Water Resources Management in the Palestine
Outlook on the West Bank’s Water Sector, from a State-Building perspectiveValerie Wilhelm 01-06-2017
Part of the course Civil War and State-Building Thesis supervisor: A. Steele
Table of Contents
Table of Contents 2 List of Acronyms 3 1. Introduction 4 2. Theoretical framework on service delivery in fragile states 6 2.1 The framework for effective state building 6 2.1 The three dimensions of effective state-building 6 2.2 Principle functions of the state 7 2.2.1 The key services 7 2.3 The dynamics of service delivery and state-building 7 2.4 Keystones for effective water delivery 8 2.4.1 Accountability in the water sector 8 2.4.2 Visibility, Collaboration, Inclusion and Opportunity 10 3. State-building efforts in Palestine in relation to service provision 12 3.1 Historical and institutional overview 12 3.1.1 Oslo agreements 12 3.1.2 Palestinian state formation since the signing of the Oslo Agreements 13 3.2 Palestinian – Israeli cooperation on water resources 14 3.2.1 JWC 14 3.2.3 Critical perspective on JWC 15 3.3 Internal issues in the Palestinian Authorities 15 4. Methods 15 4.1 Measurement section 15 4.1.1 Framework for assessing the water sector 15 4.1.2 Data collection 16 4.2 Case selection: 16 5. Mapping the West Bank’s Water Sector 17 5.1 Institutional environment 17 5.1.1 Overview of recent institutional reforms 17 5.1.2 The principles for the water sector framework 17 5.1.3 Institutional structure of the water sector 18 5.2 The reality of the water sector 19 5.2.1 Comparing theory and reality 19 6. Analysis 20 6.1 Clarifying the key findings of the sector assessment 20 6.4 Interpretation of analysis 22 7. Discussion & Conclusion 22 7.1 Discussion 22 7.1.1 Other explanations 22 7.1.2 Limitations of study 22 7.2 Conclusion 23 References 24 Appendix 27 1. The visualization of water sector in reality 27
List of Acronyms
JWC Joint Water Committee
JnWSSD Jenin Municipality Water Supply and Sanitation Department JWU Jerusalem Water Utility
Lpcd Liters per capita per day NWC National Water Council
PA/PNA Palestinian Authority / Palestinian National Authority PHG Palestine Hydrology Group
PLO Palestine Liberation Organization PWA Palestinian Water Authority
1.
Introduction
Setting the contextThe Oslo accords, signed in 1993, were expected to start of a more peaceful and stable relationship between Palestine and Israel. The accords included a section with the design for cooperation on transboundary water resources. Until now the
agreements on water resources as part of the Oslo accords did not live up to their expectations. “Generally, things have gotten much worse for the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza who rely on water for their livelihoods” (Zeitoun, 2008, sec. Preface).
In daily life of many Palestinians are confronted with water shortage.Water supply is of great importance for households and domestic use, but also for agricultural use. It may seem straightforward that water is a key factor for agriculture. Approximately 30% of the economies value is dependent on agriculture, which makes it the most important sector for income, export and employment(UNCTAD, 2015). The potential for economic growth is limited by the amount of water available, therefore the
improvement of water management is even more important in Palestine. However, water resources in the West Bank are under direct and indirect control of the Israeli government. The agreements over the distribution of water resources in Israel and Palestine are settled in the Oslo accords in 1993 and 1995 (UNCTAD, 2015). These arrangements are often designated as the cause of the prevailing water scarcity in the West Bank (Khan 2009). It is undeniable that the Israeli control over water resources limits the ability of the Palestine Authorities to control and regulate water flows in the West Bank. The limitations to the self-governance power of the
Palestinian Authorities are related to several internal and external factors. For instance, A lack of control on natural resources like water and land, diminishes the ability to deliver vital ‘state’ functions (Khan, 2009, p. 11). Nevertheless, previous studies have shown that, despite the severe consequences of the occupation, internal improvement inmanagement of the water sector could alleviate the water shortage crises on local level(Alsharif et al., 2008a). For example, water availability per capita in the West Bank has declined and the average household use is one quarter of the household use in Israel (World Bank, 2009).
Relevance
The water agreement - also referred to as article 40 of the Oslo agreement - puts serious constraints ondevelopment of the water sector. Taking the external limitations into account, the performance of the water sector can be improved by resolving some the domestic challenges in the water sector. The improvement of public service delivery by the state is directly beneficial to the quality of people’s daily life. Besides, providing serviceswill also contribute to the state building process through the reciprocal relationship between service delivery and state building. A large part of the existing literature relates to involvement of non-state actors and their impact on state building, like NGO’s (Turton, 1999; Mason, 2012; Wild and Mason, 2012). The existing literature argues that, beside the positive impact on health and hygiene, the involvement of non-state actors in the water sector has merely negative consequences for the legitimacy and capacity building in a fragile state. Another point of focus in the existing literature stress that delivering public services is a key function of a state. These articles intend to explain the link between public services and state
building as a one-way relation, in which the effectiveness of public services is dependent on the capacity of the state (Ghani, Lockhart and Carnahan, 2005, p. 6). This thesis will combine the knowledge from the two academic perspectives to substantiate the dynamics and synergy of water delivery and state building. The theoretical framework elaborates in more detail on the mechanisms that link water services and state building.
Research questions
The following research question embodies the objective of this paper: ‘What are the state-building related hindrances for achieving effective water delivery in the West Bank within the existing institutional framework?’. In order to work towards a most complete understanding of the research problem, the research process has been divided into sections. The first section outlines the asserted links are between water delivery and state building. To answer this, recent relevant literature has been reviewed and the asserted links between water delivery and state building were identified. Thereafter, the context of state building in Palestine will be set out in chapter three. After presenting the theoretical and contextual outline, the study will continue by exploring the institutional structure of the water sector. The qualitative data was collected through scoping reports on the institutional structure of the
Palestinian water sector. The findings were systematically mapped in accordance to the “Template for assessing the governance of public water supply and sanitation service providers” (Locussol and van Ginneken, 2010). The mapped structure was than compared to the actual performance of the specific sector. The assessment of the differences between the policy on paper and its implementation contributes to the following sub-question: “are the different actors in the water sector fulfilling their mandated responsibilities in accordance to the policy framework?”. The findings on the discrepancies between the theory and reality of the water sector were analyzed. The analysis addresses the last sub-question: “Is there an underlying structural issue that can explain the incomplete implementation of the institutional structure for the water sector?”.
