United or divided? The framing of the Egyptian 2013 summer protests by Al Jazeera, BBC and CNN

MA Thesis – J. Plante

United or divided?

The framing of the Egyptian 2013 summer

protests by Al Jazeera, BBC and CNN

Rijksuniversiteit Groningen Jolien Plante

MA Journalism: Thesis S1806866

Ma. D. Mustata j.plante@student.rug.nl

2

Abstract

3

Table of content

List of Tables and Figures 4.

Introduction 6.

§ 1. Historical Framework 10.

§1.1 Identifying the Arab region 10.

§1.2 The Arab media developments and characteristics 11. §1.3 Television broadcasting in the Arab world: a historical overview 13.

§1.4 Al Jazeera 14.

§ 1.5 The Anglo American media: developments and characteristics 16.

§1.6 The British Auntie: The BBC 19.

§1.7 The first 24/7 news channel: CNN 21.

§1.8 A short overview of the Egyptian uprisings 23.

§ 2. Theoretical Framework 25.

§2.1 Framing 25.

§2.2 Al Jazeera, BBC, and CNN: structure, norms and routines 28.

§2.3.1 The BBC 29.

§2.3.2 Al Jazeera 32.

§2.3.3 CNN 37.

§ 3. Methodology 40.

§3.1 Content analysis: the theoretical approach 40.

§3.2 Sample 41.

§3.3 Research Design 43.

§4. Findings 50.

§4.1 Results quantitative analysis 50.

§4.2 Results framing analysis 61. §4.3 Results qualitative analysis 67.

Discussion 75.

Conclusion 79.

References 80.

Appendix A 84.

4

List of Tables and Figures

Tables

Table 3.1 – Page 42

Featuring an overview of the scheduled points of research for the quantitative analysis.

Table 3.2 – Page 43

Featuring an overview of the proposed main frames used in this study and their description.

Table 3.3 – Page 44

Featuring an overview of the description of the different aspects of the issue the frame refers to.

Table 3.4 – Page 44

Featuring an overview and description of the different focuses the video items can have.

Table 3.5 – Page 46

Featuring an overview and explanation of the studied audiovisual aspects in the textual analysis.

Table 4.1 – Page 48

Featuring the average duration numbers of the items.

Table 4.2 – Page 49

Featuring the total number of videos broadcasted by the news outlets.

Table 4.3 – Page 51

Featuring the number of items with a news anchor.

Table 4.4 – Page 51

Featuring the ratio of number of broadcasted items and available reporters per news outlet.

Table 4.5 – Page 53

Featuring facts and figures about the use of reporters.

Table 4.6 – Page 56

Featuring an overview of the subjects portrayed by the broadcasters and the number of items portraying these subjects.

Table 4.7 – Page 58

Featuring an overview of the journalistic genres used by the broadcasters and their numbers.

Table 4.8 – Page 61

Featuring the additional third frames and their description.

Table 4.9 – Page 61

5 Featuring an overview of the used secondary frames per broadcaster

Table 4.11 – Page 63

Featuring an overview of the additional third frames

Table 4.12 – Page 63

Featuring an overview of the aspect of the issue the frame refers to

Table 4.13 – Page 64

Featuring an overview of the focus of the video item.

Figures

Figure 4.1 – Page 49

Shows the differences in duration between the broadcasters and the total amount of items within a certain duration time span.

Figure 4.2 – Page 50

6

Introduction

‘Millions flood Egypt’s streets and demand Morsi’s withdrawal’ stated headlines all over the world on June 30 2013. Just like in the spring of 2011, all eyes were on Egypt and its protesters, who demanded the resignation of their latest president Mohammed Morsi. According to the Egyptian Armed Forces, more than 14 million people marched the streets, making the demonstration one of the biggest in world history.

The protests continued the following day with part of the police forces demonstrating alongside the protesters. Through the streets of Egypt the words ‘The police and the people are one’ were scanted. The protests were planned and organized by Tamarod, a grassroot movement that selected signatures in a bid to remove Morsi from his presidency. Goal was to fulfill this wish peacefully by the end of June. On the 30th _{of June millions of Egyptians responded to Tamarods request and took to the}

streets. The proposed peaceful demonstrations however quickly turned violent, injuring hundreds of demonstrators.

On the first of July Tamarod issued an ultimatum, stating that Morsi had until 5 p.m. the following day to resign. This ultimatum was followed by another 48-hour ultimatum from Egypt’s armed forces, who argued that the political parties needed to follow the demands of its people. If not, the armed forces would interfere. The whole world held its breath. Would Morsi follow the demands? And if not what would the consequences be for the already unstable region?

On the second of July the demonstrations turned into clashes between opposing parties, leaving eighteen Egyptians dead. As the ultimatum slowly reached its ending point, tension rose on the streets of Egypt. That evening after the passing of the ultimatum, president Morsi addressed on national television that “he would defend the legitimacy of his elected office with his life”. The following morning gunmen opened fire on pro-Morsi protesters injuring over 200 and leaving 16 dead. The proposed peaceful demonstrations again turned into deadly clashes.

As the ultimatum of the Egyptian army approached tension rose again. What would happen in Egypt? Were the already violent protests turning into a civil war? What would the Egyptian army do once the ultimatum had passed? Right before the surpassing of the deadline it became clear that president Morsi was prepared to form a consensus government. Later that evening, the Egyptian army announced that Morsi’s reign had come to an end. A military coup was thereby set in motion.

In the aftermath of the coup violent clashes continued, leaving many mainly pro-Morsi supporters injured or dead. Egypt stayed centre of much international broadcasting in the months following the coup. The images of the protests were shown in every living room in the world. If everyone however saw the same image can be called in question.

7 portray a particular side of a certain event, thereby fulfilling an important and powerful role in the image-forming of that event, or as Major and Coleman (2008) describe: “the contemporary mass media have the capability to emphasize the significance of certain issues while downplaying others”.

News thus is not a window of reality to the world, but shows only particular aspects of an event while downplaying others (Strömback et al., 2008). This argument is the core of the theoretical concept of framing. The most common definition of the concept of framing is the one given by Entman (1993) describing framing as “to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation.” Concluding, framing theory thus generally tries to explain why news events are portrayed differently in the media.

