SOCIAL MOBILIZATION IN A
FRAGMENTED SOCIETY
CONTENTIOUS POLITICS IN LEBANON
2005 & 2011 COMPARED
Final Thesis Master of Political Science - International Relations •
Graduate School of Sciences • University of Amsterdam (UvA), the
Netherlands • Written by Anne Wehkamp • completed December 2012 •
Supervised by dr. Reinoud Leenders • Second Reader dr. Charlotte Hille
2
Social Mobilization in a Fragmented Society
Contentious politics in Lebanon. 2005 and 2011 compared
Master’s thesis written by Anne Wehkamp
Student’s number 10248900
Supervisor: dr. Reinoud Leenders
Master’s programme ‘International Relations’
Graduate School of Social Sciences
University of Amsterdam
3
Content
Acknowledgements ... 5
List of abbreviations ... 6
Preface ... 7
Introduction ... 9
Content ... 13
1. Social movement theory and fragmented societies ... 16
1.1.
Political process and culture and cognition in social movement theory ... 17
1.2.
Social movements in the Middle East ... 23
1.3.
The dynamics of a fragmented society ... 27
1.4.
The comparative method and social mobilization ... 29
1.5.
Further considerations, limitations and practicalities ... 30
Conclusion ... 33
2. Historical Background – Fragmentation in Lebanese society ... 34
2.1. Sectarianism from an historical perspective ... 34
2.2.
Fragmentation and foreign involvement in a fragile state – Syria’s presence ... 39
Conclusion ... 41
3. The Independence Intifada ... 43
3.1. From opposition in politics to the political street ... 44
3.2.
Branding March 14 – networks in mobilization ... 49
3.3.
The role of emotions in mobilization ... 53
3.4.
One single movement? The role of (collective) identity in March 14 ... 57
3.5.
What happened next – Foreign involvement and dreams being shattered ... 59
4
4. The 2011 anti-sectarian protests... 63
4.1. Lebanese developments between 2005 and 2011 ... 63
4.2.
The Arab uprisings of 2011 ... 65
4.3.
The evolution of the 2011 anti-sectarian protests ... 69
4.4. Organisational aspects of the 2011 anti-sectarian mobilization ... 72
4.5.
The role of emotions ... 75
4.6.
Why did large scale mobilization fail to occur? ... 79
Conclusion ... 84
Conclusion ... 86
Findings ... 86
Suggestions for further research ... 89
Relevance ... 91
5
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank dr. Reinoud Leenders for his support during the writing process of this thesis and of my
academic development in general. Although he has been ready to give me as much support and advice as
needed, he also gave me enough space to explore the complex country of Lebanon for myself. I am grateful for
his understanding of my extracurricular activities during this writing process and the contacts he provided
during the one week seminar in Lebanon, organized together with the Dutch Institute in Lebanon. I am also
grateful for the Royal Netherlands Embassy in Lebanon for giving me the chance to explore Lebanon’s many
characteristics and to meet people that gave me new inspiration and insights. I would further like to thank Sana
and Malak for providing me with contacts within the movements. I would also like to thank Alex for keeping an
eye on me during my fieldwork, for Miriam for discussing the content of my thesis with and my other friends
both in Lebanon and in the Netherlands who supported me during the writing process of this thesis.
Most grateful am I for my father Herman and his enduring generosity and support throughout my studies.
I would like to contribute this thesis to my mother, Hannie Wehkamp. She taught me to be grateful, to have
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List of abbreviations
CCT – cultural and cognitive theory
PPT – political process theory
SMT – social movement theory
UNDP – United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO – United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNIFIL – United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
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Preface
The start of a master’s thesis or research in general usually is an idea of an interesting theme or idea. The result
of this idea is living in a country, talking with people and trying to unravel how problems you encounter in your
research may be solved. The start of my thesis was different. Although my scholarly interest has always been
focused on the Middle East, the start of this research was an internship at the Royal Netherlands Embassy in
Lebanon. Knowing that I would spend half a year in this country, I had to find a topic that takes quite some time
to grasp. A topic on which you can read a lot, but that you will only understand fully by living in the country.
When writing this thesis, I time and time again got confirmed that I picked such a topic: fragmentation in
Lebanon.
As this thesis will show, fragmentation in Lebanon is based on different sectarian, political and social
identities of people living in the country. You are not only a Lebanese citizen, but additionally you can be a
Lebanese Sunni, Shia, Christian or part of a smaller sectarian group in Lebanon. Within these sects, you can
“pick” your own political leader. As a Christian, you can follow Michel Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement, or
Samir Geagea’s Lebanese forces, dependent on your stance on Lebanon’s neighbours, the area you live in, or
the leader that your history and family chose for you to follow. You can be part of the March 8 or March 14
movement, but there is also the less chosen option to be a secular Lebanese that does not want to have
anything to do with these sectarian structures in society. Sometimes you are forced to live by your sect
however, for example if you want to work in civil service positions or the political office, in which employment
is dependent on the religious balance. People living in Lebanon have a lot of different identities. Some are
chosen voluntarily, but most are being decided by birth. Daily life is structured around Lebanese fragmentation.
The capital of Lebanon Beirut is geographically fragmented, with areas where mainly Christian, Sunni, Shia or
Palestinian people live. This geographical fragmentation of Beirut was coloured by its history.
This short impression of Lebanese fragmentation hints at the influence of people’s identities on the
stability of the country. Although my background in Cultural Anthropology helped me to structure and to make
sense of Lebanese fragmentation, the topic needed to be narrowed down. The current unrest in the region
compared to the relative stability in Lebanon made me want to grasp what makes Lebanon a peculiar case.
8
standards) is that there is no authoritarian dictator that needs to be removed, there are also factors that may
foster mobilization. Still a quarter of its population lives in poverty, and “the fact that indignation and
resentment exist among the Lebanese – the majority of the Lebanese – does not warrant debate” (Abbas &
Yaakoub 2011: 208). That the Lebanese are able to mobilize is shown in their history. Martyrs’ square has been
filled with Lebanese protestors more than once, the last major protest in 2005. This thesis looks into the
dynamics of mobilization in 2005 and compares this with the absence of large scale mobilization in the context
of the Arab uprisings. It will be largely based on academic articles, but newspapers, conversations with
Lebanese friends, interviews and non-participant observation during a protest in Martyrs’ Square served as
inspiration for this research as well.
