Geopolitics and the International Development Paradigm

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Geopolitics and the International Development

Paradigm

The changing landscape of development aid:

The European and Chinese development discourses assessed

Visions on Africa – A historical study in objectives, values and principles

MA Thesis in European Studies Graduate School for Humanities Universiteit van Amsterdam Author: Miriam Klaasse Main Supervisor: prof. dr. L.A. Bialasiewicz Second Supervisor: dr. M.E. Spiering May 2014

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'The political problem of mankind is to combine three things: economic efficiency, social justice, and individual liberty' – John Maynard Keynes

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Abstract

The global geopolitical arena has undergone a number of transformations in recent years, also as a result of the shift of economic and political power towards emerging economies such as China. Among other things, this has been marked by the increased contribution of China to South-South Development Cooperation (SSDC), and in particular more intense development cooperation between China and Africa. This ‘new’ role of China as development partner for Africa has been perceived by many scholars and policy makers to have consequences for the role of the EU in the framework of international development cooperation and the international development paradigm more widely. Taking into account the changes taking place in the landscape of development aid, this thesis has sought to assess to what extent this is happening, and what has prompted this reshaping, thereby comparing the development discourses of the EU and China. Special attention has been drawn to the impact of historical legacies, representation and rhetoric, as these appear to directly influence development policies in both discourses.

Comparing the characteristics of EU and Chinese development cooperation has led to the assessment that they are distinct in a considerable number of ways, but also share some interesting resemblances, for instance, with regard to both powers’ interests in the African continent and their emphasis on ‘equality’. In addition, weighing the competing perceived benefits and challenges resulted in the conclusion that while for both policies pros and cons can be named, it seems that the Chinese narrative has a series of advantages over the European one. It has resulted in the impression that African countries prefer China’s ‘no strings attached’ and non-interference policy, following its South-South rhetoric of equality and solidarity, over the European normative rhetoric and ‘rule-based’ approach. The thesis concludes that whereas for a long time the European and Chinese development discourses have been considered as substantially different1, recently, signs have shown some convergence in both narratives, possibly indicating a new era for international development cooperation in Africa.

1_{Although it has also been argued by some scholars that European and Chinese development policy have had – and still} have – more in common than is often thought by most people. See for instance: D. Bräutigam, (2011) ‘Aid ‘With Chinese Characteristics’: Chinese Foreign Aid And Development Finance Meet the OECD-DAC Aid Regime’, Journal of International Development, 23/5, pp. 752-764

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Introduction

“The West no longer enjoys monopoly over Africa’s future development. For the first time since

the end of the Cold War, other nations are taking notice of African politics and economics. They do not stand passively aside, but actively provide aid to, trade with and invest in African economies to leverage international politics, obtain access to growing markets and acquire much needed raw materials.”2This quote strikingly summarizes the current state of the international development landscape, in which South-South Development Cooperation (SSDC) has increasingly been catching up with Western and European development cooperation after a long period of Western dominance in this realm. For decades, it was the most developed and industrialised countries that were setting the rules and norms for Official Development Assistance (ODA)3and have assisted the ‘poor’ by providing aid and paving the road to development for countries in the Global South. The European Union (EU) and its member states especially, have played a significant role in setting-up this framework for development cooperation, as European countries have long had a ‘special relationship’ with the countries that are now collectively known as the African, Pacific and Caribbean (ACP) group of states. African countries in particular have long maintained privileged ties with the EU as a result of their colonial and historical relations. Over time, European development cooperation has gradually progressed from bi-lateral relations with a few African countries to a global policy, governed by its own set of norms and values, with the EU becoming the largest provider of ODA in the world.4

However, recently changes have taken place in the international balance of power, affecting also the global landscape of development aid. Due to the rapid economic growth of Southern countries like China, India and Brazil, what is now being termed South-South Development Cooperation (SSDC) has been given a new boost. Especially China is seen to play an important part in contemporary SSDC, as its expanding global and economic power has enabled this Asian powerhouse to increase its development assistance pledges to African countries and to widen its scope of development cooperation on the African continent. The historically construed set of principles governing China’s development cooperation has resulted in what many scholars define as a distinctly corporate and pragmatic approach towards Africa. The emphasis on their ‘no strings attached-policy’ and principles of non-interference, equality and stressing win-win outcomes has been seen as a welcome policy by African countries, but it

2

M. Klare, and D. Volman (2006), ‘America, China and the scramble for Africa’s oil’, Review of African Political Economy, 33/108, pp. 297–309.

3

Official Development Assistance (ODA) is a standard definition of development aid created by members of the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) and their Development Co-operation Directorate – Development Assistance Committee (DCD-DAC).

4_{M. Carbone, (2007) The European Union and International Development, the politics of foreign aid, Oxon: Routledge, p.} 1.

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has also drawn the attention from Western development actors, criticising the Chinese approach because of the perceived challenges this latter poses to future development in Africa. Yet the rising popularity of SSDC and Chinese development cooperation in this context implies that African countries have been making a statement on the kind of development cooperation they wish to receive/prefer. This shift is highly significant for the landscape of international development aid more broadly, in fact. It is even argued that “international development cooperation is in a period of major transition”.5

In the light of these global changes and their effects on the international landscape of development aid, this thesis will provide an historical assessment of the development discourses of both China and the EU in order to provide an insight as to why and to what extent the international development paradigm is changing. The European and Chinese development discourses will therefore be subject to an historical analysis, covering the origins of development cooperation for both the EU and China to create the context for contemporary development aid to Africa. Furthermore, the characteristics of European as well as Chinese contemporary development policy will be discussed to create an idea of the content, size and structure of these policies. To be able to make a clear assessment at last, the perceived benefits and challenges of both discourses for Africa shall be analysed, so that these can be compared and evaluated, leading to an assessment of the current status of the international development paradigm. As it will be argued in the thesis, historical ties and (self-)representations still profoundly affect the rhetoric that is being employed in each of the development discourses, and this their reception and effectiveness in Africa today. The role of history and that of discursive representation and rhetoric are therefore granted special attention in this thesis.

The thesis is divided into three chapters. The first chapter will provide an overview of South-South Development Cooperation, to create the context for China’s development policy for Africa. Chapter two will elaborate on European development cooperation, focussing on its evolution, characteristics, rhetoric and the various geopolitical models that have been created to describe the EU as an actor and its role on the international development scene. Last but not least, the third chapter will start with a discussion on the changing geographies of power, followed by a paragraph on China’s development cooperation in Africa including the perceived benefits and challenges, and a section on European development assistance to Africa, also containing the perceived benefits and challenges for Africa. To complete this analysis of the international development paradigm, the conclusion will set off by comparing the characteristics of the EU’s and China’s development discourse for Africa, followed by a weighing of the benefits and

5_{F. Zimmerman and K. Smith, (2011) ‘More Actors, More Money, More Ideas for International Development Co-operation,} Journal of International Development, 23/5, p. 735.

