EXPLAINING POLITICAL CORRUPTION IN UNLIKELY PLACES:
THE CASE OF JOS VAN REY
Thesis - Research Master in Political Science and Public Administration
Student: Daan Jacobs Student number: s0924563 Supervisor: Dr. F. De Zwart Second reader: Prof.dr. P. Kopecky Number of words (including footnotes and references): 11694
2
Abstract
Political corruption is a more or less universal phenomenon, but occurs much more frequently in some places than in others. This variation has been attributed to a range of factors on which countries perform either poorly or well. Yet, political corruption also occurs in countries that seem to perform well on most known indicators. As this has been an object of little scholarly attention, it remains largely unclear how we can explain the occurrence of political corruption in ‘unlikely places’; countries where such corruption is theoretically least likely to occur. This study explores the contours of an explanation by investigating a
particular case in-depth: the case of Jos van Rey. The results suggest four potential
explanations, that range from conceptual issues to the possibility that political corruption in unlikely places is to some extent unique, and driven by a distinct set of factors.
3
Introduction
In 2012, the Dutch police raided the home and office of Jos van Rey, a senator and local politician. It quickly became clear that this was because he was suspected of several crimes that included bribery, embezzlement and electoral fraud.1 In a country where corruption is generally considered to be a rare phenomenon2,the indictment of Van Rey sent shockwaves through the political system of the Netherlands. As a former MP, he was an influential member of the ruling VVD party. Moreover, his 34 years as a councillor and alderman had made him a major player in the political scene of his hometown Roermond.3 The initial shock turned into a lasting upset when, after a lengthy trial, Van Rey was convicted for breaching confidentiality, accepting bribes, and committing electoral fraud4. He appealed, but his conviction was upheld. Jos van Rey was sentenced to a twelve-month suspended prison sentence, and would be barred from holding public office for two years.5
By some measures, this case could be considered an example of political corruption; a particular type of corruption in which elected officials abuse the authority of their office, often for personal or political gain (see Amundsen, 1999; Heidenheimer, 2002). Many explanations for the occurrence of such corruption have been suggested. For example, it is thought that political corruption is closely related to widespread poverty (Gupta, 1995; Xin & Rudel, 2004), and considerable state intervention in the economy (Sung, 2002; Gerring & Thacker, 2005). Similarly, the occurrence of political corruption has been attributed to a lack of democratic institutions like free and fair elections (Warren, 2004; Lindstedt & Naurin, 2010), an independent judiciary (Blake & Martin, 2006; Alt & Lassen, 2008), and a free press
1 van der Steen, P. & Dohmen, J. (2015, January 15). Corruptiezaak rondom Jos van Rey blijkt nog groter. NRC. 2 Transparency International. 2017. Corruption Perceptions Index 2016. Retrieved from
https://www.transparency.org/.
3 de Graaf, P. (2016, July 12). ’Van Rey is een geval uit het boekje’. De Volkskrant.
4 Van Lonkhuyzen, L. (2016, July 12). ‘Jos van Rey veroordeeld tot taakstraf van 240 uur.’ NRC. 5 van der Steen, P. (2019, July 9). ‘Hoge Raad: Van Rey terecht veoordeeld voor corruptie.’ NRC.
4 (Lederman et al., 2005; Freille et al., 2007). The occurrence of political corruption has also been tied to ineffective law enforcement, such as a low probability of getting caught (Meier & Holbrook, 1992; Sosa, 2004), or overly permissive legislation (Heywood, 1997; Rhodes, 1997).
However, many of these ‘straightforward’ explanations do not seem to hold in this particular case. As a consolidated democracy, the Netherlands has “a strong record of safeguarding political rights and civil liberties”.6 Its elections are generally free and fair, its judiciary independent and its press free.7 It has a well-developed, market-based economy in which poverty is uncommon.8 Although a Council of Europe working group was critical about existing measures to prevent the occurrence of political corruption, noting that they place “a large degree of responsibility on the members of government”, it also concludes that the “system of government in the Netherlands is based on solid constitutional principles providing a framework where the government and its members are subject to a high degree of political accountability”.9
This presents a puzzle. According to existing explanations for the occurrence of political corruption, whether such corruption is more or less likely to occur depends on how well a country performs on certain indicators. In doing so, these explanations imply the existence of countries that perform relatively on most of these indicators, and in which the occurrence of political corruption is therefore theoretically unlikely. However, extant theory cannot readily account for the occurrence of political corruption in such ‘unlikely places’. Because these countries already perform well on most relevant indicators, that theory provides
6 Freedom House. (2019). Netherlands country report 2019.
https://freedomhouse.org/country/netherlands/freedom-world/2019 (22-03-2020).
7 Reporters Without Borders. (2019). World press freedom index. https://rsf.org/en/netherlands (22-03-2020). 8 OECD Data. (2017). Poverty rate. https://data.oecd.org/inequality/poverty-rate.htm (22-03-2020).
9 GRECO. (2018). Evaluation report Netherlands – Fifth Evaluation Round.
5 little more than an explanation for the absence of political corruption. This is problematic, because countries where political corruption is theoretically unlikely are by no means corruption-free – as the case of Jos van Rey illustrates. This prompts the following question:
How can we explain the occurrence of political corruption in unlikely places?
In this study, I will answer that question by studying the case of Jos van Rey in-depth. Using an inductive approach, I analyse a range of different sources to determine which factors are likely to have contributed to the occurrence of political corruption in this case. I then use the results of this analysis to formulate a number of potential explanations for the occurrence of political corruption in unlikely places. The academic relevance of this study stems from its capacity to further develop existing theories for the occurrence of political corruption. By studying the limits of these theories, the study expands our understanding of the reasons why political corruption occurs – in likely and unlikely places alike. This also feeds into its practical relevance. By increasing our knowledge of why political corruption occurs, this study will help policy-makers to develop the tools that fight such corruption more effectively.
This study will continue as follows. First, I will briefly introduce the concept of political corruption and what qualifies as an ‘unlikely place’. Next, I will review the literature to establish common causes for the occurrence of political corruption. Following a
description of the method and data, I will describe the case and present the main results. After an analysis, in which I reflect on the implications for extant theory, I wrap up with a
conclusion that outlines the main implications and limitations, and makes several suggestions for future research.
6
Political corruption
Although it is often used colloquially, there is little consensus about the meaning of political corruption. Two approaches dominate the literature. On the one hand, there are studies that define political corruption simply as acts of corruption that are committed by elected officials (c.f. Philp, 1997; Lancaster & Montinola, 2001). These studies usually see corruption as a class of acts that are illegal or violate norms regarding the conduct of public officials, take place in the public sphere, result in some private or partisan gain and involve the abuse of power or trust (c.f. Peters & Welch, 1978; Della Porta & Vanucci, 1997). For example, Nye (1989: 966) defines corruption as “behaviour which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private regarding (personal close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private regarding influence.” Whether this behaviour constitutes a case of political corruption, depends on whether the individual exhibiting such behaviour is an elected official (c.f. Tignor, 1993).
