Sustainable Management of the Water Conflicts : Euphrates and Tigris River Basin

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Sustainable Management of the Water Conflicts

Euphrates and Tigris River Basin

Date: 27 August 2012 Name: Semra Basaran Number: s4171039

E-mail: semra.baaran@ru.nl Radboud University of Nijmegen Nijmegen School of Management

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisor Dr. J. Duncan Liefferink for his patience, advice, encouragement and insight throughout the research.

I made interviews for data collection in this research. It became clear for me that it is not easy to find someone, who answers the questions, mainly in Spain. The limited answers I had, were made possible with the initiative of Dr. Liefferink. At this point I would like to present again my special thanks to him.

I would like to dedicate this work to my dear parents and Mehmet Akpolat, who are always beside me and supporting me with their love.

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LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

Figure 1. The Euphrates and Tigris Rivers... 1

Figure 2. The Euphrates and Tigris River Basin ... 13

Figure 3. The shared river basins in the Iberian Peninsula ... 31

Figure 4. The Rio Grande and Colorado River ... 41

Table 1. Theory of Policy Transfer and Questions from Middle-East ... 11

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

DSI The General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works ETIC The Euphrates-Tigris Initiative for Cooperation

EU European Union

GAP The Southeastern Anatolian Project

GOLD The General Organization for Land Development INAG Instituto da Agua Portugal (Portugal Water Institute) INBO The International Network of Basin Organizations

OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development RBMP River Basin Management Plan

UN United Nations

UNEP United Nations Environment Programme

UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization U.S. The United States

USAID The United States Agency for International Development WFD Water Framework Directive

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CHAPTER 1

1.1 Introduction

Water is a fundamental resource for life. About 20 per cent of the world population suffers from water shortages (UN World Water Development Report 2012, 5). The uneven distribution of water resources makes the human history rich in water conflicts. There are still many ongoing conflicts over water resources all over the world. The growing demand for water under the impact of population growth and industrialization is making the conflicts harsher. The climate change is another factor that puts pressure on water resources.

The Middle-East is one of the places that suffer from water scarcity. The Middle-East together with the North-Africa Region has 5 per cent of the world population, while they have only 0.9 per cent of world’s freshwater resources (World Bank Report, 1995). Gleick claims that scarce water resources in the Middle-East are element of international and domestic policy discussions. The water disputes in this region have strategic implications. (Gleick, 1993; 85). Turkey, Syria and Iraq are the riparian countries of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers. Both of these rivers originate in Turkey, flow through Syria, unite in Shatt-al Arab in Iraq and empty in the Persian Gulf. This is the reason that some authors assume them one river basin (Hakki, 2006; Kibaroglu, 2008). These rivers flow through arid and semi-arid areas. A Mediterranean climate is dominant with rainy winters and warm dry summers in the upstream region. The main characteristic of the river basins is the high evaporation rate caused by high temperatures.

Figure 1. The Euphrates and Tigris Rivers

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All three riparian countries make use of these rivers for irrigation activities, human consumption and generation of electricity. The downstream riparians Iraq and Syria are almost totally dependent on the Euphrates River in their water need (Haftendorn, 2000; 52). Turkey as the upstream riparian, gets 28.5 per cent of its freshwater need from the Euphrates and Tigris river basin, Syria gets 65 per cent, while Iraq is totally dependent on these rivers for its freshwater supply (Kibaroglu, 2008; 186). The problem started when the upstream riparian carried out development projects on these rivers, which had consequences for other riparians. In order to have a complete picture of the situation, the political aspect of this conflict should also be taken into account, because all the three riparians ascribe political and security significances to this problem.

The problem started in the second half of the 20th century when the riparian countries came through the first phase of state building and committed to great development projects on the Euphrates and Tigris river basins to utilize their water for industrial and domestic use and irrigation activities (Kibaroglu, 2008; 187).

Along with Turkey’s Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP is the Turkish acronym), Syria’s Euphrates Valley Project is also crucial. Syria’s Tabqa Dam on Euphrates brought Iraq and Syria to the edge of the war in 1970s because of the water shortages experienced in Iraq during the same period. Saudi Arabia’s intermediary role provided them with an agreement whose content is still kept secret (Burleson, 2005).

Currently the most controversial project on this river basin is Turkey’s major GAP project. This regional development project was started in the mid-1980s and generated concerns by downstream riparians that their flow would be considerably reduced. With GAP, Turkey aims at 26 billion kWh energy generation and the irrigation of 1.65 million hectares of land. Turkey expects to be an electricity exporter in the region. Agricultural production is also expected to increase, which can make Turkey a food exporter in the region. Also, with better living standards in the future through this project in the Southern Anatolia region, Turkey may be able to find a solution to its Kurdish problem (Hakki, 2006;443).

The project has still not been completed because of political and economic issues; such as the armed conflict with Kurdish nationalist organization PKK (Kurdish Worker Party) and the international organization’s reluctance to finance the project due to the ongoing water conflict. Turkey’s increasing water use has already some qualitative and quantitative consequences on the flow for the downstream riparians, which may bring serious harms to Iraq and Syria economically and socially.

The possible impacts of GAP on downstream countries are estimated as; water quantity as well as quality problems as a result of excessive water use, increase in irrigated land area and use of fertilizers and chemicals in the river basins (Hakki, 2006;444). Irrigation activities of the downstream riparians also have considerable impacts regarding water quality and quantity. Negotiations among riparians started in 1964 and they established a Joint Technical Committee (JTC) in 1980to identify the water needs of the countries. However, during 16 meetings of JTC until 1993 they could not produce a resolution. While Turkey perceives the water problem as a

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technical one and wants to solve it in technical committees, Iraq and Syria are for an immediate allocation agreement (Kibaroglu, 2008; 188).

The Kurdish problem, which is common among these three countries, also has a considerable impact on the water conflict. With this problem the water issue gained a political significance from the 1990s on. The countries tend to use either Kurdish problem or the water problem as a political tool against each other. The 1998 confrontation between Syria and Turkey is a suitable example. When Syria demanded more water, Turkey demanded that Syria must stop its support for the PKK and both countries exchanged war threats. This ended with the deportation of Abdullah Öcalan (PKK’s leader) from Syria and the signing of the technical Adana Accord (Kibaroglu, 2008;189).

As upper-riparian, Turkey’s approach plays a crucial role in the problem. This country emphasizes its absolute sovereign rights, which say that “riparians may use the water resources in any way they please regardless of the consequences in other riparians” (Correia, Silva, 1996; 319). This is quite a problematic approach and was declared obsolete by scholars and international tribunals (Wolf, 1999). Instead “limited territorial sovereignty, which recognizes the rights of the downstream countries and at the same time, guarantees the right of reasonable utilization by the upstream country in the framework of equitable usage by all interested parties” (Correia, Silva, 1996; 319) may better serve the riparian states’ interests.

