Lauren
[Type the abstract of the document here. The abstract is typically a short summary of the contents of the document.]
[ C o m p a n y A d d r e s s ]
A diamantine struggle: Examining conflict diamond
redefinition within the Kimberley Process
Author: Lauren Bruffaerts
Student number: 4326016
Radboud University
M.Sc. Political Science: International Relations Supervisor: Dr. A. Wigger
Date: 21st July 2014
Acknowledgements
This thesis would not have been possible without the support of many people. First and foremost I would like to thank my supervisor, Dr. Angela Wigger, for her indispensable guidance and advice. Your assistance has been invaluable.
I would additionally like to thank all four KP experts who were willing to be interviewed for my thesis. The insights you provided were instrumental for my analysis and understanding of the case.
Finally I wish to express my deepest gratitude to my beloved family and friends for their unwavering love and support throughout the duration of my academic studies.
Lauren Bruffaerts, Nijmegen, 21st July 2014
Table of Contents Acknowledgements 1 Table of contents 2 Abbreviations 3 Abstract 4 Introduction 5-13 Literature review14-11
Scientific relevance of study 11-13 Chapter One: Theory 14-26
Section I. The origins of constructivism in IR 14-18 Section II. IR constructivism’s fundamentals 19-26
I. Socially constructed reality and knowledge: the first constructivist tenet 19-22
II. Mutual constitution: the second constructivist tenet 23-24 III. Logics of Appropriateness 24-26
Chapter Summary 26
Chapter Two: Epistemology, Methods and Operationalization 27-45 Section I. Epistemological concerns 27-38
I. Constructivism as the middle ground: building bridges in the air? 27-31 II. Rejecting Positivism 31-38
Section III. Methods and Operationalization38-45 I. Logic behind data selection 38-39
II. Data triangulation 39-42 III. Discourse analysis 42-45
Chapter Summary 45
Chapter Three: Empirical Analysis 46-76
Section I: The importance of changing contexts 46-58 I. Constructing the original definition 47-48
II. The redefinition campaign 49-58 Section II: Lack of consensus 58-75
I. Consensus-based decision-making and the Kimberley Process 58-61 II. The manipulation of discourse placement 61-68
III. The Marange debate and its implications for reform: identity formation and political alliance69-75
Chapter Summary 76
Conclusion 77-85 References 86-95
Abbreviations
DDI : Diamond Development Initiative EU : European Union
KP : Kimberley Process
KPCS : Kimberley Process Certification Scheme RUF : Revolutionary United Front
U.S. : United States UN : United Nations
UN GA : United Nations General Assembly
Abstract
Despite increased awareness of diamond-related human rights abuses perpetrated by governments, the conflict diamond definition of the Kimberley Process (KP) continues to only encompass diamond-related conflict that is linked to rebel groups. Within the KP, numerous representatives from states, the diamond industry and civil society have been calling for change. Yet despite this strong pressure within the KP to broaden the definition of conflict diamonds so that they explicitly mention diamond-related human rights abuses, several states continue to rebuff redefinition attempts. By employing a constructivist framework to analyze the redefinition campaign’s evolution and lack of success, this thesis has been able to identify key acts of agency on the part of those KP members who have been critical of redefinition. The redefinition discourse has been strategically manipulated, either by linking it to another KP discourse or by trying to place it outside the KP’s discursive space and instead within the discursive space of a different international body. These acts of agency have had constitutive effects on the identity and interest formation of several actors who have gone on to resist redefinition. The identification of discourse manipulation as a successful means of agency may prove relevant for the examination of other failed campaigns in the international political arena. Furthermore, this thesis’ examination of the incompatibility of a constructivist intersubjective ontology with a positivist epistemology, which informed the research design herein, may help to raise awareness of the pressures emanating from the IR mainstream, where calls for constructivist scholars to conform to positivist notions of science have given rise to countless bridge-building attempts for the last three decades.
Keywords: Kimberley Process, conflict diamonds, redefinition, constructivism, bridge-building, positivism, context, agency, discourse manipulation, identity formation, postcolonialism.
Introduction
The Kimberley Process (KP) is a joint government, industry and civil society initiative, which was set up in the early 2000s by voluntary agreement in order to regulate the international diamond trade. The initiative currently comprises 54 ‘participants’ who represent 81 countries1 (KP, 2014a). The initiative also includes formal ‘observers’, that is, members of industry and civil society. The origins of the KP date back to informal talks held between three of the largest diamond exporters and three of the largest diamond-traders and –consumers — South Africa, Namibia, Botswana, Britain, the United States, and Belgium — in Kimberley, South Africa, in May 2000. This was to be the KP’s first meeting, and the focus of the agenda was to address the issue of trade in ‘blood’, or, ‘conflict’ diamonds (Bieri, 2010, p.7).
Conflict diamonds have been defined by the Kimberley Process as diamonds used by rebel groups to fund armed opposition against ‘legitimate’ governments (Kimberley Process, 2014a).2 In recent years, however, KP participant states and observers, as well as a former KP Chair3, have called for a change in this key definition around which the whole Kimberley Process, and its Certification Scheme, orients itself. These agents have argued that the conflict diamond definition needs to be broadened to also include diamond-related human rights abuses in state-operated diamond mines (see Asscher, 2014; Belgian government, 2014; Bieri, 2010, pp.180-181; Global Witness, 2011; Human Rights Watch 2012b; Izhakoff, 2010; Martin, personal communication, 20 May, 2014; Milovanovic 2012a; Mtisi, 2013, pp.1, 4; Rapaport 2010; Smillie, personal communication, 20 May, 2014; WGAAP, 2012, p.4; Zampetti, 2012, pp.19, 21). The calls for redefinition arose after diamond-related violence was found to have been perpetrated by the security forces of the Angolan and Zimbabwean governments in the late 2000s (Smillie, personal communication, 20 May, 2014). Previously, diamond-related violence had always been linked to rebel 1 The European Union (EU) counts as a single participant.
2 Internationally recognized governments (but the term explicitly used on the KP website and in numerous KP documents is ‘legitimate’ governments).
3 During a speech marking the end of her tenure as the KP Chair of 2012, Gillian Milovanovic noted that “moderniz[ing] the definition of a conflict diamond” remains a “critical issue”, in order to meet changing consumer demands and to address the new kinds of violence that the KP faces (2012c, p.3). For more on these redefinition efforts, see Chapter Three.
groups. Because the violence occurred in state-owned diamond mines, the Marange diamonds could not be categorized as conflict diamonds according to the KP’s existing definition, as no rebel groups featured in this episode. As such, the diamonds ought to have still qualified as KP-certified diamonds and ought to have remained tradable based on the original definition. Yet sanctions were indeed still placed on the Marange diamonds by the KP.