However, some scholars have rightfully pointed out that there is nothing particularly
political about the corruption that these definitions describe. As an alternative, these scholars
generally propose definitions of political corruption that focus on the extent to which corrupt acts undermine democratic virtues (Johnston, 1983; Fackler & Lin, 1995). For example, Warren (2006: 804) has put forward a definition in which political corruption refers to acts of ‘duplicitous exclusion’; acts that exclude certain citizens from access to public services or decision-making, and are generally considered unacceptable. Yet, these definitions also have a number of drawbacks. By focusing exclusively on acts that undermine the democratic virtues that elected officials are expected to uphold, they expand the concept of political corruption to include all kinds of authoritarian behaviour that would not usually be
considered corruption. At the same time, the definitions also exclude a number of acts that are in fact associated with political corruption.
7 An ideal definition of political corruption finds a middle ground between these two approaches. This involves recognizing that political corruption is often indistinguishable from other types of corruption, whilst acknowledging that its nature is fundamentally different. Brooks (1909) provides a useful perspective. In an extensive discussion of the meaning and nature of political corruption, he defines corruption as “the intentional misperformance or neglect of a recognized duty, or the unwarranted exercise of power, with the motive of gaining some advantage more or less directly personal” (Brooks, 1909: 4). The defining feature of political corruption, he argues, lies in the duty that a public official is expected to perform. Whereas ordinary corruption concerns negligence of duty in general, political
corruption only refers to acts that neglect a duty to the welfare of public institutions – or as he puts it, “the state” (Brooks, 1909: 6).
This third approach could be used to distinguish political from more generic types of corruption. Both kinds of corruption would take on similar shapes; acts like embezzlement, electoral fraud, and breach of trust could be examples of either ordinary or political
corruption. To qualify as political corruption, the perpetrator of these acts would have to have a duty to protect the welfare of public institutions. For example, if the individual committing corruption has a duty to uphold the integrity of an electoral process, any act that decreases the legitimacy of an election would constitute political corruption (c.f. Rose-Ackerman, 1999; LeHoucq, 2003). However, if the duty of that individual was limited to administrating an election, the same act would constitute ‘mere’ ordinary corruption. In practice, this means that political corruption is more likely to take on some shapes than others. Although money laundering and embezzlement could be acts of political corruption, bribery and campaign finance violations are much more likely to qualify.
8
‘Unlikely places’
The object of this study is to explain how political corruption can occur in places where its occurrence can be considered unlikely. In this case, ‘unlikely’ reflects the probability that the conditions in a particular country are such, that political corruption cannot reasonably be expected to occur with considerable frequency (see Heath et al., 2016). The probability itself is a logical extension of theories about the relative frequency with which political corruption occurs. Because these theories explain differences in that frequency by comparing the characteristics of countries where such corruption is common to the characteristics of countries where it is not (see Freckleton et al, 2012; Avnimelech et al., 2014), they create a reference group of countries that possess the ‘right’ characteristics to prevent political corruption from taking place. This implies that there are countries in which political corruption is more and less likely to occur, and it is to this latter group of countries that ‘unlikely places’ refer.
Although the concept has occasionally been alluded to in previous studies, no clear definitions exist. This is in part due to the fact that it is hard to determine exactly what does and does not qualify as an ‘unlikely place’. In what might be termed a strict approach, the concept would only encompass countries that perform the best on all factors that have been found to deter political corruption. However, this approach would exclude a large number of countries that may not perform the best, but do perform considerably better than most (c.f. Treisman, 2000; Fisman & Gatti, 2002). A more useful approach would instead define unlikely places as all countries that perform relatively well on all relevant indicators. While this definition does not provide a clear demarcation line between the countries that can and cannot be considered unlikely places, it does provide some guidance to distinguish the one from the other.
9 Applying this definition to real-world cases of political corruption suggests that there are plenty to choose from. In 2006, an alderman from the Walloon area of Belgium was tried and convicted for misspending public money in a bout of “nepotism and favouritism”.10 Similarly, a 2010 case from Sweden involved a high-ranking municipal politician that was arrested for accepting bribes from a local construction firm.11 Like the Netherlands, Belgium and Sweden are consolidated democracies12 with well-developed, market-based economies and relatively effective law enforcement.1314 Both cases also involved elected officials whose political prominence meant that their corruption was interpreted as having harmed trust in the political institutions of which they were a part.1516 Although it is not clear how many cases there are in total, these cases two suggest that political corruption in unlikely places is not an exceptional phenomenon.
Explaining political corruption
Common explanations for the occurrence of political corruption can be divided in three categories; structural factors, institutional factors, and individual factors. Structural factors ascribe the occurrence of corruption to the more or less objective characteristics of a territorial unit that have a similar influence on all individuals within that unit. A first set of
10 Author unknown. (2006). Affaire ICDI: 2 ans de prison avec sursis er sanctions financières pour Lucien
Cariat. RTL Belgium. https://www.rtl.be/info/belgique/faits-divers/affaire-icdi-2-ans-de-prison-avec-sursis-et-sanctions-financieres-pour-lucien-cariat-298809.aspx (23-03-2020).
11Author unknown. (2010). Corruption scandal widens. Radio Sweden.
https://sverigesradio.se/sida/artikel.aspx?programid=2054&artikel=4078351 (23-03-2020).
12 Freedom House. (2019). Belgium country report 2019.
https://freedomhouse.org/country/belgium/freedom-world/2019 (28-03-2020); Freedom House. (2019). Sweden country report. https://freedomhouse.org/country/sweden/freedom-world/2019 (28-03-2020).
13 World Bank. (2015). Country data report for Belgium.
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/543471467995625052/Country-Data-Report-for-Belgium-1996-2014 (28-03-2020).
14 World Bank (2015). Country report for Sweden.
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/361301468191356999/Country-data-report-for-Sweden-1996-2014 (28-03-2020).
15 Samyn, S. (2006). Charleroi alweer in de ban van politiek schandaal. De Standaard.
https://www.standaard.be/cnt/gf1s7vj9 (28-03-2020).
