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Political Consumerism: Protest or Compliance?

A Choice-Experiment on the Effect of Political Trust on Buycotting Behavior

Master Thesis

Hannah Werner, 10602119

Research Master Communication Science Amsterdam School of Communication Research University of Amsterdam

Contact: hannah.werner@student.uva.nl Supervisor: Dr. Joost van Spanje

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Abstract

Scholars have acknowledged political consumerism as a new form of political participation. Yet, how political consumerism relates to political attitudes, such as political trust, remains unclear in the literature. This study investigates political trust as a potential driver of political buycotting. Two competing hypotheses, assuming a protest and a compliance mechanism, were tested in choice-experiments among students in the

Netherlands, Austria and the United Kingdom. Prime reports were employed to manipulate issue-specific political trust. Results showed that political trust did not influence the

likelihood to buycott for the whole sample, yet an ideology split revealed significantly different mechanisms for right- and left leaners. The findings indicate that for left-leaners the protest mechanism is more pronounced whereas the compliance mechanism is more prevalent among right-leaners.

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Political Consumerism: Protest or Compliance? A Choice-Experiment on the Effect of Political Trust on Buycotting Behavior

In the Western world, individuals increasingly buy products for other reasons than mere consumption, such as ethical or political considerations. The growing demand for organic, fair-trade, environmentally friendly or regional products illustrates the rise of the so-called political consumerism (Andorfer & Liebe, 2012; Berlin, 2011; Forno & Ceccarini, 2006; Koos, 2012).

Political consumerism does not only present a shift in consumption behavior, but also an extension of political action repertoires (Koos, 2012; Micheletti & Stolle, 2012). Scholars have acknowledged political consumerism as a new form of political participation by which citizens aim to “stimulate social change” (Neilson & Paxton, 2010, p. 5), “vent their political concerns” (Stolle, Hooghe, & Micheletti, 2005, p. 246) or, broadly, to “create a world they want to live in” (Berlin, 2011, p.277). However, the (political) reasons for individuals to engage in political consumerism are controversial in the scholarly debate. Can political consumerism be understood as a symbol of protest, alienation, and rebellion against politics and as such as “the weapon only of outsiders“? (Stolle & Micheletti, 2005, p.3; Berlin, 2011). Or are political consumers rather dutiful individuals that expand their political engagement by following governmental appeals to consume sustainably (Kneip & Niesyto, 2007)? In both cases, political trust is considered a central driver of political consumerism (Barbosa, Portilho, Wilkinson, & Dubeux, 2014; Berlin, 2011; Neilson & Paxton, 2010; Stolle et al., 2005; Strømsnes, 2009).

Previous studies indicate that trust may exhibit two competing reactions in citizens: The protest hypothesis states that low trust in political institutions drives political

consumerism, because citizens have little confidence in the capacity of authorities to solve the crucial problems we are facing today; they therefore turn to the market (Forno &

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Ceccarini, 2006; Neilson & Paxton, 2010; Stolle, 2005). In contrast, the compliance

hypothesis assumes high trust to drive political consumerism. Governments openly address their citizenry with calls for sustainable behavior and self-responsibility (Kneip & Niesyto, 2007), and it is especially the trusting citizens who generally comply with the authorities and follow environmental appeals (Berlin, 2011).

So far, the findings regarding the potential influence of political trust on political consumerism are mixed (Barbosa et al., 2014; Berlin, 2011; Goul Andersen & Tobiasen, 2004; Forno & Ceccarini, 2006; Stolle et al., 2005). Mainly three shortcomings can be

identified in previous research on the phenomenon. First, conceptualization and measurement of both political consumerism and political trust remained rather unspecific in previous literature (Bauer, 2014; Berlin, 2011; Dekker, 2011; Gershtenson, Ladewig, & Plane, 2006; Koos, 2012). Second, the almost exclusive application of survey methods and consequent analysis of cross-sectional data should be complemented by causal designs to assess the mechanisms at play. Third, possible differences in mechanism for different social groups have been understudied so far. There are empirical indications that left-leaning citizens may have different motivations to consume politically than right-leaning citizens (Berlin, 2011).

Therefore, this study employs an experimental approach and assigns a special focus on the conceptualization of political trust to answer the research question:

To what extent, in which direction, and under which conditions does political trust influence political consumerism?

This investigation is theoretically relevant as it provides insights into the mobilizing power of political trust judgments and further clarifies the nature of political consumerism as a form of participation (Berlin, 2011). Moreover, the question is of practical importance to policy makers when determining communication strategies to persuade people to consume and behave sustainably.

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In this study, choice-experiments were conducted in the Netherlands, Austria, and the United Kingdom in which political trust was manipulated and political consumerism

measured by the choice between an organic and conventional product. The selection of countries was based on a comparative pilot study among European countries.

The particular contributions of this paper are threefold: Most importantly, the protest and the compliance hypothesis were tested in a causal design which enriches the body of existing cross-sectional research and at the same time provides one of the first applications of priming political trust in the literature. Second, it incorporates an issue-specific

conceptualization of political trust and a behavior-based conceptualization of political consumerism to detect relation patterns that were disclosed in prior approaches. Third, the mechanisms are investigated for different ideological groups to account for different motivations to consume politically.