Given that all members of that the KP felt the need for the KP to address the human rights abuses in the Zimbabwean state-owned Marange diamond fields, the extensive lack of consensus to redefine conflict diamonds to explicitly mention diamond-related human rights abuses perpetrated by governments is surprising. The unanimous conviction that the KP had to respond to the situation in Zimbabwe (even though there was massive debate on how best to respond), implied an inherently shared belief existed amongst KP members, namely, that diamonds linked to human rights abuses, regardless of the perpetrator, were not to be traded. This belief appears to have been strongly internalized by Global Witness, an NGO that has been with the KP since its conception but which withdraw from the Kimberley Process on account of what it deems the KP’s ‘failures’ with regards to Zimbabwe and the continued ‘asymmetry’ of the conflict diamond definition, which fails to address human rights violations by governments (Global Witness, 2012, p.20).4In the face of this apparent unspoken agreement and the numerous calls by KP members for the redefinition of conflict diamonds, as well as the fact that redefinition has been officially identified as a “priority area” by the November 2011 ‘Administrative Decision of the Periodic Review of the KPCS’ (Kimberley Process, 2011, n.p.), it remains astounding that no consensus has been reached with regards to redefinition (Kimberley Process, 2011, p.2; Kimberley Process, 2013, p.6). The focus of this thesis will thus set out to address the reasons behind this lack of change, in the form of the following research question:
4 As such, the findings of this thesis may prove highly relevant for the Kimberley Process: if barriers to consensus on redefinition can be identified, they may also be addressed and overcome, which bode well for the KP’s credibility and may even have the benefit of preventing other KP Civil Society Partners from pulling out on the grounds of a continued asymmetry of the conflict diamond definition (see Global Witness, 2012, p.20).
Why has the Kimberley Process, in its Certification Scheme, not redefined ‘conflict diamonds’ to include state-led diamond-related human rights abuses despite intense
within-organisation5 pressure to do so?
Literature review:
Only a handful of academic works exist that have examined the KP in depth, with IR scholarship on the subject occurring in even smaller supply. However, scholars who have examined the KP have done so using numerous perspectives: some have employed a global governance and civil society perspective, whilst others have scrutinized the KP as a regulatory regime, or as a global multi-stakeholder network (see Bieri, 2010; Grant, 2013). Several scholars have furthermore examined the role of transnational campaigning and global norms for the KP, notably emerging global norms on corporate social responsibility and world citizenship (Elving, 2012; Bone, 2004; Bieri, 2010). These numerous foci have thus informed the critical reflections by academics on the strengths and weaknesses of the KP and the KPCS, such as its lacking organizational structure both in administrative and financial terms (Elving, 2012, p.1; see also Grant, 2012; Hilson & Clifford, 2010; Sharife, & Grobler, 2013).6 In addition to this, the KPCS’ implications for international law in terms of an international agreement that has given rise to norms and legal imperatives, and even the implications of conflict diamonds’ visual portrayal in film and media for ethical consumerism, have been researched by lawyers and anthropologists respectively (see Curtis, 2007; Falls, 2011; Holmes, 2007). A further point of interest in the existing literature has also been the applicability of a regulatory scheme such as the KPCS for other global governance initiatives that seek to regulate natural resources (Wright, 2004).7 For instance, it has been stated that employing the tripartite of stakeholders of the KP elsewhere, that is, involving governments, civil society and industry actors in 5 It should be noted here that within-organization pressure stems from the tripartition of actors involved in the KP: states, civil society and the diamond industry.
6 For instance, Sharife, & Grobler (2013) have exposed the possibilities for money-laundering despite KPCS regulations, whilst Hilson & Clifford (2010) note that success and failure may go hand in hand with regards to diamond regulation. Whilst export sanctions of conflict diamonds from Ghana have been heralded as a success by NGOs and donor agencies, they do entail negative repercussions for development. For instance, the resulting drop in foreign investment as a result from the sanctions has had “catastrophic economic impacts in Akwatia” (Hilson & Clifford, 2010, p.449).
international agreement for other governance frameworks for natural resources, can help these initiatives’ success (Grant, 2012, p.175.) Whilst such critical reflections holds less relevance for this thesis because the research aim herein is more explanatory than normative8, these critical reflections all emphasize the diversity of the KP as a case-study. The KP thus offers numerous avenues for analysis, whereby it may be examined within a broader framework of concerns about exploitation in extractive industries in general, as well as for its links to development, good governance concerns, and corporate social responsibility norms.
Accordingly, whilst limited in number (though not in range), the existing literature does provide integral starting points for the research that is to be conducted in the framework of this thesis. One of the key authors on the KP whose work has had an informative impact has been Andrew Grant (2012, 2013). Like many authors who examine the KP, Grant’s analysis extends beyond the Kimberley Process: his case study of the KP sought to explore the wider consequences of consensus-based decision-making mechanisms for international forums (Grant, 2013, p.324). Employing a global governance perspective, Grant investigated the consequences of the KP’s consensus-based decision-making dynamics for the global governance challenges that the KP has had to face. One key insight offered by Grant has been his identification of the high likelihood of conflicts and stalemates when it comes to the provision of ‘global public goods’9 by agents with diverging interests, whereby he has noted that consensus-decision-making in the KP, which has to entail unanimity amongst said diverging agents, has hindered the KP from swiftly addressing noncompliance by Zimbabwe and Venezuela, thereby undermining KP legitimacy and credibility (2013, p.323; 2012, p.176). Grant’s portrayal of the role that unanimity plays in KP decision-making, whereby one agent can easily veto a decision, challenges the relevance of the research question on which this thesis hinges. Indeed, 7 Wright (2004) has examined how the KPCS arose as a solution to prevent the illegal exploitation of a natural resource – the diamond, as well as its implementation through national legislation, in Wright’s case its implementation in the UK as undertaken by the UK’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Wright goes on to note in his paper that elements of the KPCS have provided a basis for an EU initiative on illegal logging as well as an Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative that was spearheaded by the UK government in 2002 (2004, p. 702; see also EITI, n.d.).
8 The aim of this thesis is to explain how a specific international outcome came about as a result of key political mechanisms and acts of agency on the part of the KP members. The focus is not on praising or condemning certain features of the KP, which is not to say that the empirical findings made herein may not be judged according to the reader’s normative standards (if so desired).
for my research question to remain relevant, there ideally have to exist a multitude of varying actors who have blocked redefinition efforts. Otherwise, lack of consensus in the redefinition debate might be accounted for by the KP’s decision-making mechanism, whereby the lack of unanimity on redefinition could have simply arisen due to one bad apple in the proverbial basket. However, this is not the case as numerous governments have been identified as redefinition critics. Thus an examination of how their interests with regard to redefinition came about retains merit.
