validity: development countries

Annex I – The rule-base

Organisational framework

Government structure & governance dynamics Society and government

Rule 1 “Attitudinal, behavioural and cultural conditions”

validity: development countries

rule: For successful decentralisation local leadership must have enough quality for imple- menting decentralisation

AND the (rural) people must have a positive attitude towards the government

AND IF traditional customs and behaviour are not compatible with decentralised pro- cedures for planning, decision-making and management

THEN attention must be given to overcoming the resistance and attaining the co- operation of local elites and traditional leaders.

explanation: These are soft variables but important ones, especially in case of long colonial past.

For instance, control-oriented and paternalistic attitudes are incompatible with the phi- losophy of decentralisation: both central government and local leaders’ attitudes and behaviour must be altered to recognise the value and legitimacy of shared decision- making and more widespread participation in development planning and management.

source: Dennis A. Rondinelli, John R. Nellis and G. Shabbir Cheema, Decentralization in devel- oping countries, a review of recent experience, The World Bank, (Washington D.C., 1984) 51-52.

Rule 2 “Decentralise as much as possible for increased political involvement”

validity: general

rule: IF an increase of the involvement of political bodies is a centrally aimed at effect of decentralisation

THEN it is necessary to transfer tasks and authority on a specific policy field as much as possible, including initiatives, formulating of targets and decision-making criteria, and the execution of the policy.

explanation: Research has shown that there is a relation between the extent of the transferred tasks and the involvement of the different political organs in decision-making. It turns out that tasks for which there exists extensive freedom in policy execution, show more intensive political discussion on local level and therefor more political involvement than in cases in which lower governments haven’t any possibilities for taking initiative, such as in situations where the law prescribes the execution of certain tasks by local government.

Not only have the latter cases much less political involvement, they also risk being taken over completely by the public administration. This is especially the case where large numbers of individual decisions have to be made. Often administrative agents are just mandated to execute these policies and this doesn’t have to be bad as long as there are political instructions beforehand and evaluations afterwards.

source: F. Fleurke, R. Hulst and P.J. de Vries, Decentraliseren met beleid. Een heuristiek, (The Hague, 1997) 67-69.

Rule 3 “Minimal security needed”

validity: development countries

rule: IF a minimal level of security can not be guaranteed THEN decentralisation can not be implemented.

explanation: Where a regime is struggling to survive (e.g. civil war or other active hostility between

groups in the society) it won’t be able to think about decentralising.

source: Philip Mawhood (ed.), Local government in the third world, the experience of decentrali- zation in tropical Africa, Africa Institute of South Africa, (1993) 261.

Rule 4 “Growing pressures for decentralisation without a crisis-situation”

validity: development countries

rule: IF there are growing pressures to decentralise stemming from the government itself, local organisations and officials, regional dissidence, ethnic tension or international do- nors

AND IF the country is not in deep crisis

THEN conditions are probably suitable for decentralisation

explanation: Growing pressures may stem form the government’s own assessment of the inade- quacy of highly centralised arrangements, from the demands of local organisations and officials, from increasing regional dissidence or ethnic tension, or from fiscal and intel- lectual pressures from international donors. On the other hand decentralisation is not suitable as a last-ditch effort to avoid catastrophe. Governments survive the worst phases of crises by centralising, but they try to avoid potentially deeper crises later on by decentralising.

source: Dennis A. Rondinelli, John R. Nellis and G. Shabbir Cheema, Decentralization in devel- oping countries, a review of recent experience, The World Bank, (Washington D.C., 1984) 71.

Public administration

Rule 5 “Consensus on the role of the government”

validity: development countries

rule: Vital for success of decentralised decision-making are societal norms and consensus on the role of various levels of governments and limits to their authorities.

explanation: In the absence of such norms and consensus, intergovernmental gaming leads to dys- functional constitutions.

source: Anwar Shah, Balance, accountability and responsiveness, lessons about decentraliza- tion, The World Bank, (Washington D.C., 1998) 30.

Rule 6 “Decision-making at the adequate level”

validity: general

rule: Authority for particular decisions should be placed there in the organisation where it is still possible to take those decisions and where at the same time it is possible to per- ceive the consequences.

explanation: An optimal measure of delegation means that on the different levels of management and operations right and adequate decisions can be taken. This way, human compe- tences are properly used and employees have responsibilities they are able to fulfil.

source: D. Keuning and D.J. Eppink, Management en organisatie: theorie en toepassing, (Ley- den, 1990) 193.

Rule 7 “Decentralisation suitable for public administration”

validity: development countries

rule: IF a development country has an inefficient public administration that does not have advanced information gathering and transmittal networks, an efficient and dedicated civil service and well developed institutions of citizen participation and accountability THEN a decentralised structure might be more suitable for the public administration.

explanation: For an efficient working of a centralised bureaucracy, advanced information gathering and transmittal networks, an efficient and dedicated civil service and well developed institutions of citizen participation and accountability are needed. A more primitive pub- lic sector environment is more suited to a decentralised form of governance, because information requirements and transaction costs are minimised by moving the decision- making closer to people who are affected by those decisions.

source: Anwar Shah, Balance, accountability and responsiveness, lessons about decentrali-

zation, The World Bank, (Washington D.C., 1998) 33.

Rule 8 “At any time clear responsibilities”

validity: development countries

rule: At any given time there must be clear rules specifying the range of responsibilities for each level of government.

explanation: In many cases decentralisation has occurred in a politically volatile environment in which the level of trust is low and policymakers respond unsystematically to emerging demands from below. Such a weak policy framework can lead to serious economic problems, including loss of macroeconomic control, regional disparities in service pro- vision, and misallocation of resources as a result of local capture.

source: World development report 1997, State, The World Bank, (Washington D.C., 1997) 124.

Rule 9 “Lack of institutional capacity”

validity: development countries / Indonesia

rule: IF there is lack of institutional capacity for decentralisation AND help from higher level governments is not available

THEN the decentralisation program should identify the nature and type of local gov- ernment, its clientele and its fiscal capacity. Taking into account these factors the pro- gram should assign differential powers to the various local governments.

explanation: Asymmetric decentralisations in Indonesia and Pakistan have shown that lack of institu- tional capacity should never be considered as an excuse not to decentralise.

source: Anwar Shah, Balance, accountability and responsiveness, lessons about decentraliza- tion, The World Bank, (Washington D.C., 1998) 31.