16 Martin, R. 2011. Bribery scandal rocks Stockholm area. The Local. https://www.thelocal.se/20110609/34254
10 factors concerns the quality of legislation and law enforcement. For example, it has been found that both liberal party finance regulations (Williams, 2000) and lenient sentences (Klitgaard, 1988) can stimulate the occurrence of political corruption by providing legal incentives to do so. Similarly, corruption is more likely to occur if public officials are not regularly audited (Walsh 1978) or anti-corruption laws are inconsistently enforced (Fijnaut & Huberts, 2002; Pande, 2007), predominantly because this decreases the extent to which rules and regulations act as a deterrent.
A second set of structural factors concerns the degree of democratic control. For example, if public officials have large discretionary space (Xin & Rudell, 2004), or a state structure is highly devolved (Morris, 2009), opportunities for political corruption will be plentiful. Similarly, if elections are not free and fair (Warren, 2004; Lindstedt & Naurin, 2010) the press is insufficiently free (Giglioli, 1996), or a political system is dominated by one or two parties (Scott, 1969; Chang, 2005) that face little electoral competition
(Przeworski et al, 1999; Montinola & Jackman, 2002), corruption is less likely to have electoral consequences and will find it easier to take root. Finally, if either the judiciary (Blake & Martin, 2006; Alt & Lassen, 2008) or public prosecutors (Van Aaken et al., 2010) are insufficiently independent, political corruption is less likely to be punished and therefore more likely to occur.
A final set of structural factors concerns the permissiveness of economic conditions. While these factors can affect the occurrence of all political corruption, they are most likely to facilitate acts that involve the misappropriation of public funds. For example, if a state features an unusually large public sector (Goel & Nelson, 1998), officials will have more opportunities to embezzle or launder public money. Similarly, if a state regularly intervenes in the economy (Goldsmith, 1999; Sung & Chu, 2003), or is in the middle of an economic transition (Kneen, 2000), officials will find it easier to seek rent for awarding public
11 contracts. The same is true for poverty (Sung, 2002; Welch & Peters, 1977); if poverty is widespread, officials will find it easier to demand bribes in exchange for access to those services. Finally, if there is a particularly large gap between public and private sector wages (Meier & Holbrook, 1992), officials might be more tempted to supplement their income by accepting such bribes.
If structural factors concern the more or less objective characteristics of a territorial unit, institutional factors reflect the “stable, valued, recurring patterns of behavior”
(Huntington, 1965) from which political corruption emerges. Many factors in this category revolve around the notion that corruption is first and foremost a cultural phenomenon. For example, it is thought that countries with patrimonial (Smith, 1964) or traditionalistic
(Johnston, 1983) cultures are more likely to feature political corruption because relationships are often personal, hierarchical, or clientelist in nature (Fackler & Lin, 1995; Reed, 1996). This notion is closely connected to ideas about the role of public morality. According to some studies, political corruption is best seen as a symptom of inappropriate norms about the role and nature of public service (Nice, 1983). If rent-seeking behaviour is considered acceptable (Wade, 1982), or if public office is generally accepted to be a vehicle for upwards social mobility (Della Porta & Pizzorno, 1996), political corruption is likely to occur.
A different way in which institutional factors can affect the occurrence of political corruption, is through so-called ‘historical path-dependencies’ (Smith, 1964; Euben, 1978). This approach is defined by the notion that political corruption is often a result of successive historical developments. In his work on the development of corruption in India for example, (Singh, 1997) suggests that contemporary corrupt practices are a logical extension of the economic and political structures that developed shortly after its independence. Similarly, Werner (1983) argues that political corruption in Israel can be traced to the early 1950s, when clientelist networks emerged in response to a sudden wave of immigration. As such, this
12 approach portrays political corruption as a practice that develops in response to particular historical conditions, and persist even if those conditions change (see Hyslop, 2005).
Contrary to structural and institutional factors, individual factors ascribe the occurrence of political corruption neither to more or less objective characteristics, nor to recurring patterns of behaviour. Instead, these factors hold that the cause of corruption lies squarely with the individuals that commit it. This approach revolves around the idea that some individuals are more prone to corruption than others. For example, it has been found that perpetrators of corruption are usually male (Pande, 2007), often have a liberal political orientation (Welch & Peters, 1977), and are likely to possess personality traits like narcissism (Prabowo, 2016), egoism (Ntayi et al., 2013) and takari – a Japanese concept that describes the “desire for profit and particularistic dependence” (Iga & Auerbach, 1977).
This plethora of explanations for the occurrence of political corruption stands in stark contrast to the few explanations for its occurrence in unlikely places. The rare sources of this information are studies that focus on the occurrence of political corruption more generally, but include countries that qualify as unlikely places in their analyses. These suggest that political corruption in these countries is usually caused by one of four reasons; changes that increase opportunities for corruption like an economic boom (Jimenez, 2009), cultural characteristics that cause a tolerance for political corruption in certain circumstances (Reed, 1996; Byrne, 2012) or specific areas (Johnston, 1983), historical developments that produce mechanisms for corruption (Scott, 1969; Meier & Holbrook, 1992), or defective personalities (Iga & Auerbach, 1977; Della Porta & Pizzorno, 1996). A study by Hessami (2014) is a rare exception. By analysing OECD members states, he finds that political corruption is
13 Yet, it is unclear if and to what extent these explanations add up to an exhaustive account of political corruption in unlikely places. For some, this is because they ascribe the occurrence of corruption to very specific circumstances. While sudden changes to the context in which political corruption takes place may not be uncommon, it is unlikely that specific circumstances like an economic boom or a rapid increase of immigration can account for all such cases. For other factors, the problem is that they are too general. Even if most corrupt officials were to have defective personalities, not all officials with defective personalities are corrupt. This suggests that the occurrence of political corruption may depend on a confluence of factors, something that has rarely been studied in the literature. The sum of these
limitations calls for dedicated studies that investigate how a confluence of factors contributes to the occurrence of corruption in cases that have rarely been examined in detail.
Method & Data
This study will explore possible explanations for the occurrence of political corruption in unlikely places by investigating a single case in-depth - the case of Jos van Rey. It will do so using an inductive approach. Contrary to deductive approaches, inductive approaches
typically involve analysing data with little or no guidance from existing theories (Connell & Lowe, 1997; Ketokivi & Mantere, 1997). Doing so allows the researcher “to understand the multiple interrelationships among dimensions that emerge from the data without making prior assumptions about the linear or correlative relationships among narrowly defined,
operationalized variables” (Patton, 1982: 8). The aim of inductive approaches is usually to develop new theories for empirical or theoretical anomalies (Thomas, 2006). As such, they lend themselves well to projects in which existing theories are either missing or non-applicable (see Ali & Birley, 1999; Morse & Mitcham, 2002).
