Who Fights, Why, and When?
Determinants of Civil Conflict Participation 1990-2004
Graduate School of Social Sciences
Master Thesis in Political Science
International Relations
Carmen Hendriks Student Number: 11002077 Supervisor: Dr. Mike Medeiros Second Reader: Dr. Jana Krause June 2020
Inhoud
Introduction ... 3
Literature Review ... 6
Conceptualization ... 6
Participation ... 7
Characteristics of Participants in Conflict ... 10
Economic Grievances ... 11
Grievances and Participation ... 13
Youth Participation in Conflict ... 16
Literature Gap ... 17
Theoretical Framework ... 17
Hypotheses ... 18
Data and Methodology ... 22
Data ... 22
Methodology ... 23
Results and Analysis ... 30
Results ... 30
Hypothesis 1: Economic Contexts and Conflict Participation ... 32
Hypothesis 2: Availability and Conflict Participation ... 33
Hypothesis 3: Fluctuation of Economic Contexts and Conflict Participation ... 34
Hypothesis 4: Macro-Level Country Characteristics and Conflict Participation ... 35
Hypothesis 5: Subjective Economic Contexts and Conflict Participation ... 36
Hypothesis 6: Stages of Conflict and Presence of Youth in Conflict ... 37
Analysis ... 39
Conclusion and Discussion ... 42
Bibliography ... 48
Introduction
In the realm of political science, several big questions have been asked. Robert Dahl, for example, asked ‘Who Governs?’ in his landmark 1961 book on democracy (Dahl 1961). Based on this question, other questions on politics and political participation emerged, such as ‘Who Votes?’, a question asked by Ray Wolfinger and Steven Rosenstone in 1980 (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980), and ‘What is Power’, a question asked by Steven Lukes in 1974 (Lukes 1974). Another such question is central in this thesis, ‘Who Fights?’ Humphreys and Weinstein first asked why some individuals participate in conflict whilst others do not and tested the three major theories on participation in civil war; grievances, selective incentives and social incentives (Humphreys and Weinstein 2008). The answer to this question was rather vague, and the authors pointed to a need for a comprehensive theory on participation in civil war. Now, 12 years and much research later, this theory still lacks shape. Various
dimensions of conflict participation, such as the influence of macro-level factors, economic contexts, and subjective contexts among others, continue to be overlooked. The question of when some individuals participate in conflict is also yet overlooked in the realm of political science research. This thesis aims to contribute to the field by exploring these dimensions. Furthermore, much research into conflict participation focuses on single cases, whilst phenomena such as large proportions of youth in conflict seem to exist on a global scale. As such, there is a need for a large-n study into the dimensions of participation in conflict, of which this thesis is a begin.
This thesis thus concerns the factors driving participation in conflict on a global scale. The research question posed in this thesis is thus “to what extent do economic contexts have an influence on participation in civil unrest?” In order to shine light on the yet overlooked dimensions of participation, this thesis concerns five dimensions: the influence of objective economic contexts on participation in conflict, the influence on biographical availability on participation in conflict, the influence of fluctuating contexts on participation in conflict, the influence of the influence of macro-level country characteristics on participation in conflict, the influence of subjectivity on participation in conflict, and the influence of timing on the participation in conflict.
As mentioned above, these questions are answered using a large-n study, using data gathered from the World Values Survey between 1990 and 2004, which asked respondents about their economic contexts, their biographical data, and their willingness to participate in three forms of civil conflict: demonstrations, occupations, and strikes. The influence of macro-level
country characteristics and fluctuating contexts is researched using data from the World Bank, which is added to the existing data from the World Values Survey. The usage of the World Values Survey allows research into a large variation of countries, which adds to the validity of the analysis. Using a large-n study also allows to understand the extent to which determinants of participation exist on a global scale to understand if protesters in the United States are driven by the same factors as protesters in China, South Africa, Chili, Egypt or France.
In order to test the influence of timing, qualitative data is used, gathered from newspaper articles concerning a variety of conflicts. These conflicts are gathered from the SPEED Program, which indicated conflicts based on newspaper articles. These newspaper articles allow for a comprehensive dataset on political conflict in various forms, such as coup d’états, assassinations, demonstrations and marches. A random selection of conflicts is made, which will be analyzed in order to understand how the composition of protesters changes over the course of a conflict. This allows to understand the influence of the stage of a conflict on participation. Specifically, this part of the research examines the influence of the stage of a conflict on the presence of young adults.
This thesis finds that, indeed, multiple dimensions drive participation in conflict. On the micro-level, I have found that both objective contexts and subjective contexts have a
significant influence on participation in conflict, but the influence of objective contexts tends to have a stronger effect. Furthermore, unlike what the literature suggests, participants tend to have higher incomes and higher levels of education, rather than lower. I have found that participants tend to be younger, male and have a higher interest in politics. On the macro-level, I have found that the structural levels of GDP and unemployment have an effect on participation, but that high levels of GDP and unemployment result in political apathy. High fluctuations of these indicators, on the other hand, increase the willingness to participate in conflict and result in political action. This thesis has also found that the macro-level
characteristics of a country, such as the size of their rural population and the proportions of young adults in their societies have an effect on the willingness of citizens to participate in conflict. Lastly, I have found that the stage of a conflict does alter the composition of the participants. Students and other young adults tend to participate more in the ending stages of a conflict, rather than at the beginning stages.
This thesis will be structured as follows. First, the literature review will establish the
theoretical framework of this thesis and will detail the hypotheses used to answer the research question. Second, the data and methodology section will provide more insight into the data
used for this thesis, as well as the methods which will be used to analyze the data. Third, the results of the analysis will be presented, followed by the analysis of the results and the
implications of the analysis for the hypotheses and the research question. Lastly, a conclusion will be formulated in which the research question will be answered and routes for further research will be outlined. A discussion of the thesis, and implications of the methods and data used, will also be included.
Literature Review
Conceptualization
This thesis will focus on the issue of participation in civil unrest and the various dimensions and factors affecting participation. In order to understand this issue, as well as the literature which has been previously written on this topic, it is necessary to first clarify the main concepts used in this thesis.
First, the concept of civil unrest. Ramakrishnan et al. (2014: 1799) define civil unrest as “a population-level event wherein people protest against the government or other large organizations about specific policies, issues, or situations.” These kinds of protest could occur in carefully orchestrated forms, as well as in the form of spontaneous outbursts of responses to specific issues and policies (idem: 1800). This particular definition is rather broad, including protests against raises in retirement ages in Europe, as well as protests against government repression elsewhere in the world. This broad definition has been chosen in order to determine the extent to which a change in economic circumstances, as well as structural economic hardships, has an effect on participation. These changes in circumstances are not necessarily limited to states and regions with violence civil conflict and civil wars, thus a broad definition of civil unrest that can include regions without these violent occurrences of civil conflict is essential.