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challenges for Africa of both discourses, and a discussion on the importance and influence of history, discursive representations and rhetoric on contemporary European and Chinese development policy. The thesis concludes that, indeed the international development paradigm is changing as a result of both changing global geographies of power, and accordingly the distinct visions of different actors on development and how to achieve it in the African context. At the same time, the conclusions note that some recent and initial signs of convergence between European and Chinese perceptions of development are visible, possibly indicating new incentives for future development cooperation in Africa.

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1. South-South Development Cooperation

For a long time, development cooperation has been provided in the context of North-South relations. Ever since the decades of global decolonisation, Europe has been providing development aid to Third World and developing countries. However, nowadays it looks like emerging economies such as China and India are changing the international landscape of development cooperation. South-South cooperation (SSC) is becoming more and more popular amongst the cooperating countries in the Global South. Development cooperation plays an important role within the framework of SSC. As a consequence of its increasing popularity, Europe is getting ‘competition’ from these countries that, in some cases, both are donor and recipient countries of development assistance.

The main aim of this chapter is to provide a clear overview of South-South Development Cooperation (SSDC), which will enable us to construct a clear image of Europe’s ‘new’ competitor in the field of international development cooperation and hopefully will provide an insight in what’s behind the recent popularity of SSDC. Therefore, first an explanation of what South-South Development Cooperation (SSDC) entails will be given, followed by the history and development of this form of cooperation. The rejuvenation of South-South cooperation and contemporary SSDC will be included in this explanation. Next, the features and main characteristics of SSDC will be provided to complete the overview of South-South Development Cooperation. Overall, this chapter aims to provide more insight in the forms of cooperation that have been initiated by countries in the Southern Hemisphere, of their drivers and interests, and it intends to create an understanding but also of the South-South rhetoric as well.

1.1 Defining South-South Development Cooperation

In order to define South-South Development Cooperation (SSDC), it is useful to start looking at the way development cooperation in general is defined by those who are subject to it. Different Southern actors define it in different ways. In most cases it includes grants, loans, lines of credit, debt cancellation, studentships and technical training, resource-for-infrastructure swaps, the provision of doctors, nurses and other skilled professionals, humanitarian relief, etcetera.6Despite the fact that SSDC has some elements that equate to the ‘international’ definition of Official Development Assistance7(ODA) or foreign aid, in most cases however, the majority of the SSDC

6

E. Mawdsley, (2011) ‘The changing geographies of foreign aid and development cooperation: contributions from gift theory’, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 37/2, p. 257.

7

The official definition of ODA was set by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD). DAC is a unique international forum of many of the largest funders of aid, including 26 DAC members. The World Bank, IMF and UNDP participate as observers. See: http://www.oecd.org/dac/.

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flows differs from the way established donors provide development cooperation.8I.e. South-South Cooperation is not limited to ‘aid’ in the way it is classified by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) - that is “aid is to be provided by official agencies; it is to be administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing

countries as its main objective, it has to be concessional in character and should convey a grant

element of at least 25 per cent”9- because it includes other kinds and types of financial flows and cooperation.10For example, South-South cooperation covers all types of political and economic exchange between countries, civil society organizations and enterprises, also including trade, investment and technology, while the criteria for ODA are more strict and determined.

It appears that South-South Development Cooperation is quite a broad concept consisting of many elements. A single definition of SSDC is therefore hard to formulate. However, the United Nations, one of the key organisations guiding global development, provides a useful, general definition of South-South Cooperation for Development:

“a process whereby two or more developing countries pursue their individual and/or shared

national capacity development objectives through exchanges of knowledge, skills, resources and technical know-how, and through regional and interregional collective actions, including partnerships involving Governments, regional organizations, civil society, academia and the private sector, for their individual and/or mutual benefit within and across regions. South-South cooperation is not a substitute for, but rather a complement to, North-South cooperation.”11

This definition of SSDC was formulated in the 2009 Nairobi Outcome Document and with it the UN attempted to present a cohesive meaning of South-South cooperation within the United Nations system. Besides the fact that it is a useable definition outside the UN system as well, it makes clear that Southern countries are willing to cooperate to help each other develop or at least let each other benefit from their own experiences and recent development.

Using this UN definition is purely to provide an official definition of South-South Development cooperation. Since there are different types of development cooperation and SSDC is such a broad concept, the different countries, organizations and parties involved often use different terms and definitions. This can be rather confusing and problematic. For example, some countries providing development assistance have a problem with the term ‘donors’ and others

8

This will become clear in the following chapters. 9

OECD DAC, (2008) ‘Is it ODA?’, Fact Sheet, November 2008, Paris.

10_{International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth (IPC-IG)(UNDP), (2010) ‘Poverty in Focus: South-South Cooperation,} The Same Old Game or a New Paradigm?’, Poverty in Focus, No. 20, April 2010, p. 11.

11_{High-level Committee on South-South Cooperation, (2012) ‘Framework of operational guidelines on United Nations} support to South-South and triangular cooperation’, SSC/17/3, 12 April 2012, p. 4.

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don’t like the term ‘aid’12. Moreover, there is quite a debate about what forms of SSDC can be called ODA and what forms of development cooperation can’t be seen as ODA.13In spite of these difficulties in defining SSDC, the 2009 UN definition of SSDC shall be used in the remainder of this thesis. In order to provide the context for understanding contemporary South-South cooperation, an overview of its history and development will follow in the next paragraph.

1.2 History and development

In order to understand the guiding norms and principles, motives and forms of cooperation in contemporary South-South cooperation, some knowledge on the history and development of SSDC is essential. This paragraph will focus on the importance of South-South cooperation for the countries involved, and it will provide the context and historical background of the international relations of the past, which will appear to have influence on the international relations of today.

Development cooperation between developing countries in the South started several decades ago. For example, The Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED), which was set up in 1961, was the first fund of its kind established by a developing country, together with the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) and Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA). Another example is China, who has also been providing assistance to several African countries for almost 50 years and helped with the construction of the Tazara railway between Tanzania and Zambia in the late 1960s.14These examples of development cooperation can be seen in the light of South-South development cooperation. Over time, these forms and structures of cooperation have evolved through different phases, stages and levels of collaboration into the existing framework of SSDC as it is known today. Development in this South-South context is being practiced by different groups, actors, countries and varying in quality and quantity and types of cooperation. While some examples of development cooperation started to manifest themselves in the early 1960s, more serious attempts to unite and organise the countries in the South were made even before that time.