14 In this particular case, the approach consists of two consecutive steps. The first
involves establishing which factors are likely to have contributed to the occurrence of political corruption. This will be achieved by studying a wide range of different sources, and scanning these for evidence that certain factors are at play. The second step involves
comparing the results to existing theories about the occurrence of political corruption in unlikely places. The inductive nature of this approach resides in the fact that it will not limit itself to studying known factors. Instead, it will consider any factor that can reasonably be classified as either a structural, institutional, or personal factor. As such, this approach is a far cry from purely inductive approaches like grounded theory (c.f. Martin & Turner 1986), and closer to what Bryman and Burgess (1994) have labelled a ‘general inductive approach’.
In order for this method to work, it is imperative that the case itself meets two conditions; that it is a case of political corruption, and that it occurred in an unlikely place. This seems to be the case. As an alderman, member of the mayoral selection committee and electable politician, Jos van Rey had an obvious duty not to accept bribes, breach prescribed confidentiality, or ‘meddle’ with proxy votes.17 Moreover, this duty clearly extended beyond the confines of the positions he held. As a particularly prominent politician and vice-mayor, Van Rey was the face of a democratic and administrative order that was damaged by his misconduct. As one judge pointed out: “the trust of the citizen in [...] public authorities has been harmed.”18 This qualifies the case as a case of political corruption. The introduction already established that the case occurred in a country where at least a number of common explanations do not seem to apply, making this country – the Netherlands – an unlikely place.
17 Kreling, T. (2019). Hoge Raad verwerpt cassatieverzoek oud-VVD’er Van Rey – veroordeling voor corruptie
blijft in stand. De Volkskrant.
https://www.volkskrant.nl/nieuws-achtergrond/hoge-raad-verwerpt-cassatieverzoek-oud-vvd-er-van-rey-veroordeling-voor-corruptie-blijft-in-stand~b7ba5d51/ (23-03-2020).
18 De Graaf, P. (2017). Voormalig VVD-politicus Jos van Rey veroordeeld tot een jaar voorwaardelijke celstraf
wegens corruptie. De Volkskrant. https://www.volkskrant.nl/nieuws-achtergrond/voormalig-vvd-politicus-jos-van-rey-veroordeeld-tot-een-jaar-voorwaardelijke-celstraf-wegens-corruptie~bffc0b71/ (22-03-2020).
15 The data for this study can be divided in four categories. The first is a selection of articles from Dutch newspapers and magazines. This selection was made by conducting a key term search in the LexisNexis database, and individually reading each result to determine its relevance. The second category consists of a book by two journalists that authored some of the earliest articles questioning the conduct of Jos van Rey. Although the book largely contains information that was previously reported in the newspaper, it also provides more detailed background information. The third category contains two documentaries that were aired on Dutch public television, and paint a portrait of Van Rey before and during his trial. The fourth category is a miscellaneous collection of background material that includes legal documents, and the result of various provincial and municipal elections.
The case of Jos van Rey
The case of Jos van Rey centres on Roermond, a former mining town in the south of the Netherlands. Van Rey, who was born and raised there, entered local politics in 1974, as a council member for the liberal VVD party. He became an alderman for that party in 1979, but left to become a member of the regional parliament in 1982, and an MP in 1989. When Van Rey left national politics in 1998, he returned to Roermond and once again became an alderman. Charged with economic affairs and housing, Van Rey was widely credited for reviving the local economy. His main feat was realising a number of large, publicly funded building projects that brought jobs to a region that was generally considered impoverished.19 This, combined with the fact that he led his party to one electoral victory after another, cemented his position as a dominant political force. It also made him a household name.20
The first signs that Van Rey engaged in acts of corruption date from 2011, when a local newspaper accused him of violating his integrity. In a series of articles, the newspaper
19 Geuze, S. (2016). De verdiensten van Jos van Rey. De Volkskrant.
16 suggested that Van Rey had regularly accepted gifts from a long-time friend and local
developer, Piet van Pol. The fact that this developer was involved in almost every building project that Van Rey had commissioned in his capacity as an alderman, the newspaper argued, created a conflict of interest.21 Although Van Rey denied the accusations, they created so much of an uproar that the mayor ordered an investigation.22 The outcome was a report that validated the findings of local newspapers, but concluded that this did not amount to evidence that Van Rey had in fact violated his integrity.23
As it turned out, these early suspicions had prompted the authorities to start a covert criminal investigation. As part of this investigation, phone calls made by Van Rey were tapped. As such, investigators overheard Van Rey briefing a mayoral candidate about his upcoming interview.24 This led authorities to bring the investigation out into the open.
Following the raid on his home and office, Jos van Rey resigned as alderman and senator. His indictment, a few months later, contained several charges. The first was that Van Rey had committed bribery for accepting gifts in exchange for awarding building contracts to local developers like Van Pol.25 The second charge, for breach of trust, concerned the illicit phone call to a mayoral candidate. A third charge held that Van Rey was guilty of electoral fraud by illegally recruiting proxy votes during municipal elections. The fourth charge, for which he was later acquitted, argued that Van Rey had engaged in money laundering.26
Van Rey’s response to the accusations was consistent; he denied having done anything untoward. With regard to the suspected bribery, he acknowledged having received
21 Goossen, H., and Sniekers, T. (2011). De connectie en de code. Limburgs Dagblad.
22 Goossen, H., and Sniekers, T. (2011). Oppositie Roermond wil onderzoek Van Rey. De Twentsche Courant
Tubantia.
23 Frissen, P. H. A., Sorgdrager, W., Ferket, J., and Schulz, J. M. (2012). De schijn en de feiten. Een onderzoek
naar mogelijke belangenverstrengeling in de gemeente Roermond. Den Haag: Uitgeverij.
24 Murk, R. (2013). Van Rey belde Offermanns met informatie. Algemeen Nederlands Persbureau. 25 Rechtbank Rotterdam. (2016). ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:5277.
https://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:5277 (05-04-2020).
26 Rechtbank Rotterdam. (2016). ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:5272.
17 gifts, but claimed that these were part of the friendship between himself and Van Pol.
Moreover, he denied having given anything in return.27 Concerning the breach of trust and suspected electoral fraud, he argued that these were common practice.28 Initially, Van Rey retained considerable political support. Although he was forced to resign, his party repeatedly professed its confidence in Van Rey.29 This changed when the case started to attract national attention. While the local chapter of his party remained loyal, Van Rey faced growing pressure not to candidate himself for upcoming municipal elections. When even the prime minister weighed in, Van Rey started his own party and took most of the local VVD chapter with him.30 His new party won the municipal elections by a landslide.31
The trial started in 2013, and was concluded in 2016. The verdict found Jos van Rey guilty of three charges; passive bribery, breach of trust, and electoral fraud. It sentenced him to 240 hours of community service, and forbade him from holding public office for three years. This sentence was considerably more lenient than the two year prison sentence that public prosecutors had asked for, and reflected the fact that a number of charges, including active bribery and money laundering, were considered not proven by the court.32 Van Rey appealed, but the court of appeals again found him guilty. However, his sentence was increased; not only was Van Rey barred from holding public office for three years, but he
27 Van Zwienen, S. (2017). Oud-wethouder Jos van Rey houdt onschuld vol. Algemeen Dagblad. 28 Goossen, H., and Sniekers, T. (2016). De zaak-Van Rey: “Iedereen doet het en iedereen weet het”. De
Limburger.