Purpose of study
The purpose of this study is to conduct an in-depth diagnosis of water services at local level. This thesis will underpin the strong complementary between effective service delivery and the overarching goal of state building is a useful approach to determine the governance related hindrances for achieving a sustainable public service delivery. In the existing literature on the water sector in Palestine this approach is still understudied. This holistic type of approach is particularly
appropriate to study the complex dynamics of water delivery in a fragile context. The purpose of this study is first to explore the synergy of institution building and effective service provision in the Palestinian water sector. Secondly, to expose the underlying governance problem that has led to a sub-optimal performance water providers at local level. The scope of this study will be limited to the water sector of the West Bank. The political and economic context in Gaza differs in too many aspects from the West Bank to study the Palestinian water sector as a whole.
2.
Theoretical framework on service delivery in fragile states
This chapter will outline the importance of effective water services for state building and claim that state building is a condition for effective water services. First, the concept of state building will be clarified by analysing the ‘framework for effective state building’. Subsequently, the three dimensions of state building that were derived from this framework will be explained in more detail. From this point, the literature on service delivery in relation to state building will be reviewed. Finally, ending this chapter by providing an insight in the relation between water services and state building. Thereby answering the first sub-question ‘What are the asserted links between water delivery and state building?’2.1 The framework for effective state building
In 2008 the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) presented a framework for effective state building in fragile contexts. The framework was developed after an extensive study into academic and policy-oriented literature. The framework denotes three dimensions that are essential for state building. All dimensions together would form the base for state legitimacy. State legitimacy is most commonly defined as “the belief that a rule, institution, or leader has the right to govern. It is a judgment by an individual about the rightfulness of a hierarchy between rule or ruler and its subject and about the subordinate’s obligations toward the rule or ruler” (Hurd, 2007).
The government can obtain political legitimacy through various sources. Two broad types of legitimacy can be distinguished on bases of their origin (OECD, 2008; World Bank, 2011).
Ø Output or performance legitimacy: If government performs its principle
functions well and proves its capacity by effectively delivering key services, the performance legitimacy will increase. This type of legitimacy is more or less measurable and objective.
Ø Process or input legitimacy: Legitimacy is in essence a perception of the state’s citizens. Therefore, the concept of legitimacy is also subject to non-rational or measurable variables. The input legitimacy is based on the opinion that the government has the right to rule. The process in which the
government came to power, the events that happened prior to the instalment of the new government and the ‘fairness’ of the policy-making process all contribute to the legitimacy.
2.1 The three dimensions of effective state-building
The first dimension of the framework is ‘political settlement’. It indicates the
agreement within the political elites and between the state and society, on how the power is distributed. This also includes the state’s monopoly of violence and
administrative control. Without political settlement, the state’s authority is in decline. The second dimension is, the state’s ability and level of responsiveness to perform their principal functions. This also includes the effective providence of key services. The key services that should be provided by the state, will be explained in more detail in the next paragraph.
The third dimension is the ability of society to co-define the terms of the state-society relationship. It also includes the perception of society on whether their demands are heard. The three dimensions all require certain interactions between the society and
the state. This interaction provides the basis for political legitimacy and a mutual relationship of trust.
The promotion of these three dimensions will build resilient state-society relations and therefore a more resilient state. Nevertheless, the framework should always be interpreted within the context of larger regional or international policy agreements. The next paragraph will elaborate on the key services that should be provided by the state and the importance of these services for the state-building process.
2.2 Principle functions of the state
As it was denoted as the second dimension in the previous paragraph, the state should be capable to perform their principle functions and effectively provide key services to society. In the article by Ghani et al. (2005), ten key functions of the state were denoted. These 10 key functions are categorized in three components essential to a stable order.
The political component consists out of: Monopoly of violence, administrative control, management of public finance and the international relations. The social order
consists out of: the investment in human capital and the delineation of citizenship rights & duties. The economic order of the state consists out of: ‘Provision of
infrastructure services’, ‘Formation of the market’ and ‘Management of public assets’. The rule of law provides the glue that transforms an order into binding ties and
obligations of citizenship in an inclusive state (Ghani, Lockhart and Carnahan, 2005). The key function can be broadly categorized but they are all interconnected. For example, the provision of transportation, water and power are essential to the state’s ability to provide security, administrative control, investment in human capital, and formation of the market. The management of the state’s assets, including; land, natural resources, the environment and cultural assets, are the first target of wealth creation (Ghani, Lockhart and Carnahan, 2005). Specifically, the state’s ability to regulate these assets is essential for sustainable wealth creation.
International support to service delivery is based on the assumption that service delivery through the state enhances state capacity, visibility and people’s perceptions of the state, while service delivery by international NGOs and other non- state actors might negatively impact citizens’ view of the state. Public services delivered by government institutions aims, not only to strengthen government capacity but also to increase its visibility within society (ODI, 2016). Negative experiences related to service provision are often more directed towards the local government. Citizens are holding local administrators accountable for bad performance (ODI, 2016).
2.2.1 The key services
The key services indicate the public services that the state should provide to all its citizens, without exceptions or in favor of certain individuals or groups within society. These services – health, education, water and sanitation – are essential for the livelihood of the state’s citizens (OECD, 2008). The process of service provision is split in two main steps. The first step is the allocation of the services, which is carried out by policy makers. The second step is the production and distribution of the
services by the responsible service providers.
2.3 The dynamics of service delivery and state-building
The dynamics of service delivery and state building are complex and subject to many external variables, therefore it’s impossible to account for all the causal effects that
are related to this subject. Also, the relation between service provision and state-building is mutually reinforcing. This implies that when a state destabilizes or becomes more fragile, the delivery of services is under pressure. However, when service delivery is improved, the state will benefit from an increase in legitimacy. The influence between public services and state-building is reciprocal (Mason, 2012, p. 8). Although states are not explicitly obliged by international law to provide basic services, like water and sanitation to its citizens, the state is responsible for the protection of its citizens. After extensive literature study on service delivery and state-building efforts, three main arguments for state-providence of public services became clear.