The end of World War II and the liquidation of colonialism in the 1950s and 1960s were an important impetus for Southern countries to start their cooperation. Most of these underdeveloped countries were struggling to overcome their colonial past and at the same time they were pressured to choose sides between the opposite superpowers in the Cold War, which

12

F. Simplicio, (2011) ‘South-South Development Cooperation: A Contemporary Perspective’, pp. 20-21. In: R. Modi, South-South Development Cooperation: Africa on the Centre Stage, Palgrave MacMillan.

13

See for example: ECOSOC (UN Economic and Social Council), (2008) Background Study for the Development Cooperation Forum; Trends in South-South and triangular development cooperation, April 2008;

D. Rowlands, (2008) ‘Emerging Donors in International Development Assistance: A Synthesis Report’; E. Mawdsley, (2011) ‘The changing geographies of foreign aid and development cooperation: contributions from gift theory’, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 37/2, pp. 256-272.

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had started in the years after the end of World War II.15Developing countries came to see their common interests and the possible mutual benefits of cooperation. They realized that it would be more advantageous for them to work together instead of being allies of one or the other of the superpowers. This understanding led to the creation of an institutional framework for South-South Cooperation because many of the developing countries began questioning the system of international economic relations. For that reason they proposed to change the structure and management of the existing system. To be able to strengthen their position, to discuss the possibilities and put their ideas into practice, various conferences and meetings were organised by African and Asian states.

The Bandung Conference that was held in Indonesia, in 1955, can be considered the starting point for South-South cooperation. Twenty-nine leaders from Africa and Asia met in Bandung with the aim to speak with the voice of the South. They recognized the urgency of promoting international economic and cultural cooperation in the Asian-African region, on the basis of equality, mutual interest and respect for national sovereignty.16A few years later, in the context of the Cold War, the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM) was founded in 1961 which focused on essential political issues. In 1964 the number of countries that were represented in the Conferences of the NAM had already doubled. The fervour for this kind of cooperation was apparently there. NAM conferences were mainly characterized by the widespread rejection of Western colonialism. Later on the focus shifted to the mere support of solutions to global economic, and other problems, rather than only political issues.17

1964 was also the year in which the Group of 77 was established as the largest Third World Coalition in the UN.18It was formed by 77 developing countries, though the number of member states has now increased up to 131 members19. The Group of 77 was founded as an intergovernmental organization within the UN, with the aim of providing the means for the countries in the Southern Hemisphere to articulate and promote their common economic interests, to enhance their joint negotiating capacity within the UN system and to promote South-South cooperation for development.20This organisation forms the largest group of Southern states and made it possible for them to express their collective concerns in both the UN General Assembly and in the Economic Social Council (ECOSOC) in which they could debate economic and social issues.

15

IPC-IG, (2010) ‘Poverty in Focus’, p. 3. 16

P. Kragelund, (2010) ‘The Potential Role of Non-Traditional Donors’ Aid in Africa’, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, Issue Paper No. 11, p. 2.

17

NAM, ‘General background information’, http://www.nam.gov.za/background/index.html, accessed 13 July 2013. 18_{F. Cheru, (2011) ‘South Cooperation: What Prospects for a New Bandung Consensus?’, p. 43. In: R. Modi,} South-South Development Cooperation: Africa on the Centre Stage, Palgrave MacMillan.

19_{Some of the 131 members are now members of the EU and consequently do not represent the South (solely).} 20

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Closely linked to the Group of 77, was the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), also established in 1964. UNCTAD was important in the early years of South-South cooperation as it provided the opportunity to express the growing concerns about the role of developing countries in international trade and to address their problems during conferences.21 All these efforts resulted in the Declaration of a New International Economic Order. Basically it was a proposition aimed at a new economic and political framework for international cooperation between equal states. But for a number of reasons it could not make a real difference. The two oil crises in the 1970s, the debt crisis in the 1980s and the process of de-industrialisation that was initiated by it, all negatively influenced South-South economic cooperation. However, in 1987 the United Nations Conference on Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries was held, which resulted in the Buenos Aires Plan of Action (BAPOA). For the first time, a strategic framework for South-South Cooperation was provided. From that moment onwards the UN would play a crucial role in supporting SSC.22

By the end of the 1980s, the basis for a framework for cooperation in the South was set up, although it was not worth much. The end of the Cold War, however, changed the entire global context of international relations. The countries in the former Eastern Bloc, who played only a minor role in North-South and South-South dialogues before, became important new destinations for investments, trade and development assistance. As a result, the political and economic attention the South was given before shifted to the East and away from the developing countries in the South. But while the attention from the Northern countries refocused towards Eastern Europe, the NAM established a new group for South-South Consultation and Coordination in 1989, known as the Group of Fifteen. Meetings would be organized on a regular basis and at the highest level; they would promote South-South Cooperation and pronounce their views on the major developments in international relations and the world economy. It was a long-term goal to be recognized as a dialogue partner for big international organizations such as the Group of 7 rich industrialized countries (now G-8) and the World Trade Organization.23However, despite the establishment of the G-15, South-South Cooperation stagnated in the beginning of the 1990’s. It was only with the start of the new millennium that SSDC was given a new boost. Yet, the fact that these countries realized that South-South cooperation could be beneficial to them and would also be an important way of gaining more political influence on the world stage, was a first step in a new direction and more was to come.

21_{Kragelund, (2010) ‘The Potential Role of Non-Traditional Donors’ Aid in Africa’, p. 2.} 22

UN Secretariat Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN/DESA), ‘Development Cooperation for the MDG’s: Maximizing Results – International Development Cooperation Report’, New York, 2010, p. 71.

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1.3 The Rejuvenation of South-South Cooperation

Halfway through the 1990s, various developments in the international scene led to the rejuvenation of South-South development cooperation. Emerging economies like China and India have contributed majorly to the renewed interest in SSDC and are also seen to be the main drivers in the rejuvenation of South-South cooperation. They have given the countries in the Global South a new boost to cooperate and as a result, different new organisations and regional meetings have been set up. These are important as they function as a framework for cooperation and create a setting in which concerns and problems can be expressed, joint statements can be made and common interests can be looked after.

