Ecology Rights: The Case
of Animal and Climate
Rights
A research paper on whether and how human
rights can be extended to include ecology rights
from a maximalist perspective.
Master thesis Political Science
Human Rights and Norms of Global Governance
Isabel Willemsen 10784179
June 21st , 2019 Supervisor: dhr. dr. G.R. Arlen Word count: 21.196 Second reader: dhr. dr. R.J. Pistorius
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INTRODUCTION AND THESIS OVERVIEW 4
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 5
Minimalist approach to human rights 5
Maximalist approach to Human Rights 7
CASE SELECTION EXPLANATION 9
CASE 1: ARGUING FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS 10
1.1. The moral blind spot of animal rights 13
1.2. The Great Ape Project (GAP) 14
1.3. The philosophy and ethics of (non)human animal rights 16
1.4. Duties 18
1.4.A. Capacity approach to duties 19
1.4.B. Capability approach to duties 22
1.4.C. Negative, positive and relational duties 23
1.5. How to implement animal rights within the (current) human rights system 25
1.5.A. How citizenship rights can be used for animals 26
1.5.B. Protection rights for animals 27
1.5.C. Expanding the receivers of human rights 29
CASE 2: ARGUING FOR CLIMATE RIGHTS 30
2.1. Three different perspectives on the consequences of climate change 32
2.2. The human rights approach to climate change 33
2.3. How to implement climate rights within the (current) human rights system 37
2.3.A. Climate right as a meta- human right 38
2.3.B. Combining climate rights with existing human right 40
2.3.C. Addressing climate change: mitigation or adaptation? 41
2.3.C.1. Mitigation 41
2.3.C.2. Adaptation 42
2.4. Intergenerational justice/ protecting future generations 42
DISCUSSION 43
CONCLUSION 49
4 Introduction and thesis overview
On December 10th, 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly in Paris (UN 2018). In 2018 the Declaration celebrated its 70th birthday. A lot has changed since then, but the content of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has not. Is the UDHR still relevant, or has it become old-fashioned and outdated?
For years there has been, and still is, a debate amongst scholars in the human rights field. One group of scholars adopt a “minimalist” perspective, arguing that the content of human rights should be narrowed down to acknowledge only a few core human rights. Another group of scholars adopts a “maximalist” position, arguing that the content of existing human rights should be expanded to include even more rights.
First, this thesis will give a brief overview of these two positions, with the scholars who believe that human rights should be more focused. For example, Michael Ignatieff, argues that a (human) rights inflation takes place. When there are too many rights that need protecting, tension and conflict arise between different human rights (Ignatieff 2000b: 298-299).
The maximalist approach, by contrast, argues that our understanding of human rights evolves through time. These scholars also argue that humanity always has a moral blind spot and that if there is a limit to human rights, as the other group suggests, we cannot guarantee we will act against a new moral blind spot. In this thesis, I take the stance of the maximalist approach to human rights. I do so by introducing ‘ecology rights’, focusing specifically on animal rights and climate rights.
The overview of this thesis is as follows. In the theoretical framework, I give a summary of the different viewpoints within the two different positions on human rights: the minimalist and the maximalist approach. The summary and comparison of these two theories culminate in my prioritizing of the maximalist approach to human rights. I then explain why I have chosen ecology rights, focused on animal and climate rights, as the two cases which best illustrate the importance of the maximalist approach to human rights. I explain why it is so important that these be incorporated into the human rights regime. I also give concrete examples of how these two cases can be implemented. For animal rights, I argue that the receivers of human rights should be expanded to animals. I acknowledge that this is a huge alteration for people to accept, so I suggest first expanding it to a select group of animals. For climate rights, I argue that a new ‘meta-right’ that can trump all other rights if necessary. This right will tackle climate change at the cause, instead of other solutions that only try to limit
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the consequences of climate change. After this discussion I conclude my thesis by answering the two-fold research question: Can human rights be extended to include ecology rights and if
so, how should these rights look like?
Theoretical framework
After introducing both viewpoints, I will argue for the maximalist approach, using the cases of animal and climate rights to support my view and to counter the minimalist approach. The research design that will be used in this thesis is a combination of a literature review and implementing two case studies.
Minimalist approach to human rights
The most plausible interpretation of the ‘minimalist approach’ to human rights, is the idea
“that a doctrine of human rights should be limited to protections of the most urgent of interests against the most likely of threats” (Beitz 2009: 142). Implementing human rights is
often challenging. These challenges can derive from the lack of political will, or due to conflicts, mostly conflicts concerning political interests (Freeman 2011: 6). However, there is another reason why human rights are challenging to implement. This is due to the fact that human rights may not be compossible (ibid.). Compossibility, a term introduced by Leibniz, means that the existence of one individual may contradict the existence of another individual (Brown 1987). This concept can also be applied to human rights: the implementation of one human right may require the violation of another human right (Freeman 2011: 6). This problem means that protecting one person’s human right may require the violation of the same human right of another person (ibid.). This problem of compossibility has been aggravated by the so-called rights inflation.
Specifically, this rights inflation means that the existing human rights are extended to an ‘ill-defined number’ (Freeman 2011: 6). One of the most well-known scholars on this subject is Michael Ignatieff, who writes on this subject in his book The Rights Revolution (2000a). In this book, Ignatieff argues that the (human) rights revolution has been divisive and destabilizing (Ford 2001: 517). Thinkers who support the rights inflation believe that in the current Declaration there are already several controversial human rights, such as the right of a periodic holiday with pay (UDHR 1948: art. 24). Critics also argue that human rights are vaguely worded and that the determination of the meaning of the rights is a continuing social process. This involves not only legal professionals, such as (academic) lawyers, judges, and UN experts but also stakeholders, such as governments, NGO’s and citizens (Freeman 2011: 6). For human rights to remain useful, some thinkers propose a distinction between human
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rights, legal rights and other desirable social objectives (ibid.). The inference is that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights embodies an unstable combination of irreconcilable conceptions of social justice (Cranston 1973:54). An example is an article by Aryeh Neier, who argues that human rights and social justice are separate causes. Neier argues that “social
justice requires economic trade-offs through a political process”(Neier 2015: 470). The
existing human rights organizations would even harm their authenticity by the needed politicization to advocate social justice (ibid.).