Rule 10 “Principle of subsidiarity”

validity: general / development countries

rule: Public goods and services should be provided by the lowest level of government that can fully capture the costs and benefits. This can partly be determined by looking at the demand and supply characteristics of the public goods and services:

Appropriate level of public provision

Demand-side factors Supply-side factors

Local • variation in local taste

• common property

• potential for competition be- tween jurisdictions

National / provincial

• spatial consumption external- ities

• equity concerns

• economies of scale

• cross-jurisdictional external- ities

IF the public services and goods are characterised as common property

THEN organisations outside the government might be the most appropriate institutional mechanism for delivery.

explanation: The principle of subsidiarity is one of the clearest and most important principles for reforms of intergovernmental arrangements. Its operationalisation is nonetheless more difficult. A practical guide in determining which level is most appropriate according to this principle, is to inspect the demand and supply characteristics. Examples for these factors are:

• Variation in local taste: street lighting, zoning

• Common property: urban roads, waste disposal

• Potential for competition between jurisdictions: police protection, road mainte- nance

• Spatial consumption externalities: control of epidemics

• Equity concerns: minimum standards for primary education

• Economies of scale: defence

• Cross-jurisdictional externalities: interurban highways

Separate organisations like forest or water user associations or NGOs may be most appropriate for delivery of local goods with common-property characteristics.

source: World development report 1997, State, The World Bank, (Washington D.C., 1997) 121-

122.

Rule 11 “Determine relationships for integrated policy execution”

validity: general

rule: Determine the scope of decentralisation by making a listing of all the relationships that play a role in integrated policy execution. For each relationship should be determined the importance for an integrated policy execution, the frequency that the relationship is of importance and the nature of the relationship (a one-sided or a reciprocal relation- ship).

explanation: Before being able to improve integrated policy execution, it is necessary to know what has to be integrated.

source: F. Fleurke, R. Hulst and P.J. de Vries, Decentraliseren met beleid. Een heuristiek, (The Hague, 1997) 35.

Rule 12 “Decentralise important, frequent and reciprocal relationships”

validity: general

rule: Tasks and competencies that should at least be decentralised to lower government levels for optimal integrated policy execution are those tasks and competencies that concern relationships which are of substantial importance, which are frequent and which are reciprocal.

explanation: Whether or not decision making and execution is concentrated on just one (lower) level, is a question of weighing the advantages of checks and balances, specialisation and economies of scale and the importance of certain interests. This weighing between concentration of decision making and the advantage of dividing tasks and competen- cies, are only of importance if the particular relationship is of importance and frequent.

Incidental relationships with other policy-fields are just not relevant enough for struc- tural design.

The nature of the relationship is also important. If there is just a one-sided dependency between both players in a relationship, then there is not a real danger to inconsistent policy execution. In case of reciprocal dependency between the players, there is danger for potential inconsistencies in the integrated policy execution and consequent less ef- fectiveness. This means that reciprocal dependencies are especially suitable for decen- tralisation in order to concentrate tasks and competencies on lower government levels.

source: F. Fleurke, R. Hulst and P.J. de Vries, Decentraliseren met beleid. Een heuristiek, (The Hague, 1997) 32-35.

Rule 13 “Reduction of local government’s dependence”

validity: general

rule: Reduce local government’s dependence on other governmental agents for more ade- quate responsiveness. Especially one-sided dependence-relationships are important to reduce.

IF not only adequate but also timely responsiveness is needed

THEN also elimination of the (most important) reciprocal dependence-relationship is needed.

explanation: Dependence on other governmental agents jeopardises adequate responsiveness by the local government. In the case of reciprocal dependence-relationships the local gov- ernment will always have some means of influencing the other agents, but in one-sided dependence-relationships it is left without any means of influencing the other. On the other hand, reciprocal dependence-relationship are certainly not a guarantee for quick reactions and should be eliminated whenever possible if timeliness is a necessity.

source: F. Fleurke, R. Hulst and P.J. de Vries, Decentraliseren met beleid. Een heuristiek, (The Hague, 1997) 48-49.

Rule 14 “A clear division of administrative services”

validity: general

rule: IF administrative services are to be subdivided according to products/services, geo- graphical territory, market/target groups, or functions,

THEN it must be clear for citizens and institutions to which administrative organisation they should turn to for all specific matters

AND citizens and institutions should not have to deal with various administrative or-

ganisations for the same matter.

explanation: A clear division of administrative services that is based on the needs of citizens and institutions improves transparency and accessibility.

source: W. Lemstra, W.J. Kuijken and C.J.N. Versteden (eds.), Handboek overheidsmanage- ment, (Alphen aan den Rijn, 1996) 121.

Rule 15 “Unity of command”

validity: general

rule: Unity of command: every civil servant employee should receive orders from only one superior.

explanation: The requirement of unity of command has to be guaranteed in order to prevent that a civil servant receives contradictory orders from above with the same level of authority to him. Unity of command can be facilitated by using procedures, instructions, planning and consultation.

source: One of the fourteen principles of organisation by Henri Fayol in: Stephen P. Robbins, Organization theory, structure, design and applications, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1990) 35-37.

D. Keuning and D.J. Eppink, Management en organisatie: theorie en toepassing, (Ley- den, 1990) 193.

Rule 16 “political control via hierarchical lines”

validity: general

rule: IF an administrative organ must answer directly to a political organ THEN the structure of the administrative organ should ideally be

EITHER a line-organisation without staff: clear hierarchy but danger of an over- loaded top,

OR a line- and staff-organisation: reasonably clear hierarchy without an over- loaded top, but staff-organs (e.g. finance) could take over control to a great ex- tent,

OR a project-organisation: suitable for interdisciplinary issues and innovating ac- tivities, but might result in strains on the usual job-activities.

OR a matrix-organisation: suitable for a combination of administrative functions with specific projects or themes which might help in case of growing complexity, but hierarchical lines might become confused with dominance of either the func- tional lines or else the projects/themes.

ELSE hierarchical lines may not be strong enough which might inhibit political control.

explanation: The supremacy of politics over public administration poses strict rules regarding deci- sion-making, accountability and makes hierarchical lines indispensable, especially where the political and the administrative subsystems interact. On a lower level within the administrative subsystems other organisational arrangements can also be feasible, e.g. professional bureaucracies and adhocracies.

source: W. Lemstra, W.J. Kuijken and C.J.N. Versteden (eds.), Handboek overheidsmanage- ment, (Alphen aan den Rijn, 1996) 121.

