Conditioned compliance : analyzing the ICTY and the politics of transitional justice in the former Yugoslavia

Conditioned Compliance: Analyzing the ICTY and the

Politics of Transitional Justice in the Former Yugoslavia

Author: Slavica Radakovic (10634797)

Supervisor: Dr. Sara Kendall

Date of Completion: June 27

_{, 2014}

“Master Thesis Political Science”

Specialization: International Relations

Table of Contents

Introduction: The Importance of Acknowledging the Past

I. Transitional Justice: Dealing with the Past

II. Research: Questions for Analysis and Thesis Ambitions III. Research Design and Methods

Chapter 1: Understanding the Politics Behind State Compliance with Transitional Justice Norms

I. Theoretical Framework II. International Pressures III. Domestic Political Conditions

Chapter 2: Between Law and Politics: The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)

I. The Establishment of the ICTY

II. The ICTY as a Legal and Political Institution

III. The Domestic Perceptions of the ICTY in Serbia and Croatia

Chapter 3: Transitional Justice and its Institutions: An In-Depth Analysis of Domestic Trials and Truth Commissions in Serbia and Croatia

I. Domestic War Crimes Trials A. Serbia

B. Croatia

II. Truth Commissions

Chapter 4: Understanding the Domestic Effects of Policies of Conditionality

I. Transnational Network Partnership: Serbia

II. The Gotovina Case: Croatia and the European Union

III. Media: A focus on the Conditions of Policies of Conditionality IV. The Masking of the Moral Obligations behind ICTY Cooperation

Chapter 5: Concluding Remarks References

Conditioned Compliance: Analyzing the ICTY and the

Politics of Transitional Justice in the Former Yugoslavia

“Discovering the truth is a cornerstone of the rule of law and a fundamental step on

the way to reconciliation: for it is the truth that cleanses the ethnic and religious hatreds and begins the healing process.” 1

INTRODUCTION

The Importance of Acknowledging the Past

For international relations scholars the events that transpired in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s may altogether be a distant reality compared to the most recent wave of political turmoil to plague the countries of the Middle East and most recently, Ukraine. However, lessons gathered from the legacy of mass atrocities and human rights violations from the Yugoslav wars can be applied in understanding how to effectively handle transitional justice initiatives that follow a society in its post-conflict peace building stage.

Despite the numerous scholarly literature surrounding Yugoslav state cooperation with external actors and with the norms of transitional justice in the years following the bloodshed, little has been reported with regards to how external demands for justice have impacted the process of truth and reconciliation in the region. The fundamental premise of this thesis will therefore be to understand the domestic politics behind transitional justice initiatives in the former Yugoslavia and how policies of conditionality and external demands for human rights violations have impacted the broader goals of transitional justice most notably truth and reconciliation.

As I delved into gathering the necessary research for this thesis, I realized the severity and the importance of what had happened in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, a region that was once prosperous and respected by the international

community. The region was a melting pot of different ethnicities and religions, a model for the world. However, with the demise of communism and the replacement of nationalism, political elites such as Serbia’s Slobodan Milosevic and Croatia’s Franjo Tudjman were successful in pitting individuals that once lived peacefully together against each other. The international community watched as the genocide at Srebrenica, perhaps the most notable event in Europe since World War II, and numerous other massacres plagued the Balkans in the 1990s (Grodsky 2009: 696; Subotic 2009: 24; Simonovic 2000: 442-443).

What is perhaps the most striking is that nearly two decades since the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords, the agreement that marked the official end to the conflict, not enough has been done in the region by individual Yugoslav states with regards to facing the past. As Serbia and Croatia, among other former Yugoslav States, tried to move forward from the conflict, international political elites realized that for these societies, coming to terms with what had happened was easier said then done. Questions arose as to how should the Balkans deal with such a violent legacy? How can individuals that once killed each other apprehend to live together peacefully?

For the international community, the response for dealing with this violent legacy was the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). It was assumed that by trying the most high-ranking individuals responsible for perpetuating these atrocious events, peace and reconciliation in the region would be a realized reality. However, even in 2014, many individuals from the former Yugoslavia, specifically speaking the political elite, have yet to

acknowledge their nation’s complicity and responsibility for the brutal conflicts in the Balkans despite the establishment of this ad-hoc tribunal.

The creation of the ICTY led Western diplomats to believe that by trying the perpetrators of the Yugoslav wars, the tribunal would put an end to the culture of impunity and by doing so, that it would subsequently forge a process of

accountability and reconciliation in the region. However, as I will explain in my thesis, the ICTY’s success beyond the judicial sphere has been minimal. Part of this can be analyzed through the policies of conditionality that have been exerted by

governmental and nongovernmental actors in their relations with the former Yugoslav states, as an effort to get them to cooperate with the norms of transitional justice. Although the application of policies of conditionality have led to the

extradition of numerous human rights violators, they have made facing the past a pragmatic issue rather than a moral one. Consequently, for transitional societies, this dilemma of conditioned compliance has hindered the domestic normative changes that were essential in order for truth and reconciliation to be achieved.

Before continuing further, it is perhaps necessary to briefly mention what I refer to as “conditioned compliance”, a term that I mentioned in the previous paragraph and a term that will be quite paramount throughout the reminder of the thesis. I use conditioned compliance to signify the fundamental premise of policies of conditionality. For example, when an international actor employs policies of conditionality or sets certain conditions and criteria for a specific reward to a target state, the target state is faced with conditions to comply with, hence the term

“conditioned compliance”.

As Serbia and until recently Croatia aspire for EU membership, they are faced with countless demands and conditions to comply with. Just as other countries in Eastern Europe who wish to become members of the European Union are required to reform their political, economic, and social systems to become more in line with European standards, so too are the countries of the Western Balkans. However, there is one exception that Yugoslav states are faced with in contrast to other aspiring EU candidate countries: compliance with the ICTY. The countries of the former Yugoslavia are asked to arrest war crimes suspects and send them to The Hague. This has now become a requirement, a normal precondition that the EU and the rest of the international community use as a leverage point for accession and financial aid talks.

The arrest of Radovan Karadzic in Belgrade in 2008 serves as a prime

example, as it highlights the interconnectedness between the highly sought after EU membership and ICTY compliance. Karadzic’s arrest came suddenly, just a few weeks after the reformist government of Boris Tadic came into power in Belgrade. As the post-oppositionist politicians noted, now that Karadzic was in custody and

was to be transferred to the tribunal in The Hague, the “doors to Europe were finally reopened” (Spoerri 2008: 364). For a country that was for years shunned by the international community, this came as a pleasant surprise.