Some scholars go even further and quote Hobbes stating: “and Covenants, without the
Sword, are but Words” (Hobbes 1651: 79). These scholars argue that the legally binding
treaty does not work due to the lack of an authoritative agent with the power to hold sovereign states to the law and because of this, the rights revolution is far from complete and it can be questioned if it will ever achieve its aims (Gutmann 2011: vii). According to these scholars, the rights inflation of human rights doctrine, imposes extreme burdens on duty bearers and unreasonable restrictions on freedom, limits the extent of democratic politics, limits the role of toleration and pluralism and undermines valuable social relations such as those of the family (Freeman: 84- 85).
Moreover, the minimalist approach to human rights Ignatieff suggests arises from the incompetence of the current human rights system (Ignatieff 2001: 39). More specifically, the current regime’s failures to prevent atrocities like Bosnia and Rwanda in the 1990s. This minimalist approach seeks to address theoretical and practical restrictions in undertaking humanitarian intervention by multiple sovereign states and since there are so many challenges to do so, the number of human rights should be limited (ibid.). This will result in a list of rights that can provide the most feasible agreement amongst all cultures worldwide and thus will limit the number of interventions to the strictly necessary (Ignatieff 2001: 39- 42). Most importantly, Ignatieff argues that such a list will be defended fiercely; it will not damage any international agreements and it will present rights that almost everyone can agree upon (ibid.). Another scholar who has tried to limit the number of human rights is Maurice Cranston. Cranston argues that human rights should go back to their original form of Locke’s natural rights, believing that these rights should only exist in a negative form (Cranston 1983: 16-17). But other known scholars like Charles Beitz, John Rawls, and Ignatieff all believe that the historical and philosophical origin of these natural rights as suggested by Cranston, are an obstacle in reaching a human rights agreement between people of different cultural backgrounds (Beitz 2003; Ignatieff 2000a; Rawls 1999). “It is not unreasonable to expect the
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societies in ways that respond to differences in the economic, social, and cultural background” (Beitz 2003:143).
Maximalist approach to Human Rights
This results in a challenge, balancing between maintaining righteousness and reliability of the existing human rights tradition and also trying to answer to new threats to human dignity and human well-being (Alston 1984: 609). The latter is supported by a group of scholars who argue that human rights should not be downscaled but instead expanded.
A well-known response to Ignatieff is by Joshua Cohen, who argues for justificatory
minimalism (Cohen 2004: 5). In his article Minimalism About Human Rights: The Most We Can Hope For? he counters the argument of Ignatieff that there should only be a limited set of
human rights installed to ensure body integrity and resist violence and oppression. Cohen says that we can hope for much more then Ignatieff proposes, namely to make a ‘substantively rich idea of human rights’ attractive (O’Neill 2003). The idea of justificatory minimalism is to “present and defend a conception of human rights, as an essential element of a conception of
global justice for an ethically pluralistic world” (idem: 4). The idea is to create a conception
of human rights with no religious or ethical outlook with the ultimate goal of broader public loyalty.
In another response to Ignatieff, Greg Dinsmore argues that defending a minimalist human rights view is “practically self-defeating”, and he states that “less really is less” (Dinsmore 2007: 473). He argues that the minimalist view will undermine the legitimacy of human rights even further. By creating a moral system that will only operate in the most difficult times, for instance in the chaos of a failed state, practical difficulties will undermine the system due to a strain on the conflict between morality and expediency (ibid.). This results in a situation that (minimal) human rights will only be implemented in a situation where they are the most likely to fail, which will then undermine the human rights regime even further (Dinsmore 2007: 473).
This maximalist viewpoint is the position of which this thesis is built upon. Instead of arguing for a minimalist viewpoint on human rights and thus a smaller, narrowed down list of rights, this thesis will suggest an expanded list of human rights. I agree with the goal mentioned by Cohen to create a broader public loyalty for human rights without a religious or ethical outlook. The only human rights minimalism I agree with is minimalism on the
justification of human rights.“If human rights can be said to be “minimalist” in any sense, it is that they constitute only a “proper subset” of the rights of social justice”(Beitz 2009: 143).
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Samuel Moyn argues in the opening statement of his book Not Enough that history can never remain the same because every era must rethink its past (Moyn 2018). He argues that especially in the field of human rights, it is a challenging obligation not to lose track of how fast our present is transforming. Human rights are some of our highest ideals in an age when lived history can seem to be accelerating so fast, that written history cannot match the pace of change (Moyn 2018). The fast transforming present that we live in causes difficulties in law that are written down. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), as mentioned in the introduction, has celebrated its 70th birthday and has not changed a word since 1948. Yes, some new conventions have been accepted in the last couple of years, such as the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT 1984) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC 1989). These are two of the nine core international human rights instruments (OHCHR 2019). But, as Moyn mentioned, the present is transforming faster than written history can change and therefore the current documents might not acknowledge all the rights that are needed in the current society. This will be briefly be explained by something called the ‘moral blind spot’.
As mentioned in the introduction of this thesis, one of the biggest arguments for an expansion of the current human rights, is that there will always be a moral blind spot. To raise awareness of a blind spot, a liberation movement stands up. A liberation movement demands an end to bias, bigotry, and discrimination that is based on an arbitrary characteristic, like ethnic origin or gender (Singer 2015: xviii). A lot of different liberation movements have emerged, including the Black Liberation movement and the Gay Liberation movement. It is commonly accepted that discrimination on the basis of gender was the last liberation movement that was needed (ibid.). “But we should always be wary of talking of ‘the last
remaining form of discrimination’” (Singer 2015: xviii). Singer argues that these different
liberation movements show that it is difficult to see the undiscovered prejudices towards certain groups until these are forcefully pointed out to us (ibid.). These movements demand a change in our way of thinking. Something that we saw as normal, comes to be seen as an inexcusable prejudgement. To avoid being the persecutor, humanity must reconsider their most fundamental attitudes towards all other groups. The most important way to do so is “to
consider our attitudes from the point of view of those who suffer by them” (Singer 2015:
xviii). In this process of reconsidering, someone may find that that that person consistently operates for the convenience to one and the same group that is generally the same group that this person belongs in. A person tends to do so at the expense of another group. If this is the case, then a new liberation movement is needed (ibid.).