Grant’s research has furthermore informed the methodological choice to conduct semi-structured interviews within this work. Grant notes that a likely reason for a lack of academic reflections on consensus-based decision-making, such as that seen within the KP, may arise when access to information of international forums where such consensus-based processes occur is limited (2013, p.323). Grant thereby raises awareness of a likely difficulty that the researcher of this thesis was bound to encounter. In Grant’s specific case, he overcomes the problem by seeking privileged access to the KP, specifically by means of interviews, insight into internal memos and participant observation (2013, p.323). Whilst the latter two options were not feasible for this researcher, the first one was. Semi-structured interviews offered key insights because most of the interviewees had participated in the decision-making processes and negotiations at the KP. Key nuances of discourse and action could thus be relayed that are not observed by outsiders examining the KP through document analysis.
Another author whose research has been instrumental for this thesis has been Bieri (2010; 2012). From Blood Diamonds to the Kimberley Process provides the most extensive academic overview available of the evolutionary life-cycle of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme as a global multi-stakeholder initiative (Bieri, 2010). Bieri’s sociological take on how NGOs have contributed to the formative processes behind the KP conception have been instrumental in laying out the context within which the first conflict diamond campaign took place (see Bieri, 2010). This contextualization of the original conflict diamond campaign, through which the KPCS came about, provides the necessary backdrop for the identification of the new context that has allowed for the redefinition campaign to emerge, thereby offering a basis from which to analyze the attempts to broaden the conflict diamond definition in Chapter Three of this thesis. Bieri has furthermore addressed the issue of
corporate social responsibility within the KP, examining how global norms help advocate specific global social responsibilities and thereby determine expectations of business conduct and how these were internalized within the KPCS (see Bieri & Boli, 2011; Bieri, 2010, 2012).
The emphasis in most of the academic literature on the Kimberley Process has been on the tripartite nature of the Kimberley Process, and the relationships between the state, civil society and industry players who constitute the tripartite of actors within the KP. The KP thus poses quite a novelty for scholars, as it is an international agreement where industry, civil society and governments interact with one another as equal players. The Kimberley Process’s Certification Scheme is namely one of the first negotiations of its kind where these three actors have collectively sought to resolve an international issue (Wright, 2012, p.182). One must accordingly understand the Kimberley Process as a case study where agency attempts might be attempted, and thwarted, by state and non-state actors alike: industry and civil society representatives’ ‘observer’ status within the KP has evolved to such an extent that the NGO and business communities can now significantly influence KP policy formulations (Bone, 2004, p. 136; see also Bieri, 2010, p.2). The tripartite nature of the KP must therefore be a consideration within analysis attempts to explain an international outcome that has occurred within the borders of the KP.
Often, academic papers that have analysed the KP have chosen to focus the spotlight on one of these three players, industry, states or civil society (see Bieri, 2010; Bone, 2004; Kantz, 2007). For instance, Wright (2012) has examined states’ role within the KP, and some of the authoritarian governments’ concerns about giving NGOs an established voice in the KP, as well as industry concerns at regulation by KP governments, at the beginning of the KPCS’s conception and NGOs’ concerns about industry commitment to regulatory reform of the diamond market (p.182-183). The scholar Bone (2004) on the other hand has sketched the outline of De Beers’ response to the NGO campaigns throughout the evolution of the KP’s construction, as well as the role that De Beers played in the KP’s construction itself.10 Kantz (2007)
10 Bone outlines how De Beers stopped trading Angolan diamonds when NGOs noted the link between UNITA diamond funds and the conflict in Angola, whereby their actions reflected considerations of corporate social responsibility (Bone, 2004, p.130, 132). De Beers also came up with the working definition of conflict diamonds, as ‘diamonds mined or stolen by rebels who are in opposition to the legitimate Government of a country’, that was later adopted universally within the international political sphere – both by the UN and the KP (Bone, 2004, p.132).
has also focused on the role of the industry within the KP, examining how the diamond industry has been “a socializing and a socialized agent” seeking to exert discursive power in its relationships with other KP members in order to increase its continued say in shaping the KPCS. He elucidates that the diamond industry’s power was furthermore consolidated following the creation of the World Diamond Council11 (Kantz, 2007, p.15).
Out of the three authors mentioned above, Kantz’s identification of discursive power and relationships between KP members has proven particularly instrumental for this thesis. Her findings help justify the focus of this thesis, as it illustrates how well-qualified a post-positivist, constructivist framework may be to examine both the discourse and socially constituted reality within the KP, as well as the transformative acts of agency that have sought to determine the course of social relations and interest formation of KP members.
Scientific relevance
Most of the theoretical works do not address the redefinition campaign in detail, whilst the majority of them, including Bieri’s (2010) extensive book on the KP, focus instead on the original conflict diamond campaign. Additionally, there is a surprising lack of literature on the subject of the Kimberley Process in general, and on the redefinition campaign in particular, with only a handful of scholars examining the KP. This is surprising given that conflict diamonds are a well-known phenomenon in the public domain: they have received strong media attention as well as cinematic attention in the past (in the form of the movie ‘Blood Diamond’ which came out in 2006). And yet academia has not tackled the issue to a large extent. Those academics who have immersed themselves in the issue area of conflict diamonds are equally stumped by the lack of academic interest displayed in the KP, given the plethora of KP-related investigative avenues that could be explored (Bieri, personal communication, May 23, 2014). This disinterest may be a symptom of a general lack of academic attention to African political affairs and political thought. Additionally, when examining political stances by African governments, many scholars attempt to 11 The WDC was created as a representative body for the diamond industry within the KP, effectively giving the industry a more united voice within the KP (Kantz, 2007, p.3).
apply political theories that have a western bias to African politics, without taking into consideration the historical or cultural context of the case studies.12 These scholars ought instead to “abandon unhelpful preconceptions” (Thomson, 2010, p. 2). This thesis has attempted to overcome this problem by looking at direct quotes made by African governments as well as the historical contexts and identities of the agents whenever the analysis has turned towards African states’ behaviour within the KP. It is this context-dependency that makes a constructivist theoretical perspective so well-suited to the analysis of the KP and its international members. Irrespective of any potential western-bias13, it should furthermore be noted that those scholars who have written on the KP herald from diverse political and social science backgrounds: sociological, anthropological and legal spheres to name but a few. Within these interdisciplinary approaches, each author furthermore has their own specific focus, whether it be on particular legal, political, normative, social or organizational features within the KP and the KPCS.