Theoretical Background

Political Consumerism

In political and communication sciences, political consumerism is often defined as the “consumer choice of producers and products based on political and/or ethical considerations, or both” (Stolle, Hooghe & Micheletti, 2005, p.246). This definition is questionable, as it focuses on the motivations behind a product choice and not on the choice per se. Following this definition, buying fair-trade coffee for reasons of taste is not political consumerism, whereas buying coca cola to support the American food industry is. Yet, in practice, political consumerism is supposed to manifest itself in the purchase of organic, fair-trade, or energy-efficient products (Koos, 2012) and the steep increase of those purchases is stated as one of the main reasons for research on the phenomenon (Forno & Ceccarini, 2006; Neilson & Paxton, 2010). Stolle and colleagues (2005) discuss behavior and motivations as distinct dimensions of political consumerism, they eventually combine both in their measure of

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political consumerism behavior (“buying products for political reasons” (p.256)). Including both an act and the causes for that act into one concept seems problematic as there is already a causal mechanism implied such a conceptualization. Especially so, because motivations are not a requirement for other modes of participation like voting or signing petitions. Previous discussions in the literature also broach this difficulty of including motivations into concepts of political participation (Hooghe, Hosch-Dayican & van Deth, 2014; van Deth, 2014).

Therefore, a definition of political consumerism is suggested in this paper that refers exclusively to behavior and does not incorporate the motivations for such behavior: Political consumerism refers to the consumer choice of products and services that are ethically superior to alternative products or services (see also Koos, 2012). In this study, ethical superiority refers to manifest characteristics of products and services, such as organic labels or energy-saving certificates.

Political consumerism generally encompasses two types of behavior. Boycotting – the deliberate choice not to buy certain products – is an inherent part of consumer culture since the early 1900s (Stolle et al., 2005). Its counterpart buycotting describes the preference for products that fulfill certain political or ethical criteria, such as organic or fair-trade food. Strategic buycotting has only recently gained empirical importance (Stolle et al., 2005; Neilson, 2010; Koos, 2012) and a substantial amount of scholarly attention in the last years (Barbosa et al., 2014; Forno & Ceccarini, 2006; Ward & de Vreese, 2011).

Political consumerism is considered a relatively new, un-institutionalized form of political participation (Norris, 2007). Citizens express their political opinion through their purchase behavior, which potentially signals shifting demands to companies and producers, enables certain production practices, and raises awareness both in the public and the political sphere (Brenton, 2013). Although primarily situated in an economic context and not in the political realm, individuals incorporate political opinions and intentions into their

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consumption decisions (Baringhorst, Kneip, März, & Niesyto, 2007; Shah et al., 2007). Compared to traditional forms of engagement, political consumerism is less hierarchical and less organized and represents an “individualized form of collective action” (Koos, 2012, p. 37; Micheletti & Stolle, 2012). The term ‘life politics’ (Beck, 1994) describes such action repertoires that are lifestyle-related, spontaneous, and embedded in regular day-to-day life (Stolle & Hooghe, 2005). As such, political consumerism “blend(s) the private and the public” (Neilson & Paxton, 2011, p. 5) as private shopping choices are combined with political statements (Forno & Ceccarini, 2006). Notably, political consumerism falls under the category of cause-oriented politics (Norris, 2007), which is directed at specific political problems at both the national and the global level.

It is commonly agreed in the field that all political consumers share a wish to

stimulate social change, however, their position towards politics itself is unclear. Therefore, the question remains, “what kind of political participation is political consumerism?” (Newman & Bartels, 2011, p.805). Are political consumers frustrated with politics and thus turn away to find new ways of engagement (Stolle et al., 2005)? Or do they instead have confidence in politics and use political consumerism as a new way to collaborate (Neilson & Paxton, 2010)?

Such questions illustrate that political trust potentially plays an essential role for political consumerism – just as it does for political participation in general (Berlin, 2011; Hetherington & Husser, 2012; Hooghe & Marien, 2012; Levi & Stoker, 2000). Previous research indicated that high trust in politics can function as a driver for traditional forms of engagement, such as voting or joining a party, whereas non-institutionalized forms of participation are rather linked to low levels of trust in politics (Hooghe & Marien, 2012). However, for the case of political consumerism, existent studies draw a different picture.

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Previous Findings on the Effect of Political Trust on Political Consumerism

Up to date, empirical findings for the relationship between political trust and political consumerism are ambiguous. The seminal study by Stolle et al. (2005) investigated drivers of political consumerism among students in Belgium, Sweden, and Canada and found trust in political institutions to be negatively related to political consumerism. Similarly, Neilson and Paxton (2010) found a weak negative relationship between trust in political institutions and political consumerism with data from the European Social Survey (see also Newman & Bartels, 2011).

Forno and Ceccarini (2006) studied the Italian case with national survey data and found that political consumers had less trust in national governments but more trust in regional and international political bodies such as the United Nations. Berlin (2011) examined the relationship between political consumerism and trust on several levels in a Swedish context. His survey study found no relation between general institutional trust and buycotting or boycotting behavior but a positive relation with high trust in institutions associated with sustainability or the environment (Berlin, 2011). Similarly, Micheletti’s and Stolle’s (2005) analysis of Swedish survey data showed that trust in general political

institutions was related negatively and trust in specific consumer-related institutions was related positively to political consumerism.

In contrast, Goul Andersen and Tobiasen (2004) found political consumers to be significantly more trusting in general political institutions than non-consumers. Other authors found no associations between political trust and political consumerism whatsoever, like Baek (2010) for American survey data, Strømsnes (2009) for Norwegian national survey data or Barbosa et al. (2014) in their study of political consumerism among Brazilian youth.

To sum up, previous studies found either a positive, a negative, or no existing relationship between trust in intuitions and political consumerism in different, mostly

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European countries. The authors themselves reflect upon two points of critique: The employed cross-sectional designs can at most show associations but no causality between variables. Further, the use of rather general measures of political trust and political

consumerism makes a refined analysis difficult (Andorfer & Liebe, 2012; Berlin, 2011; Koos, 2012; Newman & Bartels, 2011; Stolle et al., 2005). These aspects emphasize the relevance of the experimental approach taken in this study and call for a specific conceptualization and operationalization of political consumerism and political trust.