First, in order to prevent destabilization of the state, the state needs legitimacy. By providing basic services, the state shows that it is governing the interest of its
citizens. When basic services are not provided, the society will lose its willingness to pay taxes and ultimately loses its trust in the government (Ghani, Lockhart and Carnahan, 2005, p. 7).
The second incentive for the state to provide basic services is wealth creation. By securing the livelihood of its citizens, the state provides the essential base that is needed for citizens to participate in the state’s economy (Ghani, Lockhart and Carnahan, 2005, p. 8). By investing in basic services, the returns on this investment will pay-off in forms of economic growth, labour productivity and social stability for future years.
The third incentive is the potential risk of other non-state or state-actors gaining political control by fulfilling the role as provider of basic services. This argument can be linked to the first dimension of effective state building, mentioned in paragraph 2.1. The first dimension of effective state building is gaining political settlement and thus the recognition of the state’s authority by its citizens. The involvement of other actors in public service providence might pose a risk for the authority of the state. 2.4 Keystones for effective water delivery
This research paper aims to analyse the effectiveness of the water sector in particular. The theory on public services will be narrowed down to water services. Five conditions for an effective water sector were selected from the report on ‘the role of WASH services within peace- and state- building processes’ by Wild & Mason (2012). The conditions for effective service delivery are selected from a state-building perspective. Meaning that the technicalities concerning water services are excluded from the theory. In the second part of this paper, the five conditions will form the framework for analysing the performance of the Palestinian water sector.
It should be noted that fragile states, often lack institutional capacity. In order to prevent an overload on state-institutions, the OECD proposes on an initial approach in which a mix of state, private, religious-, and local-based institutions coordinated by the state, take care of the water sector. This approach creates room for state
institutions to build capacity in in the first phases of the state-building process (Wild and Mason, 2012, p. 5).
2.4.1 Accountability in the water sector
The effectiveness of the service delivery is expressed as, the level in which the demand for these services is covered by the providers and policy makers. The preferences and needs for water services changes continually. To ensure effective service delivery over time, the institutional structure should provide tools to check if
the water supply is sufficient and whether the involved actors are fulfilling their responsibilities. The state or provider’s responsiveness to the needs of citizens or clients is referred to as accountability Wild & Mason (2012, p. 6–7).
Figure 1. The Accountability Triangle (Source: OECD 2008)
Figure 1 shows a simplified visualization of the accountability relations between the three main actors in the public service chain. The policy-makers are responsible for establishing the legal and regulatory framework of the water sector. The framework comprises all the institutions, their mandates and responsibilities, the tools and procedures to carry out the mandates and the pathways within the framework that create the operating environment (UNICEF and UNDP/SIWI, 2016). The state carries the responsibility to provide its citizens with water, as a basic need and a human right.
The service providers are occupied with the operation of water services, thus
maintenance of the infrastructure and the distribution of water. Service providers are accountable to the state, to ensure the quality of the service delivery.
The citizens have the ‘human right’ to water as a basic service. At the same time the citizens are the clients of the service provider. As a client, the service provider has the duty to provide water. The accountability-relation between client and provider is arranged by contract. Citizens have two options to claim their right to water. These two options for supporting service-related accountability have been identified by Wild & Mason (2012). Firstly, the ‘long route’, in which citizens pose accountability on service providers via politicians and the bureaucratic-apparatus. The ‘long route’ seems more prone to clientelism because it is based on the assumption that the makers are politically neutral. In reality, especially in fragile states the policy-apparatus is very susceptible for patronizing favourable groups. Which jeopardises social cohesion, by amplifying religious, political, ethnic and gender lines.
The second approach to services-related accountability is direct from citizens, as clients, to service providers. This ‘short route’ is less susceptible for political-oriented decision making and exclusion. The ‘short route’ seems more favourable in fragile situations, but it comes with more responsibility for the community. The other condition for the ‘short accountability route’ is that the service provider is in fact
depoliticized or independent. In order to pose direct accountability on the service provider some collective action from the community is required (Mason, 2012). The tools for empowerment of citizens as clients are all tied to increasing the mutual information transparency and opportunity to articulate needs and preferences. Some examples from literature are mobile technology, surveys, multi-stakeholder meetings and democratic decision-making (OECD, 2008; Wild and Mason, 2012; ODI, 2016). Whether its via the ‘short route’ or the ‘long route’, more accountability should be effectuated through a two-way dialogue instead of a top-down process. It is the state’s responsibility to provide the key services, even if the service provider is held directly accountable for the delivery. If the state is not providing the platform for citizens to articulate their needs, the third dimension of state building is not met. This would cause a decline in the state’s legitimacy.
2.4.2 Visibility, Collaboration, Inclusion and Opportunity
Beside accountability, four other features have been identified in the literature. The four keystones for ensuring effective water services will be presented in this
paragraph. Each feature will be clarified by explaining; the impact on state-society relations, which stakeholders should take action on promoting this feature, what actors or processes would directly benefit from the promotion of this keystone and what are concrete measures for promoting this keystone in the water sector. Visibility
The visibility relates to the degree in which the institutions and their output - e.g. infrastructure - are visible for the community. The visible local presence of the service provider enhances the public’s trust in the provider. Also, more visibility of the
institutions that are responsible for providing water to the public ensures the public’s confidence in the state being able to coordinate and perform its principle functions. The capability of a state to perform its principle functions an essential part of state building - the second dimension state building, paragraph 2.1-.
The impact of more visibility will directly affect the local community in terms of increased trust and also, the feeling of being valued and cared for by the state. All this together enhances the social contract (Mcloughlin, 2011, p. 79). The visible presence of institutions extends the reach and authority of the state. Visibility is therefor also directly beneficial for the strength of the state (Mcloughlin, 2011, p. 80). In the water sector, visibility can be effectuated in the operational part of the water sector. For example, the visibility of maintenance on infrastructure and providing information about these activities is an important issue. The provider could install a local point of contact for the community. But also, the institutions responsible for the regulation and water quality should be included in the process. In fragile states it is important to find a balance between increasing visibility of state-institutions, without creating a premature overload of those institutions.