Officials from the European Union also marked this event as Serbia’s clear commitment to the rule of law and adherence to the norms of international justice set forth by the international community. Compliance with the ICTY was seen as a clear indicator of the region’s ability and will to deal with the past. In other words, it was compliance with ICTY indictments that was the variable that measured a

country’s respect for international law.

Yet, what was sorely lacking and inadequate from certain high-ranking politicians in Belgrade was the moral dimension of why Karadzic, like the region’s other war criminals, was arrested. The Serbian public watched as their once renowned “hero” who helped liberate Serbia from its enemies was being sent to a distant tribunal for his involvement in the Bosnian war. Although the public was well informed of the material benefits the country would be rewarded with, the nature of Karadzic’s crimes, and the implications that his arrest would have for the process of truth, reconciliation, and peace in the region was left unexplored. In essence, the moral imperative of Karadzic’s arrest was greatly overshadowed by the pragmatic imperative.

For post-conflict peace building, a society can only truly heal and begin the process to recovery only when crimes of such magnitude and severity are

understood by the target audience to be morally unacceptable. (Subotic 2009: 14-28). Recognizing, acknowledging, and exploring the past should be incorporated as state policies. The acceptance of crimes as historical facts that are not to be

tolerated and lionized by the public is important not only for victims but for states who wish to become consolidated democracies that adhere to the rule of law and the principles set forth by the international community at large.

For Serbia and Croatia, the process of accepting the past as morally and humanely unacceptable is severely lacking, in many cases even sorely absent. Almost two decades since the end of the 1990s conflict in the region, more then 160 indictments issued by the ICTY, the process of reconciliation has been inadequate

(Subotic 2009: 41). Ethnic tensions are still largely present in many Serb and Croat communities, something that still may take years to overcome.

I. Transitional Justice: Dealing with the Past

The conflicts in the Balkans and Rwanda in the 1990s led scholars and international justice activists to realize that confronting the past was a necessary requirement for a lasting peace. It was the first step, and perhaps the most

important step forward into a new beginning. For states transitioning from a period of violent conflict, the process of dealing with the past was seen through the

institutions of transitional justice (Spoerri 2011: 1829). First, before developing further into any discussion, it is paramount to define what I consider “transitional justice” in this thesis. For this, I refer to the definition of Ruti Teitel and van der Merwe, two leading scholars in the field of international criminal law and

transitional justice. Transitional justice as defined by Ruti Teitel and van der Merwe, is present in transitioning societies, where there is an effort to “establish the truth about the past, determine accountability, and offer some sort of redress” (van der Merwe 2009: 1; Teitel 2000: 231; Spoerri 2011: 1828).

The end of the 1990s, marked an unprecedented growth in the mechanisms of transitional justice which included international and domestic trials for war crimes perpetrators, truth commissions, reparations for victims, policies of

lustration and numerous other methods that help societies deal with legacies of past violence (Subotic 2009: 3; Zupan 2005: 1). However, what is evident with the

establishment of the ad-hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda in 1993 and 1994 respectively, is that contemporary discussions of transitional justice are centered on criminal prosecutions that are paved in courts of law (Huyse 2003: 34: Spoerri 2011: 1827). For the countries of the former Yugoslavia, Western governments have measured the region’s adherence to the transitional justice process in strictly narrow terms: compliance with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).

Bearing this in mind, the novelty of this thesis will be to not only illustrate how countries of the former Yugoslavia have dealt with the process of transitional justice domestically, and the politics behind ICTY compliance, but to emphasize the domestic effect policies of conditionality have had on the broader goals of

transitional justice, specifically speaking truth and reconciliation. It is a topic that hasn’t been deeply delved into by the academic community. Since not many

International Relations scholars have dealt with this topic, addressing this issue will help scholars to understand how policies of conditionality can be construed by domestic elites for purposes that are quite different from those that are advanced by the international community.

Policies of conditionality have been invoked for nearly a decade by numerous governmental and nongovernmental institutions in order to get the former Yugoslav governments to comply with ICTY indictments and bring perpetrators to justice. I refer to conditionality as the strategic linkage of material incentives to a specific policy in order to initiate a shift in state behavior (Sedelmeier 2004:663). As an example, by making the continuation of EU accession talks and US foreign aid

contingent upon a government’s full cooperation with the tribunal, Western officials have hoped reluctant states would comply with international demands for

individual criminal accountability.

The main push behind ICTY compliance over the years was the overwhelming belief that by prosecuting those individuals that were most

responsible for human rights violations in the region, the ICTY would help close a culture of impunity and initiate a culture of accountability that would eventually lead to regional peace and reconciliation. As will be made evident in subsequent chapters, although the ICTY, with the help of the international community and the use of conditionality, may have contributed greatly in the dispensation of justice, its impact on the broader goals of transitional justice, amongst them truth and

II. Research: Questions for Analysis and Thesis Ambitions

For the countries of the former Yugoslavia, hardly any issue has polarized the domestic political scene in these post-authoritarian countries as much as the issue of compliance with the United Nations ad-hoc criminal tribunal (Peskin 2003:1127). This is especially true in Croatia and Serbia, two former Yugoslav republics whose rather questionable levels of compliance and cooperation with the tribunal has led them through periods of political instability and isolation from the international community.

Given this short contextual backdrop, I will analyze the interconnectedness between the activities of the ICTY, the presence of strong international demands for individual criminal accountability, and the effects these demands have on the

domestic political scene as well as on the process of transitional justice in the region. The following pages will undoubtedly highlight the complex relationship between the ICTY -the main actor in the accountability network of governmental and nongovernmental institutions that aimed to establish peace and justice in the Balkans- policies of conditionality, and the broader processes of transitional justice.

While scholars have focused primarily on the successes and failures of the ICTY as a judicial institution, my research will take a fairly new approach in analyzing how compliance with the ICTY, through the application of policies of conditionality, has hindered the broader ambitions of transitional justice. Therefore, my thesis will address the following question:

Considering the presence of differing national and international preferences for criminal accountability, how have international actors, through policies of

conditionality, affected the broader goals of transitional justice-most notably truth and reconciliation- in the former Yugoslavia, specifically in Serbia, and to a lesser extent in Croatia?

My research question will note that by conditioning international justice to material incentives, the international community has limited the application of the broader goals of the process of transitional justice, most notably those of truth and reconciliation. As Jelena Subotic noted, domestic political elites have used

compliance with the ICTY for their own political necessity and have been able to enjoy the material benefits associated with compliance while manipulating the truth of the conflict to further consolidate their power and nationalistic ideologies

(Subotic 2009: 6-10).

