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And its impact on Kosovo’s relations with Serbia and the EUSupervisor: Dr. Mike Medeiros Second Reader: Dr. Jana Krause Master Thesis Political Science: International Relations Civil Conflicts June 2020
Abstract
The electoral victory of left-wing Albanian nationalist party Vetëvendosje – and consequently its first introduction to the government – constituted a significant change in Kosovo’s partisan landscape, after two decades of right-wing war veteran leadership. This research examined the impact of this change on Kosovo’s relations with Serbia and the European Union (EU). The ties between Kosovo and Serbia are relevant, because an unresolved conflict remains between the two after the Battle of Kosovo in 1998. Serbia to date does not recognize Kosovo’s independence and as a result ethnic tensions persist. Kosovo depends on the EU, as the EU supervises in Kosovo, contributes high levels of funding, and Kosovo has ambitions for EU membership. The
normalization of relations with Serbia through an EU-facilitated dialogue is a membership requirement, but the dialogue has been stalled since 2018. The change in Kosovo’s partisan landscape is illustrated by the rise of nationalist party Vetëvendosje, therefore the literature reviews nationalism in Kosovo and finds that ethno-nationalism was important to the outbreak of the Yugoslav wars, including the Battle of Kosovo in 1998, where ancient national myths, a charismatic leader and feelings of relative deprivation facilitated effective Serbian and Albanian national mobilization. The recent change in Kosovo’s partisan landscape, with Vetëvendosje’s government debut, shows the prevalence of similar ethno-national phenomena to those that contributed to outbreak of the Battle of Kosovo. Albin Kurti, the leader of Vetëvendosje, is a charismatic leader, with a distinct irredentist and populist, anti-establishment rhetoric, and was generally outspoken against Serbia and the EU in the past. Therefore, the change in Kosovo’s partisan landscape was expected to negatively impact Kosovo’s relations with Serbia and the EU. By means of a content analysis of newspaper articles and policy documents, in addition to
interviews with EU experts on Kosovo, this research found that the change in Kosovo’s partisan landscape positively impacted Kosovo’s relations with the EU, but did not significantly impact Kosovo’s relations with Serbia. Kurti maintained good ties with the EU and showed commitment to EU-facilitated dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia. Serbia’s President Aleksandar Vučić did not reciprocate Kurti’s commitment to the dialogue, as Kurti did not meet Serbia’s requirements. A divergence in the EU’s and United States’ (US) foreign policy approaches, fostered the
escalation of a rivalry between Kosovo’s President Hashim Thaçi, and Albin Kurti, when the US backed Thaçi and played an instrumental role in the vote of no-confidence against Kurti, that resulted in the fall of his government after two months in office.
Table of Contents Abstract………1 Table of Contents……….2 1. Introduction………..4 2. Literature Review……….8 2.1 Ethno-Nationalism Defined………8 2.1.1 Primordialism………...8 2.1.2 Constructivism………..9 2.1.3 Social developmentalism………10 2.1.4 Historical Ethno-symbolism.………..11
2.2 Nationalism & Conflict……….12
2.2.1 Ancient Ethnic Hatreds………...12
2.2.2 Relative Deprivation/Grievances Theory...………13
2.2.3 Economic Resentment………14
2.3 Nationalism & Conflict in Kosovo – Battle of Kosovo 1998-99………..15
2.3.1 Run-up to the Battle of Kosovo (1998-99)……….15
2.3.2 Ancient myths, charismatic leaders and national mobilization………..15
2.3.3 Milošević & Kosovo Polje……….16
2.3.4 Skenderbeg……….17
2.3.5 Competition, Exclusion and Relative Deprivation……….17
2.4 Nationalism, Populism & Party Politics………18
2.4.1 Populism ………18
2.4.2 Party politics ………..19
2.5 Case Presentation ……….21
2.5.1 Aftermath of the war and UN-protectorate 1999-2008.……….21
2.5.2 2008-now: “independence”………22
2.5.3 Kosovo & the EU...………23
2.5.4 Kosovo & Serbia………24
2.5.5 Kosovo now: a lack of development..………25
2.5.6 Levizja Vetëvendosje!..………..26
2.5.7 Vetëvendosje’s electoral success………29
2.5.8 Fall of the government………30
2.6 Research Gap.………30
2.6.1 Research case..………32
3. Theoretical Framework...………32
3.2 The importance of ancient myths…..………35
3.3 Feelings of relative deprivation…….………36
3.4 Hypotheses………37
4. Data….………38
4.1 Data collection...………38
4.2 Coding of the data……….40
4.3 Data Analysis...……… 41
5. Results………42
5.1 Results Serbia-Kosovo Relations……..………43
5.1.1 Kurti’s view on Serbia 2015-2020……..………44
5.1.2 Vučić’s view on Kosovo 2018-2020..………46
5.1.3 Results interviews Serbia-Kosovo relations…...………50
5.1.4 Summary results Serbia-Kosovo relations….………51
5.2 Results EU-Kosovo Relations………...………52
5.2.1 Kurti’s view on the EU 2015-2020……….53
5.2.2 EU’s view on Kosovo: Progress Reports 2015-2019……….56
5.2.3 EU’s view on Kosovo: DG-NEAR & High Representative Borrell 2020..………57
5.2.4 EU’s view on Kosovo: EU’s general enlargement policy..………58
5.2.5 Results interviews EU-Kosovo relations………59
5.2.6 Summary results EU-Kosovo relations…..………60
5.3 Results Kurti’s General Rhetoric…..………61
5.3.1 Results content analysis Kurti’s general rhetoric 2015-2020.………61
5.3.2 Results interviews Kurti’s general rhetoric………62
5.3.3 Summary results Kurti’s general rhetoric……...………65
6. Conclusion………..………65
Bibliography………...………70
Sources Content Analysis……...………77
Appendix A: Interview Questionnaire………86
Kosovo’s Changing Partisan Landscape
And its impact on Kosovo’s relations with Serbia and the EU
Introduction
“Jo negociata vetëvendosje!”1, says the Albanian writing on the wall behind the Bill Clinton
statue on Bill Clinton Boulevard in Pristina, Kosovo2. In English this translates to “no negotiations, self-determination!”, which is the main slogan of the left-wing, nationalist opposition party Vetëvendosje (Aruqaj 2012). The slogan expresses the resentment against the international actors in Kosovo that have been negotiating over Kosovo’s status without the input of Kosovars themselves, ever since the war ended in 1999 (Wintour 2019). The United States (US) played a key role in Kosovo’s independence, initiating the NATO bombardment of Serbia and recognizing Kosovo’s independence from the start, therefore the placement of this slogan behind Bill Clinton in a photo from 2018 is not surprising (Kakissis 2018, “Albin Kurti's journey (…)” 2019). Two years later, however, the context has changed drastically, setting this photo in an different light. This is all due to the recent change in Kosovo’s partisan landscape.
In the 2019 elections, Vetëvendosje won, for the first time, with the young centre-right Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) coming in second place (Wintour 2019, “Former Student Protest (…)” 2019). Consequently, Vetëvendosje formed a government, with the leader of Vetëvendosje, Albin Kurti, as the new Prime Minister, and the runner-up LDK as coalition partner (“Kosovo President Mandates (…)” 2020, Wintour 2019, Walker 2020). Vetëvendosje’s first election win showed that people in Kosovo were fed up with the former political elite (“Former Student Protest (…)” 2019). Governed by war veterans who have been accused of corruption and war crimes, Kosovo has not seen much progress in terms of its economic
development, quality of education, health care, and employment (“Former Student Protest (…)” 2019, Gray & Heath 2018, “Kosovo Center-Right (…)” 2017, Smith 2019, Wintour 2019). Kosovo declared independence in 2008, but is not recognized globally, which means that it still faces a lot of issues, in particular its unresolved conflict with Serbia, that still considers Kosovo to be a part of Serbia (Russell 2019, p. 1, Wintour 2019, Apelblat 2020, “Former Student Protest
1 Refers to the cover photo of this thesis.
2 Any reference to Kosovo as a country is without prejudice on its status. When talking about Kosovo or Pristina, I
refer to the government that resides in Pristina and calls itself the government of the Republic of Kosovo. When talking about Serbia or Belgrade, I refer to the government of the Republic of Serbia, that resides in Belgrade.