Collaboration
In fragile and post-conflict states, collaboration between the community and state-institutions is often very weak (ODI, 2016). Working on collaborative action between the government and communities on local level will enforce the social cohesion and the relationship between society and the state. Such collaboration can be very effective in the water sector because it’s one of the interfaces in which citizens and state institutions have a direct link. Through joint-working between state and society,
the responsiveness of the state to the needs of its citizens can be enhanced. More collaboration within society reduces existing tensions, which creates a more stable situation. The first steps towards more collaboration can best be taken by the state, local-governments institutions or NGO’s. It is however essential to include all
stakeholders in the water sector to take part in the collaboration, in order to overcome inefficiency. Collaborative action can strengthen community ties and supports
peace—building efforts. With mutual communication between actors the service delivery can be carried out more effectively. It reduces the likeliness of unnecessary projects or ineffective investments. With well-coordinated collaboration, less pressure is put on state-institutions.
The collaboration can be effectuated by the development of community structures to plan or implement projects. Including local-citizens is only effective when there is a certain pre-existing community (Movik and Mehta, 2010). The state can promote collaborative action by applying underlying incentives.
Inclusion
Inclusion relates to improving the circumstances in which all members of society are involved in the social, political and economic life, with emphasis on groups who are susceptible for social or political exclusion. The groups within society that risk
exclusion have often less opportunity to speak out their interests. These marginalized groups are at risk of loosing access to public services. Promoting inclusiveness helps to mitigate the inequality between groups or individuals. It is also a tool to lessen grievances and create more cohesion in society. The first steps towards more
inclusion are generally taken by civil society. The civil-society in fragile states is often still weak, in this case NGO’s could help to promote inclusion. One of the groups whose rights and interests should be more actively promoted is the women and girls in society. It’s likely that their key-role in domestic tasks makes them more aware of the specific needs for water and sanitation (Wild and Mason, 2012, p. 6). The interests of this group in particular, are also more vulnerable for exclusion because they are less often involved in determining the budget for household investment. There is still a knowledge gap on the role of gender in water services and how to overcome this problem. All together, the first step towards less exclusion is to enforce the voice of people to demand better services.
Opportunity
While improving service delivery, policy-makers and service providers should always be aware of unequal opportunities for citizens to benefit from upgraded services. Opportunity relates to the ability of citizens to participate in political, social and economic activities of every day life (Wild and Mason, 2012, p. 5). In the case of service delivery, unequal opportunities are generally related to limitations in time or money to gain access to services. Concrete examples are poverty or a rural-urban divide. These issues limit the opportunity of citizens to benefit from services or information. The part of society with limited opportunities is also more vulnerable for exclusion.
It is the state’s responsibility to take these limitations into account while developing policies. These policies should increase the opportunity to access services for all its citizens. This can be effectuated by investing in projects in rural areas, to connect more households to water networks, creating employment by engaging locals in water projects or cooperation with NGO’s and international donors.
3.
State-building efforts in Palestine in relation to service
provision
The dynamics of service delivery in a state cannot be understood without knowing the context. Several political and contextual issues should be taken into account before studying the performance of the water sector and its relation to the state (Eldon and Gunby, 2009). This chapter will address several contextual aspects of state building that are essential to the service provision in Palestine. The first
paragraph gives an overview of the Oslo agreements with specific focus on the ‘water agreements’. Subsequently the state-building efforts and challenges since the Oslo accords will be explained. The next paragraph will outline the cooperation between Israel and Palestine on water resources in the Joint Water Committee. The last paragraph will address the main domestic challenges for state building in Palestine and their relation to service provision.
3.1 Historical and institutional overview 3.1.1 Oslo agreements
The Oslo Accords are a set of agreements, signed between 1993 and 1995. The first phase was meant to end the ongoing conflict between Israel and Palestine. The negotiations took place between the Israeli government and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). One of the results of the first phase negotiations was the
establishment of the Palestinian Authorities (PA)1. The final status negotiations in 1999 were meant to resolve key issues, such as the status of Jerusalem, Israeli settlements and the natural resources. In reality, the PA was not given any ‘real’ control, as Israel has the control over water, land, capital- and labor flows (Khan, 2009). These key factors of production are essential for enabling economic growth and wealth creation.
Geographically, the Palestinian territories were divided into parcels with differences in
administrative status. The parcels in the West Bank are known as areas A, B and C.
The PA controls area A. Area B has civilian control by the PA and Israeli military control. Area C is fully under Israeli control. The Gaza-strip became divided in Yellow and White areas (Turner, 2013). All the borders surrounding Gaza and the West Bank are under Israeli control as well. This enables Israel to control the movement of people, goods, services and even fiscal revenue flows (Khan et al., 2004: 5). Article 40 of the Oslo Agreements denotes the specific agreements on the water resources. The essences of Article 40 are the following (Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on WBG, 1995):
1
Sometimes refered to as Palestinian National Authority or PNA
Figure 2. Map of West Bank divided area’s A, B and C (Khan, 2009)
Ø The official recognition of the ‘water rights’ of the Palestinians. The negotiations on the precise definition of those water rights were postponed to the ‘final status’ agreements. Unfortunately, the ‘final status’ agreement has not been signed ever since.
Ø The recharge of the three, transboundary aquifers2
is estimated on a total of 679 MCM 3. This recharge should be allocated between Palestinians and Israeli users. In order to meet the future Palestinian needs, an extra 28.6 MCM will be made available every year.
Ø The responsibility for water and sewage management for the Palestinian
population is transferred to the Palestine Water Authorities (PWA). The PWA is responsible for the development and management of all Palestinian water resources, including the implementation of water projects. The rights to ownership of infrastructure will be discussed in the ‘final status’ negotiations. Ø Any management measure or infrastructural project proposed by the PWA
requires approval by the Israeli authorities. All proposals concerning water resources are dealt with in the Joint Water Committee (JWC). Paragraph 3.2 will discuss the cooperative-framework of the JWC in more detail.
3.1.2 Palestinian state formation since the signing of the Oslo Agreements In 2003, UN Resolution 1515 was passed. The resolution called for the
"establishment of an independent, democratic and viable Palestinian state". Despite this official acknowledgement of the legitimacy of PA, the international assistance for the state building process has been sporadic and fragmented. Alongside the lack of consistent support from outside, Palestinian state-building faces some other
challenges at the international level. One of the key issues is the lack of prospect on accomplishing the Final Status agreements. Until then, many issues concerning concrete rights of the Palestinians will not be resolved. Other challenges concern the instable peace between Israel and Palestine, the expansion of settlements in the West Bank, the inability to develop the economy without sovereign ownership over factors of production - water, land, capital- and labor flows - and the overall tightening of the occupation (Menocal, 2011).
