Solving the question of adaption through non-domination

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Solving the question of adaption through

non-domination

Thesis written by: Lieke Galbraith Student number: 6179223

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“I will not be told.

I will be shown.

I will be inspired.

I will be lead.

But I won’t be told.”

2011 at Harvard Humanist Chaplaincy

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At risk of sounding corny, I would like to dedicate this thesis to

Corrie, Gregor, Jitte, Loek & Floortje.

You have been my inspiration, support, sanity and love.

We did it!

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Abstract

Climate change is posing serious challenges to people worldwide. Especially developing countries are hit by the detrimental consequences of climate change. A considerable amount of literature has been written on who should pay for adaptation, to protect people from climate change. But can we justly

specify the burden of adaptation? How can we establish the interests, needs, opinions and vulnerability of the people affected? And why have states taken hardly any action on adaptation, whilst the effects of climate change are already apparent? In this thesis, the republican concept of

non-domination is central to answering these important questions. By applying non-domination, unequal standing of states in international governance institutions can be analysed and through the implementation of checking mechanisms, the world could overcome domination in the discussion on

5 “This is what a holy shit moment for global warming looks like”, according to Mother Jones magazine. They were commenting on a Nasa conference hosted by The Guardian in May of this year. In short, global sea levels are expected to rise with at least one metre, according to a considerable collection of observations concerning the retreat of ice in West Antarctica (Rignot, 2014). Even the complete shutdown of emissions cannot undo this process and it will have major repercussions for the remaining ice sheet of West Antartica, causing even more changes worldwide (Rignot, 2014).

Currently, the world is facing an environmental crisis. Climate change has become more of a reality to global politics. It is also the stark reality of millions of people already affected by changes in their environment and it will soon be a reality to even more. Small Island Developing States are already in fear of their coastal lines, Burkina Faso is battling desertification and the people of New Orleans are waiting for the next tropical storm. Adaptation to climate change should be more prominently placed on the global political agenda.

Simon Caney has written several articles setting out the burdens of global climate change, who should bare these burdens and why they should. Numerous theorists have joined this discussion and elaborated on how the costs and compensation of adaptation should be distributed. But a normative discussion on what the content of adaptation might be is needed, so we can take necessary steps to protect people from the effects of climate change.

This thesis is concerned with the specification of adaptation to climate change. What should adaptation entail? How can we specify the need, interests and opinions of the people affected with climate change? Just as important, can we explain the lack of initiative to help countries vulnerable to climate change? In this thesis I speak of people and states simultaneously, since it is my belief that we should start at state-level in global governance institutions, before commencing to a more regional and local level. I introduce the concept of non-domination to the discussion of adaptation. Non-domination has recently been integrated into the field of global justice through work by Pettit, Young and Bachvarova. It has been complementary to the discussion of distributive justice, and now it can contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of the duty to adaptation, but also to the content of policy supporting adaptation.

A non-domination framework can identify and address vulnerability of states in global governance institutes, has the ability to incorporate plurality and local interests, and creates more autonomy and self-determination for people in subordinate positions. Since climate change will mainly affect developing countries, non-domination can ensure their interests are heard in a system that currently systematically subordinates their interests and opinions.

6 First, a brief overview of current findings on climate change is giving. After which I will move on to Caney’s work on the burdens of global climate change. Then an introduction is given of the more traditional writing on the concept of non-domination and current usage of non-domination in the sphere of global justice. Moving on to the central discussion of this thesis; a normative

framework of non-domination applied to adaptation and the specification of the interests, needs, opinions and vulnerability of the states affected by climate change. To conclude with some considerations.

The reality of climate change

Before we go on considering a normative answer to questions on who should pay for the damage done by climate change, and how non-domination can give guidelines on the specification of these obligations and the distribution of compensation, it is imperative to understand the extent of the problems and changes that will occur in people’s lives (Caney, 20005; p. 748). The general consensus between researchers working on climate change, is that the world is undergoing changes partly due to historic and current human activity, such as carbon emission and deforestation. According to several reports by working groups at the International Panel on Climate Change, in short the IPCC, emissions have not yet stagnated. The period of 1970 to 2010 has even known an increase in GHG emissions on average of 2.2% from 2000 to 2010, compared to the 0.4% increase of before 2000 (IPCC, 2014-1; p. 6). A large majority of these emissions are blamed on the practices of fossil fuel combustion and industrial processes (IPCC, 2014-1; p. 6). Drivers behind these practises are economic and population growth, but only the contribution of economic growth has increased dramatically (2014-1; p. 8).