These domestic elites greatly misuse the transitional justice project in an effort to get rid of political opponents, obtain international rewards, or gain legitimacy within the international community by joining international

organizations as the EU, NATO, or the Council of Europe (6). When states comply with international demands for criminal accountability only in an effort to be

rewarded, the necessary social transformations that countries coming out of conflict require will not be realized. By cooperating with The Hague, the Western Balkan countries have been rewarded financially, while engaging in a version of “partial or incomplete justice” (12).

Moreover, by focusing solely on ICTY compliance as the main method for achieving accountability, domestic mechanisms for transitional justice have mainly been ignored. Amongst those mechanisms are truth commissions, which as

explained by Brian Grodsky, have been artificially set up by the Serbian and Croatian authorities as a form of “compromise justice” in an effort to appease unpopular international demands that would cause political instability (Grodsky 2009: 692-694). Ignoring the domestic transitional justice process has led to the persistence of strong nationalistic sentiments and national mythology. This failure to develop efficient domestic mechanisms of transitional justice coupled with the rise of strong nationalistic and anti-Western sentiments within the countries of the former

Yugoslavia, has obstructed the process of rebuilding the rule of law in a transitional society and transitional justice’s goals of entrenching peace and reconciliation in post-conflict societies.

In order to provide a comprehensive analysis of the question I posed in my research, I will examine the external and internal dynamics of ICTY compliance, and how compliance with international justice norms affects domestic politics. To do this, I will discuss the two primary international pressures that were used for Serbia and Croatia respectively: coercive and symbolic. Then, I will identify the specific domestic political conditions (i.e. the balance of power between international justice opponents and instrumental supporters) that influence what compliance strategy states will adhere to, and subsequently, what consequences these compliance strategies have for transitional justice policy results. This section will highlight that in both Serbia and Croatia, cooperation with the ICTY has led to political instability and infighting between and amongst political coalitions.

The conclusion of my research will perhaps be unsettling and disturbing to some transitional justice activists particularly those who are judicial “romantics” and advocate tribunals as the best transitional justice mechanism for dealing with the past. I however am skeptical of the international tribunals, in this case the ICTY, in making a long lasting and genuine impact in the region. It is not because I think tribunals are ineffective, but because I believe that on their own without different mechanisms, they are inadequate. I believe a well-rounded approach to transitional justice, by incorporating the many mechanisms available for societies, amongst those truth commissions and policies of lustration, should be promoted altogether rather than just one mechanism on its own.

I am very cautious in accepting the nature in which the international community has promoted policies of conditionality. Instead of rewarding states simply for the number of transfers to The Hague, and the number of accused war criminals they have arrested, the international community should promote more profound and genuine domestic normative changes such as education reform, public debates, fact finding and documentation. When post conflict societies begin to

acknowledge the crimes of the past, who the perpetrators were, to what extent the government and civil society will complicit in the human rights violations, can the true process of peace, justice, and reconciliation take place.

III. Research Design and Methods

The case selection for this project was to take a geographic region, as the former Yugoslavia, and then to conduct and in-depth comparative analysis of two cases. The case studies I chose for this particular thesis are Serbia and Croatia. Firstly, I chose Serbia and Croatia as my case studies because both countries fall under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. Secondly, in both of these cases, policies of conditionality and transitional justice have focused exclusively on cooperation with the ICTY, thus greatly ignoring the domestic mechanisms of transitional justice. Although the extent of ICTY cooperation and the types of pressure applied by the international community have varied greatly, the cases will provide an important analysis for the general goals of this thesis.

Lastly, since 2000, post-oppositionists in both countries, who were largely against their predecessor’s policies, were voted into power. Since part of my research aims at examining how domestic perceptions of the ICTY influence the post-authoritarian transitional justice process, the thesis will examine the countries from the 2000s, which marks the year the authoritarian regimes in Serbia and Croatia were voted out of office.

In addition, I will center my thesis on three types of actors: international state elites, domestic political elites, and domestic civil society. This will be useful in understanding the process of norm diffusion from the international level to the domestic level and it will provide clarity behind the politics that is involved in the transitional justice process (Subotic 2009: 44). Within the field of domestic political elites, I will narrow my focus on the balance of power between international justice opponents, who for political and ideological reasons oppose transitional justice norms, and instrumental supporters, who promote the justice standards set forth by the international community although at a very superficial and minimal level.

IV. Types of Data Employed

The empirical analysis for this thesis relied primarily on secondary sources; however, I also conducted numerous semi-structured interviews as my primary source of data. First, this paper contains an analysis of data retrieved from certain domestic media reports from Croatia and Serbia concerning ICTY discourse. The media reports were chosen according to their coverage of the following issues: ICTY indictments and trials, Serbian and Croatian cooperation with the tribunal, and the application of material incentives by the EU and the US on local governments in exchange for cooperation with the ICTY. I used information from the main

newspapers, news programs, and online websites. The information obtained from these sources helped me in unearthing how policies of conditionality have

negatively influenced the process of reconciliation-a fundamental component of the transitional justice process- in the Balkans.

A second category of data used are a series of reports from numerous

nongovernmental organizations (Amnesty International, International Crisis Group (ICG)) and governmental organizations-both domestic and international-which examine how the ICTY is perceived domestically and why cooperation with this institution has been problematic over the years. Moreover, public opinion polls will further provide insight into how the domestic population perceives the activities related to the ICTY, in particular the issuance of indictments against individuals that are considered in their countries to be national war heroes and liberators. It will also provide paramount information with regards to the lack of popularity the tribunal has in the region.

Concerning primary sources of data, I conducted thirteen one-on-one interviews with high-ranking political officials in Serbia and Croatia. I used a semi-structured questionnaire with approximately nine open-ended questions that enabled me to get the most in-depth answers from each respondent. I originally had started with a structured set of ten questions, however; I came to the realization that not each respondent has the capability or familiarity to answer certain

questions. This is why for this particular thesis I opted to for a semi-structured interview. The results of this interview will be discussed in the chapter of the thesis that unearths the impact of policies of conditionality on the multi-faceted

aspirations of transitional justice.

In Serbia I interviewed politicians from the country’s major anti-reform party, the Serbian Radical Party (SRS). Likewise, I interviewed members from the country’s primary pro-reformist party, the Democratic Party of Serbia (DS). This same technique was applied in Croatia. There, I interviewed politicians from the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), which is the country’s most anti-ICTY political party. I also interviewed members from the major pro-reformist party, the Social Democratic Party of Croatia (SDP). By interviewing these politicians I was able to see how the representatives of their respective parties view compliance with the ICTY, and what they believe to have been the greatest impediments to ICTY cooperation over the years.