Although this thesis aims at presenting fragmentation as objectively as possible, findings of my
fieldwork are often highly subjective. Politics is overly present in Lebanese society, which means that
respondents have strong opinions and make strong claims, dependent on “their fragment” in Lebanese society.
Their claims are often made with the interest of their own group. When a respondent of one of the interviews
saw that I was trying to see how shared his opinions were and how they relate to actual events, he told me that
“to understand Lebanese politics, you have to speak to non-Lebanese people”. Although I aimed in this
research to be as complete in my observations as possible, I make no pretence that I discovered all aspects of
mobilization in Lebanese fragmented society. This thesis presents the view of Lebanese society from a
new-comer to Lebanese affairs, trying to discover what is beneath the surface with very few presumptions. In a
society were politics is omnipresent, this proved to be a benefit.
- Anne Wehkamp
9
Introduction
The assassination of Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri of Lebanon on February 14 2005, and the sharp controversies
this caused, provided an opportunity for thousands of people to gather at Martyrs’ Square in Beirut. On March
8, 2005, a demonstration orchestrated by Hizbollah mobilized around half a million people. Protesters taking
part denounced international meddling and praised the Syrian role in Lebanon. To counter this demonstration,
on March 14, 2005 over one million protesters gathered at the same Martyrs’ Square expressing their
dissatisfaction with current political events and calling for the Syrian forces to withdraw from Lebanese
territory. These events formed the so-called March 8 and March 14 blocs, each consisting of a coalition of
political parties.
Almost six years later, on February 7, 2011, another protest was taking place in Beirut. But instead of
the masses of people that demonstrated in 2005, this time only a few hundred people mobilized to show their
dissatisfaction with the sectarian political system and foreign influence in the country. The context of the Arab
spring seemed to be an opportunity to mobilize by creating a sense of momentum as the political systems in
other countries in the region seemed receptive to reform and people in the region increasingly gave agency to
their emotions of discontent. Although Syrian troops left Lebanon, there had been little improvement in the
satisfaction of Lebanese with the state of political affairs. The 8 March and 14 March movements were still
active with the latter not convinced of the total exclusion of Syrian influence. The sectarian political system still
had its pitfalls. The major underlying structures in society appeared to be still in place, but the outcomes in
terms of mobilization were different. What changed in the motivation for people to mobilize?
This thesis explores how social mobilization takes shape in the fragmented society of Lebanon. By
comparing two instances of mobilization, the main question: “How do (non)structural conditions influence the
propensity for social mobilization in the fragmented society of Lebanon?” will be answered. Sectarianism in
Lebanon may form “a form a nexus of power that can restrict social mobilizations”, but may also “have the
ability to ignite them” (Hermez 2011: 529).
But what may be gained by studying two events of protest one of which did not really work out? There
should be a point in conducting research, whether it is done for an intrinsic value of knowledge or to have an
10
revolutionary contexts (Dupont & Passy 2011: 2-3). There is no protest that occurs spontaneously. One should
ask how people who have different values bind together. To explain what factors influence social mobilization,
it is therefore also needed to study instances of mobilization that did not have impact. When investigating
factors of success for social mobilization, one cannot only look at the successful instances of mobilization, e.g.
cases of large scale mobilization preferably succeeding in their goals, but one should also look at why some
instances failed. Only selecting cases of success will result in little explanatory value. Barbara Geddes (1990:
132) showed that indeed, “the only things that can actually be explained using a sample selected on the
dependent variable are differences among the selected cases”. The population of which a researcher selects its
cases should reflect nothing more and nothing less than the complete range of phenomena that her or his
findings can bear upon. This thesis made the choice to select one case of mobilization that did not succeed.
Unsuccessful instances of mobilization are rarely investigated, because they seem to little effect on the social
world out there. Geddes however showed that it is relevant to reflect on the entire population. By also
studying an unsuccessful case, this thesis tries to contribute to mobilization studies.
John Gerring refers to the concept of “relevance” in the context of academic research as having
“significance to the lay citizens of the world” (Gerring 2012: 70).1 Showing the relationship between
fragmented societies and social mobilization may prove insightful for decision- and policy makers in
fragmented societies for mobilization is able to influence their work, but also for people living in fragmented
societies themselves: whether they want to boost the protest they are participating in or whether they are
outsiders that want to make sense of what is going on. The significance of this research is to provide answers to
more general questions on fragmentation and mobilization through applying it on two cases. Especially with
regard to the role of collective identities in mobilization, generalizable empirical research seems lacking:
scholars that use the term collective identity take for granted its existence without offering compelling
evidence that this phenomenon exists “outside the minds of the social movements analysts” (Hunt & Benford
2004: 441). Most empirical research on collective identity is limited in their scope. If we understand how
certain conditions influence social mobilization in these two cases and can give more general conclusions, then
1 This is part of the trend to link research with necessary social consequences, as if science has no intrinsic
value of its own. This is also reflected in John’s Duffield (2001:94) question regarding the relevance of research: “how can the policy community profit from the exercise?” Besides having an aim directed to the outside world, the analytical relevance of this thesis should not be forgotten.
11
the door is open to a more understanding of the relation between fragmentation and mobilization in other
cases. Other fragmented countries in the Middle East and North African region such as Cyprus, Turkey, Iraq and
Iran experienced political mobilization along ethnic lines as well, whether society was fragmented along the
lines of clans, tribes, language and/or religion (Fearon 2006: 855). Ideally, the general conclusions would also
be useful for cases of mobilization in fragmented societies outside the region, such as in protest in Sub-Sahara
Africa in which each country on average has 8.2. ethnic groups that are greater than 1% of the population, and
in which fewer than half of the countries have an ethnic majority group (idem: 853). The results of this research
may then for instance help answering the question whether segregation leads to heated sentiments and a
stronger degree of mobilization, be it within their own groups. Caution in aiming at general conclusions is
necessary, however, for the findings are only based on Lebanese society. As the fragmented society in Lebanon
is more often seen by scholars of the Middle East as peculiar or an exception to general political theories (Hrair
Dekmejian 1978: 252), this thesis tries to show how Lebanese mobilization has the potential to add new
insights on social movement theory of fragmented societies in general.
Before reading this research, some clarification on the use of the main concepts is needed. The
concept of a “fragmented society” refers to the separation in society based on sex, class and often on ethnicity.