International law is in favor of equitable use of international water resources. The UN Convention on the Law of Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses (1997) sets ‘limited territorial sovereignty’ as the international standard for international watercourses and promotes the prevention of significant harm to the downstream riparians (Burleson, 2005; 41). In the Middle-East water is not only perceived as a natural resource but as a political and military tool. This is making the conflict harder. Some scholars even argue the likelihood of a war on the waters of the Euphrates and Tigris (Darwish, 1993; Gleick, 2000). However, water is a not a substitutable resource and the riparians of the Euphrates-Tigris river basin should cooperate with each other in light of this reality to find a sustainable and acceptable solution to the water problem. In this regard the EU Water Framework Directive (WFD) may serve as a tool for better management of the shared Euphrates and Tigris river basin.

WFD, which was adopted in October 2000 and published on 22 December 2000, is one of the most comprehensive arrangements of the EU in the field of water quality and quantity. The implementation of WFD is mandatory for the member states. The directive establishes common objectives and measures to achieve good status of water. It adopts an integrated river basin management system and requires member states to prepare river basin management plans. WFD promotes the harmonization and coordination of water management and information exchange between riparian states as well as stakeholder involvement in the governance of water resources. The EU candidate countries are also required to adopt the WFD (ec.europa.eu, 10-02-2012). Accordingly, Turkey started the implementation in 2000 but delayed it because of technical problems and costs of implementation (Moroglu andYazgan, 2008; 271). Its familiarity with WFD and upper-riparian status can facilitate the establishment of the cooperation, when this country is willing.

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In this context, my hypothesis is that an international cooperation between riparians of Euphrates and Tigris on the basis of environment, water quality as well as quantity related problems may have the potential to be an initiative that contributes to the discussion of the water allocation problems as well. At that point the main core ideas of the WFD can be a roadmap for the riparians. Some of these ideas are; the cooperation of the riparian countries in the framework of river basin management, the information exchange, harmonization of the management systems, stakeholder involvement, monitoring of water status etc. Instead of identical implementation of the articles of WFD, which may be hard for the parties; an initiative between governmental and non-governmental representatives from Turkey, Syria and Iraq may consider it as a guide to reach the sustainable management of shared rivers.

In order to control my hypothesis that a co-operation based on the main core ideas of WFD, can have positive impacts on the water problems in the Euphrates-Tigris river basin area; the shared river basins (Tejo, Minho, Lima, Douro, Guadiana) of Portugal and Spain is analyzed.

These states suffer from a water scarcity problem and they have a long history of water disputes. Both are EU members. They have started the implementation of the WFD. Do O authors claim that the core ideas of the WFD affected the problem positively (Do O, 2010; 268). Maia also claims that the cooperation between Portugal and Spain in the framework of WFD contributes to the implementation of the 1998 Convention on Co-operation for Protection and Sustainable Use of Portuguese-Spanish River Basins (Maia, 2003;389). The intention here is to find out to what extent the core ideas of the WFD have impact on the management of shared rivers and scarcity problem in the Iberian Peninsula and whether the results are applicable to the Middle-East case.

As the second case, the shared river basins (Rio Grande and Colorado rivers) between U.S. and Mexico will be analyzed to see whether the measures that have been taken there to resolve the water problems of shared rivers show any similarity with the water management system of the WFD. The aim is to gather information about the implementation of these core ideas outside the EU and their contribution to the management of shared rivers. Thereby lessons can be drawn for the main case of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers.

1.1 Research Goal and Research Questions

This study is interested in what kinds of impacts integrated water management policies have on the problems of shared rivers. And what are the institutional, political, economic and social settings, required for policy transfer to the Middle-East in the context of WFD principles. In order to address this research, it is important to establish the relationship between water problems and the implementation of integrated water management principles that are formulated in the EU WFD. Following this, two case studies investigate the relationship between water problems in the shared river basins and the impact of these principles.

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5 In this respect my main question is:

To what extent may the core ideas of the WFD be applied in the Euphrates and Tigris river basins and to what extent may these serve as cooperation grounds, which will lead to the solution of scarcity problems?

The sub-questions are:

• What is the situation in the Euphrates and Tigris River basins?

• Which factors have impact on the consensus over the Euphrates and Tigris case?

• What are the characteristics of the trans-boundary river basin system of the WFD that may serve as a solution map?

• To what extent can the main core ideas of the WFD be applied to the Middle-East case? • Which lessons can be drawn from the case study of the Spain-Portugal river basins in

connection with the implementation of the WFD?

• Is there any resemblance between the integrated water management measures implemented to solve the problems of shared rivers between U.S. and Mexico and the water management system of the WFD? What is the impact of these measures on the water problems and which lessons can be drawn for the Middle-East?

Data collection includes primary and secondary literature review and interviews with the professionals of water management.

The thesis consists of the next chapters:

The second chapter introduces policy transfer approach and gives a literature review on it. The relevant ideas of this approach are discussed for the Middle-East case.

The third chapter elaborates the water problem between Turkey, Syria and Iraq in the framework of a historical perspective. The political dimension and the status of the problem in international law are investigated. The Turkish GAP project, its current status is studied.

The fourth chapter elaborates the main core ideas of WFD and investigates the relation between international water law principles. In the last section the implementation of WFD in Turkey is highlighted.

The next chapter gives the outlines of the problems of trans-boundary river basins in the Iberian Peninsula. Within the framework of the relevant agreements the evolution of the problem up to the present day is discussed.

The sixth chapter investigates the problems of trans-boundary rivers between the USA and Mexico. This chapter gives the outlines of the problems and analyses the lessons, which can be drawn for the Middle-East.

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CHAPTER 2 THEORY OF POLICY TRANSFER

In the globalizing world the impact of increasing communication between states facilitates the exchange of experiences, ideas, programmes and policies. The literature about learning from the experiences of others is dispersed between many topics such as:

• diffusion; • policy-transfer; • lesson-drawing and • convergence.

This chapter gives a view of the theoretical framework. First a literature review on the theory of policy transfer is given. After this the relevant ideas for the Middle-East case are discussed.

2.2 Theoretical approach

The concepts of convergence, diffusion, policy-transfer and lesson-drawing are approximately about the same phenomenon namely the exchange of knowledge about policies, ideas and programmes. While policy transfer involves both voluntary and coercive methods of exchange; lesson-drawing and diffusion is based on voluntary communication that enables actors to adapt the gained knowledge to their own system. Convergence however, includes the implementation of more or less the same programme in more than one state.

The theory of Policy transfer is adopted because it involves voluntary methods and gives a more comprehensive account of the conditions in which policies are transferred. Also, it indicates that the policies are not copied but rather adapted to the conditions at home. Before elaborating on the policy transfer, it is useful substantially useful to mention the other concepts to make the reason for choosing policy-transfer approach clear.

