The influence of gender at implicit role effects in negotiations

(1)

0

The Influence of Gender at Implicit Role Effects in Negotiations

Final Thesis paper

Stilyana Gateva Koleva

6121888

MSc. in Business Studies – Marketing Track

University of Amsterdam

First supervisor : Alfred Zerres

(2)

1

Abstract:

This study observes the interaction effect between the gender and implicit role on the negotiation patterns of male and female buyers and sellers. The study suggests that sellers and buyers have each a specific set of implicit role bargaining strategies. However, negotiations bring out behavior defined by the gender characteristics of each sex. Thus, the study observes the interaction of both set of characteristics and how this interaction affects the outcome of distributive negotiations both in terms of final price agreed and also individual profit. From the results, the study concludes that male sellers make more profit compared to female sellers. However, male buyers and female buyers do no evoke a significant difference in the individual profit, thus no valid conclusions could be made. In addition, in a pair with a female buyer, the male sellers negotiate a higher final price than female sellers. Furthermore, in a pair with a female seller, the male buyer negotiates a higher price than the female buyers. Finally, the paper explains the differences and draws conclusions so to extract managerial implications, relevant in the business negotiations sphere.

(4)

3

1. Introduction

The ability to negotiate effectively is a crucial leadership and management skill which is the core of successful deal-making, employment discussions, corporate team building, contract arrangement and general social and political balance. Negotiations are becoming more and more important along with the dynamic economic and political instabilities, which have been occurring lately on the global scene. On a more, business-specific level could be accounted the big players from the Silicon Valley who establish their reputation and dominance on outstanding performance and excellent deal closures. Take for instance, the famous and infinite battle between Samsung and Apple. Due to poor negotiation management, Samsung was ruled to pay $600 million and later on another $ 290 million (Harvard Law School, 2013). It is the case with the two mobile giants that negotiations define also the course of their ongoing partnership. Therefore, the worse their settlements are, the worse their commercial relationship becomes and losses are tremendous. Business-to-business relationships have become extremely dynamic and the world economy is depending on the single moves and bargaining techniques of giant business figures.

Existing literature has devoted a great amount of studies, investigating the negotiation dependencies and bargaining techniques. Moreover, the relationship buyer-seller has been in the center of attention to affluent research. The implicit roles of buyers and sellers and the interactions between them two are widely examined and their effect has been stated to be influencing the behavior of the negotiators ( Schurr, Ozanne, 1985). However, behavior is not entirely defined by the economic side of the negotiation role but is also influenced by personal characteristics. On the other hand, individual trains are exposed to commonly accepted stereotypes and behavioral stigmas. Gender is the personal trait to which, scholars and academics have devoted years of research, examining the differences between people.

(5)

4

Yet, gender differences continue to exist and are still a reason for individual segregation in multiple occupational and activity domains ( Eccles, Jacobs, Harold, 1990). Marketing researchers, social psychologists and organizational behaviorists have built strong theoretical frameworks depicting the differences of gender and bargaining roles and how each of them influences the behavior of negotiators. Despite there is abundant body of research on negotiation behavior, there is not business-to-business focus on the combination of these factors onto negotiators. This lack of an outcome focus on the business-to-business sphere is an important concern for marketers, who could predict how a male or a female would embrace their buyer or seller role and how strong their bargaining power would be. To fill in this research void the current study will investigate how gender characteristics combine together with the implicit role effects of buyer and seller and how they can influence the outcome of negotiations.

More particular attention will be spent on the combination of the primary behavioral gender characteristics with the bargaining behavior tendencies of the buyer and seller and what the results will be in terms of negotiation outcomes. On the one hand, male and female negotiate in a different way, due to their gender characteristics (Calhoun, Smith, 1999). Furthermore, both the roles of the buyer and the seller are also associated with particular behavior and decision-making, as well (Clopton, 1984). Thus, this study will explore how the relationship the implicit roles of buyer and seller are influenced by the gender characteristics of the negotiators. Thus the research question of this study will try to answer:

How do gender characteristics affect the implicit role effects in distributive negotiations?

More particularly, does the implicit tendency of each negotiator trigger out more strongly the gender characteristics or just the opposite- offsets them. Does the combination of a gender set of traits and the implicit role bargaining strategy work in synchronization with the initial

(6)

5

stereotypes (males are target oriented, sellers are profit oriented; females are cooperative; buyers are risk averse and loss minimizing) or the specific combination of a role and gender works in a neutralizing/offsetting way?

This research aims to contribute with managerial implications which will shed light on the negotiation process and enrich the academic field with more information on bargaining behavior and gender roles. Moreover, the study will contribute to the existing research by defining more concretely the gender effects on the relationship buyer-seller and how they influence their complicated role dependency. The current study will delve into the business-to-business field, and therefore the drawn conclusions will aim to enable the buyer and the seller parties to develop powerful bargaining techniques and systemize better interactions approach during economic transactions.

To provide more academic context around the research question, the paper first presents the theoretical background and literature review. Furthermore, it describes the conceptual framework and proposes the hypothesis which are later on examined in the data analysis. In addition, a detailed research strategy and design are outlined in order to describe the negotiation task and data collection. The results section follows up and a detailed discussion explaining the results from the data analysis in terms of the initially presented hypothesis. In addition, the limitations of the study are addressed and future research implications are provided. Last but not least, the conclusion and managerial implications present the findings of the study and connect them to the relevant business-to-business field specifics so as to provide reliable managerial insights. Not only practical, but also academic contributions are introduced as addition to the already existing research on buyer-seller negotiation outcomes.

