Business controller perception on a PMS, the enabling versus coercive bureaucracy: a case study.

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Business controller perception on a PMS, the

enabling versus coercive bureaucracy: a case study.

Master thesis - University of Groningen Frank van Loo

MSc. Business Administration - Organizational- & Management Control Student number: 20101035

E-mail: f.p.van.loo@student.rug.nl

Supervisor: Drs. D.P. Tavenier Co-assessor: Dr. M.P. van der Steen

Word count: 12.469 Research questions:

What makes controllers to perceive PMS as enabling of use versus coercive of use? What outcomes are generated by a perceived enabling PMS use versus coercive use?

Summary:

A case research has been performed by interviewing business controllers at a large Multinational retail company. Influencing factors that impact the implementation of a PMS are researched. The impact of these factors on the PMS being perceived as being enabling or coercive is looked into.

Furthermore outcomes that results from an enabling or a coercive perceived PMS are identified. Results show that an enabling or coercive perception of the PMS have a different impact, but

also shows some impact in outcomes that are impacted. Key words:

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1. Table of Contents

1. Table of Contents ... 1

2. Introduction ... 3

3. Literature Review ... 5

3.1 Performance Measurement System ... 5

3.2 Coercive versus enabling bureaucracy ... 6

3.3 Influencing factors ... 7

3.3.1 Senior management behavior (perception on) ... 7

3.3.2 Resource constraint ... 8

3.3.3 Employee willingness ... 8

3.3.4 Business controller role ... 9

3.4 Outcomes ... 10

3.4.1 Quality of budgets ... 10

3.4.2 Future change perception ... 10

3.5 Theoretical model & subquestions ... 11

3.5.1 Theoretical model ... 11

3.5.2 Subquestions ... 12

4. Methodology ... 13

4.1 Case company - Royal ABC NV ... 13

4.2 Benefit tracking for IP ... 13

4.3 Research type ... 14

4.4 Research design ... 14

4.5 Data analysis procedure ... 17

5. Analysis... 18

5.1 Analysis per influencing factor ... 18

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5.1.7 Communication with stakeholders ... 24

6. Discussion ... 26

6.1 Discussion per influencing factor ... 26

6.1.1 Senior management behavior (perception on) ... 26

6.1.2 Resource constraint ... 26

6.1.3 Employee willingness ... 27

6.1.7 Communication with stakeholders ... 29

7. Conclusion ... 30

7.1 Implications ... 31

7.1.1 Theoretical implications ... 31

7.1.2 Practical implications ... 32

7.2 Limitations ... 32

7.3 Acknowledgments ... Fout! Bladwijzer niet gedefinieerd. 8. References ... 33

Appendix 1 - Interview questions (English) ... Fout! Bladwijzer niet gedefinieerd.

Appendix 2 - Interview Questions (Dutch) ... Fout! Bladwijzer niet gedefinieerd.

Appendix 3 – Example of field note ... Fout! Bladwijzer niet gedefinieerd.

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2. Introduction

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understanding of the effects resulting from a PMS being shaped in such a manner. To know how a PMS is shaped as being coercive versus enabling is the first step. The second step, which is of great practical relevance, is to research what effects are the result of a certain configuration of a PMS. By researching these effects the practical implication of shaping a PMS in a certain manner is identified. Thereby the way in which a PMS is shaped can be put to better use in future practices as it is know how PMSs are being perceived as coercive versus enabling and what the effect is that results of this use.

Research question 1: What makes controllers to perceive PMS as enabling of use versus coercive

of use?

Research question 2: What is the effect that is the result of a perceived enabling PMS use versus

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3. Literature Review

To be able to research what shapes a PMS as being perceived as coercive or enabling a theoretical framework of existing literature is outlined. This theoretical framework explains PMSs, the enabling versus coercive bureaucracy and outlines several aspects that literature deems important in the implementation of PMS. These aspects form the broad base of this qualitative case study. The reason that qualitative research is used is that there is little written about the relationship between the implementation of a PMS, the perceived type of use of the PMS and the outcomes stemming from this perceived use of the PMS (De Haas & Algra, 2002; Bisbe & Otley, 2004; Wouters & Wilderom, 2008). This qualitative case study is of exploratory nature and thereby identified specific factors that are relevant for the perceived use of a PMS in practice, as well as outcomes stemming from the specific type of use.