Rule 17 “Unity of direction”

validity: general

rule: Unity of direction: each group of organisational activities that have the same objective should be directed by one manager using one plan.

explanation: This is to prevent that within the organisation several different opposite strategies are pursued to reach the same goal. Following opposite strategies at the same time might result in a situation in which neither of both gets success.

source: One of the fourteen principles of organisation by Henri Fayol in: Stephen P. Robbins, Organization theory, structure, design and applications, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1990) 35-37.

Rule 18 “Guaranteeing nation-wide norms”

validity: general

rule: ● Determine whether or not there are important interests involved in the policy-field,

such as serious consequences for safety, health and inalienable rights of citizens or

institutions.

● Determine whether the present policy execution fulfils the central norms for quality and careful decision-making. IF not THEN try to identify the cause.

● IF these failures in quality and careful decision-making in the local government’s policy are caused by unacquaintedness with the norm or with a lack of know-how and expertise and/or might just be of temporary nature THEN resources should be provided for solving these failures.

● IF these failures in quality and careful decision-making in the local government’s policy are caused by the fact that the norms are controversial or are ignored on pur- pose AND these norms are absolutely necessary

THEN these norms have to be laid down in regulations and have to be uphold ac- cordingly.

explanation: Whether or not central norms for quality and careful decision-making are necessary and acceptable, is an issue that concerns many different opinions, which also can change over time. Even so, perceptions about such interests are regularly a source for centralised regulations in the form of minimal demands or the obligation for lower level governments to make their own regulations about their decision-making procedures, decision-criteria and quality-norms. In practice upholding these central regulations often turns out to be problematic.

Central norms can easily result in lower level governments feeling patronised. Therefor it is necessary to give sufficient attention to the justification of new norms. If the prob- lems are just a matter of lack of knowledge or of insufficient time to get accustomed to the norms, then lenient measures should be used.

source: F. Fleurke, R. Hulst and P.J. de Vries, Decentraliseren met beleid. Een heuristiek, (The Hague, 1997) 77-78.

Rule 19 “Guaranteeing national interests in local policies”

validity: general

rule: ● Determine whether or not the policy of the lower level governments within the de- centralised framework is in accordance with the realisation of essential goals of na- tional interest.

● Determine the causes of existing discrepancies between policies of lower level gov- ernment and goals of national interest.

● IF faulty realisation of national goals is caused by a lack of knowledge, expertise and/or policy-instruments

THEN resources have to be supplied in order to solve this

● IF faulty realisation of national goals is caused by differences of opinion and oppo- site interests between lower level governments and the central government

THEN directing lower level government policies should preferably be done by pos- ing performance demands.

explanation: Although decentralisation is necessary for responsiveness, tailoring, etc., it is in some cases also necessary to be able to direct local government policy in such a manner that local policies contribute to the realisation of national goals.

In case faulty realisation of national goals in local policies is caused by lack of know- how, then transfer of expertise and policy-instruments to local governments keeps the decentral character of the structure intact and can at the same time result in better re- alisation of central goals. In case local government is just unwilling to pursue central goals, then a certain form of coercion might be necessary. In such a situation it is nec- essary to choose a form of central direction that influences the eventual policy per- formance but interfers as little as possible with the way in which this performance will be realised.

source: F. Fleurke, R. Hulst and P.J. de Vries, Decentraliseren met beleid. Een heuristiek, (The Hague, 1997) 79-80.

Rule 20 “Competition between public and not-for-profit organisations”

validity: development countries

rule: IF public goods or the performances of public services have to be improved

THEN fiscal transfers can be used in enhancing competition for the supply of public

goods and services. Transfers could be made available to both public and not-for-profit

private sector on equal basis using as criteria the demographics of the population

served for example.

explanation: The role of fiscal transfers in enhancing competition for the supply of public goods should not be overlooked. For example, transfers for basic health and primary educa- tion can be made available to both sectors using as criteria the number of patients, school age population and student enrolments. This would promote competition and in- novation as both public and private institutions would compete for public funding.

Opening the access to fiscal transfers for not-for-profit organisations introduces strong incentives for public institutions to improve their performances and be competitive and are especially attractive for providing greater access to public services in rural areas.

source: Anwar Shah, Balance, accountability and responsiveness, lessons about decentraliza- tion, The World Bank, (Washington D.C., 1998) 32.

Rule 21 “Minimal levels of service needed?”

validity: general

rule: IF equality in the sense of guaranteeing a minimal level of services for citizens is de- manded

THEN it is recommended to describe precisely the minimal levels and enact it by regu- lations.

explanation: In case services are only guaranteed up to a minimal level then this also means that adapting to individual cases and local differences is possible, as long as minimal levels are maintained.

source: F. Fleurke, R. Hulst and P.J. de Vries, Decentraliseren met beleid. Een heuristiek, (The Hague, 1997) 75-76.

Rule 22 “Equal decision-making criteria needed?”

validity: general

rule: IF equality in the sense of applying the same decision-making criteria is demanded THEN it is recommended to describe precisely these decision-making criteria and en- act it by regulations (if necessary together with escape clauses for special cases).

explanation: In case it is desired to have the same decision-making criteria applied in each separate case, it is wise to have these clearly stated in regulations.

source: F. Fleurke, R. Hulst and P.J. de Vries, Decentraliseren met beleid. Een heuristiek, (The Hague, 1997) 76.

Rule 23 “Equal outcomes of decisions needed?”

validity: general

rule: IF equality in the sense of guaranteeing a minimal level of services for citizens is de- manded AND equality in the sense of applying the same decision-making criteria is demanded

AND IF equality in the sense of getting the same outcome of decisions in particular situations

THEN it is recommended to realise this not by regulations but by knowledge transfer, such as regulation models and programs for providing examples.

explanation: In case of uniformly determining outcomes of decisions in rules, there is a great risk that tailoring of the policy to specific needs is impeded. Therefor it is wiser to provide instead knowledge about how to handle different cases.

source: F. Fleurke, R. Hulst and P.J. de Vries, Decentraliseren met beleid. Een heuristiek, (The Hague, 1997) 75-77.

Rule 24 “Eliminate impediments in central programming”

validity: general

rule: Eliminate or alter those parts of central programming that impede a differentiated treat- ment, especially in case:

a) there is a uniform treatment for different cases,

b) there are prohibitions on decisions that are precisely needed for tailoring, c) there are proscriptions that don’t allow any latitude.

explanation: To improve tailored policy execution, central proscriptions and rules always have to be investigated whether or not they inhibit special treatment of certain cases and situa- tions.

source: F. Fleurke, R. Hulst and P.J. de Vries, Decentraliseren met beleid. Een heuristiek, (The

Hague, 1997) 23-24.