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To detect blind spots in morality, ethics is needed (Van den Berg 2013: 42). As Van den Berg argues, ethics would be unnecessary if good and bad were abstract and clear terms. We would then only need justice and law enforcement (ibid.). In an ideal society, the moral and the law coincide. The problem is that what is moral does not necessarily correspond to what is legal. The role of ethics is striving towards an ideal, just society. In order to reach this, blind spots need to be tracked down (Van den Berg 2013: 42).
Why does this thesis use the concept of human rights to incorporate rights for animals and deal with climate change? The first reason is the importance of universalism within the maximalist argument. The two cases that are selected are part of ecology rights, and for ecology rights to be defended properly, they cannot be confined to the borders and therefore rights of individual countries, or even continents. The second reason is that ‘normal’ rights ensure something is taken seriously; but designating something as a human right is preferable,
“on account of the status of this class of rights in legal and moral discourse” (Merrills 2007:
666).
This thesis will defend the maximalist approach to human rights within two cases: animal and climate rights. I now specify why these two specific cases within the broader range of ecology rights, have been chosen to defend the maximalist vision.
Case selection explanation
This thesis will operate on the premise that there can be something called ‘ecology rights’, a concept derived from the books of Benton (1993), Varner (1998) and
Regan (1982). Even though this terminology is not commonly used, the idea of the concept is easy to imagine. First, what is ecology? Literally, ecology studies "life at home", with focus on "the totality
or pattern of relations between organisms and their environment"
(Odum and Barrett 2004: 2). In Figure 1 the different hierarchical ecology levels are hierarchically outlined.
This thesis will focus on expanding human rights in the field of ecology rights, divided into animal rights and climate rights. The term ‘climate rights’ needs some elaboration; this term is specifically chosen for rights to combat climate change. Climate change is part of the ecology but touches upon many of the different levels that can be seen in figure 1.
Figure 1 Eleven integrative levels of ecology organization in hierarchy (Barrett et al. 1997; Odum and Barrett 2004: 5).
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Why are animal rights and climate rights worth researching? Many movements call for change in the current relationship to non-human nature. While ecological politics and radical concern about human treatment of non-human animals often share common sentimental sources, the philosophical sources and political aims of these movements are often quite distinct (Benton 1993: 2). The most influential statements of moral concern for non-human animals encompass widely held moral theories, including utilitarianism and especially liberal rights-theory. For the sake of argument, this thesis will operate on the fact that climate change does exist and will not elaborate on the viewpoints of climate skeptics. For further reading, please see the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2019). As mentioned above, animals and climate represent two different aspects of ecology. Whereas animals are part of the hierarchical level of ecology organization, the climate is a transcending concept that spans on multiple levels. Even though they are so different, they have a couple of similarities and so do the people who argue for their ‘liberation’. A good example of this is intensive livestock farming. Animal activists highlight the damage and injury of the animals involved in the process, and climate activists highlight the damage that mega stalls have on the environment (Van den Berg 2013: 45). This example shows that even though both cases are different they have similarities and sometimes argue for the same cause. An example is given by utilitarian philosopher and animal rights advocate Peter Singer in his book Animal Liberation (2015): “By ceasing to rear and kill animals for food, we can make
so much extra food available for humans that, properly distributed, I would eliminate starvation and malnutrition from this planet. Animal Liberation is Human Liberation too”
(Singer 2015: xxi).
Case 1: arguing for animal rights
"Other animals, which, on account of their interests having been neglected by the insensibility of the ancient jurists, stand degraded into the class of things (...).The day may come, when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those rights which never could have been withholden from them but by the hand of tyranny (...).It may come one day to be recognized, that the number of legs, the villosity of the skin, or the termination of the os sacrum, are reasons equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate(…).?...the question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer? Why should the law refuse its protection to any sensitive being?... The time will come when humanity will extend its mantle over everything which breaths... " (Bentham 1789: xvii, 1).
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The philosophical discussion about the role that animals play in human society has been going on for quite some time. As can be seen in the introductory quote of Jeremy Bentham, the topic of animal rights has been theorized as early as the 18th century. To understand the current movements within the spectrum of animal rights, it is important to take a step back and look at one of the most influential scholars that gave a new perspective on life as we know it, Charles Darwin. Darwin, the founder of the theory of evolution, threw “light on the origin of
man and history” (Darwin 1859). The theory of ‘Darwinism’, states that evolution is a
‘descent with modification’, this is the idea that species change over time to give rise to new species and that all these species share a common ancestral species (ibid.). This theory results in three positions in regards to the relation of humans to nature, particularly to animals (Cliteur 2001: 23).
Firstly, the traditional approach: this approach assumes that Darwinism lowers the human standard and that everyone who states that the human is part of the animal kingdom, reduces man to an animal (Cliteur 2001: 23). However, there are disagreements among scholars who take this position. Some scholars delight themselves with the thought that all human action is in fact bestial. This reductionist perspective can be found in the works of contemporary ethologists Desmond Morris, Lionel Tiger and philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche (Morris 1967; Tiger 1969; Nietzsche 1881). The scholars from the second and third position argue against this theory because these groups both believe that Darwinism does not downgrade the position of the human to the animal kingdom.
Scholars that support the second position believe that there is no moral consequence to Darwinism. They do believe that the human being is not ‘downgraded’ to an animal but do not think that the theory of evolution has consequences for how we consider mankind (Cliteur 2001: 23-24). A human is a being with reasonableness and dignity and can maintain that, even though his roots are within the animal kingdom (ibid.). This can be seen as the standard approach or response to Darwinism.
Lastly, the third position in regard to Darwinism states that Darwinism has had radical philosophical and ethical consequences and that these consequences are a good thing (Cliteur 2001: 24). According to Cliteur, this view is not that common. It does not downgrade the position of the human being; it upgrades the position of the rest of nature. The human is not comparable with a naked monkey, the animal is an undressed human being. Supporters of this claim are contemporary authors like James Rachels and Peter Singer (Rachels 1990; Singer 1975). They emphasize this third position of Darwinism gives us a perspective that has far-reaching consequences on the traditional way we think about humans and their behavior
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(Singer 1999). Singer calls this interpretation ‘Darwinian left’.
I believe that the theory of Darwinism, and all the theories that were derived from this point of view, have immense consequences for how we see ourselves. I believe this is important and therefore the position of Darwinian left is the base on which this thesis will argue for the expansion of human rights with animal rights.