(…)” 2019). A dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia, facilitated by the European Union (EU) as part of its EU membership trajectory, booked some successes in the past years, but stalled at the end of 2018, failing to produce a substantial solution to the conflict, and it has not officially been reopened since (Wintour 2019, Apelblat 2020).
During its time in opposition, Vetëvendosje was extremely vocal against the
establishment, the EU and Serbia (Vardari-Kesler 2012, Skendaj 2014, Delauney 2015, Yabanci 2016, Fazliu 2019). Starting out as a social movement, Vetëvendosje has been keen on using radical means such as throwing tear gas in parliament and organizing protests in order to make their point (Smith 2019, “Former Student Protest (…)” 2019). With their Albanian nationalist, irredentist and leftist politics, outspoken against Serbia, the EU and Kosovo’s political
establishment of war veterans, Vetëvendosje’s government debut constituted a massive change in Kosovo’s partisan landscape, compared to the right-wing, corrupt war veteran governments of the past decade (Vardari-Kesler 2012, Skendaj 2014, Delauney 2015, Yabanci 2016, Fazliu 2019, “Former Student Protest (…)” 2019, Gray & Heath 2018, “Kosovo Center-Right (…)” 2017, Smith 2019, Wintour 2019). By means of scholarship on populism and party politics, the political rise of Vetëvendosje, leading to the change in Kosovo’s partisan landscape, is further clarified, as the case is presented (Yabanci 2016).
When looking at existing scholarship on nationalism in Kosovo, ethnic nationalism – both Albanian and Serbian nationalism – played an important role in the outbreak of the Balkan wars and the Battle of Kosovo in the 1990s (Bieber 2002, Harzl 2011, Hilton Saggau 2019, Lindemann & Wimmer 2018). The conflict between Serbia and Kosovar Albanians over Kosovo’s territory, has not been resolved when the war ended, therefore a dormant conflict remains, with tensions flaring up from time to time – a status quo that is not tenable on the long-term (Russell 2019). Considering the potency of ethnic nationalism for political mobilization and the link between nationalism and conflict, as made evident in the literature on the topic, the question is how this change in Kosovo’s partisan landscape, after Vetëvendosje’s election win, signifying a rise of Albanian nationalism, impacted Kosovo’s relations with Serbia and the EU. Will Kurti’s nationalist, irredentist stance, and negativity towards Serbia, deteriorate Kosovo’s ties with Serbia even further? Will it revive Kosovo’s dormant conflict with Serbia and increase ethnic tensions? With Kurti’s critical attitude towards the EU and its missions in Kosovo, will Kurti’s Prime Ministership impede Kosovo’s EU membership trajectory and reconciliation process?
In order answer these questions, this research looks at literature on ethno-nationalism. Even though there has been a lot of research on this, in the Balkans as well, most of it relates to the war (Bieber 2002, Harzl 2011, Dyrstad 2012, Dyrstad, Ellingsen, & Rød 2015, Hilton Saggau 2019, Lindemann & Wimmer 2018). While there are some studies regarding Vetëvendosje’s journey in Kosovo’s politics, this change in Kosovo’s partisan landscape is so recent that there has not been any research on this topic specifically. Kosovo’s case is particularly interesting due to the fact that it is a very young country that is still recovering from the war two decades ago, with the conflict still unresolved, and international authorities supervising its governance
(Vardari-Kesler 2012, Russell 2019, “Former Student Protest (…)” 2019). Considering Kosovo’s geopolitical importance, located in the EU’s backyard, this international involvement is likely to remain, especially since the US under Trump has been increasingly involved in diplomacy in Kosovo (Judah 2008, Kingsley 2020).
At the time of the Battle of Kosovo, there were several theories important to the rise of nationalism and the outbreak of conflict – the relevance of ancient myths, charismatic irredentist political leadership, and feelings of relative deprivation (Bieber 2002, Harzl 2011, Hilton Saggau 2019, Gurr 1993, Cederman, Wimmer & Min 2010, Dyrstad 2012). I argue that these theories are applicable to Kosovo after the change in its partisan landscape, and that their combination has the potential to fuel ethnic tensions and spark violence. Therefore I expect that the change in
Kosovo’s partisan landscape, signified by the rise of irredentist and anti-establishment party Vetëvendosje, will be detrimental to Kosovo’s relations with Serbia and the EU.
By means of a content analysis of newspaper articles and policy documents, as well as semi-structured interviews with EU experts on Kosovo, I have found that Prime Minister Albin Kurti’s, President of Serbia Aleksandar Vučić’s and the EU’s opinions have changed over the years, thereby impacting the dynamics between them. Kurti has changed from being a radical nationalist to being a pragmatic left-winger, who is accommodating to governing and slowly learning to compromise, though some of his opinions remain unchanged. Whereas the EU condemned Vetëvendosje’s radical politics when they were in opposition, it recognizes Kurti’s willingness to progress EU integration and continue Kosovo’s membership trajectory as Prime Minister, including reopening the dialogue with Serbia, as a welcome change from the former political elite. The impact of Kosovo’s changing partisan landscape on its relations with the EU is thus positive.
President Vučić of Serbia has moved away from the EU in the past years, warming up to Russia and China, and recently also the US. Though initially he was engaged in the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia and committed to Serbia’s EU membership trajectory, recently he has sought to advance Serbia’s economy through deals with China and the US, with critics
accusing him of taking an increasingly authoritarian path. Regardless of Kurti’s shift from a focus on ethnic issues to more inclusive left-wing politics, as well as his commitment to the dialogue, Vučić has not reopened the dialogue. In this sense, the changing partisan landscape has not really impacted Kosovo’s relations with Serbia. Although, this might be attributed to Vučić rather than to Kurti.
The US is looking for a quick foreign policy success in Kosovo and has found allies in Vučić and war veteran Hashim Thaçi, the President of Kosovo. Under US facilitation, Kosovo’s and Serbia’s Presidents have improved their relations through talks, while Kosovo’s government, in the person of Kurti, was left out of this conversation, as was the EU. Even though in previous years, the EU and the US were generally working together in Kosovo, the US’s aggressive political pressure on Kosovo’s government, rushed by the ambition to achieve a quick foreign policy success, led to the fall of the government in a vote of no-confidence. The EU stated the need for a stable government, and condemned the vote of no-confidence leading to the dismissal of the new, democratically-elected government, especially in times of the COVID-19 crisis.
The thesis first discusses general theory on ethnic nationalism. Second, it explores the link between ethnic nationalism and conflict. Third, the research examines the role of ethnic
nationalism in the Balkan Wars and the Battle of Kosovo in particular. Fourth, scholarship on populism and party politics in relation to nationalism will be discussed. Fifth, the case will be presented, by exploring ethnic nationalism, populism and party politics in Kosovo after the war, using the rise of the left-wing, nationalist political party Vetëvendosje as a starting point. Sixth, the research moves on to the theoretical framework, applying theory on ancient myths, relative deprivation and charismatic leadership to the current situation in Kosovo with a rise of
nationalism illustrated by Vetëvendosje’s election win. Seventh, the research discusses the data and the methodology used. Finally, the results of the content analysis and interviews covering the period of 2015 until 2020 are discussed, starting with the impact of Kosovo’s changing partisan landscape on Serbia-Kosovo relations, followed by its impact on the relations between the EU and Kosovo, and finally its impact on Kurti’s general rhetoric.
