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Subjectivity in performance
evaluation
An investigation of the influence of subjectivity in performance evaluation
related to the intention to leave the organization
Abstract
Incentive contracts are an important topic in management accounting. They are often seen as incomplete due to insufficient use of non-financial measures (e.g. customer satisfaction). Those measures are mostly set in such a manner that they are subjectively evaluated. Subjectivity makes the evaluation more uncertain and the subordinate more vulnerable. This study examines the relationship between subjectivity and the intention to leave the organization and the influence of trust on this relationship. The data was collected through a survey and the sample consists of 54 respondents who work in The Netherlands. The results indicate that subjectivity does not have a significant impact on the intention to leave. In addition, the results provide no support for the impact of trust on this relationship. However, the results did indicate a direct relationship between trust and the intention to leave which might be interesting for future research.
Keywords: Subjectivity, performance evaluation, trust, contracting theory, intention to leave Thijs Gerlofs
S3496155 University of Groningen
MSc Business Administration Organizational & Management Control Supervisors: Prof.dr.ir. Paula M.G. van Veen – Dirks & Dr. Nicolas Mangin
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I.
Introduction
Incentive contracts are attracting a lot of attention in society, but also in the academic world (Moers, 2005). In the last twenty years the agency theory has been the most important theory that is associated with incentive contracts between agents and principals. The contracting theory helps to solve interest problems, incentive problems and controlling the incentive problems. The contracting theory is a specific subdivision of the agency theory (Lambert, 2001). In the most ideal situation, all available information must be used in order to compose incentive contracts and to determine the effect of employees on the firm value (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991). However, incentive contracts are incomplete in a sense that employees may focus only on measured tasks and leave the unmeasured tasks (Gibbs et al., 2004). The distinction could be illustrated as focusing on short-term profits or long-term customer satisfaction. Kaplan and Norton (1996) argue that financial performance measures (e.g. profits) are incomplete and evoke the use of multiple (non-financial) performance measures (e.g. customer satisfaction). Anderson et al. (2004) indicate that focussing on customer satisfaction does also create value for the organization, but apparently organizations do not always use such measures in incentive contracts or in the performance evaluation of the employees.
An important characteristic to improve incentive contracts and to discourage behaviour that focuses only on measured tasks, is to use subjective performance measures (Kaplan and Norton, 1996). Subjectivity becomes even more important, because firms change their focus from the traditional financial measures (e.g. revenues) to non-financial measures such as customer satisfaction to evaluate subordinates. These non-financial measures are not formula based like the traditional measures (Lambert, 2001; Prendergast, 1999). Subordinates are also able to increase the firm value through activities that are more difficult to measure and not explicitly formula-based measures (Anderson et al., 2004). This should also be taken into account in the performance evaluation. In addition, based on the paper of Bol (2011) competence measures, such as cooperative behaviour and customer focus, are always set subjectively. The change of focus from traditional measures to non-financial measures leads to a more subjective way of evaluating performance, because not everything is measurable in one way and it leaves space for interpretation.
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perceived as ‘better’, since it can cannibalize the efficiency per customer because you need to spend more time on the customers to satisfy them. In this situation, the evaluation of customer satisfaction is based on the interpretation and perception of the supervisor. At that moment, subjectivity comes into play and the supervisor must evaluate the subordinate in a subjective way. Gibbs et al. (2004) argue that subjectivity is a way to evaluate employees in a more flexible way and adapt to changes in the environment of the organization. This could be very helpful in sectors which a more unpredictable, such as the technology sector (Raith, 2003). In this case, subjectivity could alter the targets or interpret the results in a different manner, even though subordinates have not reached their targets (Merchant and Manzoni, 1989).
However, subjectivity is ‘on debate’ since it can be biased in contrast to objectivity that is associated with transparency about targets and without evaluation biases (Prendergast, 1999). Moers (2005) argues that supervisors do have performance evaluation bias and the perception could differ between the supervisor and subordinates. The performance evaluation bias gives the supervisor the opportunity to allocate rewards based on their preferences and manipulated them in the system. This makes it more difficult to distinguish genuinely good performance from favouritism (Prendergast and Topel, 1993). Eventually, subordinates may notice the bias and become less motivated in the future (Moers, 2005). In addition, subjectivity also leads to more uncertainty, since it is based on interpretation or preferences of the supervisor (Prendergast and Topel, 1993). This uncertainty affects subordinates and makes them more vulnerable, because their performance evaluation is up to the preferences of the supervisor (Gibbs et al., 2004). This implies that subjectivity could also have a negative effect on the performance evaluation of subordinates, because every supervisor perceives information and observations in a different way.