This thesis has scientific relevance because it fills a gap in the existing literature by employing a (IR) constructivist framework to analyse the implications of discourse manipulation within the Kimberley Process redefinition campaign.14 Using the Kimberley Process as a case study and a constructivist understanding of international relations, the aim of this thesis is thus to examine how the social construction of identities and interests, through the manipulation of discourse, has enabled agency on the parts of state and non-state actors who seek to obstruct the redefinition campaign. Such an attempt has not been made before, and hopes to exemplify that the insights gained from using a single theoretical perspective of the international relations discipline has merit in their own right, without having to attempt the falsification of a different IR theory (for a more detailed justification of 12 It may furthermore be that Western-biased political assumptions about what the modern state should or should not look like do not always hold in African states and thus should be reconsidered when examining African politics. For example, the existence of ethnonationalist sentiments, that is, the desire to create a state for specific cultural groups as opposed to geographical territories, as well as the tribe as a category of self-definition may be an unfamiliar or questionable consideration for the Western scholar, but may be instrumental for the analysis of African politics (see Habyarimana, Humphreys, Posner & Weinstein, 2008). Thus historical and cultural context must always be considered when examining state and non-state actors who come from different backgrounds.
13 The alleged western bias of political analysis of African states would warrant its own research project, and given the limitations of this thesis, this issue could only be raised briefly here because it may offer some insight into the lack of academic interest in the Kimberley Process (as a large number of its diamond-related conflicts have taken place in African participant states).
14 Whilst Bieri has used a (sociological) constructivist perspective in her work, this differs slightly from constructivism within the IR discipline.
the choice to employ only a constructivist framework for the analysis in Chapter Three, see Chapter Two).
The thesis shall be structured as follows: Chapter One will focus on the key tenets of constructivism as well as its role within the IR discipline. It will end with a short summary of expected outcomes15 for the third Chapter. Chapter Two will examine the incompatibility of constructivist ontology with a positivist epistemology and will go on to argue for the selection of discursive methods instead of standard hypothesis testing. Chapter Three will analyse the role of discourse manipulation on the outcome of non-consensus in the redefinition campaign, whilst the final chapter will offer a summary of the key findings, highlighting their importance for the IR discipline and their limitations, before concluding with an examination of possibilities for future research.
Chapter One: Theory
This chapter seeks to outline the position that constructivism holds within the IR discipline, as well as the key differences that exist between a IR constructivist ontology16 and the ontologies of the mainstream IR theories, namely, neorealism and neoliberalism. The chapter is laid out in two sections: the first section will examine constructivism’s IR genealogy, as informed by the attack it faced early on in the 1980s from the mainstream, whilst the second section will outline constructivism’s main tenets, namely the social construction of reality, mutual constitution and the logic of appropriateness.
Section I. The origins of constructivism in IR
It should be noted that constructivism is not specific to the International Relations (IR) discipline and should not be perceived as a mere IR theory. Firstly, constructivism deals with metaphysics, that is, the study of the fundamental nature of being which occurs externally to experience (Adler, 2002, p.111). At the metaphysical level of understanding, constructivist ontology and epistemology, with their specific take on reality and knowledge creation (where the latter enables access to said reality), can be applied to social science in general, and not just to the field of IR (Adler, 2002, p.96). Constructivism is furthermore a social theory, which centres on the way in which social reality is constituted by knowledge and by agents holding knowledge (Adler, 2002, p.96; see also Barnett 2008, p.162). IR constructivist theory and research thus has its roots in philosophy and sociology, whereby IR constructivists have sought to ground IR theory and research in metaphysics and social theory (Adler, 2002, p.96).
Constructivism arose within the IR discipline in the 1980s as a critique of the dominant mainstream theories, where neorealism and neoliberalism had emphasised the distribution of power and the exogenously determined interests and identities of states. States were furthermore assumed to act according to rational choice and were 16 See chapter Two for an account of the methodological and epistemological considerations that has resulted in the choice to give constructivism pride of place within this chapter.
deemed the most important unitary actors in international politics.17 Constructivists “questioned the individualist ontology of rationalism”, which assumed an anarchic world comprising of asocial agents acting as rational egoists, that is, actors whose primary aim was the achievement of material interests within a given context and whose identities and interests were determined prior to social interaction (Fierke, 2010, p.181, p.182; see also Brown & Ainley, 2009, p.48). As a result of their focus on material structures, mainstream IR theories ignored the potential of ideas to shape state interests and identities, as well as rejecting the possibility of structural transformation. One of the most evident cases of such transformation soon followed in the form of the end of the Cold War.
Constructivism gained popularity in the IR discipline in 1990s, following the end of the Cold War. Neoliberalism and neorealism had both failed to predict this event. The mainstream IR theories struggled to explain how the international political order could transform from one of bipolarity to one of unipolarity, for both theories had an ontology that saw the international structure as given and set and consequently neither had predicted this change in the international order (Adler, 2002, p.98; see also Checkel, 1998; Hopf, 1998). Constructivism, with its emphasis on mutually constitutive social processes and its examination of material as well as ideational structures, allowed for structural transformations at the international level. An intersubjective social ontology thus proved highly compatible with the post-Cold War events.18
An additional strength of constructivism within the IR discipline has furthermore been its potential to explain and reconstruct processes and thereby seek out the origins of identities and interests. Such questions of origin were left unanswered by mainstream neorealists and neoliberals. This has been in part because proponents of rationalism, such as neorealists and neoliberals, are interested in only those occurrences in international politics that “are conceivable within rationalist assumptions” (Christiansen, Jørgensen, Knud, & Wiener, 1999, p.533). Whilst this may enable rationalists to study in detail those phenomena compatible with the 17 Rational choice is itself a social theory whereby actors seek to maximise fixed preferences within a given set of constraints (Barnett, 2008, p.162). For more detail on rationalism, see also Fearon & Wendt (2002).
18 For a more detailed account on constructivism’s explanation of the Cold War in terms of the role that norms and language, that is, social dimensions, played in Gorbachev’s ‘New Thinking’ and the international relations of the time, see Fierke, 2010, p.179-180; Barnett, 2008, p. 163.
employment of a positivist research design and epistemology, it is also a shortcoming, as social ontologies and non-causal explanations, such as those offered by constructivists, are left by the explanatory wayside (Christiansen et al. 1999, p.533). By stressing intersubjective understandings and social context, constructivists “seek to go beyond explaining variation within a fixed setting” (Christiansen et al. 1999, p.528). This enables constructivists to explain important processes, such as for example regime building, cooperation, identity formation, as well as agency by non-state actors and non-state actors alike: ‘If the process is to be explained, it cannot be done within a research context that is closed towards interpretative tools” (Christiansen et al. 1999, 529; see also Kowert n.d., pp.3-4). Constructivism, unlike the mainstream IR theories, offers such tools. Understanding such processes can help explain the occurrence of certain key phenomena, such as for instance the relationship between identity formation and conflicts, whereby the emergence of conflict stems from imposed identities of ‘Otherness’ in cultural, religious, ethnic or political terms, as opposed to conflict resulting from states being self-interested, with their system of self-help ‘socialized’ unto them by the anarchical international structure (see Kowert, n.d. p.2; Huntington 1996, Wendt 1998). The mainstream IR theories would not spare the time to examine identity formation, given their assumption that it is exogenously determined, and consequently the mainstream would not have laid such a link between said identity formation and the phenomena of conflict in international relations.