1.3.1 Motives for cooperation

Different factors have contributed to the rejuvenation of South-South cooperation and have motivated countries in the Global South to seek closer cooperation in order to achieve their goals. In the past two decades, the relative fast growth of big economies such as India and China resulted in renewed interests in the political and economic possibilities and potentials of South-South cooperation, both internally and externally. ‘Emerging economies’24all have got their own reasons and motives to continue and intensify their cooperation on development. For example, India and Brazil have aimed for a seat in the permanent UN Security Council, for which they needed ‘Southern’ votes; China sees this Southern cooperation as a way to fight US hegemony; and most other big countries of the South “share a belief in their entitlement to a more influential role in world affairs”.25A number of other reasons for the rejuvenation of SSDC can also be named. For example, the joint commitment to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) caused a new impulse to focus on the problems of the South again. Also, some of the developing countries had made social gains and showed signs of economic recovery. Therefore these countries could set an example for the rest of the developing world. Furthermore, the disappointment among poor countries with the established development regime and mainstream models of development cooperation made a new and more effective model desirable.26Reasons such as broken promises of more aid, the clinging to discredited conditionalities, the inability to deliver on better coordination and alignment and the minimal reform of aid architecture are all issues left unresolved by the established donors.27 , 28Next to this, at the individual level the

24

As noted in paragraph 1.1, terms and definitions are subject to debate and can be confusing. This term is used to refer to contrast these states with the OECD DAC members. See for example: N. Woods, ‘Whose aid? Whose influence? China, emerging donors and the silent revolution in development assistance’, International Affairs, 84/6, pp. 1205–1221.

25

A. Hurrell, (2006) ‘Hegemony, liberalism and global order: what space for would-be great powers?’, International Affairs, 82/1, p. 2.

26_{IPC-IG, (2010) ‘Poverty in Focus’, p. 4.} 27

Woods, (2008) ‘Whose aid? Whose influence?’.

28_{When mentioning ‘established donors’ in this thesis, in general Western, traditional donor countries aspiring to} OECD-DAC standards are referred to.

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development countries all have got their own motives to engage in SSDC too, based on political, trade, investment or other domestic interests. These motivations have led to closer cooperation in the South and the establishment of various new organisations and forums in the framework of SSDC.

1.3.2 New organisations in development cooperation

As a reflection of the above described rejuvenation of SSDC, several new organisations and forums have been established since the beginning of the new millennium. These initiatives are important because they create a platform via which SSC is promoted and via which the global bargaining power of the participating countries might be increased. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the New Africa Asia Strategic Partnership (a trilateral form of cooperation between South-Africa, Vietnam and Guinea Conakry) and the India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA), are examples hereof. The latter can be regarded as the most interesting forum for Africa.29 This trilateral development initiative between India, Brazil and South-Africa was formed in 2003 and the strategy for the long term was geared to the formation of a multipolar system based on the rule of international law. These three countries want to become power poles in this multipolar world and Brazil and India have also been striving for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council.30To increase their global bargaining power, Brazil, India and South-Africa focus on concrete areas of cooperation, like trade, health and energy security and transport. Brazil for example, has developed role-model public policies in fighting AIDS, and is exporting its know-how to different African, Asian and Latin-American countries.31The overall aim of IBSA is to promote South-South cooperation and exchange, and cooperation has already led to the setup of different joint development projects in for instance the sectors of agriculture, science, technology and education.32

India, Brazil and South-Africa are coming together on many issues, as they are collectively aiming at the promotion of shared interests such as economic and social development, democratisation and enhancing multilateralism. They even set up an IBSA fund that should pave the way for new models of cooperation and partnership in South-South Cooperation.33On the other hand, however, they are also competitors in terms of seeking broad Third World support as well as support of the United States since they need these ‘Southern’ and US votes to secure a permanent seat in the UN Security Council.34Despite this competing aspect, the IBSA can be seen both as a strategic alliance for the pursuit of the common interests of

29

Kragelund, (2010) ‘The Potential Role of Non-Traditional Donors’ Aid in Africa’, p. 3. 30

IPC-IG, (2010) ‘Poverty in Focus’, p. 15. 31_{IPC-IG, (2010) ‘Poverty in Focus’, p. 16.} 32

ECOSOC, (2008) ‘Background Study for the Development Cooperation Forum’, p. 17. 33_{Kragelund, (2010) ‘The Potential Role of Non-Traditional Donors’ Aid in Africa’, p. 3.} 34

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emerging powers in global institutions, but also as a platform of trilateral, bilateral and interregional South-South Cooperation.35These regional organisations and forums thus contribute to development cooperation in the South and the pursuit of common interests of developing countries. Regional meetings are seen to have the same effect and are equally important.

1.3.3 Regional meetings

The rejuvenation of South-South cooperation is also visible when one looks at the number of regional meetings, whose popularity has exploded. As will be shown later in this thesis, high-level and diplomatic visits are an essential part of SSDC as it is a way in which the rhetoric of SSDC is expressed. Furthermore, during these regional meetings concrete arrangements are made that contribute to the value of South-South cooperation. The recent popularity of regional meetings was initiated by China in October 2000 with the first Forum for China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in Beijing. Since 2000, a Ministerial Conference takes place every three years, with the last one being held in 2012 in Beijing. Every forum was completed with the signing of specific action plans by all of the attendees. With the FOCAC, China and Africa had set the example, as Brazil followed with the Africa-South America Summit (ASA), led by President Lula da Silva. This meeting in 2006 which was held in Abuja, Nigeria, also led to the signing of different declarations such as the Abuja Resolution and the Abuja Plan of Action. The Marrakech Plan of Action was signed after a meeting of the Trade Ministers of the regions in Morocco, which was followed by a second ASA meeting that took place in Caracas, Venezuela, in 2009. After the Brazilians, the Indians followed the example set by the Chinese in 2008. For an India-Africa summit, they invited the African heads of state to New Delhi, which resulted in the Delhi Declaration and the Africa-India Framework for Cooperation.36 From this the value of regional meetings for SSDC can be concluded, because they often result in concrete agreements or otherwise can contribute to mutual understanding.

It becomes clear that South-South cooperation went through different phases of development in cooperation and got a new boost from the 1990s onwards. In the past, China, Africa and Latin-America have shown that numerous forms of cooperation on different levels are among the possibilities, and it looks like the near future will probably bring more possibilities and bigger and more intense forms of cooperation than before. To provide more insight in South-South development assistance and the emergence of new, non-traditional donors in the development paradigm, the following section will give a short overview of a couple of these ‘emerging donors’ and their cooperation. The emerging donors used in this overview are China, India, Brazil and South-Africa, because they share a couple of interesting similarities. They all

35_{IPC-IG, (2010) ‘Poverty in Focus’, p. 16.} 36

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are emerging economies, they are also regional powers and they share a history of being former colonized countries. Besides, they have a special, dual position as they all are both donors and recipients of development assistance.