Unfortunately, this is happening during a rise in policies supporting the mitigation of emissions. The IPCC defines mitigations as “a human intervention to reduce the sources or enhance the sinks of greenhouse gases (2014-1; p. 4)”. Realising the pressing problems due to climate change, further policies are being negotiated on national and international level. The Earth is not only

becoming warmer causing icecaps to melt and sea levels to rise, the weather is becoming capricious too. Without any additional precautions, predictions by working group III are that emissions will increase and cause a rise of temperature from 3.7 °C to 4.8 °C in 2100 (2014-1; p. 9). Even if we would cut emissions within the next 5 years, some changes will still occur due to emissions spewed out since the industrial revolution (Caney, 2010; p. 204).

Nature systems are mainly impacted by climate change, but some more minor impacts on people can be subscribed to climate change as well (IPCC, 2014-2; p. 4). Changes to human systems are, amongst others, decreasing quality and quantity of water resources and disturbance to crop

7 yields (IPCC, 2014-2; p. 5). These impacts are affecting the standard of living of people worldwide, but particularly the already vulnerable (Caney, 2010; p. 203) largely located in poorer and fragile states. According to Caney, the most vulnerable will face additional risk of unpredictable weather, higher mortality due to drought, malnutrition and infectious diseases (2010, p. 203). The IPCC reckons that existing “differences in vulnerability and exposure arise from non-climatic factors and from multidimensional inequalities often produced by uneven development processes [...]. These differences shape differential risks from climate change (2014-2; p.6).”

In his article ‘Environmental refugees: a growing phenomenon of the 21th century’, Myers highlights how the already vulnerable people of Sub-Saharan Africa will be affected (2002; p. 610). Upcoming desertification in the region will ultimately affect a 100 million people, an increase of 50% compared with 2001 (Myers, 2002; p. 612). Furthermore, they will have to deal with water shortages or even scarcity and a shortfall in nutrition supplies, which can even lead to severe scarcity (Myers, 2002; p. 612). This will lead to a stagnation of the region’s development and acute danger to millions of people.

As I am not qualified to contest or endorse the findings by Myers, Caney and the working groups of the IPCC and this thesis does not provide enough substance to go into the discussion on the credibility of these reports, I assume the above mentioned claims to be incontestable. This is generally endorsed by the consensus that climate change is at least in part due to humanity, and that it will affect human systems in some way. After assuming that we are facing global effects on the lives of humans due to climate change (in part) caused by human hands, we now move on to the current views in the debate on the distribution of burdens of global climate change.

The burden of global climate change

Following Caney in his article ‘Climate change and the duties of the advantaged’, I would like to state a distinction in the burdens of global climate change. The first duty is to mitigate climate change (Caney, 2010; p. 204). As mentioned before this entails that countries, organisations and individuals should refrain from activities causing climate change, and should generate and protect carbon sinks (Caney, 2010; p. 204). So for example, countries could promote insulation of houses, develop their industries to become more sustainable or adopt policies to support public transport. This thesis focuses on the second duty, that of adaptation (Caney, 2010; p. 204). Seeing that even when we stagnate all emission, there will still be climate change, we should move from a focus on prevention to focussing on adaptation (Schlosberg, 2012; p. 449). Within the duty of adaptation we have the obligation to dedicate resources to prevent harm done to people by climate change (Caney,

8 2010; p. 204). This means actively adapting a region by building dykes, or providing knowledge and aid, relocating people living on disappearing islands, etc.

When harm is done, intuitively we point to the harm-doer to compensate for the damage done. In environmental terms, this is central to the ‘polluter pays principle’. “If an actor causes pollution then that actor is morally responsible for dealing with ensuing costs to others (Caney, 2010; p. 205). Actors have brought upon climate change in their quest for industrial development, they should now bear the burden of their past actions (Schlosberg, 2012; p. 447). Internationally this principle has already been used in several agreements and is advocated by some developing

countries (Caney, 2005; p. 752). Even the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the EU have in the past recommended and affirmed this principle (Caney, 2005; p. 752). Caney expresses several valid objections and limitations to this “backward-looking” principle, of which I will mention three. Firstly, he remarks that it is hardly achievable to measure the amount of harm resulting from individual pollution, so that the actor can compensate accordingly (2010; p. 206). Secondly, the excusable ignorance of people to the consequences of their actions (2010; p. 208). Thirdly, the principle cannot deal with the existence of climate change not caused by human activity. Formulation used by for instance the IPCC, often leaves room for changes occurring not solely by human hands. This climate change, not covered by human activity, will go unsolved, even though we have seen what effects it can have on lives (Caney, 2010; p.212). This is very unfulfilling for the victims.