(7)

6

2. Theoretical Background

2.1. Implicit Roles in Negotiation

Growing globalization is evoking dynamic international and economic

interdependency between countries and businesses ( Hollensen, 2007). Global marketing reflects the changes which occur in the sale and distribution process among customers, sellers, buyers and governments ( Hollensen, 2007). It is why business-to-business relations are becoming a unit of major importance for the successful transnational trade. On the other hand, negotiations or the buyer-seller process is laying in the core of performing economic transactions (Schurr, Ozanne). Negotiations also play an important role in the business–to– business marketing. The buyer-seller process is where the buyer and the seller meet in a market transaction. A negotiated transaction takes the final price as the final stage-gate point, which would lead the transaction to a success or failure i.e. the negotiated price is the final factor allowing the deal to be made ( Alderson, 2006). Taking the role of a buyer or a seller does not only affect negotiators’ motivational states, but also their behavior respectively (Zerres et al., 2013). Buyers strive for losses minimization while sellers aim for gains maximization (Zerres et al., 2013). It is therefore crucial what negotiation and agreement strategies each of the parties will undertake. Moreover, the implicit roles of buyer and seller can be exposed into two types of negotiations: distributive and integrative (Schurr, Ozanne 1985). Distributive negotiations are characterized by having only one issue which is negotiated over. They have a finite amount (fixed gain) which has to be divided i.e. distributed between the buyer and the seller. Therefore the loss for one of the parties is the gain for the other (Walton, McKersie, 1965). In the distributive negotiations the main focus falls on the clear assumption that the desired outcome is winning (Calhoun, Smith, 1999). On the other hand, the integrative negotiations offer more interaction as the process includes more than one negotiation issue and focuses on each of the parties’ interests, not on their

(8)

7

positions, in order to create value for each other (Kersten, 2001). In fact, both parties exchange trade-offs achieving a win-win outcome situation for each of the negotiating parties (Calhoun, Smith, 1999). In this case the negotiators integrate their interests and instead of achieving a simple compromise, they reach a joint benefit outcome. Yet, in both types of negotiation processes do not depend only on the negotiator’s implicit role but also on the negotiator’s individual characteristics. Bargaining theories postulate that behavior is also a function of personal traits (Oerhart, Rynes, 1991).

This study will particularly focus on distributive negotiations where a strong emphasis is put on tactics and initial strategy of the opening offer. In fact, distributive bargaining takes the logic of the zero-sum game theory (Barry, Friedman, 1998). The whole course of negotiating is defined by the opening offer, which formulates the responder’s first impression and respectively counter-offers (Liu, Friedman, Chi, 2005). From simply economic point of view, a negotiation would result in an ideal agreement when the demand equals the supply. Usually the seller is the proactive side, starting off with an initial offer and leading the negotiation process by convincing the buyer (Schei et al. 2006). It is however, the buyer’s final word if the deal will be signed off or not. In case of a potential disagreement, the supplier’s loss would increase “more than proportionally with the size of the respective buyer” (Inderst, Wey, 2007). Moreover, in case of disagreement, the buyer “frees up” the seller’s capacity, driving the supplier to sell only by lowering up even more the “declining marginal surplus function” (Inderst, Wey, 2007). Each of the parties has strong and decisive role in the negotiation process and it is therefore crucial that the buyer and the seller reach an agreement.

(9)

8

2.2. Gender Characteristics

Holding up seteris paribus – the economic roles of the buyer and the seller non-influenced, there would still be also other attitude conceptions which can predispose the participants in a negotiation process towards a specific behavior. Such is the case with personality factors, such as the Big Five (Barry, Friedman, 1998) or even gender differences. Gender roles have been in the focus of multiple research areas, and it is mainly due to the stereotype expectations which are exposed to a broad social sharedness (Calhoun, Smith, 1999). The gender differences have set up long-lasting and shared beliefs which convince the general public to accept gender roles as granted. Men are usually expected to be “strong, assertive, competitive, rational, and task-oriented” (Bakan, 1966; Eagly, 1987). On the contrary, women are linked to the cooperative, emotional and relationship-oriented pattern (Bakan, 1966; Eagly, 1987). In fact, women have been identified to be highly cooperative and accordingly to attain higher joint benefits (Kolb, Coolidge, 1991). Furthermore, bargaining propensity also differs accordingly to the gender types. Such is the instance with the differences in self-confidence (Ragins & Sundstrom, 1989), interpersonal orientation (Rubin & Brown, 1975), preference for harmony (Kolb & Coolidge, 1988), and self-perceptions of assertiveness (Watson & Kasten, 1988). In addition, the behavior and approach of each gender differs in the negotiation process itself. Thus it is a strong point of interest to examine how both roles – the bargaining position and the gender role combine during negotiations and if and how they influence each other.

Researchers explain the differential impact based on gender bias as a result of how personal characteristics are evaluated in the negotiation process. Being strong, dominant, assertive which are typically male characteristics are linked to effective and strong negotiation skills (Kray & Thompson, 2005). On the other hand, being weak, emotional and

(10)

9

caring for the other’s outcome is a passive component for a competitive strategy in distributive process (Clopton, 1984). Women are proved to be spending a high attention to care about the outcome for the other negotiator (Calhoun, Smith, 1999). They enter the negotiation process with a high concern for the other participant (Calhoun, Smith, 1999). On the contrary, higher gains are achieved if the participants in the negotiation process are focused more on their own goals instead of interest for the others (Barry, Friedman, 1998). It is therefore interesting from a research point of view to investigate the relationship buyer-seller lead by the goal of optimizing of the win-loss ratio under the circumstances of strong gender influence involved in the negotiation process.

3. Conceptual Framework

It is the case, that genders discriminate between particular situations, as each situation is less ambiguous for the stereotype consistent gender and respectively – more ambiguous to the opposite one (Miles, LaSalle, 2008). Particular economic situations are fitted more to a particular gender and thus associated with the gender respective traits. Negotiations, and specifically first time negotiations, are an ambiguous situation where neither knows the other party offers or alternatives (Yurtsever, 2001). Moreover, a high level of personal evaluation and judgment are involved in the process itself (Bottom and Pease, 1999). Bargaining has no established rules or strategies guiding the participants to follow a specific pattern (Yurtsever, 2001). It is therefore true that negotiations are influenced by ambiguity conditions (Yurtsever, 2001). In such a case, social theory suggests that people would engage in behavior typical for their inner dispositions (Eagly, Karau, 2002). Women and men will project activities, characteristic to their personal qualities which are in line with their common social roles (Eagly, Karau, 2002).

(11)

10

Summarizing the gender differences are more likely to be projected by participants in their first negotiations and to follow their inner instincts and stereotypical gender traits. However as buyers and sellers have to come to a certain agreement, they have to perform the offer and counter-offer process more than once and thus have the chance to adjust to the bargaining strategies of each other.