29 Baas, T. (2012). VVD Roermond vierkant achter Van Rey. BNR Nieuwsradio.
https://www.bnr.nl/radio/bnr-juridische-zaken/10116787/vvd-roermond-vierkant-achter-van-rey (05-04-2020).
30 Author unknown. (2013). VVD’er Van Rey begint eigen partij. Het Parool.
31 Van der Heijden, B., and Straus, H. (2013). Achterban blijft Van Rey trouw. De Limburger. 32 Rechtbank Rotterdam. (2016). ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:5272.
18 was also sentenced to a twelve-month suspended prison sentence.33 Van Rey appealed again, but the verdict was again upheld by the final court of appeals.34
Causes of corruption
A review of relevant materials suggests that both structural, institutional, and individual factors contributed to the occurrence of political corruption in this case. This includes factors that are commonly associated with the occurrence of such corruption, and a few that are not. There is also evidence to suggest that not all factors have facilitated to occurrence of
corruption to a similar extent. While some can easily be linked to the creation of either suitable conditions or strong incentives, other factors seem to have had a more ephemeral kind of influence. Nevertheless, it is clear that this particular case of political corruption was caused by a confluence of factors from all three categories. These categories will now be discussed in turn.
Structural factors
A first structural factor that seems to have contributed to the occurrence of political
corruption, concerns the quality of relevant legislation. Especially for the charge of passive bribery, there was considerable debate about the extent to which the law actually forbade Jos van Rey to accept the kind of gifts he had.35 This is at least in part because the gifts in
question consisted of various trips and dinners, rather than something recognizably illicit like a pile of cash.36 Moreover, Van Rey credibly claimed that he had received the gifts in the
33 Gerechtshof Den Haag. (2017), ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2017:3702.
https://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2017:3702 (05-04-2020).
34 Hoge Raad. (2019). ECLI:NL:PHR:2019:483.
https://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:PHR:2019:483 (05-04-2020).
35 de Jong, P. H. (2013). Jos van Rey en de VVD. Nederlands Dagblad. 36 Rechtbank Rotterdam. (2016). ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:5277.
19 context of a close friendship in which these kinds of exchanges were commonplace.37 The court acknowledged the absence of a clear legal framework in its verdict. While it did convict Jos van Rey for bribery, the court argued that this was due to the fact that a seasoned
politician like Van Rey “should have known better”, not because the gifts themselves were necessarily illegal.38
Similarly, it could be argued that the corruption was facilitated by less than perfect law enforcement. While the fact that Van Rey was prosecuted implies that law enforcement was effective, there are signs that a lack of such enforcement enabled a particular type of corruption to take place. When he was accused of electoral fraud, Van Rey suggested that such fraud, which in this case consisted of asking eligible voters to mandate someone to vote on their behalf when it was unclear who that person would be, was in fact common practice.39 This claim appears to have some merit. Although it is unclear whether this was a
phenomenon that occurred nationwide, there are clear indications that at least some of the other parties in Roermond engaged in similar practices.40
A factor that can be linked more directly to the occurrence of political corruption, is the extent of Van Rey’s discretionary space. In many sources, Van Rey is portrayed as having very few constraints on his power.41 With respect to a major development project for
example, Van Rey was described as regularly making promises “without any legal authority or valid mandate”.42 His soloist conduct earned Van Rey a number of telling nicknames,
37 Dohmen, J., & van der Steen, P. (2016). Corruptie? Nee joh. Het was gewoon gezellig in Roermond. NRC
Handelsblad.
38 Rechtbank Rotterdam. (2016). ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:5277.
https://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:5277 (05-04-2020).
39 Smulders, J. (2015). De weg naar het gerecht. Hilversum: Human/VPRO.
https://www.2doc.nl/documentaires/series/argos-medialogica/jos-van-rey-onderkoning-van-roermond.html
40 Author unknown. (2014). Mogelijk ook geronsel in Roermond. NOS.
https://nos.nl/artikel/622553-mogelijk-ook-geronsel-in-roermond.html (12-04-2020).
41 See for example Dohmen, J., and Van der Steen, P. (2016). Jos van Rey: daar kan je zo een ‘House of Cards’
van maken. NRC Next.
20 including ‘the strongman’43, ‘the viceroy’44 and ‘der Macher’.45 In particular, it is thought that his discretionary space enabled Van Rey to ignore prescribed tendering processes and award public projects to particular developers or contractors.46 As such, this space could be argued to have enabled the passive bribery for which he was ultimately convicted; a frequent beneficiary of Van Rey’s capacity to sidestep tendering processes was Piet van Pol.47
Van Rey’s extensive discretionary powers can be traced at least in part to the fact that his party dominated the local political landscape. From 1998 onwards, the Volkspartij voor
Vrijheid en Democratie was both the largest party in the Municipal Council48 and a leading member of every governing coalition.49 In this period, Roermond is perhaps be best described as a ‘dominant party system’ (see Arian & Barnes, 1974). The political and electoral
dominance of the VVD was such, that it managed to eliminate most checks and balances. While in government, it forced the mayor to hand of responsibilities that were typically considered a mayoral prerogative.50 This undermined the mayor’s power, and severely limited his capacity to serve as a counterweight.51 Meanwhile, the VVD silenced most of its opposition in the Municipal Council by co-opting major parties.52 Arguably, this is one of the reasons why Van Rey was not held to account for his questionable behavior. It also suggests that Van Rey’s attempt to manipulate a mayoral application process may simply have been a symptom of dominant party politics.
43 Vrijsen, E. (2014). Geen gewone verdachte. Elsevier.
44 Goossen, H., & Sniekers, T. (2011). De connectie en de code. Limburgs Dagblad.
45 Dohmen, J., & van der Steen, P. (2016). Jos van Rey: daar kan je zo een ‘House of Cards’ van maken. NRC
Next.
46 Kortekaas, L. (2012). Jos van Rey kreeg alles voor elkaar. Algemeen Dagblad.
47 See Dohmen, J. (2013). Ontwikkelaar vroeg en politicus liet het bouwen. NRC Handelsblad.
48 Kiesraad. (2020). Databank verkiezingsuitslagen. https://www.verkiezingsuitslagen.nl/ (12-04-2020). 49 See Goossen, H., & Sniekers, T. (2014). El Rey. Van jager tot prooi. Sittard: Media Groep Limburg. 50 Theunissen, A. (2015). De intimidatiepolitiek van een straatvechter. Vrij Nederland.