The necessity and importance of framing studies can be found when addressing the consequences of framing. According to Gramson & Modigliani (1987) frames are organizing ideas which not only inform but also shape the public discussion about a certain event. Framing studies for that reason are important, because they can lay bare the frames used by media to describe a news event and thereby create awareness that news is not a mirror of reality, but that there are several interpretations of one event. Framing studies therefore are especially useful for the study of an international news event like the Egyptian protests, because it exposes the differences between broadcasts of multiple nations covering the same topic, and make the audience aware that there are more sides to a story than the one that is presented to them by their media.

Many traditional framing studies focus on exposing the frames used by the media during a particular news event. Most of these studies however give insight to the frames that the media employed to describe this particular event and do not offer an explanation why they chose to do so. According to Pan & Kosicki (1993), the news discourse of which framing is an element is influenced by the shared values and beliefs of a society. Other scholars like Schoemaker and Reese (1996) and Halinn and Mancini (2004), argue that there are several other factors like the political and cultural climate and the journalistic norms and routines that are decisive elements in the adaption of media frames. For this reason it is likely that media framing will vary among regions and countries.

A comparative framing research focusing on an international news event like the Egyptian protests whereby the influential factors in the framing process are included, might not only expose different use of frames, but probably offers an explanation to why media possibly portray the same event differently. If the analyzed media content employs identical frames to portray the protests it might indicate the scale of influence of the aforementioned factors of news making.

8 research will consist of a cross national comparative framing analysis of the Egyptian summer protests of 2013.

This research focuses mainly on television broadcasting because it enables the analysis of both textual and visual elements that are significant in the portrayal of a specific event. Furthermore, television broadcasts are easily traceable, come with high quantity and are watched by millions of people, which makes it not only an interesting but also justifiable medium to investigate. The broadcasters subjected in this research are: Al Jazeera, the BBC and CNN.

First of all, a cross comparative framing analysis of the selected news outlets compares non-western with western broadcasting. Since the Egyptian protest took place in the Arab region it is interesting to analyze how the demonstrations were portrayed from both an Arab perspective as well as a Western perspective. Besides, all of the three selected media organizations operate in different countries and although CNN and the BBC both are western oriented news organizations, they operate in different media landscapes and have a contrasting organizational structure (Shoemaker & Reese et al., 1996). Al Jazeera is an interesting choice of research because it has been subject of much controversy throughout the years, mainly because of its ties with the Qatari rulers (Da Lage et al., 1999). Besides this, the network is an Arab based broadcaster with significant western influences which might shine through in its broadcasting (Zayani and Sahraoui et al., 2007).

The foundation of this thesis is a central research question that acts as the cornerstone throughout this thesis: How were the Egyptian protests of 30 June until 30 July 2013 framed by Al Jazeera, BBC and CNN and what does this say about the environment in which these broadcasters operate? To answer this main question several sub questions are formed with each contributing in answering the main question.

- In which political, cultural and media landscape do the news organizations operate and how does this influence their broadcasting?

- What are the journalistic norms and values of the selected news organizations? - In which way do the three news organizations present their information about the

Egyptian demonstrations?

- What are the differences in frames the news organizations selected for their item? The first two of these sub questions are answered with the help of an extensive literature study and make up the first two chapters of this thesis. Thereby a historical framework is provided which put the selected broadcasters and the media landscape in which they operate into context. The third and the fourth sub question are researched in the second part consisting of a combined textual and content analysis including both quantitative as well as qualitative aspects of research. In this section, the items broadcasted by the selected news outlets in the period between the 30th _{of June and the}

30th _{of July 2013 are analyzed with the help of a coding scheme. The quantitative}

9 theoretical and the analytical part of the thesis are united to answer the main research question.

To provide a clear structure, the thesis has been subdivided into several chapters. Chapter one consists of the historical framework. With the help of an extensive literature study the historical development of both the media landscape as well the media organizations self is addressed. Besides this, an overview is given of the main developments and events in the Egyptian uprisings since it started in the spring of 2011. The historical framework section is followed by a theoretical framework chapter in which the key theoretical concepts are outlined. Both of these sections lay bare any differences and similarities between the factors that are of influence in the news making process and form a theoretical foundation upon which the research is based.

10

§1. Historical Framework

In this chapter the development of the three selected media broadcasters is discussed. This section further presents details of the central conflict covered by this thesis, the Egypt uprisings. To understand how and why the news organizations operate as they do, a historical context of both the media landscape as well as the organization itself is provided. As stated in the introduction depiction of these elements is paramount because they can clarify why the broadcasters might choose a different way of framing the Egyptian protests.

§1.1

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Before going into detail about the development of the Arab media landscape we need to define what we consider to be the Arab world. As Mellor and Rugh (2005) state, there is no ‘clear-cut term’ that describes the Arab identity. Most researchers however agree upon a definition that addresses some aspect of the shared Arabic language, that causes a sense of belonging together between the Arab states. According to Mellor this shared language and religion causes the “classification of the region as such” (2005: 59). This shared mother tongue makes transmitting messages easier and thus facilitates the spreading of media publications (Abu Bahr et al., 1985).

Although the shared language is classified as the key element of being part of the Arab region, there are other factors that contribute to the classification of being Arab. Although there is no formality in the definition, most researchers agree upon the following description given by Hopkins & Ibrahim: “The Arab world consists of those who speak the Arabic language, identify themselves as Arabs and are nationals or residents of member countries of the League of Arab states” (2003: 133).

The term Arab does not specifically refer to a particular race or religion, but can be better defined as a geographical entity where people of different ethnic origin and religion live together. There are however some significant similarities that connect these countries like a shared language and historical background. One of the other contributing elements of the Arab identity is the strong feeling of ‘belonging together’ that the Arabs share (Hopkins & Ibrahim, 2003). This shared feeling has resulted in a strong sense of nationalism in both the Arab countries as such, but also in the region as a whole, which is called Pan Arabism (Abu Bahr et al., 1985). There prevails a strong feeling of ‘us against the world’ which explains the strong opposition against any foreign involvement in the region.

11 system like e.g. democratic way of ruling on non-Western states, thereby surpassing the fact that these countries often have gone through a completely different historical development and might not even be suitable for the western style of ruling. After all, we have seen what chaos the Arab Spring has created.

This interesting tug of war between on the one hand Arab nationalism and Western superiority is one of the key differences between both societies and therefore could also play a distinguishing role in news matters which are of huge importance to both regions. The Egyptian uprising is, seen the important and strategic role of the country in the Arab region a typical example.

