Heerma van Voss, G.J.J.; Keizer, A.
Citation
Heerma van Voss, G. J. J., & Keizer, A. (2004). Europees Sociaal Handvest c.a. Deventer:
Kluwer. Retrieved from https://hdl.handle.net/1887/14634
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sure to asbestos, threshold concentrations of asbes-tos fibres have been set at a lower level than that pro-vided by Council Directive 83/477/EEC (. .. ), as amended by Directive 91/382/EEC.ln the light of this information, the Committee considers that the situa-tion is in conformity with Article 3§1 of the Charter in this respect.
- Protection of workers against ionising radiation. Anorder on radiological protection (Order of 16 ju-ly 2001 ) was adopted during the reference period, in order to bring Dutch legislation in line with Council Directive 96/29/Euratom (... ) The Committee recalls for the situation to be in compliance with Article 3§1, states must offer effective protection against the risks related to ionising radiation, which involves adjust-ing their regulations to take account of the recom-mendations of the International Commission on Ra-diological Protection (ICRP). It considers that these recommendations are sufficiently reflected in the dose limits in Directive 96/29/Euratom and that the situation in the Netherlands is therefore in conform-ity with Article 3§1 in this regard.
Protectionof non-permanentworkers
(... )The Committee points out that for the situation to be to compliance with Article 3§1 of the Charter, states must take the necessary measures to equip non-permanent workers (temporary agency workers and fixed-term workers) with information, training and medical surveillance adapted to their employ-ment status, in order to avoid any discrimination in respect of health and safety in the workplace. It in-dicates that these measures must ensure that such workers are afforded adequate protection, including against risks resulting from a succession of accumu-lated periods spent working for a variety of employ-ers, exposed to dangerous substances, and, if neces-sary, must contain provisions prohibiting the use of vulnerable workers for some particularly dangerous tasks. The Committee asks the Dutch authorities to indicate how the regulations apply the Charter in this regard.
Personal scope of theregulations
(... )The Committee recalls that for the purposes of Article 3§1, all workers, including non-employees, must be covered by health and safety at work regu-lations (Conclusions I,p. 8 and Conclusions II, p. 182). It has consistently maintained this interpretation, on the grounds that employed and self-employed
work-ers are normally exposed to the same risks in this ar-ea. The Committee notes that concerning the Nether-lands, regulations currently apply to self-employed workers covering most of the risks to which they may be exposed. Considering that the general scope of ap-plication of the regulations for self-employed work-ers is clearly to ensure that greater effect is given to the rights guaranteed under Article 3§1, it considers that the situation in the Netherlands as described above is in conformity with this provision.
The Committee concludes that the situation in the Netherlands is in conformity with Article 3§1 of the Charter.'(Concl. XVI-2 vol.2,517-520)
Aantekeningen lid 2
ALGEMEEN
Nederlandse
wetgeving
- Arbeidsomstandighedenwet 1998, wet van 18 maart 1999,5tb.1999, 184, artikeI24-29.
INTERNATIONALE CONTEXT Verenigde Naties
- Vgl. artikel 7 subbIVESCR.
Intemationale Arbeidsorganisatie
- Nr. 81 (Arbeidsinspectie in industrie en handel),
5tb.
J
424 (met Nederlandse vertaling). Bekrachtigd mede voor de Nederlandse Antillen en Aruba op 15 september 1951,Trb. 1951,140.Nr. 129 (Arbeidsinspectie in de landbouw), Trb.
1970, 74 (met Nederlandse vertaling). Bekrachtigd op 29 juni 1973,Trb. 1973, 137 en van toepassing ver-klaard opArubaop 18 februari 1986,Trb.1987,7. Het verdrag is voor Aruba op 19 juni 2003 buiten werking getreden,Trb.2003, 169.
Nr. 178 (Arbeidsinspectie zeevarenden),Trb. 1997,
TOELICHTING
Europees
comit«
voor Sociale Rechten
- 'Under paragraph 2 of Article 3, Contracting Par-ties must provide for the enforcement of health and safety regulations by measures of supervision. The purpose of this provision is to ensure individuals an effective implementation of the right to protection of their physical and mental integrity at work. The Com-mittee monitors compliance with this undertaking by taking into account developments in the area of occupational accidents and diseases as well as the setting up and maintenance of an effective inspection system.Itconsiders that there is no systematic link to be maintained between the conclusions it adopts un-der paragraph 1 and unun-der paragraph 2 of Article 3 and that each of these provisions contains its own re-quirements which may be the subject of an inde-pendent assessment (dit in tegenstelling tot eerdere conclusies, e.g, Concl.Xll-I, 83).
Occupational accidents anddisease
(... )The Committee is aware of the problems relat-ed to the accuracy of statistical comparisons and is therefore cautious in its approach. For this reason, it has only found breaches of the Charter where situa-tions present obvious problems. For the current ref-erence period, it thus observed that Portugal's aver-age figures for the number of industrial accidents and fatalities recorded are far higher than those of other European Union member states - and even the high-est of all and that there did not seem to be any pro-spects of improvement in the period in question. It considers that the frequency of industrial accidents and fatalities is clearly too high for it to conclude that effective exercise of the right to protection from physical and mental injury in the workplace is en-sured in Portugal.
The proportion of fatal accidents in relation to the total number of accidents and its fluctuations are ta-ken as a significant factor for assessment of the con-formity of situations. (... )
Activities of the Labour Inspectorate
(... ) It draws the Contracting Parties' attention to the fact that an efficient inspection system can only be maintained where a minimum number of inspec-tions are performed on a regular basis, the aim being to ensure that the right enshrined in Article 3 is
ef-fectively enjoyed by the largest possible number of workers.
(... ) it noted with interest that in most of the Con-tracting Parties inspectors can use coercive means of enforcement such as stoppage of activities, placing of seals, etc. in the event of an immediate danger to the health or safety ofworkers.'(Cond.
XIV-2 vol.
1,43-46) - 'The Committee understands from the appendic-es to the report that global work-related statistics are not, or no longer developed inthe Netherlands,
a fact which is due to change as from 2000. In the absence of the necessary statistical data, the Committee defers its conclusion as concerns the development of acci-dents in the workplace and occupational disease, and it asks that the next report contain all the statistics that will have been developed by the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) as from 2001.Activities of the labour inspectorate
The Committee examined the general organisation of inspection services in Conclusions XIV-2 (p. 545). The report indicates that in 2000, the LabourInspec-torate (which employed 787 full-time workers in 2000) carried out 41 205 visits in 573 780 enterprises covering 36 %of the total workforce in the Nether-lands (19 %in the construction sector, 23 %in sales, 25 %in the service sector, 7%in agriculture and 21%in industry). Despite the Committee's request, the re-port does not contain similar information for each year of the reference period; as a result, the Commit-tee is unable to assess the development of the situa-tion. However, basing its assessment on these figures alone, in particular the ratio of visits/workers, the Committee considers that the number of inspections is sufficient and may bejudged in conformitywithAr-ticle 3§2 of the Charter.
Pending receipt of the information requested, the Committee defers its Conclusion.'
(Concl. XVI-2 vol. 2,
520-521)
Aantekeningen lid 3
ALGEMEEN
Nederlandse wetgeving
- Arbeidsomstandighedenwet 1998, wet van 18 maart 1999, Stb. 1999, 184, artikel 12.
Wet op de Ondernemingsraden, wet van 28 januari
1971,5tb. 1971, 54, artikel27 lid 1 onderd,35b lid 5, 35clid 3,35dlid 1.
INTERNATIONALE CONTEXT
Europese Unie
- Richtlijn
nr.
89{391{EEG (veiligheid en gezond-heid), artikel11.Verenigde Naties
- Vgl. artikel 7 sub b en art. 12 lid 2 sub b en c IVESCR.