51 See Frissen, P. H. A., Sorgdrager, W., Ferket, J., and Schulz, J. M. (2012). De schijn en de feiten. Een
onderzoek naar mogelijke belangenverstrengeling in de gemeente Roermond. Den Haag: Uitgeverij.
21 A second factor that may have contributed to Van Rey’s discretionary powers, is the lack of a free press. Evidence suggesting the relevance of this factor rests on the fact that a local newspaper was owned by a friend and political ally of Van Rey, Dré Peters. According to some sources, Peters used his influence at the newspaper to silence political opponents.53 Yet, it is hard to establish whether this factor actually facilitated political corruption. The newspaper in question, the Trompetter, is not considered to be a particularly influential member of the local news media. While it is distributed widely in Roermond, it rarely engages in serious journalism.54 Although this does not exclude the possibility that a lack of free press contributed to the occurrence of political corruption in this case, it suggests that the influence of this particular factor was marginal at best.
One final factor can be argued to have played a role in facilitating the charge of passive bribery. According to a number of sources, the city of Roermond regularly intervened in the local economy. Especially during the tenure of Van Rey, the municipal government became involved in a number of large building projects.55 These projects were often financed with public funds, and were rarely subjected to a formal tendering process.56 The city was also closely involved in the management of the projects, which allowed Van Rey and his fellow aldermen to make decisions about the way that specific funds were spent.57 Arguably, such interventionist policies facilitated the occurrence of political corruption by creating the spoils that made officials like Van Rey interesting targets to bribe.
Institutional factors
53 Medialogica. (2015). Jos van Rey, corruptieverdachte. Hilversum: VPRO.
https://www.vpro.nl/speel~VPWON_1234428~jos-van-rey-corruptieverdachte-argos-tv-medialogica~.html (09-05-2020).
54 Goossen, H., & Sniekers, T. (2014). El Rey. Van jager tot prooi. Sittard: Media Groep Limburg. 55 Vrijsen, E. (2014). Geen gewone verdachte. Elsevier.
56 See Frissen, P. H. A., Sorgdrager, W., Ferket, J., and Schulz, J. M. (2012). De schijn en de feiten. Een
onderzoek naar mogelijke belangenverstrengeling in de gemeente Roermond. Den Haag: Uitgeverij.
22 In addition to these structural factors, several institutional factors seem to have played a part as well. A first centres on the idea that Roermond, and the province of Limburg more generally, has a culture that fosters the occurrence of political corruption. While this culture cannot be neatly characterized as either traditionalistic (see Johnston, 1983) or patrimonial (see Smith, 1964), it shares some characteristics of these cultures in the sense that it characterizes political corruption as a fact of life, or ‘the way we do things around here’.58 However, the role of this culture in the occurrence of political corruption is hard to establish. While it is frequently suggested as a potential cause59, there is little evidence to suggest that Van Rey’s corruption was made possible by the fact that his conduct was a widely accepted cultural practice.
Evidence for the influence of a certain public tolerance for corruption is more compelling. For example, there are few indications that the allegations against Van Rey significantly decreased popular support for his policies.60 Similarly, the fact that he managed to win a local election while facing corruption charges suggests that many voters were prepared to overlook these apparent transgressions.61 This tolerance for corruption seems to be borne particularly out of a willingness to accept corruption as the price for economic success.62 As one local resident was recorded saying: “that he makes a little bit of money out of this, doesn’t seem disgraceful to me”.63 Although it is again hard to determine exactly how such public tolerance could have caused the acts of corruption for which Van Rey was
58 Duin, R. J. (2014). Jos van Rey nog steeds onderkoning van Roermond. Algemeen Dagblad. 59 Kortekaas, L. (2012). Jos van Rey kreeg alles voor elkaar. Algemeen Dagblad.
60 See for example Haenen, H. (10 March, 2018). Jos van Rey met vlaai door Roermond. Algemeen Nederlands
Persbureau.
61 Author unknown. (2014). Interview met Jos van Rey, zonnekoning van ‘Palermo aan de Maas’ Roermond.
Quote.
62 Vrijsen, E. (2014). Geen gewone verdachte. Elsevier.
63 Medialogica. (2015). Jos van Rey, corruptieverdachte. Hilversum: VPRO.
https://www.vpro.nl/speel~VPWON_1234428~jos-van-rey-corruptieverdachte-argos-tv-medialogica~.html (09-05-2020).
23 ultimately convicted, it could arguably have given him a degree of impunity that provided little incentive to cease and desist.
A similar argument can be made for the effect of historical path-dependencies. In particular, it has been suggested that the conduct of Jos van Rey bears a striking resemblance to past patterns of corruption in the city of Roermond.64 These arguments generally centre on the 1950’s and 60’s, when the Roman Catholic Church dominated political and social life.65 According to a famous book about the topic, this dominance turned the city into a ‘republic of friends’ in which ties between public and private actors were so close that corruption was inevitable.66 A number of parallels have been drawn between this period and the case of Jos van Rey. Like public officials in post-war Roermond for example, Van Rey was accused of having very close ties to private actors.67 Based on these parallels, it could be argued that his acts of corruption, particularly the passive bribery, were little more than the continuation of an established historical pattern.
Yet, there is only one institutional factor that can be tied more or less directly to the occurrence of political corruption in this case. In a large number of sources, the corruption is attributed first and foremost to what might be termed the ‘governance culture’ in
Roermond.68 When asked to reflect on the reason why Van Rey was able to continue even obviously questionable practices for so long, some former colleagues remarked for example that such practices were simply accepted as ‘given’ or ‘the way things were done’.69 This permissive governance culture could be argued to have particularly facilitated corrupt acts like passive bribery. During his tenure as an alderman, Van Rey frequently reported potential
64 Kortekaas, L. (2012). Jos van Rey kreeg alles voor elkaar. Algemeen Dagblad.
65 Goossen, H., & Sniekers, T. (2014). El Rey. Van jager tot prooi. Sittard: Media Groep Limburg. 66 Ibid.
67 Author unknown. (2013). Inval bij Piet van Pol: kocht hij Jos van Rey om? Quote.
68 See for example Dohmen, J., & van der Steen, P. (2016). Jos van Rey: daar kan je zo een ‘House of Cards’
van maken. NRC Next.