Second, the concept of participation. The issue of political participation has been conceptualized in various different ways over the years, from very narrow to very broad. For this thesis, the definition as articulated by Kaase and Marsh (1979) will be used. The authors conceptualize political participation as “all voluntary activities by individual citizens intended to influence either directly or indirectly political choices at various levels of the political system” (Kaase and Marsh 1979: 42). Thus, this definition aims to include both participation in the legal, formal sense such as political participation through voting, as well as
participation in the illegal and informal sense such as through violent conduct, civil war, and mass protests (Conge 1948: 242).
Third, economic grievances. Economic grievances, as argued by Tadjoeddin (2011: 316), tend to be tied to “the feeling of being unjustly treated” among “groups that share a similar identity”. Specifically economic grievances can be tied to the idea of relative deprivation, a concept pioneered by Gurr (1970) which will be further explained in the following section. In short, relative deprivation can be defined as “the discrepancy between what people think they deserve and what they actually get” (Tadjoeddin 2011: 316). This,
often economic-based, discrepancy could foster feelings of resentment in one group towards another group. This resentment could provide a motivation for individuals to participate in conflict or fuel an already existing conflict.
Participation
As mentioned above, participation, specifically political participation, requires individuals to take action, whether directly or indirectly and whether formal or informal, against a
government or other large organization. Whether or not these individuals actually take action is not always given. Herein lays the issue of collective action. In Olson’s groundbreaking theory of collective action, citizens are thought to take their individual interests in account when determining whether or not to participate in a given collective enterprise (Olson 1993). These individuals then make a cost-benefit analysis to determine to which extent participating in this enterprise will be viable. These analyses will be skewed, Olson argues, by the free-riding problem (idem: 25). This problem states that individuals will not necessarily take action that is in their interests if they can free-ride on the actions of others with similar
interests. Thus, in order for these individuals to participate, rather than free-ride on the actions of others, a ‘reward’ is necessary (idem: 34). Olson has named these rewards, which could also take the form of sanctions, ‘selective incentives’. These material incentives should be made available only to those who actually participate, rather than the entirety of the group. As such, Olson argues, latent groups, groups with the potential to mobilize in the future, can only be made to participate in collective action when these groups are offered selective incentives. Without these incentives mobilization will not be possible as the members of these groups would rather all free-ride on the actions of others (ibid.).
By taking Olson’s collective action problem as a starting point, participating in political action thus requires selective incentives to those who actually participate. The problem herein lies, however, that for most political actions these incentives do not exists. Yet, political action is widespread around the globe. Thus, selective incentives are not the only tool which mobilizes citizens to participate in collective action. Rather, the incentives necessary to mobilize previously latent groups appear to have non-material forms as well (Gross 1995, Van Stekelenburg, Klandermans and Van Dijk 2009). These ‘soft incentives’ tend to be based on three distinct routes (Van Stekelenburg 2013; Klandermans 2002):
First, the instrumental route. This route is based around the idea that citizens believe that they have an opportunity to change the status quo significantly (Klandermans 2002: 95). In order for citizens to believe they have this power, a movement has to be able to convince
constituents of this power. This power could be given by convincing constituents that the movement has powerful allies elsewhere or by pointing constituents to successes the
movement has had in the past. The movement could also point towards their constituency as signs of strength itself when this constituency makes large donations or when demonstrations have large turnouts. Furthermore, the leadership of a movement can also facilitate the idea that a movement, and thus a citizen, has the potential to enact significant changes to the status quo (ibid.). For this believe to mobilize citizens to participate, the potential costs of
mobilizing need to be affordable. Thus, a system where the government has significantly repressed its people, these costs could increase significantly as participating in political movement could result in a loss of social standing, freedom, employment, or even life. Political systems with a significantly repressed society could thus reduce possibilities for mobilization, whilst political systems which facilitate political action increases possibilities for mobilization (ibid.).
Second, the identity route. Citizens can also become more likely to participate in movements without clear selective incentives when they identify with members of these movements (idem: 96). For example, a member of the LGBT community identifying with other members of this community could make this member more likely to participate in the LGBT movement. Aside from identifying with other members, identification with the cause of the movement, the organization of the movement, or the leader of the movement can also make citizens more likely to participate in collective action even though these movements cannot provide its participants with selective incentives (ibid.). Aside from identification of citizens with the movement, its members, its cause or its leadership, these movements could also provide citizens with other ways of celebrating identity, for example through marches, rituals or symbols. The ability of a citizen to identify themselves with a particular
organization or movement thus facilitates mobilization and participation (ibid.). The effect of identification on mobilization and participation can take both an indirect and a direct effect. Indirectly, identification with a movement reduces the possibility that a citizen free-rides on the participation of others. Directly, participation which is based on identity does not require the outcome of the participation to be attainable, as is the case in the instrumental route. Rather, the identification of citizens with the movement alone can facilitate mobilization.
Third, the ideology route. It is also possible to mobilize citizens though juxtaposing their values with a different set of values (idem: 97). These values are placed in frames. Themes, for example, are frames which give meaning to a certain set of values or beliefs in the right move for society. For example, the belief in collective healthcare is a theme, whilst
the belief in individual healthcare is its counter-theme (ibid.). Values can also be framed as ‘rights frames’. For example the women’s rights and human rights can be placed in a frame as a fundamental right. When a citizen adheres to a frame, the violation of that frame or the existence of a counter-frame or counter-theme could give rise to participation. To illustrate, a citizen who believes in collective healthcare who lives in a society which adheres to the individual healthcare theme could be mobilized to take action against that theme (ibid.). Furthermore, a citizen who adheres to the human rights frame could be mobilized when they identify that their values are being violated. Mobilization and participation could thus result from a set of values being violated (ibid.). In this case, the mobilization and participation does not require incentives, opportunity or identification with a cause. Rather, the mobilization requires an emotional response to a set of values being violated.
This idea of a combination of identity, perceived effectiveness, and ideology has been researched on a case-level by Chan, among others (Chan 2016). Chan argues that the
participation of citizens in the Occupy Movement in Hong Kong can be explained through a multitude of factors. Firstly, participants in these types of movements tend to identify
themselves with parties and movements advocating democracy (ibid.). The identification with these parties and movements, as well as other participants, is a primary drive of participation, which aligns with the identity route as argued by Klandermans. Secondly, participants in the Occupy Movements believe that their actions, as well as the movement as a whole, are able to be effective in changing the status quo, through its ability to influence public opinion,
strengthening of the cause, and expressing public opinion in an environment where this is limited, which aligns with the instrumental route. Thirdly, Chan also finds that participation can be explained to an extent by conflicting ideologies (ibid.). Specifically, Chan finds that dissatisfaction with the ways and pace in which democracy develops and moral convictions of the values of democracy can be a significant predictor, which aligns with the ideology route.