3.1 Performance Measurement System

PMSs are generally seen as a broad range of systems and activities used for managing and controlling organizational performance. This encompasses a broader set of systems than solely MCSs, although this does include MCSs or allows a PMS to be a MCS (Ferreira & Otley, 2009). A PMS can include financial controls, non-financial controls and hybrids. More recent, PMSs consisting of a combination of financial and non-financial as the balanced scorecard have been gaining dominance (Malmi & Brown, 2008). PMSs can be seen as information systems aimed at communicating the performance of activities (Forza & Salvador, 2000). This is done by measuring performance and communicating these measured activities to stakeholders (Maisel, 2001). In this sense there is a multitude of stakeholders at whom this communication can be aimed. These can be management, shareholders or governments, but also consumers and employees (Choong, 2014). The discussed communication provides information, motivation and accountability to aid decision making (Kanji, 2002). In this research, consistent with an extensive range of literature, a broad definition of PMSs will be used: Performance Measurement Systems

are (ranges of) systems and activities that measure performance to manage and control organizational performance and communicate this to stakeholders. This definition is linked to

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The use of PMSs has been incorporated in business practice for decennia. Since the Second World War, the use of PMSs has increased as more companies adopted some sort of budgeting and management accounting techniques (Chandler, 1962; Sord & Welsh, 1962; Bourne, Neely, Mills & Platts, 2003). PMSs are traditionally used in an accounting based fashion (Neely, Mills, Gregory & Platts, 1995). This traditional use results in control focused on efficiency (Eccles, 1991). Critique on this one-sided form has underlined this use of PMSs as being backward-looking and not able to measure costs in a reliable way (Johnson and Kaplan, 1987; Chandler, 1977). This call for a broader insight in PMSs is answered by empirical studies that support and develop a broader set of PMSs, which enriched the traditional use to include new performance measures (Baines & Langfield-Smith, 2003; Maiga & Jacobs, 2005). The field of PMS research has thereby evolved with the development of PMSs such as total quality management and the balanced scorecard, which include non-financial measures (Kanji, 2002; Kaplan & Norton, 1992). As a result, research on PMSs stretches a broad field and judging the vast amount of papers written on the topic, it is of considerable interest (Choong, 2014).

3.2 Coercive versus enabling bureaucracy

Alongside the evolution of the type of PMSs, research on the different ways to use PMSs has been conducted. In this stream of research, generally two types of use of PMSs can be identified: one focused on control and one on enabling [of employees] (Franco-Santos, Lucianetti & Bourne, 2012). Multiple definitions are given in literature for two uses of PMSs that show strong similarities. Researchers often define these two uses of PMSs as interactive and diagnostic (Marginson, 2002; Bisbe & Otley, 2004; Henri, 2006). Zimmerman (1997) states that there is a dualistic role of PMSs: control and decision making. A strong and often used definition is the one used by Wouters & Wilderom (2008) that uses the coercive versus enabling bureaucracy by Adler and Borys (1996). Coercive control (PMS) is defined as: ‘to force reluctant compliance and to extract recalcitrant effort’ (Adler and Borys, 1996: 69). Coercive control is a rather top-down control style (Adler, 1999; Ahrens and Chapman, 2004). Enabling control (PMS) is defined as: ‘to enable employees to deal more effectively with [the work process’] inevitable contingencies’ (Adler and Borys, 1996: 69). Enabling control is thereby viewed as a more collaborative control style (Adler, 1999). In theory a PMS might be shaped for a sole enabling or a sole coercive use, in practice however the abovementioned balance might be a more realistic scenario. Within this balance one of the uses might be dominant, nonetheless in practice both uses will be present.

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Diagnostic (coercive) use of PMSs focuses on the support of implementation of strategy [by senior management] (Henri, 2006). Research by Simons (1995) is an example displaying the use of PMSs from the perspective of senior management. In his definition a PMS objective is to aid senior management in achieving their goals. Ferreira and Otley (2009) similarly view PMSs through the lens of management, as their focus is the realization of management key objectives and goals.