CHAPTER 1

Understanding the Politics Behind State Compliance with Transitional Justice Norms

I: Theoretical Framework

Understanding the politics behind compliance with transitional justice norms is essential to this thesis. Although international justice can be traced back to the Nuremberg trials, transitional justice is relatively a new phenomenon that emerged in the 1980s with the Greek trials and gained predominance with the trials of the Argentine junta in 1985 (Subotic 2009: 16-17; Bass 2000: 382). In the past two decades, transitional justice has emerged as a global norm that specifies the way in which transitional governments should face the crimes of the past (Subotic 2009: 15). It can be summarized that what the expectation states are faced with when dealing with the past is that crimes should be adjudicated in a court of law, rather than simply forgotten or pardoned. Perpetrators should face justice in an effort to right the wrongs of the past and bring a sense of reconciliation to both the victims and the society at large.

Nevertheless, as this thesis will show, compliance with transitional justice norms has been a thorny issue for the past two decades for both the Serbian and Croatian governments. To truly comprehend the relationship between international pressures and domestic compliance, two International relations theories will prove to be particularly useful: constructivism and liberalism. However, the theoretical model I will promote more heavily is liberalism.

Nevertheless, while I use the liberalist paradigm, the ontological basis of my research is constructivism. Constructivists within the field of international relations advocate that social norms in addition to state interests are paramount in

understanding the complexity associated with international relations and in understanding what motivates state behavior (Slaughter 1995; Baylis et al 2011:

377-379). It is a theory, which advances that international organizations and non-state actors will be able to influence non-state behavior through rhetoric: carefully applied forms of persuasion and shaming, as well as through material and institutional incentives (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 2).

As it is applicable to this thesis, the work of the ICTY and other institutions that promote transitional justice norms such as the US and the EU are key for analysis. As Jennifer Miller noted in her research, the ICTY is the main actor in what she denotes as an “accountability network” of governmental and nongovernmental organizations that aim to achieve justice and peace in the Balkans (Miller 2011: 4). For clarification purposes, Walter Powell defines networks as “identifiable systems of formal and informal organizations characterized by horizontal power relations, interdependence, and close, open lines of communication” (Miller 2001: 8; Powell 1990: 303).

Since the tribunal lacks both coercive and economic power, it relies primarily on the cooperation of other influential states and organizations that are able to exert more coercive measures. To this effect, governments of the European Union, but as well the United States and numerous nongovernmental organizations have

employed policies of conditionality- both financial incentives as well as institutional membership-to varying degrees in order to get recalcitrant states to cooperate with the ICTY and the norms of transitional justice set forth by the international

community. In addition, external actors have also employed policies of shaming and persuasion to obtain cooperation from target countries. As an example, since the onset of the tribunal’s establishment in 1993, the ICTY’s Office of the Prosecutor has issued many reports where it has openly criticized and shamed the inadequate level of cooperation from Belgrade and Zagreb (Spoerri 2011: 1833-1835).

Further, utilizing constructivist terminology, the thesis will differentiate between “logic of consequences”-where actions are rationally chosen to maximize the interests of a state- and “logic of appropriateness”, where national policies are guided by social norms have both been crucial concepts in understanding why Serbia and Croatia have complied with the unpopular Hague extraditions. From the perspective of the former, domestic political elites, when faced with international

pressures to comply with ICTY indictments-which are promoted through policies of conditionality-have cooperated with the tribunal’s requests in an effort to obtain the material benefits or institutional membership that are accompanied with

cooperation. In essence, cooperation here is rooted in the interests of a state.

Concerning the latter, cooperation rests on the premise that governments are social actors that wish to gain legitimacy in the eyes of their counterparts.

Therefore, if the international community promotes transitional justice norms, states will comply because they feel it is necessary in order to be accepted as a legitimate player in the international community. Thus, using the constructivist lens, it can be denoted that shaming strategies in addition to material and institutional benefits have been pursued by the ICTY and its networks to create incentives for governments to change their behavior and conform to international expectations (Subotic 2009: 27-28).

Liberalism is a theory that, in addition to constructivism, should be used in order to understand the relationship and interaction between the ICTY,

international pressures, and the transitional justice process. Liberalism as a theory proposes that it is the national characteristics of individual states that matter in their international relations (Slaughter 1995: 3). As Andrew Guzman eloquently noted “an examination of compliance within a liberal framework is essentially an examination of the domestic politics of countries that might lead to a decision to comply with international law” (Guzman 2002: 1839).

In both Serbia and Croatia, as will be shown, cooperation with the tribunal led to instances of grave political instability and coalition infighting. Yet in both countries, it was the pro-reformist political parties that advocated cooperation with the ICTY, whereas the radical anti-reformist parties used political rhetoric and nationalistic sentiments to label ICTY indictments as a threat to national security and as an effort of western powers in shaming and weakening the target states (Spoerri 2008: 364-367). It is imperative to recognize that considering the

importance of national characteristics of states for their international behavior, any discussion concerning transitional justice must be analyzed with regards to the domestic political system it enters. As norms diffuse through the domestic political

sphere they get strategized by domestic political elites for purposes often far removed from those intentioned by the actors that proposed them. For these purposes, it is not possible to separate politics and justice and analyze them independently; they must be examined simultaneously.

With regards to the liberalist theory as it is applicable to this situation, I will provide a brief domestic politics approach to compliance under conditions of strong international pressure for transitional justice but weak domestic demands. This discussion will aid further analyses of why states comply with international norms and to what domestic political and social effects. It will provide the backdrop to the main discussion that although policies of conditionality have been the essential tools by which target states have complied with ICTY indictments, they have also led to a sabotaged domestic transitional justice process. Using policies of conditionality, domestic political elites from Belgrade to Zagreb have complied with transitional justice norms for their material benefits, thus hampering any societal discussions concerning the moral imperatives behind ICTY compliance.

The following sections will identify the two types of pressures states are subjected to: coercive and symbolic (Subotic 2009: 364). Then, I will examine the specific domestic political conditions that determine whether, and to what extent, a state will adhere to international demands for transitional justice.

II: International Pressures

The pressure exerted by international actors can vary greatly across time and space. In states where the domestic demand for justice and accountability is strong, governments will comply with international justice requirements because these are the norms that they believe in, that they share, and that are deeply entrenched in the given society. To the contrary, in a society where there is not a strong belief in international justice norms, there will be no domestic push to

adhere to the justice requirements set forth by international actors. In this instance, the intensity, consistency, and scope of international pressures will be the deciding

factor. It is in the latter case where international political elites will have the greatest ability to influence the domestic political bargaining dynamics (Peskin 2003: 1130).