The domestic level faces many challenges as well. The key challenges on domestic level have been denoted in the Palestinian State-Building Agenda by Menocal (2011):
o Internal political tensions in the PA o Fragile state-society relations o Low social cohesion
o Gender inequality
o Civil society is still underdeveloped
o Low institutional capacity of government institutions o Securitization of authority
2
An aquifer is a source of ground water settled in a geological formation, like permeable rocks.
3
The installment of the PA in 1994 was at the time, seen as one of the successes of the Oslo Accords. However, many Palestinians did not experience any progress in the past 23 years. On the contrary, the occupation has tightened, the tensions have heightened and the living conditions of the Palestinians have been marginalized (Turner, 2013). Looking back at the Oslo negotiations, the power asymmetry between Israel and Palestine is clearly visible in the outcome of the agreements. The
undefined of undetailed rights for the Palestinians and the institutionalized dependence on Israel in the accords, has prevented the PA from establishing a sovereign state (Khan, 2009).
The undesirable outcome of the cooperation with Israel in the Oslo negotiations has let to distrust in the PLO as representatives of the Palestinians. After the Oslo
Agreement many of the former PLO-members stayed involved in national politics and occupied positions in central PA-institutions (Turner, 2013). The detrimental effects of the bi-lateral negotiations with Israel and the grievances towards the former national representatives of the Palestinians have left their marks (Turner, 2013). The feeling of betrayal after the cooperation with Israel impacted the citizens’ perceptions on whether the PA had the right and legitimacy to govern. This kind of legitimacy is denoted as input-legitimacy. The PA has been dealing with weak input-legitimacy since its establishment in 1994. The PA-institutions that were installed by the Oslo Agreements also have to deal with the legitimacy problems. The Palestine Water Authority (PWA), which got the official responsibility over the service of water for the Palestinians, was one of the first PA-institutions.
3.2 Palestinian – Israeli cooperation on water resources
In this paragraph the framework of the water resource management in the region is set out. The framework consists out of Israeli and Palestinian government institutions, their cooperation, and the laws and agreements that serve as the fundamentals to the framework.
3.2.1 JWC
The sovereignty of the PWA is restricted by the Water Agreements (article 40 of the Oslo Accords). All Palestinian water and sanitation projects have to be approved by the Joint Water Committee (JWC). The Joint Water Committee consists out of the PWA and the Israeli Water Authorities. The approval rate for licensing proposed projects in the West Bank is low. According to the World Bank’s ‘Assessment of restrictions on Palestinian Water Sector Development’ (2009), the approval rate for projects proposed by the PWA is only 50%. Of these approved projects only one third have been implemented in the period 2001-2008 (World Bank, 2009). More than 100 water projects, some of them large-scale wastewater projects, have been awaiting approval by the JWC since 1999. In the mean time, many Palestinians have to deal with severe water shortages and not being connected to the water network.
The institutional structure of the JWC limits the Palestinian water sector development. However, the internal Palestinian water management is far from optimal and requires reform in order to meet its limited potential.
3.2.3 Critical perspective on JWC
In the Oslo Accords the role of the JWC is defined as a court for joint management of that potion of the aquifer water located within the Palestinian border (Zeitoun,
Messerschmid and Attili, 2009). It suggests a mutual cooperation between the Israeli and Palestinian water authorities. The reciprocity of the cooperation is however doubted by various reports and articles (Selby, 2006; Zeitoun, 2007; World Bank, 2009). From a critical point of view, the JWC is an instrument to control the allocation of water in the West Bank and limits the sovereignty of the Palestinians. The power asymmetry within the JWC becomes visible when looking at whose interests are served by their decisions. Because of the limited scope of this paper the actual structure of the JWC will not be discussed in further detail.
3.3 Internal issues in the Palestinian Authorities
One of the ‘key domestic challenges for state building’ denoted by Menocal (2011) is the tension within the PA. Since Oslo there has been a dynamic of accepting the on-going occupation, cooping with the restricted nature of the state and resisting the oppression by Israel (Turner, 2013). Ultimately, the cooperation between the PA and the Israeli authorities has divided Palestinian politics into factions. The main divide is based on the willingness to cooperate with Israel. The established order of the political elite (in literature referred to as ‘old guard’) consists for the most part out of former PLO-members. The former PLO-members took main positions in the PA at its establishment in 1994. The ‘old guard’ has lost its credit with the Palestinian people. In contrast, the ‘young guard’ includes policy makers with a variety of backgrounds, civil society activists, local leaders and religious leaders (Shikaki, 2002; Turner, 2013). The latter, is very skeptical about cooperation, as they saw how the
occupation has tightened and Palestinian territory has decreased over the years. This has resulted in the aversion towards cooperation and focusing on independence. The policy-makers included in the young guard are more active in local-level politics (Shikaki, 2002).
4.
Methods
This study uses a qualitative approach to investigate the shortcomings in the
governance of the water sector that can be linked to the sub-optimal performance of water providers. A step-by-step approach is essential to investigate the dynamics between local water provision and the broader context of state building. The
multiplicity of actors and their reciprocal relationships will be mapped systematically to gain insight in the institutional structure. Subsequently the mapped structure will be evaluated with regards to the implementation and its efficiency at the local level. To evaluate to what extent the structure has effectively been implemented the data from existing reports is combined with data from two cases. The case selection will be presented in more in detail at the end of this chapter.