Conceptualizing Political Trust

Although political trust has received a large amount of scholarly attention over the last decades, there is surprisingly little clarity about the definition and nature of the concept; “The most common approach is simply to refer to trust without definition or explanation of it, as though we all know what is meant” (Hardin, 2013, p. 33, also Bauer, 2014). Even more so, the extensive use of large scale survey data such as the ESS or the ANES undermines the theory-based construction of measurement instruments because “trust is taken to be what is measured by one or more survey questions” (Nannestad, 2008, p. 415). There are two problems with those conceptualization. First, they are neither precise in regards to the object (the political body) they refer to – trust in whom? Second, they do not take into account the function that has to be fulfilled to satisfy the trust – trust to do what?

The definition of political trust which is suggested in this study is based on sociological work by Luhmann (1988), Simmel (1999/1908), Barber (1983), and

consolidating analyses by Kohring (2004). First, political trust is a mechanism to bridge uncertainty about a contingent future. Individuals depend on the actions of others yet simultaneously know little about how these persons might behave and how they will select their actions in the future. As such, when we trust someone we anticipate that this person will behave in a certain, favorable way. Second, political trust is specific both in regards to the

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object and in regards to the selection (Bauer, 2014; Kohring 2004; Kohring & Matthes, 2007; Marcinkovski & Starke, 2013). In Hardin’s (2002) words, A trusts B to do X. Although it is certainly debatable how precisely known both B and X are in regards to citizens’ trust in politics, it is still plausible that trust in a specific government to solve a diplomatic conflict is different from trust in a political system to avoid totalitarian dictatorship (Dekker, 2011; Kohring & Matthes, 2007; Levi & Stoker, 2000). In the literature on political consumerism and trust, this is especially important as political consumerism itself constitutes a specific, cause-oriented form of engagement (Norris, 2007). Berlin (2011) argues along these lines and calls for specific conceptualizations of trust in relationship with political consumerism.

Therefore, the definition of political trust used in this paper is directed at the future and specifies both the reference object and the specific function. First, the object of trust are political institutions. If citizens base their choice to consume politically on political trust, this trust has to refer to a political body that is expected to handle issues related to the

environment (Norris, 2007). As such, the political system as a whole, as well as a single politician cannot be the reference objects as they do not have direct agency in regard to those issues (the political system cannot reform energy saving regulations, neither can one single minister). Second, the specific function which is expected to be fulfilled by political

institutions in this regard refers to the handling of issues related to the environment and animal welfare. The trust that matters for this study is not trust in political institutions to provide a good education system or to solve international diplomatic conflicts, but is specifically directed at topics such as pollution, CO2 emissions, livestock production, or waste management.

For the purposes of this paper, political trust is defined as the expectation that political institutions address environment- and animal-welfare-related problems.

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Theoretical Assumptions on the Relationship between Political Consumerism and

Political Trust

Two competing hypothesis can be derived from the literature, of which one resembles a protest and the other a compliance mechanism.

Protest hypothesis. The most prominent theoretical approach in the literature – here

called the protest hypothesis – draws on Beck's, Giddens', & Lash's (1994) thoughts on reflexive modernizations. Globalization and the rise of supranational companies lead to a shift in power from the political arena to the market (Berlin, 2011; Stolle et al., 2005; Ward & de Vreese, 2011)

As international companies are less and less controllable by national political

authorities, global problems linked to economies, production, and trade are also evading the areas of national political agency (Kneip & Niestyo, 2007) which Micheletti, Follesdal and Stolle (2004) call the “‘global ungovernability’ of international capitalism” (as cited in Koos, 2012, p. 42). Citizens recognize the decline in power of the political system and are

“frustrated” (Stolle at al., 2005) with conventional politics. They lose trust in the capability of political authorities to handle issues such as environmental change. As a consequence of such dissatisfaction, citizens consider traditional forms of participation no longer sufficient (Forno & Ceccarini, 2006; Newman & Bartels, 2011) and take action themselves. Thus, citizens draw away from the political system and take a shortcut to address the agents of production directly. They discover the marketplace as a new ground to express their political opinion (Berlin, 2011; Shah et al., 2007; Stolle et al., 2005). Accordingly, the first hypothesis states:

H1a: Individuals with low political trust are more likely to engage in political consumerism than individuals with high political trust.

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Compliance hypothesis. In contrast, another approach – here referred to as the

compliance hypothesis – suggests high political trust as a driver for political consumerism. As Kneip and Niesyto (2007) point out, it is actually in the government’s interest if people buy organic (often considered as healthier), regional (supports domestic economy), or fair-trade goods (also Berlin, 2011). In acknowledgement of the outlined governability problems, authorities “urge [citizens] to take their share of responsibility for global challenges in their daily lives.” (Berlin, 2011, p. 278) and encourage people to behave

sustainably (Spaargaren & Mol, 2008). Hence, “single consumers are charged with a personal co-responsibility to solve these environmental problems by changing their consumption choices and everyday routines” (Halkier, 1999, p. 26). Examples are the Big Energy Saving Week organized by the UK government in 2014, the German „Echt gerecht, Clever kaufen“ campaign (Kneip & Niesyto, 2007), or the Danish consumer handbook „Danmarks

Naturfrednings Forening“ (Halkier, 1999, p. 26). Kneip and Niesyto (2007) speak of a new form of governance which is directed at activating the “citizen consumer” (p.155; also Micheletti & Stolle, 2012).

If governments promote political consumerism, the question remains what type of citizens are inclined to follow those appeals to consume responsibly. Research on cooperative behavior, also in the political realm, provides strong evidence that it is the highly trusting individuals that are most likely to comply with authorities (Berlin, 2011; Levi & Stoker, 2000). Following Hetherington and Husser (2012), political trust is especially important when people are asked to make material sacrifices, which often applies to costly organic, fair-trade, or energy-saving products. Therefore, high trusting citizens are more motivated to take their share of responsibility and ‘work together’ with the government because they believe their actions to be supported by political bodies (Neilson & Paxton, 2010).