The focus in this research is on the latter, although class also will prove to be a factor in the two cases of
fragmentation under study. The concept of “ethnicity” may be described as “an aspect of social relationship
between agents who consider themselves as culturally distinctive from members of other groups with whom
they have a minimum of regular interaction” (Eriksen 2002: 12-3). An ethnically fragmented society can be
based on political, organisational as well as on symbolic groups. Ethnicity becomes politicized “when political
coalitions are organized along ethnic lines, or when access to political or economic benefits depends on
ethnicity” (Fearon 2006: 854). Besides being referred to as a fragmented society, Lebanon is also characterized
as a sectarian society. Sectarianism may be defined as follows: (a person) strongly supporting a particular
religious group, especially in such a way as not to be willing to accept other beliefs. So where fragmentation is a
more general concept that can refer to any kind of separation between ethnic groups that may also accept
each other´s way of thinking, sectarianism implies setting aside other religious groups and not being able or
willing to accept other beliefs. Sectarianism is a result of religious fragmentation in Lebanon and often goes
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ethnic differentiation in which there is more tension between the fragments. The character of fragmentation, I
will argue, is one of the many variables that influences mobilization.
The comparative framework will make use of social movement theory (SMT), an interdisciplinary
approach that tries to explain aspects of mobilization. Within SMT there are two main perspectives that are of
help in this comparison: Political process theory (PPT), which focuses on structural explanations of the
appearance of social movements or on the ‘when’ rather than explaining why and how social movements
appear, and cultural and cognitive theory (CCT), which emphasizes the dynamics between structure and agency
and the social contexts. These two complementary approaches are chosen in order to capture both the agency
and structure involved in the fragmented society of Lebanon. Both agency and structure are needed in order to
understand social mobilization in a fragmented society. A fragmented society involves competing identity
formations, and confrontations with the other. Before delving into social movement theory in the next chapter,
a few words on the fragmented society of Lebanon are needed. How fragmentation takes shape in Lebanon will
be further discussed in the second chapter of this thesis.
Fragmentation in Lebanon takes shape along several ethnic divisions. These ethnic divisions in society
are reflected in the “geographical distribution” of Lebanese land and in the political affiliations of Lebanese
people. Lebanese identify themselves and act along these lines relative to their social surroundings. However,
fragmentation also influences the way people can act as well.2 A Christian Lebanese Beiruti is not often found
living in Beirut’s Shia neighbourhoods. The Lebanese central bank - or any other governmental institution -
must balance the religious backgrounds of their employees. Indeed, the clearest dividing line in Lebanese
society is associated with religious identification (Abul-Husn 1998: 14).
The largest religious groups in Lebanon are Sunni, Shia, Maronites, Greek Orthodox, Druze and Greek
Catholics groups. Often the Maronite, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholics and smaller Christian groups are taken
together and being labelled “Christian”3. The Sunni and Shia groups are less often taken together and labelled
“Muslim”, possibly because of the size of the two large groups and the absence of smaller religious Islamic
2
For an overview of the different affiliations of Lebanese sects towards the Lebanese state, see Haddad (2001).
3
The classification of sects inside Lebanon is not always as straightforward. The classification of Christian Lebanese should for instance also take into account political and militant divides within the Maronite sect to understand what is going on. Additionally, taking the Christian group as a whole blurs the relation between Christian groups in Lebanon as well, with some groups being more closely aligned than others (Haddad 2001: 133).
13
groups. Besides these communities just listed, there are also smaller sectarian groups living in Lebanon.
Although sectarian identification in Lebanon is strong, there are differences to the extent members of sectarian
groups relate themselves to their group identity. Hermez (2011: 535) showed that “it is not simply sectarianism
that plays a role in the making of state and selfhood”, but that indeed, “the politics of sectarianism get
moulded in ways to suit the various powers”. Therefore, the moulding of sectarianism can be better
understood by taking other identifications into account, such as an alliance to the 8 or 14 March movements.
The sectarian identification dividing lines may be crossed to meet other identifications, such as
political stance towards a certain subject, or daily life activities, such as being a mother. According to Thomas
Hylland Eriksen (2002: 31), individuals have many statuses and many possible identities, and it is an empirical
question when and how certain identities become the most relevant. When analyzing social mobilization in a
fragmented society one should not a priori take the degree of fragmentation that the subjects experience for
granted since levels of fragmentation differ per person and per experience. Cultural and cognitive theory adds
a less fixed perspective on mobilization in fragmented societies to political process theory.
The next section will give an overview of the research framework and content of this thesis.
Content
To explore how (non)structural conditions influence the propensity for of social mobilization in the fragmented
society of Lebanon, the first chapter of this thesis will proceed with a theoretical and methodological
framework capturing the relation between social mobilization and social fragmentation. This is done with the
aim to build an informative framework in which to place the findings of my research. Through investigating
previous social movement theory, it will appear that the use of a combination of both structural social
movement theories as well as non-structural theories is likely to capture the dynamics of social movements in
fragmented societies. Since this thesis focuses on mobilization in Lebanon, the history of mobilization in the
Middle East is taken into account as well. This makes it possible to place the results of this research in a
broader (historical) context and add to the more general SMT. From a more methodological perspective, the
next section will then explore Lijphart’s comparative method as a strategy for viewing mobilization in a
comparative perspective. Since Lebanon’s fragmented society plays a key role in this research, this chapter also
14
argument is made that fragmented societies shape identities and structures that influence the propensity for
social mobilization. The concluding part of the chapter will portray other methodological considerations,
limitations and practicalities of the thesis, for example by giving attention to ethnographic research, the
approach taken to conduct fieldwork for this research.
The second chapter will give a general introduction to the history of fragmentation in Lebanese
society. The goal of this section is to make clear how (sectarian) segregation took shape in this society and its
political system. As this thesis does not aim at providing a complete historical background, the chapter will
focus on how fragmentation took and takes shape in Lebanese society, influenced both by long term structural
processes and short term instances of change. In order to understand social mobilization, it is needed to know
how society is composed. The chapter also discusses Lebanon’s more recent history coloured by Syria’s
involvement after the Ta’if agreement. It shows increasing Syrian pressures on Lebanese society, which
provided the backdrop to the 2005 independence intifada. This overview will lead the way to an analysis of two
cases of mobilization in the third chapter. Here, I will discuss the Beirut Spring of 2005. In the fourth chapter I
will discuss mobilization in the context of the Arab uprisings in 2011.