Although focus has traditionally been on the coercive use of PMSs (Bisbe & Otley, 2004; de Haas & Algra, 2002), recently more interest has been displayed in the enabling use of PMSs (Wouters & Wilderom, 2008). While the coercive use of PMSs is a more traditional accounting based use, the enabling use of PMSs can be seen as more modern, as it was introduced far later in time. An early notion of control that can be linked to enabling control (in turn use of PMSs) is given by Jönsson & Grönlund (1988). A quote (p. 531) from their exploratory research shows that, in the manufacturing company central in the study, the importance of enabling people is acknowledged: “People won't accept a job unless they feel they are in control, that it is meaningful and valuable." This led the researchers to state the importance of a learning (enabling) component in control systems and consequently the need for further research on the topic. Other researchers also acknowledge the benefits of the enabling use of PMSs. Henri (2006) states that the interactive (enabling) use of PMSs fosters organizational learning, while the diagnostic (coercive) use might lead to constraints in organizational learning. Research has also found a positive effect of the enabling use of PMSs on creativity, as psychological empowerment helps to explain the relationship between PMSs and creativity (Moulang, 2015). In their case study Canonico, De Nito, Esposito, Martinez, Mercurio, & Iacono (2015) show the benefit of an enabling use of PMSs for organizational (double-loop) learning. The most important finding however, is the existence of a great dominance of the use of coercive control.

3.3 Influencing factors

In previous literature on the implementation of PMS multiple important aspects that influence the implementation of a PMS are highlighted. In the following section these are introduced and explained. As this research focuses on the implementation of a PMS, these aspects are used as base for the research.

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enabling the senior management behavior as perceived by business controllers might thereby be of importance on how a PMS is perceived. Van Camp & Braet (2016) mention the importance of ambition, interest, and motivation in the behavior that is sown by senior management in order for an implementation to be successful. The coercive versus enabling bureaucracy has a specific relation with senior management behavior by means of the goal a PMS has. Research by Bourne (2005) also found the importance of senior management behavior. This research shows that time and effort put in by senior management is important for the success of the implementation of a PMS. Furthermore Bourne (2005) stressed that senior management commitment is not absolute. In other words, the senior management commitment level may change over time. Earlier research by Bourne, Neely, Platts & Mills (2002) stressed that the senior management support and commitment is important for both the initial successful implementation but also for the on-going usage of the PMS. Besides, the top management influence during the on-on-going usage also had a positive effect on solving future problems arising in the usage of the PMS. Tung, Baird & Schoch (2011) found significant results and support for their hypothesis that senior management support was associated with performance-related outcomes of a PMS, thereby indicating the importance in a successful implementation. Concluding, a broad base of literature can be found that indicates the importance of senior management commitment in the implementation of PMS (Tung et al., 2011).

3.3.2 Resource constraint

Jordan & Messner (2012) found that performance indicators are perceived as being enabling when performance indicators are facilitators of actions, given that these performance indicators furnish little constraints at the most. In a more general light constrains of time and resources might lead to difficulties in implementing a new PMS, while the benefits from new performance measurement systems could be outweighed by increased bureaucracy (Ittner and Larcker, 1997). In a similar fashion Perera and Baker (2007) found for SMEs that time and resource constraints inhibit effective use of PMSs in general. Van Camp and Braet (2016) indicate resource constraints as a possible reason for PMS failure by leading to a biased and incomplete PMS. Resource constraints in this fashion are defined as constraints in: ‘’time, people and money.’’ This description (p. 681) of van Camp and Braet (2016) will be used in this research as it is complete and is grounded in a broad base of literature (e.g. Turban, Sharda & Delen, 2011; Micheli & Manzoni, 2010).

3.3.3 Employee willingness

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following (2005, p. 314): “Since interactive control initiates discussions about strategic uncertainties, it is likely that more information about subordinates’ and peers’ actions is disclosed when compared to diagnostic control. This is likely to intensify resistance to change.” As can be identified from this quote, the implementation of PMSs can be accompanied with resistance to change, thence showing low employee willingness. Employee willingness is considered an important aspect of organizational commitment which has been indirectly linked to readiness for change (Madsen, Miller & John, 2005). Thereby one could argue that it contributes to a sound implementation of change, such as the implementation of a PMS. Moreover, multiple researchers have noted the importance of support of employees in change implementations (e.g. Herold, Fedor & Caldwell, 2007). Thereby the concept of employee willingness is repeatedly used to assess the support of employees for a certain implementation (Van der Voet, 2013). In line with this use of employee willingness, the following definition of employee willingness will be used: “willingness [of employees] to exert considerable effort on behalf of the organization” (Mathews & Shepherd, 2002, p. 369).