Literature Review
Ethno-Nationalism Defined
As this paper researches the changing partisan landscape in Kosovo, illustrated by a rise of ethno-nationalism, I first discuss different paradigms relating to ethno-ethno-nationalism, in order to see what ethno-nationalism means according to existing scholarship.
Primordialism
The first strand of literature discussing nationalism is primordialism. Primordialists regard nations as entities that have pre-historic foundations (Coakley 2018, p. 332-335, Smith 2000, p. 2). A proneness to one particular national characteristic is genetically or culturally reproduced, enabling the stability of nationalisms over time (Coakley 2018, p. 334-335). A genetic
understanding claims that ethnicity and nationalism are reproduced through individual genes, generating a proneness to a certain type of nationalism and selective behavior towards others that is aimed at optimizing the compatibility of the individuals within a certain group (Smith 2000, p. 2). The cultural understanding within primordialism argues that it is actually specific ethno-cultural attachments that reproduce the same primordial foundations of nations and nationalisms throughout time (Harzl 2011, p. 61-62, Smith 2000, p. 2). These ethno-cultural attachments include blood relations or extended family or kin, as well as a common language, land, religion or race, but also as narratives and myths, that due to their link with the emotional, non-rational and communal sphere, are highly valued by the people within the community, as they generate a sense of safety and belonging (Connor 1993, Coakley 2018, p. 335, Harzl 2011, p. 61-62, Smith 2000, p. 2).
In this way, cultural attachments produce a type of ethnic loyalty that generates powerful group attachments and is incredibly strong and consistent over generations, thereby ensuring the recreation of the nation and nationalism with the same primordial foundations (Harzl 2011, p. 62, Coakley 2018, p. 335). These ethno-cultural attachment, such as kinship or common myths, do not need to have a factual basis, rather they can be fabricated – as long as there is a subjective conviction that these ethno-cultural attachments are what separates a certain ethnic group and nationalism, there is enough emotive power to generate strong national loyalties (Muller 2008). Though the idea of lasting ethno-cultural attachments is disputed in the literature, it does make
primordialism a useful theory to explain why people are willing to sacrifice so much in defending these genetic or cultural attachments that form the basis of their nationalism (Smith 2000, p. 2, Harzl 2011, p. 62). Moreover, it helps to explain the power and potency of nationalism as a mobilization tool (Connor 1993).
Primordialists can also be perennialists. Perennialists argue that all existing nationalisms have to be a product of perennial nations, as they find “some evidence of movements similar to nations and nationalism in premodern times (Kerr 2019, p. 104, Coakley 2018, p. 332-334). Within perennialism, there are two main understandings of nations. The first thinks about nations as being ancient and fixed, stable in their essence and ideology throughout time (Smith 2000, p. 3). The second understanding within perennialism, is that nations are reoccurring throughout time – they arrive and they leave over and over again (Smith 2000, p. 3). Though the characteristics of nations and their nationalisms remain the same over time, there is a variety in their spread and popularity depending on the time period.
Constructivism
The second approach to ethnonationalism is constructivism – also known as constructionism – as both terms are used interchangeably (Coakley 2018, p. 333-334). Constructivism is a modernist theory that considers ethnicity to be a socially constructed phenomenon, that develops with time based on the circumstances, and evolves into a new ethnic identity with different distinctions (Harzl 2011, p. 62). The nation then, is also a social construct, or a product of imagination. Social differences, like language, are important to many national frameworks and are used to distinguish between different ethnicities and nations (Harzl 2011, p. 62).
Gagnon (1995) argues how political leaders can construct ethnonational concepts to unify the population and generate national mobilization (p. 132). The population will focus on this one identity, strengthening in-group attitudes, and diminishing individual, varying opinions among the population. The process is fueled by the identification of a common ethnic threat. The result of reducing individual contributions by framing politics as one major ethnic group interest is less domestic political opposition and increased popularity domestically – very beneficial to political elites who seek to secure their power and position (Gagnon 1995, p. 132).
Constructivism in the context of nationalism and modernism has become particularly known through the works of Anderson and Hobsbawm, who look at capitalism as a driver of the
rise of literacy among cultures, that created homogeneity and pointed to language as a common denominator of culture, paving the way for the construction of a national identity (Smith 2000, p. 8, Delanty & O’Mahony 2002, p. 32-33). Within the modernization process, Hobsbawm
particularly points to the nation was a convenient instrument of social control over a capitalist society (Smith 2000, p. 8). Constructing a national identity through the concoction of symbols and myths produced a novel sense of community under the masses, which helped elite overcome “the need for elites to control the newly enfranchised masses in an era of popular mobilisation and democratization” (ibid, p. 8).
Anderson, however, argues that these constructed symbols and myths inherent to the rise of modern nationalism, require common drivers that are grounded in history, such as language, to legitimize that together they make up a specific a national identity (ibid, p. 8). The rise of printing and books was pivotal to the spread of these common drivers, as it allowed people to imagine a nation through language and history (Delanty & O’Mahony 2002, p. 32-33). Rooted in fabricated historical symbolism, nationalisms were able to foster the establishment of what Anderson calls “imagined communities”, as they provided a sense of community and security that was very strong and religion-like (Coakley 2018, p. 332).
Critics on the constructivist approach argue that it fails to account for the prevalence and power of nationalism over time, arguing that nations, as social constructs, are volatile and
changing constantly (Harzl 2011, p. 63). When the outgroup sentiments and ingroup loyalties are so deeply rooted – and so detrimental within a conflict framework – they can hardly be a mere consequence of an ethnonational product, designed by a political leader (Harzl 2011, p. 63). Muller (2008) actually refutes this criticism, and says that even though nationalism is socially constructed, it is not delicate or powerless, and cannot change indefinitely (p. 35). He argues that it does have a long-term impact and is a powerful unification tool and driver of people (Muller 2008, p. 35).
Social Developmentalism
The fourth strand of ethno-nationalism is social developmentalism, another modernist theory of nationalism, that gained prominence through the works of Ernest Gellner. Socio-economic developmentalism considers nationalism a modern concept, that did not exist before the 18th century (Kerr 2019, p. 105). It is argued that nations, nationalisms and the system of nation states
are produced by characteristics of the modern environment, such as “capitalism, bureaucracy, industrialism, urbanisation, secularism and the like” (Smith 2000, p. 4). Gellner (1983) explains that these conditions – in particular capitalism – generate a change from an agricultural society to an industrialized society (p. 40).
In the agricultural society, the economy was based on jobs that required a high degree of specialization, for which men had to have had training and education (Gellner 1983, p. 26). However, in the industrial society this way of working was no longer achievable, due to the competition that capitalism creates (ibid, p. 27). Competition generated a shift to large-scale production and with that the need for a large number of men doing professions that did not require as much training at all, rather than a small number of men doing highly-skilled
professions (ibid, p. 27). This shift required the creation of standard education, that taught basic skills and granted men knowledge of a common language (Gellner 1983, chap. 4). Through language, this standardized education system produced a culture that was homogenous and fueled the establishment of the concept of national identity (ibid, p. 44).