With these objections and limitations in mind, Caney provides adjustments to the principle, such as the rule that people who live beneath a certain standard of living should be exempt from paying when they pollute(2010; p. 213). The duty to pay is coupled to economic well being and needed economic development. Furthermore, he creates a new liability principle that states that actors engaging in climate change should bear the burden of adaptation, even if they were ignorant, since they “have benefitted from those harmful activities but their costs should correspond with the benefits they have derived (2010; p. 210).”

Even after several tweaks, Caney introduces us to the dilemma of the Remainder. What to do with the remaining climate change that is not covered by the adjusted ‘polluter pays principle’. This entails climate change by past generations, not traceable to human activity and legitimate pollution by the less fortunate (2010; p. 213). He argues that the remaining climate change can be covered by the ‘ability to pay approach’ (2010; p. 213).

9 Summarized this approach entails that the Remainder should be covered by dedication of resources by the wealthier agents and the amount of resources increases in accordance with the wealth of the agent (Caney, 2010; p. 213). Again there are several objections to be raised to the implementation of this approach, but Caney sticks by his guns. He shows that it is more justified to make the advantaged pay, rather than shoving these costs unto agents that cannot bear them (2010; p. 214). Developed countries are of course better equipped to pay the price without suffering detrimental losses. We should acknowledge that people should have the ability pursue their interests, and that this entails a duty to aid the affected and most vulnerable (Caney, 2010; p. 217).

By applying the Hybrid View of Caney1, the international community can ensure that the burden of adaptation is lifted away from the most vulnerable and borneby the advantaged, who have benefitting from decades of emissions in the strive for economic development. Now we know who should shoulder the burden, but how can we specify adaptation? We move on to the concept of domination to create normative guidelines to give body to this specification. How can non-domination be applied to the adaptation to the real effects of climate change on the most vulnerable? And can it explain the lack of action taken so far?

Non-domination, a tradition

Republicanism knows an important unifier in the conceptualisation of liberty as non-domination (Pettit, 1997; p.20). Domination entails that the power holder can interfere with the subject on an arbitrary basis. The subject feels this to be a submission to some form of alien control (Bachvarova, 2013; p. 175). This understanding of freedom is surpasses the negative interpretation of absence of interference, since a situation of domination also occurs in the threat of arbitrary

interference (Bachvarova, 2013; p. 174). The results of domination; insecurity, lack of choice and sub ordinance, can therefore appear in absence of interference. “It requires only the capacity to interfere arbitrarily in one’s affairs” (Pettit, 1997; p.22). Non-domination therefore is a situation in which subjects are protected from the presence of arbitrary interference (Honohan & Hovdal-Moan, 2014; p. 1). Theorists consequently examine the underlying impact of power within private and public relations (Benton, 2010; p. 407-408).

This does not mean that no interference can occur, but only of the ‘right’ kind in which there is no presence of arbitrariness and domination. So some forms of interference can enhance freedom, whilst people can be unfree through a lack of security against arbitrary power (Bachvarova, 2013; . 175). The power holder is forced to track the interests of the affected person or people;

10 “interference controlled by the interests and opinions of those affected, being required to serve those interests in a way that conforms with those opinions.” (Pettit, 1997; p. 35). So authorities are entitled to interfere through actions and decisions, but only to pursue the common interest and in line with common opinion (Pettit, 1997; p. 37). Domination cannot occur by accident. An intention is needed for it to be understood as domination (Pettit, 1997; p. 53).

There are two influential accounts of non-domination , that of Pettit and of Lovett. Pettit’s account was initially that of an unchecked interference by a dominator, in which the interests and opinions of the affected were not included (Honohan & Hovdal-Moan, 2014; p. 2). After partly redrafting the concept, Pettit adjusted the terms and conditions of arbitrary power somewhat. He added the necessity of tracking the interests and opinions of the affected through deliberation (Honohan & Hovdal-Moan, 2014; p. 2). This requires more stringent procedures for an interference not to be considered arbitrary and therefore to be counted as domination.