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Additionally, the certification of certain products is conducted or at least supervised by political institutions and hence political consumerism requires a minimum of trust in those labels (Boström & Klintman, 2008). Such labelling schemes can also be considered an

element of governmental appeals to responsible consumption as they enable and facilitate the choice of, for instance, organic products (Kneip & Niesyto, 2007). Conversely to the protest hypothesis, this line of thought assumes political consumers to be trusting citizens that follow governmental appeals. The second hypothesis thus states:

H1b: Individuals with high political trust are more likely to engage in political consumerism than individuals with low trust.

The Moderating Role of Political Ideology

As previous empirical evidence, the protest and compliance hypothesis are not

necessarily mutually exclusive but are likely to coexist. Berlin’s (2011) study indicates that it might be especially the left-leaners who buycott as a protest (and are then driven by low levels of trust) and especially the right-leaners who buycott to comply with governmental appeals (and are then driven by high levels of trust).

Political consumerism presents a mode of action that targets specific issues, such as the environment, climate or animal-welfare (Norris, 2007). Those are traditionally rather leftist stances (Stolle & Micheletti, 2005) and therefore the motivations to consume politically might also differ for different political ideologies. Political ideology can be defined as “set of beliefs about the proper order of society and how it can be achieved” (Erikson & Tedin, 2003, as cited in Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009, p. 309).

Whereas left-leaners might be more likely to hear or read about issues, products and labels linked with ethical consumption in their everyday lives, right-leaners might encounter them primarily in the form of governmental appeals and campaigns (Kneip & Niesyto, 2007). Additionally, whilst right-leaning political consumers are plausibly less involved than

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left-leaners with the issues per se, they might rather consider the choice of ethical products their civic duty. Another line of thought, brought up by Newman and Bartels (2011) states that leftist political consumerism is more aimed at global justice and the wellbeing of the planet whereas conservative political consumerism is rather aimed at fostering national and regional companies. Following this argumentation it seems plausible that rightist political

consumerism is also more linked to support national politics (also Schatz & Lavine, 2007). Therefore, the compliance mechanism might be especially prevalent among right-leaners whereas the protest mechanism might be more prevalent among left-right-leaners. Subsequently, the respective interactions are formulated in the following hypotheses:

H2a: The positive effect of high trust on the likelihood to engage in political consumerism is more pronounced for right-leaners than for left-leaners (compliance)

H2b: The positive effect of low trust on the likelihood to engage in political consumerism is more pronounced for left leaners than for right-leaners (protest).

Method

This study aims at following the call for experimental research on political trust (Faulkner, Martin, & Peyton, 2015; Levi & Stoker, 2000) and political consumerism (Andorfer & Liebe, 2012). A between-subjects experiment with one factor and four levels (high political trust, low political trust, control-salience, control–no salience (salience refers to the presence of environmental issues in the stimulus material)) was employed. Data collection lasted from the 19th of May until the 8th of June 2015.

The experiment focused on only one type of political consumerism behavior, namely buycotting. The reasons are of practical nature, as buycotting manifests itself mostly in the choice of ethical products, which can be identified as such via their labelling. Products that are typically boycotted however do typically not carry labels and are thus difficult to include into an experimental design.

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Sample

Data were collected among students in three different European countries, namely the Netherlands, Belgium and the United Kingdom. The choice of countries was based on a pilot study which was conducted in preparation of the current project (For more information see appendix). This multilevel analysis of data from the European Social Survey 2002/2003 yielded different relationships between political trust and political consumerism: In Austria, low levels of political trust were associated with high political consumerism, in the

Netherlands high trust was associated with high political consumerism and in the United Kingdom no relationship could be found. To assess the actual mechanisms at play and

examine possible differences, the experiments were conducted in the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Austria.

The population consisted of university students in the respective countries. Student samples were chosen to achieve sample comparability across countries, also due to limited financial resources. The study was distributed by university employees among their students in the United Kingdom and Austria. In the Netherlands, the survey was distributed via the subject pool of a Dutch university. Out of 391 started questionnaires 199 were completed, resulting in a drop-out rate of 49%. After excluding further cases with missing values on variables of interest, unrealistic answer patterns and those that did not believe the

reports1,159 cases remained for the analysis. Young (M = 22.08, SD = 4.00) and female (female: 76%) individuals dominated the sample.

Stimulus Material

The manipulation of the independent variable political trust was based on Faulkner and colleagues’ (2015) work on the possibilities of priming political trust in experimental designs. They found evidence that reading a text on the probity of a politician written by a neutral source can manipulate political trust, both on the American trust-in-government index

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(as used in the ANES) as well as on the European trust-in-institutions scale (as used in the ESS). This innovative study opened up new possibilities in researching consequences of political trust in experimental designs.

As this study is concerned with issue-specific political trust on an institutional level, primes were based on past performance of political institutions as a manipulator. For this purpose, short texts were created that were labelled as an extract from the annual report of an independent scientific institute (e.g. in the UK the ECI, Environmental Change Institute at the University of Oxford), in which conclusions were drawn on political performance regarding ‘green’ issues (CO2 emissions and energy supply, animal welfare, waste). The texts in the low and high conditions differed in the valence of their judgments and were otherwise identical (see Appendix). Two control texts were created which were not related to political

performance. One of them also dealt with environmental topics. The last control text dealt with language education research. These two controls were employed to disentangle trust-effects from mere exposure-trust-effects as the political trust primes also evoke salience of

environmental issues. A pretest (n = 45) confirmed the credibility and the effectiveness of the trust primes in manipulating issue-specific trust (MH = 4.14, SDH = .25; ML = 2.79, SDL = .22; t(47) = -3.972, p < .001).