In their research on why nation-states replaced “empires, kingdoms, city-states, and the like”, Wimmer & Feinstein (2010) find that there is “no evidence for the effects of
industrialization, the advent of mass literacy, or increasingly direct rule, which are associated with the modernization theories of Gellner, Anderson, Tilly, and Hechter”, but rather conclude that historical institutionalism provides the best explanation, saying that the change to nation-states was fueled by local and regional political opportunities, instead of national or international factors that impact over a longer time-span (p. 764).
Historical Ethno-Symbolism
The final paradigm on ethno-nationalism is historical ethno-symbolism. Smith (2000) looks at perennialism and constructivism and concludes that there is a theoretical gap in the sense that perennialism does not regard for the novel features of modern nations and nationalism as it regards nations to be a return of or a continuation of an already existing nation (p. 12). At the same time, constructivism does not account for the fact that some features of nations have in fact been very successful at cultivating themselves over time (Smith 2000, p. 12). Smith therefore, congruent to the approach of John Armstrong, prefers “historical ethno-symbolism” (ibid, p. 12).
This theory emphasizes the relevance of historical notions, including “myths, memories, values and symbols for cultural community formation” as well as the fundamental capacity of ethnic bonds and communities to foster the rise and endurance of nations (ibid, p. 12). Smith calls these ethnic ties and communities ‘ethnies’, which could be described as “a named human
population with a common myth of descent, shared historical memories, one or more elements of common culture, a link with an historic territory, and a measure of solidarity, at least among the elites” (ibid, p. 12). Within this definition, it is especially the centrality of myths, symbols and subjective, ethnic memories and histories, in drawing the boundaries of a certain ethnie, that link perennialist and constructivist approaches (Harris 2009, p. 48). Their efficiency in fomenting shared emotions, accounts for nationalism’s potency over a longer time period, without diminishing the distinctive characteristics of modern nations as merely a repetition of an
immemorial nation, by guaranteeing the development of cultural distinctions over time (ibid, p. 12, Harris 2009, p. 48).
According to Smith (2000), recent nations are thus modern in the sense that they are newly established, but not fully novel, as many share pre-established ethnies that are not new and their formation has often been taking place over a long time-span (p. 13). Smith’s
ethno-symbolism is critiqued for the fact that it “is terminologically slippery” as it often confuses ethnies and nations and thereby blurs the distinctions between them (Kerr 2019, p. 113).
Moreover, critics argue that nationalism in the ethno-symbolist sense is described as very much restricted by historical notions – whereas in reality, nation building is a lot less selective (ibid).
Nationalism & Conflict
This research explores the impact of a rise of ethno-nationalism, therefore the next section will look at theories relating to the consequences of a rise of ethno-nationalism. One of the main consequences discussed is conflict, therefore the following part will explore the link between these general theories of ethno-nationalism and ethnic conflict.
Ancient Ethnic Hatreds
First, if we take the primordial approach to nationalism and link it to conflict, conflict is a product of mere cultural diversity (Harzl 2011, p. 62). The primordial view on the Balkan Wars is one of escalating ancestral ethnic hatreds that are the driving force behind cycles of war, reoccurring
throughout time, fueled by an essentialist view on the categories of ethnic groups and loyalties (Harzl 2011, p. 62, Vladisavljevic 2002, p. 776, Weber 2010, p. 76). These hatreds are stable, rooted in history, and cannot be overcome with time. Thus if ethnic opponents, such as the Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo, want to escape these cycles of war, complete institutional segregation between the two ethnic groups is required (Harzl 2011, p. 62). Scholars that have become known in this theoretical field are for example Robert Kaplan (1993) who wrote on the importance of ancient ethnic hatreds in the Balkan Wars in his book ‘Balkan Ghosts’. But also Samuel Huntington, who writes about a ‘clash of civilizations’, in which the “dominating source of conflict will be cultural”, can be placed among ancient ethnic hatred scholars (Huntington 1993, p. 22). With specific reference to the Balkans, Huntington argues that “a cultural wall exists between Western Christianity and Islam, and it runs through the Balkans and Serbian territory” (Hilton Saggau 2019, p. 2). Harris (2019) does not see much value in this approach to the study of nationalism, and describes ancient ethnic hatreds as “an oversimplification”, arguing it is often “historically erroneous” (p. 107).
Relative Deprivation/Grievances Theory
Third, Gurr (1993) researches how and why groups decide on communal mobilization as a means of pursuing their common interests. He argues that communal mobilization is actually fueled by grievances, stemming from cultural identity, ethnic inequality or a historical loss of autonomy. The greater the grievances, the stronger is a communal group’s mobilizing potential. Grievances generate feelings of relative deprivation when an ethnic group feels that it is not getting its fair share. Relative deprivation is thus very subjective, based on perception, but this does not limit its capacity. In addition, Gurr (1993) argues that communal groups often lack an institutional status within their state territory, leading them to develop grievances over this issue. Consequently, the state is thus always the entity challenged by communal political action. Cederman, Wimmer & Min (2010) support the relevance of ethnic “exclusion and competition” over state authority in relation to grievances (p. 113). In addition, they find that “[l]arge ethnic groups that are excluded from state power or underrepresented in government are much more likely to challenge the regime’s insiders through violent means” as well as the fact that “a loss of power in recent history or previous conflict further increases the likelihood of armed conflict”, supporting Gurr’s theory
of a historical loss of autonomy generating grievances and feelings of relative deprivation (Cederman, Wimmer & Min 2010, p. 114).
Vladisavljevic (2002) argues that the strength of emotions that fuels powerful collective nationalist mobilization, can actually be accounted for by grievances, explaining that are produced by recollections of past conflict and disparities between ethnic groups as well as national attachments (p. 779). Nonetheless, these aspects do not clarify the timing and
development of national mobilization and fail to point out why ethnic grievances are developed sometimes, but not always (Vladisavljevic 2002, p. 779). Vladisavljevic suggests that the impact of political factors on national mobilization ought to be considered, therefore he studies the interaction between institutional politics and collective political struggle (ibid). By referring to social movement theory, that explores the impact of political opportunities and series of collective action, he shows that political factors and circumstances as well as the interaction between institutional politics and its challengers, have an definite impact on all the temporal stages of national mobilization (Vladisavljevic 2002, p. 780).
Economic Resentment
Finally, the link between nationalism and conflict, and through conflict the establishment of the nation state, Gellner retrieves from the idea that this particular type of a modern capitalist economy creates a lot of resentment (Gellner 1983, chap. 4). This resentment is initially generated by the consequences of industrialization, especially those resulting from the final phases of industrial development in which inequality is the strongest, such as agony, starvation and estrangement of the lower working classes (Gellner 1983, p. 74-75). However, after this final phase, these objective agonizing environment is over, and resentment is now generated from the more subjective differences in traits (ibid, p. 75). These differences are normal, and arise
automatically due to entropy, however, some are perceived as better than others, generating a ranking in certain cultural traits, which fosters resentment, when one’s trait is perceived as being less, with certain societal consequences (ibid, p. 64, 75). These higher and lower cultures can foster the establishment of new nations around either of these cultures (ibid, p. 75). After the objective misery of the latter stages of industrial development is over, resentment is fueled by cultural, habitual and visible differences, that can foster nation-building.
Nationalism & Conflict in Kosovo – Battle of Kosovo 1998-99
Having established the general paradigms within ethno-nationalism and the relation between nationalism and ethnic conflict, this research now examines nationalism and conflict in Kosovo specifically, exploring the rise of nationalism in the run-up to the Battle of Kosovo in 1998-99. In this instance, the rise of nationalism led to a violent conflict. It is necessary to establish what conditions enabled that, in order to predict what the impact of the recent rise of a nationalist party in Kosovo will be in relation to conflict later in this research.