Frank Lovett in his book A General Theory of Domination has build upon these additions and adaptations of Pettit, by arguing for a more social view of non-domination. His argument entails two important dimensions. First, dependency of the affected on the relationship with the power holder creates a certain scale on which domination can be measured (Lovett, 2001; p. 102). More

dependency leads to more domination. If one has a low dependency on a relationship, an unequal standing may not be dominating even if the power can be considered arbitrary. But if the subjected to arbitrary power has a high dependency on the relationship, such as the relationship between employee and employer, the level of domination is high. This dependency also comes as the ‘costs of exit’ (Honohan & Hovdal-Moan, 2014; p. 2). Second, Lovett contrasts with Pettit’s account by focussing more on the threat of uncontrolled social power (Honohan & Hovdal-Moan, 2014; p. 2). Domination can be kept within limits by laws controlling social power of individuals and groups as long as everyone is aware of these rules (Honohan & Hovdal-Moan, 2014; p. 2). A side note made by Benton and Pettit is that this could also affect positive power relationships, such as between parents and children. They would therefore not adopt a procedural understanding of arbitrariness. Benton would claim that someone is instead vulnerable when they are dependent on a relationship within arbitrary power is exercised (2010; p. 408). The principle of tracking interests as central to non-domination, provides security in positive relationships (Benton, 2010; p. 408) .

To summarize, the framework of domination, according to republicans, consists of three elements. All three of these elements will need to be addressed in a quest for non-domination. The first is an imbalance of power, the ability to achieve your interests. Secondly, the measurement scale of dependency. Is someone dependent on the relationship? How high are the costs of exit? Thirdly,

11 the presence of arbitrariness. According to Lovett this refers to the absence of rules, Benton sees it as unaccountability and Pettit considers it the lack to track interests through deliberation. In this thesis I would like to propose a combination of the three definitions. The need for accountability can be achieved through rules regulating the essential tracking of interests. Further on I will divulge on how this can be done.

Global justice by non-domination

So, for republicans domination indicates the possibility of a power holder, may it be a group or an individual, to pursue personal interests in an (quite) unrestrained, uncontrolled and often systematic manner at the expense of groups or individuals subordinate to them (Laborde, 2010; p. 54). A way of testing a theory is by taking it out of its traditional context, where it works a charm and placing it in new surroundings confronted with new issues. In this thesis, I am of course lifting the concept of non-domination from the comfort of national citizenship to the higher grounds of the global political arena. Let’s see if non-domination can make it.

Several authors have been able to successfully use the concept of non-domination to analyse, explain and advocate pressing issues outside the realm of national citizenship. Bachvarova declares that non-domination has the ability to highlight “structural inequalities of power in the global order and to make them central, in a way that not only encompasses but also moves beyond questions of redistribution (2013; p. 173).” Iris Young has for instance used non-domination in her pursuit of a theory for international democracy (Bachvarova, 2013; p. 175). In her book, Young considers determination through non-domination. She argues that people have a right to self-determination, but obligations of justice are not bounded by the nation-state. People may have the right to determine their institutions of governance, they are relationally bound to other people so should take other interests into account and pursue equal relationships without domination (Bachvarova, 2013; p. 175). Self-determination therefore also entails, according to Young, that people worldwide are entitled to be free from domination. The obligation of people to obey this principle therefore does not stop at the border, because global justice requires freedom from arbitrary power and sub ordinance (Bachvarova, 2013; p. 175).

According to Laborde the duties of distributive justice are not constrained to the boundaries of a single society, but argues that a republican account of non-domination can advocate more global justice to support equal capabilities (2010, p. 48). By adjusting and adding to the definition of Pettit, the article points out that basic, systemic power structures undermine basic capabilities (Laborde, 2010; p. 54). Using Pettit’s example of the slave-master relation, Laborde argues that not the interpersonal relationship between these agents causes domination and subordination, but the

12 system of the slave trade (2010; p. 57). “The institution of slavery provided the resources and the background structure for the domination of slaves by their masters (Laborde, 2010; p. 57).”

The systemic relations of domination between North and South deny the latter basic capabilities and it should be a priority to reinvent international governance to provide the poorer countries with more equal standing (Laborde, 2010; p. 54). The constant deprivation of basic capabilities like food, shelter and health strips people from the potential of self-direction and autonomy, which are essential for agency and democratic citizenship (Laborde, 2010; p. 53). Our global institutional hierarchy has created an inescapable interdependence from which the global poor cannot exit, therefore making them vulnerable to domination (Laborde, 2010; p. 54).