PARLEMENTAIRE BEHANDELING
- 'Overleg met het georganiseerde bedrijfsleven over nieuwe wettelijke maatregelen op het terrein van de veiligheid of de gezondheid van de arbeiders vindt in Nederland steeds plaats, zowel in de vorm van rechtstreeks v66roverleg als door het vragen van advies aan de Sociaal-Economische Raad of de Stich-ting van de Arbeid over ontwerpen voor wetten of be-sluiten,'(MvT, 8606,R533)
TOEUCHTING
Europees
Comitevoor SccicleRechten
- 'In the same way as the other paragraphs of Arti-cle 3, this obligation applies to all sectors of the eco-nomy. The Committee notes that national reports of-ten contain little or no information on consultation in the public sector. It therefore insists on receiving in-formation to show that consultations are held in ev-ery sector of activity.
The requirement to consult the social partners is restricted to "measures aimed at improving safety and health at work". An important change is intro-duced by the revised Social Charter on this point: the obligation to consult employers' and workers' orga-nisations will now apply to all the questions dealt
with in Article 3, which means that the social partners should be consulted in order to determine, imple-ment and periodically review the "coherent national policy in matters of safety and health of workers and the working environment" which is the aim of Article 3 para. 1 ofthe revised Charter. Observance of Article 3 para. 3 must be ensured at both the national and enterprise levels.
Consultation
atnational
levelThe Committee's supervision concentrates on two aspects:
- on one hand it checks that supervisory machine-ry and procedures for consultations between profes-sional organisations and the public authorities are provided for on a national scale. (... );
- on the other hand, it makes sure that consulta-tion is effectively held. The Committee recalls that it has interpreted the wording 'as appropriate' used in Article 3 para. 3 as laying upon the Contracting States the obligation to proceed to consultations whenever the need arises.
(Conclusions I, pp. 23)
Consultation
atregional
levelThe Committee does not consider this to be a pre-requisite condition for conformity with Article3 para. 3. With regard to Article6 para. 1 of the Charter, the Committee has held that special features of certain countries render regional tripartite organisations un-necessary (Conclusions XIII-2, p. 274). Its position on consultation with employers' and workers' organisa-tions on measures to improve occupational health and safety is,a
fortiori,
the same.Consultation
atenterprise level
(... ) Itconsiders that in setting up a specialist body representing workers' interests, which employers could consult in respect of health and safety mea-sures, the right provided under Article 3 para. 3 ofthe Charter is more effectively guaranteed.
conclude that the situation in these countries meets the requirements ofArticle 3 para. 3.'(Concl. XIV-2 vol.
1,43-49)
- 'The Committee recalls from previous (Dutch, bew.)reports that consultationat national levelwas previously organised within the Working Conditions Committee, a tripartite body consulted before de-crees on working conditions entered into force. It ob-serves, however, in the light of the text of the Working Conditions Act Nr. 664 of 1980, as amended in 1996, that the provisions relating to this body have been re-pealed but not replaced by any new provision. It therefore wishes to know what the present arrange-ments are for consulting employers' and workers' or-ganisations at national level on measures to improve occupational safety and health, both in law and in practice. Asregards the application ofArticle 3 para. 3
within thefum,the Committee refers to its conclusion on Article 3 of the Additional Protocol and considers that the procedures prescribed by the Working Con-ditions Act for informing and consulting workers' representatives are in conformity with Article 3 para.
3: (Concl. XIV-2vol.2,546)
- 'The Committee examined the structures and procedures for consulting at national level and within the firm in the previous conclusion (Conclusions XIV-2. p, 546), and concluded that these were in con-formity with Article 3§3 of the Charter. However, it had deferred its conclusion pending receipt of infor-mation on the practical application of consultation at national level. In this respect the report indicates that social partners are regularly and fully informed with-in the Safety, Health and Welfare Committee, a tripar-tite body. The Committee concludes that the situation intheNetherlandsis in conformity with Article 3§3 of the Charter.'(Concl. XVl-2 vol.2,521)
Recht op billijke beloning
Art.4.
Om de onbelemmerde uitoefening
van het recht op een billijke beloning te
waar-borgen, verbinden de Overeenkomstsluitende
Partijen zich:
1. het recht van de werknemers op een
zo-danige beloning die hun en hun gezin een
be-hoorlijke levenspeil verschaft, te erkennen;
2. het recht van de werknemers op een
ho-ger beloningstarief voor overwerk te
erken-nen. behoudens uitzonderingen in bijzondere
gevallen;
3. het recht van mannelijke en vrouwelijke
werknemers op gelijke beloning voor arbeid
van gelijke waarde te erkennen;
4. het recht van aIle werknemers op een
re-delijke opzeggingstermijn bij beeindiging der
dienstbetrekking te erkennen;
5. inhoudingen op lonen aIleen toe te staan
op voorwaarden en in de mate als
voorge-schreven door nationale wetten of
verorde-ningen, of vastgesteld bij collectieve
arbeids-overeenkomsten of scheidsrechterlijke
uit-spraken.
De uitoefening van deze rechten dient te
worden verwezenlijkt door middel van
vrije-lijk gesloten collectieve
arbeidsovereenkom-sten, bij de wet ingestelde procedures voor
loonvaststelling, of andere bij de nationale
omstandigheden passende middelen.
The right to ajair remuneration
Art. 4. With a view to ensuring the effective
exercise of the right to a fair remuneration, the
Contracting Parties undertake:
1. to recognise the right of workers to a
re-muneration such as will give them and their
fa-milies a decent standard of living;
2. to recognise the right of workers to an
in-creased rate of remuneration for overtime
work, subject to exceptions in particular cases;
3. to recognise the right of men and women
workers to equal pay for work of equal value;
4. to recognise the right of all workers to a
reasonable period of notice for termination of
employment;
statutory wage-fixing machinery, or by other
means appropriate to national conditions.
Aantekeningen
TOEUCHTING
Europees Comite voor SociaIeRechten
- 'The Committee considered this right as being the essential corollary of the first three fundamental rights of the Social Charter. Indeed. the right to work. the right to just conditions would stand in danger of losing much of their meaning without an effective guarantee of the right to fair remuneration, which constitutes one of the basic economic objectives of human activity.
In the Committee's opinion, Contracting Parties who have accepted this article should take the neces-sary measures to guarantee, in all sectors of the nomy, fair remuneration in the full social and eco-nomic sense of the term - i.e. remuneration which takes account of the basic economic, social and cul-tural needs of workers and their families, the special efforts expended by workers during overtime and the right to equal pay for equal work for both men and women workers:(Coticl.l, 25)
Aantekeningen lid 1
ALGEMEEN
Nederlandse wetgeving
- Wet minimumloon en rninimurnvakantiebij-slag, wet van 27 november 1968,Stb. 1968, 657.
INTERNATIONALE CONTEXT
Verenigde Naties
- Vgl. artikelen 7 sub a (ii) en 11 lid 1 IVESCR. lntemationale Arbeidsorganisatie
- Nr. 26 (Invoering of hand having van methodes tot vaststelling van minirnumlonen),Stb.1934,6 en
st».
1936,99 K(met Nederlandse vertaling). Bekrach-tigd op 10 november 1936,Trb. 1957, 159.Nr. 99 (Methoden tot vaststelling van minimumlo-nen in de landbouw),Trb.1952,44 (met Nederlandse vertaling). Bekrachtigd op 11 juni 1954,Trb. 1957, 193.
Nr. 131 (Vaststellingvan minimumlonen in het bij-zonder m.b.t. ontwikkelingslanden), Trb. 1971, 48 (met Nederlandse vertaling). Bekrachtigd op 10 ok-tober 1973,Trb. 1973, 150 en toepasselijk verklaard op Aruba op 18 februari 1986,Trb.1987,8.