Rule 25 “Central government interests in integrated policy execution”

validity: general

rule: IF with integrated policy execution in particular cases a specific central government interest is helped

THEN together with relevant competencies supplemental resources have to be trans- ferred, such as knowledge about the relationships in the particular policy field, and suc- cessful integrated projects from the past, but the central government’s wish for integral policy execution should not result in proscriptions and procedure regulations, which im- pede local decision-making ability.

explanation: To realise the central objectives for integrated policy execution on decentralised level it will not be enough to just eliminate impediments for integrated policy execution on lower levels. Supplemental resources are needed to stimulate the integrated policy execution and it should be noted that directing in this case can also be effective without any coercion.

source: F. Fleurke, R. Hulst and P.J. de Vries, Decentraliseren met beleid. Een heuristiek, (The Hague, 1997) 40-41.

Rule 26 “Maintain positive elements in central programming”

validity: general

rule: Determine which elements of central programming have to be maintained or even strengthened in order to guarantee better tailoring, especially those elements that spec- ify more precisely the norm that has to be attained. This has to be done particularly if there are unfavourable conditions for tailoring (rule 31 “Unfavourable conditions for tai- loring”).

explanation: Although central rules that prescribe how to deal with individual cases can impede tai- loring, central rules that consist out of a more precise description of the norm and the target which have to be realised in the execution of the tasks don’t have to be impedi- ments to tailoring and can even enhance tailor-made policy execution. Those particular rules can be left alone or strengthened in the view of tailoring policies.

source: F. Fleurke, R. Hulst and P.J. de Vries, Decentraliseren met beleid. Een heuristiek, (The Hague, 1997) 23-24.

Rule 27 “Differentiate goods and services for better tailoring”

validity: general

rule: Determine how to differentiate between the provided goods and services in order to meet the requirement of tailoring taking into account:

a) the norm or target for that particular policy-field

b) the relevant differences between individual cases and situations for which this norm has to be realised.

explanation: Without a clear vision on how to differentiate between provided goods and services of a particular policy-field it will be impossible to determine which elements of the central administration have to be changed or eliminated and to determine to which extent cen- tral programming of the policy will still be possible or needed.

source: F. Fleurke, R. Hulst and P.J. de Vries, Decentraliseren met beleid. Een heuristiek, (The Hague, 1997) 21-22.

Rule 28 “Interest groups actively involved”

validity: general

rule: IF interest groups on local level are organised or at least give some active opposition AND IF these interest groups are involved in the policy execution on local level

THEN so far as tailoring is concerned decentralisation will only have to consist out of removing impediments for tailoring, mainly in central programming of tasks

ELSE rule 31 “Unfavourable conditions for tailoring”

explanation: Tailoring demands the availability of all relevant information concerning the character-

istics and situation of individual cases and to take this information into account in the

subsequent individual decisions. Active involvement of interest groups ensures that in-

formation about the relevant conditions will be “automatically” available which makes

gathering of information less dependent on the efforts of the government. Besides, ac-

tive opposition by interest groups reduces the risk that decisions are being made with-

out taking into account the relevant conditions of the individual case.

source: F. Fleurke, R. Hulst and P.J. de Vries, Decentraliseren met beleid. Een heuristiek, (The Hague, 1997) 24-25.

Rule 29 “Participation of the local private sector”

validity: general / development countries

rule: IF rent-seeking behaviour in the local private sector is minimal

THEN participation of a strong local private sector may promote better administrative performance by providing pressure on public entities.

explanation: The participation of local businesses can play a crucial role in decentralisation by shap- ing incentives at the local level. They have for centuries strongly influenced both the pace of (economic) development and intergovernmental relationships in industrial countries. The property-owning classes that had command over local resources exerted considerable pressure on public entities. A prerequisite for this role is however that rent-seeking behaviour such as the exploitation of local monopolies or oligopolies is minimal. This can be achieved by effective competition policies provided by higher level government.

source: World development report 1997, State, The World Bank, (Washington D.C., 1997) 123.

Rule 30 “Scarce resources allocated by political bodies”

validity: general

rule: IF policy execution is mainly focused on the distribution of scarce resources among different sectors and interests

THEN it is important that the local government has enough power or controlling instru- ments at its disposal in relation to the involved societal agents in order to ensure the dominance of the political arena over the policy execution.

explanation: In case organised interest groups or societal institutions play a certain role in policy execution, then they normally succeed in getting access to the decision-making. This access by organised societal agents can be detrimental to the role of the representative bodies. Especially in case the local government is dependent on the co-operation of certain organised societal agents, those agents are often involved in the preparation of the policy’s outline, which leaves less room for the representative bodies to impose their own wishes. When resources are scarce for policy execution, it ultimately should be the political arena where the distribution of these resources is decided and it is par- ticularly in this case when dominance by organised societal agents could be harmful. In such cases local government has to have enough governing power to counterweight those agents.

source: F. Fleurke, R. Hulst and P.J. de Vries, Decentraliseren met beleid. Een heuristiek, (The Hague, 1997) 70-71.

Rule 31 “Unfavourable conditions for tailoring”

validity: general

rule: IF the requirement of tailored execution is controversial in this policy OR IF diminishing financial means for this policy

OR IF the policy executing governmental body is (completely) financially responsible AND there is uncertainty about the financial consequences of the policy for them

OR IF the tasks before and after decentralisation will be performed by the same gov- ernmental body

THEN there are unfavourable conditions for tailoring. It is recommended to introduce compensations or guarantees in the decentralised government system in order to stimulate the real use of available possibilities for tailoring. Effective compensations and guarantees for tailoring are:

• particular forms of central programming that make norms and targets of policies more precise and concrete or obligate local government to take certain character- istics and situations of individual cases into account in their decisions. (See rule 26

“Maintain positive elements in central programming”)

• implementation programmes that support government bodies during decentralisa-

tion processes by clarifying the demanded changes for example by means of pilot

projects, model regulations, exchange of successful concepts and organisation

forms.

• a financial relationship that doesn’t place the financial burden of policy programs with uncertain and extensive expenditure amounts completely at the local gov- ernment level

explanation: Controversiality about the necessity of tailoring in a policy field and diminishing finan- cial means are unfavourable to implementing decentralisation to improve tailoring. Un- certainty about the financial consequences makes local government more inclined to provide subsidies and grants to the minimum amount in all cases instead of determin- ing the nature and necessary amount for all individual cases separately. Also continu- ing execution of the policy by the same administrative body entails risks for actually improving tailoring. The resistance of existing routines, but also the lack of capacity or expertise for necessary innovations and policy development, make it very possible that existing practises continue to live on unchanged.

source: F. Fleurke, R. Hulst and P.J. de Vries, Decentraliseren met beleid. Een heuristiek, (The Hague, 1997) 26-29.