1.3.4 Emerging donors

As shown in paragraph 1.2, South-South cooperation should not be seen as something new. However, while emerging powers such as China, Brazil, South-Africa and India all focused on issues concerning domestic development in the 1980s and 1990s, the North had a lot of room to operate and act to determine the rules of the game for the South in this period. Therefore, from the end of the Cold War until the beginning of this millennium, development assistance was almost exclusively provided by the traditional donors of the North. This was also the case in terms of investment and trade.37Nevertheless, in recent years bilateral development assistance providers outside the Development Assistance Committee have increased their funding and activities and it is argued that a silent revolution is taking place in the development paradigm.38 Emerging donors are now offering alternatives to other aid-receiving countries, which has resulted in an increased range of choices for developing countries as they now have the option to choose from a number of countries with whom they wish to cooperate. Because of this shift, a new kind of competition is putting pressure on the existing development system. The Western development paradigm, that has determined the external and internal relations of developing countries for decades, is as a consequence of the rise of these new donors seen to be in decline.39 Next to these emerging donors however, many other parties are participating in South-South development cooperation. For example, countries like Venezuela and Saudi Arabia and different Southern multilateral institutions such as the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA), the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) and the OPEC Fund for International Development (OFID) are playing an important role in Southern development cooperation as well. After the setup of SSDC in the 1950s, different forms of cooperation between developing countries in the South have taken place in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, until cooperation stagnated at the end of the 1980s. A few years later, the economies of countries like China and India grew explosively, and together with other developments in the 1990s this eventually resulted in the rejuvenation of SSDC. The motives for cooperation may differ per country, yet in general the main aim is the pursuit of common interests and obtaining more global bargaining power. In order to achieve this, regional organisations like the IBSA were established and regional meetings such as the FOCAC have been set up. These often have often led to concrete

37_Ibid. 38

Woods, (2008) ‘Whose aid? Whose influence?’, p. 1221.

39_{C. Six, (2009) ‘The rise of postcolonial states as donors: a challenge to the development paradigm’, Third World} Quarterly, 30/6, p. 1118.

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agreements and arrangements between the participating parties and are still valuable for contemporary South-South cooperation.

1.4 Contemporary South-South cooperation

The road for South-South Development Cooperation has been a long one so far, and it has formed SSDC as we know it today. Along the way it has been adapted to evolving international relations and other events that required adjustment of the Southern framework for cooperation. To provide a clear overview of contemporary SSDC, this paragraph will elaborate on its characterizing aspects including participants, amounts of aid, channels, types of cooperation, allocation and destination, and sectors and projects, all of which are important indicators of the way development assistance is provided by non-traditional donors40 to developing countries in the South. Insight in these aspects will enable us to make a proper comparison between the development cooperation and assistance provided in the context of SSDC, and development assistance provided by the European Union. It will appear that there is a considerable variety in the numbers of participants; that project finance and infrastructural projects are respectively the preferred type of cooperation and sectors to cooperate in, and that (geo-)political, commercial and self-interests plays an important role in the allocation and destination of assistance and cooperation within SSDC.

1.4.1 Participants

To get a clear image of the parties that are involved in South-South cooperation, a short overview will be given first. South-South Development Cooperation takes place on different levels and in different areas of cooperation, and therefore a variety of parties is involved generally. A lot of players participate in SSDC and they consist of, amongst others, Southern countries’ governments, civil society organizations, multilateral institutions, national institutions and networks, as well as enterprises, academic institutions and philanthropic foundations and trust funds. Most of the SSDC is found on a bilateral level, however triangular cooperation is becoming more common. This form of cooperation consists of a tripartite collaboration and partnership between North-South-South countries and is usually the result of technical cooperation among two or more southern countries (South-South), which is supported through

40

Like the term ‘emerging economies’, the term ‘non-traditional donors’ has also been subject of discussion. Richard Manning referred this group of donors as ‘emerging donors, while it was also noted they are rather re-emerging (Manning 2006), Kragelund (2008) therefore suggested the term ‘non-DAC donors’ (grouped as members of the EU and/or OECD), while Grimm, Humphrey, Lundsgaarde & de Souza (2009) also questioned the accuracy of the term ‘emerging’ donors and therefore suggested the term ‘new state actors’. In this thesis I will use the term ‘non-traditional donors’ as it is simple and points to the difference in terms of the definitions and standards applied between the established donor community (DAC) and these non-traditional donors.

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financial, technical or other means by northern donors or by international organizations.41 In addition, southern countries are also advancing in trilateral cooperation, for instance in the earlier mentioned framework of the IBSA, the India-Brazil-South Africa Trilateral initiative. More examples of South-South Cooperation are included in annex 1.

The rapid economic growth that major Southern economies have been experiencing, has increased their importance and role international relations. As a result of this positive development, they are now able to offer a wider range of technical development expertise, services, and goods. Therefore, they can also offer more financial and technical cooperation. Unlike the countries in the North/West, the countries in the South share a more similar cultural, social and economic environment with those they aim to assist, which can lead to a more favourable outcome and might make Southern cooperation more effective and appropriate.42 There are thus a lot of different parties and participants involved in SSDC, and moreover, some of the rapidly growing economies are becoming more capable of providing more development assistance, and in greater variety, to countries that are in need.

1.4.2 Amounts of aid

The discussion of the amounts of aid that are provided in the context of SSDC can give an insight in, and indication of the size of this kind of development cooperation. South-South development cooperation has grown very fast recently. It is even stated that the share of South-South cooperation in global development cooperation has doubled in ten years.43What should be noted however is that given the lack of accurate information about the scale, content, forms and mode and sectoral distribution of development assistance by the Southern contributors, data and figures are only estimates.44Weak and/or unavailable data and lack of hard reported data of some smaller contributors play a negative role in this case. Moreover, definitions of what constitutes development cooperation or ODA are deeply contested and are diverging among those who do make public their aid contributions.45,46There is also evidence of official errors in reporting, which means that comparative calculations are often hazardous.47Besides, different studies use varying methodologies, definitions and sources, therefore, numbers and estimates vary as well.48

41

United Nations Industrial Development Organization, ‘South-South and Triangular Cooperation’, http://www.unido.org/south-south.html, accessed 26 July 2013.

42

UN/DESA, (2010) ‘Development Cooperation for the MDG’s, p. 71. 43

P. Kragelund, (2011) ‘Back to BASICs? The Rejuvenation of Non-traditional Donors’ Development Cooperation with Africa’, Development and Change, 42/2, p. 598.