Procedure

The online-experiment was programmed using the software tool Qualtrics and distributed in the form of a short promotion text and a link by university staff members via e-mail. To create a realistic consumption choice and to avoid demand effects, a cover story was used. Prior to the study, participants were told that the experiment dealt with memory in science communication and new media and that chocolate baskets would be raffled as a thank you among the participants. During the experiment, participants were first shown one of the four reports (for instance a political trust primes) and were asked to read it carefully as they

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would have to recall the information given in the text at a later stage in the study. Afterwards, they watched an unrelated YouTube Video and were then asked recall-questions about the content of the text they read. Both served the purpose of enhancing the credibility of the cover story; additionally the recall-questions should reinforce the manipulation as described in the design by Faulkner et al. (2015). Subsequently, a screen popped up which declared that this was the main part of the study and that, as promised, chocolate baskets would be raffled among the participants. Participants were asked to choose between organic and conventional chocolate to register their preference for the raffle before some more general questions would be asked. A short question about YouTube-use functioned as a filler and as a credibility enforcement. Further, the political concepts were measured, followed by the ‘environmental’ measures, the manipulation checks and demographics.

At the end of the study, participants were told that the reports they read in the beginning were not real but drafted for the purpose of the study. They could sign up for further information as well as for the chocolate raffle and were thanked for their contribution. A full debriefing followed one week after data collection via e-mail.

Measures

Consumption choice. This study aimed at constructing a measure that resembles real

consumption decisions compared to fictional consumption scenarios or consumption

intention measures, as both have been heavily criticized for their artificiality and the lack of ‘payment‘ (Andorfer & Liebe, 2012; Griskevicius, Tybur, & Van den Bergh, 2010).

Furthermore, social desirability is a considerable problem in research on ethical purchases and the measurement should thus account for such effects (Andorfer & Liebe, 2012). Inspired by designs from marketing literature (Hudson, Hudson, & Edgerton, 2013), a consumption choice measure was integrated as the incentive for participation in the study: participants can win one of 20 chocolate baskets, worth €12. Chocolate was chosen as a product as it is

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feasible to send out to participants, is generally popular, and credible to exist in both organic and conventional versions.

Individuals chose between a basket with three organic chocolate bars and a basket with five conventional chocolate bars to include the element of price difference between ethical and conventional products. The ‘the willingness to pay more’ is a crucial element in political consumption behavior (Brenton, 2013; Griskevicius et al., 2010). The chocolate bars looked identical apart from the labels on the organic chocolate (both the EU label as well as the most popular organic label in the respective country) and the word ‘organic’ (or ‘bio’, respectively). As chocolate brand, ‘Ghirardelli’ (USA) was chosen, based on several

considerations: The brand is not available in any of the three countries, the product ranges in a higher but not luxurious price category, the brand name is not linked to the language of one of the three countries, the package looks appealing but neutral and does not show a globe (which is a prominent feature on chocolate bars but evokes association to fair-trade labels). A pretest (n = 47) confirmed that the organic chocolate was perceived as ethically superior (on a scale from 1 (organic chocolate) to 6 (conventional chocolate) M = 1.72, SD = .69, differing significantly from the midpoint (t(46) = 12.71, p>.001)) and that the perceived price

differences matches the choice of three organic versus five conventional chocolates (average price perception of organic chocolate: €3.17, of conventional chocolate €1.98).

Consumption intention. As an additional measure, consumption intentions were

assessed as well. Following Berlin's (2011) and Koos' (2012) criticism of common measures of political consumerism, the applied scale distinguished between several product categories (food, clothing, transport, cosmetics, household and cleaning supplies and electronic devices) and did not assess a single purchase but the relative frequency of political consumption behavior. Answers were measured on a five-point scale (never, 25% of the time, half of the

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time, 75% of the time, always). The scale achieved acceptable reliability (Cronbach’s α = .72).

Political ideology. Based on the measure employed in the European Social Survey,

political ideology was assessed on a left-right continuum, ranging from 0 = left to 10 = right (ESS round 1, 2004).

Manipulation checks.

Issue-specific political trust. The effectiveness of the manipulation was measured by 4 items. Based on the definition of trust as an expectation towards a political body to fulfil a specific function, participants were asked about their expectations towards political

institutions to handle issues related to the environment or animal welfare in the next years. This measure is both specific in regard to the object as well as to the function and clearly directed to the future. The scale achieved good reliability (Cronbach’s α = .91).

Trust in institutions. Additionally, the conventional measure for trust in political institutions in the European context was included in the questionnaire to gain further insight into the effectiveness of the manipulation and the relation between issue-specific primes and general trust judgements. Based on the ESS scale, trust in seven political institutions plus trust in the national government was measured on a Likert scale ranging from 0 (no trust at all) to 10 (complete trust) (ESS round 1, 2004). The scale achieved good reliability

(Cronbach’s α = .92).

Report credibility: The manipulation could function only if participants found the presented reports to be credible. Thus, one item was included to assess whether individuals actually believed the report they had read.

Controls.

Perception of ethic qualities of the product. As political consumerism in this study is defined as the choice of products that are perceived as ethically superior, it was important to

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assess whether participants perceived such a difference between the organic and the conventional chocolate. Political efficacy has shown to positively influence political consumerism behavior (Neilson & Paxton, 2010) and was therefore included in the design. Last, demographics such as sex, age and income, more precisely the ‘amount of money available at your disposal per month’ were collected as previous studies showed that

especially young, female and affluent individuals engage in political consumerism (Forno & Ceccarini, 2006; Neilson & Paxton, 2010; Stolle et al., 2005).