24 conflicts of interest with regard to his friendship with Piet van Pol.70 Yet, these reports were rarely if ever discussed and, in spite of standing rules and regulations, did not lead to his exclusion from further decision-making.71
Individual factors
While these structural and institutional factors can be argued to have created the right environment for political corruption to occur, the cause of such corruption can be more readily attributed to a number of individual factors. The first and foremost is takari, or the extent to which the perpetrator of corruption has an ‘entrepreneurial spirit’ (see Iga & Auerbach, 1977). In addition to the fact that Jos van Rey was a successful entrepreneur who sold a thriving insurance business some time before he re-entered local politics72, he also exhibits a number of character traits that would qualify as entrepreneurial. According to friend and foe, Van Rey had a talent for spotting opportunities that allowed him to realize seemingly impossible projects.73 This regularly involved bending the law, which is also why it is likely that the character trait is a cause of political corruption. Throughout his career, Van Rey repeatedly professed believing that ends justify means74, and it is easy to see how this might have motivated him to violate confidentiality regulations, meddle with proxy votes, and accept gifts that could be considered bribes.
This particular character trait is closely associated with other aspects of Van Rey’s personality that are thought to have caused his corrupt behavior. For example, it has been suggested that such behavior fits that of a male public official whom colleagues describe as
70 Goossen, H., & Sniekers, T. (2011). Jos van Rey’s problemen met integriteit. Brabants Dagblad.
71 Frissen, P. H. A., Sorgdrager, W., Ferket, J., and Schulz, J. M. (2012). De schijn en de feiten. Een onderzoek
naar mogelijke belangenverstrengeling in de gemeente Roermond. Den Haag: Uitgeverij.
72 Vrijsen, E. (15 October, 2011). VVD’ers onder vuur. Elsevier.
73 Dohmen, J., and Van der Steen, P. (2016). Jos van Rey: daar kan je zo een ‘House of Cards’ van maken. NRC
Next.
74 Author unknown. (2013). ‘Ik ben bij voorbaat schuldig’; van corruptie verdachte Van Rey doorbreekt
25 “cocky”75, and who was known for publicly berating his subordinates.76 Similarly, his
penchant for skirting the edges of the law has been attributed to the fact that Van Rey is a fervent liberal.77 Through its commitment to individualism, this political orientation would have motivated Van Rey to ignore or circumvent existing ruled and regulations.78 Yet, it is unclear whether these characteristics constitute an independent cause of political corruption. Given their considerable overlap with what it means to have an ‘entrepreneurial spirit’, such characteristics could be conceptualized as part of this concept instead.
An individual factor that does appear to have wielded an independent influence, is the extent of Van Rey’s networking skills. In a considerable number of sources, Van Rey’s capacity to commit corrupt acts is related to the fact that he has a talent for forging strategic friendships and alliances.79 A merger that made his party the largest in the municipal council is often cited in this context, as is the way in which he managed to secure national attention for local issues by maneuvering proteges into prominent positions.80 The most telling anecdote concerns the charge for breach of trust. According to some sources, Van Rey used his network to acquire additional information about one of the mayoral candidates. While illegal, this is in itself not particularly remarkable. However, the fact that he did so by contacting a junior minister in the national government, is testament to the strength of his network.81
A final individual factor concerns the motive to commit political corruption. When the first accusations against Van Rey were made, sources were quick to note that it was not
75 van den Boogaard, R. (2015). Lichtpuntjes voor Jos van Rey. NRC Handelsblad. 76 Dreissen, G. (2015). Wat deed Jos van Rey voor de Donderberg? De Limburger.
77 van Hulten, M. (2012). Corruptie in Nederland is erger dan men denkt. NRC Handelsblad. 78 Goossen, H., & Sniekers, T. (2014). El Rey. Van jager tot prooi. Sittard: Media Groep Limburg. 79 See for example Kortekaas, L. (2012). Jos van Rey kreeg alles voor elkaar. Algemeen Dagblad. 80 See Goossen, H., & Sniekers, T. (2014). El Rey. Van jager tot prooi. Sittard: Media Groep Limburg. 81 Ibid.
26 clear what he stood to gain from the alleged corruption.82 This is particularly true for the charge of passive bribery. While breach of trust and electoral fraud could be argued to have helped van Rey to maintain and expand his power base, there appears to be no financial motive for bribery. Following the sale of his insurance company, Van Rey was “financially independent” and made a point of showing that he did not enter politics to increase his wealth.83 As one source puts it: “[…] it isn’t money that drives him in politics. It is much stronger; it is self-assertion”.84
While this does not exclude the possibility that a financial motive did exist, it leaves open the possibility that his behavior was driven by less particularistic motivations. In particular, there are indications that some of his conduct was fueled by an extreme if misplaced sense of public duty. In addition to his own statements to this effect85, sources generally suggest that Van Rey was an extremely driven politician whose main aim was to further the state and interests of his voters and the city in general.86 This, combined with his professed willingness to bend the rules, suggests that at least some of the behavior that was later deemed corrupt, may in fact have been the fruit of attempts to further a particular conception of the public good rather than of a calculated criminal intent.
Towards an explanation
What do these results tell us about the cause of political corruption in unlikely places?
Relating the findings back to existing ideas about the cause of political corruption suggests at least four possible explanations:
82 Author unknown. (2016). ‘Jos van Rey heeft niets verkeerd gedaan’. Nederlands Dagblad. 83 Vrijsen, E. (2011). VVD’ers onder vuur. Elsevier.
84 Vrijsen, E. (2014). Geen gewone verdachte. Elsevier.
85 Smulders, J. (2015). De weg naar het gerecht. Hilversum: Human/VPRO.
https://www.2doc.nl/documentaires/series/argos-medialogica/jos-van-rey-onderkoning-van-roermond.html
27
1. Nobody’s perfect
A first explanation rests on the idea that political corruption in the case of Jos van Rey was caused by the fact that the country in which it occurred, the Netherlands, only scores relatively well on certain factors. This is particularly true for quality of relevant legislation. As a common explanation for differences in the frequency with which political corruption occurs, having an adequate legal framework is one of the factors that determines whether such corruption can be considered unlikely in the first place. As such, the fact that the quality of legislation was found wanting, suggests one of two things. On the one hand, it is possible that prior evaluations of such legislation were in error, and that the case does not in fact qualify as corruption in an unlikely place. On the other, it is also possible that the evaluations simply failed to account for the fact that relative quality does not equal perfection; the fact that the quality of legislation in a particular country is better, does not mean that it cannot still cause political corruption.