The Beirut Spring of 2005 may be labelled as a successful4 case of mobilization: successful because a
large part of the Lebanese population was involved, either by participating or by being an opponent. This
chapter will therefore also discuss the role of the pro-Syrian demonstration held on March 8, which formed an
impetus for anti-Syrian Lebanese to respond. The focus on the anti-Syrian movement allows for more depth in
the analysis. It will link the analysis to topics discussed in the theoretical chapter: the role of networks,
organisational structures, emotions, perceptions and (collective) identity. The protests in the 2005
independence intifada created a sense of unity among those going to Martyrs’ Square on March 14. Lebanese
fragmented society made that March 14 wanted to respond to what happened on March 8, it shaped the
4
To state that the mobilization of 2005 was more successful than that of 2011, or to make statements on their general success in relation to instances of mobilization in the region, one needs to have a standard on which the degree of success or failure of social mobilization can be measured. I measure the degree of success of mobilization in terms of the number of people and the period of time people mobilized. Besides that, one should also take into account the feelings of attachment of people to the movement and its goals. Where there many people who joined because their friends did as well? How critical were the people with regard to the movement’s goals? And how destined were they to see the change taking place that they were protesting for?
15
organisation and networks of the March 14 movement itself, the dreams and expectations of Lebanese who
mobilized, the creation of a common identity and the feeling of disappointment that followed March 14 2005.
Five years from then, as mass mobilization commenced throughout the region, “the political landscape
of the Arab world began its most dramatic transformation in half a century” (Heydemann & Leenders 2011:
647). Lebanon would not remain unaffected by these events. Just as in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt, people
unsatisfied with the current political situation of their country gathered at the main square of Beirut, but in this
case their actions involved fewer people, did not last long and did not seem to have any significant impact. The
internal differences within the anti-sectarian movement combined with discourse of disenchantment and the
loss of hope prevented the anti-sectarian movement to reach the same heights as the 2005 movement.
Both chapters will make use of the theoretical framework offered in the first chapter. Applying insights
of political process theory and cultural and cognitive theory provides answers to the main question. Relating to
PTT, it will focus on state structures in 2005 and 2011, the regional environment and foreign involvement, the
institutional provisions for participation in place at the time, the stability of the political alignments, influence
of elite alliances on government, and networks. Academic literature, news articles and policy briefings are able
to provide some important insights in the structures at play. This research also investigates how people
perceived these structures. CCT investigates the influence of customs, beliefs, values, symbols and rituals in
mobilization (Johnston & Klandermans 1995: 3). This information is largely available through academic
literature, blogs or internet pages such as Facebook. The use of ethnographic fieldwork develops “as intimate
an understanding as possible of the phenomena investigated” (Eriksen 1995: 24).
The conclusion answers the main question “How do (non)structural conditions influence the
propensity for social mobilization in the fragmented society of Lebanon?”. It will compare and analyze the two
findings of the two previous chapters through looking at both structural and non-structural aspects of
mobilization by giving an overview of the findings. It will then proceed with suggestions for further research
and a reflection on the relevance of the findings of this thesis.
The next chapter will make a start in finding out which conditions matter through elaborating on the
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1. Social movement theory and fragmented societies
This chapter will explore the dynamics and propensity for social mobilization in fragmented societies, such as
Lebanon, by offering a theoretical framework. This is done in multiple steps. The first step is to investigate
social movement theory research. The relation between political process theory and cultural and cognitive
theory in particular becomes clear with the help of the work of major scholars in the field. Social movement
theory (SMT) offers tools to analyze mobilization, although these tools are not often adjusted to fit the regional
peculiarities that influence mobilization. This does not necessarily mean that all SMT theories are
western-biased, but rather that some studies have the tendency to take the world as a constant on which every theory
should work the same. General social movement theories should be complemented with theories that take
regional peculiarities into account. Since mobilization does not follow the same paths across the world but
instead is influenced by regional and local factors, these contexts must be considered in order to expose a
more narrowed down view of the agency and structure of mobilization. The following step is to use Lijphart’s
comparative method as a strategy for viewing mobilization in a comparative perspective. Next, the dynamics of
fragmented societies will be linked to social movement research. Fragmented societies shape identities and
structures that influence the propensity for social mobilization. The concluding part of this chapter will show
how these characteristics can be relevant from a social mobilization theorist’s point of view. Why would one
study two instances of mobilization one of which only had limited effects? It will also show other
considerations, limitations and practicalities involved with conducting ethnographic research.
The goal of this chapter is to link social movement theory with relevant theories on dynamics in
fragmented societies, to understand how (non)structural conditions influence the propensity for mobilization
in fragmented societies. Lebanon’s fragmented society is more often seen by scholars of the Middle East as
peculiar or an exception to general political theories (Hrair Dekmejian 1978: 252). This thesis tries to
17
1.1.
Political process and culture and cognition in social movement theory
Since social movement theory is closely linked to the concept of social movements, it is necessary to give a
short definition of what social movements exactly are. Especially when trying to use both structural and agency
oriented approaches and applying them to a relatively understudied subject area such as fragmentation, it is
needed to be precise on what exactly is being discussed. Each approach within SMT will conceptualize the
concept of a movement differently. Trying to focus not too much on political structures, nor too much on
agency and identity relating processes, the definition of a social movement should be as “neutral” as possible.
The goal of Mario Diani’s (1992) article “the concept of social movement” is exactly this: trying to define social
movement in such a way that synthesis between more structural and agency approaches in social movement
theory is possible.
This research will make us of the following definition:
A social movement is a network of informal interactions between a plurality of individuals, groups and/or organizations, engaged in a political or cultural conflict, on the basis of a shared collective identity. (Diani 1992: 13.)
According to Diani (1992: 17), this definition involves the necessary components of social movements:
networks or relations between a plurality of actors; collective identity and the presence of conflict. Therefore it
can be used in a design focused on the interplay between structure and agency in social movement theory,
represented by political process theory and cultural and cognitive theory.5
As the more structural component of SMT, political process theory focuses on explanations of
movement’s success and failure rather than on the internal organization of social movements themselves
(Duboc 2011: 62). “The emphasis tends to be on longer cycles of mobilization and decline and on factors
external to movements that can constrain and shape movement outcomes” (Schaefer Caniglia & Carmin 2005:
5
Additionally, the concept “non-movement” as proposed by Bayat (2010: 14) gives a more informal character to mobilization, describing situations in which millions of people who remain fragmented in their organization unintentionally act for a common cause through the unintended consequences of daily practices. There is no common identity as a group and the organization of mobilization lacks structure. It could be the case that the people who joined in 2005 as a group to display their dissatisfaction with the current political situation are now protesting on a more individual basis, for example by means of not giving out their votes on election day. This would become apparent in the Lebanese elections of 2013.