What the countries in the Arab region further share is their relatively low score on the so-called freedom index of Freedom House. According to this American organization, “the Arab countries are behind others in political rights and civil liberties” (Freedom House, 2005). This lack of freedom has determined the development of the Arab society and has played a significant role in the development of the Arab media landscape which will be thoroughly discussed in the next paragraph.

Although the Arab states have significant shared factors that connect them, there are almost as many differences that set them apart, one of them being their economic prosperity. While the oil rich countries like the United Arab Emirates are rolling in their oil money, countries like Yemen are known for their high poverty rates. And although the region is known for its authoritarian regimes and lack of democracy one cannot lump them together. To make research more clarifying the Arab region therefore often is divided into three geopolitical entities namely North Africa (Libya, Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria); The Nile Valley (Sudan, Egypt) and the Asian Arab countries (Syria, Jordan, Palestine, Lebanon, Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf), the latter in whom Qatar, the home country of Al Jazeera is also categorized (Mellor, 2005).

The lack of economic prosperity and political freedom played a key role in the development of the Arab media landscape which can be noticed until today. Therefore, a better understanding of how this media landscape came into existence is important and will be discussed in the next paragraph.

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The development of the Arab media has from the start been dominated by strict political control. Even the first Arab newspapers to appear were not private, but official government publications that served as a propaganda tool. “The Arab media has since its dawn been linked to politics. Firstly because it served its settlers and later the aims of the nationalists” (cited by McFadden, 1953: 58). Over time the media have thus been used by the regimes as a powerful propaganda weapon with as goal to mobilize public opinion in their countries. The Arab media thereby distinguish themselves from western media, who from an early start at least experienced some form of press freedom.

12 instability that has troubled the region. For decades, the Arab world has been dominated by colonialism and conflicts (Mellor, 2005). After the colonial reign of Britain and France came to an end, the control over the media further intensified. The newly established governments justified their increasing influence by explaining that “their newly independent nations faced overwhelming external and internal problems requiring unity purposefulness and a minimum of dissent in the public debate” (city by Rugh, 2004: 15).

In the 1950s the regimes used their newly independent status and the continuing internal and external struggles as justification for controlling the media. By regulating the media, the authorities could create the longed for stability and unity in their countries. This intensification of government control on the media can be mainly explained by the Arab-Israeli conflict, which has been occupying the regions politics since the late 1940s (Rugh, 2004). In this context Rugh explains that “Arab governments have been able to justify explicitly and implicitly their influence over the mass media as necessary either while the country is ‘at war’ with Israel, or politically confronting Israel’s policies” (2004: 17). Leaders thus took advance of the political instability of the region to control the media.

Dominating the media was further moderated due to the weak economic base of Arab media. From the beginning, Arab media lacked two crucial factors that are necessary for a mature development; advertising revenues and mass circulation (Chapman, 2005). Reasons for the limited presence of these factors are the high illiteracy, small populations and low national incomes. Even after World War II, when the media became more and more important for the newly established regimes, advertising revenues remained insufficient (Mellor, 2005).

Many media companies were therefore forced to rely on the subsidies provided by the ruling regimes, which in turn were eager to do so and used the media to promote their political interests and censure sensitive subjects. An independent fourth estate like in the West for this reason never developed. These circumstances have formed the Arab media landscape and illustrate to what extend political instability can contribute to the development of fundamental parts of society like the media.

As a result of the economic weakness and political control in the region, the journalistic profession until today cannot be compared to that of the West. Is this a bad thing? From a western perspective it looks so. One could on the other hand also argue that the Arab media landscape fits the Arab society as a whole since it has arose from this. One only has to bear in mind that the standpoint of many Arabs towards the media is different than in the west, for example the credibility of the media of which many are suspicious.

Consequently, the so-called shillas are very important. A shilla can be described as a small group of friends and family, that meets regularly to discuss public affairs and private concerns (Rugh, 2004). It are these shillas and not the media that have functioned as a forum to exchange public opinions.

13 knowledge that is provided to the audience. This information revolution has resulted in relatively more independence for the mainstream media, who have become less dependent on government sources.

Furthermore, the rise of the internet has fuelled public debate in the region. More and more Arabs choose the internet and social media like Twitter above the mainstream media, simply because of the lack of credibility from the latter. The shillas therefore are no longer the only possible form of public debate in the Arab society. Internet has given Arab people the opportunity to debate openly about public affairs on forums that are significantly larger than the traditional shillas.

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The development of Arab broadcasting stations in the 1960s and 1970s was similar to other mass mediums. Arab authorities quickly notified the power of the media as a communication tool that could, unlike the newspaper, reach the illiterate masses. Besides this, costs for broadcasting were significantly higher than that of other media and since advertising revenues were still low, television stations soon became dependable on government funding and were put under strict government control (Mellor, 2005).

Newly established broadcasters in the Persian Gulf followed the path of the British public service model. Many non-Arab journalists were thereby hired to fill the shortage of journalists in the region. Through these journalists, the television stations were put in touch with western traditions of journalism. Due to their oil generated wealth, the Gulf States were able to create what Rinawi calls “the most technically advanced broadcasting stations in the Arab region” (2011: 87).

Why the Arab states did follow the path of state controlled television? As mentioned above the broadcasters did not have much choice since their financial revenues were too low to operate independently. They were received with open arms by the authorities, who saw television as the tool to create national homogeneity in their countries, while privatized broadcasting stations might only provoke the already tensed situation in the region. Another aspect that contributed to the strict government control was the minimal geopolitical influence of the United States in the area. As a result, Arab states did not come in contact with the commercial model of American broadcasting, and were instead led by the public broadcasting system of their former colonial rulers (Rinawi, 2011).

During the decades that followed the formative stage of television broadcasting (1970s-1980s), no significant changes were made in the organizational structure. Arab television stations continued to operate without financial and editorial independence and remained reliable on subsidies. Television organizations continued to function as the propaganda machine of the ruling elite, with the heads of the companies often directly appointed by the nation’s leaders (Rinawi, 2011).