The questionnaires were administered in English, Dutch and German. Translations were either taken from cross-national surveys (ESS round 1, 2004), offered by the authors in the respective articles (Kohring, 2004; Beierlein et al., 2012) or converted by bilingual speakers in a back-translation procedure. All scales can be found in the Appendix.

Results

Although student samples typically show a bias towards leftist political ideologies and relatively high levels of political trust, the distribution of scores on the variables of interest was rather balanced (Table 1). Overall, 63% chose the organic chocolate over the

conventional chocolates. Thus, also the distribution of buycotters was rather balanced in the sample.

Table 1 Descriptives

Mean SD Min Max

Choice of organic chocolate .63 .48 0 1

Specific political trust 3.80 1.24 1 7

Political ideology 5.35 2.21 1 11

Political efficacy 4.29 1.07 1.25 7

Issue relevance (environment & animal welfare)

4.98 1.16 2 7

Note. n = 159

Following, results are presented for the whole sample as separate country analyses did not yield notable differences.

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Manipulation Check

To begin with, the prime-reports were generally perceived as credible (M = 4.71, SD = .97 on a seven-point scale). The manipulation of the independent variable, specific political trust, was successful as participants that were exposed to the high-trust prime (M = 4.34, SD = 1.17) showed significantly higher levels of specific trust than participants that were exposed to the low-trust prime (M = 3.65, SD = 1.28; t(86) = -2.41, p < .05). Interestingly, comparing the trust levels of the prime groups to the control groups in a one-way ANOVA revealed that only the high-trust prime differed from the control groups (control-salience: M = 3.68, SD = 1.24; control-no salience: M = 3.62, SD = 1.18;

F (2, 142) = .03, p <.05) whereas the low trust prime did not. In other words, reading a report about political failures regarding environmental issues in the last year did not lower the self-reported individual trust in political institutions whereas a report about political successes increased self-reported levels of trust. Further, the salience of the issue itself had no effect on specific trust, as the no-salience control group did not differ from the salience-control group.

Moreover, participants perceived a significant difference in ethical properties of the chocolates as they found the organic chocolate to be more sustainable, responsible, green and ethical (M = 2.56, SD = 2.06; difference from the middle category: t(158) = -15.61, p < .001).

Examining political trust effects on buycotting

Hypothesis 1a and 1b predicted effects of political trust on the choice of organic over conventional chocolate. Accordingly, a first Chi-Square test of independence was run

between the four prime conditions and consumption choice. No significant dependencies were found (χ2(3) = 5.29, p = .15). Although this superficial analysis did not show significant relations, the full analysis was conducted to include control variables, disentangle salience effects and to later test the predicted interaction. To account for the binary nature of the data, a binary logistic regression was executed.

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The estimates are presented in odd-ratios in Table 2. To differentiate salience effects from trust effects, the control-salience condition was chosen as a reference category. Model 1 confirmed the preliminary findings: Political trust showed little relation to the choice of organic chocolate. The insignificant likelihood ratio test indicated a poor model fit as the present model did not seem to fit the data significantly better than an empty model.

The control-no salience condition exerted a significant negative influence on the consumption choice, indicating a strong salience effect. Having been exposed to a report that did not deal with environmental issues (condition 4) lowered the odds to choose organic chocolate by 54% compared to choosing conventional chocolate and compared to having been exposed to a report that deals with environmental issues (condition 1, 2, 3). Yet, in light of the poor model fit, this effect should be interpreted with care. The finding mostly supports the choice of two control groups to disentangle salience from trust effects in later models.

Table 2

Binary logistic regression explaining consumption choice

Model 1 Model 2 Odds-ratio p Odds-ratio p Prime: High trust .63 .344 .53 .254 Low trust .58 .217 .65 .376 Control – no salience .36 .015 .26 .007 Political Ideology .92 .365 Political efficacy .77 .148 Age 1.16 .035 Income .99 .640 Constant 2.92 .001 1.64 .779 LR-test Chi2 5.33(df = 3) .101 17.61(df = 8) .024 n 159 159

Note. Choice of organic chocolate is coded 1 = yes, prime reference category: control salience .Data from

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In Model 2 control variables are included and the fit improved as the model fits significantly better than an empty model. Yet, it did not lead to a change regarding the hypothesized relationships. Interestingly, other measures of political attitudes such as political ideology and political efficacy did not show significant influences either. In this model, it did not make a difference whether a person had a leftist or rightist political ideology or whether a person felt that he or she can make a change in politics or not for the likelihood to choose organic chocolate over conventional chocolate. This finding is striking as previous studies found political consumers to be generally left leaning and to show rather high levels of efficacy. Further, age exerted a significant positive influence on the likelihood to buycott, which is in line with previous findings (Neilson & Paxton, 2010). This is remarkable insofar as the present student sample showed a relatively small age variance.

These results did not support Hypotheses 1a and 1b. Neither the high nor the low trust condition impacted the individual choice for organic chocolate or one’s motivation to buy ethical products in the future. It seems as if the individual choice of ethical over unethical products was completely independent of levels of political trust in this study. Additional analyses with institutional trust – which was not affected by the trust primes – did not yield any significant effects either.

Differences for left- and right leaners

To test for possible differences for different ideological groups, the sample was split up into a right-leaning group and a left-leaning group (midpoint split2). Both groups showed sufficient variation on their consumption choices (right-leaners: 57.42% buycotted; left-leaners: 68.31% buycotted). The results are presented in Table 3.

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Remarkably, in the right-leaning group a negative effect of low trust on the

consumption choice appeared which was significant at the .10-level. Thus, if an individual had a rightist political ideology and was exposed to a low-trust prime, the odds to choose organic chocolate decreased by 73% compared to choosing conventional chocolate. Apparently, low trust in the government to solve environmental issues also alienates

individuals from ethical consumption choices which partly confirms H2a. For left-leaners, no significant relations could be detected in this regard (as assumed in H2b).