Subordinates tend to be more averse to the risk/uncertainty that results in a loss than in a gain (Thaler et al., 1997). The uncertainty could contribute to a negative perception of subordinates towards the performance evaluation. This evokes uncomfortable situations which contribute to intentions to leave the organization (Scott et al., 1999). There is evidence that employees quit voluntarily (Mitchell et al., 2001) due to uncertainty (Bordia et al., 2004). Thus, subordinates do consider leaving the organization voluntarily due to uncertainty and this paper investigates if this is evoked by subjectivity in performance evaluation. Based on the arguments, there is positive relationship in the paper between subjectivity in performance evaluation and intention to leave the organization.
However, this relationship can be influenced by the level of trust. Trust has the capacity to mitigate the negative effects of subjectivity, such as uncertainty and vulnerability (Gibbs et al., 2004;
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In this situation, trust is supplementary to the contract and trust must be present to rely on the agreed contract. This indicates that the negative effects of subjective performance measures decrease when there is a personal trust relation between the supervisor and the subordinate (Gibbs et al., 2004). Thus,
it is likely that trust mitigates the uncertainty and vulnerability that is associated with subjectivity (Paillé et al., 2010). This paper builds on the research of Gibbs et al. (2004) by investigating what kind of impact trust has on the relationship between subjectivity and intention to leave, which resulted in the following research question: To what extent is subjectivity in performance evaluation related to the intention to leave the organization and what is the impact of trust on this relationship?
This study answers the research question based on a (online) survey that is filled out by employees of several organizations in The Netherlands. The survey is only focussed on employees at the operational level (subordinates) and excluded the employees at higher levels (e.g. CEO’s and directors). A total of 66 respondents filled out the survey to provide data to investigate the influence of subjectivity in performance evaluation on the behaviour of subordinates, whereas 54 respondents were actually used in the sample.
I investigated two relationships, namely between subjectivity and intention to leave and the impact of trust on this relationship. However, for both relationships I did not found significant results to provide support for the theoretical predictions. I did find a significant relationship between trust and intention to leave, however this is based on a direct relationship instead of the intended indirect relationship in combination with subjectivity. Trust has several more significant correlations with other variables what indicates that it might be interesting for future research.
This research contributes to the literature of subjectivity. Gibbs et al. (2004) show effects of subjectivity that affect subordinates in a positive way. However, subjectivity has also negative effects on subordinates and this paper tries to investigate the negative side of subjectivity. In addition, the paper investigates subjectivity in performance evaluation and explicitly focusses on performance measures. Gibbs et al. (2004) focused on subjective bonusses and this paper focuses on subjectivity measures in the performance evaluation of subordinates.
The practical contribution and managerial implication of this paper is based on how an organization or manager could enhance the implementation of subjective performance measures. This has not been investigated yet and trust might be an important determinant of the effectiveness of subjective performance measures. Eventually, this could provide support for an organization and managers to deal with the incompleteness of incentive contracts.
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identify the method that is used to test the hypotheses. In section 5 the results and findings are explained and in the last section the discussion takes places and conclusions are drawn.
II.
Literature review
Subjectivity
Gibbs et al. (2004) indicate that incentive contracts are incomplete, because subordinates will only focus on the performance measures that are actually measured and evaluated. These measures are mostly based on financial measures such as revenues, but single financial performance measures seem to be incomplete. Therefore, a multiple use of performance measures mitigates the incompleteness of incentive contracts and financial performance measures (Kaplan and Norton, 1996). Moreover, Anderson et al. (2004) indicate that focussing on non-financial measures (e.g. customer satisfaction) increase the shareholder value and therefore the value of the organization. However, when implementing multiple performance measures, it becomes even more essential for subordinates which performance measures are most important. The ‘weighting’ of performance measures is already a form of subjectivity (Ittner et al., 2003).
In addition, subjectivity plays also an important role in the performance evaluation. Organizations prefer to reward their employees based on subjective targets or measures. Subjective measures can be indicated as measures that are not verifiable to a third party (Prendergast, 1999). With subjective measures, organizations are able to control how subordinates allocate their effort in performance measures. If subordinates need to maximize the quantity produced, then the quality produced might decrease due to allocating more effort in maximizing the quantity (Prendergast, 1999). In addition, subjectivity does have multiple common grounds with the agency theory. Lambert (2001) investigated how the contracting theory (a subdivision of the agency theory) could be used in order to solve incentive problems. He argues that performance measurement systems are very important, because these systems affect how people in the organization act. Prendergast (1999) argues that traditional performance measures evoke employees to focus on the “wrong” things, since they need to meet their targets at all costs. With subjectivity, organizations are able to evaluate subordinates in a more ‘total’ picture instead of evaluating just on targets (Prendergast, 1999).
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However, subjectivity has also drawbacks. Moers (2005) and Bol (2011) indicate that in drawing up the contract there is already subjectivity involved, because the number of objective and subjective measures are up to the supervisor. Besides, they argue that supervisors do have a kind of performance evaluation bias and evaluate subjective measures based on preferences. The influence of preferences does create uncertainty for subordinates, since the performance evaluation is based on the discretion of the impression of the supervisor (Prendergast, 1999; Fiske, Morling and Stevens, 1996). Subjectivity could also lead to favouritism since it is based on the preferences of the supervisor (Prendergast and Topel, 1993). Supervisors are able to evaluate their favoured subordinates as good as possible in order to maximize the likelihood that they will get promoted (Bjerke et al., 1987). In addition, subjective measures enable supervisors to manipulate the assessments of subordinates, for example to save on wages and therefore undervalue the performance of subordinates (Prendergast, 1999). Thus, if subordinates are not favoured by their supervisor, they might not get promoted or do not get a higher wage.