In a general sense, this implies that the unlikely nature of political corruption is, to some extent, a paradox. While it makes intuitive sense to conclude that the occurrence of political corruption in countries that perform relatively well on most factors is puzzling, it could also be argued that doing so is a logical fallacy; although performing relatively well on certain factors should make the occurrence of political corruption less likely, there is no reason to presume that it makes the occurrence of such corruption unlikely. Yet, it would be a mistake to dismiss the phenomenon as little more than a false contradiction. The fact that no evidence was found to suggest the influence of other national-level factors, combined with the fact that such evidence was found for factors to which the occurrence of political corruption is not usually attributed, implies that the occurrence of such corruption is more than a paradox alone.
28
2. Local versus national conditions
A second explanation is based on the fact that evidence for the influence of these other factors has been found – but only at the local level. For example, while the Netherlands as a whole can arguably be said to have a multiparty system (see Irwin & Thomassen, 1975; Swank & Eisinga, 1999) in which governing parties face considerable electoral competition (see Irwin & van Holsteijn, 1989; de Vries, 2018), and elected officials do not have
extraordinary discretionary powers (see Aalders 1993; Borghi & van Berkel, 2007), the same could not be said for the city of Roermond. Similarly, whereas it would be hard to argue that economic policies in the Netherlands are overly interventionist (see van Waarden, 1992; Sondermann et al., 2011), or that its economic circumstances were particularly conducive to political corruption (see Mauro, 1995; Ata & Arvas, 2011), there are indications that these factors did influence the occurrence of corruption locally.
Although this explanation also supports the idea that political corruption in unlikely places is to some extent paradoxical, it also highlights the fact that existing theories about the occurrence of such corruption are predominantly geared towards national conditions. This is presumably because most are based on country-level comparisons; in order to determine which factors are likely to cause political corruption, studies often compare the
characteristics of countries in which that corruption is more and less likely to occur (c.f. Xin & Rudel, 2004; Blake & Martin, 2006). However, the results of this study suggest that doing so could ignore considerable variation in the extent to which national and local conditions overlap.
3. Distinct factors
A third explanation centres instead on the notion that political corruption in unlikely places is driven at least to some degree by different factors than in places where such corruption is
29 more likely to occur. For example, the results from this case suggest that political corruption in unlikely places is closely connected to the networking skills of its perpetrators. While this factor has been associated with corruption in these places before (see Della Porta &
Pizzorno, 1996), it is rarely mentioned as a cause of political corruption more generally. Similarly, indications that the political corruption of Jos van Rey was facilitated by a permissive ‘governance culture’, have little precedent in studies of more generic political corruption.
This can be interpreted in at least two ways. Firstly, it is possible that factors like networking skills and a permissive governance culture are unique to the political corruption that occurs in unlikely places. It could for example be argued that such places are generally more economically integrated (see Brada & Mendez, 1985; Rivera-Batiz & Romer, 1991), which would create unique opportunities for a public official with well-developed
networking skills. However, it is more likely that the influence of these factors is simply more pronounced. For example, it is not hard to imagine how a permissive governance culture might have a greater influence in a country where factors like an independent judiciary are less of an issue (see Kate & van Koppen, 1994; Feld & Voigt, 2003).
4. A different kind of corruption?
A fourth and final explanation builds on the idea that political corruption in unlikely places is distinct from the political corruption that occurs elsewhere. This explanation is based
primarily on indications that political corruption in the case of Jos van Rey was driven by an extreme sense of public duty instead of clear criminal intent. If this alternative motivation has some basis in fact, it could indicate the existence of a distinct type of corruption that is driven less by factors that enable rent-seeking behaviour (see Lambsdorff, 2002), and more by factors that govern the boundaries of acceptable behaviour like checks and balances and
30 formal accountability.87 However, this assumes that such alternative motivations are either unique to or more pronounced in the political corruption that occurs in unlikely places. The present study provides no basis to indicate if and to what extent that assumption holds true.
Conclusion
In this study, an attempt was made to explain political corruption in ‘unlikely places’; countries where a number of straightforward explanations for the occurrence of such corruption do not seem to hold. It did so by studying a particular case – the case of Jos van Rey. Using an inductive approach, the study first analysed a wide range of different sources to identify the likely cause of political corruption in this case. It then used these results to formulate four possible explanations for the occurrence of political corruption in unlikely places. The first and second attribute the occurrence of political corruption in unlikely places to conceptual issues; the fact that relative performance is not the same as substantive
performance, and the fact that there can be considerable differences between national and local conditions. The third and fourth explanations suggest instead that political corruption in unlikely places is to some extent unique - either because it is caused by a distinct set of factors that includes networking skills and a permissive governance culture, or because it represent a different kind of corruption that is driven by more than just criminal intent.
These findings give rise to at least two possible implications. On the one hand, they could imply that political corruption in unlikely places is not fundamentally different from the political corruption that occurs elsewhere. If this is true, explaining the occurrence of such corruption in unlikely places would require little more than modifying extant theory to better take both the absolute performance and regional characteristics of countries into account. To do the former, that theory could for example re-conceptualise the performance of countries in
87 Frissen, P. H. A., Sorgdrager, W., Ferket, J., and Schulz, J. M. (2012). De schijn en de feiten. Een onderzoek
31 which political corruption is rare as an intermediate phase of development instead of a
developmental terminus (see Grindle, 2004). Similarly, extant theory could better take differences between national and local characteristics into account by introducing the region as a secondary unit of analysis (c.f. Pitschel & Bauer, 2009).
On the other hand, the findings could also imply that political corruption in unlikely places is in fact different from the political corruption that occurs elsewhere. If this is true, explaining the occurrence of such corruption in unlikely places would instead require new theories that can better account for the distinct nature of this phenomenon - and the unique set of factors driving it. For example, whereas current theories often conceptualize political corruption as criminal behaviour, a dedicated theory for the occurrence of such corruption in unlikely places could instead be based on the assumption that political corruption is
boundary-crossing behaviour that can occur regardless of good or bad intentions (see Collier, 2002). Similarly, such a theory could take stock of the distinct factors driving political corruption in unlikely places by focusing on more on the ‘soft’ side of corruption prevention; governance culture instead of democratic institutions, and networking skills instead of previous convictions.
Determining which of these implications is likely to ring true, or to what extent, is beyond the scope of this study. At the very least, this would involve developing potential explanations into a set of testable hypotheses. The idea that political corruption in unlikely places is caused by the fact that countries featuring such corruption only perform relatively well on most straightforward explanations, could for example be argued to suggest that cases of political corruption in unlikely places are likely to feature evidence of factors on which the countries involved perform relatively well. Similarly, the idea that political corruption in unlikely places is driven by a distinct set of factors, suggests that evidence for the influence of such factors is more common in cases that qualify as political corruption in unlikely places
32 than in cases that do not. Once developed, future studies could test such hypotheses by means of comparative or other cross-sectional methods. Then, and only then, will it be possible to fully account for the occurrence of political corruption in unlikely places.
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