PARLEMENTAIRE BEHANDELING
- 'Hoewel een zodanig recht niet wettelijk is gere-geld, voigt de erkenning daarvan met name uit het be-staan van het loonpolitieke systeem, zoals dit is neer-gelegd in het Buitengewoon Besluit Arbeidsverhou-dingen 1945. Dit toch is een belangrijk instrument voor het sociaal-economisch beleid van de Regering, hetwelk gericht is op handhaving van een zo hoog mogelijke graad van werkgelegenheid, een even-wichtige betalingsbalans, een investeringsbeleid dat de levensstandaard geleidelijk verhoogt, een zo rechtvaardig mogelijke verdeling van het nationaal inkomen en een stabiel prijsniveau(het loonpolitieke systeem van het BBAisthansbuiten toepassing, bew.).' (MvT,8606,R533)
TOELICHTING
Europees Comite voor Sociale Rechten
- 'The concept of a "decent standard of living" as laid down in Article4, paragraph 1, must take account of the fundamental social, economic and cultural needs of workers and their families in relation to the stage of development reached by the society in which they live; furthermore this concept must also for the present be judged in the light of the economic and so-cial situation in the country which is being consid-ered.
In a given country and at a given time the wage paid to the largest number of workers can be taken as rep-resentative of the wage level in that country.
could no longer be considered as sufficient to permit a "decent standard of living in the society under con-sideration".'(Concl. V,25,zie oak Cenci. XIII-3, general observation 215-218)
- 'Assessment of the implementation of Article 4 para. 1, requiring states "to recognise the right of workers to a remuneration such as will give them and their families a decent standard of living" has proved difficult throughout the history of the supervision of the Charter. Several factors have contributed to the difficulties, notably the widely differing wage forma-tion mechanisms in the countries concerned due to differences in labour market, socio-economic and in-stitutional conditions and the paucity of data which could be used to determine the relevant wage levels. As early as in its first conclusions, the Committee observed that this provision "which obliges Contract-ing States to take appropriate measures to ensure a decent standard of living for workers and their fami-lies, requires those states to make a continuous effort to achieve the objectives set by this provision of the Charter. This being so, account must be taken of the fact that the socio-economic status of the worker and his family changes and that his basic needs, which at first are centred on the provision of purely material basic necessities such as food and housing, subse-quently move towards concerns of a more advanced and complex nature, such as educational facilities and cultural and social benefits." (Conclusions I, p.26).
In Conclusions Vthe Committee adopted an assess-ment method based on statistical studies carried out by the OECD and the Council of Europe from which a so-called decency threshold for the lowest wage was established. The basic premise of this method was that wages which fall markedly behind those of the community in general could not be considered de-cent or fair. Thus for a wage to be dede-cent it had to be at least equal to 68 %of the national average wage in a given country. Ifthe lowest wage fell below this level, the Committee did however take certain compensa-tory factors into account such as taxes, substantial so-cial benefits, including family and housing benefits (see Conclusions V, pp. 25-26).
A modifiedassessment method
During the present supervision cycle the Commit-tee therefore reviewed the matter in the light of all the information submitted by the Contracting Parties
and decided to make certain adjustments to the method of assessment with a view to assessing the situation for the Contracting Parties concerned. In do-ing so, the Committee deliberated on and clarified a number of points with respect to some basic defini-tions in the light of the wording of Article 4 para. 1. (
...
)The Committee still proceeds from the fundamen-tal assumption that in order for the situation to be in conformity with the Charter, ie. for a wage to be fair, the lowest wage should not fall too far behind the na-tional average wage in a given country. However, the Committee found it appropriate to fix the percentage threshold (lowest net wage as a percentage of net av-erage wage), below which the lowest wage should not fall, at 60 %instead of 68 %. (..• )
The Committee proceeds from the expectation that a wage amounting to at least 60 %ofthe average wage (calculated net - see below) will provide the wage earner concerned - and not the family - with a decent living standard. It nevertheless underlines that a wage does not meet the requirements of the Charter, irrespective of the percentage, if it does not ensure a decent living standard in real terms for a worker, ie. it must be clearly above the poverty line for a given country.
The Committee notes that in many countries provi-sion is made for a minimum guaranteed income for persons whose income falls below a given poverty line. (... )The Committee emphasises that in so far as the minimum guaranteed income is not linked to the wage of a full-time worker so as to increase the level of the minimum wage, it is not directly relevant to the assessment of conformity under Article 4 para. 1.
The Committee defines remuneration for the pur-poses of the assessment under Article 4 para. 1 as the net value, ie. after deduction of social security contri-butions and taxes, ofthe total wages, in principle both monetary and in kind, paid regularly by an employer to a worker for work carried out. Account shall where applicable be taken ofbonuses and gratuities not paid regularly with each pay packet. Social security contri-butions shall be calculated on the basis of employee contribution rates laid down by law or collective agreement. Taxes are all taxes on earned income. In-direct taxes are thus not taken into account.
con-sideration as Article 4 para. 1 concerns remuneration for work as such. (... ) The Committee underlines that by looking at net wages it takes into account any re-distributive effects of contributions and taxes.
The reference wage considered by the Committee is the national net average wage for a full-time wage earner, if possible calculated across all sectors for the whole economy, but otherwise for a representative sector such as manufacturing industry or for several sectors.' As the lowest wage the Committee will con-sider the net statutory minimum wage for those countries where such a wage has been established. (
...
)Ifthe lowest wage in a given Contracting Party does not satisfy the 60 %threshold, but does not fallvery far below, the Committee will not immediately reach a negative conclusion, but will ask the Government in question to furnish it with detailed evidence that the lowest wage is sufficient to give the worker a decent living standard even if it is below 60 %of the national net average wage. In particular, consideration will be given to the costs of having health care, education, transport, etc. In extreme cases, however, for in-stance where the lowest wage is less than half the av-erage wage the Committee would, however, consider the situation to be in breach of the Charter and pro-ceed to conclude negatively. (... )
The Committee emphasises the importance ofArti-cle 4 para. 1 of the Charter, which - as stated by the Committee on several occasions - merits being in-cluded in the hard core of the treaty.It insists that member states take all necessary steps to comply with the provision.'(Conc/. XIV-2 vol.1,49-54)
- 'In its examination of theDutchreport the Com-mittee has taken into account the detailed explana-tions presented by the Government during the bilat-eral meeting with the Committee on 29 June 1999. The report states that in 1997 the net annual average wage represented 14 368€ increasing to 15 610€ in 2000. In comparison, the net value of the statutory
1. The Committee notes that the number of workers in the manufacturing industry is declining in many countries, but it is without comparison in the sector which is best descri-bed by existing statistics, both nationally and internatio-nally. In addition. it appears that the wage level of this sec-tor in general is a rather close approximation of the overall average wage for the whole economy, although in many cases slightly lower.
annual minimum wage for workers aged 23 or over was (... ) corresponding in both years to about 70 %of the net average wage. (... ) The Committee considers that the minimum wage for the age group concerned meets the requirements of the Charter. However, the Committee recalls that under the Minimum Wage and Minimum Holiday Allowance Act as amended workers under the age of23 years are entitled only to a percentage of the adult minimum wage ranging from 30 %for 15-year olds increasing to 85 %for 22-year olds. Aworker aged 18 22-years was thus entitled to 45,5 %of the adult minimum wage which in 2000 rep-resented a net value of about 4 904€ annually or a mere 31,4 %of the net average wage. Notwithstan-ding the Government's arguments, the Committee can only reiterate that such a wage is too low to be considered fair in the meaning ofthis provision of the Charter. (... )
The Committee concludes that the situation in the Netherlands is not in conformity with Article 4§1 of the Charter as the statutory minimum wage of work-ers aged between 18 and 21 years falls below the re-quirements ofthis provision.'(Concl. XVI-2vol.2, 522-523)
Aantekeningen lid 2
PARLEMENTAIRE BEHANDELING
- 'Ook dit recht wordt niet uitdrukkelijk wettelijk erkend. Echter, aile collectieve arbeidsovereenkorn-sten bevatten bepalingen over vergoedingen voor overwerk.'(MvT, 8606, R533)
TOELICHTING
Europees ComitevoorSodafe Rechten - Zie ook de Conclusies bij artikel 2 lid 1.
