• No results found

Detecting Bioterrorism: How to Detect The Unexpected?: Introdution: Detection

N/A
N/A
Protected

Academic year: 2021

Share "Detecting Bioterrorism: How to Detect The Unexpected?: Introdution: Detection"

Copied!
2
0
0

Bezig met laden.... (Bekijk nu de volledige tekst)

Hele tekst

(1)

Amsterdam University of Applied Sciences

Detecting Bioterrorism: How to Detect The Unexpected?

Introdution: Detection Wielinga, Peter R.

DOI

10.1089/bsp.2013.0863 Publication date

2013

Document Version Final published version Published in

Biosecurity and bioterrorism : biodefense strategy, practice, and science License

Unspecified Link to publication

Citation for published version (APA):

Wielinga, P. R. (2013). Detecting Bioterrorism: How to Detect The Unexpected? Introdution:

Detection. Biosecurity and bioterrorism : biodefense strategy, practice, and science, 11(Supplement 1), S123. https://doi.org/10.1089/bsp.2013.0863

General rights

It is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), other than for strictly personal, individual use, unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).

Disclaimer/Complaints regulations

If you believe that digital publication of certain material infringes any of your rights or (privacy) interests, please let the Library know, stating your reasons. In case of a legitimate complaint, the Library will make the material inaccessible and/or remove it from the website. Please contact the library:

https://www.amsterdamuas.com/library/contact/questions, or send a letter to: University Library (Library of the University of Amsterdam and Amsterdam University of Applied Sciences), Secretariat, Singel 425, 1012 WP Amsterdam, The Netherlands. You will be contacted as soon as possible.

Download date:27 Nov 2021

(2)

Introduction: Detection

Detecting Bioterrorism: How to Detect the Unexpected?

Peter R. Wielinga

T errorism works because its actions happen when and where they are not expected. In that sense, it works like a natural disease outbreak: One cannot predict when it will come, who it will affect, or which disease will strike again.

We have learned to live with this uncertainty and risk and found ways to protect ourselves against such disease outbreaks.

To do so, most, if not all, countries in the world have active surveillance programs for a list of the most endemic diseases.

Bioterrorism is a term used for terrorism using biological weapons, such as infectious diseases or biological toxins.

Having normal surveillance programs in place, we have the necessary tools to detect and act against many biological weapons and diseases that may be used by terrorists. How- ever, some diseases are not included in the active surveillance programs of many countries, because they do not cause problems in the specific country, either because they never have been endemic or they have been eradicated in the past.

Two important infectious diseases for which this is the case are anthrax and botulism, caused by Bacillus anthracis and Clostridium botulinum, respectively. Both are zoonotic and may live in all kinds of animals, including the animals used for consumption. In addition, these infectious diseases form spores that are difficult to kill and easily survive standard food treatments. This puts these pathogens at the top of the list of most feared diseases and biological weapons. However, these diseases have been dealt with efficiently in many countries in

the past and have not caused major outbreaks in many western countries recently. This has allowed some countries to loosen the surveillance and research on these diseases.

Because of the anthrax letters in the United States, the failed anthrax attack in the streets of Japan, and the increased global will to have preventive tools in place for possible terror at- tacks, the research into anthrax and botulism, as well as sev- eral other potential biological weapons, has been revived.

The articles in this section deal with methods to detect anthrax and botulism in settings that are relevant when used in terrorist actions. They describe several new and im- proved methods and discuss approaches to best look and sample for the diseases. Specifically, the use of whole- genome sequencing techniques deserves attention, as it will be an important tool in future bioterrorism and also normal surveillance research. Whole-genome sequencing can be used to detect any microorganism in a sample with 1 analysis, thus making it truly a technique to detect the unexpected. It can be foreseen that the introduction of whole-genome sequencing, not only in the field of bio- terrorism, but also in the fields of public human health and animal health or as a diagnostic tool used by hospitals and general practitioners, will greatly advance treatment of in- fectious diseases and human health.

E-mail: pwie@food.dtu.dk

Peter R. Wielinga is Academic Officer, special assignments, National Food Institute, Technical University of Denmark (DTU), Søborg, Denmark.

Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science Volume 11, Supplement 1, 2013 ª Mary Ann Liebert, Inc.

DOI: 10.1089/bsp.2013.0863

S123

Referenties

GERELATEERDE DOCUMENTEN

We use MD simulations and analysis tools for: (1) the study of various properties of a simple homogeneous bulk fluid under several planar velocity fields, (2) the calculation of

The camera's zoom was increased to maximum, and microscope slides were pressed right up to the lens, with another bit of tape atop the samples to keep the lens clean. A

Gegeven dat we in Nederland al meer dan twintig jaar micro-economisch structuurbeleid voeren, vraagt men zich af waarom de aangegeven verandering niet eerder plaats vond, op

To ob- tain the spin transport parameters of the different regions we use the following procedure: We fit the Hanle curves to the Bloch equations for the uniform sys- tem and

Concreet zal er worden gekeken naar de gevolgen van een grotere of juist kleinere rol van het parlement op het formatieproces en dan in het bijzonder naar de lengte van het

Een gerechtvaardigde vraag zou zijn in hoeverre NPM fase 1 maatregelen in Nederland doorgevoerd zijn in de publieke sector tijdens de vorige crisis van eind jaren zeventig en

Table 5 Proportions of correct data sets (i.e., data sets without false negatives or false positives), proportions of data sets without false negatives, and numbers of false

To this end, Project 1 aims to evaluate the performance of statistical tools to detect potential data fabrication by inspecting genuine datasets already available and