements with states parties
regarding assistance and protection (CWC, Art. VIII, para. 34(b)).
The Council has very large decision-making powers. Furthermore, it must approve agreements that Technical Secretariat has made with states parties regarding its verification activities, as will be elaborated on below (CWC, Art. VIII, para. 34(c)). This is not done during the inspections, but only generally during reviews of longer periods of the
organisation’s functioning (Interview with representative). The convention does not
necessitate consensus, as 2/3 majorities suffice for matters of substance, and simple majorities for matters of procedure. However, reaching consensus on decisions is something that is typical for the organisation (CWC, Art. VIII, para. 29; Kelle, 2013: 144; Interview with representative).
Not all members of the OPCW are always part of the Executive Council. This is so in
29
order to balance representation and efficacy (De Guttry, 1998: 127). The shape of the 41- member body is based on dimensions that provide certain member states with a higher possibility of being part of this important body (CWC, Art. VIII, para. 23). The relevance of size of domestic chemical industry and the use of the so called UN regional groups have led to an Orwellian situation, where some states ‘are more equal than others’, as the permanent members of the UNSC have a seat in the Executive Council at all times (Fry, 2010: 51; Dunworth, 2008: 138).
The Technical Secretariat performs a multitude of tasks. The CWC establishes that it should draft the budget, and forward it to the Executive Council, which then leaves it to the CSP for assessment (CWC, Art. VIII, para. 38(a)). The overall budget of the OPCW is established based on the UN Scale of Assessment (CWC, Art. VIII, para. 7; De Guttry, 1998: 140). The staff of the Secretariat is only responsible to the other bodies of the OPCW, and may not be instructed by anyone outside of the organisation (CWC, Art. VIII, para. 46). I will now focus on the verification tasks, as it is indeed one of the core tasks of the OPCW and of prime importance for my study. The Verification Annex to the CWC has very elaborate provisions on the tasks and duties of the inspectors regarding verification. There are general provisions for verification (CWC VA, Part II), but it also differentiates between rules for verification of destruction of (old) chemical weapons (CWC VA, Part IV), the destruction and conversion of chemical weapons production facilities (CWPFs) (CWC VA, Part V), inspection of schedule 1, 2 and 3 facilities that produce chemicals for non-prohibited use (CWC VA, Part VI-VIII), and inspection of other chemical production facilities (OCPFs) (CWC VA, Part IX). Also the rules for challenge inspections (CWC VA, Part X) and investigation of alleged use (CWC VA, Part XI) are presented in this Annex.
In order to verify compliance, the OPCW’s Technical Secretariat is continuously performing routine inspections. Here the need for prolonged execution of a delegated task comes to the fore, and it is argued that the OPCW’s continued efforts are part of its success (Batsanov, 2006: 341). Investigations of alleged use and challenge inspections have never been done.
The selection of sites to inspect is also tasked to the Technical Secretariat. It is supposed to decide on the frequency of inspection. As mentioned above, there are different provisions for Schedule 1, 2 and 3 chemicals and OCPFs. Schedule 1 chemicals being those that have been developed for use in chemical weapons, or otherwise pose a risk to the convention and have no or very limited use for peaceful purposes (CWC Annex on Chemicals, para. 1). Schedule 2 chemicals are those that could pose a high risk to the