Rule 32 “neutralising external effects of improving responsiveness”

validity: general

rule: IF external effects and/or prisoners’ dilemma’s threaten local government’s respon- siveness

THEN provisions in the decentralised governmental structure have to be made in order to give local governments more security about the conduct of relevant other local gov- ernments, such as mutual consultation or horizontal co-ordination between local gov- ernments.

explanation: Sometimes a local government disadvantages itself in relation to other local govern- ments by implementing responsiveness improvements. This can be the case when the outcome or effects of policy decisions are made dependent on the choices of other lo- cal governments. Insecurity about other relevant local government’s choices can lead to sub-optimal policy choices or may even paralyse decision-making. This undesirable negative competition of policies between local governments could be reason for cen- tralising the policy or for laying down central norms and standards.

source: F. Fleurke, R. Hulst and P.J. de Vries, Decentraliseren met beleid. Een heuristiek, (The Hague, 1997) 51-52.

Rule 33 “Stimulating first-movers in improving responsiveness”

validity: general

rule: Design provisions in the decentralised structure for reducing risks in case of responsive actions, or for rewarding local governments that act responsively (as first-movers). The decentralised structure should at least prevent that local governments that already have implemented improved responsiveness should be disadvantaged afterwards.

explanation: Being the first to innovate policies or approaches to new issues entails risks for the first mover. Although it might mean a competitive edge on the other lagging local govern- ments, it can also produce disadvantages later on when the chosen innovations turn out not to be the best available or become much cheaper after being developed.

source: F. Fleurke, R. Hulst and P.J. de Vries, Decentraliseren met beleid. Een heuristiek, (The Hague, 1997) 53-54.

Decentralisation project

Rule 34 “Plan for the long term”

validity: development countries

rule: Decentralisation should be planned with a long term horizon.

explanation: Decentralisation requires a lengthy period of gestation before its benefits will be real-

ised as it is an attempt to counteract, not to reinforce, ingrained bureaucratic and

managerial behaviour. Its success depends in large part on changes in attitudes and

behaviour that have been bred by and maintained through highly centralised structures

and procedures. As such, decentralisation requires thorough design, analysis and

preparation, which in turn requires a relatively long period for implementation before

positive results can be seen. Because decentralisation often goes against the grain of

tradition and custom and against the interests of those whose support is most important

for its success, it cannot be implemented without conflict. The inevitable conflicts can only be resolved through education and persuasion: processes that require a great deal of time.

source: Dennis A. Rondinelli, John R. Nellis and G. Shabbir Cheema, Decentralization in devel- oping countries, a review of recent experience, The World Bank, (Washington D.C., 1984) 72.

Rule 35 “Realistic expectations about decentralising incrementally”

validity: development countries

rule: IF decentralisation is viewed as an incremental process THEN expect a slow, halting and hesitant pace.

explanation: Although central government leaders have been afraid to actually execute decentralisa- tion and there are pervasive technical and administrative problems involved in transfer- ring responsibilities, there have been positive results with decentralisation. Although the record of decentralisation has been mixed, its problems are identifiable and potentially solvable.

source: Dennis A. Rondinelli, John R. Nellis and G. Shabbir Cheema, Decentralization in devel- oping countries, a review of recent experience, The World Bank, (Washington D.C., 1984) 45.

Rule 36 “First priority sectors”

rule: Decentralisation of service delivery should be carefully staged and be approached sec- torally, beginning in priority areas such as health, education or infrastructure.

explanation:

source: World development report 1997, State, The World Bank, (Washington D.C., 1997) 129- 130.

Rule 37 “Use of well-developed technology”

validity: development countries

rule: IF operations are primarily concerned with applying a well-developed technology THEN institutional transfer might be easier.

explanation: It seems that there is a intimate relationship between technological and institutional changes, and it is suggested that institutional transfer is easier in organisations whose operations are primarily concerned with applying a well-developed technology than in organisations that are not technology-centred.

source: Dennis A. Rondinelli, James S. McCullough and Ronald W. Johnson, “Analysing de- centralization policies in developing countries: a political-economy framework”, Devel- opment and change, 20 (1989) 1, 57-87, there 68.

Rule 38 “Transfer first simple functions, then more complex functions”

validity: development countries

rule: Functions should be allocated to local units incrementally, as they meet performance criteria. More complex functions should be transferred only after local units increase their administrative capacities and resources.

explanation: The functions transferred to local administrative units must be suited to their current or potential managerial capacities.

source: Dennis A. Rondinelli, John R. Nellis and G. Shabbir Cheema, Decentralization in devel- oping countries, a review of recent experience, The World Bank, (Washington D.C., 1984) 62-63.

Rule 39 “Plan small, expand incrementally”

validity: development countries

rule: Start with small-scale decentralisation projects designed for limited impact and expand decentralisation step by step.

explanation: Small-scale decentralisation programs designed for limited impact will generate more

positive and durable results than large-scale, sweeping, organisational reforms. The

smaller the program, the less threatening it will be and the less demanding of resources

and personnel. That small ventures are less likely to be discarded at the first disap-

pointment, is particularly important in the light of long term-planning. Small programs

are more likely to attract donors, who can see bearable costs in limited operations.

Small programs are more easily controlled and evaluated and are easier to learn from and to readjust. Successful small efforts can be expanded incrementally as personnel and organisations attain greater skills and capacity to plan and manage development activities.

source: Dennis A. Rondinelli, John R. Nellis and G. Shabbir Cheema, Decentralization in devel- oping countries, a review of recent experience, The World Bank, (Washington D.C., 1984) 72.