However, Chan also finds that anger can be a significant motivator of participation, which aligns with the idea that emotions and subjective circumstances can be a factor in determining participation. This anger can take the form of dissatisfaction with the political environment, as is the case for participants in the Occupy Movement in Hong Kong (ibid.). It could thus be said that the individuals who participate in conflict tend to identify with the causes they fight for, as well as other participants in these causes. They also believe, whether this belief is justified or not, that their actions will have a possible effect on the status quo. Furthermore, they tend to hold similar values, which help with identification with a cause, and
are more likely to participate in a conflict when these values are violated or when the current situation or political climate does not align with these values. These violations or
dissatisfactions can also give rise to emotions like anger, which makes participation more likely. However, not all individuals who share these incentives actually end up participating in a conflict. Rather, individuals who end up participating generally seem to share various
characteristics, which will be the focus of the next section.
Characteristics of Participants in Conflict
Several sections of conflict theory have focused on the characteristics of individuals who are more likely to participate in civil conflict.
Wu and Gerber (2017), for example, have focused on political participation theory as well as civil unrest theory in order to understand the various factors which can explain
participation. Specifically, they composed three categories of factors, biographical availability (i.e. marriage, employment), political engagement (i.e. knowledge of politics, political
efficacy), and structural availability (i.e. presence in political networks, recruitment) (idem: 83).
This participation has been further explored by Meier (2019), who focuses on recruitment of young adults into armed groups, specifically the Tamil Tigers. Meier argues that the Tamil Tigers, like other armed groups, tend to focus on recruiting young adult males for their causes, as this sub-group of the population tends to be most willing to participate in violent upsurges and conflict (idem: 12). Strategies to recruit these young men tend to focus on emotions, such as hope or anger, as well as socioeconomic situations in which these men tend to grow up. The differences between these situations and power of emotions in young men then could explain why some joined the Tigers whilst others did not (idem: 14).
McIntyre (2003) continues this argument by theorizing the potential of youth in conflict. She argues that young adults are seen as commodities to be used as an instrument of warfare and are actively recruited to participate in conflict. These young adults are often lacking in education and possibilities for their futures (ibid.). As such, they are more vulnerable for recruitment than other groups in society. McIntyre argues that youth are also often mobilized through promises of better futures, education, or emancipation. Even though these promises are not always fulfilled, they do prove effective for the mobilization of youth (ibid.). Armed groups, rebels, but also politicians and government thus recognize the ways in which the youth can be effectively mobilized through incentives and anger, but they also
recognize the potential of youth and the ways in which this youth can aid in achieving the end goal of a movement (ibid.).
Participation in civil conflict is not always of the voluntary kind, however. As Humphreys and Weinstein (2008) show, involuntary participation, usually in the form of abductions, is a large part of overall participation numbers in contemporary civil wars. Whilst less a characteristic of civil unrest in the form of demonstrations and protests, abductions are commonplace in cases of civil conflict in Sierra Leone, the DRC, and Sudan, among others (idem: 439).
Economic Grievances
Emotions, as well as socioeconomic circumstances, are thus essential in order to understand why some citizens join protests and armed groups whilst others do not. These emotions could take the form of grievances, which could be based on identity or economic factors.
Grievances based on identity factors tend to focus on historical issues between groups, perceived deprivation compared to other groups, or oppression of one group by the other (Horowitz 1985). Identity-based grievances can provide strong bases for uprisings and conflict. As Giordano (2000) argues, these identity-based grievances can be fostered by a leadership group, if these grievances are not instantly perceivable, in order to legitimize a movement or a claim for independence or more autonomy. Similarly, Lecours and Beland (2019) argue that identity-based grievances are necessary for a claim for independence to persist for an extended amount of time. They show that grievances based on economic factors could lose momentum and even disappear, as happened in Western Australia in the early 30s, when the grievances that fueled the movement in the first place are resolved. As such, they argue that a solid base of identity-based grievances is essential for a movement or secessionist group to survive on the long term (idem: 40). This has been further examined by Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2010). They have found that a large amount of ethnic polarization in society increases the duration of a conflict significantly compared to areas with lower ethnic polarization. A basis in identity politics could then be necessary for a violent conflict to endure for a significant portion of time, however, as the authors point out, the emergence of conflict can have a multitude of factors, not limited to identity-based issues (idem: 124).
It could thus be said that economic grievances could be a significant factor in
explaining why civil conflicts arise, and possibly why some citizens join a movement whilst others do not, but these grievances alone could likely not maintain the movement in the long term. Thus, these economic grievances need a base in identity politics in order to ‘convince’ citizens to possibly risk their lives and livelihood by joining instances of civil unrest.
Furthermore, the importance of emotions on participation could affect the kind of economic circumstances that influence participation and the extent to which participation is affected. Subjective economic circumstances, such as faith in the future or faith in economic policies, rooted in emotions could thus have a larger impact on participation in civil conflict than objective economic circumstances such as unemployment rates or inflation rates. This line of research is, however, still unexplored in the literature on conflict participation.
The effect of subjective contexts in relation to objective contexts has also been explored in research by Zagórksi (2012). This research focuses on support for changes to the state. It shows that the support for change is not necessarily determined by objective material contexts, but that this support rather flows through the subjective perception of material contexts. This subjective perception does have a large effect on an individual’s support for change in society, but this subjective perception is at least partly by objective levels of material well-being (ibid.). As such, it is also possible that the subjective perception of an individual’s material contexts could also have an effect on ways change in society takes place, for example through conflict.
The effect of objective perceptions on subjective perception is also explored in other field of research, such as the effect of language on conflict. As Medeiros (2017) theorizes, the objective vitality of language affects the subjective vitality. This subjective vitality concerns the subjective views of an individual on the vitality of a language. This subjective view is at least correlated with the objective view, but their influences on the perceived level of threat varies, with the author theorizing that the subjective perceptions of vitality largely determine the attitudes of an individual to other groups which speak a different language (ibid.).
As mentioned above, the sustainability of conflict thus depends on a solid base in identity politics and grievances based in identity. However the emergence of conflict could arise from economic grievances alone. As is argued in Relative Deprivation Theory, relative economic deprivation could fuel the emergence of conflict (Gurr 1970). For example, the secessionist movement in Western Australia was fueled primarily by the economic disparities between Western Australia and the rest of the country, as well as discontent with the Commonwealth government (Lecours and Beland 2019). This has also been the case in Indonesia and Papua New Guinea (Tadjoeddin 2011). The conflict in Italy, on the other hand, was fueled by discontent in Northern Italy with the distribution of wealth to the south of the country (Giordano 2000). This relative disparity between regions, or in other cases between groups, thus fueled these conflicts.