3.3.4 Business controller role

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3.4 Outcomes

3.4.1 Quality of budgets

In literature generally the implementation of PMS is assessed as a success or as failure. Widespread the importance and added value of PMS is acknowledged, yet the potential failure of the implementation cannot be neglected as there still is a great possibility of failure (De Waal & Counet, 2009). In this research the success of a PMS is seen as the attainment of the goals of the implementation, which is improved budgeting practice. Pohl et al. (2011) performed specific research to PMS for . Their research showed that it is important for a department to have a solid PMS in place thereby communicating results thoroughly. This communication of results should lead to better [strategic] planning in the company which is in turn related to performance. This is endorsed by Clinquini and Mitchell (2005) who define an effective and thus successful PMS as a PMS that achieves the objectives set for a task. In line with this definition is the importance of communication of goals or attainment of goals, which is also mentioned as important aspect.

3.4.2 Future change perception

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3.5 Theoretical model & sub questions

3.5.1 Theoretical model

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3.5.2 Sub questions

Based on the theoretical model that is derived from the literature, the research question is split into multiple sub questions, these sub questions are covered in separate parts of the interview questions.

Research question 1: What makes controllers to perceive PMS as enabling of use versus coercive

of use?

SQ1: How does the perception on senior management behavior (by business controllers) impact the perception of the PMS (balance between enabling and coercive)?

SQ2: How do the available resources impact the perception of the PMS (balance between enabling and coercive)?

SQ3: How does the business controller role & responsibility impact the perception of the PMS (balance between enabling and coercive)?

SQ4: How does the employee (business controller) willingness impact the perception of the PMS (balance between enabling and coercive)?

Research question 2: What is the effect that is the result of a perceived enabling PMS use versus

coercive use?

SQ5: What is the impact of a PMS that is perceived as enabling on the outcomes (quality of budgets & future change perception) of the implementation of this PMS?

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4. Methodology

4.1 Case company – AB corp

AB corp(ABC) is an international retail concern with its roots in the Netherlands. The company is divided in an European operating unit and an US operating unit. The company focuses on retail and owns multiple brands of stores.. Furthermore the company is active with multiple online platforms.

The focus in this research is put on the European operating unit, specifically on the Indirect (IP) department. The IP department sources goods, which are not sold to consumers, for their internal business stakeholders of the multiple ABC brands. In this sense the IP department differs from the regular (direct ) in that none of the goods are actually retail goods or consumer goods that end up in the stores as sellable products. Stakeholders are the multiple brands that are included in the European Operating Unit.

4.2 Benefit tracking for IP

ABC is distinctively chosen as case company, because of the specific implementation of a PMS that took place. At ABC, benefit tracking was introduced mid 2015 to support information provision from IP to controlling teams of the different brands. The process was initiated by the senior vice president responsible (amongst others) for the IP department. The development process was led by the business controller of the IP department (also member of IP management team) and featured input from IP senior managers and buyers as well as business controllers and managers. The systems should eventually allow controllers to perform (a part of) their work better and also gave better data provision to senior management. As more data came available throughout ABC better insight was given in the budgeting practices.

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decades, but can still be seen as very relevant as Stoelhorst and Strikwerda (2009) note that it still is the dominant organizational form. As the IP department is an overhead department working for multiple brands (business units/departments) the same question arose and was aimed to be solved by the implementation of benefit tracking.

Benefit tracking is achieved by sharing benefit forms with information concerning a certain project with business managers and business controllers. The benefit forms contain all details regarding the contract and specifically show the calculation of the project value and realized savings. The benefit forms are signed off by the business manager(s) and business controller(s) responsible. By this sign off not only the business manager is fully aware of the specifics of the project (which was already the case before the introduction of benefit tracking), but also the business controller is informed with regards to the realized savings that (might) impact his/her budget. Benefit tracking in the scope of this research is thereby defined as the communication through benefit forms of savings realized by the IP department that impacts the budget of the business controllers at whom the communication is addressed.

4.3 Research type

A sound base of literature is present on the implementation of PMSs. Also recently more interest has been generated into the enabling and coercive bureaucracy in relation with PMSs. Nevertheless a gap exists in the explanation of how a PMS is implemented and shaped in such a way that is perceived as enabling and/or coercive. Calls have been place to perform research in this area and discover how a PMS is shaped in such a way that it is perceived as enabling or coercive (Ittner and Larcker, 1997; Tuomela, 2005; Wouters & Wilderom, 2008; Wouters & Roijmans, 2011; Jordan & Messner, 2012). Specifically no practical research has been performed to investigate this interaction, while the practical relevance is great as great amounts of money are involved and are being reported by the PMS that are subject. Therefore, exploratory research to develop theory is performed to contribute to literature and also help practitioners (Eisenhardt, 1989). A single company case study is performed by using field notes and conducting semi-structured interviews at multiple departments. A cross case analysis is performed to investigate differences between different sized and organized departments (brands) at ABC.