Bachvarova (2010; p. 175) states it even stronger, and classifies it as “a systemic order where sets of economic and institutional relations are stabilized in the current pattern of interaction which aggravates the situation of weak states, forcing them into a permanently subordinate position.” The possibility of an actor to interfere, should be combined with an analysis of how the system

dominates and keeps dominating positions in place (Bachvarova, 2013; p. 175). A global ideal

consisting of non-domination with the right to participation, contestation and justification, will create an understanding of the current dependence of poor states and the advantage for the North to sustain these relationships, but especially move from there to a “culture of trust, accountability, publicity, ‘state socialization’ and non-coercive compliance, and [...] greater global justice (Laborde, 2010, p. 60).”

It seems that non-domination can be used in the analysis and answer to international pressing issues, such as distribution and self-determination. Non-domination is a powerful tool to establish, analyze and change international power structures, so open up global governance to subordinate states to enhance agency and autonomy. In the next section I would like to use the framework of non-domination and several points made by the above mentioned authors to form an argument, in which I will defend the power of non-domination in specifying the obligations we have towards the people affected by climate change. Non-domination can be used as a normative guideline to establish policies compensating the people affected by climate change in way that their interests and opinions are included. Furthermore it gives us concrete standards by which we can analyse the current situation and future progress.

Specifying interests and needs

The general focus within discussions on adaptation to climate change lies on the discussion of who should pay and how this burden should be divided, but there is a lack of normative discussion on how we can specify the vulnerabilities, interests, needs and opinions of the ones affected

13 (Schlosberg, 2012; p. 449). Important work has been done by David Schlosberg to move the

discussion onwards in his article on climate justice and capabilities. Sidenote, throughout this section I will use the example of disappearing islands to concretize my statements. So I’ll first give a brief introduction of these islands and the problems they are facing, before moving on to the discussion that has been started by Schlosberg.

The Small Island Developing States, in short SIDS, know 38 UN member states and a selection of other countries and areas, such as the Dutch Antilles (Kostakos et al, 2014; p. 4). The islands with a combined population of around 66 million people, lie in the Pacific, Atlantic, Carribean and Indian Oceans, and the Mediterranean and South China Sea (Kostakos et al, 2014; p. 4). These countries face unique problems due to their geographical position and features. Compared to industrial countries, SIDS have hardly contributed to emissions for economic gain, but climate change is exposing these islands to storm surges, flooding, water scarcity and sea-level rise (Kostakos et al, 2014; p. 4). Doing extensive damage to nature and humans. In 1992, the UN even acknowledged the unique problems and vulnerability facing these islands due to climate change through the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), “[...]thus stipulat[ing] that their specific needs and concerns should be given full consideration (Kostakos et al, 2014; p. 4).” Since the SIDS will be hit first by climate change, they can be seen as a frontrunner on how the world could deal with the effects of climate change or how they are failing to take a stand.

Moving on to the discussion at hand. Schlosberg argues that the capabilities approach encompassing recognition, can specify the concerns brought on by climate change, so it will fill the gap between theory and policy to preserve basic capabilities needed for individual and community functioning (2012; p. 457). Two important weaknesses in the current normative debate are

highlighted in the article; the failure to identify misrecognition and to include the capabilities approach (Schlosberg, 2012; p. 446). Furthermore, he argues against the individualist position taken by the most conceptions of justice and feels that his approach can reach both the individual and community-level (Schlosberg, 2012; p. 446).

Recognition in the context of climate change focuses on the relationship between the natural and social world. Changes in the natural world impact cultural practices and identity (Schlosberg, 2012; p. 451). This relationship between nature and human has not yet been included in the discussion, ultimately threatening basic needs and rights of people, resulting in inferior status (Schlosberg, 2012; p. 451). According to Schlosberg, “these two approaches help us understand the political, social and cultural condition – in addition to the physical ones – that create and sustain vulnerability (2012; p. 446).”

14 I will not contest his observation of these weaknesses, but will comment on how the concept of non-domination can be highly complementary to the specification of the vulnerabilities, interests, needs and opinions of those affected by climate change. As a way to determine what we are looking to protect, just the inclusion of recognition does not fully capture the subordinate position of the most vulnerable in the world. I believe that domination plays a big part in undermining the concerns uttered by the victims of climate change and is at the heart of the subordinate and vulnerable position of poorer countries in the discussion on adaptation to climate change. Leading to the invisibility of the most vulnerable being hit by climate change.