- 'The Committee recalls that the principle of this provision is that work performed outside normal working hours requires an increased effort on the part of the worker, who therefore should be paid at a rate higher than the normal wage. The Committee al-lows additional time off to replace increased remun-eration.
Com-mittee has noted that most Contracting Parties hav-ing accepted this provision have adopted schemes providing for flexible working hours, according to which working hours are calculated as an average over given reference periods. The result of these schemes is that hours worked in excess of the average number are compensated in practice by rest periods in the course of other weeks within the reference pe-riod. The Committee has considered that such ar-rangements are not in breach of Article 4 para. 2. In some cases, increased remuneration for overtime work has been maintained where work is carried out over and above the maximum daily or weekly hours provided in the flexibility scheme. TheCommittee re-serves the possibility to assess on a case-by-case basis whether flexible working time arrangements ensure effective compliance with Article 4 para. 2.' (Concl. XIV-2vol.1,35)
- 'If overtime is not remunerated the Committee accepts a compensatory rest period, on condition that the time off work exceeds the amount of overtime performed, corresponding to an increased rate of pay. Ifovertime work is remunerated at the normal rate of pay, the Committee requires that the obligation im-posed by Article 4 para. 2 be satisfied by according workers time off work, the length of which corre-sponds to an increased rate of pay.'(Concl. XIV-2vol.2, m.b.t. Luxemburg,479)
- 'On the basis of the information provided in the
Dutchreport and in previous reports, the Committee notes that the situation with regard to the workers' right to an increased rate of remuneration for over-time work, which it previously considered to be in conformity with the Charter, has not changed. Fur-thermore, it notes that, in reply to its general question on the effect of flexibility measures on remuneration and compensation for overtime work, the report sta-tes that where weekly working hours are increased by collective agreements these agreements automat-ically provide for additional compensatory leave pe-riods. It therefore concludes that the situation in the Netherlands is in conformity with Article 4§2 of the Charter.'(Concl. XVI-2vol.2,523)
Aantekeningen lid 3
ALGEMEEN
- VgI. artikel 1 van het Aanvullend Protocol en de conclusies daaronder.
Nederlandse wetgeving
- Burgerlijk Wetboek, artikel 7:646.
Wet gelijke behandeling van mannen en vrouwen, wet van 1 maart 1980,5tb.1980, 86, artikel 7-12.
Algemene wet gelijke behandeling, wet van 2 maart 1994,5tb.1994, 230.
INTERNATIONALE CONTEXT Europese Unie
- Artikel 141 EG-verdrag.
Richtlijn or. 75/117/EEG (Gelijke beloning m/v). Richtlijn or. 76/207/EEG (Gelijke behandeling m/v bij de arbeid).
Verenigde Naties
- VgI. artikel7 sub
a
(i) IVESCR.lnternationale Arbeidsorganisaiie
- Nr. 100 (Gelijkebeloning), Trb.1952,45(metNe-derlandse vertaling). Bekrachtigd op 16 juni 1971, Trb.1971, 134.
Nr. 111 (Discriminatie in arbeid en beroep), Trb.
1962,41. Nederlandse vertalingTrb. 1972, 70. Be-krachtigd mede voor de Nederlandse Antillen en Aru-ba op 15 maart 1973,Trb. 1973,48.
Nr. 156 (gelijke kansen en gelijke behandeling van mannelijke en vrouwelijke arbeiders; arbeiders met gezinsverantwoordelijkheden), Trb. 1981, 244. Ne-derlandse vertaling inTrb.1982, 101. Bekrachtigd op 24 maart 1988, Trb. 1988, 29.
PARLEMENTAIRE BEHANDELING
Nadere MvAII. In dit verband stelden verscheidene leden de vraag, of, nu een vrijere loonpolitiek is inge-voerd, aanvaarding van het artikellid de Regering niet tot meer kan verplichten dan tot het bevorderen van gelijke beloning voor mannen en vrouwen. Deonder-getekenden zouden hierop willen antwoorden, dat het artikel de verdragsluitende partijen te dezen ver-plicht het recht op gelijke beloning te erkennen en dat hieraan volgens het slot van het artikel wordt vol-daan, indien de uitoefening van het recht op gelijke beloning wordt verwezenlijkt door middel van vrij-elijk gesloten collectieve arbeidsovereenkomsten. Nu hier te lande het streven van het georganiseerde bedrijfsleven erop is gericht de gelijkheid in beloning te bevorderen, menen de ondergetekenden dat op dit punt aan de verplichtingen van het Handvest wordt voldaan.'(MvT, 8606, R533)
TOELICHTING
Europees ComitevoorSociale Reehten
- 'The Committee held that this provision obliges the Contracting States who have accepted it to recog-nise the principle ofequal pay for work ofequal value, not only in law but also in fact. The Committee was aware of the importance attached by public opinion to this provision in the Charter and felt it necessary to elucidate a certain number of its implications.
Firstly, as regards the interpretation to be given to this paragraph, the Committee pointed out that equal pay for men and women workers is required for work of equal value, this presupposes the establishment by the governments of the states concerned of objective criteria for evaluating work, on the basis of appropri-ate methods (commissions, surveys, etc.). In this con-nection, the Committee considered that the Charter leaves governments free to choose the methods whereby equality of pay between men and women workers is achieved and that this equality may be en-sured either by means of legislation and regulations or by collective agreements, provided only that equality is achieved in practice.'(Concl. 1,28)
- 'The Committee wished to make it clear that if,in a country which has accepted this undertaking, the full exercise of the right to equal remuneration can-not be ensured for all workers simply through the op-eration of collective agreements, the State is required
to intervene by way of statutory wage-fixing machi-nery or any other appropriate method. On this point the Committee had already found that the Charter goes further thanILOConvention Nr. 100,as is evi-dent from a comparison of the two international in-struments, since the Charter included an explicit un-dertaking to recognise this right, whereas under the
ILOConvention the States merely undertake to pro-mote the application of the principle of equal pay for work of equal value and to ensure such application insofar as this is consistent with the methods in oper-ation, for determining rates of remuneration. More-over, the obligation to ensure enjoyment of this right is, in the Charter, absolute.
However, the Committee recognised that, while it is possible for a State to require by law, in default of collective agreements, compliance with the rule of equal pay for work of equal value involves compari-son and assessment of many complicated factors sub-ject to variation in time and space. Accordingly, the undertaking in Article4,paragraph 3,could be re-garded as being met if,on the one hand, the "equal pay for equal work" rule was established de jure and de facto and, on the other hand, the Contracting Party provided evidence that it had taken all steps in its power to achieve equality of remuneration for work of comparable value.' (Cond.II, 18-19)
- 'In the light of the difficulties noticed in hetprac-tical application of the principle enhrined in para-graph 3 of Article 4 of the Charter, the committee agreed to clarify in a more complete manner its scope:
- the legislation of a state which has accepted this provision must prescribe that men and women work-ers must receive equal pay not only for equal work but also for work of equal value;
- any clauses of collective agreements or indi-vidual contracts which contravene this principle must be declared null and void by law;
- the protection of this right must be ensured through adequate remedies;
- workers must enjoy effective protection from measures of retaliation arising from their claim for equal pay (notably protection against dismissal). '(Cond.VIII, 66)
- 'The Committee takes note of the information contained in theNetherlandsreport.