14 player, The Middle Eastern Broadcasting Company (MBC) was founded in September 1991. With the launch of this station, the Arab world was provided with its first independent 24-hour Pan-Arab satellite station. MBC brought a lot of changes into the Arab broadcasting world; not only did they introduce the area with (western) entertainment, MBC was also more professional in its program offerings (Ayish, 2011). During the 1990s and the beginning of the 21th century many private television broadcasters followed in the footsteps of MBC, of which Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya are most well-known. New communication technologies, economic privatization and relative political liberalization made this so-called satellite revolution possible (Ayish, 1997). The commercialization of Arab TV and the increasing growth of satellite television lead to the generation of a Pan-Arab audience, an audience that looked beyond its nation’s border. It further resulted as Krawdy states: “to a severe change in the way that media programmers, advertisers and politicians conceived the Arab audience” (2002: 5). Due to the rise of the amount of broadcasters and viewers the region became more attractive to programmers and advertisers.

Although there have been some drastic changes in the Arab media sphere since the introduction of the first private broadcasters, critics state that in reality not that much has changed as it seems at first glance (Fahmy, Wanta and Nisbet et. al., 2012). Indeed there seems to be another side to this seemingly success story. Despite the fact that on paper the networks operate privately, critics state that the influence of the political authorities are still present and even the largest networks do not operate fully independent.

To a large extent these critics certainly are right. Even the largest and most influential Pan Arabic broadcaster Al Jazeera still not operates independently. But what critics forget is that western media have had ages to develop and fight for their independent status. In that light, the development which the Arab media have gone through in the recent decades is huge, but still cannot be compared to the biggest Western news outlets as the next paragraph will show.

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‘Presenting the view and the other point of view’ is the motto of the well-known Arab broadcasting station Al Jazeera. Launched in Doha on the first of November 1996, the network became the first ‘free’ Arab television network based in the Middle East. The newly established broadcaster thereby smartly bridged the gap after the BBC closed down its Arabic Television channel in April 1996 (Ayish, 2011).

15 exceptional freedom of expression” (2007: 28).

In comparison with other Arab broadcasters, Al Jazeera indeed upholds this motto of ‘presenting the view and the other point of view’. El-Nawawy and Iskander (2002) argue that Al Jazeera has caused a revolution in the Arab media landscape, by broadcasting “what no other Arab news organization dared to: the hard, often harsh truth of Arab life, culture and politics”(2002: 29). One look at the subjects covered by the broadcaster indeed seem to confirm this statement. Al Jazeera addresses issues that are highly sensitive within the Arab region. The network shocked its audience when they broadcasted an interview in Hebrew with top Israeli politicians, thereby receiving much criticism, since Arabs were not used to publicly hearing other arguments about the Israeli conflict than the one provided by the government (El-Nawawy & Iskander, 2002). The motto of the media company can be further applied to the role Al Jazeera has played in the rest of the world. With the launch of the channel, a platform for previous unheard voices was created. This often involved groups that were critical about the West and were therefore ignored, the most well-know group being Al Qaeda, whose messages were frequently broadcasted during the 9/11 aftermath to much criticism of the West. In that way Zayani and Sahraoui agree that “what Al Jazeera did was provide a platform for opposing groups and views regardless of whether these were legitimate or illegitimate in the eyes of the government” (2007: 29).

In providing an alternative media platform for opposing voices, Al Jazeera was presented with sources that no other Western media station had access to. The channel sold their footage successfully to the likes of BBC and CNN and thereby put itself on the global map. That way Al Jazeera became as Kraidy argues “a source of fascination, praise and outrage in a global public discourse” (2002: 7). Looking from this point of view, Al Jazeera can be seen as the channel that put an end to the Western domination as the delivers of international news. It furthermore shows that Al Jazeera, unlike western news outlets, often relies on other alternative sources which might be of influence in the way they portray a certain event.

Critics however take Al Jazeera for something it pretends to be while it is in fact not (El Biary et al., 2007). They claim that Al Jazeera is in fact not at all free, ‘global’ and open-minded as it appears to be. Their criticism begins with the start of the television station in 1996. Al Jazeera was launched with a $140 million loan from the Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Hassad Bin Khalifa, a progressive leader, who wanted to introduce his country with democracy, by starting a TV network that “was free from government scrutiny, control and manipulation” (cited by El-Nawawy & Iskander, 2002: 27). The funding was provided by the sheikh to help the channel through its first difficult start-up years. Once the network would earn enough advertising revenues, the loan would be suspended and Al Jazeera would be financially independent. This however never happened, and until today, the channel is still heavily reliable on subsidies from the Qatari government (Zayani & Sahraoui, 2007).

16 build a credible news network. The influence of the Qatari authorities however goes much further and is even noticeable in the organizational structure.

The chairman of Al Jazeera for example, is a distant cousin of the emir. Critics (El-Biary et al., 2007) therefore state that Qatar uses Al Jazeera to promote its political interests. Fandy argues that the main goal for the channel’s launch was “to achieve greater leverage against rival Gulf countries, particularly Saudi-Arabia” (2007, 129). If this was indeed their ambition they have succeeded. Because of the launch of Al Jazeera, Qatar is no longer known for being the country of the goats, but for being the state that hosts the famous TV channel.

Recent articles in the Guardian also suggest that the Qatari government tries to gain even more control over Al Jazeera and sometimes influences the editorial process of the channel. Scholars (Uysal et al., 2011) thereby claim that there is a division between the English, and the Arabic counterpart of the broadcaster. Uysal argues that “the Arabic broadcasting tends to display a more Third World and pan-Arab orientation with the focus on the Middle Eastern conflicts, while its English counterpart tends to display a more international approach” (2011: 2). In that light it looks like Al Jazeera English not only wants to reach an Arab audience, but also viewers who do not have such a background. If true, then one can expect to see this international focus in the reporting of the Egyptian protests.

Al Jazeera staff denies the claims of these critics and argues that the BBC model “still serves as the primary model” (cited by El-Nawawy & Iskander, 2002: 41). Looking at the organizational structure of the channel, this indeed seems to be a valid argument. Al-Mirazi, a journalist working from Al Jazeera’s Washington’s bureau states: “We follow the BBC model in that we are a public corporation that enjoys editorial independence. It used to be the case that Arab people prefer Western media over Arab media, thinking that you cannot have an independent media body in the Arab world that is free from government control. Al Jazeera broke that rule” (cited by El-Naway & Iskander, 2002: 41).

In a certain way Al Jazeera definitely broke with traditional elements of Arab media. But we must not forget that this ‘freedom’ and ‘independence’ is relatively new in the Arab media landscape. To expect that Al Jazeera enjoys the same amount of editorial and organizational freedom like similar western broadcasters is in my opinion to optimistic. Recent discussions in the Guardian as well as the interference from the Qatari royal family in several levels of the organization support this theory.