Diffusion is defined as “the process by which an innovation is communicated through certain channels over time among members of a social system” (Rogers E.M, 2003; 5). This definition explains the diffusion as a decision taken by the ‘members of social system’. However Stone prefers to define it as a kind of inevitable. She says that “the ‘diffusion literature suggests that policy percolates or diffuses; something that is contagious rather than chosen. It connotes spreading, dispersion and dissemination of ideas or practices from a common source or point of origin.” (Stone, 2004; 546). This concept seeks to identify “the patterns according to which policies spread and the geographic and structural characteristics of countries which might explain them” (Stone, 2000a;4). However working with patterns forms the main handicap of the diffusion that it has little to say about the changing political dynamics that have impact on the policy adoption. Due to this characteristic Peters (1997; 76) qualifies diffusion as apolitical. Convergence is described as the possible result of the policy-transfer (Stone, 2004; 547). Bennett (Bennett, 1991; 32) suggests a 3 level of experience exchange: “knowledge about a programme, utilization of that knowledge and the adoption of the same programme” to explain the difference between convergence and diffusion. He puts diffusion into the first level while putting convergence into the ‘adoption of the same programme’ level. Here the cumulative

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adoption is dominant rather than the selective one. There is no absolute necessity for a direct link between states; convergence can happen in its absence. The pushing factors towards convergence are seen as industrialization, globalization or regionalization (Stone, 2004; 547). The increasing similarity between states is the result of adoption of the same policies.

The lesson-drawing, contrary to convergence, depends on the communication between agents and the selective adoption of the experiences. Except including only the voluntary methods, it has many commonalities with policy-transfer. Robertson claims that “Successful lesson-drawing depends on estimating the potential fungibility of a program and anticipating possible systemic, instrumental, or cost obstacles, whether or not they enter into political debate” (Robertson, 1991; 68). Policy transfer also emphasizes the impact of the political, economic and institutional conditions on the outcome of the process.

It is seen from the literature that the studies of policy-transfer were originally started in the USA to explain the adoption of policies and the spread of diffusion throughout the federal state (Stone, 2004; 546). Dolowitz and Marsh (1996; 344) define both policy-transfer and lesson-drawing as “ the process in which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions in one time and/or place is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements and institutions in another time and/or place”. This is not a determined process. Actors involved in the process, methods, objects, the outcomes and the degree of exchange can be diverse.

In the globalizing world governments face similar problems, which induce them to seek policy transfer. They sometimes search for foreign experiences as the easier, cheaper and faster way of solving a complex problem. In this respect governments can attempt to policy-transfer for the problems that need an urgent resolution (Dolowitz, 2000; 8). Along with the displeasure with the status-quo, the enforcement of another government or international organization and the interdependencies between states can also be reasons for policy-transfer.

Although nation-states are mostly mentioned as the agents of the transfer, these can be various. Actors engaged in transfer can be both governmental and non-governmental such as politicians, bureaucrats, civil servants, experts, non-governmental organizations, transnational and supra-national organizations, consultants, think tanks (Dolowitz, 2000;10), business representatives, in some problems the people that are directly affected through the problem can be actors of transfer.

The object that these various actors want to transfer can be policy goals, structure and content, policy instruments or administrative techniques, institutions, ideology, ideas, attitudes and concepts and negative lessons (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996; 350).

The actor composition may change according to whether it is a voluntary or coercive policy-transfer. Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) analyze the policy transfer methods under three topics:

• voluntary; • coercive and • indirect coercive.

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Not only the method but also the reason for transfer differs between the three. Communication is the main attribute of the voluntary transfer. The status quo, which turned out to be a disturbing deadlock, forms the ground to search for new lessons based on voluntary communication (Dolowitzand Marsh, 1996; 346). Here, the push for policy-transfer comes from inside the unit, where it should take place.

However in direct coercive transfer, the push comes from another government or organization. Examples of this kind of transfer are numerous when we consider the World Bank. In 2006 the World Bank’s conditional approval of a $75 million loan to a mining project in Ghana can be an appropriate example. Here the World Bank approved the amount under the condition that certain environmental criterion has to be met (Veenman, 2008; 2).

Indirect coercive transfer, on the other hand, is seen as the method between voluntary and direct coercive transfer. It emerges from externalities that come from outside the government. The environmental externalities from the US in pushed Canada to look to the US for lessons to make new environmental regulations (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996; 348).

Transferability of a programme may be determined by many factors. “Convenience of the problem, direct relationship between the problem and solution, fewer side-effects, more information agents and easily predicted outcomes are the transfer facilitating factors” (Rose, 1991; 21). Similarity of the political and institutional settings is also among these factors (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996).

Rose identifies five level of transfer as “copying, emulation, hybridization, synthesis and inspiration.

Copying indicates adoption of a programme, which is in use elsewhere, without any changes. “The easiest way to prove that copying has occurred is to examine the wording of the legislative” (Rose, 1991; 22)..

Emulation happens when a country “reject(s) copying in every detail, [but] accepts that a particular program elsewhere provides the best standard for designing legislation at home” (Rose, 1991; 22).

Hybridization and synthesis involve “combining elements of programmes found in two or more countries to develop a policy best-suited to the emulator” (Rose, 1991; 22)..

Finally, “studying familiar problems in an unfamiliar setting can expand ideas and inspire fresh thinking about what is possible at home” (Rose, 1991; 22).

The water conflict in the Middle-East is complicated through different political and institutional factors. The objective here is to investigate the transferability of the WFD ideas to the Middle-East on the basis of communication, which may bring about an inspiration.

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9 2.3 Middle-East and Policy Transfer

Continuing disputes in the Middle-East region reveal the urgent need to discuss the region’s issues in peaceful initiatives that include a wider scale of stakeholders beyond the governmental and military representatives such as non-governmental organizations, think tanks, scholars and people of the region. It is obvious that the harder the conflict is, the more difficult it is to find a resolution and consensus between stakeholders. However, through communication among stakeholders a wide spectrum of interests is considered and in that way the region can establish more effective solutions to its problems.

It is hard to estimate over the conflict-resolution potential of such a multi-actor voluntary communication in the Middle-East; while the government regimes of the parties are a matter of controversy and the problems are so intertwined. However, there are already some examples of voluntary communication in diverse fields, which show that the region has at least the potential to maintain such actions.

One of these actions is related to the Euphrates and Tigris problem. This is the Euphrates and Tigris Initiative for Cooperation (ETIC). It was established in May 2005 by a group of scholars and professionals from Syria, Turkey and Iraq. The aim of the ETIC is to promote the development of social, economic and technical cooperation between these countries (Kibaroglu, 2008; 182). It intends to lead the dialogue on the issues of the region and it s involves a wide range of stakeholders. It has organized workshops and projects for the riparians’ representatives. ETIC also aims at mobilizing faculty members and students in the regional universities to promote joint research and activities (Kibaroglu, 2008; 194).