conditions. Section 7 of the WGB stipulates that com-parison should be based on "the salary normally paid in the firm where the worker on whose behalf the comparison is being made is employed, to an employ-ee of the other sex for work of equal value, or where there is no such work, for work of comparable value". The comparison is limited to the firm.The term salary refers to the remuneration payable by an employer to an employee in exchange for his/her work, but does not include benefits or rights linked with a pension scheme. Section 9, Sub-section 2 of the WGB stipu-lates that account should be taken of elements of wages other than cash in accordance with the market value that can be assigned to them. The Committee has always considered that the principle of equality should cover all elements of pay. It considers that the idea of remuneration in the Charter, for the purpose of the application of the princi pIe of equality between the sexes, covers "basic or minimum wages or salary plus all other benefits paid directly or indirectly in cash or kind by the employer to the worker by reason of the latter's employment". It considers that the ex-clusion of benefits or rights linked with a pension scheme from the notion of pay and therefore the ap-plication of the principle of equal treatment is too ex-tensive and as a consequence not in conformity with Article 4§3 of the Charter. (... )
In its conclusion on Article 1 of the Additional Pro-tocol to the Charter (Conclusions XV-2, p. 378), the Committee noted that one of the reasons for this dif-ference in pay was that women worked part-time more often than men. In the Netherlands. about 15% of collective labour agreements still do not apply to employees working "short parttime" (less than twelve hours a week). The Committee considers that the principle that there should be no discrimination between the sexes implies that the rule of equal pay for full-time and part-time workers should be ob-served, since most of the latter are women and this can gives rise to indirect discrimination.' (Cond.XVI-2
vol.2, 523-526) IURISPRUDENTIE
- 'Het middel faalt omdat de hiervoor in 3.1 geci-teerde bepaling(art.7IVESCR,bew.)niet kan worden aangemerkt als een bepaling die een ieder kan ver-oinden als bedoeld in art. 93 Gr.w.
In de eerste plaats is hier de inhoud van deze bepa-ling van belang. Daarin wordt geheel in het algemeen zonder enige andere uitwerking - afgezien van het hier niet aan de orde zijnde vervolg betreffende gelij-ke beloning van mannen en vrouwen - gesprogelij-ken over het waarborgen van "billijk loon" en over een ge-Iijke beloning van werk van "gelijke waarde"; een dergelijke algemene formulering kan op een zo om-vangrijk terrein als het onderhavige bezwaarlijk in de rechtsorde functioneren zonder nadere uitwerking, zodat rechtstreekse werking niet voor de handligt, Voorts kan worden gewezen op de memorie van toe-Iichting bij de Wet tot goedkeuring van het IVES(-Verdrag (Bijl. Hand. II 1975-1976, 13 932, nr.3), waaraan - anders dan onderdeeI2.2.1 betoogt - wei een zekere betekenis kan worden toegekend (HR 23 sept.1988,N]1989, 743, onder 3.2).lndeze memorie (p. 12/13) wordt opgemerkt dat de bepalingen van dit verdrag "in het algerneen" geen rechtstreekse wer-king zullen hebben. Voorts wordt ten aanzien van art. 7 gezegd (p. 47): "De erkenning van het recht van de enkeling op billijke en gunstige arbeidsvoorwaarden moet - zoals bij vele bepalingen van het onderhavige verdrag - worden gezien als een doelstelling waar-naar gestreefd dient te worden". Deze laatste passage heeft, anders dan onderdeel2.3 betoogt, ook betrek-king op de gelijke beloning van werk van gelijke waarde, nu zulks is te beschouwen als een concretise-ring van het recht op billijke en gunstige arbeidsvoor-waarden.
Een en ander vindt verder steun in art. 2, waarin wordt gesproken over een verplichting van de Staten die partij zijn bij het Verdrag om maatregelen te ne-men teneinde steeds nader te kone-men tot een algehele verwezenlijking van in het Verdrag neergelegde rechten, zij het ook dat dit artikel, zoals onderdeel2.1 terecht stelt, niet eraan in de weg behoeft te staan dat aan bepalingen van het Verdrag rechtstreekse wer-king toekomt.
waar-naar gestreefd dient te worden.'(HR20april 1990,N] 1992,636: AB 1990,338)
_ 'De rechtbank neernt hierbij in aanmerking dat in het rechtsbewustzijn het algemeen beginselleeft dat werknemers recht hebben op een billijke belo-ning, hetgeen onder meer meebrengt dat gelijke ar-beid in gelijke omstandigheden op gelijke wijze ge-honoreerd dient te worden, behoudens een
objectie-ve rechtvaardigingsgrond. Dit beginsel heeft ook in het geschreven recht erkenning gevonden, lOwe I in algemene zin als toegespitst op de verhouding tussen mannen envrouwen.Verwezen kan worden naar on-der meer:
- art. 23vande Universele Verklaring van de rech-tenvan de mens;
- art. 7 aanhef en ondera,sub(i)van het Interna-tionaal verdrag inzake economische, sociale en cultu-rele rechten (... );
- art. 119van het EEG-verdrag;
- art. 4vanhet Europees Sociaal Handvest: - diverse richtlijnen van de EG;
- par. 2van de Wet gelijke behandeling op man-nen envrouwenjunctoart. 7A:1637ij BW. (... )
Op grondvan art. 1638z is Agfa verplicht ook ten aanzien van Schoolderman de Agfa-voorwaarden met betrekking tot de honorering toe te passen, waar-bij de Rechtbank mede in aanmerking neemt het in het aigemeen rechtsbewustzijnIevend beginsel dat werknemers recht hebben op een billijke beloning, hetgeen onder meer meebrengt dat gelijke arbeid in gelijke omstandigheden op gelijke wijze gehono-reerd moet worden, behoudens een objectieve recht-vaardigingsgrond.'(HR8apri/1994,N]1994,704,]AR
1994, 94,AgfajSchoolderman)
- 'Het gaat in dit geding am de vraag of KLC-vlie-gers op grand van het aan het arrest van de Hoge Raad
van8 april 1994, nr. 15292,N] 1994, 704, ontleende
"algerneen erkende rechtsbeginsel dat gelijke arbeid in gelijke omstandigheden op gelijke wijze moet Norden beloond, tenzij een objectieve
rechtvaardi-~ingsgrandeen ongelijke beloning toelaat" (hierna ook:het "Agfa-criterium") aanspraak kunnen maken ipdezelfde arbeidsvoorwaarden wat betreft salaris
~nsenioriteit als KLM-vliegers.
Bij de beoordelingvan deze vraag moet worden -ooropgesrelddat het in het onderhavigegeval niet taat om een onderscheid dat door de wet of een 'echtstreeks werkende verdragsbepaling wordt
ver-boden, zoals het ingevolge art. 5 Aigemene wet gelij-ke behandeling verboden onderscheid op grand van godsdienst, Ievensovertuiging, politieke gezindheid, ras, geslacht, nationaliteit, hetero- of homoseksuele gerichtheid of burgerlijke staat, het door art. 7:646 BW en art. 7 Wet gelijke behandelingvanmannen en vrouwen met betrekking tot de arbeidsvoorwaarden onderscheidenlijk het loon verboden onderscheid tussen mannen en vrouwen, of het ingevolge art. 7:648 en 7:649 BWverbodenonderscheid op grand van verschil in arbeidsduur of van het al dan niet tij-delijke karaktervande arbeidsovereenkomst.