The implicit role effects are stated to be that sellers strive for profit maximization (Zerres et al., 2013), so sellers work to receive as much as possible out of a deal. Moreover, sellers are the proactive side, where they work in a direction to persuade, to convince the buyers and to exchange information with them (Zerres et al., 2013). The initial offer relates to the confidence and certainty of the participant. As men are stated to be more assertive and confident than women (Kray & Thompson, 2005), it is expected that they will initiate the negotiation process and also define its course, which would suit better the seller’s role. In terms of achieving an end result, men have higher payout expectations (Major, 1987) and they are task-oriented with strong orientation towards problem-solving (Calhoun, Smith, 1999). Considered men are more outcome-oriented, they tend to be earnings maximization focused. In fact male are more likely to achieve higher economic outcomes than women (Walters, Stuhlmacher and Meyer, 1998). Thus, they will undertake either competitive or cooperative strategy, accordingly to the situational settings (Neu, Graham, Gilly, 1988) in order to achieve a high end result. As they are aggressive, initiative, result-oriented and competitive in the negotiation process, their inner dispositions coincide with the highly valued at the bargaining table characteristic, which are associated with powerful negotiations (Walters, Stuhlmacher and Meyer, 1998).

As women are more interpersonally oriented they will care for the relationship outcome and they will cooperate to keep up with good relationship management , as well as

(12)

11

high concern for the other’s welfare (Calhoun, Smith, 1999). Indeed, women are less aggressive, threatening or engaging in a war of words, than men (Calhoun, Smith, 1999), so they are more amiable and diplomatic in bargaining. Female will remain caring for the outcome of the other, regardless of their aspiration to maximize their profit. Thus the thesis will suggest the following hypothesis:

H1: Being a male seller results in a higher price agreed, than being a female seller.

H1a: Being a male seller results in a higher individual profit, than being a female seller.

On the other hand buyers are risk averse because they opt for loss minimization (Zerres et al., 2013) , while the buyers are striving to pay as least as possible. Moreover, the buyers are more passive and hold the final say in the deal, expecting the seller to propose an acceptable offer ( Zerres et al., 2013). Along the strong and task-focused male nature, the buyer’s role emphasizes more on the own preferences of the participant (Schei et al., 2006) and not the other parties, as women tend to do (Calhoun, Smith, 1999). In addition, the buyer is the key figure in distributive negotiations as buyer may be reluctance to move away from their initial position, further on in the deal (Clotpon, 1984). Thus, they are the key to close a deal and have a successful outcome from the negotiations. As the goals of each of the implicit roles face a conflict (the seller wants to earn more and the buyer wants to save more), there must be achieved a certain level of flexibility ( Clopton, 1984). Yet, the male nature is characterized with more assertive and proactive approach (Walters, Stuhlmacher and Meyer, 1998) and thus the males are expected to push more, than to be flexible in the negotiation process. Given the demanding character of the buyer’s role, where the buyer strives for accepting a price, close to their own preferences (Schei et al., 2006), the male’s aggressive and assertive manner would combine well and would evoke high end outcome. Thus, the study suggests the following thesis:

(13)

12

H2a. Being a male buyer results in higher price agreed, than being a female buyer.

H2b. Being a male buyer results in higher individual profit, than being a female buyer.

4. Research Strategy and Design

4.1. Participants

An experiment was conducted among four different groups of female and male participants. In order to achieve realistic behavior, the participants were promised a bottle of fine wine and refine chocolate as a prize for the two participants (one buyer and one seller) with the biggest profit. The experiment was organized as a game, so that it evokes the most competitive behavior from the players. A total of 154 students took participation in the experiment ( 77 men and 77 women, mean age: 25.06 SD: 2.612). Moreover, considered that gender and implicit roles are a central focus of the study, the dyads were organized in the following way:

Dyad 1: Male buyer vs male seller Dyad 2 : Male buyer vs female seller

Dyad 3: Female buyer vs male seller Dyad 4: Female buyer vs female seller

Since the data is highly interdependent on a unit-level, the statistical analysis was focused on a dyad level, which means that the results were divided into 4 dyads, approximately 20 per dyad.

4.2. Procedure

Participants were randomly assigned to the role of a buyer or a seller and also to the partner, they had to negotiate with. Both participants were seated in a room, where they were alone with each other and a video camera. They were initially explained the process will be recorded and each of them gave their consent prior the experiment started. Each of them was

(14)

13

given instructions respective to their role exposing them to one particular buyer situation, regardless if were male or female (Buyer Instructions, Apendix) and one particular seller situation, regardless if were male or female (Seller Instructions, Apendix). After each of them was familiar with the business situation from the case study, they were given a short questionnaire to fill in (Questionnaire 1, Apendix ). The short survey focused on their negotiation expectations. Upon completion of it, they had fifteen minutes to perform a process of distributive negotiations, where on the fourteenth minute of their bargaining process, they received a warning they are left with one more minute to negotiate. Participants were asked not to disclose or discuss the actual instructions they received, but only the negotiation task itself. The participants were prior to the task provided with a completely fictive agreement with no jurisdictive validity (Purchase Agreement, Apendix), to sign for the purposes of confirming the end price. To achieve highest levels of credibility, the negotiations were video recorded. The participants are asked to perform the negotiations and fill in all the documents in English.

4.3. Negotiation Task

Since the negotiations will be focusing on the end purchase price of a utility product, the buyer and the seller have different settings, which they need to take into consideration while bargaining. The buyer is a retail company which sells tablets online to end customers. The buyer has to fill in an order for 20 tablets. The tablets were already paid in advance to the buyer at the price of $399. Yet, as the buyer does not have 20 tablets on stock, needs to buy them from a wholesaler in order to fulfill their order. The task is to negotiate with the seller end price for a batch of 20 tablets.

The seller is a company producing and wholesaling tablets. The seller has produced an excessive amount of tablets and cost which occur for producing them is $200. The seller

(15)

14

must sell them as this is the last batch produced from the particular model. In case the tablets stay in storage they will not have any market value within a month. However, if sold now, they would increase the monthly revenue considerably. The seller may sell only a box with 20 items inside, as this is the fixed trading unit for wholesaling. No discounts (e.g. buy 21 at the price of 20) or any bonuses (e.g. buy 19 and the 20th is for free) are allowed. The task of the seller is to negotiate a purchase price for a box of 20 items with the buyer company.

4.4. Dependent Measures

There will be two independent variables which will be controlled – these are the gender of the participants and their bargaining role. It is the gender that will influence the buyer and the seller’s mindset, which is in the focus of the research. It is therefore the first independent variable, which is the cause of a certain bargaining behavior. The other independent variable, which will be also controlled is the bargaining role, i.e. the buyer and seller implicit position in the negotiation. The behavior of the different roles is expected to be changing because of the gender of the negotiator. What is meant, is that the negotiator role will incorporate the gender stereotypical characteristics during the negotiation process. Thus, what the thesis observes is the effect of gender and bargaining role on the final price agreed and then the individual profit for each participant. There are two dependent variables, examined in this study. The first one is the end purchase price achieved at the end of the negotiation process. The second one is the individual profit each of the participant from the groups is making. Both dependent variables are influenced by the independent variables – gender and implicit role. In order to observe the main and interaction effects, the independent nominal variables are combined and systemized into four different categories: male buyer vs male seller (MBMS), female seller vs male buyer (MBFS), male seller vs female buyer (MSFB) , female seller vs female buyer (FSFB).