Another example is the initiative of the International Dialogues Foundation (IDF) in the field of youth employment in the Middle-East and the European countries. IDF is an independent Dutch non-governmental organization but gained international character through inclusion of various members from Middle-East and Europe (Stone, 2000; 212). It organizes conferences and publishes reports in order to increase dialogue and understanding and to foster the cooperation between Western and Arab countries. Conferences were organized under the name of “Employment for Migrant Youth in Europe and in the Emigration Countries”. The participants were NGOs, civil servants and entrepreneurs from the Middle-East and Europe. Youth employment projects were investigated, in which many Arab organizations (including Iraq and Syria) were participated (Stone, 2000; 213).

This initiative is described as an indirect coercive policy transfer because participation in the projects was free but the nature of these projects was largely influenced by the funding priorities of the EU. The degree of transfer is inspiration because “the ideas are likely to be adapted and synthesized depending on each country’s individual characteristic” (Stone, 2000; 214).This initiative is expected to promote further policy transfer to the Arab world and cooperation between European and Middle-Eastern countries.

Water policy is one of the policy fields, where governments intensively look for foreign experiences to shape their water management policy. There are also many organizations such as OECD, UN World Water Development or The International Network of Basin Organizations (INBO) that induce the spread of water policies.

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The two case studies of the thesis give general information over the social, political and economic conditions in which principles of integrated water management are implemented. This information should give a base to assess the possibility of water policy transfer in the Middle-East.

As Bulmer et al. (2007) do, I prefer to make a distinction between the negotiation and implementation phases of WFD. Bulmer et al. (2007) describe the negotiation process of WFD as voluntary transfer because it is negotiated by member states and the implementation process as coercive transfer because implementation is obligatory for member states. According to this division, there is no obligation to implement the WFD as none of the Middle-Eastern countries are EU members. Nevertheless, there is a need for sustainable water management. On the other hand Turkey endeavors to join the EU, which requires the transposition of WFD into national law. Thus the policy transfer here is somewhere in between voluntary and coercive transfer in the continuum of policy transfer.

Instead of full implementation, I prefer to talk about the transfer of core ideas of the WFD, such as coordination of the water management policies, data exchange, stakeholder involvement in the governance of the policy and more specifically preparation of river basin management plans. These ideas are part of integrated water management approach. In other words, the WFD is anticipated as a roadmap that is discussed in a voluntary communication initiative that may be established between the riparians. From here it can be said the degree of the policy transfer is likely to be the ‘inspiration’ because “familiar problems in an unfamiliar setting is studied to expand ideas and inspire fresh thinking about what is possible at home” (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996; 351).

Before talking about reasons for choosing policy transfer, the concepts ‘voluntary’ and ‘communication’ need to be highlighted.

Rogers (2003; 35) defines communication as “a process in which participants create and share information with one another in order to reach mutual understanding”. Veenman describes characteristics of ‘communication’ as “different actors communicate about problems or policy issues, providing and creating knowledge and information and exchanging experiences” (Veenman, 2010; 6). Information exchanged and created in this way, namely through participation, information and experience sharing, stimulates actors to produce their own policies according to their conditions and needs.

The ‘voluntary’ method of the communication emphasizes that the governmental actors do not necessarily take part in this initiative (Veenman, 2010; 6). However excluding them would not be realistic since they are the water policy implementing agents. The driving force in voluntary transfer, seen as the “need coming from inside the government for policy change” rather than obligations, power imbalances or economic processes (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996; 346). However, the push coming from the non-governmental actors should also be listed as the driving force as it fits the description of the voluntary method above.

An initiative that is based on the main core ideas of WFD can be more effective when including all the stakeholders such as governmental representatives, NGOs , think tanks, people from the region and businessmen as much as possible. Wide scale stakeholder involvement contributes

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to the discussion of the problem with all the aspects. While the governmental actors think mostly in the framework of the political dimension of the problem, scholars and professionals contribute with data and research as the think tanks and NGOs.

Table 1 below constitutes a summary of the theory and questions from the Middle-East case.

Theory of Policy Transfer Euphrates-Tigris River Basin-Questions

1

Reasons to search for foreign experiences

Why should we adapt integrated water management i.e. WFD principles?

2 The source of need for policy transfer

Who sees a need for transfer of integrated water management i.e. WFD ideas?

3 The agents of policy transfer Who should transfer these ideas?

4 The level of policy transfer

Should we adapt these integrated water management i.e. WFD principles to our conditions or accept them

as a whole?

5 The object of policy transfer What should we transfer? Ideas, policies, concepts…

6 Type of policy transfer

Should we transfer these ideas through voluntary, coercive and indirect coercive methods?

7 Transferability of policy

Are the main core ideas of WFD i.e. integrated water management applicable to the Middle-East?

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CHAPTER 3 CONFLICT IN THE EUPHRATES-TIGRIS RIVER

BASIN

The problem on the Euphrates and Tigris rivers is complicated through disagreements on the issues such as whether the negotiations should exclusively be limited to the Euphrates or to include the Tigris as well; whether these rivers are international or not and whether the water should be shared or allocated.

This chapter analyzes the water conflict between Turkey, Syria and Iraq in its political and juridical context. The following points are discussed:

• The hydrological and the geological analysis of the river basins

• The historical evaluation of the problem and the impact of the non-water issues on the conflict

• South Anatolia Project (GAP)

• The important agreements and protocols among the parties that include water related components.

3.2 Hydrological and Geographical Characteristics

The Euphrates and Tigris rivers are the two longest rivers in southwest Asia (Kollars and Mitchell, 1991; 4). Both of them originate from highlands of Turkey flow through Syria and Iraq and empty in Persian Gulf. The Euphrates-Tigris river basin lies in a region with high mountains to the north-west and lowlands in south and east (Kibaroglu, 2002; 160).

The Euphrates River emerges around the city of Elazig in Turkey. Its total length is 2,780 km. It has a river basin area of 444,000km2wide. Thirty three per cent of Euphrates river basin lies in Turkey, 19 per cent in Syria and 46 per cent is in Iraq. Two main tributaries in Turkey are Murat and Karasu rivers. The main tributaries in Syria are Sacir, Balikh and Khabur. Almost 90 per cent of the waters of the river is generated in Turkey while Iraq makes no contribution to the run-off and Syria makes the remaining 10 per cent (Kibaroglu, Scheuman, 2011; 277). It loses a part of its flow into the series of deserts and distributaries after entering Iraq.

Tigris River emerges almost 30 km away from Euphrates near Lake of Hazar in south Elazig. It forms, before entering Iraq, the border, first between Syria and Turkey, then between Syria and Iraq. Fifteen per cent of it lies in Turkey while 0.3 per cent in Syria and 75 per cent in Iraq. Its total length is 1840 km and its river basin covers 387.600 m2area. The main tributaries in Turkey are the Tigris and Batman-su; in Iraq Great Zap, Little Zap, Adhaim and Diyalah. (Kibaroglu, 2002;16 ). Iraq is totally dependent on the Euphrates and Tigris for its freshwater needs (Haftendorn, 2000; 52).