Despite these proven strengths, mainstream scholars remain critical of the constructivist research programme, or, as they deemed it, the lack thereof. This stance is best reflected by Robert Keohane’s early attack on the constructivists in the 1980s, where he noted the ‘failure’ of constructivists to “develop a coherent research program on their own” (1988, p.379). This accusation of failure – despite the reflectivists’ useful critical insights into rationalistic theory, which Keohane actually did concede - was coupled with the desire that in the future, ideally, a “synthesis” between reflectivist and rationalist perspectives might emerge (Keohane, 1988, p.379). It was this call for synthesis that resulted in a polarization within constructivism.19 A distinction can since be found between those constructivists who 19 It should be noted that despite its ‘success’ post-Cold War, IR constructivism has never been a unified undertaking. There exist numerous camps within IR constructivism. For instance, some constructivist camps draw on organizational theory whilst others focus on discourse analysis or norms.
have sought to employ a positivist epistemology in an effort to bridge the gap between the mainstream IR theories and constructivism, and those who do not. The former, known as bridge-builders, or, conventional constructivists, seek to answer Keohane’s call for synthesis and find themselves up against those who feel that such a response is untenable given social constructivism’s ontology.20 More specifically, conventional constructivists, who are well-represented in the U.S. IR discipline and who focus principally on the role of norms in determining outcomes within international relations, have a positivist epistemological orientation and a preference for process-tracing as their primary methodology: they believe that bridge-building between rationalism and sociology is a feasible and worthwhile undertaking (Checkel 2006, p. 58; Christensen et al., 1999; Fierke, 2010, pp. 183-184). Consequently, conventional constructivists do not see the combination of a positivist epistemology with an intersubjective ontology as problematic. Such constructivists draw on organizational theory and sociology, where Wendt’s Social Theory of International Politics poses a classical example (Checkel, 2006, p. 58). However, it has been noted by critics that the failure of conventional constructivists lies in their acquiescence to depict norms as having a causal influence in order that their research may be more acceptable for their positivist-minded IR mainstream peers (Aalberts & van Munster, 2010, pp.728-729). Yet as will be outlined in Chapter Two, this focus on causality does not do justice to the mutually constitutive relationships between agent and structure that is integral to constructivist ontology (see Section II, entitled ‘Rejecting positivism’). Causal explanations seek to answer ‘why’ questions, whilst constructivists, with their focus on process reconstruction and explanation, would rather see ‘how possible’ questions answered first (Checkel, 2006, p.58). This is because an explanation for an occurrence of change rests on the assumption that change is possible, and as such it is important to answer the ‘how possible’ question before one can answer any ‘why’ questions. The answer to the how possible question
IR constructivists can be identified as modernists and others as postmodernists, or as conventional, interpretive, critical, naturalistic, linguistic or holistic. For a more detailed description of the various camps, as well as their positionings relative to rationalism and reflectivism, see Adler, 2002; Barnett, 2008, p.162; Checkel, 2006, pp.58-59; Christiansen et al., 1999.
20 Given this thesis’ engagement with examining the compatibility of a constructivist ontology with a (post)positivist epistemology, the focus of the continuing theoretical analysis shall lie on two specific camps - conventional and interpretative constructivism (as according to Checkel, 2006). These two camps feature as the dominant protagonists in the post-positivist-positivist debate that informs all constructivist researcher’s choice of epistemology (see following chapter).
is in such a case ontologically prior to the answer of the why question, and has value in its own right.
At the other end of the constructivist spectrum the interpretative constructivists are to be found.21 Such constructivists undertake inductive research and focus on the constitutive role of language in social construction (Checkel, 2006, p.58). They adopt postpositivist epistemologies and methods based on linguistic techniques to answer ‘how possible’ questions which necessitate non-causal explanations and process reconstructions: “interpretative constructivists [therefore] explore the background conditions and linguistic constructions (discourses) that made any such change [for example in a state’s identity] possible in the first place” (Checkel, 2006, p.58). Interpretative constructivists have refused to let Keohane’s accusations coerce them into adopting more ‘acceptable’ positivist frameworks when conducting research in order to achieve an arguably impossible ‘synthesis’ of reflectivism and rationalism.22
Irrespective of which epistemological position constructivist researchers ultimately decide to employ, it should be noted that all constructivists adhere to three key tenets, which must first be outlined before the full argument can be made that constructivism should not have to strive to be the middle ground between rationalism and reflectivism.
21 For a more detailed analysis of the distinctions between conventional, interpretative, and critical/radical constructivists, see Checkel, 2006.
Section II. IR Constructivism’s fundamentals: ontology
Constructivism’s social ontology23 is based on three main tenets, the first of which is socially constructed reality and knowledge, the second of which is mutual constitution, and the third of which is a logic of appropriateness which helps direct actors’ behaviour. These three tenets will be briefly outlined below and will culminate in the formulation of three expectations of constitutive processes that likely influenced the outcome of the KP’s redefinition campaign.
I. Socially constructed reality and knowledge: the first constructivist tenet
Constructivists see international relations as shaped by an ongoing process of social practices and the interaction of agents. This draws on the idealist notion that actors confer meaning upon a material reality via ideas and interpretation, that is to say, actors construct a social reality (Barnett, 2008, p.163).24 Constructivism thus posits a social ontology that emphasizes the role of human consciousness and interaction in international politics (Ruggie, 1998: 33; Fierke, 2010, p.179). Agreement on meaning results in what are called social facts. A social fact is a social fact by virtue of its being agreed upon as such (Searle, 1995, p.2).25 Social facts are furthermore constructed with intentions, for “[o]nce constructed, each of these objects has a particular meaning and use within a given context” (Fierke, 2010, p.179).
Examples of social facts include human rights or sovereignty (see Searle, 1995; Barnett, 2008, p.163; Fierke, 2010, p.181). For instance, the principle of sovereign states that is so central to the study of international relations does not simply exist objectively ‘out there’ in the world, but rather, the concept requires consensus by agents (individuals, or in this case, states) on what ‘sovereignty’ and ‘states’ entail. States must share and accept the social construct of sovereignty before the political authority that is a sovereign state can exist as such (Fierke, 2010, p.181; Barnett, 2008, p.163). Socially established conventions thus constitute the existence 23 That which is, or, “ the nature of being” (Fierke, 2010, p.180).