(16)

15

4.5. Data collection

As there were no impasse outcomes, meaning all participants reached to an agreed price, there was no cleaning of the data needed. The data was entered manually from the paper versions of the questionnaires and the purchase agreements into an Excel file, where it was structured and calculated accordingly. Then the processed data was entered in an SPSS file and then analyzed accordingly. The two dependent variables were coded for the purposes of the analysis

The purchase prices negotiated at the end were systemized according to the four different categories and each of them was given a group number (MBMS =1; MBFS =2; MSFB=3; FSFB=4).

The individual profit for each of the four categories was taken as the profit of each of the participants from each dyad. Take for instance the dyad male buyer and male seller, then individual profit for the male buyer is the difference between the retail price and the negotiated price , i.e. Profit(buyer) = 400- negotiated price. Respectively, the individual profit for the male seller is the difference between the negotiated price and the production costs, i.e. Profit(seller) = negotiated price – 200.

Considered, there are four groups of interaction (both on individual profit and final price level), the most suitable statistical approach to test the hypothesis is to conduct a One-way ANOVA analysis so that a comparison in between each of the groups could be performed. The thesis observes both the impact of gender and bargaining role on the final price agreed and on the individual profit. The dependent variables are the outcomes influenced by the independent variables gender and implicit role. The dependent variables are final price and individual profit, they are both continuous and can take any value between 200 and 400.

(17)

16

5. Results

5.1 . Effects of Interaction of Role and Gender on Final Price Agreed

5.1.1. Normality test

To ensure the reliability of the results, the data first was exposed to a normality test. The normal distribution of the data will show how often a value occurs and it is a basic assumption for conducting a valid One-way ANOVA analysis, which later on is used. Normality of distribution applies to the sampling distribution of means of variables rather than of the raw scores for each variable. Moreover, the sampling distribution of means should be normal regardless of the distribution of individual variables according to the Central Limit Theorem.

Case Processing Summary

Cases

Valid Missing Total

N Percent N Percent N Percent

Purchase price 77 100,0% 0 ,0% 77 100,0%

Table 1

Tests of Normality

Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig.

Purchase price ,150 77 ,000 ,949 77 ,004

(18)

17 Table 3

(19)

18

The normality test suggests that the data has normal distribution as the null hypothesis for normal distribution is confirmed. Based both on the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, which is significant (p=0.000< 0.05) and the Shapiro-Wilk test, which gives also significant results (p= 0.004<0.05) (Table 2).

5.1.2. One-Way ANOVA and Tukey’s HSD Test

The One-way Anova test is preferred in the current situation in order to test the four different groups at the same time and then use the post-hoc tests to oppose each of them to the others. Another statistical strategy could have been undertaken where two groups at a time are compared (Independent t-tests), however, the risk of committing Type I error increases. Thus One-way Anova was chosen and the following formula was applied:

F

When applying the One-way Anova, a few assumptions were taken into consideration in order to achieve reliability of the results :

- Random convenience sampling : the students participating in the experiment were chosen on random basis from the faculty of Economics and Business in the M hall during the schooldays and were asked to participate in the experiment. Other young professionals then also took part of the experiment. However, they share similar demographic and academic background as the students, therefore the homogeneity of the target group is kept consistent. Possible bias is expected, as the students are all following Business studies, and supposedly will follow one and the same logic. Moreover, external factors could have influenced the decision or behavior of the

(20)

19

participants. These will be further discussed in the “Discussion” and “Limitations and implications for further research” sections.

- Normality of distribution : as discussed above, the normal distribution assumption is confirmed.

- Homogeneity of variance – Levene’s test needs to be non-significant in order to keep this assumption valid. In the particular case, after the analysis was performed, Levene’s test appeared to be non-significant (Sig= 0.632) (Table 4), therefore the assumption of homogeneity of variance is met.

Test of Homogeneity of Variances

Purchase price

Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig.

,578 3 73 ,632

Table 4

After having the three prerequisite assumptions met, one-way Anova was performed with the following results: ANOVA Purchase price df F Sig. Between Groups 3 32,513 ,000 Within Groups 73 Total 76 Table 5

(21)

20

Descriptives

Purchase price

N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Group MBMS (1) 17 285,2941 17,98181 4,36123 FSMB (2) 20 307,5000 15,85294 3,54483 MSFB (3) 20 252,0000 38,19617 8,54092 FSFB (4) 20 232,3250 25,40638 5,70068 Total 77 268,6558 39,21065 4,46847 Table 6

The results are reliable as the overall ANOVA is significant: p< 0.05 (Table 5) and F(3,73) = 32.513 (Table 5). From this step, the results suggest that there are significant differences in the final price among the four groups. Yet, the one-way ANOVA test does not show between which groups is the difference or the clear patterns of difference between them groups , thus further testing and pairwise comparison is needed.

As a next step, a post-hoc test was conducted to test between which exact groups there is a difference. As the experiment compares four different treatments with equal sample sizes, the best way to identify which differ in the sample pool is to undertake the Tukey’s HSD test, so to compare the means of each group (Table 7). It was exactly the Tukey’s HSD test chosen, as it shows the precise sampling distribution of the biggest difference between a set of means emerging from the same population (Abdi, Williams, 2010). All differences between the groups are shown using the same sampling distribution as for the biggest difference (Abdi, Williams, 2010).

The test shows that there is a significant difference in the final price between group 1(MBMS) and group 3(FBMS) value <0.05) ; group 1(MBMS) and group 4(FBFS) (p-value<0.05); group 2(FSMB) and 3(MSFB) (p-value <0.05); group 2(FSMB) and 4(FSFB) (p-value<0.0005). The Tukey’s HSD test gives an obscure evidence to draw final conclusions

(22)

21

about Hypothesis 1 – if it is supported or not, as groups 1 (MBMS) and 2 (MBFS) where a direct comparison between the Male seller and Female seller could be done. The p- value of this comparison is close to a significant difference in the final price agreed (p = 0.058; Table 7). Thus further tests will be executed to verify the effect of gender and implicit role on the final price agreed. On the other hand, the results give a reason to conclude that Hypothesis 2 is supported, as groups 2 (FSMB) and 4 ( FSFB) , as the p< 0.05 ( Table 7). In fact the difference between groups 2(MBFS) and group 4 (FBFS) is 75.17500 euros( Table 7) so the

male buyers negotiate with about 75 euros more the female buyers.