“Animals are the main victims of history”, according to bestseller author of Sapiens and Homo Dues Yuval Noah Harari in the introduction to Peter Singers’ 2015th edition of
Animal Liberation (Harari 2015: ix). Harari writes about years of animal extinction caused by
humans, and that the population of large animals in the world no longer consists of lions (40.000) and elephants (500.000), but of 1 billion domesticated pigs, 1.5 billion domesticated cows and 20 billion chickens (ibid.). Harari argues that modern-day industrial agriculture brings animals “more pain and misery than all the wars of history put together” (Harari 2015: xiii). For four billion years, life was dependent on natural selection and this is now rapidly changing to human intelligent design. When humanity designs this ‘brave new world’, Harari argues that this should be based upon the welfare of all sentient beings and not just of humans (Harari 2015: xiv).
Peter Singers book Animal Liberation will be one of the main works this argument for animal rights is built upon and can be summarized in Singer’s first sentence: “This book is
about the tyranny of human over nonhuman animals” (Singer 2015: xv). Singer’s book is one
of the main works the animal liberation movement is built upon. This movement is interested in preventing suffering and misery and believes it is wrong to “inflict needless suffering on
another being, even if that being is not a member of our own species” (Singer 2015: xvi). The
movement believes that animals are ruthlessly and cruelly exploited by humans and they, therefore, criticize the meat industry. They argue that animals should not be treated as a means to human ends, but as free, conscious beings (ibid). The movement wants to end oppression and exploitation of animals and shows that “the basic moral principle of equal
consideration of interests is not arbitrarily restricted to members of their own species”
(Singer 2015: xvi). It is an appeal to these principles that all humans accept (Singer 2015: xvii).
Singer addresses everything that is wrong within the current system regarding animals, for instance using animals in experiments, and their role within the consuming industry and I believe that Singer’s book makes a very important topic visible to a wider public. Even though these wrongdoings within the system are very interesting, this thesis will stay away from these proceedings and will present arguments to build a larger, structural foundation for
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animal rights. The practical examples like animal experiments, the meat industry, but also discussions on topics that Singer did not discuss, like hunting and trapping, the fur industry, the abuse of companion animals, rodeos, zoos, and circuses, (Singer 2015: xxiv) will find a way within the public debate but will not be discussed in this thesis. If one of these topics is revised and discussed in the public debate, an unexpected effect is that this creates a precedent to revise the entire intensive livestock farming, or even broader animal welfare grounds (Van den Berg 2013: 26). To build this large structural foundation, that can eventually be used to find an answer to the proceedings mentioned by Singer, I would like to start with explaining the (moral) blind spot that exists on animal rights.
1.1. The moral blind spot of animal rights
As has been mentioned above in the text explaining the maximalist approach to human rights, every generation has its own blind spot in history. The tyranny that Singer mentions of human over nonhuman animals, can “only be compared with the pain and suffering that resulted from
the centuries of tyranny of white humans over black humans” (Singer 2015: xv). He argues
that animals are the new moral blind spot of this century. Singer believes that “there is no
reason, except for the selfish desire to preserve the privileges of the exploiting group, for refusing to extend the basic principle of equality of consideration to members of other species” (Singer 2015: xix). According to Singer, the attitudes of humans against animals are
a form of bias no less offensive than the prejudgment on a person’s ethnical background or gender (ibid.). By eating animals, Singer felt like he was participating in a systematic form of oppression of other species by his own species (Singer 2015: xxxii).
There are a couple of handicaps within the Animal Liberation movement. The most obvious handicap being that the members of the exploited group cannot organize a protest against the treatment they receive. “The less able a group is to stand up and organize against
oppression, the more easily it is oppressed” (Singer 2015: xix). As Jonathan Safran Foer puts
it, is that humans are the only party that can negotiate but they are not the only party at the negotiation table (Foer 2013: 185). Since animals cannot protest or stand up for their interests, it is important that some humans give animals a voice (Cliteur 2013: 24). Joel Feinberg argues that children and idiots can start legal proceedings through the actions of proxies or attorneys (Feinberg 1974: 47). They are empowered to speak in their name. “If there is no conceptual
absurdity in this situation, why should there be in the case where a proxy makes a claim on behalf of an animal” (Feinberg 1974: 47)?
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discourse. People commonly make wills in which they leave money to custodians for animal care. This can be viewed as the animal’s right to its inheritance (Feinberg 1974: 47). If a custodian steals from the animals’ account, and someone, speaking on behalf of the animal presses its claim, this can be seen as proclaiming the animal’s rights (McCloskey 1965: 121- 124)? Feinberg argues that there is no reason that the animal needs to understand what is going on, as a prerequisite for being seen as a possessor of rights (Feinberg 1974: 47). Lastly, another handicap for the Animal Liberation movement is that everyone who eats meat sees benefit from the oppression of animals. Therefore, everyone who eats meat is a member of the oppressing group (Singer 2015: xix).
One who supports the minimalist approach to human rights might argue against animal rights with the valid point that implementing animal rights within the current UDHR will be very difficult. The problem of compossibility mentioned earlier in this thesis, the idea that implementing one right might conflict with implementing another right, might be a problem when it comes to the freedom of religion and animal rights. Ritual slaughter of animals is still allowed, and a law submitted in the Dutch Parliament by the Party for the Animals, who argued for prohibiting ritual slaughter, was accepted with a vast majority in the House of Representatives but turned down in the Senate (Dutch Senate 2012). Some thinkers like Cliteur, reply to this critique that a human animal does not have the moral right to hurt another (non-human) animal for the religious beliefs of another human being (Cliteur 2013: 24). They say that you can use your own religious ideas to make decisions for yourself, but not to make decisions for another being, certainly not if this being has no possibility to defend itself (ibid.). Some even say that some religious organizations have privileges within society that other organizations have not, such as ritual slaughter (Van den Berg 2013: 26). Due to these ‘privileges’, there is a tension between them and legal principles that apply to all citizens. This causes legal inequality.
So now that there has been established that the lacking of animal rights is a blind spot and, according to Singer, perhaps the moral blind spot of this generation, it is important to see how we should act after acknowledging this moral blind spot.
1.2. The Great Ape Project (GAP)
The most important first step in the direction of animal rights is to come up with a strategy that can change our views of the relative importance of humans and nonhuman animals (Singer 2015: xxvii). According to Singer, this can be done in two ways. The first way of challenging our accepted attitudes to nonhuman animals is to encourage people to become
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vegetarian and to live a cruelty-free lifestyle (ibid.). Although this, of course, is a possibility, it is not that interesting in creating animal rights by expanding human rights, and not that easily achievable. The second way Singer proposes to change views to a positive attitude towards animal rights, is a project he founded with Italian animal liberationist Paola Cavalieri, called The Great Ape Project (GAP).