Employees of an organization want to feel valued and appreciated by the firm and their supervisors, since appreciation of an employee is connected to their well-being, success and building trust (Fagley and Adler, 2012). This could be harmed by the uncertainty that is created by subjectivity. Although subjectivity provides risk/uncertainty reduction for subordinates (e.g. sheltering subordinates for uncontrollable events), subordinates tend to be more sensitive to the ‘negative’ uncertainty than towards ‘positive’ uncertainty (Thaler et al., 1997). Every subordinate that is exposed to this ‘negative’ uncertainty, that is related to subjectivity, deals with it differently (Fiske et al., 1996). It could result in less job satisfaction or maybe even in the intention to leave (Scott et al., 1999). Subordinates might consider of quitting their job, because their perception of the performance evaluation is more uncertain and therefore uncertainty might contribute to a negative perception. Bordia et al. (2004) indicate that the level of uncertainty has a positive relation with the intention to leave. In addition, Mitchell et al. (2001) provide evidence that employees quit voluntarily. Thus, employees have actually the intention to leave if they are exposed to uncertainty. Based on this information, this paper focusses on ‘the intention to leave the organization’ to measure the influence of subjectivity on the behaviour of subordinates. Fiske et al. (1996) argue that uncertainty, among other things created by subjective measures, goes together with vulnerability.
Trust
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suggest that when there is a greater trust between the supervisor and the subordinate the outcome of subjectivity is more likely to be positive.
Thus, this research focuses on the relationship between subjectivity in performance evaluation and the intention to leave the organization. Within this relationship, based on Gibbs et al. (2004), trust might mitigate the negative effects of this relationship. The goal of this research is that it tries to provide insights on how subjectivity in performance evaluation is perceived by subordinates and if this results in the intention to leave. The perception depends on what kind of personal trust relation subordinates have with their supervisor.
III. Hypotheses development
Subjectivity in performance evaluation and contracting theory
Subjectivity already comes into play by weighting the measures that are included in the employee’s contract (Ittner et al., 2003). The supervisor has more information about the “weighting” process than the subordinate if this is not noted in the contract. Supervisors decide on their interpretation if all measures are equally important or some measures more important. Transparency of the “weighting” process becomes even more important for subordinates when using multiple (subjective) performance measures. When using multiple (subjective) performance measures, the incompleteness of incentive contract and financial measures decreases (Kaplan and Norton, 1996). In addition, subjectivity plays a role in the performance evaluation of subordinates. Subjectivity enables supervisors to evaluate based on their preferences which could lead to favouritism in determining the wage or promotion of subordinates (Bjerke et al., 1987; Prendergast and Topel, 1993). Moers (2005) indicates that performance evaluation bias is involved in evaluating subordinates by the supervisor and the perception of the performance differs between the supervisor and subordinates. Based on this, subjectivity leads to more uncertainty for subordinates about their performance evaluation. Uncertainty can be considered as undesirable by anyone to a certain extend based on Hofstede (2009) and Hogg (2000). In addition, uncertainty does also interrelate with vulnerability (Fiske et al., 1996). Subordinates will be more vulnerable when a supervisor has the power to influence the performance evaluation based on their preferences through subjective measures (Gibbs et al., 2004). Although subjectivity also provides ‘positive’ uncertainty for subordinates for changes in the environment, subordinates tend to be more sensitive to the ‘negative’ uncertainty than towards ‘positive’ uncertainty (Thaler et al., 1997).
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the power to determine the contract, because they could offer the agent a contract that is just at the minimum utility. This allows the principal to decide what kind of risks the agent is bearing in contracted period. This does also have an impact on the vulnerability of subordinates, because the utility of subordinates is partially decided by the supervisor. Fischer (2000) argues that the decisions, made by principals, about the level of risk and utility would not be the same as agents would make themselves. Eventually, when the risk/uncertainty is not compensated to the minimum utility of the subordinate, then it leads to disutility (Lambert, 2001).
Subordinates want to be appreciated for what they do for the organization (Fagley and Adler, 2012) and disutility will affect the behaviour of subordinates (Lambert, 2001). The disutility that is evoked by the uncertainty of subjectivity can also have more drastic consequences. Bordia et al. (2004) show evidence that a higher level of uncertainty leads to a higher possibility that subordinates intent to leave the organization. This is based on the fact that uncertainty evokes stress and anxiety and contributes to a low morale of subordinates, which leads to the intention to leave (Bastien, 1987; Johnson et al., 1996). Mitchell et al. (2001) provides evidence that subordinates quit voluntarily.