Yet, an important assumption has to be taken into consideration and this is the interaction of the participants and how they adjust each other’s bargaining strategies. Thus, the results from the Tukey’s HSD test cannot be taken as a final conclusion. They give a good overview of the tendencies of each group and thus are reviewed in a more detailed manner in the below analysis.

Multiple Comparisons

Purchase price Tukey HSD

(I) Group (J) Group Mean Difference (I-J) Std. Error Sig.

MBMS MBFS -22,20588 8,63499 ,058 MSFB 33,29412* 8,63499 ,001 FSFB 52,96912* 8,63499 ,000 MBFS MBMS 22,20588 8,63499 ,058 MBFS 55,50000* 8,27752 ,000 FSFB 75,17500* 8,27752 ,000 MSFB MBMS -33,29412* 8,63499 ,001 MSFB -55,50000* 8,27752 ,000 FSFB 19,67500 8,27752 ,091 FSFB MBMS -52,99412* 8,63499 ,000 MBFS -75,17500* 8,27752 ,000 MSFB -19,67500 8,27752 ,091 Table 7

(23)

22

In order to visualize more explicitly, the differences in the mean of the different groups, a bar chart with the final price on the y-axes and the group on the x-axes was created (Table 9). It could be seen that the interaction between the male buyer and female seller has the highest final price agreed (307,5000; Table 6) . Then the second highest final price comes from the interaction between the males – male buyer and male seller (285,2941; Table 6). Then these are followed by the female buyer and male seller ( 252,000; Table 6) and finally the female buyer and female seller (232,3250; Table 6)

Table 9

5.1.3. Independent T-test

In order to verify the results from the post-hoc Turkey’s HSD, a separate test was conducted to examine the results between groups 2 and 4 (MBFS and FBFS) and 3 and 4(MSFB and

(24)

23

FBFS). An independent T-test was conducted in order to observe the effects of gender and implicit role on the final price. In the first case the category of the female seller is a constant. In this way could be observed the interaction of the categories, where the male buyer and the female buyer are compared. In the second case, the category of the female buyer is kept constant. In this way, the interaction of categories compares the male seller and the female seller. Running the T-test observes the differences in the final outcome price between on a group level. In this way is aimed to find out what is the difference in the final price agreed for the buyer and the seller, for each gender. Moreover, it could be observed what is the tendency for building individual profit both for the buyer and the seller.

In addition, running an independent T-test also reduces the probability of having type 1 error with a false positive. In the current case, with the particular data set both normality and homogeneity were confirmed. In the case of comparing groups 2 and 4, Levene’s test is non-significant (p=0.619, Table 11) and in the case of groups 3 and 4, it is again non-non-significant (p =0.587, Table 13). Thus homogeneity of variance is assumed and the condition of homogeneity is met. Moreover, as above stated, normality of distribution is confirmed. Therefore, the independent T-test is valid based on the basic assumptions of normality and homogeneity.

5.1.3.1. Female Buyer vs Male Seller Compared to Female

Buyer vs Female Seller

The hypotheses being tested with the T-test is directional, meaning that there is a pre-established direction in terms of the final price between the parties. Thus the p-value (0.063) derived from the independent samples t-test is divided per 2, as the test is running a two-tailed significance level. Then are observed significant results, meaning that there is a statistically significant difference p<0.05 and t= 1.645(p= 0.0315 and t = 1.916; Table 11)

(25)

24

between the mean final price for the two groups. Group 3 (FBMS) had on average a higher final price than Group 4(FBFS), with a mean difference of 19.6750 euro (Table 11). Considered, the p-value <0.05, the directional hypothesis is supported. Thus, keeping the category female buyer constant, the interaction of the male seller with the female buyer compared to the interaction of the female seller and the female buyer results in a higher final price for the male seller. Summarizing, it could be stated that the male sellers negotiate higher, even though not drastically much, end price than the female sellers. Thus, we can confirm Hypothesis 1, which states that being a male and a seller generally results in a higher end price than being a female and a seller. This is in line with what the theory would suggest, as the effect of the gender and the effect of the implicit role result in an increased purchase price for the male seller. The dominant and more powerful nature of the male combines with the assertive and proactive role of the seller in a stronger symbiosis resulting in a better price for the male seller.

Group Statistics

Role N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean Purchase price FBMS 20 252,0000 38,19617 8,54092

FBFS 20 232,2500 25,49421 5,70068 Table 10

Independent Samples Test

Levene's Test for Equality of

Variances t-test for Equality of Means F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Difference Std. Error Difference Purchase price Equal variances assumed ,251 ,619 1,916 38 ,063 19,67500 10,26865

(26)

25 Table 11

5.1.3.2. Male Buyer vs Female Seller Compared to Female

Buyer vs Female Seller

The hypothesis being tested with the T-test is directional, analogically to the first case.Thus the p-value (0.000) derived from the independent samples t-test is divided per 2, as the test is running a two-tailed significance level. Then are observed significant results, meaning that there is a statistically significant difference p<0.05 and t > 1.645 (p= 0.000 and t = 11.199, Table 13) between the mean final price for the two groups. The independent samples t-test gave significant results, meaning that there is a statistically significant difference between the mean final price for the two groups. Group 2(MBFS) had on average higher final price than Group 4 (FBFS), with a mean difference of (75,17500 euro, Table 13). Considered, the p-value <0.05, the directional hypothesis is supported. Thus, keeping the category female seller constant, the interaction of the male buyer with the female seller compared to the interaction of the female seller and the female buyer results in a considerably higher final price for the male buyer. Summarizing, it could be stated that the male buyers negotiate higher end price than the female buyers. Thus, we can confirm Hypothesis 2, which states that being a male and a buyer generally results in a higher end price than being a female and a buyer. This is in line with what the theory would suggest, as the effect of the gender and the effect of the implicit role result in an increased end price initiated by the male buyer. The higher the end price is, the more is the profit for the buyers in the current situation. This means that the proactive and assertive nature of the male combines with the demanding role of the buyer and results in a better off situation for the buyers who are male.