Dependency and vulnerability

Non-domination can be a good tool to measure how vulnerability to sub ordinance is

created, leading to an unequal standing and a lack of recognition of interests, opinions and needs. An increase in dependency can mean an increase in vulnerability to domination. For domination to occur there has to be a degree of dependence, in addition to an imbalance of power (Lovett, 2001; p. 102). This element can be seen as a scale of measurement (Lovett, 2001; p 102). Benton and Pettit feel that vulnerability can be shared as a group, but Benton sees it more than just the result of a

membership of a vulnerable group. Increasing dependency can also be measured by the cost of exit out of a power relationship (Benton, 2014; p. 53). “Someone is vulnerable to domination to the extent that they are dependent on a relationship where the power holder can exercise arbitrary power over them, power that is unaccountable (Benton; 2014; p. 408).”

Exemplified by SIDS, these countries take part in internationally organized negotiations on climate change, but these negotiations have mostly been organized along the lines of already existing institutions. These institutes have a long history of domination, powerful agents and sub ordinance. The marginalisation of SIDS means that their interests and opinions are not seen as priorities by important decision makers overseas (Kelman 2001; p. 606). There are initiatives taken by individual SIDS, such as the negotiations of Tuvalu with New-Zealand. But the situation is dire, and there are hardly alternatives.

Several of these islands employ lobbyists to get them at the table with other countries and at the UNFCCC. So when they get the countries at the negotiation table and since there are hardly any alternatives, realistically the islands cannot exit when dominating actors do not consider their interests reasonably. Offers made to them are hard to refuse, but agreements are open-ended and non-committal. Thereby, the sheer magnitude of economic, diplomatic and political difference between these islands and for instance the US en EU, creates inevitable domination in which the

15 interests of the islands are overshadowed. This is exemplified by several rounds of negotiations in the past that have left the islands without any commitments made by the international community.

Furthermore, important international power houses and institutions, such as the UNFCCC on climate changes, have major control over the global political agenda. SIDS builds partly on them to raise their interests and problems at international negotiations. According to Lovett, strategies like agenda control, preference manipulation through media and educational institutions, are part of the influence powerful players can have over the situation of others (2001; p. 107). SIDS are dependent on media coverage, international institutes, other countries, etc. to raise awareness. This can cause a vulnerable position if these actors are not regulated to take in their interests, so without just

consideration to the needs and opinions of SIDS a situation of domination can occur. And maybe it has already, but this should be considered in empirical studies.

Plurality and localities

Secondly, non-domination has eye for plurality and local particularities, since it requires the inclusion of interests and opinions of the affected group. The content of interests can be specified in accordance with local and cultural particularities. Global agreements can be made with

consideration to common opinion and interests such as human rights, but with the implementation and further specification of these agreements there should be eye for the local to make it legitimate and fall under non-domination. For instance, it can be a global agreement that all countries affected by climate change should receive 54 million Euros to compensate for climate change. The spending of this money would be different per country, since every country has its individual problems. A country can be heavily corrupt, so it is not in the best interest of the people for the government to receive this money. It could be better to invest it in adaptation of the country determined by the UNFCCC and in accordance with the interests of the inhabitants affected.

Global agreements should never drastically diminish the subset of choices of individual states. In the case of SIDS, there are organisations with the interests of all these islands at heart, but this does not mean policy can uniformly affect 66 million people in over 40 different countries in exactly the same way. Kelman paraphrases several authors stating that people of the SIDS know “close kinship ties, strong cultural heritage, sense of identity, and sense of place; and a long history of dealing with social and environmental change, difficulties, and opportunities (2001; p. 605). It would feel as arbitrary power, since the diversity between these groups is enormous and interests of particular countries cannot be tracked on this scale. Furthermore, we have seen that non-domination also entails self-determination according to Iris Young. The right to determine one’s own governance systems to protect and provide.

16 Agency and inclusion

Thirdly, non-domination requires the active inclusion of the affected, not only to track their interests through domination but also to create autonomy and agency. These concepts are highly valued by democratic countries. Without the possibility of political participation and freedom from arbitrary power even the acknowledgement of the rights of a person, can still leave her in a vulnerable and unsecure situation in which there is no obligation to include her interests and opinions (Benton, 2010; p. 406). It is not only vital to have rights, one also needs the possibility to participate in their determination (Benton, 2010; p. 406). One should have the possibility to affect decisions affecting one’s situation. According to Bachvarova, “a free state in the international order is a state that is not denied a basic capability for minimum self-direction (2013; p. 178).” This way, victims are not victimized but empowered to change their situation. By including them it further legitimizes intervention and will create a broad acceptance and feeling of justice.