This issue of relative deprivation can take subjective forms. In these cases, it is not necessarily the actual, objective differences between groups which fuel conflict and resentment, but rather the subjective, emotional differences which a group or an individual finds. As Bernstein and Crosby (1980) argue, the judgement of an individual’s situation and economic contexts is not just a product of their objective circumstances. Instead, negative assessments of their
situation, such as anger or resentment, are subjective to an individual. The authors find that comparisons, entitlements, and control over outcomes are necessary to understand differences in subjective assessment of individuals with similar objective contexts.
It is thus possible that the subjective assessment of a situation can also be a factor in determining whether or not an individual is willing to take action to change their situation. It would then not be an individual’s actual situation, such as their income or employment status, but rather their situation when compared to others, or their subjective assessment of their lives and economic situation, which plays a major factor in determining possible action an
individual can take, such as participating in a conflict.
Further insight into the mechanisms of participation, and the distinction between objective and subjective factors within these mechanisms, is thus necessary to understand the
determinants of participation in civil conflict.
Grievances and Participation
As mentioned above, it is thus important to understand the relationship between grievances and participation in conflict. Research conducted by Kurer et al. (2019) concerns the
relationship between economic grievances and political participation. Their research finds that grievances concerning structural economic hardships tend to reduce incentives for political participation. However, grievances concerning changing economic circumstances tends to rise incentives for political participation (idem: 5). Thus, volatile economic circumstances could, in theory, fuel the emergence of conflict as well as the participation of citizens in these kinds of conflicts, whilst economic hardships in the long-term could halt the emergence of conflict and participation in these conflicts (ibid.).
The effects of changing economic circumstances could be tied to literature
surrounding economic stability. The International Monetary Fund (2018) defines economic stability as a lack of “economic and fiscal crises, large swings in economic activity, high inflation, and excessive volatility in foreign exchange and financial markets”. This stability could be operationalized by analyzing a countries “growth of real output, the rate of inflation, and the current account deficit” (World Bank 2005: 9). Economic stability, as measured by
volatility, could then be tied to risks of domestic conflict. As Mobarak (2005) and Rodrik (1999) show, large trade and growth volatility could increase the risks of domestic conflict. It could thus be possible that this relationship is mediated by rising incentives for political participation.
A similar argument has been made by Humphreys and Weinstein (2008). Specifically, they argue that “discontent, when aggregated across individuals in a particular social class or ethnic group, provides the foundation for mobilization and the onset of violence against the state” (idem: 440). The authors identify three different approaches to the influence of grievances on participation in conflict.
First, social class. This approach, rooted in Marxist theory, argues that social class determines who is more likely to participate in civil conflict (ibid.). As it seemed that the main participants of revolutions were rural people rather than the urban working classes, it can then be theorized why only certain parts of the rural group participated in the revolutions. One possible explanation is that those rural people participated whose landowners were least likely to give into demands (ibid.). A different explanation seemed that a lack of access to land, to some a better indicator of class than poverty, made citizens more likely to revolt, as seemed to be the case in Latin America. Others have argued that not access to land, but rather income inequality drives discontent and participation in conflict (ibid.).
Second, ethnic and social grievances. This approach creates a tie between ethnic and social grievances and relative deprivation (ibid.). The possibilities of mobilization and participation are, in this argument, driven by the modernization of the last century. The
upward social mobility has often resulted in a subsequent upward economic mobility. In some cases, this economic mobility has advantaged some groups over others, which could have created grievances and discontent among the ‘losing’ group (ibid.). This argument thus ties in social grievances with economic-based relative deprivation in order to explain why some groups are more likely to participate in conflict than others (ibid.).
Third, political alienation. This approach focuses on the effects of political alienation on participation in conflict. As individual citizens are alienated from political processes, they become unable to express frustration with these political processes or their grievances they could turn to violent means (ibid.). Thus, when political decision-making is increasingly closed off from certain individuals or groups, or when these groups feel their voices or concerns are not heard, these groups could be more likely to resort to means of civil unrest (ibid.).
Individuals can also be inclined to participate in civil conflict through the presence of conflict in their regions. Justino (2009), building on Humphreys and Weinstein (2008), shows that the economic situation of a household can determine whether or not a household participates or supports an armed group in their region. When a household has more vulnerability to poverty, or vulnerability to violence, they are more inclined to be supportive of an armed group or even participate in the conflict of which the armed group is a part (ibid.). This relationship matters both before a conflict, as well as during a conflict, since long-term conflict can have a significant effect on the economic situation of a region. This economic situation can be, for a large part, influenced by the armed group. It then becomes vital for a household to ensure that the armed group protects their existing economic status, in return for support, cooperation or participation of the household in the conflict. As such, it can thus be said that the economic contexts of a household, or an individual, can have a significant effect on the willingness of that household or individual to participate in a conflict (ibid.).
The idea of economic grievances and deprivation fueling conflict also has been
explored by Padmi (2019). Padmi argues that in the case of the violent secessionist conflict in West Papua, poverty, social exclusion and deprivation can influence participation in violent conflict. Specifically, the author argues that these grievances fuel the importance of inequality in an individual’s life (ibid.). The issue of poverty, such as structural widespread poverty in the case of West Papua, incites an individual to be more likely to commit violent acts and participate in the conflict as the poverty makes an individual more vulnerable. The grievances associated with deprivation as well as incentives offered by joining a conflict are amplified by the poverty, which increases the willingness to participate in a conflict, such as the violent conflict in West Papua, even further (ibid.). These grievances are further consolidated by the social and economic systems of societies such as West Papua, where those living in poverty are excluded from large parts of society and entitlement to ways of bettering their lives like social recognition, a source of income and food (idem: 63). These exclusions further lead to social and political apathy and alienation, which might provide an incentive for these individuals to participate in a conflict, when these individuals are recruited. The grievances are thus not necessarily limited to an objective and economic situation, but have further subjective and social consequences for an individual.
Based on the Padmi argument, it could thus be that it is not necessarily the structural poverty which increases the willingness to participate in a conflict, but rather the subjective feelings of deprivation and the desire to change a situation which amplify the willingness to participate in a conflict, which is in line with the argument made by Kurer et al. (2019).
Grievances based on class, economic mobility, and political alienation could thus explain why some groups participate in conflict whilst others do not. It does not, however, take into
account whether some grievances are more likely to cause an individual to participate than others, nor does it take into account how individuals within and among their groups act when faced with economic grievances and political alienation. Furthermore, present literature does not account for the ways in which economic contexts affect certain groups, such as young adults, compared to others.
Youth Participation in Conflict
Some research has been conducted into specific factors which could have an impact on participation in conflict. As mentioned above, Humphreys and Weinstein find that material circumstances, lack of education, and political alienation have a significant influence on likelihood to join instances of civil conflict (2008: 446). They also find that selective incentives, such as money being offered on membership, connections with others already in the group, age, and gender have an influence on likelihood of participation, which ties into literature previously covered before (ibid.).