§1.5 The Anglo-American Media: development and characteristics

17 and has been an important aspect of American society since its start (Chapman, 2005). In Great Britain complete press freedom was restricted by the so-called Stamp Act, which was passed in parliament in 1712 and abolished in 1855. The act created a tax on publishers, which raised the prize of printing and as result also the prizes of newspapers. After a further expansion of the Act in 1765, publishers were forced to choose political sides which further restricted the press.

Despite the regulation caused by the Stamp act legislation, a growing population, an expanding distribution network and the spread of literacy resulted in a flourishing British press (Allen, 2011). This in combination with the political unrest caused by both the French revolution and the American strive for independence increased printing and showed the use of printing as a weapon to influence public opinion. Because of these reasons, Allen argues that by the close of the eighteenth century “the foundations were being laid for a newspaper press which would come to represent to the world the epitome of democratic power, prestige and influence” (2011: 32).

It was however not until the beginning of the nineteenth century that the objectivity standard emerged, which today is ultimately related with Anglo-American journalism. The arise of the objectivity standard falls together with the come into existence of the press as a fourth estate, a reflective position in which the press could monitor the political process in order to guarantee democracy. The press thereby functions as both a representative as well as an informant of the public; by reporting what the public should now (Habermas, 1991).

Factors that contributed to the development of a fourth estate were the publicity of the parliamentary assemblies. As a result of this, journalists did not longer have to rely on eye-witnesses but were able to witness and reflect on practicing politics themselves, which increased the credibility of the press significantly. The emerge of the fourth estate did not only result in an increase of the press’ credibility, but also in a severe change of style from eye witness reporting to balanced and objective reporting (Chapman, 2005). The emergence of the fourth estate together with the changing democratic environment in the eighteenth century, lead to the creation of a public sphere in which people could debate and reflect upon politics freely. It is this relative early emergence of a public sphere and the development of the press as the fourth estate in this era that distinguishes Western media from Arab media.

Historical accounts (Allan et al., 2011) also name the development of the so-called ‘pauper’ or ‘penny’ press as a contributing factor to the rise of the objectivity ideal. These so-called forms of popular journalism focused on human interest stories that attracted working-class people. The penny and the pauper press were able to attract high readership because “of its commitment to delivering a form of journalism these readers wanted to see at a prize that they could afford” (2011: 33).

18 popular newspaper resulted in a “quick redrawn of the contours of public opinion” (2011: 35), because they were significantly more commercialized and mainly dependable from advertising and sales revenue. As a result, popular newspapers could operate more independently since “they could declare a greater degree of political independence from government and party” (Cited By Allen, 2011: 35).

The introduction of the telegraph in 1843 further contributed to the emergence of objectivity as a professional ideal in journalism. Four years after its introduction, six New York newspapers launched the Associated Press (AP), “a wire service devoted to providing equal access for its members to news from one another, and more importantly from sources in distant sites” (City by Allen, 2011: 37). Because AP was subscribing its service to several newspapers it was forced to focus on delivering the facts, thereby shunning their opinion which newspapers had to assert themselves. According to Kaplan (2009), these emerging conventions of wire service reporting further established objectivity as a journalistic ideal.

At the end of the nineteenth century efforts were also made to organize journalism as a profession. One of the most important factors in setting professional norms and values was the foundation of the National Association of Journalists in 1884, followed by the establishing of the National Union of Journalists (NUJ) in 1907 (Hilmes, 2012). The early constituting of these organizations in the West in comparison to the Arab world where similar organizations were not founded until mid-twentieth century, is another significant difference in the development of the journalistic profession in both regions and has contributed towards the status the profession enjoys today.

During the 1920s objectivity became further institutionalized in British and American professional journalism culture. Objective and non-biased reporting were the ground rules of Anglo-American journalism, which resulted in e.g. more investigative and interpretative reporting (Allen, 2011). It was this set of objectivity norms that functioned as the groundwork for the introduction of radio and television in the twentieth century (Hilmes, 2012). Because the historical development of the above media was different in Great Britain and in the United States, their expansion will be addressed separately in the upcoming two paragraphs.

The development of both the Arab and Anglo-American media landscape creates understanding for the position of the media in the regions today. While both regions throughout their histories have been scourged by different conflicts, it was the continuing instability in the Arab region that was key to the tight government control of the media. This together with high illiteracy rates, low population density, no professional distribution network and less economic prosperity is what made the creation of a flourishing Arab press, but also the journalistic profession impossible. Only in the last decades some significant changes, like the launch of ‘independent’ news station like Al Jazeera can be notified.

19 are many other studies that prove that the network still has to deal with typical characteristics of the Arab media landscape.

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BBC

The British Broadcasting Company (BBC) was founded on 18 December 1922 as a monopoly radio broadcaster. The BBC thereby became the first national broadcasting organization. British newspapers soon felt threatened by the new medium and demanded that the BBC did not employ its own journalists (Hilmes, 2012). Instead, BBC news reports were forced by the government to limit themselves to present short news summaries prepared by news agencies, which were broadcasted after 7:00 p.m. That way the broadcaster would not harm the sales of the daily newspapers (Allan, 2011). From its early start, just like Arab rulers decades later, British politicians saw the huge potential of broadcasting as a tool for reaching and influencing the masses. The government therefore did everything in their power to prevent broadcasting from becoming commercial, like the print media (MC Nair, 1996). The British broadcasting had to become as Scannell and Cardiff argue “a utility to be developed as a national service in the public interest” (1991: 8). A noble goal, but also one out of fear what the consequences would be if these messages that could also reach the illiterate masses would not be controlled.

The first opportunity of the BBC to break free from its news regulating restrictions came in 1926 during the General Strike (Hilmes, 2012). Due to the demonstrations, all newspapers were closed and so people turned to the radio to hear the latest developments. With the shutting down of the print media, the BBC was finally able to make their own ‘news’ and reported about the strikes in up to five news bulletins per day (Allan, 2011).