The Great Ape Project is an attempt to enlarge the group of beings who are recognized to have certain basic rights (Singer 2015: xxvii). It emphasizes the expansion of the group that receives ‘human’ rights, from humans to nonhuman animals. It, therefore, seeks a historical breach in the species barrier. The project specifically urges to extend the rights to life, liberty, and protection from torture to chimpanzees, gorillas, and orang-utans. The capacities of great apes should ensure that they are entitled to be considered more like persons, than as things (Cavalieri and Singer 1993). Essentially, they want to change the law regarding great apes, going towards a United Nations Declaration of the Rights of Great Apes (ibid.). The reason for focusing on great apes and not all sentient beings is that research shows that these three monkey species are “thinking, self-aware beings, capable of planning ahead, forming lasting
social bonds and having a rich social and emotional life” (Singer 2015: xxviii). Singer argues
that chimpanzees, gorillas, and orang-utans are the ideal group for illustrating the arbitrariness of the ‘borders’ between different species. Singer believes that some animals even excel some humans in their capacities and that it is, therefore, reasonless and inconsequent to deny the great apes these rights (ibid.). Also, if these three monkey species are granted rights, this would not be a threat to any major industry or the diets of the majority of the population- which will happen if all animals are granted rights (Singer 2015: xxviii).
The most important part of this project is that it has the radical goal that it serves as a bridge to overcome the gap between humans and other species. If it does, “it will make it more
feasible to extend equal consideration to other nonhuman animals as well” (Singer 2015:
xxviii). “The GAP has a huge symbolic value as a concrete representation of the first break in
the species barrier” (Cavalieri and Singer 1993). It is intended to complement (not replace)
the broader struggle for animal liberation.
By challenging the current receivers of ‘human’ rights, what is done with GAP, is to challenge the existing concept of who we consider being part of mankind, and who we consider being animals. Although his ideas are ground-breaking, he is not the first to challenge these relationships. This will be illustrated by briefly summing up how critical thinkers thought of the relationship between animals and humans in the past decades and where exactly the difference lies between humans and animals and why the latter has no
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specific universal rights, and the former has. The GAP should be seen as a starting point of the discussion around the different philosophical viewpoints on the concept of mankind and the role of animals in the history of this debate.
1.3. The philosophy and ethics of (non)human animal rights
Human rights assume that there is a concept of man/ mankind. But what is this concept of mankind? Is there a difference in the concept of human and animal nature? As read above, the case Peter Singer makes with his Great Ape Project, shows that large apes are thinking, self-aware beings (Singer 2015: xxviii). “If we think that all human beings, irrespective of age or
mental capacity, have some basic rights, how can we deny that the great apes, who surpass some humans in their capacities, also have these rights?” (Singer 2015: xxviii). So when we
look at this Great Ape Project, a problem arises. Where does the concept of mankind start, or where does that of the animal stop? Do we need to make a difference between human and nonhuman animals, and on what grounds would we do so? This thesis will try to answer these questions in the next part. To do so, it is necessary to travel back in time and revisit some of the most influential philosophers on animal rights. The distinction between human and animals has existed in writing for a long time.
“Then God said, “Let us make man in our image, after our likeness; and let them have
dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the birds in the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creeps upon the earth.” So God created man in his own image, in the image of God he created him; male and female he created them.” (The Bible, Genesis, 1:26-27).
Aristotle wrote in the fourth century B.C. that some of the ‘lower animals’ (that is nonhuman animals), share many capacities in common with humans, including the capacity to gain nourishment, to reproduce, to be aware of the world through ‘sensory apparatus’ and the capacity to desire, feel, remember, and imagine (Aristotle De Anima 2.4.415b18). According to Aristotle, the first two capacities are shared with plants, animals, and humans. But plants do not have the third and fourth capacity. In his view, man alone possesses the capacity to reason. Therefore, man can be defined as a rational animal (Regan and Singer 1976: 3). Aristoteles’ view has been challenged a couple of times, but the most well-known responses are the following two.
The first well-known challenger of the theory of Aristotle was Descartes. He argued that animals are automata, machines (Descartes 1664: AT XI 202, CSM I 108). Descartes
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thought of animal bodies as nothing more than complex machines, in which the bones, muscles, and organs could be replaced with cogs, pistons, and cams. According to Schultz and Schultz, this mechanism of Descartes became the standard to which Nature and organisms were compared (Schultz and Schultz 2008: 28-34). Descartes’ theory is contradicted by Regan, who believes there is a set of reasons for attributing consciousness or mental life to animals, and that therefore Descartes’ belief that animals are merely machines, is invalid. He calls this the Cumulative Argument for animal consciousness (Regan 1986: 28).
This argument goes as follows. First Regan argues that the ascription of consciousness to some animals is commonly accepted and efforts to prove the opposite lacked sufficient grounds (Regan 1986: 28). Secondly, Regan argues that the ascription of consciousness to some animals is also consistent with the commonly used language and efforts to change or replace this way of speaking, also lack sufficient grounds (ibid.). Thirdly, the ascription of consciousness to some animals “does not imply or assume that animals have immortal
(immaterial) souls and thus can be made and defended independently of religious convictions about life after death” (Regan 1986: 28). Fourthly, animal behavior is consistent with them
having consciousness and lastly, “an evolutionary understanding of consciousness provides a
theoretical basis for the ascription of awareness to animals other than human beings” (Regan
1986: 28). This argument proves, according to Regan, that consciousness is not restricted to human beings (idem: 30).
The second challenger disputes the claim of Aristotle that man is the only rational animal. Before this claim can be challenged, it should be noted that this presupposes that there is an agreement on what is meant with rationality. To be able to reason involves being able to recognize that certain things support or necessitate certain other things (Regan and Singer 1976: 5). Regan and Singer argue that to test a being’s capacity to reason is not only to do so by putting premises into words, as can be done to most humans but to observe the nonverbal behavior of a creature (idem: 6). They have done so following philosophers such as Voltaire and Hume. Voltaire argues, in a reply to Descartes, that animals have received the gifts of feeling, memory and of a certain number of ideas (Voltaire 1764).