Rule 40 “Effective design and organisation of decentralisation programs”

validity: development countries

rule: For successful decentralisation there have to be clear and simple structures and proce- dures for decentralisation

AND the implementing agency staff must be able to interact with higher level authori- ties (e.g. staff-members with ranks that are high enough)

AND IF supporting institutions (public and private) which are needed to complement and bolster the managerial capacity of local governments, are absent or weak OR IF there are weaknesses in the linkages and interaction between central and local administration (integrated policy execution)

THEN central government agencies should provide assistance to weak local ad- ministrations, such as:

• offering training

• seconding personnel from central agencies to meet pressing staff shortages at the local level

• supervising and assessing local projects and providing technical assistance whenever problems or weaknesses appear

• creating a national cadre to supply personnel to agencies at provincial, district and local levels.

explanation: Many detailed central rules and regulations for decentralisation may turn out to be in- applicable at the local level. Furthermore, especially in some Asian countries the status of officials in decentralisation-programs has been too low to effectively interact with higher level authorities. Also the degree to which components of decentralised pro- grams are integrated is important for the success of decentralisation. For instance, rural development needs several (government) institutions working together and the com- plementarities among the institutions are as important as what the institutions do them- selves. This means that institutions must be linked both vertically and horizontally to provide a hierarchy of services and to increase the quality and reliability of service de- livery. Not only do the decentralised components have to be integrated, also linkages between central and local organisations have to be created between central and local governments in order to overcome weakness in administrative capacity at lower levels of government. Such linkages probably work better than just central regulations and controls. Despite this, there is always the risk that partnership between central and local government could be used to increase the penetration of central authority into the countryside.

source: Dennis A. Rondinelli, John R. Nellis and G. Shabbir Cheema, Decentralization in devel- oping countries, a review of recent experience, The World Bank, (Washington D.C., 1984) 57-61.

Rule 41 “Plan tutorially”

validity: development countries

rule: Closely supervise the first stages of decentralisation programmes to teach local staff and citizens how to handle new responsibilities.

explanation: Decentralisation programs in which the first stages are closely supervised efforts to teach local staff and citizens how to handle new responsibilities, will be more success- ful than those that transfer large numbers of tasks or great responsibility all at once. In many development countries centralist patterns and attitudes have become en- trenched. Low-level officials and local groups sometimes appear incapable of seizing initiatives, even when they are legally and financially empowered to do so. In other cases, the transfer of large responsibilities to inexperienced people has resulted in drastic declines in efficiency of delivery systems and in the quality of public services.

Successful programs for decentralisation must break the ingrained resistance to local

initiative without disrupting essential government activities. A tutorial perspective on the part of central officials is required. This involves the piecemeal, incremental build- ing up of responsibilities and resources of decentralised institutions. This runs the risk of excessively close supervision and central paternalism, but it may be the most that circumstance will bear.

source: Dennis A. Rondinelli, John R. Nellis and G. Shabbir Cheema, Decentralization in devel- oping countries, a review of recent experience, The World Bank, (Washington D.C., 1984) 73.

Rule 42 “Formal ex-post evaluation”

validity: development countries

rule: In order to nurture a climate of listening, learning and accountability in the public sec- tor, formal ex-post evaluation has to be performed.

explanation: Evaluation capacity development is of fundamental importance in public sector reform in developing countries. “Evaluation is to the public sector what accounting is to the pri- vate sector” (Picciotto).

source: Anwar Shah, Balance, accountability and responsiveness, lessons about decentraliza- tion, The World Bank, (Washington D.C., 1998) 31.

Rule 43 “Plan for donor involvement”

validity: development countries

rule: Plan for donor involvement, but at the same time plan for the gradual phase-out of donor activities

explanation: Programs of decentralisation that use the financial and personnel resources of donors will be better planned and more easily launched than those not involving international agencies. But when developing countries rely exclusively on donors, the long-range impact of decentralisation will be constrained.

Decentralisation requires strong, sustained political commitment, extra resources, new patterns of administrative behaviour, a reorientation of attitudes and relationships, and a long list of other requirements. The participation of international agencies can be cru- cial to the successful implementation of decentralisation. They can provide the means necessary to experiment and can help to persuade leaders that it is a wise and profit- able course of action. Many decentralisation programs in development countries would simply never have been initiated without the involvement of international agencies. The obvious danger is the possibility of establishing a dependent relationship, in which a government relies totally on the donor and commits few or no resources to the pro- gram. The mutual interests of the host government and international agencies will be served by maximising from the outset the financial and personnel commitments of the host government to decentralisation. Such programs should be supported by donors only when the host government has a substantial stake in the operation.

source: Dennis A. Rondinelli, John R. Nellis and G. Shabbir Cheema, Decentralization in devel- oping countries, a review of recent experience, The World Bank, (Washington D.C., 1984) 73-74.

Rule 44 “Political commitment and administrative support of central government”

validity: development countries

rule: For successful decentralisation national political leaders have to be committed to de- centralising planning and administrative functions;

AND the national bureaucracy has to be able and willing to facilitate and support de- centralised development activities.

explanation: Political commitment and administrative support from the central government is a pre- requisite for realising decentralisation.

source: Dennis A. Rondinelli, John R. Nellis and G. Shabbir Cheema, Decentralization in devel- oping countries, a review of recent experience, The World Bank, (Washington D.C., 1984) 46-47.

Rule 45 “Patient supporting decentralised bodies”

validity: development countries

rule: Until a local body is fully mature, it requires to be actively defended during the first ten or twenty years by external support in order to survive. Practical supports are the fol- lowing:

1. Explicit acceptance of governmental decentralisation as an important norm ranking equally with norms as the impartial administration of justice or civil service effi- ciency, and with the same access to public resources for achieving its goals.

2. Recognition by the (central) government that the norm of decentralisation is in con- flict with many others.

3. Construction of institutions with the purpose of especially preserving the decentral- ised character:

a) a central department having the power to represent and defend the decentralised authorities, in addition to serving as a channel of communication between central and decentralised governments;

b) central support to the executive of local authorities, especially to make their staff careers equally attractive with central government service; this can be stimulated by providing sufficiently intense inspection to maintain bureaucratic standards and by checking local budgets and legislation for financial wisdom and realism;

c) structures which cause the policy-makers of local authorities to be broadly repre- sentative of all local groups, able to decide local policy in a sense that they per- ceive as real, and trained so that they understand how to do it;

d) the provision of enough finance to enable each local authority to pay its execu- tive staff on equal terms with central government employees.

explanation: Practice shows how easy it is for an autonomous body, left to itself, to run into trouble through lack of resources, external competition from public agencies and individual politicians, internal corruption, or inefficiency. This is especially the case if deconcen- trated agents of the central government continue to exist at the local level.

source: Philip Mawhood (ed.), Local government in the third world, the experience of decentrali- zation in tropical Africa, Africa Institute of South Africa, (1993) 261-262.