The reporting of the strikes by the BBC however, did not uphold the objectivity norm that had become so characteristic for the Anglo-American press. The BBC strongly sided with the government by only giving government ministers’ air time, thereby shunning the view of the opposition (Crussel, 2002). The reporting by the broadcaster about the Great Strikes thus showed the direct control the government had over the organization. It “underlined how the direct line of control held by the state over the company under the legal authority of the Wireless Broadcasting License was being translated into self-censorship (Cited by Allen 2011: 49). The reporting showed that the BBC was not only financially dependent through the broadcasting license, but could also not operate independently.

20 This development took place almost parallel to the opening up of the Arab media landscape one year later, when Al Jazeera was launched. On paper the BBC is not so different from Al Jazeera, which seems logical since the broadcaster used the former as an example. The criticism on the organizational structure of Al Jazeera, therefore I propose can also indirectly be seen as criticism to that of the BBC. Both are funded with government money and as the above section shows, even the BBC was regulated for a very long time.

At the end of 1934 a BBC news department was established, which separated the news from the talk programs. The goal was to “encourage public confidence in its corporate ethic of neutrality” (cited by Allen, 2011: 50). The BBC became known for its authoritative style of news broadcasting, which still consisted mostly of news facts obtained from press agencies. All of this changed during World War II when the audience was introduced with reports of war correspondents on site with the BBC continuingly making its own news. As Küng-Shankleman argues “the organization emerged from the war immensely strengthened at home and abroad, having become a major influence on the societal, cultural and political affairs of the nation” (2000: 69). After being closed during the war, the BBC returned with its television service on June 7, 1946. The organization went to great lengths to demonstrate her impartiality, which it deemed a public and professional duty (Crussel, 2002). To ensure this impartial status and as way of self-protection by the British politics to prevent the BBC from become a national forum for debate, the fourteen day rule was implemented (Allan, 2011). This meant that the broadcaster did not cover issues that were debated in the House of Commons or the House of Lords in the fourteen days prior to a debate (Allan, 2011). Again this example shows that the BBC was still significantly regulated by the government.

In 1955, the monopoly position of the BBC came to an end when its first commercial competitor, television broadcaster ITV was introduced. ITV however did not give much competition to the BBC, who had firmly established itself in the previous ten years. Besides that, the new commercial broadcaster was being heavily criticized for its poor quality programming, while the BBC was highly applauded. Eventually this lead to the launch of a second BBC television channel in 1964 (Hilmes, 2012).

Although the introduction of ITV on the television market caused an end to the monopoly position of the BBC, competition remained very limited for the next four decades. While the BBC was funded by the license fee which every household with a TV had to pay, ITV was depending on advertisement revenue. The broadcasters thus were competing each other for viewers, but remained both monopolies financial wise (Crisell, 2002).

21 deal with clear government meddling in the form of the fourteen day rule. This however unlike Al Jazeera, did not hinder the BBC from becoming a highly respected and credible news institution.

§1.7

T

24-

:

CNN

On 21 May 1979, Ted Turner announced the launch of Cable News Network (CNN) stating that the network would go on air 374 days later on 1 June 1980. Turner had inherited a billboard advertising business from his father and soon moved into television world by buying a local broadcasting station in Atlanta (Hilmes, 2012). He became known for his bold and inventive business moves and was able to “exploit existing industry practices to his advantage” (cited by Küng-Shankleman, 2000: 80). It were for these tactics that Turner was able to develop an enormous business empire at a fast pace. Wallace and Maner (1991) credit Turner for his ability to always cross the line to create new trends and niches.

Turner also credits himself for this ability saying: “I’ve always thought several moves ahead. I pride myself on being able to look into the future and say, ‘what is the future going to look like? And what can we do to be in the right place at the right time?” (Turner cited in Küng-Shankleman, 2000: 81). It were exactly those tactics Turner applied when he announced that he was launching CNN. Again his competitors laughed at his idea to make the station the first 24 hour news channel, an idea thought to be bold but also incredibly stupid at the time.

Turner indeed seemed to make a daring move when he launched CNN. The television landscape in the United States was dominated by a few commercial broadcasting networks, whose goal was to make as much profit as possible (Hilmes, 2012). The American broadcasting landscape thereby differed largely from the British one where the main function of broadcasting was to inform and educate people (Küng-Shankleman, 2000). In America this situation was completely different.

During the 1970s, television networks noticed that they were losing money on news. Advertising revenue did not weigh up to the production costs that were made to produce news. At first, television bosses looked past this loss and justified it by saying that it was their task to inform the public with the latest news (Bibb, 1993). In the late 1970s however this common feeling changed when recession set in and budgets were being cut. Networks were doing everything in their ability to boost ratings and make more revenue (Chapman, 2005).

One of the sacrifices that had to be made were the news bulletins. The focus shifted towards programs that were cheaper to produce and the content of news bulletins was centered around ratings. In this same setting, one of the current characteristics of American broadcasting, infotainment, was introduced. Infotainment can be best described as “current affairs coverage with less hard news and more carefully presented stories designed to appeal to audiences” (Cited by Küng-Shankleman, 2005: 81).

22 to be a huge gamble. Turner thought that in the changing American lifestyle with its longer working hours, there was a market for a news broadcaster like CNN. Furthermore, he was convinced of the potential of technological advancements like suitcase satellite link ups, which would make global broadcasting much easier (Küng-Shankleman, 2000). In his essay ‘My Beef with Big Media’ Turner talks about the early days of CNN, which shows that the launch of the network was quite a gamble: “Soon after our launch in 1980, our expenses were twice what we had expected and revenues half what we had projected. Our losses were so high that our loans were called in…Eventually, we not only became profitable, but also changed the nature of news- from watching something that happened to watching it as it happened” (2005: 226). For a long period, CNN could operate relatively under the radar. The next fifteen years after its launch the network did not have competition from similar broadcasters, for the reason that “neither cable nor news were considered attractive by the dominant players” (cited by Küng-Shankleman, 2000: 109). CNN thus operated alone in the field of 24-hour international broadcasting. This however did not mean that the broadcaster did not draw any attention. During the 1980s CNN put itself on the map with the live coverage of the baby Jessica rescue and the live coverage of the space shuttle challenger disaster (Hilmes, 2012). .

CNN’s big breakthrough however occurred in the 1990s when covering the Gulf War. The Network had the ability to use portable satellite on the front line, which as Zelizer argues “enabled journalists to collect news by satellite, introducing faster news transmissions and generating a continuous stream of news copy from diverse locations, thereby being one step ahead of other competing TV stations (1992: 73). CNN was the only network that could “present, transmit and distribute news 24-hours a day” (cited by Zelizer, 1992: 73). It was during the Gulf War that as Diamand argues “CNN went from the Chicken Noodle Network, to having public credibility (1991: 35).