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13 Figure 2. The Euphrates and Tigris River Basin

Source: http://www.britannica.com/bps/media-view/546/1/0/0

Both rivers flow through arid and semi-arid areas. Kollars and Mitchell (1994; 78) characterize the Middle-Eastern streams as being ‘exotic’, which means that “they rise in well-watered areas but before reaching the sea or some inland sink, they flow into an arid zone, where no more water is added, and they actually diminish in volume through evaporation and seepage…that makes them have seasonal periods of high water followed by periods of reduced flow”. Due to these seasonal fluctuations; the Euphrates flows 28 and the Tigris almost 80 times higher than their minimum.

Characteristics of sub-tropical Mediterranean climate in the river basin are wet winters and dry summers. They are evident mostly in southeastern Turkey and northern Syria and Iraq. While in the Mesopotamian plain annual rainfall is around 200 mm/m2; the winter precipitation is between 400-600 mm/m2 (Kibaroglu, 2002; 164). The summer season is characterized with high temperatures approaching 50 0C, relative low humidity and high evaporation rates especially in the lower regions of the basin.

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Due to high seasonal fluctuations (Kibaroglu, 2008), rapid developments on these rivers in recent years and lack of confidence among riparians that prevent data sharing, it is difficult to make a certain evaluation of the Euphrates and Tigris average discharge volume. Kollars and Mitchell claim that maximum average annual volume of the Euphrates reaches up to 35, 9 billion m3 (bcm)/year and of the Tigris up to 70, 4 bcm/year (Kollars and Mitchell, 1991; 3). Per capita water availability of the three riparians is at the threshold of falling into the ‘water stressed’ category. UN describes water stressed places as areas, where yearly water availability is below 1700 m 3 / per capita (http://www.un.org/waterforlifedecade/scarcity, 03-2012). According to UNESCO Report, per capita available water in Syria is 1440 m3/year, in Iraq 2920 m3/year and 2950 m3/year in Turkey (UNESCO, 2006). Along with the existing situation, the future demographic expectations are also aggravating the situation. The General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works estimates Turkish population as 100 million by 2030 and per capita available water as 1000 m3/year; while the availability in Syria in 2025 is estimated 770 m3 /year by UN Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (Aydin andEreker, 2009; 607)

3.3 History of the Hydro-political Relations in Euphrates-Tigris River Basin

Due to great differences in hydro-political relations in the first and the second half of the 20th century the analysis is divided into two periods i.e. from the 1920s to the 1960s and from the 1960s to the present.

3.3.1 From the 1920s to the 1960s

Kibaroglu characterizes the international water resources in this period as “harmonious” (Kibaroglu, 2000; 185). The three riparians of the Euphrates and Tigris were established at the beginning of the 20th century. Consequently, they were mainly engaged in state consolidation such as the establishment of new government institutions and investigation of development potential related to land and water resources in the first part of the century. This agenda prevented them from developing projects on these rivers.

The Treaties signed during this period such as the Lausanne Treaty of 1923 and the 1946 Treaty of Friendship and Neighbourly Relations between Turkey and Iraq mostly regulate the flood control measures rather than allocate water or promote cooperation.

3.3.2 From the 1960s to the present

After the first phase of state consolidation the riparians almost simultaneously started water development projects on the Euphrates and Tigris.

Turkey established its General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works (Turkish acronym DSI), which is the state agency responsible for utilization of water resources, in 1954. (Aydin, Eker, 2009; 608). In 1960 it started the construction of the Keban Dam on the Euphrates as part of the Lower Euphrates Project of Turkey. This project was extended and transformed to GAP later. In Syria the Baath Party, which came to the power in 1960, gave priority to the water development projects on the Euphrates. The Euphrates Valley Project was initiated for the purposes of irrigation of 640,000 hectares area, the generation of electricity, urban and

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industrial use and the prevention of floods through regulating the flow of the Euphrates (Kibaroglu, 2008; 186).

The picture is the same for Iraq. The Iraqi government developed the “Revolutionary Plan” in 1968 for irrigation and agricultural projects. Also some new state organizations such as the Higher Agriculture Council and The Soil and Land Reclamation Organization were established to carry out studies and to provide the development projects (Kibaroglu, 2008; 187).

With the Keban Dam in the upstream region, concerns rose in Iraq and Syria that their flow would be reduced. They claimed a guarantee of absolute minimum flow (Scheuman, 2003; 748). Syria and Iraq tried to manipulate the donors of the Keban Dam namely the World Bank and USAID (US Agency for International Development) to force Turkey to an agreement. Turkey avoided giving such a guarantee (Kibaroglu and Ünver, 2000; 313). Consequently, negotiations started in the 1960s.

During the first trilateral negotiations in Bagdad in 1965, Iraq proposed to establish a joint technical committee (JTC) with the power of supervising a water-sharing agreement. Turkey wanted a JTC with only the power of coordinating the development projects of the three states on the Euphrates and Tigris. Whereas Syria’s proposal was to establish the JTC with the power to study the water needs of the states for irrigation needs and to study the possibility of covering the water shortages of the Euphrates by diverting water from the Tigris. This proposal met with a strong rejection from Iraq (Kibaroglu and Ünver, 2000; 315). The meeting was fruitless.

In the meantime, Turkey unilaterally gave a guarantee for an annual minimum 350m3/sec flow at the end of the negotiations with USAID in Ankara, (Aydin, Ereker, 2009; 608).

In another meeting in 1973, a trilateral technical committee studied the development sites of the three riparians and a sub-committee was established to discuss a water allocation agreement. But the Turkish delegation declared that they found 18 bcm water amount that Iraq declared as their water need, exaggerated. Thus, providing this amount was impossible. Turkey claimed that Iraq was using water inefficiently and that their calculations were not based on objective criterion. The outcome of this meeting was the decision that hydrometric information on daily water reservoirs of Keban and Tabqa Dams would be exchanged between the parties (Kibaroglu and Ünver, 2000; 316).

Due to the uncoordinated construction plans of the riparians the problem was escalated to a war threat between Iraq and Syria in 1975. Turkey started with the filling of the Keban Dam while almost simultaneously Syria undertook the filling of the Tabqa Dam and Iraq the Habaniya Lake. As a result Iraq accused Syria of cutting its flow to intolerable levels. Syria refused this accusation and showed the filling of Turkey’s Keban Dam as the main reason of the reduction. Both states threatened each other with war and massed their troops to the border. Scheuman suggests that the competition for hegemony in the Arab world between two Arab Baath regimes was probably played a role in this situation (Scheumann, 2003; 748). The conflict was quieted with the mediation of Saudi Arabia and the then Soviet Union. An agreement was signed, which was not made wholly public. It was declared that through this agreement “Syria was

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allowed to keep 40 percent of the Euphrates’ that flows within its borders while the rest was to flow to Iraq” (Mehr, 2003; 259). Turkey also declared that it would increase the flow to downstream riparians to 450m3/sec (Scheumann, 2003; 748). However without a trilateral water agreement the conflict continues with periodic escalations.