Run-up to the Battle of Kosovo (1998-99)
Before the war, Kosovo was part of Yugoslavia. Albanians did not have a protected status in Yugoslavia, but in 1974, under Tito’s leadership, Kosovo finally received an autonomous status (Dyrstad 2012, p. 820, Judah 2008, p. 55-57, Vardari-Kesler 2012, p. 155). However, this autonomy was retracted under Milošević, who gained popularity throughout the 1980s as Tito’s successor (Vardari-Kesler 2012, p. 155). These conditions changed the circumstances
dramatically for Albanians as increasing Serbian oppression fostered the mobilization of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), that started attacking Serbian police and military in Kosovo (ibid). In 1997, Milošević ordered more soldiers to Kosovo to counter Albanian attacks, but soon the conditions derailed immeasurably as “the ethnic cleansing of Albanians became the guiding policy of the Serbian forces operating in Kosovo” (Vardari-Kesler 2012, p. 155). These instances of violence soon progressed into what can be called a violent ethnic conflict.
Ancient myths, charismatic leaders and national mobilization
Historical myths and charismatic leadership were key to national mobilization in Yugoslavia in under Milošević (Harzl 2011, p. 64-65). Myths are historic tales, set and used within a
nationalistic framework – identifying an ‘us’ and ‘them’ and thereby creating stronger in-group relations, but more aggression towards the outgroup (Harzl 2011, p. 64). Theory on the
importance of common myths to nationalism in Kosovo fuses concepts from primordialism and constructivism, as “memories can be framed collectively so that they become socially relevant and produce mass loyalties”, which means that they are not immemorial, but are able to produce loyalties that last longer than constructivism would deem them capable (Harzl 2011, p. 64-65).
Common myths that exist within the collective memory, were used by political leaders as a tool towards constructing a common ethnic identity and legitimizing their ethnonationalist goals (Harzl, 2011; Bieber, 2002). In this sense, nationalism can be a strong and effective mobilization device for political leaders, fostering support for their course and an increase in popularity. When tensions arose in Yugoslavia in the 1990s, a rise in Serbian nationalism, fueled by Serbian
political leaders, revived the importance of ancient myths, spiking Serb aggression that generated ethnic conflict (Bieber, p. 106). In 1998, the same happened in Kosovo, when the Kosovo Polje myth resurfaced and increased tensions between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo, leading to violence.
Milošević & Kosovo Polje
The myth of the Kosovo Polje battle resurfaced in the 1980s and formed a basis for the
legitimization of the Serbian nationalism that was growing under Milošević in the run up to the battle of Kosovo (Bieber 2002, p. 106, Harzl 2011, p. 64). Kosovo Polje was a battle between the Serbian King Lazar and the Ottoman Empire in Kosovo Polje in 1389 and according to the myth, the Serbs lost this battle and it has been framed as a defeat of the Christians by the Muslims, emphasizing the suffering of Serbs in Kosovo (Bieber 2002, p. 96, 106). Another ancient myth, related to Kosovo Polje, regards Kosovo the birth place of the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC). The archbishop long resided in Kosovo and many Nemanjíc sites are still Serbian monasteries, making Kosovo a Jerusalem or Serbs (Hilton Saggau 2019, p. 5, 10). A third myth, about the Serbian migration or exodus, stems from two instances in the 17th and 18th century, when Serbs had to move out of Kosovo due to a failed rebellion against the Ottomans, which resembles how Serbs have slowly lost influence over Kosovo, with more recently Muslim Albanians filling the territory, instead of the Muslim Ottomans, in the centuries before (Hilton Saggau 2019, p. 6).
Serbian leaders instrumentalized these ancient myths to make a claim to Kosovo as a territory within Serbia, arguing that the territory on which the SOC was founded was taken from them in the Kosovo Polje battle, so as to compensate for the lack of other proof, e.g. legal or ethnic composition (Bieber 2002, p. 106). This territorial claim to Kosovo makes the Serbian nationalism under Milošević inherently irredentist, which means that it revolves around a
“territorial claim based on a national, ethnic, or historical basis” (Ambrosio 2016). Irredentism is different from secession, as it is a “process by which a part of an existing state breaks away and
merges with another, whereas in secession merging does not take place” (Ambrosio 2016). Irredentist movements or political parties often allude to the establishment of “a “Greater X,” with the “X” being the name of a country or state” (Ambrosio 2016).
Skenderbeg
Serbia’s territorial claim to Kosovo left little room for Albanian territorial claims, and with that little room for fair negotiation over the territory (Bieber 2002, p. 106). Albanians were stripped of their autonomous status and victim to pervasive oppression under the Milošević regime, all throughout the 80s and 90s (Bieber 2002, p. 101, Lindemann & Wimmer 2018, p. 316). Consequently, Albanian nationalism was growing in reaction to the Serbian nationalism and oppression, but was not equally potent yet (Harzl 2011, p. 76).
Albanian nationalism responded to Serbian territorial claims with a historical myth of its own, making reference to the ancestry of the Albanian ethnicity in the Illyrian clan, who ruled the area of Kosovo in the Middle Ages (Harzl 2011, p. 76). Interestingly, the Albanian myth also revolves around a Christian figure, in their case Skenderbeg, a hero that defeated the Ottomans in the 15th century (ibid, p. 77). Parallel to the Serbian Kosovo Polje myth, in the Albanian myth the Ottomans are also the enemy, showing how myths can be contradictory (ibid, p. 77). Yet even if their factuality is dubious, the effectiveness of myths in mobilizing a population and legitimizing its leadership persists, as leaders themselves deliberately choose a retelling of a myth that is beneficial to them and their nationalist goals (Bieber 2002, p. 98, Harzl 2011, p. 54).
Competition, Exclusion and Relative Deprivation
Nationalist rhetoric often fuels conflict through the pursuance of ethnic homogeneity, calling for exclusion of other ethnic groups through competition (Harzl 2011, p. 53). As was mentioned before, “exclusion and competition” among ethnic groups, as well as “a loss of power in recent history”, increase “the likelihood of armed conflict” (Cederman, Wimmer & Min 2010, p. 114) These qualifications are both true in the context of the battle of Kosovo – the Albanian
population was the large majority in Kosovo and Kosovo’s autonomy under Tito was taken away by Milošević when he took back the power over the region in the 1980s (Bieber 2002, p. 101, 106). According to Gurr (1993), such a loss of autonomy symbolizes relative deprivation (Gurr 1993, p. 188). In his research, he argues that “the greater a group's relative disadvantage on these
variables, the greater the sense of grievance and, consequently, the greater its potential for political mobilization”, as disadvantages and ethnic identity fuel grievances (Gurr 1993, p. 173-174). The context of relative deprivation thus fits the situation in Kosovo for Albanians well.
Nationalism, Populism & Party politics
The next part discussed theory on populism and party politics and relates it to nationalism. This theory will also be used to analyze the recent change in Kosovo’s partisan landscape and the background surrounding this change. It will specifically look at the case of Vetëvendosje as the embodiment of the rise of ethnic nationalism in Kosovo over the last decade.
Populism & Nationalism
Populism is a very common term in current day political pieces, but more often than not, authors fail to properly justify the use of the term, which is partly due to the fact that there are many different understandings and approaches to populism, with some even wondering whether it exists at all (Stavrakakis & Katsambekis 2014, p. 121, Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser 2013, p. 494). Mudde (2004) presents an ideational approach to populism, which means that populism is used as a discourse or a way of looking at the world, defining it as “as a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic camps, “the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite,” and which argues that politics should be an
expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people” (p. 543). This definition describes an anti-establishment stance, as well as “a defence of popular sovereignty at any cost”, as
inherent to populism (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser 2013, p. 494).