Furthermore, as Collier and Hoeffler (2004) show, the enrollment rates of young adults in secondary schools are an explanatory factor for the emergence of conflict. Similar to Meier’s (2019) research discussed earlier, Collier and Hoeffler find that young adult males tend to be the most recruited groups in civil conflicts. Thus, the authors argue, when this group increases its chances in the job market by enrolling in secondary schools it reduces their incentives to join rebellions and other instances of civil conflict (idem: 569).
Other research has been conducted into the participation of young adults in civil conflict. Specifically, it has been found that the proportion of young adults in a country can influence the likelihood of conflict. This concept has been called the ‘youth bump’. As Cincotta, Engelman and Anastasion have found, countries with a significant young population, more than 40% of citizens between the ages of 15 and 29, are more than twice more likely to experience civil conflict than countries with a lower proportion of young adults (Cincotta, Engelman and Anastasion 2003). Similarly, Flückiger and Ludwig (2018) find that an increase in size of the group of young adults aged 15 to 19 increases the risk of civil conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa. The authors tie this increase in risk to the idea that this group
corresponds to the group entering the labour force. When economic circumstances worsen, and this group faces marginalization and unemployment, this group becomes more likely to participate in civil unrest or be recruited to armed groups (idem: 1934). The ‘youth bump’
thus increases the likelihood of conflict when young adults face difficulties in entering the labour force, as this group is most likely to participate in civil unrest and armed struggles.
To further this line of research, it then becomes necessary to extend the research to identify relevant economic indicators on both a micro- and a macro-level in order to understand the effects of these indicators on the participation of young adults in civil conflicts, as well as understand the effects of both objective and subjective economic circumstances.
Literature Gap
As mentioned above, the research covered in the section above mostly focuses the effect of macro-level indicators on the emergence of conflict and subsequent participation of citizens in these conflicts. In order to fully understand the extent to which participation in civil conflict is affected by economic circumstances however, it becomes necessary to use indicators on both micro-level and macro-level, as well as both indicators concerning objective economic circumstances and subjective economic circumstances. Furthermore, it also becomes
necessary to understand the extent to which certain groups, such as young adults, participate in civil conflicts at the beginning stages of the conflict compared to other sub-sections of society.
The issue of participation in conflict has been researched to some extent. The literature covered has mostly argued that economic context could indeed have an influence on
participation in conflict. This participation could, rather than most rational-choice literature on participation would propose, be a result of emotions and identification with a cause rather than any selective incentives. These emotions could be a result of economic contexts, which generally tend to affect young adults more than other groups in society. These young adults could then be more likely to participate in civil conflict or be recruited into an armed group than other members of society.
Theoretical Framework
The main argument in this thesis thus concerns various dimensions and contexts affecting participation in conflict. Based on the literature reviewed above, I argue that subjective economic contexts will have a larger influence on participation in conflict than objective economic contexts. This would be a result of subjective economic contexts influencing emotions of citizens in society in a stronger manner than objective economic contexts. These emotions could then provide the incentives citizens need in order to start participating. I also will argue that changing economic contexts will have a stronger effect on participation in
conflict than structural economic hardships, as economic instability tends to give rise to conflict, whilst macro-level characteristics of a country also affect participation. Furthermore, young adults, I argue, will be more likely to participate in early stages of the conflict, as these groups are more likely to be strongly affected by changing circumstances and subjective economic contexts.
This thesis will thus argue that economic contexts, specifically subjective economic contexts and changing economic contexts, have an effect on the participation of young adults in civil conflict, through the mechanism of subjective and changing contexts influencing emotions, which, I argue, will give rise to participation, specifically in young adults.
Hypotheses
The main argument of this thesis will be tested using six hypotheses. These hypotheses will test each component of the argument: the effect of economic contexts, the effect of
availability, the effect of fluctuating economic contexts, the effect of macro-level country characteristics, the effect of subjective economic contexts, and the timing of when groups participate in conflict. In the following section, each hypothesis will be outlined using the literature covered above:
The first hypothesis aims to test the idea that economic contexts have an influence on participation in conflict, an idea proposed, among others, by Kurer et al. (2019) and
Humphreys and Weinstein (2008). This hypothesis supposes that economic circumstances can fuel discontent when this discontent is aggravated across society. Similarly, when the
economic circumstances of a significant group in society is affected, or when economic circumstances of a group differ significantly from another group, this can fuel discontent which could result in individuals participating in conflict. It could thus be hypothesized that weaker economic contexts result in an increase in the likelihood of participation in conflict. H1: Weaker economic contexts result in an increase in the likelihood of participation in conflict.
This hypothesis can be modeled as follows:
Economic Contexts Participation in Conflict
The second hypothesis aims to test the idea that participation in conflict is influenced by the availability of citizens. Research conducted by Collier and Hoeffler (2004) shows that higher enrollment rates in secondary education for young adult males decrease the likelihood of
participation in conflict. Similarly, Cincotta, Engelman and Anastasion (2003) hypothesize that the age group in society which enters the labour force are more likely to participate in conflict when economic contexts are weak. Similarly, Wu and Gerber (2017) argue that, aside from age, other characteristics can influence participation in conflict, such as having children or being married. Furthermore, interest in politics can also influence participation.
Thus, it could be that young adult males, as well as those who are interested in politics, are more likely to participate in conflict. As such, it could be hypothesized available citizens are more likely to participate in conflict than other members of society.
H2: Available citizens are more likely to participate in conflict than other groups in society.
This hypothesis can be modeled as follows:
Availability Participation in Conflict
The third hypothesis aims to test the idea that fluctuating economic contexts influence participation in a stronger manner than structural economic hardships. As Kurer et al. (2019) have argued, changing economic circumstances seems to raise political participation in society. The fluctuation of economic contexts, such as sharp decline in growth rates or high rates of inflation, could have a larger influence on the likelihood of participation in conflict than structurally low growth rates or inflation. Similarly, as Mobarak (2005) and Rodrik (1999) argue, economic instability could increase risks of domestic conflict which could increase the likelihood of participation in conflict. As such, it could be hypothesized that these fluctuating economic contexts have a stronger influence on the likelihood of participation in civil conflict than structural economic hardships.
H3: Fluctuating economic contexts are more likely to increase the likelihood of participation in conflict than structural economic hardships.
This hypothesis can be modeled as follows: Fluctuating Economic Contexts
Participation in Conflict Structural Hardships
The fourth hypothesis aims to test the influence of macro-level characteristics of a country on the likelihood of participation. As Humphreys and Weinstein (2008) argue, those living in rural areas are more likely to participate in conflict. Thus, when a country has a high percentage of citizens living in rural areas the likelihood of individuals participating in conflict could increase. Furthermore, this hypothesis also tests the idea that a youth bump can influence the likelihood of conflict. Cincotta, Engelman and Anastasion (2003) argue that countries with high proportions of young adults are more likely to experience conflict, as these groups enter the labour force. When this group is then unable to find work, this group is more likely to participate in conflict. Thus, the hypothesis argues that macro-level
characteristics of a country such as the rate of rural population and proportions of youth can influence the likelihood of participation in conflict.