(27)

26

Role N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean Purchase price MBFS 20 307,5000 15,85294 3,54483

FBFS 20 232,3250 25,49421 5,70068 Table 12

Variances t-test for Equality of Means

F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Difference Std. Error Difference Purchase price Equal variances assumed ,301 ,587 11,199 38 ,000 75,17500 6,71294 Table 13

5.2. Effects of Interaction of Role and Gender on

Individual Profit

5.2.1. One-Way ANOVA

The same data set was used to perform statistical analysis on an individual level in between the different negotiation categories. After Hypothesis 1 and 2 were confirmed, the study aimed to delve more into depth into the interaction within each bargaining group. What is meant, is that each of the negotiating category was analyzed in order to explore more extensively the effects of the implicit role and gender on the bargaining patterns and individual profit. The categories were structured as follows:

(28)

27 Implicit role

Gender Buyer Seller

Male Male buyer Male seller

Female Female buyer Female seller

The data was restructured and regrouped, as the profit of each category was calculated and assigned to each of the categories. They were coded as follows:

Male buyer’s profit =1, Male seller’s profit=2

Female buyer’s profit=3 and Female seller’s profit =4

As in the section Data Collection was explained, the individual profit is calculated on the following basis: the individual profit for the male buyer is the difference between the retail price and the negotiated price , i.e. Profit(buyer) = 400- negotiated price. Respectively, the individual profit for the male seller is the difference between the negotiated price and the production costs, i.e. Profit(seller) = negotiated price – 200. Thus these numbers are continuous and can take any value between 200 and 400.

As there are again four groups which will be analyzed, the study used One-Way ANOVA. For this purposes, normality was confirmed by running descriptive test statistics. The normal distribution was verified and the proof of normality was supported by the bell-shaped profit curve:

(29)

28

Then One-Way ANOVA test was run and the following results were observed:

ANOVA

Individual_profit

Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. Between Groups 210838,444 3 70279,781 59,659 ,000 Within Groups 180235,967 153 1178,013 Total 385218,067 156 Table 14 Descriptives Individual_profit

N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error MB 37 102,7027 20,05529 3,29707 MS 40 68,1500 35,14771 5,55734 FB 40 157,8375 33,56593 5,30724 FS 40 69,9125 43,45258 6,87046 Total 157 99,5924 50,06883 3,99593 Table 15

(30)

29

The results are reliable as the overall ANOVA is significant: p< 0.05 (p=0.000, Table 14) and F = 67.071 (Table 5). From this step, the results suggest that there are significant differences in the final price among the four groups, which was demonstrated in the previous analysis among the interacting groups as well. This is an expected occurrence, however, running the ANOVA confirms the significance of diversity. As the main focus of this comparison is to find out how gender and implicit role affect the individual profit, as a next step, an independent T-test was run among the same gender groups. In order to visualize the difference among the groups a bar chart was provided with the mean individual profit of each of the participating categories (Table 16)

Male seller

(31)

30

5.2.2. Independent T-test

As already the first analysis on a group level was performed, there are clear indications which categories to be compared. Again an independent T-test was conducted, analogical to the first review of analysis, in order to observe the effects of gender and implicit role on individual profit. In the first case the factor of the implicit role of the buyer is constant. In this way could be observed the interaction of the categories, where the male buyer and the female buyer are compared. In the second case, the factor of being a seller is kept constant. In this way, the interaction of categories compares the male seller and the female seller. Running the T-test observes the differences in the profit which each of the participants scored at the end. In this way is aimed to find out what is the difference in the profit for the buyer and the seller, for each gender. In this way, the sub-hypothesis are reviewed as a follow-up to the first review of analysis.

5.2.3.1. Male Seller vs Female Seller

The hypothesis being tested with the T-test is directional, the tendency showing which party makes a bigger profit, is going into one direction. Thus the p-value derived from the independent samples t-test is divided per 2, as the test is running a two-tailed significance level. Thus the p-value (0.842) derived from the independent samples t-test, divided per 2 gave non-significant results, meaning that there was not a statistically significant difference p>0.05 (p= 0.421 Table 18) between the mean individual profits for the two categories. This means there is no significant difference between the two individual categories. The male seller had on average higher an individual profit than the female seller only 1, 7625(Table 17) euros, which is does not make it distinctly higher. Considered, the p-value >0.05, hypothesis 1a is not supported. Thus the interaction of gender with implicit role on an individual level reveals that the effect on individual profit does not hold the same direction as the effect on

(32)

31

the final price, on a group level. Therefore, this suggests that the gender and the implicit role do not affect only the behavior of the sole participant, but matter for defining the interaction of both participants. What is meant, is that being a male and a seller does not necessarily evoke a higher price per se, unless the male seller does not interact with a female buyer. Moreover, the interaction does not necessarily evoke drastically different final prices negotiated, as well, thus the hypothesis needs further to be researched and tested.

Individual_gende

r_role N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean Individual_profit Male seller 40 68.1500 35.14771 5.55734

Female seller 40 69.9125 43.45258 6.87046 Table 17

F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Difference Std. Error Difference Individual_profit Equal variances not assumed 9, 125 0,003 -,199 78 ,842 -1,76250 8,83670 Table 18

(33)

32

5.2.3.2. Male buyer vs female buyer

As mentioned above, the T-test is directional, as the tendency showing which party makes a bigger profit, is pointing towards one direction. Thus the p-value (0.000) derived from the independent samples t-test is divided per 2, as the test is running a two-tailed significance level. Then are observed significant results, meaning that there is a statistically significant difference p<0.05 (p= 0.000 and t =- 8.661, Table 20) between the mean individual profit for the two categories. The male seller had on average a higher individual profit than the female seller with a mean difference of 55.133 euro (Table 19). Considered, the p-value <0.05, the hypothesis is supported. Thus, comparing just the individual profits of each buyer, the interaction of the male and a buyer compared to the interaction of the being a female and a buyer results in a higher individual profit for the female buyer. Summarizing, it could be stated the female buyer evoke better profit for themselves than the male buyers. Thus, we can reject hypothesis 2a, which states that being a male and a buyer generally results in a higher profit than being a female and a buyer. This is in line with the theory, supporting the female risk-averse and patient nature. The results reject the hypothesis, but however, they comply with the inner female nature and the stereotypical female traits- women are cooperative, weak, emotional and person-oriented (Eagly, 1987). As cooperation is a passive component in competitive strategy in distributive negotiations (Clopton, 1984), it actually turns out that it helps women to achieve better profits in negotiations with male. Thus, could be concluded that the collaborative and easy nature of the female combines well with the passive and reactive role of the buyer, so that female buyers achieve higher profits in negotiations than male buyers.