Where the domestic demand for justice is weak, international actors will employ conditionality with the ambition to coerce the state into complying with international justice requirements (Subotic 2009: 364). Governments that are faced with this proposal will most likely comply with international justice in order to diminish international scrutiny and in order to obtain the material benefits

associated with compliance. Coercive pressures signify that if a state complies with the given requirements, it will obtain the rewards. Given the nature of this

conditioned compliance, coercive pressures may lead to a domestic rejection of restorative justice since justice seems to be imposed on the unwilling state (365). Moreover, another problem associated with coercive pressures is that coercion may only lead to compliance as long as benefits are expected, but it will doubtfully lead to long-term compliance and to the profound societal transformation that is essential in countries transitioning from a period of civil unrest.

The other form of international pressure used by actors is symbolic pressure. According to this pressure, if the state in question complies with the international demands of a given organization, it will become a member of that organization. In states that exhibit a strong desire for international membership and recognition, international actors will use this form of pressure to entice the state to comply with justice norms, where in other instances, the state would typically not comply

(Subotic 2009: 364-366).

Important to bear in mind are some of the domestic repercussions associated with symbolic forms of pressure. Firstly, states that comply with the demand do so not because of what the demand does, but rather what it signifies (Subotic

2009:366). It is the appeals to legitimacy and international prestige for which a state will comply with justice norms, not because there is a consensus that it is the moral and necessary step to take. Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, once a state joins its institution of choice and the symbolic pressure is lifted, the state will resort back into its old habits. Once it achieves this institutional praise, the broader efforts

associated with transitional justice goals- as the acknowledgment of crimes, or the societal establishment of an accurate account of events-will not transpire (366).

III: Domestic Political Conditions

As mentioned previously, it is important to bear in mind that international pressures always interact within a given domestic political environment. When examining the domestic situation of societies that exited a period of conflict, one must pay attention to certain factors.

-Who are the political elites that oppose transitional justice norms? -How much power do they have in the current government? And, -To what extent are the members of the previous regime that were

responsible for the human rights violations still in charge of the decision making process?

These factors are essential because, as the case studies of Serbia and Croatia will prove, unless there was a social revolution -as exhibited recently with the Arab Spring-, countries that transition from a period of authoritarian rule to a system of liberal democracy, the likelihood that members of the previous regime are still in force in the state’s apparatuses is extremely high (Subotic 2009: 34).

Under these conditions, it proves to be very difficult for pro-reformist

governments to institutionalize the norms set forth by the international community. These domestic political elites are at a constant fear that their decisions will lead to political instability. As states are considered to be rational actors, while they are concerned with maintaining a good international standing, they are also careful not to alienate themselves from the domestic audience (Subotic 2009: 36). They realize that in order to stay in power they need the votes of the electorate, and thus, they are careful not to pursue policies that are contested by the domestic civil society.

For states, as Serbia and Croatia, that are presented with conditions of low domestic demand and high international pressures for compliance with justice norms, compliance will center around the balance of power between two competing domestic political coalitions: international justice opponents and instrumental

supporters (Subotic 2009:365; Grodsky 2009:692-693). As Jelena Subotic noted in her research, international justice opponents are domestic political elites that for political and ideological reasons are opposed to international justice norms (366).

In Serbia, international justice opponents are those individuals loyal to the previous authoritarian regime of Slobodan Milosevic. These loyalists include members of the far-right wing SRS, SPS, and DSS political parties, the Orthodox Church, and members of the states’ security apparatuses such as the military, the police and foremost, members of the state-owned media (Subotic 2009: 70-71). In Croatia, the norm resisters largely supported the policies of former Croatian president Franjo Tudjman, who ruled the country throughout the Croatian Homeland War. After his death in 1999, norm resisters were centered among the far-right wing political parties including Tudjman’s own HDZ, and the extreme right HSP party, the professional media, the Catholic Church, and numerous war veterans associations (111-114).

Politicians that are norm resisters2 _{are generally involved with the policies of}

the previous regime, and are usually hesitant to adopt international standards that are aimed towards accountability for past events. They are weary of international pressures, and if they do comply with the demands set forth to them, they do so minimally and superficially. They will comply with demands to the extent that they are able to get the material benefits. Such domestic political elites focus on

international justice compliance for material rather than moral principles.

Domestic political elites may also be instrumental supporters of international justice (Subotic 2009: 366). These individuals use the justice issue to distance

themselves from nationalistic groups and to leverage themselves as supporters of international norms. They comply with the international justice requirements set forth to them because they believe that compliance is essential if the state is to acquire international prestige and standing. Instrumental supporters define themselves domestically as pro-reform forces that are able to make partnerships with international actors-whose financial support is essential for the economic

recovery of transitional countries (Subotic 2009: 366). Compliance to them is not solely to obtain material benefits, but also to gain good international standing.

In Serbia, norm promoters have strategically centered along former Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic, the DS left-wing political party, major business elites, and a few local nongovernmental organizations that have aimed to raise awareness amongst the local population of past events (Subotic 2009: 366). In Croatia, norm-promoters consisted of the then newly elected president Stjepan Mesic and his SDP political party, former Prime Minister Ivica Racan, and Croatian nongovernmental organizations (Subotic 2009: 117).

To conclude this chapter, if international norms and institutions are accepted out of coercive measures, compliance will be aimed at obtaining material benefits, and the broader goals of transitional justice will not be fulfilled. Domestic norm-resisters will take advantage of international demands for local political goals (Subotic 2009: 36). Furthermore, if a state’s compliance stems from legitimacy concerns, norm promotion will be instrumental to the extent to which it is necessary to maintain international reputation and prestige. As the analysis of the two case studies will show, domestic political elites have managed to use international demands for transitional justice to their advantage. For years, politicians in both countries have survived off of international rewards for compliance with the ICTY; however, in both countries deeper societal transformations have yet to take form. With the exception of certain civil society groups and a handful of pro-reformist politicians, very little effort has taken place in order to promote truth and

reconciliation. The nature and interplay of policies of conditionality, international pressures, and domestic political conditions have made this an unfortunate reality.

The following chapter will examine the transitional justice process and its mechanisms. Moreover, the chapter will be devoted to a discussion of the activities of the ICTY, which as a form of international and transitional justice, was established to restore peace, justice, and reconciliation in the Balkans (Spoerri 2008: 360). Furthermore, a section in the chapter will discuss the domestic perceptions of the tribunal in Serbia and Croatia. This section will be useful in understanding how

negative perceptions of the tribunal, through its linkage to policies of conditionality and international isolation, has enabled anti-reform forces to misuse justice norms to their political advantage.