H4: Macro-level characteristics have an influence of the likelihood of participation in conflict.
This hypothesis can be modeled as follows:
Macro-level characteristics Participation in Conflict
The fifth hypothesis aims to test the idea that subjective economic grievances impact participation in civil conflict in a stronger manner than objective economic grievances. As mentioned above, the distinction between subjective and objective economic grievances has not been made sufficiently in the literature. However, as Meier (2019) and Klandermans (2002) have pointed out, emotions are essential in understanding participation in conflict. As such, it could be hypothesized that subjective economic circumstances such as satisfaction with life or satisfaction with the financial situation could have a larger influence on
participation than objective economic circumstances, such as education or income scale.
H5: Subjective economic contexts have a stronger influence on likelihood of participation in conflict than objective economic contexts.
This hypothesis can be modeled as follows: Subjective Economic Contexts
Participation in Conflict Objective Economic Contexts
The sixth hypothesis aims to test the idea that young adults are more likely than other groups in society to participate in civil unrest in the beginning stages of the conflict. As Meier (2019), Cincotta, Engelman and Anastasion (2003), and Flückiger and Ludwig (2018) have shown, young adults are more likely to participate in civil conflict or be recruited to armed groups. Similarly, countries with a large proportion of young adults are more likely to experience civil conflict than countries with a smaller proportion of young adults. This increased likelihood could be tied to young adults, when faced with economic hardships, being unable to enter the labour force. The marginalization and unemployment of these young adults, tied to emotions playing a significant role for this group, could make these young adults more likely to participate in civil conflict. It is, however, yet unexplored at which stages groups are likely to participate. I hypothesize that, as young adults are more likely to participate in conflict and as large proportions of young adults increase the likelihood of conflict, young adults will participate at the beginning stages of conflict as they will have fewer barriers to entry than other groups in society. It could thus be hypothesized that young adults are more likely to participate in the beginning stages of civil conflict than other groups in society. I will, in this hypothesis, also make the distinction between young adult males and young adult females, as the literature mainly argues that males are more likely to participate in civil conflict.
H6: Young adults are more likely to participate in the beginning stages of conflict than other groups in society.
This hypothesis can be modeled as follows:
Biographical Availability
Stage of Conflict Participation in Conflict
Thus, this research will focus on the effects of economic circumstances on the participation of citizens in civil conflict. The research question for this thesis is thus “to what extent do
economic contexts have an influence on participation in civil unrest?” The hypotheses outlined above can be analyzed using a multi-method analysis, which will be detailed in a subsequent section. First, however, I will detail the cases which will be used to collect the data upon which the analysis is based. The selection of these cases will be detailed in the following section.
Data and Methodology
Data
These hypotheses will be explored through a multitude of cases, rather than focus on a single case. Although much of the literature covered in the section above have focused on a single case to make their arguments and present their theories, Cincotta, Engelman and Anastasion (2003) have shown that the higher chance of participation of young adults in conflict is a global phenomenon. Across countries in the Americas, Asia and Africa, high proportions of youth in the population result in higher chances of civil conflict. Thus, it would be more representative of the situation to use a large-n study rather than focus on a single case.
For my micro-level data, I will utilize the World Values Survey (World Values Survey n.d.), which has been conducted in waves since 1981. This survey is centered on the values of its respondents and contains questions regarding economic values, faith in policies, hopes, personal economic circumstances and political participation. As such I will be able to use the data from this survey to research the effect of micro-level, subjective and objective economic circumstances on participation. The data which will be used are the responses to this survey in the waves from 1990 to 2004, which coincides with the second, third and fourth wave of the survey. The first wave (conducted from 1981-1984) is exempted as there is a 6 year gap between the first and second wave. The later waves of the survey (2004-2014) are also exempted as the case selection used only has data until 2004. For my macro-level data, I will utilize datasets from the World Bank. This data is centered on macro-level economic
circumstances, such as unemployment rates and GDP percentages. This data will be collected for the countries participating in each wave of the World Values Survey. This data, when connected to the data gathered from the World Values Survey, will be used to research the effect of macro-level and objective economic circumstances on participation. As is the case for the micro-level data, this data has been gathered for the period of 1990 to 2004. The combination of these two sets of data results in 110.954 observations.
Furthermore, I will use a content analysis using newspaper articles in order to map the extent to which young adults participated in conflict at the beginning stages. Specifically, I will use the countries listed in the SPEED Program (Social, Political and Economic Event Data) from the University of Illinois (Cline Center n.d.). This program has coded newspaper articles since the end of the second World War until 2004 in order to map civil conflict in the form of demonstrations, protests, wars and coup d’états across the globe. I will use conflicts in the SPEED Program between 1990 and 2004 which lasted at least 14 days, in order to
accurately indicate the beginning and ending stages of the conflict. This leaves 4.786
observations. Then, I will make a random selection of conflicts, as identified by the data from the SPEED Program, and use newspaper articles from the New York Times covering the conflicts, in order to map the participation of young adults. I will then use the MaxQDA program to analyze the articles.
Methodology
As mentioned above, this thesis will make use of a quantitative analysis using both
quantitative and qualitative data. This analysis is used in order to fully be able to understand the research question posed in this thesis. A combination of quantitative and qualitative data will avoid some of the pitfalls of analysis previously used in literature reviewed in the section above. This literature generally focuses on a single dimension which can explain participation in conflict, such as education, age or income. However, these dimensions all only explain a portion of why individuals choose to participate in a civil conflict. Thus, it is necessary to combine multiple dimensions into a single analysis, as this ensures that the separate
influences of each dimension on participation can be analyzed. Furthermore, a quantitative analysis as used here allows for testing the hypothesis on a large scale. As argued above, I believe that the determinants of participation are largely similar across the globe, as well as the characteristics of the participants themselves. Using a large-n analysis using data gathered on a global scale thus ensures that this can be analyzed. The qualitative section on the other hand ensures the possibility of researching a previously overlooked question of ‘when do people participate in conflict?’ The quantitative data alone would not be able to answer this question, hence the qualitative section is added.
The methods used in this thesis ensure that the research will be both externally and internally valid. The large-n study, with data gathered on a global level, means that the results of this thesis can, to a large extent, be generalized, which increases the external validity. The internal validity is ensured by the data. A large part of the data is gathered from survey questions and macro-level sources, which measure characteristics and macro-level contexts. The internal validity is limited to a slight extent, however, by the measurement of the willingness to participate in a conflict. As the survey data only measures the extent to which an individual would consider participating in a conflict, it cannot ensure that these individuals would participate should a conflict occur. Furthermore, the measurement of the willingness to participate in conflict uses proxies of conflict. Survey data which measures other proxies of conflict, such as conflicts of a more violent nature, could result in other conclusions.