Populists argue they represent the popular will and express a commitment to defend the interests of the people against the corrupt elite (De la Torre, 2018, Weyland, 2018). This general will is perceived as completely transparent, therefore any critique on populists is viewed as a critique on the will of the people, and thus as something undemocratic and elitist (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser 2013, p. 503, 507, Weyland 2018). Representing the will of the people and challenging the elite, populists often critique types of representative government, instead proposing direct forms of government as an alternative (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser 2013, p. 506, Stavrakakis & Katsambekis 2014, p. 123, Yabanci 2016, p. 24). In this way, “populism can be both a threat and corrective to democracy”, either leading to weaker protection of minority
rights or increasing the influence of excluded groups in institutional decision-making (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser 2013, p. 507).
The ideational approach to populism, regards populism as a thin-centered ideology, that often finds itself binding to other -isms – like nativism and socialism – or already existing societal issues, that can differ drastically based on time and circumstances, making populism a fluid phenomenon (Brubaker 2017, Mudde 2004, Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser 2013, p. 494, Stavrakakis & Katsambekis 2014, p. 123). Left-wing populism, for example, often revolves around social and economic issues that foster resentment, and lobbies for the inclusion of civil society in decision-making (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser 2013, p. 497, 508, Stavrakakis & Katsambekis 2014, p. 123).
Stavrakakis & Katsambekis (2014) argue that populism also has “a nationalist potential” (p. 123). Left-wing populists in Latin America, for example, challenged the ‘American
colonization’ of the region (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, p. 508). Greek and Spanish populist leaders challenged the EU and international organs like the International Monetary Fund, while considering them “the external elite” (Salmela & von Scheve 2018, p. 440). Speaking of populist leaders, charismatic leadership is described as one of the corner stones of populism (Stavrakakis & Katsambekis 2014, p. 123). Though maybe not a “defining attribute of populism”, it can be seen as a “facilitator” of populism (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser 2013, p. 510).
Party Politics
Many different aspects of a state’s party system, political parties and party politics, can have an impact on the way that a parliament functions and on how different parties interact (Reilly 2006, Savage 2016, Maeda 2015, Tavits & Letki 2014). Understanding these dynamics could contribute to understanding the recent change in Kosovo’s partisan landscape. Fragmentation among
opposition parties is for example relevant, because it can change the functioning of the government (Maeda 2015). When oppositional fragmentation is high, it is harder for the opposition to hold the government accountable, as they do not pose a real challenge to the governing parties (Maeda 2015, p. 764). Governments could then lose the motivation to tackle issues that are important to the people, as the risk of defeat in the next election is low as a result of the fragmentation among the competition (Maeda 2015, p. 764).
Reilly (2006) examines the different approaches to managing the development of
parliamentary systems in conflict-prone democracies, including Kosovo (p. 812). Conflict-prone states in particular face challenges in upholding democracy due to the fact that there are often identity-based social cleavages that have the tendency to be politicized (Reilly 2006, p. 812). Politicizing ethnicity is often a more effective tool for political parties to mobilize voters than to appeal to class-based or religious issues, tempting politicians to “play the ethnic card” (ibid, p. 812). Due to political competition, parties can start “outbidding” each other on ethnic issues (Reilly 2006, p. 812). Democratization processes can thus “lead to an increase in ethnic tensions and, in some cases, the outbreak of ethnic conflict” (ibid, p. 812).
In order to prevent this, the international community has actively intervened in the establishment of parliamentary systems in post-conflict democracies by means of funding or technical assistance, like in Kosovo, where international authorities have tried to develop a multi-ethnic parliamentary system (Reilly 2006, p. 822-823). However, the effectiveness of these missions is not convincing, considering the continued politicization of ethnic issues in the entire Balkan region, which makes the idea that political parties can be shaped to an equal extent as other entities within the political arena disputable, to say the least (ibid, p. 823).
This lack of results could be attributed to the fact that many new democracies experience trouble with the transformation of armies into political parties post-conflict, as these “political parties are organized around personalities, narrow political interests, and tribal and ethnic
loyalties”, which is also the case in Kosovo (Reilly 2006, p. 823). These types of political parties form underdeveloped party systems of which the parties are “generally weak, electoral volatility is high, party roots in society are weak, and individual personalities dominate parties and
campaigns” (ibid, p. 814). Additionally, Savage (2016) argues that newly established
democracies tend to have unstable parliamentary systemsthat are institutionalized to the same extent as older democracies (p. 499-500, 503-504). They often show considerable variations in incumbents and strength overall per election, with new parties being able to enter the political arena easily and managing to quickly exert influence on policymaking, as well as large fluctuations in the party programs presented over time (Savage 2016, p. 499-500, 504). Easy access to the political arena for new parties, impedes coalition formation, as many parties lack quality and governing experience, which is generally detrimental to the stability of a democracy (ibid, p. 511).
In addition, Tavits & Letki (2014) discuss how in new democracies – that often have political contexts that are less stable and structured – party strategies have a greater impact on party competition (p. 247). When economic inequality rises, voters have the tendency to be more drawn to left-wing parties, which in response will motivate the right-wing to shift the focus away from economic issues, so as not to jeopardize their chances in the elections (Tavits & Letki 2014, p. 247). In doing this, they often revert the attention away from economic topics to ethnic or religious social cleavages, that have the potential to gain the attention of voters’ values, rather than tap into their economic preferences (ibid, p. 256). This strategy works best in political contexts with pre-existing identity-based cleavages, as the appeal of these issues to voters is then stronger (ibid, p. 256).
Case Presentation
Before moving on the current state of affairs in Kosovo, background as to what happened in the aftermath of the war and after Kosovo’s independence need to be discussed, as these
developments have paved the way for the recent change in Kosovo partisan landscape. The case presentation will refer back to the literature on nationalism, populism and party politics as discussed previously.
Aftermath of the war and UN-protectorate 1999-2008
During the Battle of Kosovo in 1999, the parties came together at Rambouillet to negotiate (Vardari-Kesler 2012, p. 155). Milošević failed to agree with the main request of these negotiations, which was to withdraw his troops from Kosovo, and consequently the National Alliance Treaty Organization (NATO) bombed Serbia for 78 consecutive days in order to cease the ethnic cleansing and other violence going on in Kosovo, until Milošević gave in to the initial request and withdrew the Serbian troops from Kosovo (Vardari-Kesler 2012, p. 155, “Albin Kurti's journey (…)” 2019). Soon after, Milošević was indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia on the grounds of war crimes (Hooper 2000, p. 28).
From June onwards, Kosovo became an international protectorate under the authority of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), part of UN Resolution 1244, that was to provide security and stability as well as ensure the rehabilitation of institutional structures (Vardari-Kesler 2012, p. 155). It was decided that UNMIK was to collaborate with the
main post-conflict authority in Kosovo, the Kosovo Liberation Army, which according to Briscoe and Price (2011) provided the foundations for the following decades of structural “state fragility” (p. 3). Party systems literature also recognizes the tendency for problems with the shift from armies to political parties, arguing that it produces parties that rely heavily on personalities and ethnic identities (Reilly 2006, p. 823).