David Hume wrote that no truth appears more evident to him than “that ‘beasts’ are
endowed with thought and reason as well as man” (Hume 1738). He argues that humans and
other creatures perform the same actions for self-preservation, to gain pleasure and to avoid pain. Both humans and other creatures perform these actions and direct them to like ends. According to Hume, this means that we have to believe in the existence of ‘a like cause’ (Hume 1738). Hume takes it one step further and argues that if the (external) actions of both
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humans and animals bear a resemblance, then the internal actions of animals should be judged likewise to resemble ours:
“If the resemblance betwixt the actions of animals and those of men is so entire in this
respect, that the very first action of the first animal we shall please to pitch on, will afford us an incontestable argument for the present doctrine” (Hume 1738: xvi).
And since our internal actions bear a resemblance, the causes from where these internal actions came from must also bear a resemblance (ibid.).
Another supporter of observing the nonverbal behavior of a creature is Darwin. He argues that sometimes a single painful experience is sufficient for certain monkeys to stop doing what led to the unwanted experience. He argues that this represents a creative, non-instinctive use of intelligence and that this means that the monkey can reason that he must not do so (Darwin 1871). The monkey does not speak this thought, but this is not a sufficient reason for denying that he has the capacity for thinking it (ibid.).
1.4. Duties
After this evaluation of the concept of mankind from an ethical philosophical perspective, it has been established that animals can have rights. Now, it is interesting to research whether man owes animals anything. No serious moral thinker accepts that animals can be treated how we please but that legitimate moral constraints apply to our treatment of them (Regan 1986: 150). This results in the question of whether or not humans have any obligations to other (lower) animals. Statutes making cruelty to animals a crime and laws not to maltreat animals are common, but do animals, as receiver of those duties have rights corresponding to these duties (Feinberg 1974: 45)?
“We may very well have duties regarding animals that are not at the same time duties to
animals, just as we may have duties regarding rocks or buildings, or lawns, that are not duties to the rocks, buildings, or lawns.” (Feinberg 1974: 45).
Different scholars within the animal rights literature/ movement have different ideas on what these obligations, or duties, should look like. Even though some scholars use the term obligations, this thesis will use the term duties to refer to this engagement to avoid ambiguities. This thesis will examine two different viewpoints on duties within the animal rights literature.
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1.4.A. Capacity approach to duties
In order for humans to have duties to another being, that being must have certain capacities (Regan and Singer 1976: 8). The example Regan and Singer use is that it feels much more normal to have duties towards another human, than to, for example, a cloud or a rock. Regan and Singer propose two questions to find out whether or not humans have obligations to lower animals. The first question is ‘What capacities must a being have if we are to have any duties to it?’. The second question is ‘Which lower animals, if any, have these capacities?’ (Regan and Singer 1976: 8). To answer the first question, this thesis reviews three capacities that have been reviewed in academic literature: first: rationality, the capacity to reason. Second: sentience, the capacity to experience pleasure and pain and third: autonomy, the capacity to make free choices. Before discussing these three capacities and explaining their (philosophical) background, it is interesting to highlight the opinion of Tom Regan on this. He states that “it is not clear, first, that no nonhuman animals satisfy anyone (or all) of these
conditions, and, second, it is reasonably clear that not all human beings satisfy them” (Regan
1976: 198). If humans have the right to life, it cannot be maintained that humans have this right because they satisfy one of all of the above-mentioned conditions. If humans still have this right to life, even if some of them do not satisfy the capacities, then it cannot be said that animals lack this right because they also sometimes do not have these capacities (ibid.).
(1) Rationality, the capacity to reason. A being must have the capacity to reason for humans to have any duties to it. The philosopher-theologian St. Thomas Aquinas believed that when a being has the capacity rationality, it makes a being more or less perfect. He sees the human being more perfect than other animals because they do not have the capacity to reason (Aquinas 1265). Aquinas believed that the beings who are less perfect may be used by more perfect beings. So, a man can use a lower animal as he pleases, not vice versa. Both lower animals and man can use a plant however they desire. Aquinas believes it is wrong to treat animals in a cruel way that causes them unnecessary pain, but he does not believe man has a duty to lower animals to abstain them from being treated cruelly (ibid.). So, Aquinas believed that humans only have duties to those beings who have the capacity to reason.
Critics disagree with Aquinas in two ways. First, they argue that it is not true that animals do not have the capacity rationality, at least some of the animals have this capacity. Second, they would dispute the very basis which he proposes for determining
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those beings to whom we have duties (Regan and Singer 1976: 10). This second reaction of critics will be reviewed below in ‘sentience’.
(2) Sentience, the capacity to experience pleasure and pain. Instead of asking what beings are rational, it should be asked what beings are sentient. This means that if an animal can experience pleasure or pain, humans have duties towards it. These critics believe that we have these duties directly to those animals who are sentient. This position has been held by scholars like Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, Peter Singer, and also Albert Schweitzer.
“Ethics thus consists in this, that I experience the necessity of practicing the same
reverence for life toward all will-to-live, as towards my own. I have already the needed fundamental principle of morality. It is good to maintain and cherish life; it is evil to destroy and to check life.” (Schweitzer 1923: 254).
(3) Autonomy, the capacity to make free choices. To review the autonomy of (lower) animals, it is interesting to review the eighteenth-century philosopher Kant. He reasons that man, but not an animal, exists as an end in himself. So, the existence of man, and not of a lower animal, is intrinsically worthwhile or has value in itself (Kant 1963). He makes this distinction between man and animal because he seems to believe that men are autonomous beings and animals are not and therefore do not have a free will. Kant believes that animals have no self-consciousness. Because they lack an ego, they cannot conceive of how they ought to act according to the conception of laws (ibid.). With laws, Kant means natural laws, for instance, the law of gravity. A man, however, can choose to obey the natural laws which apply to his behavior, or he chooses to act as he thinks he ought. According to Kant, this capacity is what separates man from all other animals (Kant 1963). Therefore, he believes that humans have direct duties to all other humans, but not any direct duties to animals. He argues that “if we develop a habit of treating
animals cruelly this will damage our character and ultimately lead to inappropriate treatment of other human beings” (Skidmore 2001: 541).