In het onderhavigegeval kan de vraag of sprake is van een ongeoorloofd onderscheid dan ook slechts worden beantwoord aan de handvan de eisenvan
goed werkgeverschap op devoet vanart. 7:611 BW, in welke bepaling de algemene eisenvanredelijkheid en billijkheid, zoais neergelegd in art. 6:2 en 6:248 BWvoorhet arbeidsrecht uitdrukking vinden. Bij de vaststelling van wat de eisen van goed werkgever-schapvooreengevalals het onderhavige inhouden, moet derhalve, zoais invoormeldarrest ook is
over-wogen, het beginsel dat gelijke arbeid in gelijke om-standigheden op gelijke wijze moet worden beloond, tenzij eenobjectieverechtvaardigingsgrond een on-gelijke beloning toelaat, "in aanmerking worden ge-nomen". Dit een en ander betekent dat dit beginsel-waaraan, gelet op het feit dat het ook steun vindt in verdragsbepalingen als art. 261VBPR en art. 7lnterna-tionaal Verdrag inzake economische, sociale en cul-turele rechten (hierna: IVESCR), een zwaar gewicht kan worden toegekend - niet doorslaggevend is, maar dat het naast andere omstandigheden van het geval moet worden betrokken in de afweging of de werkgever in de gegeven omstandigheden heeft ge-handeld in strijd met de eisenvan goed werkgever-schap. Anders gezegd: ook ingeval op zichzelf moet worden aangenomen dat werknemers gelijke arbeid in gelijke omstandigheden verrichten, zonder dat
voor een verschil in beloning een objectieve recht-vaardigingsgrondvaltaan te wijzen, kan dit nog niet zonder meer tot de slotsom leiden dat zij een gelijke beloning behoren te krijgen. Tevensvoigthieruit dat bij de beoordelingvandevraagof een overeengeko-men ongelijkheid in beloning op grondvandit begin-sel als ongeoorloofd moetworden beschouwd en
hier gaat om een toetsing van gelijke aard als die wel-ke plaatsvindt bij de toepassingvan art6:248lid 2 BW en dat derhalve deze vraag slechts bevestigend kan worden beantwoord indien de ongelijkheid in belo-ning naar maatstaven van redelijkheid en billijkheid onaanvaardbaar is. Hetzelfde geldt eens te meer in-dien de ongelijke beloning voortvloeit uit een collec-tieve arbeidsovereenkomst, omdat dan tevens het uit verscheidene verdragsbepalingen voortvloeiende zwaarwegende beginsel van de vrijheid van onder-handelen over arbeidsvoorwaarden in het geding is.'
(HR 30januari 2004, JAR 2004/68, Parallel Entry/ KLM&VNV)
Aantekeningen lid 4
ALGEMEEN
- Deel Ilvan de BijlageESH is van toepassing: 'This provision shall be so understood as not to prohibit immediate dismissal for any serious offence.'
Nederlandse wetgeving
- Burgerlijk Wetboek, artikel 7:672.
INTERNATIONALE CONTEXT
Intemationale Arbeidsorganisatie
- Nr. 177 (Thuiswerk),Trb.1996,329. Nederland-se vertaling inTrb.2001, 25. Bekrachtigd op 31 okto-ber 2002,Trb.2003, 176.
PARLEMENTAIRE BEHANDELING
- 'Het in dit lid neergelegde recht van de werkne-mers is wettelijk geregeld in 9+Boek III, titel 7A, van het BurgelijkWetboek, artikelen163ge-1639x (thans boek7,titellO, artikel652,667-686NBW, bew.).' (MvT, 8606, R533)
TOELICHTING
EuropeesCornirevoor Sodale Rechten
- 'On studying the first governmental reports, the Committee was brought up against the question of
interpreting the notion of a "reasonable" period of no-tice and its limits. The Committee took the view that no absolute definition of reasonableness could be given where a period of notice was concerned, and therefore confined itself to determining particular cases in which the period of notice given could not be considered as reasonable.'(Cond.I, 29)
- 'The Committee's estimation of what constitutes a clearly "unreasonable" amount of notice is founded on criteria offairness, such as a worker's period of ser-vice with a firm, as well as making allowance for the progressive character of the Charter which was envi-saged by its authors.'(Cond.IV, 35)
- 'Referring to its case law (see Fifth report on cer-tain provisions of the Charter which have not been accepted, pp. 10-11), the Committee observes that workers who have completed two years of service must be entitled to more than two weeks' notice. As this is not the case in theUnited Kingdom,the Com-mittee finds that this is inconsistent with the Charter too. Where a worker has a longer service record, ego up to five years, the period of notice should not, in general, be less than one month. Accordingly, the three weeks' notice provided for workers with three years' service is inadequate. The longer periods laid down for workers with four and five years' service (four and five weeks respectively) are however ac-ceptable.
Where the worker has more than five years' ser-vice, the Charter requires a period of notice longer than one month(cfConclusions XH-1, p. 104). This is the case in the United Kingdomwhere, for example, a notice period of eight weeks must be accorded after eight years' service. Nevertheless, the Committee re-calls that in view of the dynamic nature of this provi-sion of the Charter, it reserves the right to reassess national situations from cycle to cycle: (Cond.XIV-2 vol.2,m.b.t. het Verenigd Koninkrijk, 773)
no-tice is added for each additionaI5-years' service peri-od with the same employer. The Committee also notes that notice of termination of employment is not required during probationary periods. It therefore asks whether the length of probationary periods is determined by law or by other means and what is its average duration. Pending receipt of the requested information, the Committee concludes that the situa-tion in the Netherlands is in conformity with Article 4§4 of the Charter.'(Concl. XVI-2 vol.2, 527)
Aantekeningen lid5 ALGEMEEN
- DeelIIvan de Bijlage ESH is van toepassing: 'It is understood that a Contracting Party may give the un-dertaking required in this paragraph if the great ma-jority of workers are not permitted to suffer deduc-tions from wages either by law or through collective agreements or arbitration awards, the exceptions be-ing those persons not so covered.'
Nederlandse wetgeving
- Artike17:631 BW.
INTERNATIONALE CONTEXT
lntemationale Arbeidsorganisatie
- Nr.95 (Bescherming van het loon), 5tb. 1951,
542. Nederlandse vertaling inTrb.1951,32. Bekrach-tigd op 20 mei 1952. ZieTrb. 1957,190. Toepasselijk verklaard op de Nederlandse Antillen 10 juni 1955,
Trb.1957, 190. Van kracht voor Aruba vanaf 1 januari 1986.
TOELICHTING
EuropeesComitivoorSociale Rechten
- 'The worker's right to receive his wages in full had been the subject of long battles in the history of the labour movement. The Social Charter too was bound to establish the principle that deductions from wages can be authorised only "under conditions and to the extent prescribed by national laws or
regula-tions or fixed by collective agreements or arbitration awards". The Committee pointed out that a Contract-ing State cannot be regarded as meetContract-ing its obligation under the terms of Paragraph 5 unless these condi-tions and limitacondi-tions are respected.'(Concl. 1,30)
- 'The examination of the contents of biennial re-ports relating to Article 4, paragraph 5, prompted the Committee to clarify its interpretation of the scope of the appendix to this provision. In fact, if on the one hand this provision obliges Contracting States to per-mit deductions from wages in respect of all workers only "under conditions and to the extent prescribed by national laws or regulations or fixed by collective agreements or arbritation awards" thus implying that any other deductions must be considered as con-trary to the Charter; on the other hand, the appendix states that "if the great majority of workers are not permitted to suffer deductions from wages ( ... )" the undertaking laid down in the Charter is satisfied.
Asthe "travaux preparatoires" show that the text of the appendix was inserted in orderto permit States to satisfy the Charter even if only the great majority of workers were protected as required by Article 4, par-agraph 5, the deductions not permitted by the appen-dix are those which are not authorised either by law or regulations nor fixed by collective agreements or arbritation awards and which are consequently not in conformity with Article 4, paragraph 5, of the Charter. It follows that a State must be regarded as acting in conformity with this provision when deductions from wages are permittted for the large majority of workeres only when they are expressly authorised by laws, regulations, collective agreements or arbrita-tion awards.'(Concl. V,34-35)
- 'The Committee noted with interest the informa-tion contained in theDutchreport (... ).It noted in par-ticular that all situations which may lead to deduc-tions from wages are governed by very strict regula-tions (... ) (Concl. VIII, 75).
Recht
op
vrijheid van organisatie
Art. 5. Ten einde het recht van werknemers
en werkgevers tot oprichting van plaatselijke,
nationale of internationale organisaties voor
de bescherming van hun economische en
sod-ale belangen en tot aansluiting bij deze
organi-saties te waarborgen, verplichten de
Overeen-komstsluitende Partijen zich dit recht op
ge-nerlei wijze door de nationale wergeving of
door de toepassing daarvan te laten beperken.