Only two years after the exchange of war threats, Turkey initiated its Karakaya Dam on Euphrates River. Iraq used its oil card and threatened to cut its oil exports to Turkey and demanded immediate debt repayment. Consequently, Turkey increased the flow to Iraq in 1980. Later, during the meeting of the Joint Economic Commission Iraq and Turkey decided to establish the JTC with the power of information exchange about the construction works, definition of procedures and measures to determine the appropriate amount of water necessary for irrigation needs and to discuss plans for the filling of the Karakaya Dam (Scheumann, 748). Syria joined the JTC in 1983. Despite this improvement, the problem became more complex with the integrating political and security aspects through Kurdish problem in the 1980s.

In the 1980s the water conflict gained a new political dimension through the Kurdish problem in the region and the GAP. The Kurdish Worker Party (PKK) was established in Southeast Anatolia in 1982 as an armed organization. It has national claims over this region. Syria provided training bases for PKK militants in the Bekaa Valley, which were controlled by Syria, and allowed the party leader Abdullah Öcalan to stay in Syria (Scheumann, 2003; 749). Aydin and Ereker (2011; 610) claim that Syria supported the PKK as a response to the GAP project of Turkey. This made the water problem an issue of national security for Turkey.

In March 1985 a Border Security Agreement was signed between Turkey and Syria but after a short time the Syrian Prime Minister, during his visit to Ankara, stated that “they were not able to prevent PKK intrusion, but if GAP dams would retain an excessive amount of water, Syria could retaliate with other means” (Scheumann, 2003; 749).

During the Prime Ministry and later the Presidency of Turgut Özal between 1983 and 1993 Turkey pursued a more cooperative approach. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that the main principles were abandoned. During the Gulf War, the USA requested Turkey to reduce the water flowing to Iraq. However Özal refused and stated that Turkey would not use water as a threat (Scheuman, 2003; 749). Also, during the filling process of Karakaya dam, which became a new crisis between riparians, Özal promised more water flow annually to the downstream riparians. (Scheumann, 2003; 749). An Economic Cooperation Protocol between Syria and Turkey was signed. During this meeting a security protocol was also signed with Syria. Though Turkish scholars (Kibaroglu, 2002; Turan, 2011) claim these protocols show that the the Kurdish issue and water problem were dealt together by the riparians.

In the mid-90s the situation turned. Iraq came out of first the Gulf war. The PKK increased its activities against Turkey. At the same time, Turkey started the filling of the Atatürk Dam and informed Iraq and Syria that it would take 4 weeks. However, during this process, the flow of the Euphrates to the downstream riparians stopped for a month. While the Turkish side explained this with technical problems (Altinbilek, 2004; 16), Arab countries claimed that it was a deliberate action by Turkey.

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The result of this dispute was a failed oil agreement between Turkey and Iraq. However an agreement signed between Iraq and Syria in Damascus in 1990, in which parties agreed that regardless of water quantity, Syria would receive 42 per cent of Euphrates waters that flows within its boundaries while Iraq would receive the rest of 52 per cent (Gruen, 2000; 566). The problem went on with the construction of the Birecik Dam. Iraq and Syria managed a strong opposition in the international arena. They demanded that Arab League countries stop their financial support to the construction. The Arab League called Turkey for an agreement based on the equitable use of the waters. Downstream riparians warned international companies that they may cut them from their future business plans, if they fund GAP. Moreover, during peace negotiations with Israel in 2000, Syria wanted the USA and Israel to force Turkey to let more water to the down-stream countries as a compensation for their loss of Golan Heights (Aydin and Ereker, 2009; 612).

At the end of the 1990s relations changed after the ultimatum crisis between Turkey and Syria. Turkey sent an ultimatum to Syria in 1998 saying that as soon as Syria supported PKK and let its leader Abdullah Öcalan to stay in its territory, it would be ready to go to war with Syria. After almost a month of war threat exchanges, Syria deported Abdullah Öcalan and the delegations of the two countries signed the Adana Protocol on 19-20 October 1998. This protocol promotes cooperation in the field of security but does not include any relevant article regarding the water issue (Karmon, 1999).

In this new period, the land and water development administrations of both countries; i.e. GAP and GOLD, started to cooperate in the field of making environmental protection projects, which provide sustainable utilization of regional land and water resources; training programmes, expert and technology exchanges and study missions (Kibaroglu, Ünver, 2000; 189).

The 2000s refers to a new period for Iraq as well. After the US invasion in 2003, establishment of updated databases became a priority and under the impact of US organizations such as the US Bureau of Oceans, Environmental and Scientific Affairs, USACE and USAID, the Ministry of Water Resources in Iraq was reorganized. Within this framework Iraqi authorities emphasize the importance of cooperation and data exchange (Kibaroglu, 2008). However there is still a trust problem. Iraqi people are skeptical of Turkey, due to its water reductions during the hard times of Iraq during wars (Orsam, Interview with Al-Mossavi, 2012). The ongoing chaos in Iraq also forms a barrier for further cooperation.

After a long time, high level visits were made between the two states. Political, economic and cultural relations were improved. Turkey in this period emphasized the good neighbourship policy (Ministry of Foreign Affairs). The ministers of both sides often mentioned their faith in finding a resolution to the water problem in this atmosphere. In April 2008 within this framework the three riparians started to negotiate through water institute that consists of the water experts of them, to find a reasonable solution (FAO, 2008). A high Level Strategic Cooperation Council was established among riparians. Four pieces of water-related Memorandum of Understanding were signed between Turkey and Syria on the establishment of Orontes Friendship Dam by pumping water from the Tigris on the Syrian side, on the fight

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against drought, and on the protection and improvement of water quality (Interview 3).Also Iraq and Syria signed an agreement in 2002 that allowed Syria to install a pumping station on the Tigris for irrigation purposes (FAO, 2008).

A significant development in this period is the establishment of the Euphrates-Tigris Initiative for Cooperation (ETIC) in 2005. This initiative was established by scholars and experts from the three riparians as well as Jordan and the U.S. to promote cooperation. The experts shared information about the national water policies and to develop a common understanding of the situation in the region. This voluntary initiative also aims at contributing to dialogue among the governments and creating sub-networks by bringing together different private stakeholder groups including farmers, community-based organizations, NGOs, business and professional societies (Interview 3). Kibaroglu, as one of its founders says, that “it embraces a holistic, multi-sectoral approach as opposed to one simply aimed at sharing the river flow”. (Kibaroglu, 2008; 192). However, it faces some challenges such as the lacking of institutional structure and funding (Interview 3). This initiative works through workshops, seminars and joint studies and meets each year. The last meeting took place in May 2012 in Istanbul and here the parties decided to extend the database for national and international law regarding water conflicts (Max Plac Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law).