This theory of Kant has been criticized by many scholars, such as Arthur Schopenhauer, who has an important remark to Kant. Schopenhauer believes, contrary to Kant, that animals do possess self-consciousness. He believes that there are more similarities than dissimilarities between man and (other) animals. This similarity is present when we consider the fact that both have a will (Schopenhauer 1840). For Schopenhauer, this ‘will’ is the desire, effort and striving of the human spirit. Because this will is something that humans and animals share, Schopenhauer believes that they are
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both fundamentally the same. As such, human beings should have respect and sympathy for animals as they have for other human beings. As a response to Kant, he writes “Since
compassion for animals is so intimately associated with goodness of character, it may be confidently asserted that whoever is cruel to animals cannot be a good man”
(Schopenhauer 1840: 223).
Another response to the suggestion of Kant that man has no obligation to animals but to himself, is that in the 19th century it was widely believed that statutes that make cruelty against animals a crime, were not designed to protect animals, but to protect humans from developing cruel habits that could cause harm to the human being (Feinberg 1974: 45). “Our concern is for the feelings of other human beings, a large proportion of whom,
although accustomed to the slaughter of animals for food, readily identify themselves with a tortured dog or horse and respond with great sensitivity to its sufferings (Schwartz
1963: 673). Feinberg believes this to be ‘factitious’ and he answers that the very people whose sensibilities were invoked are the ones who would want animals to have protection (Feinberg 1974: 45). Therefore, the obligation is not to themselves, as Kant argues, but to the animals. It is not the animal that has duties, it is the human that has duties towards the animal.
The second question brought up by Regan and Singer, ‘which specific lower animals, if any, have these capacities’ (Regan and Singer 1976: 8), does not have to be answered. Regan argues that if these capacities are an important measure for humans to have duties towards an animal, even if some humans do not have these capacities, then it cannot be said that animals lack this right because they also sometimes do not have these capacities (Regan 1976: 198). I feel like this argumentation does not do justice to this elaborate research above on whether or not animals have certain capacities. Singer argues that equality needs to be extended to other species (Singer 1976: 149). He states that there are important differences between human beings and animals and this should lead to some differences in human rights and animal rights, but that this is not a barrier for extending the basic principle of equality to nonhuman animals (idem: 150). He uses the example that “since a man cannot have an abortion, it is
meaningless to talk of his right to have one. Since a pig cannot vote, it is meaningless to talk of its right to vote” (ibid.).
There is a lot of literature on the subject which animals should receive rights (MacIntyre 1999; Wise 2002; Sunstein 2003; Jasper and Nelkin 1991). This thesis will, as mentioned above, adopt Singers view in which he is arguing for equality between all species
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and that the differences between species are within the specific rights, but not within the different kind of species that exists. Still, it is interesting to review how specific animal rights should look like in practice. This will be reviewed later in this thesis.
1.4.B. Capability approach to duties
Martha Nussbaum uses the capability approach, instead of the capacity approach used by Singer and Regan. Nussbaum states that this capability approach is not a theory of human nature and it does not derive standards from innate human nature, but it is evaluative and ethical (Nussbaum 2011: 51). She states that nonhuman animals are less malleable than humans. Therefore, they may not be able to suppress a harmful ability without painful frustration and they are harder to read because their lives are not the same as ours (ibid.). Observing their true capabilities and having a good descriptive theory of each species and its form of life plays a bigger role in creating a normative theory of animal capabilities than creating one for humans (Nussbaum 2011: 51- 52). The ten essential capabilities that Nussbaum mentions are life, physical health, physical inviolability, sensory perception, feelings, practical reason, social connections, life with other biological species, to play and lastly the design of their own environment (idem: 57- 59). So whose capabilities matter? According to Nussbaum, almost every advocate of the approach states that the capabilities of all humans matter as equals (idem: 215). But there are five different elemental positions within the capability approach:
(1). Only human capabilities count as an end to itself, although other capabilities can be instrumentally valuable in promoting human capabilities.
(2). Human capabilities are the primary focus, but because people have relationships with non-human beings, those beings can be included in the description of the goal to be promoted, not just as means, but as participants in intrinsically valuable relationships. (3). The capabilities of all beings who have a consciousness, count as an end to itself and all these creatures must reach capabilities above a certain threshold level.
(4). The capabilities of all living organisms, including plants, should count, but as individual entities, and not as a part of the ecosystem
(5). The individualism of the first four positions will be abandoned and the capabilities of systems (in particular ecosystems, but also species) count as ends to itself (Nussbaum 2011: 216).
Nussbaum herself argues both in favor of position two, as well as position three when it comes to social justice. She states that the idea of social justice is inherently connected with at
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least minimal awareness and with the associated capacity for goal-oriented pursuit (Nussbaum 2011: 217). She states that animals can not only suffer from pain, but also from injustice (ibid.). This capability approach is presumably well suited for focusing on malicious things that people do to animals, at least better than looking at it from a utilitarian perspective, Nussbaum argues. The problem with utilitarianism is that it tries to measure the outcome of for instance pain and it then aggregates results. Nussbaum states that animals do not simply strive to the prevention of pain, but strive towards lives with multiple, clearly distinguishable components, including freedom of movement, friendship, honor or dignity and we should stay sensitive for the individual interests of each of these components (Nussbaum 2011: 218- 219). The capability approach sees animals as actors, not as passive receivers of pleasure or pain. According to Nussbaum, this radical conceptual difference can contribute to a more relevant form of respect for animal endeavors and activities that this approach develops. To make sure the capability approach is suitable for the above purposes, it needs to be adjusted slightly (Nussbaum 2010: 220). There is, for instance, a bigger need for dignity, this is not just limited to human dignity anymore, but also has to be in accordance with the dignity of a wide range of conscious beings. Every type of animal has its own dignity (ibid.). Also, the idea that animals who are living in the wild should be left alone, must be rejected. According to Nussbaum, there is no habitat that is not permeated by human action. This results in an adjustment in the list of capabilities, namely the freedom of choice in reproduction (Nussbaum 2010: 221- 222). But most importantly, animals should have rights to a minimum threshold level to live a life that is characteristic of their species (idem: 222).
So, to conclude, the capability approach by Nussbaum argues that animals are actors, which results in them gaining more respect and dignity, in comparison to other approaches. The duties of humans towards nonhuman animals are equal to the capabilities Nussbaum suggests, and these capabilities should even be adjusted to fit the purpose of being projected on animals as well.