The way the war was reported was the kind of coverage CNN did best; it showed the ability of the network to present an unfolding story live, 24 hours a day. The

extensive coverage of the Gulf War showed that there still was a demand for foreign news “as long as this was presented in ways that heightened liveness and immediacy” (cited by Stuart, 2011: 205). It was during CNN’s coverage of the Gulf War that the now well-known term CNN-effect came into use, which argues that the media can directly influence foreign policy. Although studies like that of Girandet, Robinson et al. (1999) address the important role media like CNN have played in influencing the public debate, they state that it is hard to determine the direct impact of media on crises and intervention discussion.

23 administration did not favor with the aim to create a public opinion in favor of launching an aggression in Iran and Syria” (SANA, 2012).

This shows that even commercial networks like CNN do not seem to be free from accusations of biased reporting. Furthermore, the so-called CNN-effect once again displays how intertwined journalism and politics are and to what extent both can exceed influence.

§1.8

T

E

The Egyptian spring from the 25th January 2011 until the 11th of February 2011, was a turbulent period in which the Egyptians showed to the rest of the world that they were longing for democracy. The Egyptian people wanted to follow the Tunisians, by overthrowing their leader Hosni Mubarak who had been ruling their country for almost thirty years. By protesting, they hoped to change the circumstances in their country, which suffered from high unemployment, inflation, low wages and lacked free elections and freedom of speech. By demanding the overthrow of their authoritarian president, the Egyptians hoped to establish a new Egypt in which freedom, justice and democracy were priorities.

The protests started on the 25th _{of January and lasted until the resignation of}

Mubarak on the 11th _{February 2011. Mubarak dissolved his government and promised}

that he would not seek re-election during the elections the following September. Omar Suleiman, the former head of the Egyptian intelligence service was appointed by Mubarak as vice-president. It was Suleiman who announced to the public on 11th

February, that their president would step down and that the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SAF) would take over. Egypt thus fell in the hands of the military junta, with the Egyptian constitution as well as the parliament suspended for six months, until there was enough stability for new elections.

The military leaders however did not give a concrete date when this would happen. Again this lead to turmoil and mass protests in Cairo and many other cities. On many occasions, the protesters were encountered with violence from the military. The so longed for elections finally took place at the end of 2011; first the parliamentary elections between 28th _{November and 11}th _{January 2012 which resulted in the transfer}

of authority from the SAF to the People’s Assembly.

The parliamentary elections were followed by the presidential elections in May and June 2012. They were however not as democratic as they ought to be. The military rulers announced an interim constitution which allowed them to control the prime minister as well as the national budget and the lawmaking. Furthermore, they chose a panel consisting of hundred members that were going to draft the new permanent constitution. After more than a year, Egypt again was back to square one.

The new rules of the SAF were met with demonstrations. On June the 24th

24 stability that Egypt so desperately needed. In the four months after Morsi’s appointment, the country was again scourged by strikes and clashes between pro-Morsi and anti-Morsi protesters.

Protests against the ruling leader came to a climax on November 22nd_{, when}

Morsi issued a temporary constitutional declaration, which gave him unlimited powers as president. He argued that such measures were required to protect the newly established elected assembly. Egyptians were afraid that this move from their president would only result in another Mubarak era and marched the streets to protest. On 8th

December 2012, Morsi put an end to this extended authority, and on December 22nd _a

new constitution was adopted by a majority of the elective population.

The opposition however claimed that the results of the referendum were defrauded, and protests against Morsi continued for another six months. On the 26th _of

June, Morsi held an extensive speech on national television. Although the intention of the talk was to reconcile the opposing groups, the speech was received as hostile and provocative by anti-Morsi protesters. The speech resulted in more determination from the opposition to take the streets on 30th _{June, for a planned uprising.}

On June 30th_{, people massively took the streets. 22 million signatures were}

collected, demanding the withdrawal of Morsi (Middle East Monitor, 2013). On the evening of July 3, the Egyptian Armed Forces announced the end of Morsi’s presidency, stating that new elections were to be held in the near future. In a reaction to this news, many pro-Morsi supporters took to the streets to demonstrate. They were met with heavy violence which lead to hundreds of casualties.

As a result of the military coup on June 30th _{2013, several media outlets that were}

25

§2 Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework of this thesis utilizes literature of the so-called framing theory. Framing theory generally tries to explain why an identical event is portrayed differently by multiple media organizations. The concept of framing is based upon the assumption that frames are windows on the world through which reality is observed (Strömback et. all 2008). Framing theory is thereby letting go of the concept of news as a mirror of reality, but instead sets on multiple realities and focuses on factors as, e.g. journalistic norms and routines, for the identification and explanation of portrayals. A theoretical framework based on the concept of framing therefore can explain why the selected broadcasters might frame the Egyptian protests differently. Hence, framing is used as the core theoretical concept in this thesis.

§2.1

F

Robert Entman (1993) referred to framing as a ‘scattered conceptualization’. A closer look into the literature shows that there is far from consensus as to what exactly defines framing. Generally, framing studies follow the broad definition of Gamson and Modigliani referring to framing as “the central organizing idea or story line that provides meaning to an unfolding strip of events” (1987: 143). Gamson and Mogdiliani (1987) thereby follow the earlier work of Goffman (1974) whose work can be seen as one of the groundwork’s of framing studies.

Goffmann argues that frames are used to organize experiences. In other words, frames are used to indentify for us “what is taking place” (1974: 93). Both of these descriptions generally describe what frames do. Entman, Matthes and Pelicano (2009) however name a second genre which focuses more on what effect frames have. According to Entman (2004) frames “define problems, make moral judgments and support remedies” (cited by Entman et al in Wahl-Jörgensen, 2009: 176).

Describing framing as “selecting some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and or treatment recommendation” (1993: 55), Entman in my opinion pinpoints the significant relevance of framing and its study. Since frames only show some aspects of what we see as reality, its use can have an enormous impact in the understanding of the public about news events. It is therefore important to distinguish what frames media use when portraying a certain event. That way the audience is aware that what the media present to them is only part of a perceived reality in which the media select which aspects are shown.

26 the aspects of how frames are perceived by the audience, while media frames focus on how frames are established by the media (Scheufele, 1999).