In conclusion, if supervisors use subjectivity and subjective measures in the performance evaluation, then this leaves space for interpretation and preferences (Prendergast and Topel, 1993). This creates uncertainty and makes subordinates more vulnerable, which might lead to the situation where the supervisor takes advantage of this (Baier, 1986). The level of uncertainty and vulnerability that influences the subordinates, will lead to disutility (Lambert, 2001). In addition, the decisions that are made by the supervisor in drawing up the contract, differ from the decisions that subordinates would have made themselves (Fischer, 2000). This implies that there is a difference in perception and interpretation between supervisors and subordinates in drawing up and evaluating the contract. Eventually, disutility influences the behaviour of subordinates which could be expressed by the intention to leave the organization (Mitchell et al., 2001). Therefore, the uncertainty and vulnerability that is associated with subjectivity in the performance evaluation, leads to the intention to leave (Scott et al., 1999). Thus, I hypothesize that:
H1: The presence of subjectivity in performance evaluation is positively related to the intention to leave
the organization.
Trust
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with trust when there is a hierarchical relationship between two parties (Mayer et al,.1995; Rousseau et al., 1998; Nienaber et al., 2015). An important aspect of trust is that the trustor (e.g. supervisor) does not take advantage of the vulnerability of the trustee (e.g. subordinate; Bews, and Rossouw, 2002).
Gibbs et al. (2004) argue that when there is a greater trust between the supervisor and the subordinate, the outcome of subjectivity is more likely to be positive. Trust establishes norms and expectations about appropriate behaviour and lowering the perception of risk in the exchange (Dyer and Singh,1998, p. 671). Risk can be related to uncertainty, because risk is when the probability of possible outcomes that are known and uncertainty is when the probability of possible outcomes is not known (Tversky and Fox, 1995). In addition, risk is related to vulnerability, because the more a person is willing to be vulnerable, the more risk that person takes (Lin et al., 2003). This is based on the fact that vulnerability relates to the possibility that supervisors take advantage of the subordinate’s vulnerability (Bews and Rossouw, 2002). Thus, if subordinates have a higher level of trust in their supervisors, subsequently they are more willing to be vulnerable (Gillespie and Mann, 2004).
In conclusion, a trust relationship can mitigate the risk that is perceived by subordinates with subjectivity in performance evaluation (Gibbs et al., 2004). This is based on the fact that a higher level of trust increases the willingness of being vulnerable and lowers the perception of risk that is associated with subjectivity (Gillespie and Mann, 2004). This will result in subordinates that are accepting the uncertainty and vulnerability that are associated with subjectivity due to a higher level of trust. Trust creates positive expectations of the supervisor by subordinates and they expect that the supervisor will not take advantage of their vulnerability (Mayer et al,.1995). Therefore, subordinates will have less intention to leave, because the negative effect of uncertainty and vulnerability that is associated with subjectivity decreases when they have a higher level of trust in their supervisor. Thus, I hypothesize that:
H2: With a high level of trust, the relationship between the presence of subjectivity in performance
evaluation and the intension to leave the organization is less positive.
Conceptual model
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FIGURE 1
Conceptual model: subjectivity and the intention to leave
IV.
Methodology
Research approach & data collection
This research has a quantitative, theory testing design. This is based on the fact that this research tests hypotheses from the world of theories in the empirical world and investigates a relationship between variables that is based on theories. This is a deductive way of testing, because my reasoning is based on theories from the academic literature and I operationalize the theories in the empirical world
(Morse, 2003). In addition, this research uses a survey as data collection method. The reason for using a survey is based on the fact that the desired information is based on perceptions. The perception of people is not collectable through archival data. In addition, the research uses an online survey instead of a ‘paper’ survey. This decision is based on the development of digitalization. Almost every segment is using the internet for communication and information. Besides, an online survey is easier to distribute at certain groups or population which are difficult to access (Wright, 2005). Based on these arguments, I use a web-based online survey called Qualtrics.
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to all subordinates. This realized a response of 9 out of 12, but 2 respondents did not fill out the survey for 95% who were eliminated. Thus, GEON BV contributed 7 respondents for the sample with a non-response of 3. Afterwards, I tried to focus on several more organizations, but this resulted only in one or two responses per organization. To collect more responses, I distributed the survey among several unrandomized persons (acquaintances) with a total of 43. I collected 36 additional respondents and total of 5 respondents did not fill out the survey for at least 95%. This adds up to an additional 31 respondents with a non-response of 7. The total respondents that will be used as the sample for the analyses is 54 out of 66 respondents, with a non-response of 12 and a response rate of around 85%. All organizations, where the respondents work, are located in The Netherlands. The sample consists only of employees which are working at the operational level. This implies that they have a supervisor who assesses them explicitly on their performance. I did not focus on the employees at the management level or above, because employees at the lower level of the organization have different characteristics than employees at management level. Accordingly, I am not able to provide support that the literature about the operational level does also apply to higher levels in the organization, for example CEO’s or directors. As mentioned, the data for all the variables that are included in this research will be collected through an online survey.