1.4.C. Negative, positive and relational duties
According to Donaldson and Kymlicka, animal rights theory remains politically marginal, mainly because it has mostly been written down in a list of negative rights (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011: 6). There has been too little written on what positive duties we have towards animals, such as to respect the animal’s habitat, or designing neighborhoods and roads in a way that takes into account nonhuman needs (ibid.). They also suggest duties for rescuing animals that are unintentionally injured by human action or duties to care for animals who
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have become dependent upon us (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011: 6). They argue that the existing animal rights theory has overlooked what relational duties humans may have towards animals. These are duties that do not come from the intrinsic characteristics, as argued by Regan and Singer above in capacity duties, but from the more “geographically and
historically specific relationships that have developed between groups of humans and groups of animals” (idem: 261). They explain this by giving an example that humans have a different
moral obligation to dogs and cows because humans have “deliberately bred these
domesticated animals to become dependent on us, than we have to ducks and squirrels who migrate to areas of human settlement, and both of these examples differ from animals isolated in wilderness who have little or no contact with humans” (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011: 6).
They argue that the focus in current animal rights theory on negative rights is exactly how it differs from the human rights theory. All human beings have basic absolute negative rights, but the majority of moral reasoning and theorizing concerns the positive and relational duties that human beings have towards other human beings, such as neighbors and co-citizens (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011:6). Different relationships generate different duties and because every relationship differs in duties, which results in a complex situation. “Our
relations with animals are likely to have a similar sort of moral complexity, given the enormous variation in our historic relationships with different categories of animals”
(Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011: 6). So, the focus in animal rights theory should be shifted to incorporate not only negative but also positive and relational rights between humans and animals.
The reason why animal rights theory has been focused on negative rights is that positive rights are challenging and do not have priority (Francione 1999: 77). Also, because it is so hard for animal rights theorists to persuade the public to accept negative rights for animals, it may result in even more difficulties when insisting on positive rights as well (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011: 7). Finally, and most importantly, there is skepticism on whether human beings should have relations with animals that results in relational duties at all (ibid.). But Donaldson and Kymlicka argue that “limiting animal rights theory to a set of
negative rights is not only unsustainable intellectually, but also damaging politically, since it deprives itself of a positive conception of human-animal interaction” (Donaldson and
Kymlicka 2011: idem). Some scholars believe that recognizing relation-specific positive duties make animal rights theory more demanding, or even reductio ad absurdum (Sagoff 1984: 297 -307). Donaldson and Kymlicka argue that, therefore, the relational duties approach results in the animal rights theory being much more appealing.
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Shepard argues that human beings are intertwined with nature and interconnected to the animal world. Therefore, animals have ‘made us human’ (Shepard 1997). Animal rights theory should not only include negative rights, but also positive duties and it should suggest terms under which the interactions between humans and animals “can be respectful, mutually
enriching and non-exploitative” (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011: 11). This theory should be a
combination of universal negative rights to all beings, and specified positive duties that are dependent on the relationship between humans and animals (ibid.). Some already existing experiments that are examples of different duties towards different human-animal relationships are designated pigeon lofts, wildlife refuge centers, wildlife overpasses and animal sanctuaries (idem: 256).
The suggestions presented by Donaldson and Kymlicka makes animal rights theory more politically viable because it offers the assets that are needed to create greater public support and even bring together allies that were former enemies, such as animal rights activists and ecologists (idem: 10-11).
Three different theories on duties for animals have been reviewed above. First, the capacity approach, that argued that animals must have three capacities for humans to have duties to them: rationality, sentience, and autonomy. Second, the capability approach that argued that existing capabilities need to be expanded to incorporate animals and third, the theory that argues that the relation between animals and humans should be reviewed before establishing what duties humans have towards animals. This thesis will now research how these specific animal rights should look like.
1.5. How to implement animal rights within the (current) human rights system
What is clear after seeing all these different perspectives on human duties to animals, is that scholars agree that animals have inviolable rights (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011: 4). This means that an animal is not alive to serve human ends and that therefore some things should not be done to animals. Animals are no slaves and “have their own moral significance and
their own subjective existence that should be respected” (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2014: 4).
Different scholars have different theories on how these rights should be implemented within the current human rights regime. This thesis will review the most three ideas that have been chosen either because they are revolutionary (Singer), they have been around for ages (Bentham; Cliteur) or have strong theoretical base and line of thought (Donaldson and Kymlicka).
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1.5.A. How citizenship rights can be used for animals
As stated above, Donaldson and Kymlicka argue for a more expansive account of the current animal rights theory, one that integrates negative rights for all species combined with positive rights that are dependent on the relation between humans and the specific animal (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011: 11). They believe that this approach is “more intellectually credible than
the existing welfarist, ecological or classic animal rights approaches to human-animal justice and that it is more politically viable” (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011: 11). The crux of their
aim is that this human-animal relationship needs to be understood in more political terms. They mention that this relationship differs because of political institutions, state sovereignty, and their territory. It also depends on whether they have migrated, were colonized, and if they are a member of a group (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011: 12). Therefore, the issue of animal rights can be shifted from an issue in applied ethics, what it has been so far, to a question of political theory (Cline 2005).
The argument of Donaldson and Kymlicka uses recent developments in the associated fields of political philosophy as a basis. In this field, they have struggled to implement the different relationships in the existing universal, individual rights (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011: 13). A crucial concept in this consideration is citizenship (Kymlicka and Norman 1994). They use citizenship rights as an example because it presents distinguishing rights and accountabilities, in addition to the existing human rights that are owed to everyone (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011: 13). There are “multiple overlapping, qualified, and
mediated forms of citizenship, which all flow from the more basic fact that human society is organized into distinct, territorially bounded self-governing communities” (Donaldson and
Kymlicka 2011: 13). They argue that the development of this citizenship theory gives a useful design for combining the traditional animal rights theory with relationship rights (idem: 14). The same guidelines that humans have formed within the citizenship theory, can be applied to animals. Examples that are presented by Donaldson and Kymlicka can be seen in table 1.
Humans in citizenship theory Animals in citizenship theory
Forming separate sovereign communities on their own territories (e.g. indigenous people)
Animals in the wild vulnerable to human invasion and colonization
Denizens, rather than citizens. (migrant
workers or refugees). They reside on the territory of the state, are subject to its governance, but are no citizens.
Animals who choose to move into areas of human habitation (liminal opportunistic animals)