Gitlin (1980) elaborates on the work of Scheufele by arguing that frames organize the world for journalists when making the news. The audience can relate to the double function since they rely on the news as reported by journalists. Entman (1991) makes a similar distinction between individual and media frames, with a strong focus on the direct relation between media frames and the news itself, calling them “an attribution to the news itself” (1991: 7). Individual frames function as a way for individuals to process information handed to them by the media. Although both concepts are indefinitely intertwined, the focus in this research lies on media framing, because it addresses the journalistic side of framing and how frames are established by the media.

Just like Schoemaker & Reese (1996) and Tuchman (1996) I argue that media frames are relative and thus are affected by media context. To back this claim I concur with Bourdieu’s conclusion that ‘reality is social through and through’ (Bourdieu, 1991) and is determined in the environment in which it is formed. Frames are used to present this reality and are thus also socially determined. Like Scheufele argues they serve as “working routines that help journalists in classifying and identifying information and present them efficiently” (1999: 300).

This is in line with Heider’s theory that “humans cannot understand the world in all its complexity” (cited by Scheufele, 1999: 310) and that frames are used for simplification. I thus argue that reality is socially formed and is a result of the fact that people do not understand the complex world they live in, thereby using frames to create the understanding they need. Just like reality, media frames are socially determined and as a consequence result in news events being framed differently.

I thereby follow the so-called sociological approach of framing research (Pan & Kosicki et al., 1993) arguing that frames are amongst others “the outcome of journalistic norms or organizational constraints” (1993: 298). The three main players in the news discourse process (audience, source and journalists) participate in the process based on their “socially defined roles” (Gans, 1979: 8), confirming Bourdieu’s statement that reality is social through and through. It are after all these players who decide what we ought to see as reality. Frame building, the process wherein a frame is build, thus is influenced by shared beliefs in a society (Pan & Kosicki, 1993).

However, these are not the only factors that contribute to the selection and building of frames. Goffmann (1979) argues that the meaning of a frame is culturally rooted. Indeed it seems that not only socially defined factors such as journalistic norms, but also political actors and cultural context play their part in frame building and the following reporting of an event (Gans et al., 1979). Tuchman (1978) even goes as far by stating that media use different aspects of reality to promote certain ideas. This is in line with Bourdieu’s argument that media is just a representation of reality, which supports the idea that only certain representations are dominant in the media discourse and in turn are seen by the public as reality.

27 between frames takes place. I agree with Pan & Kosicki (1993) that journalistic norms and values are influencing factors in the news discourse. These are however not the only ones.

Studies of media framing (Shoemaker & Reese et al., 1996) confirm the existence of several factors significant for the adaptation of media frames. According to Schudson (2003) the perception of reality promoted by the media is a result of the norms, values and practices influencing the decision making process within a news organization. These factors vary amongst the different news organizations and as a result lead to different reporting.

However, when studying these factors one has to bear in mind how these journalistic norms and values come about. Halinn and Mancini (2004) state that journalistic norms, values and practices are influenced by the different media systems, political climate and culture in which the media operate. I agree with these researchers that to understand how frame building works you need to take a closer look at the overall climate in which the news outlets operate, because these are the foundational grounds for the creation of both norms and values and at the same time influence the journalists that are operating in it.

But there are more factors that need to be taken into consideration. The influence of interest groups should for example not be underestimated. Edelman’s study of the news coverage about the Gulf War shows that “authorities and pressure groups categorize beliefs in a way that marshals support and opposition to their interests” (1992: 168). Interest groups thus use the media to construct their reality by influencing the construction of frames (Scheufele, 1999).

Edelman further addresses the influence of ideology stating that “the choice for a frame often is driven by ideology and prejudice” (1993: 22). Shoemaker & Reese (1996) narrow down the role that ideology plays to the individual level, arguing that ideological and political viewpoints of journalists influence their eventual reporting. Part of these personal values, attitudes and beliefs of journalists are formed during motherhood, while others are typical of the society in which they live.

Due to mixed research outcomes Shoemaker & Reese were however unable to make any sweeping statements about the influence of communicators personal attitudes, values and beliefs on media content”(1996: 87). This shows how hard it is to measure the influence of personal beliefs and values on the eventual reporting of an event.

Yet, as mentioned before I argue that news is not a mirror of reality but is social through and through and that frames are used to present reality. That means that personal beliefs and values certainly play a role in frame building because they are formed and created by society itself. The same applies for professional norms and ethics which are shaped on the job. Again the process in which they are formed is socially influenced in what Breed calls socialization, focusing on how a journalist “discovers and internalizes the rights and obligations of his status and its norms and values” (1960:182), which they develop by observation.

28 created in which journalists working for the same organization, view and create news (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996). Both above arguments show that the specific norms and values of a news outlet are socially dictated within the organization itself. It does however not explain how they originate. I propose that just like frames, they are a result of the society and media landscape which they operate in.

Taking the above arguments into consideration I argue that there are four potential factors of influence within the news discourse: norms and values (both societal and journalistic since both rely on each other), political and ideological beliefs of the journalists themselves, interference of interest groups and journalistic routines. To this I add a fifth and last factor which is the organizational structure of the media organization.

Several studies (El Biary et al., 2011) have shown that especially in countries where the government has (or previously had) a history of controlling the media, their autonomy often has come under scrutiny. Furthermore, the historical framework section has showed that a different media landscape as well as a corporate structure results in different goals (commercial vs. public broadcasting), which might in turn be of affluence in the framing of an event. CNN for example is a commercial network which operates in a media landscape dominated by commercialism and sensationalism, while the BBC on the other hand, as a public broadcaster is known for its educational focus (Küng-Shankleman, 2007). In my opinion, a different organizational structure therefore not only affects the editorial independence, but also results in a different approach of reporting.

Although some of the proposed influencing factors of media content like ideology are difficult to detect measure and verify, they are taken into consideration by this study because it facilitates answering the research question. The next paragraph explains the differences and similarities in journalistic norms, values and organizational structure of the selected broadcasters.

§2.2 Al Jazeera, BBC and CNN: structure norms and routines

In the historical framework section the development of both the media landscape and the selected news outlets was outlined. This showed that the circumstances in which the organizations were founded have contributed significantly to where they stand today. This ad prove to the argument of Bourdieu (1991) that reality is socially created which in turn implicates that news is socially created.