Especially in the case of climate change it feel intuitively just to attach extra value to the interests and needs of the affected. Since the advantaged countries have benefitted hugely of climate change caused by their pursuit of industrial growth, but subsequently causing harm.

Furthermore, the most vulnerable countries have contributed minimally compared to industrialized countries, but are bearing the heaviest burdens.

In their pursuit of justice, the SIDS also highlight that their contribution to emissions are marginal, but are facing disproportionate consequences (Kelman, 2001; p. 610). Therefore, SIDS are emphasising that they should receive the power over resources and decision-making so to deal with adaptations (Kelman, 2001; p. 610). This way they want to include their terms and conditions in own decision-making on needed policy and actions (Kelman, 2001; p. 610). Further, justice would require the international community to support this, so adaptations can be made now instead of waiting for a human crisis in which emergency decisions will be made mainly by outsiders (Kelman, 2001; p. 610). Or this would require for large groups to leave their homeland. Something widely feared by the people of SIDS.

Moreover, including the people of SIDS in decision making also opens the door to valuable local knowledge. The people of SIDS have been living in accordance with the dangers nature can throw at them. They have a strong social, cultural and economic connection to the islands they live on, that has lead to sustainable livelihoods, extensive knowledge on environmental changes going back for hundreds of years passed on from generation to generation (Kelman, 2001; p. 2).

Organisations such as UNESCO and the World Wide Fund For Nature have started initiatives to document, share and learn from observations of and ideas on climate change by indigenous peoples and SIDS. Unfortunately, even on the islands themselves local knowledge is often seen as inferior to

17 Western science and technology (Kelman, 2010; p. 9). By including the SIDS in decision making, it would empower them and emphasise the value of traditional knowledge. Local knowledge could provide a good starting point from which the discussion on adaptation can start (Kelman, 2001; p. 9). After all, an intense cooperation between traditional and modern knowledge and experiences would make policy more specific and fitting to context, therefore “a needed entry point to the communities on the communities’ own terms (Kelman, 2001; p. 9)”.

Non–domination in practice

The international community should take priority in fixing the structure from which domination is derived. Laborde believes that, “non-domination [...] can never be achieved outside the law: for republicans, freedom can only be achieved under institutionalized schemes setting fair terms of social cooperation (2001; p.59)”. A thorough reconstruction of institutional governance with additional checking mechanisms should create an equal platform for poor countries to voice, advocate and defend their concerns, interests and needs (Laborde, 2001; p. 54). International governance needs to become more accountable and representative to achieve just terms of interdependence (Laborde, 2001; p. 62).

The best platform for climate negotiations could be the UNFCCC with their power to bring together most countries, scientists, NGO’s and collectives, and therefore the supervision over equal standing between countries could be organised within this forum. Ian Fry, negotiator for Tuvalu, emphasises the important role of the UNFCCC in an interview with the World Wide Institute; “There's no reasonable alternative. If you want all countries to agree on a collective global effort to address climate change, there is no other institution that can bring together that global effort. It has to work through the U.N. and the UNFCCC.”

Offering a solution to the lack of accountability, Benton, in his article on denizenship and non-domination, introduces us to three mechanisms that could provide the necessary checks on domination when implemented (2010; p. 408). First justification, power exerted is justifiable to the affected (Benton, 2010; p. 408). Second, contestation entails the possibility for the affected to raise objections if their interests and opinions are not met (Benton, 2010; p. 408). Finally under

retribution, power holders can be held accountable by punishment when they fail to include the interests and opinions of the affected (Benton, 2010; p. 408). When there are deficient ways of checking power on justification, contestation and retribution we can speak of an accountability gap (Benton, 2010; p. 408).

These mechanisms have mostly been used on a national level by republicans, since they reckon democratic institutes to be essential for the establishment and protection of basic interests

18 (Laborde, 2010; p. 56). But, lighter versions of these mechanisms are already available internationally through institutionalized schemes, such as the International Court of Justice or the Security Council. Moreover, non-domination entails that the interests of the affected are tracked through

deliberation, and that this is somehow protected by rules, making sure that power holders can be held accountable and subordinate players are secure from unequal standing. This legitimizes interference and this can be achieved through the above mentioned mechanisms without the necessity of democratic elections and voting. Of course, nationally this would be preferable and essential to ensure self-determination and autonomy, but in an international setting actors such as collectives, NGO’s and (preferably democratic) states can adequately represent the interests of their people.