Examining the previously discussed salience effect, the two groups also differed substantially from each other: whereas the influence of not having been in a salience

condition was strong and highly significant for right-leaners, the effect is not significant for left-leaners The two groups also showed deviating results for the impact of other variables on the consumption choice (Table 3). High political efficacy decreased the likelihood of

choosing organic chocolate for the left-leaners. Those findings are surprising as political Table 3

Binary logistic regression explaining consumption choice for left-leaners and right-leaners

Left-leaners Right-leaners Odds-ratio p Odds-ratio p Prime: High trust .27 .141 .36 .266 Low trust 2.41 .247 .23 .066 Control – no salience .43 .203 .06 .003 Political efficacy .60 .086 .93 .461 Age 1.21 .067 1.14 .145 Income 1.01 .083 .99 .249 Constant 1.48 .879 .51 .779 LR-test Chi2 21.39(df = 8) .005 15.54 (df = 8) .049 n 87 72

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efficacy was assumed to positively relate to buycotting. Further, age and income showed a small positive effect for left-leaners which is in line with findings from previous research.

Sensitivity Analysis

To further investigate the robustness of the negative effect found in the right-leaning group, some additional analyses were conducted. If interaction terms between ideology and trust primes were included in the model instead of splitting up the sample, the direction of the effect remains the same yet becomes insignificant (OR = .81, p = .147). Additionally, when running a regression model on consumption intentions as the dependent variable for the right-leaning group, the negative effect of having been in a low trust condition on buycotting became insignificant. These findings show first of all that the effects found in the logistic regression did not show much robustness and should thus be interpreted with care.

Interestingly however, in the left-leaning group the low-trust prime exerts a

significant positive effect on buycotting intentions (b = .55, p < .10). Having been exposed to a low-trust prime significantly decreases the intentions to engage in political consumerism. Therefore, the protest hypothesis finds support for left-leaners when consumption intentions rather than consumption behavior are looked at. This relation speaks in favor of H2b (see full model in the Appendix).

Discussion

This study was concerned with the potential effect of political trust on political consumerism, more precisely buycotting. In contrast to previous, cross-sectional research, political trust primes did not exert a direct influence on the likelihood to choose organic chocolate over conventional chocolate. Therefore, the protest (H1a) and the compliance hypotheses (H1b) are not supported by the data.

Yet, differences in mechanisms could be found for different ideological groups, which partly supports H2a and H2b. For right-leaners, political trust exerted an influence in such a

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way that low trust in political institutions to handle problems related to the environment or animal-welfare reduced the likelihood of ethical consumption. At the same time, for left-leaners the low-trust prime exerted a positive influence on the intentions to buycott, supporting the protest-hypothesis.

Interpreting these findings, right-leaners might associate ethical products and labeling schemes much closer with national politics than left-leaners. Thus, if they lose trust in

political institutions, they also lose trust in labeling schemes and concepts like organic production. Right-leaners may be less likely to encounter ‘leftist’ issues in their everyday lives; instead they may encounter them mainly in the shape of governmental campaigns or appeals. This plausible explanation is supported by the strong salience effect for right-leaners. Consequently, these finding might speak in support of the compliance hypothesis for right-leaners - yet not in the way that high trust increases compliance but rather that low trust decreases compliance. Left-leaners on the other hand may be more involved with environmental issues and therefore also more put out about governmental failure on this issues. Thus, in case of losing this trust in political institutions, left-leaning citizens might want to take action to compensate the lack of legislative impact whereas right-leaning citizens rather lose faith in political consumerism as well. Therefore, the protest mechanism might be more prevalent among left-leaners.

Most of all, these findings points out that motivations for political consumerism and therefore also its meaning might differ substantially among different social groups which is in line with previous research (Berlin, 2011; Newman & Bartels, 2011).

Limitations

Naturally, some methodological limitations occurred in this study. First, the use of a rather small convenience student sample has to be noted. A consequence may have been the poor robustness of the effect for right leaners as well as generally high p-values. Second, this

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study could only look at a small action area of political consumerism - it examined

specifically the choice of organic chocolate. Even more fundamental, only buycotting was looked at in this paper. There are indications that boycotting relates to the concept of interest in a substantially different way. As boycotting is punishment-oriented, it may be closer linked to protest behavior compared to reward-oriented buycotting (Baek, 2010; Copeland, 2013; Neilson, 2010). Thus, studying the effects of political trust on boycotting might yield more support for protest mechanisms and less support for compliance mechanisms.

Lastly, the external validity in general and the realism of the consumption choice in particular has to be discussed. The choice was still presented in a gain-frame compared to normal shopping decisions which resemble rather a loss-frame because the individual has to sacrifice real money. Research in political psychology provides strong evidence that decision making varies substantially between loss and gain frames (Martino, Kumaran, Seymour, & Dolan, 2006) as different brain regions are activated respectively. Nevertheless, the presented measure probably came closer a true purchase decision than measures of intention or

preferences alone.

Implications

Having said this, implications for our understanding of political consumerism shall be discussed. The theorized mechanisms could not be found in the data as there was neither strong support for the protest nor for the compliance hypothesis. In fact, it seemed that political concepts of all sorts, including political efficacy and ideology, were merely related to buycotting behavior in this study. This poses the question, why other studies found relationships between political trust and political consumerism. This project differed

substantially from previous work, as a behavior-based conceptualization and measurement of political consumerism was employed. Thus, intentions and socio-political motives for

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asked whether they buy products for ‘political reasons’ but instead their choices themselves were observed. It might be possible that previous work found associations between political attitudes and political consumerism only because they predefined such behavior as political in the questionnaires.