As for the ethical issues raised by this literature, a case could be made that more knowledge on those who participate in civil conflict could limit protests and demonstrations in the future. Should repressive governments have more insight on the characteristics of participants, which could be gathered from this thesis, they could have more of an opportunity to limit conflict through protests or demonstrations. These issues could raise ethnical concerns around this thesis. There is, however, no indication that the methods and methodology of this thesis, or the data gathered for the analysis, could raise ethical concerns. This is a result of the ways in which the data is gathered, through anonymous, voluntary surveys and macro-level data from government sources and other reputable, internationally recognized sources. The quantitative data will be used to research the first five hypotheses of this thesis and will consist of two components: a micro-level component and a macro-level component. The qualitative data will be used to research the sixth hypothesis. Both sections of data will be elaborated upon in the following section. I can now detail the variables taken from this data which will be used to test the hypotheses of this thesis. The first five hypotheses can be tested using the quantitative data.
The dependent variable which will be used in the quantitative section is participation in political action. The World Values Survey categorizes political action in three separate actions: occupy buildings and factories, join an unlawful strike, and attend a lawful demonstration. These responses will be used as proxies for participation in conflict. These responses to the questions are then coded by the World Values Survey in three categories where 1 stands for ‘have done so’, 2 stands for ‘might do so’, and 3 stands for ‘would never do’. The missings are coded as ‘.’.
The independent variable for the first hypothesis is economic contexts. This variable has been operationalized as consisting of three separate indicators, measured and coded by the World Values Survey, unless otherwise indicated:
The first indicator is employment. This indicator measures the kind of employment of the respondent. This indicator is coded as 1 indicating ‘>30 hours a week’, 2 indicating ‘<30 hours a week’, 3 indicating ‘self-employment’, 4 indicating ‘retired’, 5 indicating
‘housewife’, 6 indicating ‘student’, 7 indicating ‘unemployed’, and 8 indicating ‘other’. The missings are coded as ‘.’.
The second indicator is highest level of education attained. This indicator measures the highest level of education the respondent has enjoyed. This indicator is coded as 1 indicating ‘none’, 2 indicating ‘less than primary school’, 3 indicating ‘primary school’, 4
indicating ‘less than secondary technical school’, 5 indicating ‘secondary technical school’, 6 indicating ‘less than secondary university preparatory school’, 7 indicating ‘secondary
university preparatory school’, 8 indicating ‘some university education’, and 9 indicating ‘university degree’. The missings are coded as ‘.’.
The third indicator is scale of incomes. This indicator measures the subjective level of income as indicated by the respondent on a scale of 1-10. The indicator is coded as 1
indicating ‘lowest scale’ and 10 indicating ‘highest scale’. The missings are coded as ‘.’.
The second hypothesis adds availability to the first model. The operationalization of
availability is taken from the analysis of Wu and Gerber (2017), who indicate age, gender and interest in politics as variables indicating availability. These variables are operationalized using the following three indicators, all measured and coded by the World Values Survey, unless otherwise indicated:
The first indicator is age. This indicator measures the age of the respondent. The indicator age has been coded from 16 to 99 years old. This variable has been recoded into six separate groups. This indicator is coded as 1 indicating ’16-24 years old’, 2 indicating ’25-34 years old’, 3 indicating ’35-44 years old’, 4 indicating ’45-54 years old’, 5 indicating ’55-64 years old’, and 6 indicating ’65-99 years old’. The missings are coded as ‘.’.
The second indicator is gender. This indicator measures the gender of the respondent. The indicator has been coded as 0 indicating ‘female’ and 2 indicating ‘male’, which is recoded from the original coding of the World Values Survey. The missings are coded as ‘.’.
The third indicator is interest in politics. This indicator measures the interest the respondent has in the political system. This indicator is coded as 1 indicating ‘very
interested’, 2 indicating ‘some interest’, 3 indicating ‘not very interested’, and 4 indicating ‘not at all interested’. The missings are coded as ‘.’.
The independent variables of fluctuating economic contexts and structural hardships can be operationalized as follows. All variables are measured on a macro-level and are taken from the World Bank. The macro-level variables are measured as the mean of the variable during the wave of the survey in which the respondent participated.
Fluctuating economic contexts can be operationalized by measuring the volatility in economic contexts. As the hypotheses state that fluctuation can have a significant impact, the variation of the variables has been taken into consideration. To do so, the standard deviation will be used, as this measured volatility (Badinger 2010: 10). A standard deviation larger than one is seen as volatile (idem: 17). In order to measure fluctuating economic contexts, I will
make use of the indicator GDP volatility. This indicator is measured as GDP per capita growth in annual percentages. The coding of this variable has been done by the World Bank, whilst I will calculate the standard deviation using in order to measure volatility.
The second indicating measuring fluctuating economic contexts is the unemployment volatility. As is the case for the volatility in the growth rate, the unemployment rate, measured as percentage of the labour force, is coded by the World Bank. After which, I have calculated the standard deviation in order to measure the volatility of the unemployment rate.
Furthermore, volatility in inflation could increase the risk of conflict (Judson and Orphanides 1999; Fatás and Mihov 2013). Whether or not inflation is high generally depends on the country in question. For example, the European Union aims for an inflation lower or equal to 2%, whilst the West African Monetary Zone aims for an inflation lower than 10% (Qureshi and Tsangarides 2008: 214). However, whilst this indicator seems to be important to explain participation in conflict, data on inflation rates in the period which this thesis covers is limited. As such, I have decided not to include inflation rates, as well as current account volatility which has a similar problem, in this analysis.
In order to measure structural economic hardships, I have used the GDP and the unemployment rate. Both of these indicators are measured by the World Bank. However, rather than calculate the volatility, as is the case for the fluctuation, this variable uses the mean of the GDP rate and the unemployment rate for each country in a particular wave in order to measure the structural economic hardships of citizens living in these countries. The fourth hypothesis measures the influence of macro-level country characteristics. This variable is composed of two indicators. Both indicators are measured and coded by the World Bank. As is the case for the previous hypothesis, the variables are measured as the mean during the wave of the survey in which the respondent participated.
The first indicator measuring macro-level country characteristics is the rural population. This indicator measures the percentage of the population living in rural areas.
The second indicator is the youth proportion. This indicator measures the percentage of the population that is between 16 and 24 years old. This indicator is separated into the percentage of young adult women and the percentage of young adult men, operationalized as proportion youth female and proportion youth male.
The fifth hypothesis analyzes the effects of the subjectivity of economic contexts on participation in conflict. The variable of subjective economic contexts is composed of two indicators, which both measure the satisfaction of a respondent with a particular facet of their
lives. Both indicators are coded by the World Values Survey.