Government resources

Rule 46 “Adequate financial, human and physical resources”

validity: development countries

rule: For successful decentralisation adequate financial, human and physical resources have to be provided to the decentralised government units in the initial stages.

explanation: Financial, human and physical resource constraints have inhibited the successful im- plementation of decentralisation in nearly all developing countries. The limited re- sources made available to local organisations in the initial stages of decentralisation undermine decentralisation policies and maintain weak local institutions.

source: Dennis A. Rondinelli, John R. Nellis and G. Shabbir Cheema, Decentralization in devel- oping countries, a review of recent experience, The World Bank, (Washington D.C., 1984) 63 and 69.

Financial resources

Rule 47 “Choose financial arrangement”

validity: general / development countries

rule: Depending on the situation at hand, choose feasible financial arrangements with as much autonomy as possible in the following order (from most favourable to least fa- vourable to decentralisation):

1. Own revenues: local government is able to levy and collect their own taxes.

2. General grants: grants that are given without any direction as to how they must be spent. Often these grants are calculated mathematically based on the available lo- cal resources and needs of the local government.

3. Assigned revenues: prescribed and collected by the central government but trans-

ferred to local government. These are a little less favourable than general grants,

because they do not take into account a calculation of local resources and needs.

This category includes ‘own resources’ in which case local government does not have discretion over determining the amount of tax collected.

4. Incentive grants for a stated proportion of the financial cost: Local government has to decide whether or not to adopt such policies with incentive grants, but the offer of an incentive grant is persuasive to adopt centrally favoured policies.

5. Hundred-per-cent grants: No local contribution is required and the local government only acts as a spending agent. Normally such grants are accompanied by strong central direction. It should be noted that despite their centralistic character such grants can be valuable, especially in the case of permanent existence of grants for helping local governments fight emergencies (e.g. floodings, infectious diseases and environmental disasters).

6. Deficiency grants: These grants just make up the difference between a local gov- ernment’s actual expenditure and its actual revenues. They do nothing to encourage local responsibility in collecting and spending and are quite similar to financial ar- rangements with subordinate government agencies.

explanation: It is very important that the money is handled efficiently by local government and that this is done in conformity with the main national policy objectives as long as they are not working to destroy local autonomy but to protect it. The form of the financial ar- rangement is a good indication whether or not autonomy is real.

source: Philip Mawhood (ed.), Local government in the third world, the experience of decentrali- zation in tropical Africa, Africa Institute of South Africa, (1993) 13-14.

Rule 48 “Serious local inefficiencies”

validity: general

rule: IF inefficiencies are caused by the situation that the central government (in fact) bears the financial consequences of lower level government decisions

AND these inefficiencies are serious

THEN an increase of the financial responsibility of lower level government for those decisions is necessary.

explanation: This rule refers to the extent of financial responsibility by lower level government. For instance, in case a directive for declarations is not properly monitored by local govern- ment, then a transfer from the central budget to local budgets accompanied by financial responsibility might be the solution. Another solution for this example could be an ad- justment of declaration payments afterwards which make local governments pay for in- efficiencies caused by their own negligency.

source: F. Fleurke, R. Hulst and P.J. de Vries, Decentraliseren met beleid. Een heuristiek, (The Hague, 1997) 60.

Rule 49 “Well designed fiscal transfers program”

validity: development countries

rule: For successful decentralisation there has to be a fiscal transfers program that is simple, transparent and consistent with its objectives.

explanation: For successful decentralisation is needed a well designed fiscal transfers program. This enhances accountability of the fiscal system just as general revenue sharing has the potential to undermine it.

source: Anwar Shah, Balance, accountability and responsiveness, lessons about decentraliza- tion, The World Bank, (Washington D.C., 1998) 32.

Rule 50 “Representativeness vs. financial viability”

validity: development countries

rule: Decentralise to smaller geographical areas with a more limited population in order to enhance representativeness, but at the same time secure financial viability by choosing a population and area size with enough taxable capacity to support an efficient local administration for the decentralised services.

explanation: The dilemma between wishing optimal representativeness by smaller population/area sizes on the one hand and optimal taxable capacity for financial viability by choosing larger population/area sizes, is more difficult to solve in development countries. Espe- cially in the rural countryside people have low incomes and live scattered over wide ar- eas. Different services may demand different areas for their optimum performance.

Setting up special-purpose authorities each with its own particular function and area is

not always an ideal solution as it can cause co-ordination problems when specialist and generalist organisations have overlap.

source: Philip Mawhood (ed.), Local government in the third world, the experience of decentrali- zation in tropical Africa, Africa Institute of South Africa, (1993) 10.

Rule 51 “Autonomous financial responsibility”

validity: development countries

rule: Serious decentralisation involves large increases in the power of sub-national units to raise revenues

AND IF there exists behavioural dependency on central subsidies OR there is weak tax base

THEN extra measures should be taken to ensure that there is an increase in the revenue sums that are actually generated

AND IF there is a weak tax base

THEN it might be advisable to raise only for projects aimed at clearly felt needs explanation: Autonomous financial responsibility is at the core of decentralisation. Not only legal

authority to impose taxes is necessary, but also the achievement of getting the money by that legal authority. A weak tax base and behavioural dependency on central subsi- dies could cause problems as it might be that no attempts are made to implement the theoretical power. In case of a weak tax base, then it would be advisable to raise only for projects aimed at clearly felt needs.

source: Dennis A. Rondinelli, John R. Nellis and G. Shabbir Cheema, Decentralization in devel- oping countries, a review of recent experience, The World Bank, (Washington D.C., 1984) 43-44.

Rule 52 “Efficient, controlled and uncorrupt local tax collection”

validity: development countries

rule: Local revenue collection needs an efficient, controlled and uncorrupted administration, which can be stimulated by:

• self-respect and a high morale among its councillors and local officials, which de- pends to some extent on the central government’s own attitudes;

• a sufficient measure of financial autonomy which forms an incentive to seek out the highly profitable activities in order to tax them for local services (e.g. with the help of rewards for the more successful council or staff).

• being aware that the local finance committee should not rely wholly upon the gov- ernment auditor to prevent theft and corruption. Before enough experience is built up in the council an external inspector is needed to make regular visits.

explanation: Although efficient, controlled and uncorrupted local revenue collection is easier to say than to get, there are some tangible means for improving the situation.

source: Philip Mawhood (ed.), Local government in the third world, the experience of decentrali- zation in tropical Africa, Africa Institute of South Africa, (1993) 16-17.