4.1 Measurement section
4.1.1 Framework for assessing the water sector
By employing qualitative modes of enquiry, I attempt to illuminate the functioning of the water sector, especially the pathways for interaction and accountability between actors. In order to assess the local water sector a framework was created, based on
the “Template for assessing the governance of public water supply and sanitation service providers” by Locussol & van Ginneken (2010). The assessment will consist out of mapping the institutional structure of the West Bank’s water sector. The map will conclude with an overview of the technicalities of the local service provision. Proceeding with an analytical assessment of the functioning of the institutional structure by looking at its implementation and the effectiveness on the local level. The data collection on the structure will focus on the main actors, their mandates, arrangements for mutual interaction and the instruments and procedures to fulfill the mandates per actor. These components together are referred to as ‘the accountability framework’ (Locussol and van Ginneken, 2010). The main actors will be mapped by explaining; which levels of government are involved in the water service, what actors are active on the different levels of government and how the responsibilities or
mandates are distributed over the main actors. Subsequently, the procedures or tools used by the institutions to carry out their mandates are explained. The checks and balances between institutions are in some cases arranged by contract. If applicable, the contract between institutions will also be clarified.
After the outline of the institutional structure design, the level of implementation will be addressed. In this section, special attention is paid to the discrepancies between the institutional structure on paper and the de facto functioning of the water sector on local level. Two cases of local water supply in the West Bank will be used to amplify to what extent the reality defers from the institutional structure as it was designed. 4.1.2 Data collection
The research data on the institutional structure is drawn primarily from official documents published by the Palestine Authorities. The data on the technicalities of the water sector was drawn from reports published by the Palestinian Hydrology Group (PHG). The assessment of the implementation and effectiveness was based on various reports published by the World Bank and the PHG. Both institutions are considered to be independent and objective in their data collection and research. 4.2 Case selection:
The two cases cities in the West Bank have been selected: Jenin and Ramallah. Both cities are relatively large in comparison to most cities or villages in the West Bank. The water provision is in both cases executed by a so called ‘water utility’. The
utilities are responsible for the supply and distribution (operationalization) of water for domestic and agricultural purposes in their area. The second selection requirement was the difference in performance, or the quality of the water provision.
The first selected sample is the Jerusalem Water Utility, which is covering the cities of Ramallah and al-Bireh, 40 villages and five refugee camps. The served population is approximately 350.000. The JWU is the best performing Palestinian water service provider in the West Bank in terms of network coverage, reliability of the network and financial viability (Palestinian Hydrology Group, 2008).
The second selected sample is the Jenin Municipality Water Supply and Sanitation Department (JnWSSD). This ‘semi-autonomous utility’ is considerably smaller, compared to the JWU. It serves approximately 55.000 people in the area of Jenin, the northern part of the West Bank. The JnWSSD is chosen as the second sample
because of the difference in the quality of the water supply. Compared to the JWU, the supply in Jenin is very, low and there have been numerous cases of destructions of the network that have resulted in a low service quality (Palestinian Hydrology Group, 2008). The following chapter will systematically map the institutional structure of the water sector and review its implementation. The cases of local water provision in Ramallah and Jenin will be used as examples to concretize the findings.
5.
Mapping the West Bank’s Water Sector
This chapter covers the institutional environment within which water service providers operate. The outline of the institutional environment consists out of the main actors in the water sector, their responsibilities and the interaction between actors. Before describing the institutional environment, an overview will be given on the recent reforms that have shaped the institutional environment as it is today. The overview of the institutional structure is initially based on the policy framework on paper. The de facto functioning of actors might defer from the framework design. To account for these potential discrepancies, the following paragraph will address the actual implementation and functioning of institutions. The last paragraph will focus on the current performance of local water services by technicalities of the local water supply. to indicate the quality of the service provision. The local water services will be
evaluated by paying particular attention to two water providers in the West Bank. The cases have been selected on the variation in the quality of local water supply. The selected cases are the cities of ‘Jenin’ and ‘Ramallah’, which are both situated in the West Bank, have a respectively low quality and high quality of water supply. The chapter will conclude by answering the sub-question: What are the de facto characteristics of the water sector?
5.1 Institutional environment
5.1.1 Overview of recent institutional reforms
The most profound reform of the institutional structure has been carried out after passing the new Water Law in 2002. This law provides a framework for the
envisioned Palestinian water sector. This law was formulated with the following aims: centralization of water management, improvement of the quality of service delivery, increase the institutional capacity and decrease Palestine’s dependency on the Israeli water supplier ‘Mekoroth’ (Zeitoun, 2008). This law is accompanied by an outline of the envisioned water sector. The reformed system should have build-in checks to ensure the quality of the service delivery. These ‘checks’ would be effectuated by implementing several institutional layers. The intention of dividing tasks and responsibilities over different institutions is to create a more accountable and effective water sector (Palestine Water Law No.3/2002).
5.1.2 The principles for the water sector framework
The structure of the water sector in Palestine relies on the following principles (ACWUA, 2016):
Ø Segregation of regulatory and operational duties;
Ø The division of the institutional structure of the water sector into three levels: I. The political level (National Water Council): is the water policy-making level.
II. The organizational level (PWA): is the level of implementation of water policies.
III. The operational level (water utilities): is the level of service delivery and water supply.
Ø Standardization of water services institutions in the regional water Authorities at the provincial level, provided that these utilities have financial and administrative independence;
Ø Integration of water supply and sanitation services in the utilities of the proposed territorial waters, as a confirmation that treated wastewater is a source of water; and
Ø The establishment of the National Water Utility to provide wholesale water supply services to the regional utilities, by turning the West Bank Water Department to a bulk water utility.
5.1.3 Institutional structure of the water sector
This section maps out the structure of the water sector in the West Bank, designed according to the principles that were summarized in the previous paragraph. The institutional structure is clarified by denoting the main actors, their specific mandates, the tools and procedures that can be used to fulfil the mandate and the arrangements for interaction between the actors.
Figure 3. The Palestinian Water Sector, according to the 2002 Water Law (Zeitoun, 2008)
The National Water Council (NWC) was installed as a high political reference for policy-making purposes. Their mandate concerns the decision-making on new policies, based on the needs and preferences of citizens and other stakeholders in the water sector. The content of these policies concerns the establishment of water management policies and the approval of the water tariff structure.
The Palestine Water Authority (PWA) is the national regulatory body of the water sector. The mandate of the PWA is the regulation of the regional water utilities. This involves monitoring the efficiency and water quality at the regional utilities. Besides, the PWA is also responsible for the allocation of water, by planning the water
infrastructure and the licencing of water projects (World Bank, 2009, pp. 56–58). However, it should be noted that the capability of the PWA to allocate water is limited. As it was stated previously in paragraph 3.2.3, every water-infrastructure project has to be approved by the Joint Water Committee (JWC) before getting a licence by the PWA. The available tools for the PWA to carry out their mandates are: conducting surveys, creating economic and financial models, conducting technical audits on the service utilities and monitoring the abstraction rate and quality of water (Palestinian Hydrology Group, 2008).