The first indicator is satisfaction with your life. This indicator measures the subjective satisfaction of the respondent with their lives in general, including their employment and their overall happiness on a scale of 1 to 10. This indicator is coded as 1 indicating ‘dissatisfied’ and 10 indicating ‘satisfied’. The missings are coded as ‘.’. This variable is added, in addition to the indicator measuring satisfaction with the financial situation, as this variable also
measures satisfaction with other contexts than income, such as education level or employment or work situation.
The second indicator is satisfaction with financial situation of the household. This indicator measures the subjective satisfaction of the respondent with the financial situation of their households on a scale of 1 to 10. This indicator is coded as 1 indicating ‘dissatisfied’ and 10 indicating ‘satisfied’. The missings are coded as ‘.’.
The quantitative data used in this section of the analysis will be analyzed using an ordered logistic regression, as the dependent variables, willingness to participate in conflict using various means, are ordered variables.
The second component of the quantitative analysis will concern qualitative data. This analysis aims to test the sixth hypothesis of this thesis, which hypothesizes that young adults are more likely to participate in civil conflict at the beginning stages of the conflict than other groups in society. Text as data has been used as the quantitative data does not distinguish at which stage of the conflict individuals have participated. Qualitative data, which allows to separate in time, will be able to provide this data, which can be used to test the sixth hypothesis.
The dependent variable in this hypothesis is the presence of youth in conflict. This variable can be operationalized by analyzing participants of conflict using newspaper articles. These articles will be taken from the New York Times, as well as local newspapers where possible, using the LexisUni program. First, I will select 15 random cases of conflict from the SPEED Program. Then, I will be able to analyze articles written during these conflicts using the MAXQDA Program. These articles are selected using the precise start-date and end-data as indicated in the SPEED Program. Then, I will be able to code these articles in order to map the participants of the conflicts. This mapping will be done using the following codes: youth, young, young adults, students, university, college, schools, and youth unemployment. These codes have been chosen as they represent the who (youth, young, young adults, students), where (university, college, schools), and the why (youth unemployment) of youth
participation in conflict. As Franzosi (1990) argues, a semantic grammar allows the coding of information from textual sources. A semantic grammar, or the particular structure and
hierarchy of information, assumes that actions are related to individuals, which are in turn connected to characteristics such as time or place. For this case, actions, i.e. participating in conflict, are related to individuals, i.e. students and young adults. These actions are then connected to characteristics, i.e. university campuses or motivation of youth unemployment. Coding the ‘who’, ‘where’ and ‘why’ of student participation in conflict thus would give an accurate representation of the concept of student participation as represented in textual, qualitative sources such as newspapers. The variable is then coded as the number of times young adults are mentioned in articles covering each stage of a conflict.
The coding scheme used to code the newspaper articles will be revised, and when necessary adjusted, during the process of coding.
The independent variable in this hypothesis is the stage of conflict This variable will be operationalized in three sections: the beginning stage, the middle stage, and the ending stage. These stages will be coded using the start-dates and end-dates of the conflict as indicated by the SPEED Program. Then, I will be able to divide the conflict into the three stages in order to code the variable, where a code of 1 will indicate ‘beginning stage’, 2 will indicate ‘middle stage’, and 3 will indicate ‘ending stage’. Each stage has approximately the same number of days.
I will also control for various indicators. I will first control for the amount of articles analyzed in each stage, operationalized as frequency, which is measured by the number of pages in order to also take into account the length of the articles.
I will also control for each particular conflict as it is possible that the country or the timeframe affected the participation of youth, operationalized as conflict. This variable includes conflicts occurring in the same country in different years, which is indicated in the coding. This variable is coded as 1 indicating ‘Argentina’, 2 indicating ‘Bolivia 1996’, 3 indicating ‘Bolivia 1995’, 4 indicating ‘Bulgaria’, 5 indicating ‘India’, 6 indicating ‘Iraq’, 7 indicating ‘Ireland’, 8 indicating ‘Israel’, 9 indicating ‘South Korea’, 10 indicating
‘Madagascar’, 11 indicating ‘Serbia’, 12 indicating ‘United States 2003’, 13 indicating ‘United States 1998’, 14 indicating ‘United States 1991’, and 15 indicating ‘Zimbabwe’.
I will lastly control for the type of conflict, operationalized as type. This variable is coded as 1 indicating ‘Boycott’, 2 indicating ‘Uprising’, 3 indicating ‘Rally’, 4 indicating
‘Strike’, 5 indicating ‘Riots’, 6 indicating ‘Demonstration’, 7 indicating ‘March’, 8 indicating ‘Multiple conflicts’, 9 indicating ‘Protest’, and 10 indicating ‘No Conflict Reported’.
The data will be analyzed using a Poisson-test, as the depending variable in this model, youth presence, is a count-variable.1
This quantitative analysis will thus composed of two sections of data, a quantitative section composing of micro-level and macro-level data, and a qualitative section, composed of text as data. The analysis can then be used to test the hypotheses outlined in the section above, which in turn will allow answering the research question posed in this thesis. The results and the analysis will follow in the next section.
1
Results and Analysis
Results
The first models will test the first five hypotheses. The dependent variables in these models are the willingness to occupy a building, join a strike, and join a demonstration. The
independent variables in this model are employment, highest level of education attained, scale of income, age, gender, interest in politics, GDP volatility, unemployment volatility, GDP, unemployment rate, rural population, proportion of young women, proportion of young men, satisfaction with life and satisfaction with finances of the household. Each model is controlled for the country of the respondent and the wave in which the survey took place. The results of the models are presented in Table 1 below.
Table 1. Willingness to Participate in Conflict
VARIABLES Occupy Strike Demonstration
Wave (Reference: 1990-1994)
1995-1998 -1.068*** -0.608*** -0.720***
(0.0903) (0.0618) (0.0515)
1999-2004 -1.549*** -0.961*** -0.668***
(0.129) (0.0834) (0.0677)
Employment (Reference: >30 hours a week)
< 30 hours a week -0.118*** -0.105*** -0.0391 (0.0382) (0.0300) (0.0251) Self-Employed 0.00215 0.106*** 0.0885*** (0.0365) (0.0296) (0.0232) Retired 0.270*** 0.231*** 0.164*** (0.0549) (0.0407) (0.0301) Housewife 0.234*** 0.401*** 0.419*** (0.0423) (0.0327) (0.0242) Student -0.238*** -0.0795** -0.0704** (0.0417) (0.0347) (0.0287) Unemployed -0.124*** -0.0363 0.0593** (0.0355) (0.0291) (0.0236) Other 0.0495 0.117* 0.0661 (0.0785) (0.0598) (0.0476)
Highest educational level attained -0.0195*** -0.0543*** -0.108***
(0.00528) (0.00423) (0.00332)
Scale of incomes 0.0192*** -0.00575 -0.0150***
(0.00492) (0.00392) (0.00315) Age (Reference: 16-24)