Nevertheless, the distrust in Syria could mean a break in the good relations. The consequences of this recent situation are not clear yet.

3.4 Southeast Anatolia Development Project (GAP)

Understanding Turkey’s development intentions on the Euphrates and Tigris rivers is essential, due to its upper-riparian position.

GAP is considered as one of the most extensive river basin projects in the developing countries (Harris, 2002; 745). It was launched in 1977 and consists of 22 dams and 19 hydroelectric power plants on the Euphrates and the Tigris within the Turkish territory. The project aims at the irrigation of 1, 65 million hectare areas and an annual 27 billion kWh energy generation (Carkoglu and Eder, 2001; 48). By 2007, 14 dams and 7 hydropower plants had been built. Seventy two per cent of the hydropower generation and 12 per cent of the irrigation areas has been realized (Altinbilek, 2004;25). The total amount needed for full implementation of GAP is $32 billion and almost this entire amount is financed by the Turkish state itself. International organizations such as the World Bank or UNDP finance only limited activities related to social and economic development aspects of projects such as establishing women centers, literacy programmes or urban rehabilitations in order to avoid contributing to the water conflict (Harris, 2002; 749).

The project is managed by DSI. It is part of the Ministry of Water Affairs and Forestry. DSI is charged with the utilization of surface and ground waters, the prevention of soil erosion, building protective structures against floods, draining swamps, building irrigation and drainage systems, constructing hydroelectric power generation plants and developing all stages of water supply (Mitchell and Kollars, 1991; 8).

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GAP covers a 75, 358 km2area, which includes Adiyaman, Gaziantep, Mardin, Siirt, Sirnak, Diyarbakir and Urfa cities of Turkey. Southeast Anatolia is the least developed province of the 7 provinces in Turkey (Carkoglu and Eder, 2001; 44).

GAP means a wide-range of objectives for Turkey, such as reducing its dependence on imports in energy sector or being a food importer in the region. Kollars and Mitchell (1991; 2) say that the energy use between 1975 and 1982 in Turkey increased by 30 per cent; while the inland production increased by 24 per cent. Thirty nine per cent of its energy use came from petroleum imports. With this project Turkey may be an electric importer in the region.

With improved living standards as a result of project implementation, the support for the separatist PKK is expected to disappear. Harris (2002; 749) claims that this political goal is the main point of the project. “As the centerpiece of GAP development, water serves as the integrating resource that has the potential to resolve long-standing conflicts in the region… For example, it is possible that the aggressive development of the southeast will provide the possibility that improvement of living standards in the southeast may undermine bases for the Kurdish separatism and enhance legitimacy of the Turkish state.”

However, the downstream riparians also have a stake in the Euphrates-Tigris river basin. They also initiated some development works. It is claimed that if Turkey completely implements GAP, it will consume annually 10 bcm water. That means the reduction of the Euphrates by one third. In that case, Syria can realize only 42 per cent of its project while the percentage of project realization by Iraq is 40 (Scheumann, 2003; 752). It can be seen from the Annex I and II that the existing dam and barrages on these rivers have already exceeded the capacity of rivers. The negative impacts of the GAP on downstream riparians are predicted more or less as follows: The flow from Turkey to Syria will be reduced from 30 bcm to 16 bcm. On the other hand the flow to Iraq will decrease from 16 bcm to 5 bcm (Hakki, 2006; 444). Also as a result of increased irrigation and agricultural activities in the upstream area; the use of fertilizers and agricultural chemicals as well as the salinity level will increase. As a result making agriculture will no longer be possible (Beaumont, 1996: 142) in the downstream areas.

Turkey claims that dams built on the Euphrates help Turkey to maintain a minimum monthly average of 500 m3/sec flow to Syria (Altinbilek, 2004; Scheumann, 2003). Turkey has also tried to present positive arguments against the environmental considerations, such as the one that came from the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) in 2001. In the UNEP Report Turkey is blamed for building large dams and damaging the ecosystems. Moreover, it is said that 90 per cent of the marshlands of Mesopotamia had disappeared between 1970 and 2000 (UNEP, 2001). As a response Turkey claimed that “although the period 1999–2001 encompassed dry years for the Euphrates, a sizeable portion of the flow of the rivers was still flowing into the Gulf unused. The main cause of the disappearance of the marshlands was the construction of drainage engineering works such as levees, drainage canals, control structures and gates built by Iraq.”(Altinbilek, 2004; 30).

For Syria, the Euphrates River represents 86 per cent of the available water supply (Zawahri, 2006; 1044). It means that the country is dependent on the river for drinking water, agricultural

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and industrial use. In 1979 electric generation from the Euphrates namely Tabqa Dam accounts for 70 percent of all generation of electricity. The country is facing electric and water shortages, which it intends to resolve through development projects, mainly on the Euphrates. Between 1985 and 1998 the irrigated areas in Syria increased from 650,000 to 1, 2 million hectare (Kolars and Mitchell, 1991; 3).

In Syria the emphasis has been put on the supply-side management until recently. This causes inefficiency in water use along with the low water availability. Government subsidies for farmers and high crop prices contributed to the groundwater extractions for irrigation use. However, in the last few years the Syrian government started water pricing and demand-side management policies to get efficiency. It has involved the beneficiaries of irrigation systems in the costs of development (Salman and Mualla, 2008, 13).

Iraq’s situation is more vulnerable. The country is totally dependent on the Euphrates and the Tigris for freshwater resources and two-thirds of Iraq is desert. Currently, it is using 97 per cent of its available water resources (Zawahri, 2006; 1045). These rivers mean self-sufficiency in agricultural production for all the riparians. After the wars Iraq’s irrigation system was totally destroyed. Water management is divided between several authorities, which make the coordination a difficult task. This fact is the same for all three riparians.

In the last few years NGOs were established by Iraqi people regarding the protection of water in Iraq (FAO, 2008). Also a draft law was approved to form a national water council in June 2012 to contribute the participation in water management and to negotiate with neighboring countries regarding water issues (newspaper article Al-shorfa).

Because of climate conditions, high evaporation rates and the inefficient policies of these countries the region faces considerable water problems. Irrigation is done in all the riparians, but mainly in Syria and Iraq, through traditional methods, which causes high salinity. (Salman and Mualla; 2008). This makes new sustainable policies unavoidable.

3.5 Agreements and Protocols

Indeed, none of the agreements since 1920 were mainly on water relations. Here some significant agreements and protocols are studied. These agreements do not include any water share or allocation mechanism that may serve as a resolution. Rather they regulate issues such as building flood control measures on these rivers.