De mate waarin de in dit artikel voorziene
waarborgen van toepassing zullen zijn op de
politie, wordt bepaald door nationale wetten
of verordeningen. Het beginsel volgens
het-welk deze waarborgen van toepassing zullen
zijn ten aanzien van leden der strijdkrachten,
en de mate waarin deze waarborgen van
toe-passing zullen zijn op personen in deze
catego-rie, wordt eveneens bepaald door nationale
wetten of verordeningen.
The right to organise
Art. 5. With a view to ensuring or
promot-ing the freedom of workers and employers to
form local, national or international
organisa-tions for the protection of their economic and
social interests and to join those organisations,
the Contracting Parties undertake that
nation-allaw shall not be such as to impair nor shall it
be so applied as to impair this freedom. The
ex-tent to which the guarantees provided for in
this article shall apply to the police shall be
de-termined by national laws or regulations. The
principle governing the application to the
members of the armed forces of these
guaran-tees and the extent to which they shall apply to
persons in this category shall equally be
deter-mined by national laws or regulations.
Aantekeningen
ALGEMEEN
- Dit artikel is
tevens
geratificeerdvoor
de Neder-landse Antillen (zieTrb.1980,65) en Aruba (zie art. 34).Nederlandse wetgeving
- Grondwet, artikel8 en 9.
Wet op het algemeen verbindend het onverbin-dend verklaren
van
bepalingenvan
collectieve ar-beidsovereenkomsten, wetvan
25 mei 1937, 5tb.1937,801, artikel2lid 5.
Toetsingskader algemeen verbindend verklaring CAO-bepalingen (AW), besluitvan 2 december 1998,
5tert.1998, 240, par. 4.3 onder 3.
SER-verordening representativiteit organisaties, SER-verordening
van
15 september 2000.Wet op de bedrijfsorganisatie, wet
van
27 januari1950,5tb. 1950, K 22. INTERNATIONALE CONTEXT Verenigde Naties
- Vgl. artikel 8 lid 1 sub a, b en c, alsmede lid 2
IVESCR.
Intemationale Arbeidsorganisatie
- Nr. 87 (Vrijheid tot het oprichten
van
vakvereni-gingen en beschermingvan
het vakverenigings-recht),5tb.J
538, 1949 (met Nederlandse vertaling). Bekrachtigd op 7 maart 1950,Trb.1951,27.Toepasselijk verklaard op de Nederlandse Antillen op 25 juni 1951,Trb.1951,146. Van krachtvoor Aru-ba vanaf 1 januari 1986.
Nr. 98 (Recht zich te organiseren en coUectiefte on-derhandelen),Trb.1972, 105. Nederlandse vertaling
Trb.1979,79. Bekrachtigd op 22 december 1993,Trb.
1994,26.
Nr. 135 (Bescherming van de vertegenwoordigers
van
de werknemers in de onderneming en hun te ver-lenen faciliteiten),Trb.1971,207 (met Nederlandse vertaling). Bekrachtigd op 19 november 1975, Trb.Nr. 141 (Organisaties van personen die in de land-bouw werkzaam zijn en hun rol in de sociaal-eco-nomische ontwikkeling),Trb. 1976, 29 (met Neder-landse vertaling). Bekrachtigd op 26 januari 1977.
Trb. 1977, 27. Verdrag is toepasselijk verklaard op Aruba vanaf 18 februari 1986.Trb.1987. 16. volgend op de rijkswet van 12 december 1986, Stb. 1986.668, waarin (mede)gelding van een aantal verdragen, an-ders dan die in art. 34 van het ESH genoemd worden. tot stand gebracht werd. Inmiddels heefft Aruba een opzeggingsverklaring laten registreren op 28 maart 1998. waarop het verdrag per 18 maart 1999 buiten werking is getreden ten aanzien van Aruba. zieTrb.
1997,203 enTrb.1998. 129.
Nr. 151 (Bescherming van het vakverenigingsrecht en procedures voor het vaststellen van arbeidsvoor-waarden in de openbaren dienst),Trb.1979.50 (met Nederlandse vertaling), Bekrachtigd op 29 november
1988. Trb.1989, 16.
PARLEMENTAIRE BEHANDELING
- 'Artikel5 van her Handvest houdt tweeerlei plichting in: een verplichting tot nalaten en een ver-plichting tot waar nodig actief optreden. De eerste houdt in. dat de wetgeving noch de bestuurspraktijk een verbod mag inhouden van het vormen ofhet zich aansIuiten bij werkgevers- resp. werknemersorgani-saties. De tweede houdt in
net,
zo nodig, treffen van wettelijke of andere maatregelen ten einde te waar-borgen dat het recht op organisatie daadwerkelijk kan worden uitgeoefend, waarbij met name ware te denken aan bescherming van werknemersorganisa-ties tegen enigerlei bemoeienis van de kant van werk-gevers. Gezien de situatie in de praktijk in Nederland worden op dit punt wettelijke maatregelen niet no-dig geacht. Ditzelfde standpunt is destijds ingeno-men ter zake van de bekrachtiging van IAO-verdrag 87 met betrekking tot de vrijheid van organisatie. Wij zijn derhalve van orrdeeel dat de situatie in Neder-land voldoet aan het in artikel 5 bepaalde.'(MvA I. 8606, R533)TOELICHTING
Europees Comite voor Sociale Rechten
- 'This article sets out the principle that employers and workers have the rights to form national or in-ternational associations, for the protection of their economic and social interests. The Committee noted that two obligations were embodied in this provision. having a negative and a positive aspect respectively (ziedeMvA1hierboven. bew.). (... )The Committee also noted that, all classes of employers and workers. in-cluding public servants. subject to the exceptions mentioned below, are fully entitled to the right to or-ganise in accordance with the Charter. Certain re-strictions to this right are however permissible under the terms of the two last sentences of Article 5 in re-spect of members of the police and armed forces. The Charter however lays down different rules in respect of the position of each of these two classes of workers vis-a-vis the right to organise: it is clear in fact from the second sentence ofArticle 5 (taken in conjunction with the third sentence of the same Article) and from the 'travaux preparatoires' on this clause, that while a State may be permitted to limit the freedom of orga-nisation of the members of the police. it is not justi-fied in depriving them of all the guarantees provided for in the Article. On the other hand. the third sen-tence of Article 5 permits a State to limit in any way and even to suppress entirely the freedom to organise of members of the armed forces. The Committee also noted that, in accordance with the Appendix to the Charter. Article 5 does not rule on the admissibility of union security clauses or practices. The Committee considered, however. that any form of compulsory unionism imposed by law must be considered incom-patible with the obligation arising under this Article of the Charter.'(Concl.1. 31)
Hence. Article 5 is not satisfied merely by the fact that a statutory or other compulsory organisation effec-tively engages in procedures resembling collective bargaining:(Concl.ll, 22)
- 'The Committee pointed out (... ) that all workers and all trade union organisations should. in principle under Article 5 of the Charter, be free to decide to which trade union, professional or technical associa-tion they wish to belong;
The principle of the compulsory registration of trade unions is not, on the other hand. incompatible with Article 5. so long as the persons concerned have adequate administrative and jurisdictional protec-tion against abuse of the power to refuse to register a trade union.'(Concl. II, 184)
- 'The Committee would like to make it clear that national regulations which make authorisation to create a trade union empowered to exercise the right of collective bargaining conditional upon a minimum number of members, are not consistent with the prin-ciple of the freedom to organise; the same holds if this authorisation depends on the deposit of an excessive-ly large sum of money:(Concl.III.30)
- 'After careful consideration. the Committee adopted a conclusion ofa general characted on anoth-er important issue: the compatibility of trade union security clauses or practices (notably the closed shop) with the spirit and the letter of Article 5 ofthe Charter (Concl.VIII. 9). While conceding that the Appendix to the Charter in respect of Article 1. paragraph 2 stip-ulates that this provision "shall not be interpreted as prohibiting or authorising any union security clauses or practice". the committee considers, in view of the clear wording of Article 5, that no Contracting Party can fail to provide legal remedies or sanctions for practices which unduly obstruct the freedom to form or join trade union organisations. for otherwise the scope of the aforementioned provision of the Appen-dix would be excessively widened and situations in-compatible with the fundamental freedom secured by Article 5 would be considered lawful:(Cone/. VIII,
77)
- 'Considering that the freedom to join trade unions. guaranteed by Article 5 of the charter. neces-sarily implies the absence of any sort of obligation to become or remain a member of a trade union. The Committee held that the absence of adequate protec-tion of such a freedom in naprotec-tional law (either through
lack of appropriate statutes or through Case-Lawvali-dating practices conflicting with the freedom to orga-nise) cannot be considered as consistent with Article 5 of the Charter:(Concl. Xl-I, m.b.t.ljsland, 78)
- 'The Committee recalls the importance of these provisions of the Charter. Not only do they guarantee some of the most fundamental rights, but they also allow other Charter provisions to be effectively guar-anteed. In these circumstances. the Committee con-siders that all the Contracting Parties should accept the undertakings of Articles 5 and 6. It considers in fact that even if it is difficult to ensure that the rights provided in these Articles are fully upheld, states which commit themselves to respecting them will have an easier task when conforming to the other provisions of the Charter.'(Concl. XlV-I vol.1.42)
- 'In the report, theDanishGovernment refers to . the European Court of Human Rights' case law with which it considers Denmark to be in conformity. The Committee wishes to underline that the European Convention on Human Rights and the Social Charter are two separate instruments; according to Article 5 of the Charter there can be no sort ofobligation to be-come or remain a member of a trade union:(Concl. XIV-l vol.I, m.b.t. Denemarken, 177)
- 'The most important elements of the case law as regardsthe right ofworkerstoform and join organisa-tionsare the following:
- all workers and all trade union organisations should in principle, under Article 5 of the Charter. be free to decide to which trade union, professional or technical association they wish to belong;'
- the principle of compulsory registration of trade unions is not incompatible with the Charter, so long as the persons concerned have adequate administra-tive and jurisdictional protection against abuse ofthe power to refuse to register a trade union;'
- trade unions must be free to organise and admin-ister their own affairs without undue interference from governments; their autonomy in the exercise of legitimate functions must be respected. Any legisla-tion which regulates in detail the internal funclegisla-tioning of trade unions poses a serious risk of interference in-compatible with Article 5;3