18
204). Focal points of PTT research are institutional provisions for participation; stability of political alignments;
elite access and alliances; elite conflict; and the level of repression. Indeed, structural metaphors dominated
the field of study on social movements: “Insurgents must find ‘cleavages’ among elites; ‘windows’ of
opportunity must open for them; participants are recruited through ‘networks’; social movement organizations
compete in a social movement ‘industry’; the right frames must be discovered to express cultural meanings”
(Jasper 2004: 1).
Goodwin and Jasper (1999) argue that PPT has two major weaknesses: a strong bias in favour of
metaphors of structure, and an incapability to reach agreement on the definitions of its basic concepts.
Structural factors are emphasized more readily than elements of agency. These scholars (1999: 47) show that
PPT theorists tend to reify culture, “instead of conceptualizing (and analyzing) culture as a ubiquitous and
constitutive dimension of all social relations, structures, networks, and practices”. PPT scholars should
recognize that cultural and strategic processes define and create the factors usually represented as
“structural”.
This study argues that structural processes in mobilization should not be forgotten, but instead should
be complemented by studies that focus on agency in mobilization rather than structure. Since structure and
agency are mutually influential in daily life, persuasive analysis should take both into account. Economic, social
or political structures influence the way people respond, dependent on their personal identities and cultural
surroundings. This goes beyond the black box theories “that seem to suggest that movements wondrously
appear out of social structural conditions” (Hunt & Benford 2004: 438). The first step in analyzing mobilization
is a dialectic relationship between the individual and its surroundings. Besides framing mobilization in the social
and cultural context, there will be an emphasis on identity construction and emotions to provide more insight
in Lebanese fragmented society. As this chapter will show, investigating the role of fragmentation in a society
necessarily means delving into people’s perceptions of themselves, their group, and of the others. Participation
in social movements frequently involves an enlargement of personal identity for participants and offers
fulfilment and realization of the construction of the self (Oberschall & Kim 1996: 63).
Gradually, PPT scholars recognized that their theory was lacking the other more discursive side of the
19
showed that later political process scholars did not limit their attention to structural factors alone, but
extended their reach to include cultural and social contexts as factors that attenuate movement dynamics.
By making use of “an interpretative lens” cultural and cognitive theory of social movements is able to
show the fluent character of mobilization and to emphasize agency in explaining why social mobilization occurs
(Schaefer Caniglia & Carmin 2005: 205). The changing character of fragmentation in a society can be explained
by looking at how people construct their identity. As already shown, fragmentation can refer to a division of
society along sectarian lines, but also for example along the lines of political affiliation. Fragmentation is based
on certain identity constructions. Since people may have different identities at the same time, society can be
split along different lines of fragmentation. Instead of seeing identities as relatively fixed as PPT does, cultural
and cognitive theory brings a more fluent perspective on mobilization in fragmented societies. The main
argument of CCT is that “movements arise and work within social and cultural contexts that are ripe with
meaning. Participants are motivated to join movements, at least in part because they resonate with their
personal values and beliefs” (idem: 205). The cognitive elements such as values, beliefs and ideas, show how a
sense of unity is constructed, being composed of individual identities.
The concept of identity can thus be a useful tool to understand the role of personal values and beliefs.
Identity refers to the “state of mind that includes a view of self, attitudes, lifestyles, and experiences shared
with others which is publicly recognized and labelled, and which is usually associated with role, membership,
and/or category, though not concretely anchored in social structure” (Obesrschall & Kim 1996: 64-5). This is
related to the concept “feeling of belonging”. Sofia Hamaz and Ellie Vasta (2009) describe this concept as
feelings of community, home, acceptance and affiliation in and to spaces and places. It is “a complex social
process which for many entails multiple affiliations across space and place, as well as multiple identities and
expanded identities” (Hamaz & Vasta 2009: 22). People have ‘multiple belongings’ that stretch beyond the
bounds of the nation-state (Hamaz & Vasta 2009: 7), to for example a certain fragment in society or to a social
movement.
The membership of a group of people with a certain identity, for example a religious or class identity,
consequently creates out-groups: people who do not belong to the same group as you do. “Political identities
include boundaries, relations across the boundaries, relations within the “us” and within the “them,” plus
20
group members and the out-group create fragmentation. This fragmentation influences mobilization, as Hunt
and Benford (2004: 432) show when they state that collective identities6 in social science are seen as “both a
necessary precursor and product of movement collective action”7. This way, cultural and cognitive theory is
able to link fragmentation to characteristics of social movements.
Individuals are connected to social movements through framing. Problems are articulated in a certain
rationale that makes that people of certain groups identify with these issues (Schaefer Caniglia & Carmin 2005:
205). The communication of a common public identity explains why people join social movements. The
strategies of social movements are being framed in the same discourse. Organizations select tactics based on
functional criteria such as familiarity, perceived efficacy, and the messages they want to communicate to the
public (idem: 206) and their own group. Identities cause subconscious actions and behaviour (Oberschall & Kim
1996: 65). When established in-group identities do not correspond to or are confronted by structural realities
in the world “out there” that negatively affects group members, social action is likely to occur. Since the 1960s,
collective identities are increasingly seen as a premise for social action to occur since a “strong identification
with a collectivity makes participation on behalf of that collectivity more likely” (Hunt & Benford 2004: 437).
This way, the understanding of the idea of different collective identities that people have helps to understand
why mobilization occurs in one year, and stays absent in the other.