24 In addition to this, the sharing of meaning is always conditioned by the context within which it takes place.
25 Social facts are distinguishable from brute facts, whereby the former facts are independent from human institutions and agreement and the latter cannot exist without these (Searle, 1995, p.2).
of social, or what Searle calls ‘institutional’ facts in the form “X counts as Y in context C” (1995, p.46). The creation of social facts hence occurs within specific historical, political and cultural contexts (Fierke, 2010, p.182). Wendt (1999) famously exemplified this by depicting how the realist notion of anarchy (as a given structure that necessitated a system of self-help behaviour) should not be assumed to be one of Searle’s ‘brute facts’ (see footnote 25). Misinterpreting anarchy as a brute fact dictating a particular mode of action on the part of states when it is in fact a social fact (where states determine the course anarchy takes for them by agreeing, through social interaction, on a specific culture they live in vis-à-vis one another) ignores the potential of anarchy to be what states make of it – that is, a Hobbesian, Kantian, or Lockean culture (Wendt, 1999, pp.246-311). The international political order can accordingly been seen as being constituted by ideas, not simply material forces. The state system is thus a human construction. Consequently, it are social facts and their origins and implications that form the focus of constructivist research, whereby social constructs determine actors’ identities and interests within given contexts (Adler, 2002, p. 95; Ruggie, 1998, p.13).
Social construction therefore implies the existence of shared intersubjective beliefs and thus social relations between groups of actors, whereby actors do not spring up fully formed prior to social interaction but may instead develop their identity and subsequently their interests as a result of their social interactions (Fierke, 2010, p.182).26 Interest formation is thus much more dependent on identity for constructivists than for rationalists27, and to the constructivist, identity and interests are inseparable from social meaning (Fierke, 2010, p.182). For example, holding an identity as an authoritarian state presupposes an interest in consolidating one’s monopoly on violence. Likewise, holding the identity of Kimberley Process participant state is inseparable from the interest in regulating conflict diamonds (whether this be out of economic or humanitarian reasons).
26 As previously mentioned, Wendt exemplifies this in Anarchy is What States Make of it (1992), where he illustrates the role of interaction and ideas in the social construction of particular cultures of anarchy and subsequently in states’ behaviour towards one another. Wendt’s work was a response to the materialism that dominated the IR discipline in the 1980s (and still does today).
27 Rational choice theory, as drawn on by the mainstream IR theories of neorealism and neoliberalism, posits that actors are asocial, that is, “born outside and prior to society” (Barnett, 2008, p.163). As such, their interests are determined exogenously by the international political structure. For constructivists, this is untrue: “actors are produced and created by their cultural environment”, and as such identities and interests are socially constructed within international relations (Barnett, 2008, p.163).
This constructivist notion of interacting agents who confer shared meaning upon the world at certain times and within certain contexts thereby implies a role for agency28 within international relations, and posits an international order that is constituted by shared ideas, not merely material forces. This conflicts with the rationalism displayed within the mainstream IR theories such as neoliberalism and neorealism, which saw actors merely as rational individuals seeking to maximize their power or utility within a static context (Fierke, 2010, p.180). Because social reality is socially constructed, it can always change as a result of agency (Fierke, 2010, p. 178). Hence socially constructed structures of shared knowledge are not a given, and instead require continuous reproduction and reaffirmation in order to prevail: this is the job of social practices and interactions (Wendt, 1995, p.76). If human agreement changes, so too, does social reality. Social reality is thus contestable, “confined to a limited time-frame” (Christiansen et al., 1999, p. 530).
By emphasising both the importance of social structures as well as the material structures within which agents operate, and by allowing for constitutive effects of such a social and material environment on agents (see following subsection), constructivism has challenged the materialism of the dominant IR theories, as well as their methodological individualism29 (Checkel, 1998, pp.325-6). Social structures could still include material matter according to constructivists, it was just that these material capabilities were themselves socialised, having acquired meaning through interpretations contingent on a specific social context, that is, “the structure of shared knowledge in which they [were] embedded” (Wendt, 1995, p.73; see also Adler, 2002, p.96; Checkel, 1998, p.326; Ruggie, 1998, p.33). Even the ‘security dilemma’ inherent to realism is a social structure according to constructivist ontology, “composed of intersubjective understandings in which states are so distrustful that they make worst-case assumptions about each others intentions, and as a result define their interests in self-help terms” (Wendt, 1995, p.73). Thus material reality can be 28 Agency, that is, the ability for actors to influence outcomes as well as be influenced by their environment (Jabri, 2008, p.14; Fierke, 2010, p.180).
29 It should be noted here that some authors deem the contrast between rationalism and constructivism to be less uneasy then is commonly portrayed, deeming the conflict between the two to exist only if one interprets the rationalism vs. constructivism debate from an ontological viewpoint, as opposed to perceiving both approaches as analytical tools that do not necessitate the researcher to take on the ontological baggage of either (Fearon & Wendt, 2002). Then the methodological individualism and asocial character of agents within rationalism is not always necessarily the case and thus rationalism and constructivism do not conflict (see Fearon & Wendt, 2002). This argument will arise again in Chapter Two and will be criticized accordingly.
seen as only having meaning by virtue of the ideas and interpretations that actors have debated over and hold in specific contexts, whereby this in turn determines how actors should respond to that material reality (Barnett, 2008, pp.162-3).
An example of such context-dependency can be found in a state’s threat perceptions with regards to other states’ possession of nuclear warheads. As a result of their friendly social interactions and relationship with Britain, the U.S. would perceive Britain’s possession of multiple nuclear arms as non-threatening, whilst the possession of only one nuclear warhead by North Korea would be perceived as highly threatening (Wendt, 1995, p. 73). Wendt uses this example to illustrate how different understandings – of Britain as a friend and North Korea as an enemy – result from social interactions, whereby the resulting shared understandings give meaning to the distribution of material capabilities of Britain and North Korea respectively and thereby constitute the U.S. interests and, ultimately, U.S. behaviour (Wendt, 1995, p.73). Consequently, “ideas always matter”, as they give meaning to the material international political structure and thereby may empower agents (Wendt, 1995, p.74; see also Ruggie, 1998, p.33). The same can also be said of socially constructed norms, which empower norm entrepreneurs to change international relations through the advocacy of certain norms which posit specific identities and interests (see Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). In summation, what the IR discipline was meant to take away from the constructivist research programme was the notion that international reality consists of both social and material structures alike (Ruggie, 1998, p.33). It is such social understandings within the Kimberley Process – such as the conflict diamond as a social construct - that will need to be highlighted and which will provide the key findings for analysis in Chapter Three. One can therefore expect the KP members’ social interactions to have, in part, determined the outcome of non-consensus, given the formative effects of social interaction on actors’ identities, interests and behaviour.