The items of the survey will be analysed through a factor analysis to determine the respective constructs based on the factor loading of the items (discriminant validity). It means: ‘the extent to which a construct is truly distinct from other constructs by empirical standards’. Each variable of interest will conduct an own factor analysis. It could be the case that items do not measures the respective construct which indicates that those items are not reliable and valid to use in further analyses (Lau and Scully, 2015). Fornell and Larcker (1981) suggests that a factor loading above 0.4 is acceptable, because items with a Likert scale from 1 to 5 are not perfectly measured. If the factor loading of an item is below 0.4, it will not be used in further analyses. The items that are above 0.4 and load on the same factor will form the respective constructs. Based on the value of the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy test, which should be bigger than 0.5, I am able to argue if the items are ‘factor analysable’. Afterwards, I will access the Cronbach alpha to ensure the internal consistency reliability of each respective construct. The Cronbach alpha “provides an estimate of the reliability based on the intercorrelations of the observed indicator variables” (Hair et al., 2014, p. 101). Nunnally et al. (1967) recommends a threshold of 0.7 to ensure the internal consistency reliability.
Measurement
Independent variable. As illustrated in the conceptual model, subjectivity in performance evaluation
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two categories to measure subjectivity in performance evaluations; to what extend subjective and objective measures are used, and how important these measures are in the performance evaluation, which can be described as the weighting of the performance measures.
The first items (SUB1-SUB2) are about how much knowledge the subordinate has about their own performance evaluation. These items are included because it is important that the respondent knows to a certain extent their performance evaluation process, otherwise it can be questioned if the outcomes of this respondent are reliable. The respondents rated the items on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 – strongly disagree to 5 – strongly agree. A higher score indicates a higher level of knowledge and objectivity.
The items 3 till 11 are based on the two categories mentioned by Moers (2005). The respondents need to indicate which performance measures are used (SUB3-SUB10). The first three items are objective performance measures (SUB3-SUB5) such as ‘Performance compared to the budget’ (Moers, 2005) and ‘Number of sales’ (Baker et al., 1994). A higher score indicates a higher level of objectivity. Therefore, the scores on the items (SUB1-SUB5) will be reversed, since I want to measure subjectivity instead of objectivity. This implies that, for the reversed scores, a higher score indicates more frequent use of subjectivity. In addition, I also want to measure if they are evaluated on subjective performance measures (SUB6-SUB10) such as ‘Innovative solutions’ and ‘Quality improvement’ (Baker et al., 1994). The respondents rated the use of the performance measures on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 – strongly disagree to 5 – strongly agree. These items relate to the definition of subjectivity itself, since more frequent use of subjective measures creates a bigger opportunity for the supervisor to evaluate in a subjective way. A higher score indicates a more frequent use of subjective measures. Besides, Ittner et al. (2003) argue that the process of weighting the performance measures is also a form of subjectivity, since very often it is not clear which performance measures are most important. Therefore, it is up to the supervisors if measures are equally important or some measures are more important. The respondents needed to indicate if they know which measures are most important (SUB11) rated on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 – strongly disagree to 5 – strongly agree. This is in line with the definition of subjectivity, because without a weighting process, the weighting will be up to the judgement of the supervisor. A higher score indicates transparency and objectivity. Based on meaning of the outcome, I will also reverse the scores of SUB11, because I want to measure subjectivity instead of objectivity.
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indicates that they are more evaluated on their competences and subsequently more evaluated in a subjective way. Table 1 shows the items for the independent variable.
Table 1
‘Subjectivity in performance evaluation’ items
Item SUB1 I know at which fundamentals I am assessed upon.
SUB2 I am evaluated on specific performance measures.
SUB3 I am evaluated on the criterium ‘Performance compared to the budget’.
SUB4 I am evaluated on the criterium ‘Absence percentage’.
SUB5 I am evaluated on the criterium ‘Quantities’, such as sales.
SUB6 I am evaluated on the criterium ‘Quality improvement’.
SUB7 I am evaluated on the criterium ‘Contribution to innovative solutions’.
SUB8 I am evaluated on the criterium ‘Makes use of available resources’.
SUB9 I am evaluated on the criterium ‘Involvement in the organization’.
SUB10 I am evaluated on the criterium ‘My reliability in the organization’.
SUB11 I know which performance measures are most important.
SUB12 I am evaluated on my competences.
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Factor analysis & Cronbach Alpha of subjectivity
Factor 1 Factor 2 Cronbach Alpha Subjectivity in performance evaluation (SUB) SUB1 -0.467 0.139 SUB2 -0.051 0.585 SUBI: SUB3 -0.084 0.599 0.629 SUB4 0.256 0.355 SUB5 0.039 0.602 SUB6 0.221 -0.438 SUB7 0.168 -0.545 SUB8 0.542 -0.289 SUBII: SUB9 0.896 0.166 0.726 SUB10 0.697 -0.037 SUB11 -0.603 -0.045 SUB12 -0.068 -0.468
Dependent variable. The dependent variable is intention to leave the organization (ITL). The intention
to leave can be defined as ‘the extent to which subordinates intended to leave’ (Johnsrud et al., 2000).