The operational part of the water sector consists out of three regional utilities. The regional utilities have the mandate to provide water to their clients, maintenance of water infrastructure and the collection of water bills from clients. Every utility would account for one specific region (north, centre, south) of the West Bank. One of the conditions is the financial and administrative independence of the utilities. The customer contract between the utility and its clients should ensure the
responsiveness of the utility to the clients’ needs. Besides, the client can also be hold to account for paying the water bills (World Bank, 2009). The utility uses tools like demand assessments and customer satisfaction surveys to improve its effectiveness and enhance community engagement. Besides, the utility should report regularly to the regulative body of the water sector, in this case the PWA.
Lastly, the citizens or clients are at the end of the water-supply chain. They are mandated to pay for their water use. This mandate is enforced via a customer
contract. The two available procedures for citizens to improve water services are the dispute resolution mechanism and filling out the survey conducted by the PWA or the utility.
5.2 The reality of the water sector
In fragile states the official policies are often not carried out as intended (Locussol and van Ginneken, 2010). Therefor it is crucial to study the ‘reality4’ of the water sector and compare this to the institutional structure on paper. The insights gained from studying the reality of the water sector, can be compared with the intended design. The dissimilarities between theory and reality might indicate hindrances for achieving optimal results in the water supply.
5.2.1 Comparing theory and reality
This section comprises key findings on the functioning of the water sector in the West Bank. The findings will be presented in an order similar to the framework used to map the institutional structure in the previous section. Starting with presenting the informal stakeholders in the water sector who have not been included in the policy framework. Subsequently the mandates that are not (entirely) fulfilled by the responsible actor are discussed. And finally the institutions will be mentioned, which have been included in the institutional structure but do not meet the requirements to fulfil their responsibilities in accordance to the framework will be presented.
The first finding is the absence of the traditional systems for water delivery in the institutional structure. Throughout the West Bank there are 300 low capacity
agricultural wells. The majority of these wells where dug before the Israeli occupation
4
A clear visualization of the institutional reality of the Palestinian water sector can be found in appendix 1
in 1967. The agricultural wells where until 2002 privately owned. According to the 2002 Water Law the agricultural wells now fall under the jurisdiction of the PWA. However, there is resistance against the transition from the family based system to the centralized management of the PWA. This causes serious legitimacy constraints. The wells being under the jurisdiction of the PWA since 2002 was not welcomed by the municipalities or by the traditional privately owned wells (World Bank, 2009). Those wells have never been regulated in the framework.
The second main finding is that actors who did not receive official mandate execute some essential processes in the water sector. For example multiple actors are
involved in the distribution of water. Beside the JWU, hundreds of separate municipal water departments and several local councils are supplying water in the area. In addition to several agricultural operators for the wells and springs from the private sector (Palestinian Hydrology Group, 2008).
The third difference that was discovered is that only one regional utility in the West Bank, the Jerusalem Water Undertaking (JWU), has been operating in accordance to the principles of the institutional structure (Alsharif et al., 2008b). The majority of cities and large villages in the West Bank are dependent on a municipal water department (MWD). This type of utility often has a low performance rate. Besides that, MWD’s are not meeting the requirement for water utilities according to the principles for the water sector. Namely, they are financially and administrative dependent on the municipality. The municipalities that have managed to claim effective right over a well are reluctant to share it with other villages (World Bank, 2009, p. 59). Because this construction was not incorporated in the institutional structure, no one can be held to account for this inequality.
6.
Analysis
In the previous chapter comprised an overview of the institutional structure and an assessment of the extent to which the structure has been implemented. The analysis aims to answer the question “Is there a underlying structural issue that can explain the incomplete implementation of the institutional structure for the water sector?”. To uncover the underlying cause, the findings on the institutional structure and its
performance have been analysed. The cases in the West Bank are used again in the analysis, to gain more insight in the dynamics of the water sector at local level. These following insights were derived from the sector assessment: the design of the
institutional structure did not include the traditional structures of water management that already existed in the area, the interaction between the operational level and regulatory level is weak and the operational-level institutions are not functioning as they were intended. Ideally the actors in the water sector are interconnected through accountability relations. If there is a discrepancy in the functioning of the framework, the issue can be resolved by holding the responsible actor to account. In the analysis below, the main findings from the previous chapter will be analysed by paying
attention to the links with accountability.
6.1 Clarifying the key findings of the sector assessment
The institutional structure only recognizes the regional water utilities as the official and responsible actor to carry out the operational functions in the water sector. One of the main findings from the previous chapter was the exclusion of traditional water
systems and its stakeholders from the institutional structure. When the traditional systems for water management are not included, the preferences and needs of citizens who are (partially) dependent on traditional water services will not be
incorporated in the policy-making process. The institutional structure would be more effective and accountable towards society if all stakeholders are included (Mason, 2012).
Some actors do not fulfil their mandate or carry out procedures outside of their mandates. The PWA does not fulfil its responsibility to monitor all water providers. For example the JnWSSD, the water utility of Jenin conducts its own quality checks. The lack of cooperation between the JnWSSD could be explained by grievances by the community in Jenin. Through the years the municipalities lost trust in the PWA. The PWA was not able to mitigate the destructions on Palestinian water infrastructure in Jenin, nor did the PWA confront their Israeli counterpart in the Joint Water
Committee with the Israeli violations (Zeitoun 2008, p. 93). The performance of the PWA has been detrimental for its legitimacy, resulting in less effective cooperation between the water utility and the PWA, as the regulating body of the water sector. This example shows the vulnerability of non-autonomous water utilities for political decision-making. Also, the example exposes the weak accountability relation between the regulating body and the water provider. Because the municipality of Jenin does its own quality checks, there is a higher risk of fraud.