CHAPTER 2

Between Law and Politics: The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)

I. The Establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

In the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s, newly democratizing states as South Africa, Greece, and Argentina, had a key role in the development of initiatives which aimed to seek accountability for atrocities committed by their former

authoritarian rulers (Peskin 2003: 1121). For these countries, facing the past was a necessity rather than a choice. For them, transitional justice was viewed as a social need (Subotic 2009: 24). Although the institutional design varied from country to country, for example: South Africa decided to establish a Truth and Reconciliation Committee, whereas Argentina developed domestic tribunals to try the junta, the ultimate aim of the transitional justice project was reconciliation.

Yet, as political instability started to grip South-Eastern Europe with the fall of communism and revival of nationalism, scholars and politicians noticed that for some governments establishing a mechanism for dealing with the past was a far too distant aspiration. It was something that these societies were reluctant to do. In these cases the international community decided to take the leading role in developing ad-hoc tribunals, which would force these societies into facing the atrocities that were committed partly in their name (Simonovic 2000: 441). For political science scholars, the establishment of international courts that would try human rights violators was of outmost importance.

These “judicial romantics”, -as they are referred to by Patrice McMahon- believe that international tribunals are essential in transitioning states in order to establish some form of peace, security, and reconciliation (McMahon 2008: 414). It was believed that a tribunal would foster a culture of accountability: it would help deter future international law violations by portraying to potential violators that no one was above the law. Further, a court would bring the perpetrator to justice and would be a form of “social revival” that would help victims and the society in general to achieve some compensation for the past suffering, and that this would eventually help lead to reconciliation (Peskin 2003: 1118; Subotic 2009: 24-26; McMahon 2008: 416).

The conflict that transpired in what is now known as the former Yugoslavia, at the beginning of the 1990s, was of a gruesome nature. The world watched as refugees throughout Bosnia and Croatia left their homes in what was largely Slobodan Milosevic’s nationalistic effort to create a larger Serbia (Simonovic 2000: 443). Although it can certainly be said that war crimes were committed by all

parties in the conflict, the level and awareness of the atrocities committed under the command of Serbian leadership, propelled the international community to take substantive steps to first put and end to the war, and second, to bring those individuals most responsible for human rights violations to justice.

Although at the onset of the Yugoslav conflicts officials in Brussels and Washington differed in what their role was and should be, it was the pressure of the world public opinion that served as a catalyst for action by the international

community (Simonovic 2000: 442). As a reaction to the human rights violations that were transpiring in the Bosnian town of Srebrenica and the Croatian city of Vukovar, the institution of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on examining the human rights situation in the region was introduced in 1992 (Zacklin 1994: 277).

The reports of the Special Rapporteur confirmed suspicions that human rights violations were taking place primarily throughout Bosnia and Croatia, and to a lesser extent, Serbia. As a subsequent step, in October of 1992, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) established a commission that was responsible for

444). The scale of atrocities that continued to be committed in Bosnia, along with the final report from the Commission of Experts, led the international community to determine it was necessary to establish an ad-hoc criminal tribunal.

On the May 25th_{, 1993, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former}

Yugoslavia (ICTY) came into existence by virtue of United Nations Security Council Resolution 827 (McMahon 2008: 414). This ad-hoc tribunal was established under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, which made it legally binding on all UN member states (Dixon 2013: 44-48). Under its powers, the United Nations Security Council determined that, as per Article 39 of the UN Charter, the violations of humanitarian law had constituted a “threat to the peace” in the region (Simonovic 2000: 443; Dixon 2013: 76-79).

Further, in accordance with Articles 7(2) and 41, of the Charter, the Security Council established that a subsidiary organ for the performance “of judicial

functions was needed to restore international peace and security” (Simonovic 2000: 443). Therefore, the ICTY was created by an executive body instead of a legislative one, and was responsible for a political purpose: restoring peace in the region. The statute of the ICTY contains thirty-four articles, and due to its function as a judicial organ, the statute has specifically laid out that rules and procedures of evidence are to be determined by the tribunals’ judges, in an effort to act independently of the political considerations of the Security Council (ICTY Statue: Article 15).

Although established in 1993, the ICTY has a mandate to adjudicate for specific international law violations that transpired in the region of the former Yugoslavia from January 1st, 1991 (Ciric 2013: 113-114). Furthermore, the statute authorizes the tribunal to try those individuals who are believed to have committed any of the four categories of crimes: grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva

Conventions, violations of the customs of war, crimes against humanity, and

genocide (Simonovic 2000: 444). The following crimes are enumerated in the ICTY Statute as Articles 2 through 5.

II. The ICTY As A Legal and Political Institution

The ICTY was the first international criminal tribunal that served to apply the law for all parties to the conflict, regardless of nationality. Unlike its predecessor, the Nuremberg Court, which was largely an instrument of victor’s justice, the ICTY specified that it would try all individuals that were most responsible for the crimes that took place in the region (Simonovic 2000: 445). Although as previously

discussed, the tribunal was established under the Security Council’s Chapter VII powers, meaning it was imposed on all sides, there has been much objection to cooperation with the court from the target states, due to its political underpinnings.

With regards to the politicization of the court, there are a number of concerns worthy of mentioning. Firstly, the ICTY has a limitation upon state sovereignty, which is inherent in its statute. As Article 9 stipulates3_{, the ICTY has}

primacy over national jurisdiction, meaning that during any stage of the domestic procedures, the ICTY may request national courts to defer the cases back to its jurisdiction. This raises serious questions to those legal and political scholars who believe that state sovereignty is a deeply rooted principle of international law (Saxon 2005: 560).

Secondly, the use of the Security Council’s Chapter VII powers, concerning its applicability to the situation in the former Yugoslavia, has been questioned by politicians from Belgrade and Zagreb as well as from the international community. For example, H.Kochler in his article entitled “Global Justice or Global Revenge?” demonstrated that according to his findings, the Security Council had no right to establish a court, because the court is not a “measure” that can be taken in

accordance with Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter (Kochler 2003: 171-172; Ciric 2013: 76).

Resonating Kochler’s fears over the Council’s far-reaching powers, were politicians from Brazil and China that expressed their concern that the Security Council’s powers had in fact been interpreted too broadly (Simonovic 2000: 445).