UNMIK did not manage to solve the Serbian issue around Kosovo’s status and remained working with a temporary compromise – Kosovo was usually referred to as “the UN’s Mission in Kosovo” (Russell 2019, p. 4). This working definition was later also implemented by the EU, as not all EU member-states recognize Kosovo (ibid). From the start, UNMIK had unrestricted authority over legislation, police and military, even though it was considered to be a temporary international mission (Vardari-Kesler 2012, p. 156). Institutions aimed at slowly transferring power to local actors – such as in 2001 the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG) – were often deficient in granting real authority, as UNMIK still got to sign off on every decision that was made (ibid). UNMIK is thus a good example of what Reilly (2006) describes as an international actor actively engineering a party system in a new democracy, in an attempt to ensure stabilization, further democratization and prevent another conflict. The effectiveness of international intervention in such a way is still highly contested in the literature.
Kosovo’s case is a good illustration as to why this is the case. As a result of UNMIK’s presence, Kosovo had a dual governance system, with a combination of international and local authorities (Vardari-Kesler 2012, p. 156). The two were constantly in disagreement about the division of authority – local actors demanding a stronger voice in decision-making with regard to their own interests, emphasizing the temporary nature of the UNMIK, while the UNMIK
dismissed these requests based on doubts about maturity on the side of local actors, justifying their prolonged stay by arguing that local actors still needed the education in liberal values such as democracy and human rights that UNMIK was teaching (Vardari-Kesler 2012, p. 156). These circumstances prevented the development many people had hoped for in these transitional years.
2008-now: “independence”
In 2007, the Finnish UN Special Envoy for Kosovo Martti Ahtisaari made the recommendation that Kosovo was to become independent, though under supervision of the international
the civilian and political missions of the EU, so the EU would become the dominant international presence overseeing Kosovo’s independence (ibid, p. 157). His plan was realized and on
February 17, 2008, Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence was signed (ibid, p. 157). Most European countries and the United States recognized Kosovo’s declaration of independence.
The European bodies that were established in Kosovo with its independence were the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) and the International Civilian Office (ICO), the former took over all the legal control from UNMIK, and the latter was to oversee the implementation of Ahtisaari’s proposal (Vardari-Kesler 2012, p. 157). Though Kosovo’s
independence entailed the realization of a long-sought wish for Kosovar citizens, the international supervision clause meant that it was nothing like the local sovereignty that it at first glance
seemed to be (ibid). In the years that followed, Kosovo’s judiciary system, police and customs remained monitored by EULEX, Kosovo’s governance overseen by the ICO and Kosovo’s security controlled by NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR) (ibid). Unsurprisingly, the political problems with dual governance continued even after independence.
Kosovo & the EU
To date, EULEX oversees many of UNMIK’s former responsibilities. However, following a corruption scandal within EULEX in 2017, it changed its mission in 2018 from a judicial executive mandate to a monitoring and advising one, transferring a lot of its authority to the Kosovar government (Council of the EU 2018, Hopkins 2017). Apart from EULEX, Kosovo is monitored by the Directorate General for European Neighborhood and Enlargement Policy (DG NEAR) of the European Commission that works closely together with the European Union Special Representative in Kosovo (EUSR) (“The Directorate-General” 2019, “Kosovo” 2019). All these institutions are so involved, because Kosovo, and the Western Balkans in general, is of major geopolitical importance to the EU, located in its backyard, surrounded by EU countries (Judah 2008, p. xiii)
In addition, Kosovo has been negotiating with the EU about integration, in particular its EU Membership trajectory. The EU has allowed Serbia to officially become a candidate for EU membership and to start the procedure, whereas Kosovo is still a potential candidate (Gray & Heath 2018, “Kosovo” 2019). A requirement for EU membership for Kosovo – and Serbia – is to take steps towards resolving ongoing disputes (Apelblat 2020, Bytyci 2018, Gray & Heath 2018).
Kosovo solved its border dispute with Montenegro and showed commitment to the EU-facilitated dialogue with Serbia aimed at resolving the conflict (ibid). At the moment, the EU is Kosovo’s biggest donor, with a stifling 650 million euros of funding from the Instrument for
Pre-Accession, and with the membership procedure other benefits could lie ahead as well (“Apostolova: EU remains (…)” 2019, Bytyci 2018, Russell 2019, p. 2).
Regardless of the benefits and negotiations in past years, Kosovo is still the only Western Balkan country that does not enjoy visa tree travel to the EU, to the annoyance of Kosovar citizens, for whom it is incredibly hard to obtain a visa (Madhi 2020, “We must stop (…)” 2019). Even though Kosovo has met all the requirements set by the European Commission for visa liberalization, the proposal for its implementation is still pending in the European Parliament (EP) and European Council, due to the fact that the EU is divided on the topic of Kosovo, with five member states – Cyprus, Slovakia, Spain, Greece, and Romania – still not recognizing Kosovo as an independent country, often due to their own local secessionist issues (Apelblat 2020, Russell 2019, p. 3, “Kosovo” 2019, “We must stop” 2019).
Kosovo & Serbia
This research also explores the impact of a rise of nationalism in Kosovo on Kosovo’s relations with Serbia, therefore this next section provides some background. To date, Serbia does not recognize Kosovo’s independence and considers it a break-away province within Serbia (Russell 2019, p. 1). Following the International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) ruling on Kosovo’s independence not being in conflict with international law, Serbia, in 2012, did agree that Kosovo could act on its own, though being referred to as Kosovo*, with the footnote: “This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence” (Russell 2019, p. 4).
The EU-facilitated dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia after Kosovo’s independence first took place in 2011, and in the period up until 2015, it led to significant decisions and agreements, most importantly the Brussels Agreement in 2013 (Russell 2019, p. 2). From 2015 onwards, however, the EU-mediated talks were stalled by a number of confrontations between the two parties in 2017-2018, that were detrimental to their relations (ibid, p. 2). In 2015, Kosovo Constitutional Court ruled that a part of the Brussels Agreement was unconstitutional, setting the implementation of the agreement back massively (ibid, p. 6). In 2017, a Serbian train on which
the words ‘Kosovo is Serbia’ were painted in 21 different languages, was heading for North Mitrovica in the Serb-majority Northern part of Kosovo, sparking resentment among the majority ethnic-Albanian population in Kosovo (ibid, p. 2). In 2018, a Kosovar Serb politician, Oliver Ivanović, was killed in the North of Kosovo (ibid, p. 2). In addition, a Serbian politician, Marko Djurić, was thrown out of Kosovo during a visit, for allegedly accessing Kosovo illegally (ibid, p. 2).
As a consequence of the unresolved conflict between Kosovo and Serbia and the recognition issue, the Serb-majority Northern part of Kosovo is de facto outside of Pristina’s control. Most Kosovar Serbs live here and due to a strong distrust against the government in Pristina, many choose to answer to a parallel network of institutions instead, that are Belgrade-run, and many do not vote in Kosovar elections (Briscoe & Price 2011, p. 2, Skendaj 2014, p. 144). Serb resentment against Pristina-run institutions is amplified by the lack of representation of Serbs in Pristina’s institutions (ibid, p. iii, 2). Although Pristina promised to establish the ASM as part of the Brussels Agreement in 2013, to date this has not happened, making Belgrade less inclined to take down its parallel institution and work towards a better integration of Serbs in Kosovo.
Kosovo now: a lack of development
Before going into the change in Kosovo’s partisan landscape, it is important to explain what the situation in Kosovo is now, especially since the literature on party systems emphasizes how in new democracies socio-economic factors can have a strong impact on party strategies (Tavits & Letki 2014). All in all, Kosovo has lacked much needed progress in the last 20 years – not only has it struggled with its ongoing conflict with Serbia and international supervision, the country is also suffering from high unemployment, a lack of economic development, as well as low-quality education and inadequate public health care (Ahmetxhekaj 2019, Alia 2019, Briscoe & Price 2011, CEIC Data 2020, World Bank 2018). The improvements that were promised and expected after Kosovo’s independence were not achieved, therefore the nation-wide joy that was felt after independence has since faded and made way for widespread disappointment in the leadership (Briscoe & Price 2011, p. iii).