Within the setting of the UNFCCC, countries vulnerable to climate change can form formal and informal alliances with each other and sympatric countries (Kelman, 2001; p. 11). By bundling their power they strategically place their interests and concerns on the agenda and overcome potential domination. These alliances can exert more influence on negotiations and form a fist against overpowering countries such as the US and China (Kelman, 2001; p.11). In the case of SIDS, their similarities are a powerful tool in the negotiations and collective action can avoid unnecessary sidesteps. These collectives can bring together vulnerable people who do not have the opportunity to interact and compete with power houses (Kelman, 2001; p. 10).

Problems facing non-domination and adaptation to climate change

The duty to adaptation is inevitably linked to the contribution of a country to climate change. The remaining climate change that cannot be attributed to a country, since it was not caused by human activity or the pollution was caused in ‘legal’ pursuit of development by a poor county, is covered by the capacity to contribute, following the theory of Caney. Unfortunately, often the situation is not as clear cut. Richard Black convincingly questions the simplicity of the notion of ‘environmental refugee’, stating that migration due to desertification or sea-level rise is hardly ever only caused by climate change (2001; p. 4). Other causes can be identified, such as bad governance, economic and cultural reasons. As I have established before, many countries most affected by climate change, are also poor and fragile countries. It would be quite easy to find additional reasons for water scarcity, death contributed to flooding, etc. So how does this affect our model?

In addition to the theory of Bachvarova and Laborde, in which they state that global governance knows an inherent state of domination in which interests of poor countries are structurally left on the sideline, causing a unequal distribution of wealth and capabilities

19 multiplier of existing problems, tensions and instability (Kostakos et al, 2014; p.4). Even the

Pentagon realizes that climate change can create further threat of violence, due to potential conflict over resources and extra pressure on economies, societies and governance institutions (Horn, 2014). Since climate change can work as an accelerate of existing instability and problems, which according to some authors are also due to domination, the international community bears the obligation to shoulder the burden of adaptation even when the situation is not fully caused by climate change. It is also in the interest of the international community to suppress future conflicts and humanitarian crises.

For non-domination to work in the situation of climate change, the whole international system should be one of non-domination and preferably even in every country. This is exemplified by agreements on trade and development assistance between the EU, African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries that were recently negotiated, which state a preference for agriculture, even though “mass farming [...] is no longer viable for some states because of changing climatic conditions (Kostakos et al, 2014; p. 6)”. Furthermore, even if funds for adaptation are made available for poor countries and negotiations on this were possible in an international system free from domination, domination within a country can cause that minorities are left out of adaptation and compensation.

Hopefully, the success of non-domination in dealing with adaptation to climate change will lead to more non-domination. If the refurbishment of the UNFCCR is successful, it could well be implemented further. Also the success poor countries could achieve through a restructuring or setting up alliances with fellow subordinated and sympathetic countries, could lead for them to take similar actions in other governance institutions within the UN, IMF or World Bank. It could also inspire minorities within countries to stand up against structural domination. Furthermore, non-domination does not need to be the only regulative ideal of international or national politics. It should be considered in combination with other such compelling ideals, such as human rights and capabilities. These could also provide necessary guidelines in addition to non-domination.

To conclude, in this paper I set out to defend the republican concept of non-domination to provide normative guidelines to further specify the duty to adaptation. It can provide us with tools to apply justice beyond the discussions on footing the bill concerning adaptation, prevention and mitigation to the essential question of adaptation strategies and policies. In particular, I show that non-domination can play a vital complementary role in assessing interests, analysing vulnerability, securing plurality and including local knowledge to fulfil the world’s duty to adaptation. Non-domination can provide necessary protection of the vulnerable, and give them autonomy and self-determination. Nonetheless, this was only a first step, I fully acknowledge the interdependence

20 between climate change, the already existing question of distribution, unequal economic alliances and exclusions, and so on, but hopefully I have stressed that the effects of climate change and a failure to adapt successfully to these changes, will further plummet poor countries in the deep end and will undo successes already achieved by developing countries. In this thesis, I have not had the opportunity to divulge further what policies and restructuring could be put in place, but the checking mechanisms of Benton can be considered a good starting point. The world owes the world a careful consideration of domination and the ways to avoid it.

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