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Explanation and determination

Gijsbers, V.A.

Citation

Gijsbers, V. A. (2011, August 28). Explanation and determination. Retrieved from https://hdl.handle.net/1887/17879

Version: Corrected Publisher’s Version

License: Licence agreement concerning inclusion of doctoral thesis in the Institutional Repository of the University of Leiden

Downloaded from: https://hdl.handle.net/1887/17879

Note: To cite this publication please use the final published version (if applicable).

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Explanation and Determination

Proefschrift ter verkrijging van

de graad van Doctor aan de Universiteit Leiden, op gezag van Rector Magnificus

prof. mr. P. F. van der Heijden,

volgens besluit van het College voor Promoties te verdedigen op 28 september 2011

klokke 15.00 uur

door Victor Alexander Gijsbers geboren te Leiden in 1982

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Promotiecommissie

Promotor Prof. dr. B. G. Sundholm Co-promotor Dr. J. W. McAllister

Overige leden Prof. C. R. Hitchcock, California Institute of Technology Prof. dr. A. J. M. Peijnenburg, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen Prof. S. Psillos, University of Athens

Dr. H. W. de Regt, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam Prof. M. Strevens, New York University

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Contents

1 Introduction 1

1.1 Introducing the introduction . . . 1

1.2 Overview . . . 2

1.3 Discourse on method . . . 4

1.3.1 Analysis . . . 4

1.3.2 Contemporary science . . . 8

2 Why Unification Is Neither Necessary nor Sufficient 11 2.1 Introduction . . . 11

2.2 Two types of unificationism . . . 12

2.2.1 Kitcher’s theory . . . 12

2.2.2 The problem of spurious unification . . . 13

2.2.3 Schurz & Lambert’s theory . . . 17

2.3 Causality and lawhood . . . 18

2.3.1 Kitcher and causal asymmetry . . . 19

2.3.2 Lawhood in Kitcher . . . 22

2.3.3 Lawhood in Schurz & Lambert . . . 25

2.4 Is unification necessary for explanation? . . . 26

2.5 Conclusion . . . 30

3 Against Inference to the Best Explanation 33 3.1 Introduction . . . 33

3.2 IBE as an inference scheme . . . 35

3.3 Loveliness and likeliness . . . 36

3.4 The guiding thesis . . . 38

3.5 First argument: virtues . . . 40

3.6 Second argument: case study . . . 45

3.7 Third argument: Bayesianism . . . 50

3.8 Modest explanationism . . . 53

3.9 Conclusion . . . 55 iii

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iv CONTENTS 4 A General Interventionist Theory of Explanation 57

4.1 Introduction . . . 57

4.2 Causality and explanation . . . 58

4.3 Woodward on causation and explanation . . . 59

4.4 Is the interventionist theory circular? . . . 62

4.5 Mathematical explanation introduced . . . 66

4.6 Steiner’s theory of mathematical explanation . . . 67

4.7 An interventionist theory of mathematical explanation . . . . 69

4.8 Law explanations . . . 73

4.9 A general interventionist theory of explanation . . . 76

4.10 Conclusion . . . 78

5 Explanation’s Many Contrasts 81 5.1 Two types of contrast in explananda . . . 81

5.2 The conjunctive theory . . . 85

5.3 The double-contrast theory . . . 91

5.4 Contrasts and irrelevance . . . 95

5.5 Conclusion . . . 98

6 The Determination Theory 99 6.1 Introduction . . . 99

6.2 Explanation as determination . . . 100

6.3 The determination theory . . . 104

6.4 Capturing determination . . . 106

7 Indeterministic Explanation I 111 7.1 The non-specific deductive model . . . 111

7.2 Probability: the debate . . . 114

7.3 Probability: answers . . . 117

7.4 Totally unspecific explanation . . . 121

7.5 Indeterminism: biting the bullet . . . 122

7.6 Indeterminism: is it a bullet? . . . 124

7.7 Conclusion . . . 129

8 Indeterministic Explanation II 131 8.1 Introduction . . . 131

8.2 Preliminary argument: Gal´apagos finches . . . 132

8.3 Strevens’s theory of explanation . . . 134

8.4 Microconstancy and macroperiodicity . . . 136

8.5 Three types of explanation . . . 138

8.6 The statistical deterministic explanation does not exist . . . . 140

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CONTENTS v

8.6.1 The problem . . . 140

8.6.2 Attempts to define macroperiodicity . . . 141

8.6.3 Further attempts . . . 143

8.7 The low-level deterministic explanation is not irrelevant . . . . 145

8.8 Non-explanatory critical events . . . 149

8.9 Deductive closure . . . 151

8.10 Conclusion . . . 155

9 Discussion and Implications of the Determination Theory 157 9.1 Introduction . . . 157

9.2 Are explanations arguments? . . . 158

9.3 Laws and regularities . . . 160

9.3.1 Explanation without regularity? . . . 160

9.3.2 Hidden regularity . . . 162

9.3.3 The heart of the matter . . . 163

9.3.4 Explanation through redescription . . . 164

9.4 Ambiguity and pluralism . . . 166

9.4.1 Ambiguity and combination . . . 166

9.4.2 Explanatory pluralism . . . 169

9.5 Explanation and understanding . . . 173

9.5.1 Understanding: introduction . . . 173

9.5.2 The feeling of understanding . . . 174

9.5.3 Understanding versus explanation . . . 176

9.5.4 Methodological problems? . . . 181

9.5.5 Erkl¨aren and Verstehen . . . 182

9.6 Explanatory power and objectivity . . . 184

9.7 Conclusion . . . 187

10 Conclusions 189

Nederlandse samenvatting 193

Curriculum Vitae 199

Acknowledgements 201

Bibliography 203

Index 214

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vi CONTENTS

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