The discourse and communication of a social movement gives a tool to study the internal dynamics of
a social movement. Cultural and cognitive theories’ emphasis on agency and the individual shows that change
in mobilization should not only be sought for outside the movement. This would neglect “large categories of
change, particularly the agency of members” (Baylouny 2011: 163). In line with CCT, Anne Marie Baylouny
6
Hunt & Benford (2004: 434-441) give an historical overview of the use of the concept collective identity in classical and contemporary social sciences, which they define as “a shared sense of ‘we-ness’. Insights of how a collective feeling of belonging to a certain common identity can affect society can be found at Karl Marx’s concept of collective class consciousness as a necessary condition for his revolution. Emile Durkheim argues that a collective identity can lead to collective representation, in which the collective has become a living ‘object’ that lives, thinks, feels and acts. Acts against the collective representation become personal. Lastly, from a Weberian perspective, collective identity comes from various sources, be it class, status or party. Collective action requires the development of collective identification. “From the 1960s onward collective identity as a concept replaced class consciousness as the factor that accounts for mobilization” (Hunt & Benford 2004: 437). Within this movement, identity was thought to influence the way opportunities are being perceived and used.
7
The concept of identity has been used to explain the emergence, trajectories and impacts of social movements, to analyse grievance constructions and framing processes, motivations for participation, activists’ tactical choices, life-course outcomes and emotions (Hunt & Benford 2004: 433).
21
argues that a lot of mobilization takes place in the informal everyday spheres of life, for example through
watching television. She argues that the development of the Hizbollah owned television station al-Manar, in
which there seems to be a softer stance against American influence, are due to the central role of women in
the organization (idem: 164). Internal dynamics in the movement can change its direction, since movements
depend on their memberships’ approval (idem). The growing importance of women for Hizbollah is reflected in
the space and progressive stance that they are allowed to take in its broadcasting. “Women have taken
advantage of their importance and pushed the boundaries” (idem: 178). The discourse of al-Manar shows the
internal dynamics of the movement. However, although Hizbollah communicates its progressive stance in the
media, the framework of a religious party and militia remains intact (idem). This study shows again the
importance of taking into account the group members of social movements.
These cognitive aspects have consequences for the role of culture in mobilization. The values
emphasized by the cognitive aspect of this theory are moulded into the broader culture of the group via
institutionalization and routinization (Johnston & Klandermans 1995: 9). Culture is being consumed by the
group members through public discourse, persuasive communication and the raising of consciousness. There
can be for example a “culture of protest” within a certain group, which lowers the threshold of mobilization.
Through networks of meaning, active attempts by members to persuade others, and through discussions
among participants, a collective consciousness or culture is being created (idem: 10). Culture is seen as “a stock
of knowledge that allows a person to perform as a competent member” (idem: 13).
However, collective action is more than “just a matter of political consciousness” (Gamson 1995: 89).
People may join protests without making the conscious choice to do so. As Reinoud Leenders (2012a: 430)
states: social mobilization may be caused by other conditions, such as “dense social networks involving clans,
labor migration, cross-border movements, and crime”. People may join a protest because other members of
the in-group did, because of the social position of the particular person, or because joining would lead to other
social benefits.
While combining aspects of PTT and CCT, Katheleen Blee and Ashley Currier (2005: 130-1)
demonstrate that the rise of social movements could be seen at three important arenas, in which social
movements develop sets of characteristics: interpersonal, organizational and ideological. The interpersonal
22
and outsiders. “The relationships of friendship, antagonism, love and betrayal – a group’s “economy of
affection” – can unite a social movement or hasten its collapse” (Blee & Currier 2005: 130). These interpersonal
relations affect the collective identity present in the movement. The interpersonal relations may be
manipulated for this reason. This may be done by the organization of the movement or by some of its
members. The interpersonal strategies may thus be uneven within groups and change over time (idem).
Secondly, research on the arena of organizational characteristics shows that the homogeneity or heterogeneity
within movements influences the movement’s outcomes (idem: 131). The legitimacy of the leadership of the
movement is given by its members, and therefore will strengthen or weaken by the membership’s approval of
choices taken. As also shown above, not all members of social movements make the conscious choice to do so.
There are also members of the movement that are not “members in the organizational sense”, and who might
just be “superficially and sporadically engaged by struggle” (idem: 131). Finally, the arena of ideological
characteristics refers to research done on the connection of group beliefs to the concerns of members,
potential recruits and audiences. This arena can be subdivided in research that show that “a major ideological
task confronting social change groups is the need to define some aspect of current social life as problematic”,
and studies that argue that “social movement groups try to create an expectation that a problem can be
remedied through collective action, thus creating a foundation for solidarity and collective identity” (idem:
131).
Besides looking at research done on how social movements grow, for a comparative perspective it is
also interesting to see why movements demobilize. This may give us clues on why the major part of the
anti-sectarian movement in 2011 stopped organizing protests. Pascal Menoret (2011) showed how internal aspects
of political movements influence their strength. Internal power relationships or a lack of a clear group identity
can cause members to break with the movement. In the case of Menoret’s (2011: 60) research, disengagement
of members of political movements in Saudi Arabia was not caused by repression of the government
(macro-structure) but was rather “triggered by mismanagement and subsequent exhaustion of militant and human
resources”.
Demobilization may also take place because the members do not feel engaged with the causes of the
movement anymore. The term “social fatigue” is used by Duboc (2011: 62) to describe the “weariness of
23
to bring about an alternative to the status quo”. The informality of networks can represent an opportunity of
exit, “enabling actors to keep their level of engagement minimal and thereby facilitating phasing down their
activism” (Duboc 2011: 65). Duboc (2011: 68) demonstrates that both structural and non-structural factors,
“such as internal divisions within communist organizations, the failure to articulate a political goal, and
individuals’ social and intellectual networks and affiliations” also shape the practice of the movement.
Demobilization is in her view not a structural problem of the organization itself as Menoret argues, but is being
caused by the way individuals experience participation in a movement. Yet, the dichotomy between
mobilization and demobilization is not as strict as it may seem. By showing how Egyptian intellectual activists in
the 1960s and ‘70s framed their participation in political organizations and social movements, the option of the
middle road becomes apparent. Duboc (2011: 62-3) speaks of a decentred notion of activism, “meaning that
the centre of gravity of activist practices has been challenged and restructured”.
This section showed the insights provided by cultural and cognitive social movement theory. Political
process theory’s emphasis on structure however should not be forgotten. Opportunity matters. “Changes in
the broader political structure and climate may open and close the chance for collective action to have an
impact” (Gamson 1995: 89), and may be seen as a driving factor for mobilization to start with. The next section
will focus on the regional environment of Lebanon, the Middle East and North Africa. Changes in regional
structures have an impact on local level events, and to understand how mobilization does or does not take
place in Lebanon, it is good to know the regional history of mobilization and the role of a general social
movement theory as opposed to a theory solely focused on the Middle-East and North Africa as a peculiar
region.