The formal economy of Kosovo is looking quite bleak, with an average monthly income of $574 USD in December 2018 and a low to middle income GDP per capita of $4.302 USD in
2018 – comparable to Jordan, Guatemala or Georgia – and there is a strong reliance on segments of the informal economy, such as smuggling, and remittances from diaspora communities (World Bank 2018, CEIC Data 2020, Briscoe & Price 2011, p. 2). Though Kosovo’s unemployment rate has considerably improved since its independence – from 47% in 2008 to 26% in 2019 – it remains quite high. This is also due the fact that there is a gap between the education system and the labor market (Alia 2019, p. 10-11).
This gap is one of the many problems with Kosovo’s education system. In 2015, Kosovo took part in the PISA international education test, ranking “at the lowest level of achievement in Europe”, “behind those in Latin America, Asia and the Middle East”, which can be accounted for by the lack of government funding for education in general, which lags far behind the per capita spending on education of OECD countries, leading to inadequate infrastructure, teaching
resources and quality standards (Alia 2019, p. 7-10). Apart from that, Kosovo’s healthcare system is not adapted to Kosovo’s health care needs. There is a huge deficit in the amount of healthcare workers employed Kosovo (Ahmetxhekaj 2019). On average, there are 2.3 doctors per 1.000 inhabitants, based on the 4.100 active physicians in total for a population of 1.8 million, one of the lowest rates on the European continent (ibid). The reason for this deficit is again a lack of government spending on healthcare, that has led to a lack of resources and facilities in clinics and hospitals as well as “poor working conditions”, “a lack of opportunities for professional
development” and “low salaries” for healthcare workers (Ahmetxhekaj 2019).
The fact that Kosovo has not seen a lot of much needed development in the past years, as well as the fact that it is under international supervision, creates “complicated political
dynamics”, which makes it “a favourable political opportunity structure” for populist parties – especially since issues like “nation, identity and ethnicity are still highly politicised and contested in Kosovo” (Yabanci 2016, p. 19). This system has allowed local governing parties to become a “clientelist and corrupted political class”, making Kosovo’s institutions weak, without sufficient rule of law and lacking opportunities for civic engagement (Yabanci 2016, p. 19-20). At the same time, the continued international supervision is seen as an authority that cannot be held
accountable in any way, which demotivates citizens from engaging in politics (ibid, p. 19-20).
The change in Kosovo’s partisan landscape is signified by the rise of nationalist movement, and later political party, Vetëvendosje, over the last decade. Levizja Vetëvendosje!, or ‘Vetëvendosje’ in this paper, means self-determination in Albanian. Vetëvendosje’s roots trace back to the Kosova Action Network (KAN) that was established in 1997 and concerned with civil society initiatives against Serbia’s occupancy of, and hostilities in, Kosovo (Vardari-Kesler 2012, p. 158). In 2004, a new movement of citizens was founded out of KAN, by Albin Kurti, that was later named ‘Levizja Vetëvendosje!’ (Vardari-Kesler 2012, p. 158, Briscoe & Price 2011, p. 19).
Yabanci (2016) argues how Vetëvendosje is a left-wing populist party, that is keen on using “contentious politics as a means to disperse its message” (p. 17). Congruent with
populism’s tendency to challenge representative democracies, Vetëvendosje also contest aspects of Kosovo’s democracy, emphasizing the importance of the will of the people, making use of popular mobilization in the form of anti-establishment protests (Yabanci 2016, p. 26). To
illustrate, from the beginning, Vetëvendosje was adamantly against the international influence in Kosovo, proliferating itself as a movement speaking on behalf of the people, often talking in terms of “we”, and focusing on a future of self-determination, where Kosovar people were in charge of their own country, and not the international community (Vardari-Kesler 2012, p. 158, Briscoe & Price 2011, p. 19). Vetëvendosje tried to delegitimize UNMIK by arguing that it violated the right of Kosovo’s citizens to have the freedom of determining their own political course, going as far as indicating that the UNMIK regime was equally undemocratic and oppressive as the Serbian authority of Milošević and arguing that UNMIK constituted a type of modern colonization (Vardari-Kesler 2012, p. 162-163). Later the EU was targeted as well, also because of the lack of accountability and civil influence, arguing that Kosovo’s independence was nothing more than a formality (ibid, p. 163).
Apart from the international community, the local leadership faced opposition as well, due to the lack of performance by the ruling elite in Kosovo, who have not managed to solve the most pressing issues, such as “corruption, unemployment, or minority issues” (Skendaj 2014, p. 143). Vetëvendosje was often the only party openly speaking out on the institutional corruption, always putting the ethical integrity of its own membership first (ibid, p. 144). Vetëvendosje’s thus shows a clear anti-establishment stance that narrowly resembles populism (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser 2013, De la Torre, 2018, Weyland, 2018). Also, the fact that populism tends to have
more success in weaker parliamentary systems with widespread social resentment against the state, fits Kosovo’s circumstances well (Yabanci 2016, p. 18-19).
Vetëvendosje was keen on using radical means and protests to make their point. Vetëvendosje felt that the lack of institutional options for political accountability from a civil level pushed it to embrace means outside of – and against – the institutionalized realm, e.g. surrounding the UNMIK office in Pristina with police ribbon reading “Crime Scene/Do not Cross” or knocking over 30 EULEX vehicles in 2009 (Vardari-Kesler 2012, p. 164-165). Their actions were sometimes reciprocated, with a radical response from the local or international authorities, who used tear gas and rubber bullets against protesters in 2007, and arrested Albin Kurti, who spent time in prison and under house arrest until the beginning of 2008 (ibid, p. 166). The authorities used the security and stability framework to depoliticize Vetëvendosje by framing it as a radical, public threat rather than a legitimate political actor, leading to their expulsion from the political arena (ibid, p. 167).
Kosovo’s society has a clear division between ethnic Serbs and Albanians, the presence of which provides an incentive for populists to use politics of exclusion or to promote ethnic
homogeneity (ibid, p. 21). Also in the case of Vetëvendosje, exclusionary, irredentist ethno-national appeals are inherent to their politics (ibid, p. 28). Albanian and KLA symbols are often pervasive in demonstrations, rather than the official Kosovar symbols (Yabanci 2016, p. 26). Moreover, Albin Kurti himself always had the Albanian, rather than the Kosovo flag, in his office (“Albin Kurti's journey (…)” 2019, Fazliu 2019). In contradiction to other political parties, Vetëvendosje has also been sporting the highly disputed idea of a Greater Albania, in which Kosovo would unify with Albania, which is against Kosovo’s constitution (Fazliu 2019, Tanjug 2019, Yabanci 2016).
Moreover, Vetëvendosje actually started out as a platform for ethnic Albanians (Fazliu 2019, Tanjug 2019, Vardari-Kesler 2012). Yabanci (2016) describes their documented rhetoric as a promotion of “a defensive Albanian nationalism”, calling for the adoption of Albanian symbols to replace the official state symbols, as well as aiming to define “Kosovo as a state of Albanians” (p. 28). Additionally, Kurti opposed the establishment of a war crimes court that would trial KLA veterans accused of war crimes, claiming these crimes could have been done by anyone in the same circumstances (Tanjug 2019). In its party documents, Vetëvendosje expresses commitment maximizing the “cultural autonomy of national minorities”, yet its rhetoric is predominantly