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‘Intention to leave’ items
Item ITL1 In my current employment I did apply for a new job.
ITL2 I am actively searching for another job right now.
ITL3 I will probably look for a new job in the next year.
ITL4 I often think about quitting.
The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy test (value: 0.761) indicates that the items of intention to leave are ‘factor analysable’. Table 4 shows the results of the factor analysis of the intention to leave. The factor indicates the respective construct of the dependent variable intention to leave. All item loadings are above 0.4 and load on intention to leave which implies that the respective construct consists of ITL1 till ITL4. The respective construct will be calculated by the mean. In addition, the Cronbach Alpha is 0.801, thus I can ensure the internal consistency reliability of this respective construct.
Table 4
Factor analysis & Cronbach Alpha of the intention to leave
Factor 1 Cronbach Alpha Intention to leave (ITL) 0.801 ITL1 0.560 ITL2 0.689 ITL3 0.769 ITL4 0.858
Moderating variable. The moderating variable is trust (TR). Trust can be defined as ‘accepted
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and Tan, 2006; Otley, 1978; Ross, 1994). The four items (TR1-TR4) are rated on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 – not at all to 5 – very often. A higher score indicates a higher level of trust. Table 5 shows the four-items instrument by Read (1962).
Table 5 ‘Trust’ items
Item
TR1 To which extent will the supervisor take advantage of opportunities to further your interests?
TR2 To which extent do you feel free to discuss problems with your supervisor without fearing for your position?
TR3 To which extent do you feel that your supervisor will keep you fully informed about things that might concern to you?
TR4 To which extent do you trust that your supervisors’ decisions are justified by other considerations whenever the supervisors make decisions against your interests?
The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy test (value: 0.674) shows that the items of trust are ‘factor analysable’. Table 6 shows the results of the factor analysis of trust. The factor is indicating the respective construct of trust. The respective construct of trust consists of items TR1 till TR4 and will be calculated by taking the mean. In addition, the Cronbach Alpha is 0.800, thus I can ensure the internal consistency reliability of this respective construct.
Table 6
Factor analysis & Cronbach Alpha of trust
Factor 1 Cronbach Alpha Trust (TR) 0.800 TR1 0.758 TR2 0.526 TR3 0.650 TR4 0.999
Control variables. Based on the literature, there are variables that have an impact on the intention to
leave. Prior studies that investigated the intention to leave used multiple control variables such as age, gender, job tension, education, tenure of the supervisor, job satisfaction and firm size (Chan et al., 2013;
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Secondly, Miller and Wheeler (1992) show that there is a significant relationship between gender and intention to leave, whereas women are more likely to intend to leave or actually leave. Although gender explains only two percent of the variance in intention to leave (Miller and Wheeler, 1992), it is included as a control variable.
In addition, some researchers have shown evidence that job tension, such as stress and anxiety have an impact on the intention to leave. They argue that a higher job tension is related to a higher intention to leave (Fakunmoju et al., 2010; Villanueva and Djurkovic, 2009).
Fourthly, education should also be considered as a control variable because it has a relationship with the intention to leave. A higher education level has a positive effect on the intention to leave (Mrayyan, 2005; Sourdif, 2004).
Besides, the tenure of the supervisor has a positive correlation with job satisfaction (Bedeian et al., 1992). Although job satisfaction is not the totally same as the intention to leave, I include the tenure of the supervisor as a control variable. This is based on the fact that job satisfaction is highly associated with the intention to leave (Hellman, 1997).
In addition, some papers provided support for the relationship between job satisfaction and the intention to leave. A lower job satisfaction will result in a higher intention to leave (Harrington et al., 2001; Strolin-Goltzman et al., 2007).
Also, firm size will be included as a control variable. Although it has not been proved yet that there is a direct relationship between firm size and the intention to leave. But firm size has a negative relationship on job satisfaction (Tansel and Gazîoğlu, 2014) which is correlated with the intention to leave (Hellman, 1997). Besides, firm size has an influence on the culture in the firm (e.g. bureaucracy, hierarchy) and other organizational characteristics (Hope, 2003) which might influence the intention to leave.
Lastly, Hellman (1997) indicates that employees in the private sector leave an organization quicker than employees in the public sector. However, the difference of sectors has not been considered in previous papers regarding the intention to leave. But I will include the sector of the organization as in the private or public sector. This is included as a (dummy) control variable (0; public, 1; private) based on the evidence provided by Hellman (1997).
Method of analysis
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the appropriate constructs. Besides, I will conduct a statistical analysis in order to test the relationship between the constructs through a multiple hierarchical regression analysis. Based on this analysis, I can determine if there is a relation between the variables and if there is a moderating effect.