1.2.
Social movements in the Middle East
Social movement theory as a field of study has almost solely been applied to western contexts. Only in the last
ten years, when studies on social movements became mainstream, this sub-field of social science has become
internationalized (Beinin & Vairel 2011: 2). Studies on mobilization are now being applied to other regions,
such as to the Middle East and North Africa. The emphasis of peculiarity pushed the Middle East and North
24
Joel Beinin and Frédéric Vairel (2011: 3) argue in favour of an approach in which Islamic activists are
considered “as ‘normal’ social actors having resources, strategies, and practices that are comprehensible using
the tools of social science”. Indeed, the regional aspects should be seen as complementary to general social
movement theories rather than mutually exclusive. Making use of general SMT concepts does not mean that
concepts such as Islam, or nation, or class do not need to be contextualized and localized. Since concepts in
social science are “produced in relation to a socio-historical context, they are not automatically reproducible
from one case to another” (Joel Beinin and Frédéric Vairel 2011: 8). The networks that SMT focuses on can only
be grasped if the social aspects of power relations are being revealed. Additionally, if one would disregard the
aspect of context (be it rational or regional) in studying social movements, one would also disregard the fact
that “political struggles offer opportunities for learning and experimentation” (idem: 13). The history of protest
should be taken into account. One scholar who investigated mobilization in the Middle East from a historical
perspective is Asef Bayat (2002; 2010).
Bayat (2002) explores the nature of grass-roots activism in the region to defend livelihoods and pursue
social developments. Activism in the Middle East takes many forms (Bayat 2002: 3): it is complex, diverse and
dynamic (2002: 3). The degree to which individuals feel the incentive to let themselves be heard depends on
the subtext of a society’s structure, which varies from country to country. Country specific factors “such as the
extent to which the educational system is an effective force for change”, shape the form of social mobilization
(UNDP 2002: 119). In general, Bayat distinguished six different forms of activism in the Middle East: urban mass
protest, trade unionism, community activism, social Islamism, NGOs and quiet encroachment8. The focus of this
thesis is on the first form, urban mass protest, for the protests under study are carried out in the centre of the
capital of Lebanon: Beirut. That these protests were carried out in an urban setting is not a coincidence.
In another work Bayat (2010: 11) demonstrates that contentious politics are primarily produced and
expressed in urban settings. “When people are deprived of the electoral power to change things, they are likely
to resort to their own institutional clout [...] to bring collective pressure to bear on authorities to undertake
change.” When institutional power is lacking, as is the case in Lebanon, the street becomes the arena to show
discontent. Besides offering an alternative place to go to, urban protest also functions as a place to express
8
Quiet encroachment refers to direct actions of individuals and families to acquire the basic necessities of their lives in a quiet and unassuming, illegal fashion.
25
grievances, enlarge solidarities and hereby enlarge the in-group, which also shapes patterns of protest. The
shared expressions of public opinion in public spaces is what Bayat (2010: 12-3) labels the political street.9 The results of these protests in the Middle East were mixed. At times, governments in de Middle East
responded with measures of repression, but at others they gave in a little to the demands of the protestors.
Heydemann and Leenders (2011: 649) show that both civil society and regimes learn from previous experiences
of themselves and in the region. Regime strategies “should be seen as complex, multilevel games involving
regimes, publics, and external actors, in which regimes develop strategies that aim to affect the strategic
calculus of citizens, allies, and adversaries [...]”. Consequences of these riots should not be seen as fixed or
predictable but rather as dependent on context. When states lose control and become vulnerable, street
politics has the potential to develop in large scale mobilization (Bayat 2010: 74).
Writing in 2010, Bayat (2010: 75) argues that large scale mobilization is rather uncommon in the
Middle East as compared to other regions. Only under revolutionary conditions: in times of crisis; in times of
war; or when the state is totally absent, social mobilization may occur. The absence of large scale social protest
may also be caused by the weakness of cooperation at the level of the community. Social networks are largely
based on kinship or ethnicity. Other communities remain “largely causal, unstructured and paternalistic” (Bayat
2010: 75). Another reason for the absence of large scale mobilization has to do with the social contract of the
9 The dynamics of the political street are apparent in the urban protests in the 1980s, when urban riots
expressed discontent with some aspects of neo-liberal policies implemented in the Middle East, such as the austerity policy measures taken to reduce state deficits. During the civil war in Lebanon, Lebanese citizens joined to stage “a massive demonstration in Beirut against the drop in the value of the Lebanese pound” (Bayat 2002: 4; Bayat 2010: 68-9). Trade unions to represent workers in the Middle East disappeared at decolonization, when labour organizations were integrated in the political system. In 2010 only Jordan, Morocco and Lebanon still had independent pluralist unions (Bayat 2010: 71).Due to stricter control of the governments in the Middle East, the amount of protests decreased in the 1990s (idem: 69). This coincided with ordinary people moving away from tolerance of the regime.
Roel Meijer (2009: 198) demonstrates the case of the Egyptian al-Jama’a al Islamiyya movement that fits the pattern as described by Bayat. Whereas the movement started as a loosely organized group of students, a more formal organization of the movement appeared in 1977, and really took shape after 1979. Next to national influences on the movement, the Iranian revolution of 1979 inspired the organization. From now on, (violent) revolution was seen as a strategy in order to achieve the formation of a certain practice (Meijer 2009: 198). By establishing social, educational and health services, the Jama’a succeeded in gaining popularity among Egyptian citizens. However, in the late 1980s the Jama’a movement “increasingly came into conflict with the state” (Meijer 2009: 207). The insights of Meijer demonstrate that the ideological development of social movements in relation to their sense of reality is crucial to understand them (Meijer 2009: 217). The movement developed not only due to external circumstances, but also through tendencies within the movement: in this case “from a strong Salafi tendency [...] to a phase in which the Jama’a were forced to give reality and the general good more room” (idem).
26
state with the lower and middle classes of society. Because there is little sense of collective identity, “many
people still look at the states as the main source of protection” (idem: 76).