45

The Reality of Aid Management Committee, (2010) ‘South-South Cooperation: A Challenge to the Aid System?’, Special Report on South-South Cooperation 2010, p. 5.

46

To add to this discussion; to clarify the definition of ODA, DAC has recently introduced the concept of ‘programmable aid’, but this too is subject to discussion.

47

Mawdsley, (2011) ‘The changing geographies of foreign aid and development cooperation’, p. 261.

48_{For more information on DAC ODA and methodology, see: ECOSOC, (2008) ‘Background Study for the Development} Cooperation Forum’.

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Taking into account these issues concerning the amounts and numbers of aid, numbers can still provide some insight and will therefore be discussed next.

According to the UN International Development Cooperation Report 2010, it is estimated that SSDC has grown from US$8,6 billion (6,9% of global development cooperation) in 2006 to US$15.3 billion (9,5% of development cooperation) in 2008. This represents an increase of US$6.7 billion or 78% in two years and is a much faster rate than was foreseen in 2008 at the Development Cooperation Forum. Reasons for this increase are mainly the large growth numbers of China and Saudi Arabia, and a doubling of Venezuela’s cooperation with the Caribbean, through its Petrocaribe oil loan arrangements. A lot of other Southern providers also saw their flows rise.

Among the biggest bilateral non-OECD contributors are the People’s Republic of China, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, who provide each over US$2 billion a year. They are followed by Arab Agencies49 and India, with respectively a combined total over US$ 1 billion and over US$750 million a year.50In 2006 the three biggest providers of SSDC, China, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela, accounted for 60% of the total Southern development cooperation. In 2008, this percentage had risen to 75%, which is quite a significant increase. These numbers show fast growth in expenditure in South-South Development Cooperation. Moreover, in 2009 China even guaranteed an amount of US$10 billion in concessional loans to Africa for 2010-2012, which means that they doubled the pledge of the previous three years.51And during the India-Africa Forum in 2008, India announced that it would give US$5,4 billion as lines of credit to African institutions and countries over five years. Other bilateral contributors like South-Africa and Brazil also declared that their intentions of expanding their input in South-South development cooperation substantially.52 Table 1, provides an overview of the 16 major governments who participate in South-South cooperation and also four of the Southern multilateral institutions, namely the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (AFESD), Arab Bank for Economic Development (BADEA), the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) and the OPEC Fund for International Development, who cover a large number of programme countries.

49

E.g. Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (AFESD), Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA), the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB).

50

UN/DESA, (2010) ‘Development Cooperation for the MDG’s, p. 72. 51_{UN/DESA, (2010) ‘Development Cooperation for the MDG’s, p. 71.} 52

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As shown above in paragraph 1.4.1, cooperation takes place on bilateral, multilateral and triangular levels. In comparison to the former two, the latter is actually very difficult to determine because there is no formal reporting of these flows by pivotal countries or funding institutions. Countries who do compile data, like Chile and Brazil, indicate that around US$1 million dollar was funded in 2008 for projects, by countries like Germany, Canada, Spain and Japan.53

Overall, it can be concluded that despite a lack of complete and comprehensive data on financial flows in South-South Development cooperation, there is a trend visible in SSDC; cooperation for development between developing countries is growing in popularity and financial support continues to increase. Compared to the amounts for development cooperation provided by the DAC donors, SSDC still has got some ground to gain but they are catching up. And although there is not a lot of information available on the future plans of Southern providers, it is expected that SSDC will continue to grow rapidly, as different bilateral providers like China, India, Brazil and South-Africa have declared their intentions to expand South-South cooperation.54

53_{UN/DESA, (2010) ‘Development Cooperation for the MDG’s, p. 89.} 54

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1.4.3 Channels

Just like there is a variety in participants, cooperation and aid within the framework of SSDC is channelled in various ways. Most of the cooperation is channelled through multilateral organizations like the United Nations and the World Bank and donations to these institutions are increasing over the years. This is also the case for South-South philanthropy. The money comes from foundations, trust funds and CSO’s, who are financed by endowments by wealthy corporations and individuals. Also, Northern donors, foundations, and CSO’s provide a substantial amount of their funding. For example, the Nelson Mandela Foundations and the United Nations Children’s’ Fund (UNICEF) receive their funds from individuals through its Friends Programmes. Other Southern foundations receive direct support from Northern donors and others receive a high proportion of their funding from Southern Governments or South-South multilateral organizations. Next to this, there are also self-financing charities who provide microfinance to the rural or poor, like BRAC and the Grameen Bank.55Channels of cooperation thus vary, even as the donors and the types of cooperation, which will be discussed next.

1.4.4 Types of cooperation

There are different ways and types of cooperation within SSDC, which are important to mention as they give a clear insight in how SSDC works and what it consists of. Over 90% of Southern development cooperation, funded by South-South multilateral organizations and governments, is ‘country programmed’, meaning that the proportion of aid is programmed per country by Southern providers. The reason for this is that some Southern providers do not include debt relief, scholarships, or humanitarian assistance and their data often does not include refugee costs. More or less three quarters of southern development assistance is in the form of project finance, of which China is a big fan and most of the largest providers focus on this type of cooperation, mainly on large infrastructure projects. Recently though, there has been a rapid rise in budget support and debt relief. Some countries have written-off incredible sums. Among these countries are China, Brazil, India, South Africa and multilateral institutions.56One of the key modalities of SSDC is technical cooperation (TC) and many smaller contributors plus Brazil focus mainly on this type of cooperation. For them, technical cooperation remains vital because it provides an important opportunity to contribute to the development of others. Technical assistance is also provided by China and India, who have a long history of significant TC. The TAZARA railway between Tanzania and Zambia, mentioned before, is an example of TC. But it also includes peer learning through training, capacity building and study tours. Despite of the fact that TC is a key

55

UN/DESA, (2010) ‘Development Cooperation for the MDG’s, p. 76.

56_{Annual flows of debt relief can’t be quantified, because almost all SSC providers exclude it from their statistics. But} during the last decades is has totaled well over US$1 billion.

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modality, it is only a relatively small component of assistance by Southern multilateral institutions.

In response to natural disasters, humanitarian assistance by Southern providers has also been increased dramatically. This was mainly due to the dramatic increase of US$515 million by Saudi-Arabia, what makes it the third largest provider of humanitarian assistance after the US and the European Commission.57 Most humanitarian support goes to regional neighbours. For example, Asian providers delivered support after the Asian Tsunami, the floods in Bangladesh and the earthquake in Pakistan. However, in recent years Southern providers have increasingly provided humanitarian assistance for disasters outside their regions as well. Hence, development cooperation in the Global South is characterized by its different types of cooperation, of which project finance and technical cooperation can be seen as being used most. Yet another characteristic of SSDC is important in the context of this thesis: the allocation and destination of aid.