V.
Results
Descriptive statistics & correlations
Based on the results of the factor analysis, I am able to determine the items that are included in the respective constructs that will be used in further analyses. Table 7 shows the descriptive statistics of the respective constructs and control variables. Table 7 indicates that subordinates in the sample have a mean of intention to leave of 2.54 on a scale from 1 to 5. Besides, the tenure of the supervisor has a relatively high standard deviation. This might be caused by the respondents of GEON BV, because some of them have their supervisor already 24 years. Lastly, respondents indicate that they trust their supervisor with a mean of 3.42 on a scale from 1 to 5.
Table 7
Descriptive statistics
Mean Median Range SD
Variables SUBI 3.00 3.00 3.33 0.777 SUBII 3.86 4.00 3.00 0.626 ITL 2.54 2.38 4.00 0.972 TR 3.42 3.50 3.00 0.695 Control variables Age 3.00 3.00 3.00 0.673 Gender 1.22 1.00 1.00 0.420 Job tension 2.52 2.33 3.33 0.720 Education 3.89 3.00 6.00 1.690 Tenure of supervisor 3.26 1.00 23.00 4.885 Job satisfaction 5.44 5.60 4.40 0.906 Firm size 3.50 4.00 3.00 0.863 Sector 0.87 1.00 1.00 0.339 N = 54
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The results of table 8 indicate a strong and significant correlation between subjectivity (SUBI) and trust. It seems that when there is more subjectivity involved in the performance evaluation, the trust in the supervisor decreases. In paper, trust is included as a moderator, however this indicates that there is also a direct relationship between subjectivity and trust. In addition, there is a correlation between trust and intention to leave. If trust in the supervisor increases, it is likely that the intention to leave decreases. It makes sense that if subordinates do not expect that their supervisor takes advantage of their vulnerability, that it would result in less intention to leave. Lastly, if job tension increases then the intention to leave also increases. If subordinates experience more stress and anxiety in their job and relations with their colleagues and organization, they tend to have more intention to leave. In the end, the table does not indicate that the constructs of subjectivity have a significant positive correlation with the intention to leave. However, SUBI does show some significant correlations with other variables such as education and tenure of supervisor.
The table provides also some unexpected correlations. For example, subordinates with a higher education level tend to have less job tension. It could be the case that subordinates with a higher degree are better able to structure their work, build up a relation with their colleagues and organization in order to avoid stress and anxiety. Besides, the table indicates a significant positive correlation between trust and job satisfaction. If subordinates trust their supervisor, they tend to be more satisfied with their job. It could be the case that subordinates feel more appreciated when they have a personal trust relationship with their supervisor, which contribute to a higher job satisfaction.
Multiple regression analysis
21 Table 9
Hierarchical multiple regression analysis for the interactions of subjectivity in performance evaluation and trust in intention to leave
Dependent variable: intention to leave
Model Expect (0) (1) (2) (3) (4) Subjectivity I (+) -0.061 (0.159) 0.225 (0.171) 0.164 (0.182) 0.252 (0.173) Subjectivity II (+) -0.123 (0.187) 0.033 (0.175) 0.055 (0.177) -0.059 (0.196) SUBI x TR (-) -0.179 (0.180) SUBII x TR (-) -0.287 (0.273) Trust -0.778*** (0.177) -0.563** (0.210) -0.473* (0.222) -0.442 (0.225) -0.475* (0.222) Age -0.353* (0.173) -0.364* (0.175) -0.369* (0.175) -0.390* (0.176) Gender -0.280 (0.285) -0.287 (0.288) -0.230 (0.293) -0.262 (0.288) Job tension 0.421* (0.181) 0.504* (0.194) 0.460* (0.199) 0.495* (0.194) Education -0.040 (0.068) -0.074 (0.073) -0.073 (0.073) -0.071 (0.073) Tenure of supervisor 0.009 (0.026) 0.013 (0.026) 0.010 (0.026) 0.017 (0.026) Job satisfaction -0.148 (0.158) -0.123 (0.160) -0.148 (0.162) -0.105 (0.161) Firm size 0.017 (0.137) -0.002 (0.138) 0.029 (0.142) -0.003 (0.138) Sector -0.271 (0.386) -0.229 (0.389) -0.223 (0.389) -0.198 (0.390) N 54 54 54 54 54 R2 0.314*** 0.505*** 0.524*** 0.535*** 0.537*** R2 adjusted 0.273*** 0.403*** 0.400*** 0.400*** 0.401*** Standard error estimate 0.823 0.751 0.753 0.753 0.752
(0): model which includes subjectivity and trust as control variable; (1): model which includes controls variables;
(2): model 1 with adding subjectivity;
(3): model 2 with adding the interaction term between SUBI and trust. (4): model 2 with adding the interaction term between SUBII and trust.