II. Mutual constitution: the second constructivist tenet
As mentioned above, social reality is the product of human creation: shared intersubjective beliefs constitute both social reality and knowledge.30 Thus agents may have, through social action, a constitutive effect on structure. But this constitution is mutual: social structure enables and constrains certain outcomes and behaviour on the part of agents because it constitutes them with specific identities and interests (Wendt, 1995, p.76; Christiansen et al., 1999, p. 535). As such, structure remains highly important to the constructivist (Wendt, 1995, p.71).31 By
examining mutually constitutive processes, constructivists have been able to open “the black box of interest and identity formation”, something that the mainstream IR theories, with their assumption of exogenously determined interests and identities, have been unable to do (Checkel, 1998, p.326). An ontology that features mutual constitution between agent and structure questions the methodological individualism displayed in neoliberalism and neorealism, both of which see structures reduced to agents, and as a result, agents’ interests and identities as given by the existing structure (Checkel, 1998, p.326). Constructivist ontology sees states’ identity as endogenously formed by those structures that states interact with and imbue with intersubjective meaning (Checkel, 1998, p.326; Ruggie, 1998, p.16). Mainstream IR theories lack the “analytical means” to explain or even to question where state’s identities originate from and how these can transform because of their ‘neo-utilitarian’ assumption of an exogenously given identity (Ruggie, 1998, p.14). This furthermore hinders them from being able to examine how interests and international outcomes are determined by specific identities (Ruggie, 1998, p.14).
In summation, constructivist ontology assumes the existence of a mutually constitutive relationship between structure and agents, and perceives “mutually constitutive social action” as playing a fundamental role for identity construction (Christiansen et al. 1999, p. 535). Through structure’s constitutive effect on identity it is subsequently able to contribute significantly to interest formation, behaviour and 30 See subsequent chapter for more on the implications of socially constructed knowledge for epistemological choices in constructivist IR research.
31 Alexander Wendt shared Mearsheimer’s realist assumptions of an anarchic international political order, namely: that offensive capabilities of states existed; that uncertainty exists about another states intentions; states as units of analysis and that systemic (third image) theorizing is important, as well as states’ desire to survive and that they are rational (Wendt, 1995, p.71). Wendt, however, wanted to highlight the structuralist commitments of constructivists (1995, p.71).
thus outcomes in international relations. Consequently, it is to be expected that within the KP redefinition campaign we will be able to find examples where shared intersubjective meanings have led to specific identities which in turn have determined actors’ interests and thus behaviour, (and, ultimately, international outcomes).
III. Logics of appropriateness
The final key tenet of constructivism finds its counterpart in mainstream IR theory in the form of the logic of consequences, which argues that actors, as rational egoists, will rationally select action, that is, behave in ways which maximize their interests within a given structure, whereby this structure simultaneously constrains their behaviour (March & Olsen, 2009, p.5). Constructivism, with its emphasis on social structures, depicts that such a one-sided materialist focus on structure’s constraining role on behaviour is misguided: socially constructed intersubjective meaning can also have constitutive effects on actors’ behaviour, whereby such shared meaning underpins the perspective of internalized logics of appropriateness (March & Olsen, 2009, p.5). The first main tenet of constructivism, that is, the social construction of reality, is intrinsically linked to such a logic of appropriateness. Actors determine what constitutes ‘legitimate’, right or good’ and ‘acceptable’ action in their social reality (Barnett, 2008, p.163; March & Olsen, 2009, p.3). Actors thus behave as they do not solely because of some cost-benefit analysis which factors in other states’ actions (logic of consequences), but rather because they also deem certain socially constructed rules, as well as the actions they decree, to be legitimate (logic of appropriateness) (Barnett, 2008, p.163). They thus act “without, or in spite of, calculation of consequences and expected utility” (March & Olsen, 2009, p.3). Actors thus change their behaviour not vis-à-vis other actors’ behaviour as if they were in a game of chess, that is, contingent to another’s move, but rather because they adhere to a specific logic of appropriateness and because they become aware of beliefs, norms, or identities that they share32 (contrast to Keohane, 1988, p.380). This focus by constructivists on a social ontology constructed by the sharing and 32 Just because behaviour is not, as Keohane states, “contingent on changes in the other’s behaviour” (1988, p.380), this is not to say that one state may not be influenced or inspired by the actions of another state. For instance, they may seek to emulate another state if they observe them to be a norm leader who has adopted a logic of appropriateness (see Finnemore & Sikkink, 1999).
internalization of intersubjective meanings (of which norms are but one) is furthermore one of constructivism’s greatest explanatory strengths, for without it, one cannot conceive of shared norms’ existence (Kratochwil & Ruggie, 1986, pp. 764). For example, when it comes to explaining regimes, understanding “the collaborative potential of rational egoists” becomes possible because actors’ interests and behaviour converge as a result of norm-, identity- and idea-sharing (Kratochwil & Ruggie, 1986, pp. 764-5 in Christiansen et al. 1999, p.534). Because norms can constitute identities, shared intersubjective understandings and logics of appropriateness amongst collectivities of states can lead to cooperation as a result of their constraining influences on behaviour (Fierke, 2010, p.181; Ruggie, 1998, p.12). An ontology that sees interests as exogenously given and solely determined by a logic of consequences on the other hand, cannot, and would not, seek to account for the influential role of intersubjective meanings on actor behaviour (Kratochwil & Ruggie, 1986, pp. 764-765 in Christiansen et al. 1999, p.534).
Following a specific logic of appropriateness may guide decision-making: it may be that an actor reconsiders his choice to act in a way which holds high expected utility because the act may violate socially internalized rules of appropriate behaviour, that is, the action may have been collectively agreed upon as being ‘inappropriate’. The logic of appropriateness also accounts for actors adopting behaviour which may not maximize their individual material interests in any substantial way at all: an action may primarily be taken simply because it adheres to an existing shared understanding that this is the ‘right’, or, ‘legitimate’ behaviour to undertake, by virtue of the actors’ shared norms within their specific social structures (Fierke, 2010, p.181; see also March & Olsen, 2009). Socially adopted and internalized shared norms hence play a consequential role for constructivists because they may also exert such substantial constraints on behaviour (Fierke, 2010, p.181).
The logic of appropriateness also ties to the notion of (norm) agency: an awareness of the constitutive role of shared norms on behaviour and interests means that agents may attempt (and may succeed) in eliciting specific international outcomes by advocating certain norms and standards of appropriate behaviour (see Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, pp.891-892). It should be noted that both non-state actors and state actors can achieve such agency by employing methods such as lobbying, persuasion, shaming and framing in order to shape state’s attitudes and interests on certain issues (see Price, 1998; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). Actors can thus “construct, reproduce,
and transform […social] structure” (Barnett, 2008, p.163). In the case of the Kimberley Process then, we may expect to find cases of agency, where the promotion of a specific logic of appropriateness has determined agents’ interests and behaviour within the KP redefinition campaign.