Such thoughts lead to a more general discussion about the ‘political’ in political participation. As with all other forms of participation, we usually consider the act itself political without the requirement of actual political intention (Hooghe et al., 2014; van Deth, 2014). Already for reasons of consistency it is not plausible to set political motivations as the defining element (Hooghe et al., 2014). Further, as Hooghe et al. (2014) point out,

participants do not per se have one driving motivation that can be categorized as political or not. Qualitative studies that were concerned with individual reasons to buy ethical products identify drivers such as ‘it makes me feel good about myself’ (Varul, 2009) or a ‘warm glow’ Hudson et al. (2013), This phrase illustrates that self-centered and society-centered (political) motives are not necessarily distinguishable from each other.

If political attitudes and sentiments are rarely related to ethical consumption choices, as is the case in the present study, one can wonder whether the political nature of political consumerism is overestimated. In this regard the strong salience effect present in the data should be discussed. The mere exposure to reports about environmental issues was by far the strongest predictor as it doubled the odds to choose organic chocolates compared to choosing the conventional chocolates. Possibly, consumption choices are much less based on rational reasoning, not to speak about political motives, as scholars commonly like to assume3.

Priming political trust

The manipulation of the independent variable in this study – political trust primes - presents a novel methodological approach in the field. Prior to this project, the approach of priming political trust with exposure to short texts has been applied only once, namely by

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Faulkner and colleagues (2015). The present method differed from Faulkner et al. (2015)’s work as issue-specific trust was primed. Consequently, the manipulation successfully altered self-reports of issue-specific trust but not measures of issue-unspecific institutional trust. This finding supports the notion that citizens do indeed differentiate in their trust judgements concerning different issues; trust in political institutions to handle environmental problems may be substantially different from trust in political institutions to solve diplomatic conflicts (Marcinkowski & Starke, 2013).

Another deviation from Faulkner’s et al. (2015) design was the use of two control texts in this study that helped to assess the individual influence of each trust prime and to disentangle it from mere exposure effects. Interestingly, the manipulation check revealed that only the high-trust prime significantly influenced levels of trust compared to the control groups whereas the low-trust prime did not. It is indeed surprising that reading about the radical failure of the political institutions in one’s country did not lead to lower levels of trust. Yet, considering that effects were found for the low-trust condition, the explanation may be purely methodological. Conceivably, the persuasive power of the low trust prime was of a very short-termed nature and did not endure until the manipulation check was conducted at a much later point in the study. Indeed, research on negativity biases in processing of political information shows that negative messages are more appealing at first but are recalled less and used less in evaluations (Bradley, Angelini, & Lee, 2008; Diagnault, Soroka, & Giasson, 2012). These findings are interesting aspects to explore the potential of priming political trust.

Suggestions

Political consumerism seems to be a complex phenomenon with individually varying motivations as the split between leftist and rightist respondents illustrated. Therefore, a potential advice for policy makers is directed at acknowledging the different motivations of

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different groups and thus targeting them individually. Yet, what seems to be a generally important factor is merely the salience of the issue. Raising awareness for environmental or livestock production-related problems might already serve as an efficient strategy.

This study showed potential for further research on political consumerism and

political trust. Aside from the call for application and development of political trust primes in experimental designs, future research should also go deeper into the concept of political consumerism itself. Disentangling shopping behavior from political intentions proved to be an interesting step in assessing the political nature of this mode of action. Incorporating both behavior and intentions into causal designs but keeping them analytically distinct will add important insights into the concept political consumerism.

Conclusion

To conclude, this paper presents the first experimental study on the relationship between political trust and political consumerism. Thus, the main contribution to the literature lies in the application of a causal design which complements existent cross-sectional research. In this regard, the study followed the promising path opened up by Faulkner and colleagues (2015) to prime political trust in experiments. Furthermore, the use of specific conceptualizations and measures of political trust and political consumerism constitutes a further step to disentangling intentions from behavior in lifestyle politics. Lastly, it yielded indications for possibly different mechanisms in different social groups.

Understanding the role of political trust for political consumerism is crucial to shed light on the political nature of this type of action. It tells us, how choices in day-to-day consumption are linked, or even driven by political attitudes and thus whether political consumerism is a tool of the dissatisfied, alienated or of the complying, involved citizens. This study represents another step in exploring the ‘political’ in political consumerism.

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Notes

1Scored 1 or 2 on the item: I believe the report (1 = completely disagree, 7 = completely agree)

2Here a midpoint split (1-6 and 7-12) seems more suitable than the often applied medians split as the sample is rather left leaning. A median split would allocate weak left leaners and right leaners into one group.

3Research in political psychology keeps proving this point in various settings (Martino et al., 2006; Meffert, Chung, Joiner, Waks, & Garst, 2006; Taber & Lodge, 2006)

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Appendix Stimulus Material: Political Trust Primes

The English versions, used for data collection in the United Kingdom, are presented.

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Figure A2: prime high political trust (English version)

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Figure A3: control text – salience (English version)

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Measure Buycotting: Consumption Choice Figure A5: choice between chocolate baskets for raffle

Scales (in order of relevance)

All scales are presented in English. Table A1:

Issue specific trust in institutions

If you think about the next years, to what extent to do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

M SD

I trust in the British legislation to decrease CO2 emissions in the country.

3.71 1.42

I trust in the British legislation to ensure sustainable energy supply

4.01 1.45

I trust in the British legislation to protect the natural environment from pollution.

3.80 1.44

I trust in the British legislation to improve animal well-being in livestock-production

3.66 1.37

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This thesis also draws from works in Shakespeare Animal Studies, such as Erica Fudge’s works on the distinction between human and nonhuman in early modern England (“Monstrous

Therefore, the aims of this study were (i) to determine the completeness of information of the most viewed YouTube patient testimonials re- garding Invisalign treatment and

This allows for consistency between quasi-steady pressure distributions (the difference between two steady solutions) and unsteady solutions at zero frequency. In