Nevertheless, the legitimacy of the court was settled in the Tadic case where the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY determined that the establishment of the court had in fact fell within the powers of the Security Council.4

Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, the political dimension of the tribunal is most apparent with regards to the Prosecutor’s determination on which cases will be tried before the court. As Justice Arbour, the former ICTY Prosecutor noted, the important distinction between the ICTY and national courts is that prosecutors of the ICTY have to be “highly selective before committing resources to investigate or prosecute a certain individual” (Simonovic 2000: 534). In regard to this issue, due to the time constraints of the tribunal-since it was only temporarily established- and due to the lack of funding available for its operations, the ICTY cannot prosecute all individuals who committed crimes in the region. Rather, it has to be highly selective in determining which individuals will be brought before the court.

III. The Domestic Perceptions of The ICTY in Serbia and Croatia

The various issues mentioned in the previous section have remained important in discussions of the legitimacy of the ICTY’s operations in both Serbia and Croatia. Domestic political elites from both countries have in many instances failed to cooperate with the tribunal and have used the court’s “political” aspect as a means of justifying their lack of cooperation with the tribunal and in gaining

political support at home. Important to bear in mind in this discussion is that public opinion in both Serbia and Croatia is heavily dictated by the views of the domestic political and academic elites rather than to the actual proceedings that transpire in The Hague (Klarin 2009: 90). It is these individuals, as discussed in the theoretical framework chapter that are essential in misusing transitional justice norms and framing cooperation with the ICTY to their advantage.

Dan Saxon, a previous Prosecutor at The Hague who served on the Slobodan Milosevic trial, and a current scholar within the field of international criminal law, has written an article outlining how the tribunal is perceived in the communities of the former Yugoslavia. Saxon notes that although the Tribunal was established to promote peace and reconciliation in the region, more then twenty years after its establishment, the tribunal is still widely despised among the Serb and Croat national communities (Saxon 2005: 563). Both communities fail to acknowledge their responsibility and to recognize the atrocities committed by their own forces during the armed conflict (562). In addition to the general public, former Yugoslav authorities have yet to account for their nation’s role in the Yugoslav conflict, as both Serb and Croat political elites view their governments’ as the victim instead of the victimizer (Spoerri 2011: 1831).

Siding with the findings of Dan Saxon is Denisa Kostovicova who asserts that although the ICTY, with the help of the international community, has been able to conduct more than 161 trials, and has brought countless high-ranking officials including a former head-of -state to The Hague, it has largely failed in its effort to achieve reconciliation or to create a demand among the domestic communities for more comprehensive forms of transitional justice (Kostovicova 2009: 75).

In Serbia, the ICTY is portrayed by the domestic political elites as a Western ploy used to weaken Serbs and to embarrass them in front of the international community (Ciric 2013: 187). The Serbian community feels that the tribunal is biased in its operations, trying primarily Serbs and casting a culture of blame upon the Serbian society (187). They point to the fact that close to 75% of the individuals indicted by the tribunal are of Serbian ethnicity, while in contrast only 22% are Croats, and approximately 3% are Bosniaks5_{, to prove the biased nature of the court}

(Simonovic 2000: 450). According to a 2007 survey published by the Belgrade Center for Human Rights that only 7% of respondents felt that the tribunal was

unbiased in its proceedings (Klarin 2009: 92).

5 _{I use the term ‘Bosniak” to refer to a person of Bosnian ethnicity rather then}

Furthermore, for the Serbs, the individuals indicted by the ICTY are

considered heroes, individuals that had sacrificed their lives to protect the Serbian public from its neighboring enemies (Subotic 2009: 88). Jelena Subotic lamented that these perceptions were largely a consequence of the period of “ethnification” politics in the 1990s, where ethnic groups that were non-Serbs were considered as hostile and dangerous for the survival of the Serbian community (Subotic 2009: 72-75). These other ethnic groups, according to the rhetoric used by Milosevic and his loyalists, needed to be subdued in order not to pose a threat to the Serbian

government and the people within its borders.

In the Croatian community, the ICTY has also been a subject of great hostility, specifically during the Tudjman government. For years, Tudjman and Croatian right-wing political elites successfully manipulated the memory of the Homeland War to challenge the indictments of the ICTY against Croatian nationals and to question the legitimacy of the tribunal (Saxon 2005: 565). For example, in an effort to

delegitimize the indictments of the tribunal, the Croatian parliament adopted in October of 2000, the “Declaration of the Homeland War” which laid out in seven Articles, that between 1991 and 1995, the Republic of Croatia engaged in “a just and legitimate defense…to defend its borders against Greater Serbia’s aggression” (Saxon 2005: 565).

What is perhaps even more telling is that the Declaration noted that while Croatia would try all violations of international law, Article 5 of the text stipulated that the state is to provide “full protection and welfare” to all “defenders” (Jovic 2006: 7). The extent to which the politicians and the domestic population view Croatia’s role in the conflict is codified in that very declaration. For Croats, the defenders of the Homeland War were fighting a just battle to liberate Croatia from the aggression that was waged upon them from Belgrade. To them, the defenders were war heroes that deserved to be defended, rather then tried in a court of law.

The fact that the tribunal has such a negative perception in these two communities is merely a surprise if we consider that for the first seven years since its establishment both Belgrade and Zagreb were ruled by individuals who were accused by the ICTY of engaging in acts in violation of international humanitarian

law. Naturally, it was essential that these very individuals portrayed a negative image of the ICTY to their constituents. To do so, they depicted the tribunal as extremely biased and against their states’ ethnic group (Klarin 2009: 90-91).

The domestic political elites that arrived following the elections in 2000 in both Serbia and Croatia did little to change the perceptions of the ICTY among the domestic communities. For some politicians, who were loyalists of the former

regime, they further used their power to continue sidelining the issue of cooperation with The Hague, by using the same rhetoric of their predecessors. On the other hand, the elites that were for promoting cooperation and believed in justice norms, found it difficult to operate in an environment that was so deeply entrenched against the ICTY. These individuals needed to balance remaining in good standings with the international community while at the same time, trying to marginalize nationalists and political backlash they faced at home.

The next chapters will be devoted to understanding the institutions of transitional justice and in exploring how policies of conditionality have helped lure Serbia and Croatia in cooperating with the Tribunal, while failing to contribute to the broader goals of transitional justice, most notably truth and reconciliation.

CHAPTER 3

Transitional Justice and Its Institutions: An In-Depth Analysis of Domestic Trials and Truth Commissions in Serbia and Croatia

As a state emerges from a period of violence and political instability, one of the primary concerns for the new government is how to handle the events that marked its predecessor. For the new political elites, it is not simply an issue of how to lead the country to a stable and prosperous future. Rather, questions as to what, if anything, should be done to try previous officials for violations of international humanitarian law become of fundamental importance. How exactly do societies, as those in the former Yugoslavia, emerge from a period of grave inter-ethnic conflict? How can communities that were once pitted against each other regain a sense of trust and security and how can reconciliation lead to political and economic stability, and eventually democracy?