Chapter Summary
Constructivism as an IR theory emphasizes intersubjectivity, social context and the relation of mutual constitution between agents and structures (Adler, 2002, p.96). Given constructivism’s intersubjective and social ontology we can thus expect the following from the empirical research that is to follow in Chapter Three:
Firstly, that KP members’ social interactions have, in part, determined the outcome of non-consensus, given the formative effects of social interaction on actors’ identities, interests and behaviour.
Secondly, we can expect that within the redefinition campaign we will be able to find examples where shared intersubjective meanings and representations of reality amongst KP members have informed the formation of specific identities, which in turn have determined actors’ interests and thus behaviour and, ultimately, the international outcome of non-consensus in the redefinition campaign.
Finally, constructivist theory would note the possibility of to identifying moments where the promotion of a specific logic of appropriateness by an agent has determined actor behaviour and interests within the redefinition campaign.
The next chapter will now go on to make the argument that the ontological tenets that have been outlined in this chapter disallow for the adoption of a positivist epistemology when conducting a constructivist research project.
Chapter Two: Epistemology, Methods and Operationalization
The aim of this chapter is to examine the epistemological and methodological implications of constructivism’s intersubjective ontology, specifically, its compatibility with a post-positivist epistemology but not a positivist epistemology. The chapter will consequently be divided into two sections. The first section will examine and question the feasibility of bridge-building in IR constructivism, whilst the second section will outline the incompatibility of constructivism’s social ontology with a positivist epistemology. It will be shown that the positivist epistemological principles that bridge-building constructivists have employed in order to position themselves between rationalism and reflectivism do not stay true to the epistemological stance posited by a constructivist ontology. The final section shall examine the methods that were used to conduct the research within this thesis, outlining how the choice was made to embrace data triangulation, a multiperspective discourse theory and case study analysis in order to stay true to constructivism’s ontological tenets.
Section I. Epistemological concerns
I. Constructivism as the middle ground: building bridges in the air?
So where did Keohane’s attack leave the constructivist research programme and its comparison with mainstream IR theories? Two options are possible: either researchers can adopt a positivist epistemology to make constructivism compatible and comparable with mainstream IR theories (and, as will be argued, thereby go against vital constructivist principles), or, they can accept that a constructivist explanation requires a research design using methods that cater to the interdependency of constructivist epistemology and ontology. Conventional constructivists chose the first option whilst interpretative constructivists opt for the second (Checkel 2006, p. 58; Fierke, 2010, pp.183-184).
attempts to design ‘testable’ theories, because these imply that the researcher adheres to the positivist belief of an objective truth ‘out there’ existing independent of theories, whereby only those theories seeking to establish rule-like generalizations qualify as scientific academic research (Aalberts & van Munster, 2008, p.728; Smith, 2010, p.9). It shall be argued here that such an epistemological stance cannot be justified by those who claim to hold a constructivist ontology.
Before constructivism’s incompatibility with a positivist epistemology is examined however, it is advisable to consider the works of researchers who have written about or undertaken bridge-building. It should be noted that it is not this author’s intention to vilify conventional constructivists’ motivations or research. Conventional constructivists’ works have been deemed, albeit also by mainstream IR scholars, to be of significant importance in highlighting the role of ideational structures and norms within international relations.33 Think of scholars like Wendt, Finnemore, Sikkink, Keck, Risse-Kappen, Schimmelfennig, or Price. All of these are household names in the IR discipline, and even though one can argue that this is partly because of their acquiescence to positivist pressures by the mainstream, no one can claim that their research was not insightful or relevant. Yet it is unfortunate that constructivists face such a pressure to ‘synthesize’ when this arguably goes against the social ontology posited by constructivism. And it is this incompatibility that has informed my own research design choices.
Examples of conventional constructivists thus abound, and Christiansen et al. offer an illuminating illustrative depiction of researchers’ past middle-ground decisions, by displaying how constructivists can position themselves vis-à-vis rationalism and reflectivism (as two opposing poles) and vis-à-vis one another (1999, p.536). Whilst Christiansen et al.’s (1999) article thus offers insight into the positioning choices of certain constructivist authors in the rationalist-reflectivist debate, it disappointingly never once enters into a discussion about whether such positioning is actually justifiable from a constructivist ontological perspective, instead depicting attempts at achieving a middle ground by positioning oneself between rationalism and reflectivism as an unproblematic occurrence and as an unquestioned given (which it is not – see following section for more on this). By failing to reflect on 33 This arguably perpetuates the dominant view that conventional constructivism is the way forwards in an IR discipline of which constructivism is to be a part of.
the pressures exerted by the mainstream on constructivist researchers, scholars such as Christiansen et al. (1999) arguably help to perpetuate the dominance of the ‘middle ground’ quest by constructivists, even though the feasibility of this venture is inherently problematic and should not be assumed as a given possibility, let alone a necessary undertaking.
Others have addressed the latter indictment head-on and have asserted that the accusation of mainstream ‘pressures’ is an unfair one to make and that constructivism-as-a-middle-ground can be an unproblematic phenomenon. Fearon & Wendt for example have argued that the incompatibility of constructivism with rationalism (and by extension positivism) holds when a researcher is arguing from an ontological point of view but not when a researcher perceives the constructivism-rationalism dispute “pragmatically” from an analytical perspective (2002, p. 53). By perceiving constructivism and rationalism as mere analytical tools a researcher subsequently does not have to commit himself to a specific ontology: he is “ontologically-agnostic” (Fearon & Wendt, 2002, p. 53). However, such an argument is problematic: for, if the researcher and social reality mutually constitute one another, as was argued in the previous chapter, then social ontology underscores what the world and social knowledge is for the researcher. As such, it cannot be feasible to think the researcher could perceive constructivism only in analytical terms and examine the world without social ontology playing a part in his research; intersubjective meaning determines the researcher’s as well as other social actors’ social knowledge and consequently how they represent the world. Additionally, the risk exists that a researcher who is ‘agnostic’ with regards to the mutually constitutive social relationships posited by constructivism may overlook the constitutive effect his own research may have on his subject.34 Furthermore, there exists the possibility that an ‘agnostic’ researcher will fail to give credit to those constraints that direct the focus of his research (and which arise from the social and linguistic frameworks he employs as well as social relationships he engages within). Thus Fearon & Wendt’s endorsement of abandoning ontology as a way of solving the incompatibility of positivist epistemology with a constructivist ontology issue no longer appears so self-evident.
Additionally, the counter-danger of “ruling out certain arguments a priori on 34 An influence which all researchers undertaking constructivist research ought to acknowledge at the very least.