1.4.5 Allocation and destination

With the comparison between European and South-South development cooperation in mind, the allocation and destination of aid might turn out to be a distinguishing element in the framework of SSDC. As we will see, the destination and allocation of aid often depends on the interests of the parties involved. It has been argued that the decision making process about the allocation and destination of SSDC, including the choice of recipients, and its nature and conduct, is for a large part driven by national self-interest.58Different factors determine the allocation of South-South and bilateral cooperation and assistance, and it is also known to be used for different goals. Southern development assistance is, indeed, frequently used as a foreign policy tool and as an instrument to gain political and economic influence. Brazil and India for example, used it as a means to acquire more international political leverage and to secure a seat in an enlarged UN Security Council. But there is more to it.

Interests of geopolitical nature are playing a significant role as well. Geographical proximity has been a decisive factor given that many providers focus their flows on countries in the neighbour region or sub-region.59 The providers often have a better understanding of the needs and interests of their neighbours as well as an understanding of the language and other similarities, which will help to find joint solutions to common problems. It is also said that regional cooperation provides opportunities to strengthen political ties, trade relations and investment links. Besides, it can be cheaper to administer than cooperation programmes with a

57

58_{Mawdsley, (2011) ‘The changing geographies of foreign aid and development cooperation’, p. 266.} 59

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longer distance in between.60For example, in Asian intra-regional SSDC, India provides most of its assistance to Afghanistan, Bhutan, Myanmar, Maldives, Sri Lanka and Nepal. This also created the opportunity to promote stability and security and to extend the Indian spheres of influence. However, since India’s rapid economic growth, development assistance was extended overseas in order to help and boost trade, ensure its access to energy resources, project soft power and to build military alliances.61Likewise, political ties for Venezuela, geography and cultural and language links for Arab agencies and countries are vital for the allocation of development assistance. And recently other forms of regional cooperation have shown comparative advantages, for example South-South cooperation funding in regional programmes and institutions. Intensified regional integration has shown to be an important catalyst for SSDC. Like other forms of cooperation, these regional cooperation initiatives are, again, often based on common political, trade and investment interests, or as for Brazil, a shared language. It appears that Brazil provides three quarters of its African aid to Portuguese speaking countries.62Countries who have taken a step further down the road of regional integration have reached cross-regional cooperation of which the IBSA is an example. As regards the allocation of SSDC and factors influencing it, contributors of the South have tended to focus more concessional cooperation on the poorer countries, maybe with the exception of some Arab countries and institutions that support the more middle income countries in their vicinity.

Solidarity and political considerations have also been decisive for the allocation of aid provided via South-South Cooperation, because of the strong influence of non-aligned and G77 solidarity at the Bandung Conference. As an example one can look at the development cooperation of Cuba and Venezuela, which is part of wider Latin-America solidarity initiatives.63 Political power and influence can play an important role as well. Like China, Venezuela uses South-South cooperation to oppose to the US, and in the case of China, SSDC is also used to mitigate the influence of the Taiwan government.64Rights, and especially human rights, are also considered while locating developing assistance. Some Southern providers have been criticized for not taking human rights into account, however, trade and investment opportunities or strategic and political considerations sometimes overrule human rights issues.65

Commercial interests can probably been seen as the most important driver of Southern development assistance nowadays. Originating from these commercial interests is the promotion of bilateral trade and investment, which has been, and still is, a powerful motive for Southern

60 Ibid. 61

The Reality of Aid Management Committee, (2010) ‘South-South Cooperation’, p. 11. 62_{UN/DESA, (2010) ‘Development Cooperation for the MDG’s, p. 79.}

63

64_{The Reality of Aid Management Committee, (2010) ‘South-South Cooperation’, p. 11.} 65

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development cooperation. This is most notable in the case of China, whose cooperation saw some obvious benefits for trade. The need to extend energy and raw material resources, which China needs to sustain its manufacturing for export industrialization strategy, is one of the primary motives for South-South cooperation for this big Asian economy.66These commercial interests are apparent in a lot of its projects, like rebuilding a railway that creates a functioning east-west corridor across the African continent to facilitate the free movement of goods, of which China benefits big time. China also provides low-interest loans that debtor countries can repay with natural resource exports.67 The commercial interests apply for India as well. Indian aid for neighbours like Bhutan, Nepal and Afghanistan is not only about the promotion of regional security and goodwill, but also about securing hydroelectricity and energy for itself. In a 2008 study of the development assistance practices of China, India, Brazil and South-Africa, Rowlands concludes:68 “Emerging donors practices suggest that politically motivated assistance is of particular importance regionally, while commercial interests seem more influential the further away the recipients are located… This is a logical allocation of resources to ensure an emerging donor’s own immediate developing interests… Of course, it is also true that the more powerful the donor, the more dispersed and far-flung its political interests.” It should be noted that this behaviour is consistent with the practices of the established donors. For example, leading donors from the North provide a lot more ODA to their former colonies and provide more aid to countries that vote with them at the UN.69Recapitulating, aid/assistance is used by major donor countries, including those of the South, as a tool for investment, export promotion, and diplomacy.

1.4.6 Sectors and Projects of cooperation

The development of poor countries is a central focus in SSDC and therefore, when one looks at the distribution of development aid and assistance provided via SSDC, it will appear that a lot of areas and sectors are covered. Southern providers have intended to balance their focus on all sectors. However, there are fields of assistance in which the focus lies on specific sectors. The social sectors and capacity development, for example, are provided for via technical cooperation and grants. For the Arab donors these sectors account for more or less 20 per cent of their funding. Sectors like health and education are two other important ones and are subject to the spending of emerging economies like China, India, Brazil and South-Africa. China for instance focusses mainly on constructing health and education facilities. And together with India, China

66

The Reality of Aid Management Committee, (2010) ‘South-South Cooperation’, p. 11.

67_{D. Bräutigam, (2010a) ‘Africa’s Eastern Promise, What the West Can Learn from Chinese Investment in Africa’, Foreign} Affairs, January 5, 2010.