To answer these questions, one must turn to a process that has gained predominance over the past decades, a process most commonly referred to as transitional justice. Transitional justice’s ambitions are broad and numerous to say the least, however, there is a general consensus among political science and

international law scholars that its core aim is for societies to “develop an accurate truth about the past, achieve accountability, and offer some form of redress” (van der Merwe et al 2009: 1).

Whether transitional justice has been achieved is largely measured by its ability to consolidate a government that adheres to democratic principles and the rule of law, and the extent to which the society in transition from war to peace has been able to achieve an accurate historical record of past events in an effort to obtain reconciliation (Minow 1998: 32). Moreover, transitional justice will succeed only if it is able to garner a true transformation of self-identity (Pond 2004: 79).

Just as numerous as are the ambitions of transitional justice, so too are its methods. These include: prosecution of war criminals in international and/or domestic courts, truth commissions, policies of lustration and reparation (Minow 1998: 35; Spoerri 2011: 1829). Empirical evidence collected and analyzed by scholars over the years has indicated that a combination of these mechanisms, in contrast to just one institutional form on its own, enables transitional justice to come to fruition.

Nevertheless, until recently, it has been largely believed that criminal prosecutions-in either domestic courts or international tribunals-is the most effective mechanism of transitional justice (Spoerri 2011: 1829). Underlying the mass support behind criminal accountability is the perception that judicial verdicts have the ability to extend past the courtroom. In essence, it was advocated that criminal justice not only determines whether a person is guilty or innocent, but that it also is able to lead societies to implement the rule of law, truth, and reconciliation (Teitel 2000: 18-25; Spoerri 2011: 1830; Roht-Arriaza 1995).

Due to these convictions, for the countries of the former Yugoslavia, the international community established the ad-hoc tribunal as discussed in the

previous chapter. In addition, countries as Serbia and Croatia were encouraged, not only to cooperate with the ICTY, but also to establish their own domestic tribunals to try their nationals for their role in breaching customs of international

humanitarian law. It was almost assured that these trials would lead to societal healing, and thus reconciliation in the region. By prosecuting the alleged

perpetrator, actions would be criminalized, potential human rights violators would be deterred, and this would eventually provide the national community with a sense of “moral renewal” (Humprey 2003: 500; Spoerri 2011: 1829).

However, as the case studies of Serbia and Croatia will show, the mechanisms of transitional justice, most notably trials and truth commissions, have failed to establish an accurate historical record of atrocities committed by each states’ armed forces, and reconciliation has been at best, marginally achieved. Rather then

establishing domestic trials and truth commissions with the ambition of achieving reconciliation, and peace and stability, domestic political elites have initiated these

mechanisms largely in an effort to appease international demands for criminal accountability. This in turn has enabled government officials and the domestic audience to make it appear to the international community as if they have come to terms with the past, while in essence domestically, a culture of impunity prevails.

Instead of analyzing each transitional justice mechanism, this chapter will solely examine domestic trials and truth commissions. For Serbia and Croatia, trials and truth commissions have been the most eminent and politically the most highly controversial transitional justice institutions, and are thus worthy of analyzing (Subotic 2009: 18-19).

I. Domestic War-Crimes Trials

A. Serbia

The transitional justice process in Serbia has to a great extent been a

disappointment for many international justice supporters. Since it was the country where the majority of the perpetrators responsible for the atrocities in the 1990s originated from, it was bound to be the most difficult case for the promotion of transitional justice (Subotic 2009: 36). To this regard, the international community’s assumptions were correct: transitional justice would prove to be a slow and

incomplete challenge for years. In 2000, after Milosevic conceded his defeat to a democratic coalition of eighteen political parties led by presidential candidate Vojislav Kostunica, and Prime Minister Zoran Djindic, the world assumed Serbia would transition into a politically stable country, one that would abide to

international standards for the rule of law. However this dream would prove to be short lived.

Shortly after taking office, tensions emerged between newly elected President Kostunica, a conservative politician that was skeptical of the ICTY and transitional justice efforts, and Prime Minister Djindic. Djindic, who was a moderate left-wing politician and a member of the DSS political party, was a strong proponent of transitional justice norms. Once the ICTY indicted former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic for numerous international humanitarian law violations, Djindic supported and orchestrated his extradition to The Hague on June 28th_{, 2001, amidst}

fervent opposition from nationalistic groups and from Kostunica himself (Spoerri 2008: 363). It was due to this cooperation with the ICTY and strong support for Western promoters of transitional justice institutions that led Djindic to a

premature death. In the spring of 2003, he was assassinated by a group of Milosevic regime loyalists known as the “anti-Hague patriots” (Subotic 2009: 38). Yet, in a surprise change of events, it was his assassination that sparked an initiative

amongst domestic liberal politicians to develop a stronger Serbian judiciary (Subotic 2009: 57).

Armed with a sense of urgency to prosecute the individuals responsible for the assassination, the post-Djindic government established two judicial institutions-the Organized Crime Chamber and institutions-the War Crimes Chamber (WCC). In 2003, institutions-the WCC was established by the Serbian parliament in an effort to adjudicate all future war-crimes trials in Serbia (Subotic 2009: 57). Institutionally, the chamber

consisted of a specialized prosecutor, a cell for detainees, and an investigation unit responsible for investigating all potential and reported cases (57). For Dusan Protic, the former Serbian deputy justice minister most responsible for establishing the WCC, there were two concerns that led to the establishment of the domestic tribunal.

Firstly, the liberal government thought that dealing with war crimes was a necessity, instead of an historic event that should be forgotten. 6 _{The assassination}

of the prime minister led domestic liberal elites to realize how vital the issue of organized crime, which had been deeply entrenched in Serbian institutional

structures since the early 1990s, really was. Since the members of the “anti-Hague” criminal group were actively operating in the Serbian police Units for Special Operations (JSO), the case highlighted the link between state structures that were loyal to the Milosevic regime and organized crime groups (Jovic 2003: 5). For the newly established post-authoritarian government, eliminating these domestic

threats by prosecuting the individuals in a court of law gained importance. Secondly, establishing the WCC was seen as a necessary factor if Serbia wanted to integrate itself into the European community. As Protic asserted, the pressures from the European Union and the United States, which did not want to continue financing the ICTY, was an additional motivating factor in institutionalizing the WCC.

The specialized War Crimes Chamber was received with great enthusiasm and support from the international community. The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), an international nongovernmental organization and an active voice in the promotion of transitional justice norms for the region, believed that the establishment of the chamber was a fundamental step in rebuilding a