(34)

33

Individual_gender_

role N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean Individual_profit Male buyer 37 102.7027 20.05529 3.29707

Female buyer 40 157.8375 33.56593 5.30724 Table 19

F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Difference Std. Error Difference Individual_profit Equal variances assumed 0,891 0,348 ,8,661 75 ,000 2,61520 6,36597 Table 20

6. Discussion

The aim of this study is to explore how gender stereotypes are relevant to the contemporary business world in the aspect of negotiations. As expected, when participants enter the negotiations, they tend to engage in the behavior typical for their inner dispositions. Instead of following the bargaining strategy, which is respective for their implicit role, the participants were following their natural predispositions. Thus, it could be concluded that the gender stereotypes are prescriptive – the gender characteristics predispose certain direction and way of negotiating.

(35)

34

6.1. Sellers

Male sellers combine the characteristics of both the initiative and assertive nature of the male, together with the proactive and even sometimes exclusive strength of the seller. Therefore, they project the strong sellers behavior and achieve higher final prices compared to the female sellers. Yet, the difference is just a slightly lower, which gives a reason to consider that female sellers are not performing distinctly different in distributive negotiations. Hence, a considerable implication is that women negotiate as tough as the male sellers. It turns out that male participants do engage themselves in a more assertive and forceful negotiation. Males are more hard to agree on a price and stand their position firmly. They do not show great interest in sustaining the relationship management, as females do, but on the contrary strive for the best result. The male sellers were not very influenced by their opponent’s stand and negotiate firmly in favor of their own interests. Moreover, the male sellers achieve significantly higher results than the female sellers. They do display more aggressive and firm approach, which results in average of 22 euros higher purchase price than the female sellers, which is not a dramatically higher end results.

However, from the seller’s negotiations, could be seen that female sellers strive for a good long-term relationship with the other party and try to establish strong brand awareness and further contacts with the buyers. The female sellers project very assertive bargaining strategy at the beginning, but they step back once the buyer displays doubts about the purchase or try to reject the deal. Women also bargain in a different way when it comes to selling – they show more personal attitude to the buyer and try to suit the product with the needs of the customer ( delivery time, personalization, sampling offers, discounts for future deals, higher quality over the other products, perfect fit for the current business of the buyer, maintenance and support deals). This supports the assumption that women care more about

(36)

35

the relationship management than the males and try to sustain not only the end sale but also future relationship with the customers. Even though, female sellers achieve lower end results than male, they show tendency of establishing long-term profit maximization instead of short-term task fulfillment.

6.2. Buyers

The male participants – both sellers and buyers did not leave a great margin of discussion, but rather pushed back and defended their initial stand. This, however, turns to be the reason why male buyers achieve better results on an end price level, and not on an individual level. Female appear to achieve better results as buyers than the males in terms of individual profit. The buyer’s passive and more requiring nature is in line with the demanding and expecting female gender. Female have highly set expectations and they work their way to achieving them. However, they manage to request a good purchase price, which will make also a profit for them and will still leave the other party happy with the end outcome. The female buyers “maneuver” more skillfully than the male buyers, who are very straight forward. The female buyers ask for different side characteristics of the product and use this in their favor to achieve a low purchase price. Yet, the male buyers stand their position and use the strong bargaining power of walking away, thus they achieve higher end results. Males’ assertive nature still works in their favor despite of the more passive role they have to undertake. Moreover, male buyers negotiate longer and slower, which could be seen as a tendency to exhaust the other party and get them to agree with the first slightly acceptable offer. In the given time restraints, male used the time limitation for negotiations to procrastinate and portray a never ending discussion, which was threatening the sellers of an impasse results and thus no deal.

(37)

36

7. Managerial Implications

The results from the negotiations of female and male sellers give a strong direction for a managerial interpretation within the B2B settings. On the one hand, from the perspective of the final price agreed, it could be clearly seen that male buyers achieve a higher end price. Yet, on an individual level, it is the female buyers who make more profit. This difference derives from the difference of the groups within which of the buyers were negotiating. The study shows that the gender of the buyer affects the seller’s approach and the end results are different than the same-sex dyads. What is meant, is that the profit of the female buyers is calculated on the basis of what they have earned in the interaction with both male sellers and female sellers. The same is valid for the male buyers, as well. The comparison made between the male buyers and the female buyers, does rely not only on the pure mathematical assumption, but also how each of these groups interacted between each other during the negotiations. Thus, it could be considered that there is a strong interaction effect between the female seller with the buyers and more specifically with the male buyer. Only in the case of the female seller negotiating with a male buyer, the female seller achieves high individual profit results. In case of a female seller negotiating with a female buyer, the interaction effect of the implicit roles is neutralized by the cooperative nature of the females and thus they collaborate on the best price for the best parties without a remarkable profit for any of the parties. Thus it is better for managers to pair female seller with male buyers, in order to achieve better results in term of profit for the company which is selling.

On the other hand, for the male buyers is better to interact a male buyer with a male seller and thus make a better profit. Analogically, female buyers can save more if they are paired with a female seller. This means that the interaction effect of the gender and being a buyer neutralizes when facing the same sex seller. So from a managerial point of view, it is

(38)

37

better to send a male buyer representative in case of negotiations with a male seller, and a female buyer when meeting a female seller. This way, the buying company would incur better purchase and higher profits.

The managerial implications should always take into account the fact that negotiations are not a mere pairing of a buyer and a seller, but that the genders of each do matter for the final outcome. In fact, the study shows that females are as good negotiators as men and sometimes they even outperform them. The combination of a male with a female has always more remarkable end result, than in a single-sex dyad. Hence, this means that the genders affect the implicit roles and the course of bargaining itself, as well.

8. Limitations And Further Research

The study is delving into the negotiation area of genders, which is definitely not lacking limitations and future research suggestions. One of the most important limitations of the particular study is the randomization of participants – when the students from the faculty were not available or were precipitating for their classes, they had to rush through their negotiation time and did not involve in deeper bargaining, just to manage to agree upon an end result. In general the time frame of negotiating turned to be a limitation, as most of the groups needed more time. Moreover, the game nature of the experiment increased the overall competitiveness of some of the participants who were more pushy and assertive than they would be in a real-life business situation, mainly lead by the competition incentives. On the other hand, the shooting and presence of camera was a reason for some of the participants to be more timid and shy than their usual state and they did not reveal their best of potential, disturbed by the camera presence.