68_{Rowlands, (2008) ‘Emerging Donors in International Development Assistance’, p. 9.} 69

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has developed capacity to fabricate health products which are affordable and are less expensive than those made by OECD countries.70Adding to this, Venezuela, Cuba and Brazil are leading in supplying doctors and teachers to other developing countries, with Cuba providing qualified manpower on quite a big scale, considering the size of the country. In 2004 Cuba provided over 1300 Cuban doctors in 15 African countries, which is quite an effort considering that China now has over 700 medical doctors practicing in Africa.71Next to this, health system development and health research and entrepreneurial collaboration are other areas focussed upon by (emerging) Southern actors. Despite the fact that SSDC has and shows great potential to make a contribution to the improvement of health, capacity building and innovation, it still needs to overcome many challenges.72,73

Agriculture is a second main sector of focus in SSDC. Within this sector, support in food security and technical cooperation are vital for developing countries, especially for Africa. The Arab States, Brazil, China and India all support African countries in different ways, from land management to transferring agricultural technologies to capacity building. Also at triangular level there are initiatives, like Japan and Brazil partnering up to transfer agricultural technology to Africa and other developing countries.74

Another key component of SSDC is infrastructure development. The main destinations of the money spent in SSDC are Africa and Asia, with one of the main providers being China, who recently made large new pledges for these parts of the world. The Arab states also focus their aid on infrastructure, mainly on transport, energy and water. On the other hand, in contrast to the Arab States and China, DAC donors have decreased their focus on infrastructure over time and have spent far less on this sector lately.75A reason for this can be that different priorities have been set by the parties concerned. However, for SSDC it is clear that the main focus lies with energy and railways. Southern finance even exceeded ODA by some 50% for African electricity and for railways it was even more than 100%.76 For Africa, the major contributors to infrastructure are China, India and the Arab States. The importance varies per country, but it is paramount in resource-rich countries like Guinea, Angola, Gabon and Sudan.

A distinguishing feature of SSDC has been its openness to funding infrastructural development and productive sector investments. Funding these sectors is expected to be crucial to

70

Ibid. 72

These challenges will be attended to in the last chapter.

D.L. Shushan, and C. Marcoux, (2010) Assessing Arab Aid: Trends, Explanations and Unreported Transfers, paper presented as Aid Data Conference, Oxford, March 22-25 2010, accessed 25 September 2013.

76

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overall poverty reduction as is stated in the first of the Millennium Development Goals.77In national development strategies and poverty reduction, these sectors are often prioritized as a key component for recipient countries. Moreover, countries such as Kuwait, China, India and Saudi-Arabia and different multilateral institutions have in particular provided extensive support for infrastructure and agriculture. These countries and some other Southern providers have also financed so called priority ‘prestige’ projects. These consist of among others Ministry buildings, parliaments, football stadiums and presidential residences. It is more likely that a party will finance such a prestige project when the motivation for cooperation is more political rather than solely that of development. However, it is also argued that this is also true for DAC donors and military aid as well.78So, even though the intention of Southern providers is to balance the focus on all sectors and projects, it might be concluded that the social sectors, infrastructure and agricultural development have been given attention more than others.

Overall, what can be concluded so far is that contemporary South-South Development Cooperation is advancing. Even though there is a lack of accurate data and figures, and the difficulties that come with defining development cooperation and ODA make it rather hard to assess the actual dimension of South-South cooperation, the available data do give an impression. Project finance and technical cooperation are important types of cooperation, while debt relief is taking place more often as well. Next to this, interests of different kind are determinant in the allocation and destination of development cooperation within the framework of SSDC. To complete this overview of South-South cooperation, the next paragraph will describe some more specific characteristics of SSDC.

1.5 Characteristics

South-South Development Cooperation is characterized by a couple of key aspects and they are important to understand what’s behind the growing popularity of South-South cooperation. They might even appear to be decisive factors in the changing paradigm of international development cooperation. Rhetoric, conditionality and tied aid and the commercial nature of South-South cooperation will therefore be the subject of the next subparagraphs.

1.5.1 Rhetoric

At the basis of South-South development cooperation a couple of key points can be distinguished. The first of which is the assertion of a shared experience of colonial exploitation, postcolonial inequality and present vulnerability to uneven neoliberal globalisation, resulting in a shared identity as ‘developing’ nations. Based on this shared experience, developing status and some

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geographical commonalities, these nations have a specific expertise in appropriate development approaches and technologies. Also, these developing nations explicitly reject hierarchical relations and have a strong articulation of the principles of respect, sovereignty and non-interference as can be noted if one looks at the language used in meetings and agreements. They insist on win-win outcomes of South-South development cooperation and on mutual opportunity.79This can be seen as a ‘symbolic regime’ because all of these principles and values are being propagated through statements, meetings and speeches, as well as in ritualised performances of equality and respect in high level meetings and forums.

Southern development cooperation partners see the providing of aid as economic opportunity, in which counter-gifts are given and there is diplomatic solidarity. This contrasts with the Western ways of development cooperation where charity (as in generous rich countries who give to poor needy countries) is the dominant symbolic and used regime.80Partner nations in south-south development cooperation also highlight claims to expertise on their own domestic challenges and experiences which invokes a discourse of ‘mutual learning’. This too can be seen as contrasting with the claims to expertise based on culturally superior knowledge and institutions made by the West.

It becomes clear that rhetoric plays an important role when it comes to South-South development cooperation. It starts with the fact that southern countries themselves resist the terminology of ‘donor-recipient’ and even that of ‘foreign aid’.81The language used by southern partners is rather one of ‘horizontal’ relations than of ‘vertical’ relations and themes as equals, mutual opportunity and reciprocity openly emerge in the rhetoric of the south.82 Opportunities and cooperation in the South can therefore be seen as being based on symmetric relations and some even call it ‘soft power’. This contrasts with the coercion rooted in the vestiges of the colonial rule which can be noticed when one looks at North-South development cooperation.83 The rhetoric used in SSDC serves as a legitimizing device and as a means of persuading, symbolizing and euphemizing claims to particular identities and social relations. Moreover, by asserting subordinate expertise and grounding development assistance in challenges and shared experiences, they create a distinct position for themselves in the area of foreign aid from those of the North.84The connection made between the rhetoric of SSDC and the North-South rhetoric in this subparagraph, is done with the aim of emphasising the importance of the South-South

79

Mawdsley, (2011) ‘The changing geographies of foreign aid and development cooperation’, p. 263. 80

Mawdsley, (2011) ‘The changing geographies of foreign aid and development cooperation’, p. 264. 81

Mawdsley, (2011) ‘The changing geographies of foreign aid and development cooperation’, p. 257. 82_{Mawdsley, (2011) ‘The changing geographies of foreign aid and development cooperation’, p. 264.} 83

K.S. Amanor, (2013) ‘South-South Cooperation in Africa: Historical, Geopolitical and Political Economy Dimensions of International Development’, IDS Bulletin, Vol. 44/4, p. 20.

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Geopolitics and the International Development Paradigm