3.5.1 The Lausanne Peace Treaty 1923

The Lausanne Treaty is a kind of establishment declaration of Turkey. At the time of signing Iraq and Syria were under the mandate of the United Kingdom and France. Article 109 determines that in case of tracing a new border between states that would have impact on the water facilities of others, the interests of the parties must be shared through an agreement. It does not indicate any share or principles of water use (Lausanne Treaty).

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3.5.2 The Treaty of Friendship and Neighborly Relations 1946

This treaty was concluded between Iraq and Turkey. It provides a framework for the two parties to deal with their interests in the Euphrates-Tigris river basin and tributaries mainly within the framework of building up flood control works (Kibaroglu, 2002; 222).

3.5.3 The 1987 Economic Protocol

The protocol of 1987 was concluded between Turkey and Syria. With this agreement a minimum of 500 m3/sec. water flow should be delivered to Syria. However, this is agreed only for a definite period namely ‘during the filling of Atatürk dam’. Iraq objected to this protocol because 500 m3/sec. did not meet the minimum limit of his legitimate rights to the waters of the Euphrates (Inan, 2002, 14). The protocol emphasizes the importance of cooperation in water issues, speeding up the works of the JTC and the organization of joint irrigation and power generation projects on the Euphrates and the Tigris.

3.6 Riparian Approaches and International Water Law

Despite the negotiations going on between Syria, Iraq and Turkey for more than four decades, they have still not been able to reach a tripartite water agreement.

Turkey makes a difference between international and trans-boundary waters and puts the Euphrates and the Tigris in the second category. According to the Turkish approach “international rivers are those, which forms the border between two or more riparians” (Gruen, 1998, 572) while the trans-boundary rivers are those, which are under a state’s sovereignty until they flow into the border of another state. This approach is described as “Absolute territorial sovereignty” or ‘Harmon Doctrine’1which claims that “a state has the right to do whatever it chooses with the waters that flow through its boundaries, regardless of its effect on any other riparian state” (Yonatan Lupu, 2007; 5).

The Harmon Doctrine, which is cited several times by Turkish officials, has already been declared as obsolete by the international tribunal over the Lax Lanoux case in 1957 (Wolf, 1990; 18) and many scholars. Among them is Dante Caponera, the international legal authority, who drafted the International Law Association’s Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers in 1992 (Gruen, 1998; 572) and. As a result of this doctrine, Turkey claims that an agreement between the parties should regulate ‘how to allocate water’ but not ‘how to share water’.

Syria and Iraq however, defend the doctrine of ‘absolute territorial integrity’ which is also seen as obsolete (Burleson, 2005; Kibaroglu; Yonatan Lupu, 2007). As per this doctrine, upper riparians’ activities to harness water that would harm the lower riparian countries can be vetoed by them. According to Yolatan Lupu (2007; 5) “Iraq would then have the strongest position, essentially it will able to veto any Turkish –or even Syrian- plans to build waterworks along the Tigris and the Euphrates. Such a situation would award a disproportionate share of power to Iraq….and result in the underutilization of the Tigris and Euphrates because Iraq does not have

1_{This doctrine is the U.S. State Attorney-General Judson Harmon’s juridical advice over the rights and the} obligation of the parties regarding theutilization of the Rio Grande waters between U.S. and Mexico (Mccaffrey, 1996).

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sufficient demand to use all the waters of both rivers”. Instead of these both obsolete and deadlock generating doctrines international law presents the ‘limited territorial sovereignty principle’ to apply to international water agreements.

International law, serves with a mechanism to regulate water quantity and quality related issues between the riparians of international waters (Fischhendler, 2004; 282). One of the greatest steps in international law in the field of water disputes is the UN Convention on the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses signed in 1997 (Burleson, 2005; 10042). The convention makes no difference between international and trans-boundary watercourses (Gruen, 200; 572) and defines ‘international watercourse’ as “a watercourse parts of which are situated in different states” (UN Convention, 1).

In second the part of the convention general principles to be applied to international watercourses were agreed. “Equitable and reasonable utilization and participation” and “not to cause a significant harm” are set as principles to apply to agreements. In article 6 factors that are relevant for equitable and reasonable use were determined. Some of these factors are “geographic, climatic, ecological factors; social, economic needs of the riparians, the population that depends on these waters and the existing and potential uses of these waters” (UN Convention, 5).

Article 8 emphasizes the importance of cooperation among riparians on the basis of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, mutual benefit and good faith in order to attain optimal utilization and adequate protection of an international watercourse (UN Convention, 5). Cooperation between riparians is characterized as an obligation. It is suggested that article 5 to 7 must be read in a combination that will mean the “balance between sovereignty and integrity” (Burleson, 2005; 10043).

However, according to Wolf the convention institutionalizes the conflict between upstream and downstream riparian by calling for both ‘equitable use’ and the obligation of ‘not to cause appreciable harm’. ”These two principles are in implicit conflict in the setting of an international waterway; upstream riparians have advocated that the emphasis between the two principles be on ‘equitable use’ since that principle gives the needs of the present the same weight as those of the past. In contrast, downstream riparians have pushed for emphasis on ‘no significant harm’ which effectively protects the pre-existing uses, generally found in the lower reaches of most major streams” (1998, 252).

The Convention also emphasizes the protection and presentation of the ecosystem of international water systems (Burleson, 2005; 10044).

The Convention requires 35 ratifications to come into force, which it still lacks. Syria is one of the few countries who ratified the Convention. During the making of the Convention this country was active and able to put a provision to Article 33 in the Convention that says if the parties could not find any resolution after six months of negotiations on the demand of a single party a commission of inquiry can be created (Gruen, 2000; 573). Iraq accessed to the Convention in 2001, while Turkey is one of the three states that voted against it. Turkey claims that the Convention gives a veto right to the downstream riparians on development projects (Burleson, 2005; 1044). Thus “it should have only set out only general principles and not

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establish a mechanism for planned measures, which has no basis in international law” (Gruen, 2000; 573).

The water conflict in the Middle-East is a complex one. The Kurdish problem’s impact on the water issue, the country’s obsolete approaches, lack of trust hence lack of healthy information over the real status of water quality and quantity all contributed to this complexity and prevented the international water commission JTC to work efficiently and to produce cooperation among riparians.

However after a decades-long conflict, non-coordination among riparians and inefficient water use policies; the governments as well as the non-governmental actors realize the need for new sustainable policies to protect their waters. The riparians started with revitalization of national water policies. More participation in water management is promoted through different groups. In the international arena they started to the negotiations over the Euphrates and Tigris. These countries have common historical and cultural features and strong economic relationships that can help improve cooperation. Nevertheless, the impact of the recent distrust in Syria is still not clear. The Turkish government’s attitude towards Syria during the last months was not appreciated by the Syrian government. Thus, this may be a break in the calmer relations. At the same time Turkey’s statement not to use water as a weapon, hence not to reduce the water flowing into Syria (Interview 3) during this period may help to bring the newly started water negotiations further.

Sustainable Management of the Water Conflicts : Euphrates and Tigris River Basin