After the 9/11 events, the political street revived as a concept, “despite the Middle East’s regimes’
continuous surveillance of political dissent” (idem: 14). Street politics was based on nationalistic and
anti-imperialistic concerns. The developmental state of the Middle East was in a deadlock (idem: 27). According to
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP 2002: 1), the main two challenges faced by the Middle
East in the new millennium are the pursuit of freedom from fear and freedom from want. These challenges are
caused by “significant deficits in Arab countries with respect to key elements of human well-being: civil and
political freedoms, the status of women in society, and access to knowledge. The Middle East was seen as
being at a crossroads, facing the choice between a continuation of doing nothing, or constructing institutional
arrangements that can transform “the huge potential of Arab integration into a reality” (idem: 32).10
During the 2011 Arab uprisings, large scale social mobilization across communities in the “region that
used to be characterized by passiveness and stability” proved to be possible (Aarts, Van Dijke, Kolman, Statema
& Dahhan 2012: 34). Although many experts characterized the situation in Arab states as unsustainable
(Laipson 2011: 4), no academic specialist on the Middle East predicted “the timing and the extent of the
region-wide upheavals in the Arab world that began in December 2010 and continue today” (Gause 2011: 11). The
causes of these protests are complex, and cannot be grasped by only looking at the claims for fundamental
rights and democracy (Powell 2012: 208). Being fed up with corruption, the incompetence of the regimes and
the lack of jobs, people in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria took the streets. Hazem Kandil (forthcoming)
demonstrates reasons for mobilization of the middle class in Egypt. The state alienated this class by their
economic liberalization policies, staggering unemployment and no trust in future developments, resulting in
mass scale protests. These protests inspired activists in Lebanon to mobilize against the sectarian regimes. “The
strategy, building from revolutionary movements elsewhere, was to mobilise people with the help of social
10
Arab countries progressed in the level of political participation. Freedom of expression and association has increased over the last twenty years (UNDP 2002: 109). This could be considered as a part of authoritarian learning. More open, flexible governance in the Middle East are elements of the upgrading of regimes. This can be seen in the growth of access to media, telecommunications technologies, and the internet (Heydemann 2007: 19). They confront the demands made by for example UNDP-reports on democratization and market-based economic reforms, but nonetheless still use coercion as an important component of their policy (idem: 2). By manipulating identity categories Arab regimes were able to stay in power. Indeed, they employed “divide and role tactics by accentuating existing divisions, be they tribal, sectarian, or the divide between secular and Islamic politics” (Baumann 2011: 510).
27
network sites, such as Facebook, and to ensure that nodes of activity spread beyond Beirut [...]” (Hermez 2011:
527). Until the time of writing, this has not been the case.
This thesis will analyze the Lebanese 2011 protests as compared to those in 2005 by making use of the
comparative method. This comparative framework shows the differences and similarities between the two
instances of mobilization in relation to Lebanese fragmented society.
1.3.
The dynamics of a fragmented society
The first step of this research is to investigate the degree of social fragmentation in 2005 and in 2011. The word
degree is not meant to indicate a fixed measurement of social fragmentation but rather is used to refer to the social dynamics of fragmentation at play in 2005 and 2011. These are not fixed and measurable in a
quantitative manner, but should be studied in terms of relativity towards each other by investigating different
aspects of fragmentation.
Indicators of social fragmentation can be based on social, cultural or economic fragmentation. To
analyze fragmentation in Lebanon, ethnographic fieldwork was conducted in 2012. However, these results will
not be able to explain on its own the degree of fragmentation at play in 2005 or 2011. Critical reading of news
paper and academic articles provided the recent historical information needed to grasp the degree of
fragmentation of the two times under study. Academic scholarship on social fragmentation gives indications on
how to measure fragmentation.
For instance, Simon Haddad (2002) conducted a quantitative analysis on cultural diversity and
sectarian attitudes in Lebanon. His research was focused on group consciousness and inter-group interaction to
measure the degree of fragmentation. The degree of group consciousness indicates how people relate
themselves to a certain fragment and perceive themselves as distinct from other groups (Haddad 2002: 294).
Group consciousness has three dimensions: group cohesion, group solidarity and satisfaction with group
membership. Relating survey questions are for example “how attracted do you feel to your sect?”, “I believe
that my sect can serve this country better than any other sect”, and “I am particularly proud of being a member
of my sect” (idem: 298). Secondly, inter-group interaction was also studied to understand fragmentation.
Relating questions refer to the confidence levels towards other groups, or to what degree respondents feel
28
Arend Lijphart (1981: 355-6) gives four criteria on how to measure degrees pluralism. Pluralism is a
necessary condition for fragmentation. The criteria are part of an ideal type. “All societies deviate from the
ideal type, and the degree to which they deviate can be used as an indication of their degree of pluralism”
(Lijphart 1981: 356).
First, Lijphart states that “it must be possible to identify exactly the segments into which the society is
divided”. In Lebanon, this may seem like an obvious question: one would automatically think of the sectarian
divides. However, other divides exist as well, such as the division between the 8 and the 14 March movement.
When conducting fieldwork, a useful interviewing technique may be to “ask for explanations of what seemed
obvious to the interviewee. Asking about the obvious could elicit the categories that interviewees took for
granted, and could yield surprising results” (Suleiman & Anderson 2007: 5). One advantage as an inexperienced
researcher is that this technique is more a necessity than a technique that is consciously applied. Secondly,
Lijphart (1981: 356) states that “it must be possible to state exactly the size of each segment, that is, how many
people belong to the segments”. When taking as an assumption that the segments are based on sects, In the
case of Lebanon, stating their exact size is problematic. The last official counting dates from 1932. However,
there are estimations that can hint at the exact size of each group. Third, in a plural society, there must be
“perfect correspondence between segmental boundaries and the boundaries between the political, social, and
economic organizations”. If Lebanon would be a fragmented society, Maronite, Shia and Sunni sects would
have their own political parties, hospitals, schools, and labour unions. To a certain extent, it is possible to link
organizations in Lebanon to certain fragments, but the dividing line is not always strictly applied: mixed
organizations exist as well. The final criterion is that loyalty towards the political parties (part of the third
criterion) should be constant. This will be shown in little or no change in the voting support of the different
parties from election to election. “In a perfectly plural society, an election is a segmental census” (Lijphart
1981: 356). This criterion is problematic because of the lack of knowledge on the size of the fragments.
The comparative ethnographic approach of this thesis makes these criteria to a certain extent
subjective and perhaps even arbitrary. The degree of pluralism present in Lebanese society depends on the
data of analysis: the answers given by respondents and the literature. These criteria may be used as a tool to
measure the respondents’ feelings of belonging to his/her fragment. Subjective results gives us insight in the