1. Conclusions II,p.184. 2. -Ibidem.
- trade unions must be free to select their own members: Contracting Parties must legislate to pre-vent the exclusion of individuals on discriminatory grounds, contrary to the Preamble of the Charter and to prevent the exclusion of foreigners, nationals of other Contracting Parties to the Charter;
The main aspects examined relating to
thenegative
freedom of
association, that is the right not to join a trade union, are legislation which permits closed shop clauses in collective agreements as well as closed shop practices which are incompatible with Article 5 of the Charter. Article 5 also requires legisla-tion or case law to protect the negative freedom of association.Article 5 safeguards the right of workers to form and join trade union organisations "for the protection of their economic and social interests".
Trade union
activities -
necessary for the protection of economic and social interests - are therefore one of the most important aspects of the right to organise. In this re-spect Article 5 is very closely linked to Article 6, which guarantees the right to bargain collectively, and which is an essential trade union activity (... ).Workers must be protected against reprisals on grounds of trade union activity, in particular against dismissal but also other measures which could affect their working conditions and career.
Furthermore, states are obliged to ensure byappro-priate means that trade union representatives can have access to firms for the purpose of their trade union activities. However, this right should be exer-cised taking account of the employer's rights and in-terests, such as the efficient operation of the firm and the requirements of confidentiality and safety.' (... ) Also relevant to Article5 is Article 19 para. 4b of the Charter, which obliges Contracting Parties to afford migrant workers treatment not less favourable than that of their own nationals in respect of the member-ship of trade unions and the enjoyment of the benefits of collective bargaining. Membership of a trade union should also cover the right of foreign workers to be-come a founding member or to exercise trade union responsibilities in the same way as nationals." (6e
Rap. Art.
22, 9-12)1. Conclusions XII-2, p. 98. 2. Conclusions XllI-3, p. 414.
- 'The Committee takes note of the information contained in the
Dutch
report and its appendices. The committee recalls that the right to organise is pro-tected by the Constitution and that the situation in respect ofregistration andfees, therightoftrade unions
to choose theirmembers and representatives,
toorga-nise theiradministration and activities and to affiliate
withnational
orinternational organisations
has always been found to be compatible with Article 5 of the Charter. (... )The report confirms that workers are free to decide whether to join or not to join a trade union. However, from another source1 the Committee notes that a
clause in a collective agreement obliging the employ-er to employ only unionised workemploy-ers is valid undemploy-er
Dutch
law, and that such closed shop clauses, al-though very much the exception, exist in collective agreements in the printing industry. The Committee asks that the next report provide details on this point. It recalls that under Article 5 of the Charter there can be no sort of obligation to become or remain member of a trade union (... ).Pending receipt of the information requested, no-tably as regards the existence of closed shop clauses, the Committee concludes that the situation in the Netherlands is in conformity with Article 5 of the Charter:
(Conel. XV-I Addendum,
85)- 'The Committee takes note of the information in the report of
the Netherlands.
Regarding the right to freedom of association, the report states that the collective agreement covering printing and allied trades contains a closed shop clause
(de oude Grafimedia
CAO,bew.).
However, the clause does not apply if the employer orthe employee has been granted a waiver. The report explains that a waiver will be granted "if the employee concerned submits grounds against the obligatory membership which in all reasonableness carry such weight for the employee, that the membership cannot be asked of him/her". Requests tor a waiver are first considered by the company, and, in the second instance, by an independent panel composed of three persons from outside the sector. The report adds that according to Dutch case law, the possibility of a waiver isa precon-dition for the validity of a closed shop clause(vgl. HR
16januari 1970, NJ 1970, 156, bew.). In practice, a waiver is always granted upon request. The Commit-tee has consistently held closed shop clauses or any other arrangement which entails an obligation to be-come or remain a member of a trade union to be con-trary to Article 5. In this regard therefore, the situa-tion in the Netherlands is not in conformity with the Charter.' (CondXVI-1 vol.2, 441)
- 'The Committee notes in theDutch report that the closed-shop clause in the print workers collective agreement was abolished following the collective bargaining negotiations that began in January 2003. The violation of Article 5 of the Charter (... ) has there-fore been rectified, but outside the reference period.'
(Cenci. XVII-1 vol.1, 142) Regeringscomtte
- 'The Dutch delegate informed the Committee that the closed shop clause in question was a dead let-ter' which had not been applied since the 1970s and the organisations concerned had indicated that the clause would be removed from the collective agree-ment, probably as from 1 February 2003. The Com-mittee took note of this information and decided to await the next assessment of ECSR.'(16e rapport(I),
30)
(lnmiddels is een nieuwe Grafimedia CAO inwer-king getreden, geldend van 2003-2005, waarin een evidente closed-shop clausule niet is opgenomen,
bew.).
JURISPRUDENTIE
- 'Weliswaar kent de Wet op de ondernemingsra-den (WOR)geen bevoegdheondernemingsra-den terzake van primaire arbeidsvoorwaarden aan de ondernemingsraad toe, maar aangenomen moet worden dat art. 32 WORde mogelijkheid schept de bevoegdheden van de onder-nemingsraad uit te breiden, ook tot het onderhande-len over primaire arbeidsvoorwaarden. Het in het Eu-ropees Sociaal Handvest (ESH)en het ILO-verdrag ge-waarborgde recht van werknemers zich te organise-ren en op collectiefonderhandelen staat daaraan niet in de weg. Die verdragsbepalingen roepen geen ver-plichting van de werkgever in het leven om met vak-organisaties te onderhandelen.'(Rb. Den Haag19mei 1992, NJ 1993/342, KG 1992/210, JAR 1992/22, Gra-bowsky)