Rule 53 “Financial decentralisation for urban services”

validity: development countries

rule: IF financial responsibilities for urban services are decentralised

THEN municipal administrative capacity has first to be strengthened by:

1. Grant municipal governments the authority to organise themselves more effectively to raise and manage the revenues needed to finance urban service and infrastruc- ture

2. Initiate or expand training and technical assistance to improve municipal planning and management capacity

3. Provide new incentives for municipal governments to increase local revenue collec- tions

4. Assist municipal governments to reduce the costs of service provision and to man- age expenditures more efficiently.

explanation: In most developing countries, central governments must give municipalities more au-

thority to raise taxes from a wider variety of local sources and to use a greater number

of tax instruments. But expanding their revenue-raising authority alone will have little

impact on improving the capacity of municipal governments to provide services if they

continue to be plagued by inefficient organisational structures and operating proce-

dures, and lack clear legal authority to deal effectively with urban development prob- lems.

source: Dennis A. Rondinelli, “Financing the decentralization of urban services in developing countries: administrative requirements for fiscal improvements”, Studies in comparative international development, 25 (1990) 2, 43-59, there 54.

Rule 54 “Decentralise financial responsibility for local services”

validity: general

rule: ONLY IF it is desirable to have the control over execution, extent, nature and quality of a particular service in the hands of local government

THEN a form of decentralisation with complete transfer of financial responsibility is logical and doesn’t need any further evaluation

ELSE decentralisation should lead to a balanced relation between the financial risks for an executing administrative agent and its capacity to influence the extent and effi- ciency of the policy expenditures. Therefore:

IF citizens and other legal persons are entitled to claim certain governmental services by law

OR IF executing administrative agents do not possess sufficient authority to distinct between rightful claimants and unrightful ones

OR IF expenditures of the program depend on the policy execution of other administrative agents

THEN the financial responsibility for the policy executing agent should re- main limited in order to avoid that excessive expenditures, caused by factors outside its influence, have to be borne by that agent;

IF expenditure levels can be predicted well by one or more indicators THEN setting of norms might be a good efficiency incentive

ELSE budgeting for a longer period based on the actual expenditures at the beginning of that period can be an efficiency incentive

OR the policy-executing agent should be provided with the authority and/or means to control the amount of its financial burdens.

explanation: Services which are already performed under complete responsibility of the local gov- ernments and for which local preferences may be decisive in every aspect, can be de- centralised financially without risk. In case of (legal) demands by the central govern- ment on the extent or quality of the services that have to be realised by local govern- ment, risks will be present. Because of these external risks, which can’t be influenced by the executing agent, adverse financial consequences should be shared or borne by the central government. To preserve some sort of efficiency incentive the setting of norms can be used in more predictable cases, or long-term budgeting. Although long- term budgeting does not place the financial responsibility at the local level, it still limits declaration possibilities for local governments on the short run.

source: F. Fleurke, R. Hulst and P.J. de Vries, Decentraliseren met beleid. Een heuristiek, (The Hague, 1997) 61-63.

Rule 55 “eliminate central regulations that impede efficient expenditures”

validity: general

rule: IF inefficiencies are caused by central spending regulations that exclude certain effi- cient expenditures

AND these inefficiencies are serious

THEN those regulations should be eliminated

explanation: This rule refers to the policy freedom provided by the central government to local gov- ernment. Certain central regulations can cause inefficiencies, for example inefficiencies that are a result of fatal deadlines for subsidies and grants.

source: F. Fleurke, R. Hulst and P.J. de Vries, Decentraliseren met beleid. Een heuristiek, (The Hague, 1997) 60.

Rule 56 “Absence of a powerful local administrative agent”

validity: general

rule: IF a specific central governmental interest is involved in integrated policy execution by

lower levels of government

AND IF there is not a local administrative agent with much power over the sectors con- cerned

THEN IF financial means are available to a certain extent

THEN scarcity of financial means in that policy field must be avoided in order to stimulate integrated policy execution

ELSE aimed incentives that will stimulate integrated policy execution or the participation of the relevant agents have to be incorporated in the administra- tive structure.

explanation: If there is one local administrative agent who dominates de facto in integrated policy execution, then decentralisation is relatively easy. But without, it is quite difficult to change the activities and employment of resources as they are attached to interests among the participators in the policy execution. Rearranging will be much more difficult when there is also less money to spend. On the other hand, if there is money available then it will exactly stimulate participation of the agents if they are rewarded or compen- sated for co-operating in the decentralisation.

source: F. Fleurke, R. Hulst and P.J. de Vries, Decentraliseren met beleid. Een heuristiek, (The Hague, 1997) 43-44.

Rule 57 “Determine the inefficiencies”

validity: general

rule: Determine the nature and extent of the inefficiencies in the task execution in the pre- sent administrative structure and answer for each the following questions for determin- ing their origin:

• How far is the centralistic character of the administrative structure really responsible for the inefficient expenditures or for insufficiently guarding the access to the ser- vice? Those elements should be eliminated.

• Which elements of the administrative structure precisely form a valuable guarantee for efficiency? These elements have to be maintained as far as possible.

• Which factors of inefficiency are situated outside its administrative structure? For these factors a change in the financial situation might not mean a change in effi- ciency. Other means should be provided to the local government for tackling these inefficiencies. For instance, it could be that the local government does not have enough resources or the authority to do something about it.

explanation: If it is expected that decentralisation will improve efficiency, it implicitly means that it is assumed that the centralistic structure causes many substantial inefficiencies. This cer- tainly may not be the case for all inefficiencies and therefor further analysis of these in- efficiencies is needed before actual choices are made.

Regarding centralistic inefficiencies might be caused by absence of financial responsi- bility for lower government levels, the nature and details of spending regulations and the distribution of decision-making authorities for the allocation of financial means.

source: F. Fleurke, R. Hulst and P.J. de Vries, Decentraliseren met beleid. Een heuristiek, (The Hague, 1997) 58-59.

Rule 58 “Avoid undesired forms of controlling expenditures”

validity: general

rule: IF the judicial framework only provides a global right on particular government services and has produced a vague norm for providing these services

OR IF the knowledge among interested parties about their right to certain government services is lacking

OR IF there aren’t any organisations of interested parties or their caretakers

OR IF the amount of the expenditures for the services concerned are extensive, unsta- ble and/or unpredictable

THEN there is a high risk for undesired forms of controlling expenditures by local gov-

ernments and countermeasures have to be taken; one possibility is to decentralise the

financial responsibility only to a limited extent (see rule 54 “Decentralise financial re-

sponsibility for local services”); another possibility is to implement guarantees in the

administrative structure as a guarantee against undesired forms of controlling expendi-

tures, such as more precisely described obligations for lower governments by central

programming, selective forms of administrative supervision, or by making regulations

or laws that interested parties can invoke against local government.