(39)

38

As far as implications for further research are concerned, they could be established a few propositions. Firstly, it is suggested exploring more the business to business sphere and how the gender roles are influenced by the business realm – some business spheres are more suitable for one of the genders and the other way round. Moreover, how experience is influencing the implicit role of each of the negotiating parties and if gender plays so significant role for the non-experienced negotiators or it still the dominant factor. In addition, the patterns of bargaining could be researched deeper – how genders differ in bargaining strategies. In this study were identified, yet not enough for stating a significant tendency, that males procrastinate more the bargaining and intimidate the opponents with walking away, just so to achieve their desired goal. Moreover, female sellers achieve close results to the male sellers, thus it is a good implication to research further on if female have already lost the stereotypical “ weak” attitude and engage and a tough and proactive negotiations process.

Moreover, the philosophy of language and non-verbal expressions would shed more light on how the genders approach the negotiation process, combined with the fact they are buyer or sellers. As Rindova, Becerra, Contardo (2004) suggest, language games are “in integrative model that describes how context, action, and language reciprocally affect each other”. Thus, this model could explain the correlation of the gender actions according to the context and their language techniques to achieve the desired end result during negotiations. As males engage in more offensive and assertive way, war of words is a good way to manipulate the opponents and further research can explain if this simplistic way works for both the buyers and the sellers. In addition, females with their caring way of negotiation may display more personal language and actions, including non-verbal communication. Therefore, non-verbal communication is a great opportunity for future investigation, in order to explain how negotiations are influenced during the participants sending and receiving wordless cues.

(40)

39

9. Conclusion

The study focuses on how the gender and the implicit role of a negotiator influence the end outcome of the bargaining, for each of the parties in a distributive negotiation. The experiment conducted and the results from it show that there are interaction effects on two levels. On the one hand, gender influences the implicit role and they both define the bargaining strategy of the negotiator.. This means that it greatly matters if a buyer will be a male or a female and also for the sellers- if they are male or female. Males are confirmed to be more assertive, more firm and more risk-inclined during the negotiations, as they also often threaten the other party of going away, without finalizing the deal. Yet, female appear to be more collaborative and more relationship concerned, as they project care for the others and involve into a long-term planning and relationship management.

On the other hand, gender influences the interaction between each of the participants within a negotiation dyad. In single-sex dyads where the buyer and the seller are either just male or either just female, do not show specific tendencies of behavior. However, in the dyads where the sex of the participants is different, more explicit gender effects could be recognized. For example, female sellers make better profits if they are paired with a male buyers. Moreover, buyers make a better profit if they are paired with the same sex seller, both in the case of a male and female. The study shows that the interaction effect of the gender and being a buyer neutralizes when facing the same sex seller. In addition, the study concludes that female and male sellers negotiate close end prices and do not have a drastically different individual profit on individual level, thus a further research should be undertaken and the issue could be more extensively researched. As for the buyers, surprisingly males achieve higher end prices, but lower individual profits, than the female buyers. This is due to the interaction effects of the

(41)

40

gender within each dyads, as they define the profits for the participants. In this sense, female buyers incur higher individual profits, but not end prices.

Summarizing, the study proves that distributive negotiations are not a matter of just a mathematical expression of just pairing a buyer and a seller but their gender and the combination of the two defines the future not only of the negotiation round, but also of the further relationship with the other party, which in the B2B world is of a crucial importance and significant managerial stance.

Bibliograpy:

Abdi, H., Williams, L. J. ( 2010). Tukey’s Honestly Significant Difference (HSD) Test. The University of Texas at Dallas. Retrieved on 06/07/2014 from:

http://www.utd.edu/~herve/abdi-HSD2010-pretty.pdf

Alderson, W. (2007). The Analytical Framework for Marketing. Retrieved on 31/05/2014 from :http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F0-387-28181-9_4

Bakan, D. (1966). The duality of human existence. Chicago: Rand McNally.

Barry, B., Friedman, R. A. (1998). Interpersonal Relations and Group Processes. Bargainer Charachteristics in Distributive and Integrative Negotiation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 74, No 2, 345-359.

Ben-Yoav, o., Pruitt, D.G. (1984). Accountability to constituents: A two edged sword. Organizational Behaviour and Human Perforamnce, 34, 282-295.

Calhoun, P. S., & Smith, W. P. (1999). Integrative bargaining: Does gender make a difference? International Journal of Conflict Management, 10, 203-224.

(42)

41

Clopton, S. W. (1984). Seller and Buying Firm Factors Affecting Industrial Buyers'

Negotiation Behavior and Outcomes. Journal of Marketing Research, Vol. 21, No. 1., 39-53.

Eagly, A. H. (1987). Sex differences in social behavior: A social-role interpretation. Hillsdale, NJ England: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.

Eccles, J., Jacobs, J., Harold, R. (1990). Gender Role Stereotypes, Expectancy Effects, and

Parents’ Socialization of Gender Differences . Journal of Social Issues. Vol. 46, No. 2. pp. 183-201.

Gerhart, B., Rhynes, S. (1991). Determinants and Consequences of Salary Negotiations by Male and Female MBA Graduates. Journal of Applied Psychology. Vol. 76, No. 2,256-262.

Harvard Law School. (2013). Top Business Negotiations of 2013: Apple versus Samsung.

Retrieved at 18/01/2014 from:

http://www.pon.harvard.edu/daily/business-negotiations/top-business-negotiations-of-2013-apple-versus-samsung/

Harvard Law School. (2013). Top Business Negotiations of 2013: Starbuck versus Kraft Foods. Retrieved at 18/01/2014 from: http://www.pon.harvard.edu/daily/business-negotiations/top-business-negotiations-of-2013-starbucks-versus-kraft-foods/

Hollensen, S. (2007). Global Marketing. Fourth edition. Pearon Prentice Hall: England.

Inderst, R., Wey, C. (2007). Buyer Power and Supplier Incentives. European Economic Review. Vol.53, Issue 3, 647-667.

Kersten, G. E. (2001). Modeling Distributive and Integrative Negotiations. Review and Revised Characterization. Group Decision and Negotiation 10:493-514.

The influence of gender at implicit role effects in negotiations