The only water utility that is performing its mandates and meets the set requirements is the Jerusalem Water Undertaking (JWU). The JWU is operated like a business, meaning that the JWU is autonomous and financially viable. The revenue is higher than the cost, the surplus is reinvested to maintain the high standards. The clients pay their water bills because they are content with the service. Simultaneously, the dependence of the JWU on their clients results in a direct accountability relationship between the utility and its clients. As long as the service delivery is meeting the clients’ needs, the JWU can secure its position (Palestinian Hydrology Group, 2008). The other water providers in the West Bank are not autonomous or just partially. Given the fact that this applies to almost all water providers, it can be concluded that the operational level of the water sector defers strongly from the institutional design. The real impact of this implementation flaw is too complex to study within the scope of this paper. However, some assumptions can be formulated on the basis of the existing literature on service delivery. These assumptions have been formulated in the first place to substantiate the relevance of this issue. First of all, the financial or administrative dependence of service providers on a municipality or local authority, induces the vulnerability to political decision-making and clientelism (Mason, 2012). Especially in the context of a fragile state, the autonomy of the service provider is essential for safeguarding the inclusiveness and accountability of the service delivery. The second assumption is that the relation between the municipal water department (MWD) and the clients does not bring the ‘short route’ accountability relation, which is present between the JWU and its clients. Because the MWD is not fully financially dependent on the bill collection, the mutual accountability relation is less strong. This can lead to less efficient service provision.
6.4 Interpretation of analysis
The main findings can for the most part be related to weakened accountability relations between the different institutional levels. It may be concluded that
accountability is a significant weakness of the water sector. However, not all water providers seem evenly affected. The JWU, the regional utility that serves the large city of Ramallah, has a relatively good performance record. It is not possible to determine exactly whether this is related to accountability. The organisational structure of the JWU might be beneficial to the accountability of the JWU. Namely, the JWU is organized in accordance to the institutional structure. Therefor, their mandates are clearly defined in the policy framework. Also, the cooperation and interaction between the JWU and other institutions will run more smoothly. These conditions would all be beneficial to the accountability of the JWU and simultaneously explain the low performance of the other utilities that are operated by local
authorities. But maybe the best explanation for the JWU success is its business-like organisational structure, which enables an optimal ‘short route’ accountability relation between the utility and its clients.
7.
Discussion & Conclusion
7.1 DiscussionThis study was exploratory and interpretative in nature, which implies that the final conclusion is only one of the contributing factors. While conducting the research I found many dynamics that have contributed to the de facto functioning of the water sector. Some of these explanations are outlined in the paragraph below.
Subsequently the limitations for this study are denoted.
7.1.1 Other explanations
Jenin was one of the cities where Hamas gained a significant support in the 2005 municipal elections (Ibrahim, 2005). Hamas won six of the twelve seats in the
municipal council in Jenin. Hamas rejects cooperation with the Israeli authorities. The changing political climate might interfere with cooperation and could jeopardize the water supply in Jenin.
The JWU maintains relatively good relations with Israeli utilities and the Israeli authorities in general (JWU 2016). The willingness to make concessions and cooperate with the Israeli Authorities could be beneficial to the approval rate in the JWC.
7.1.2 Limitations of study
Complexity of subject, water management in the West Bank and Palestine in general is subject to a lot of internal and external interests, constraints and stakeholders. Thus, investigating this subject will merely remain a qualitative and interpretative activity.
Conducting surveys or interviews would be the ideal research methods to study political alliances and underlying tensions between local and central government institutions. Due to the practical limitations of this bachelor thesis, the expressions of disunity have been extracted from existing literature or secondary sources.
The third limitation is the variation between the two cases that were used in chapter 5 and 6. The quality of the service provision in Jenin and Ramallah is partially
determined by the scale of the service provider and the geographical location. Due to the limited availability of data it was not possible to select more similar cases.
7.2 Conclusion
In this paper I have argued that the current performance of the West Bank’s water sector has been sub-optimal, even when the limitations of the Israeli occupation and the lack of Palestinian sovereignty are taken into account. This study focused on the domestic challenges of water delivery in the West Bank with the intention to explore the governance related hindrances are, that have prevented the development of effective water delivery. The importance of effective service delivery by the state is more far-reaching than the direct health or wealth related issues. Water delivery is a public service that can contribute to Palestine’s state-building, provided that the service is effectively provided. Therefor, the theoretical framework aimed to outline the role of water delivery as an essential component of the state’s legitimacy. In addition the following keystones for effective water delivery were set out:
accountability, visibility, collaboration, inclusion and opportunity.
In the empirical section the performance of the water sector was studied by comparing the institutional structure to the implementation of these policies. This assessment concluded that the envisioned water management framework has not been implemented effectively. The separation of the key functions over the different governance levels has not been carried out fully. The institutional framework that was installed in 2002 promoted a very centralized framework. Considering that before the 2002 water law, no official water management framework existed in Palestine, the sudden centralization has been detrimental for state-society relations. Local sources of authority should be better able to gather information and respond to changes in expectations. The new state institutions are lack capacity and cannot estimate the needs and issues of citizens because of the over-centralized structure.
Finally, the discrepancies that were found in the assessment were analyzed to clarify the structural weakness that could explain the lack of implementation at some points. The analysis concluded that the weak accountability relations between the various actors in the framework are a key component of the sub-optimal performance of water delivery in the West Bank. However, the Jerusalem Water Undertaking (JWU) has proven that within the right conditions, Palestinian operators can be efficient and provide the proper services to people. One of the main conditions for effective en reliable service supply is the autonomous structure of the institution.
This study concluded that the development of sustainable water delivery should focus on the keystones that were set out in chapter 2. The national- and local government institutions, service providers whether institutionalized or traditional, civil society and the community should all fulfill their responsibilities and actively enforce the
accountability-relations to develop the Palestinian water sector to its full potential. Therefor, the recommended solutions for the implementation issues that were
identified in chapter 5 should primarily focus on supporting good governance and an inclusive and accountable framework for the water sector. Accountability relations can be enhanced by enforcing the voice of communities or by including all
stakeholders in the policy framework. Besides, it is essential to clearly define the responsibilities of all actors.
Equitable management of water resources can contribute towards state building in fragile environments by supporting basic human needs, livelihoods, wealth creation, improvement of health and cooperation at every level of society.
Need for cooperation between different actors and ideally a centralized management to ensure institutional effectiveness and balance the power of Israel over water. Effective and independent service delivery is also a precondition to become less reliant on Israeli service provision.
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