22
Model 0 was conducted to see whether subjectivity has an influence on the intention to leave over and above the most important control variable trust. However, the model failed to indicate a significant coefficient between subjectivity and the intention to leave. Model 1 shows that the control variables account significantly for 50.5% of the variance in the intention to leave. Trust, job tension and age were found as significant predictors of the intention to leave. However, other control variables cannot be indicated as significant predictors. In model 2, subjectivity in performance evaluation does not have a significant coefficient on the intention to leave. This implies that subjectivity, in this model, is not a predictor of the intention to leave. But model 2 does contribute to a higher variance of intention to leave compared to model 1. Model 3 shows a significant change in R2 with 1.1% which indicates with a total
of 53.5% of the variance in the intention to leave. However, due to the implementation of the interaction term, trust is no longer a significant predictor. Lastly, model 4 indicates a higher variance in the intention to leave with the interaction term between SUBII and trust compared to the interaction term between SUBI and trust. Model 4 explains 53.7% of the variance in the intention to leave compared to 53.5% in model 3.
VI.
Discussion and conclusion
23
al., 2010). Based on this, the following research question was stated: To what extent is subjectivity in performance evaluation related to the intention to leave the organization and what is the impact of trust on this relationship? Data is collected through an online survey with a total of 66 respondents that are working for different organizations in The Netherlands and are working at the operational level.
The results do not support H1 which was stated as follows: The presence of subjectivity in
performance evaluation is positively related to the intention to leave the organization. The results of the regression are not consistent with the hypothesis which is based on the theory. There might be a potential theoretical reason for this outcome, because this research focussed only on the negative effects of subjectivity. However, as mentioned in the literature, subjectivity is a double-edged sword which implies that it may have positive as well as negative effects on subordinates. Subjective provides also flexibility in the assessment if there were environmental changes which were not foreseen (Gibbs et al., 2004), whereas subjectivity shelters subordinates from unforeseen events and evokes ‘positive’ uncertainty. Thus, subjectivity has not only negative effects on subordinates.This two-sided thinking of subjectivity evokes uncertainty when investigating it, but subjectivity is also based on interpretations and preferences of supervisors and how they deal with subjectivity is personal (Prendergast and Topel, 1993). In addition, I controlled for the sector (public and private sector), but it might be the case that some sectors are less influenced by subjectivity than others. Subjectivity provides also flexibility, but flexibility might be not that important in for instance a production organization and subsequently there might be limited presence of subjectivity. This is in line with Raith (2003) who argues that some sectors are more predictable (e.g. production) than others (e.g. technology), thus it might be the case that the sample mainly consists of organizations which are more predictable. This could result in limited presence of subjectivity and therefore less significant correlations between subjectivity and other variables.
In addition, the results do not provide support for H2 which was stated as follows: with a high
24
In the introduction, the theoretical contribution, practical contribution and managerial implications of this research based on the predictions are mentioned. However, the research fails to support the theoretical concepts. These were based on the influence of the negative effects of subjectivity performance measures on subordinates. The results did not indicate a positive relationship between subjectivity and intention to leave. In addition, the prior stated practical contributions and managerial implications cannot be supported based on the results. These observations might be explained by the fact that I only focused on the negative side of subjectivity, but the subjectivity has also positive effects which are described in the academic world (Gibbs et al., 2004). In addition, I focused on the intention to leave as a proxy for the behaviour of subordinates, but there are many more proxies for the behaviour of subordinates (e.g. pay satisfaction) which might do have a relationship with subjectivity. However, the results do indicate a very important factor for the behaviour of subordinates. This factor is trust which has several significant relationships with the behaviour of subordinates, such as the intention to leave, job tension and job satisfaction. This indicates how important a personal trust relationship is between the subordinate and the supervisor. This observation is a confirmation for supervisors to invest in the relationship with their subordinates.
This study has some (methodological) limitations. Firstly, the generalizability of the research is arguable. The research focusses on the employees at the operational level of organizations. However, it might be more difficult for a CEO or a director to leave their position because organizations have less positions for those functions. Based on this, it might be more difficult for a CEO or director to find a new job at the same position. Thus, the likelihood of leaving the organization might be influenced by the position the subordinate occupies in the organization. Secondly, I did not take into account all the demographic data of the respondents in the survey. For example, ethnicity of subordinates is a significant predictor of trust in the supervisor (Krosgaard et al., 2002). This might have an impact on the 5-point Likert scale, whereas Chinese people might fill out less positive (e.g. 4 on 5-point scale) in a positive situation than American people (e.g. 5 on 5-point scale) in the same situation (Lee and Seligman, 1997). Lastly, this research controlled for the sector where the organizations are active. However, the composition of the sample might show a distorted picture of the distinction between the private and public sector. The sample consists of 66 respondents, whereas 30 respondents are only originating from two different organizations (Gasunie and GEON BV) in the private sector. This implies that the other 36 respondents do not have a big influence on the sector, since almost 50% of the respondents are already labelled as private sector.
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