4.4 Research design

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reliability (Van Aken, Berends, Van der Bij, 2012). For the two smallest departments one controller was interviewed, for the two bigger departments four controllers per department were interviewed, totaling to a number of 10 interviews.

By conducting interviews in more than one team generalizability of the results was improved (Van Aken, Berends, Van der Bij, 2012). As results could be attributed to more than one team, in contrast to just one team the results could better be generalized, thereby giving this improvement. Furthermore due to differing specifications of the departments and different relations to senior management these departments were looked at separate initially. By initially looking at these departments separately a form of cross case analysis was performed. Cross case analysis allows to identify commonalities or differences among cases thereby increasing generalizability and value of the outcomes of the case study (Khan & VanWhynsberghe, 2008).

Besides working for different departments the main attribute that caused difference relevant for this research was the experience (in time) with the PMS. The difference in experience was rather large and showed a bandwidth between 4 and 18 months of experience. Nevertheless the experience with the PMS did not show to be of great influence on the results, far more important was the difference of being involved in the introduction of the PMS as opposed to starting to work with it after the implementation (due to starting in the function of business controller in a later point of time). This is discussed in more depth in the results and discussion part.

Interview Departement Responsibility Gender Experience with the PMS

1 (Pilot) ABC 1 Real estate & construction

F 4 months

2 ABC 1 Other store expenses M 18 months (from start)

3 ABC 1 Overhead M 18 months (from start)

4 ABC 1 IT F 18 months (from start)

5 ABC 2 Other store expenses F 12 months

6 ABC 2 Overhead M 14 months (from start)

7 ABC 2 Logistics M 10 Months

8 ABC 2 Marketing M 8 months

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By using multiple sources of data, triangulation was achieved, improving reliability (Eisenhardt, 1989). As interviews were combined with field notes, in the form of email conversations and on site notes, this use of multiple types of data was ensured. During the data collection active participation in the company took place, which created even more insight in the project. Another benefit of being involved in the case company is that the persons interviewed were easily accessible. As written by Atkinson & Shaffir (1998) better understanding might be created by being involved. Being involved in the case company and project could also have caused a possible problem of bias and thereby lowered internal validity. By taking this possible bias into account in the research design up front awareness was created by the researcher to overcome this bias. By not directly being involved in the communication with and from the controllers (interview group) the researcher/interviewer tried to lower the bias by not having any up front information about the controllers’ opinions. Furthermore any bias still present by the active participation was seen as being outweighed by the extra benefit created by the active participation. This is also endorsed by Labro & Tuomela (2003, p.424) whom suggest that by taking the possibility of bias into account, the benefits of participating in the company outweigh the possibility of reduced internal validity.

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4.5 Data analysis procedure

All interviews were recorded and transcribed by the researcher, by doing so controllability and reliability is increased as the tapes can be repeated and interpreted by the supervisor or a different researcher (Van Aken, Berends, Van der Bij, 2012). All interviews were transcribed and coded separately and as soon as possible after the interview was conducted to keep separation and be able to perform within-case (per interview) analysis (Eisenhardt, 1989). The codes to be applied are English codes (also for the Dutch interviews) based on the concepts found in the literature.

After transcribing and coding each interview was analyzed separately. This was followed by a cross-case analysis (Eisenhardt, 1989) to come to conclusions. These conclusions were checked with the interview transcripts and supported by quotes in the results section. Quotes from the Dutch interviews were translated to English, to be in line with the research language.

# Code Topic Times used

1 Enabling Perception on implementation of PMS 29

2 Coercive Perception on implementation of PMS 24

3 Resources Resources 23

4 Initial attitude towards change Employee willingness 12

5 Communication of change Employee willingness 13

6 Management commitment Senior management behavior 15

7 Management pressure Senior management behavior 18

8 Department size Role & Responsibility 3

9 (De)centralization Role & Responsibility 9

10 Quality of budget Quality (of budgets) 31

11 Quality of PMS Quality (of budgets) 67

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5. Analysis

Based on the codes a schematic analysis was made per topic as indicated by the literature. This was done to assess the important aspects as well as the relation with the enabling versus coercive bureaucracy. The analysis is not performed for the topics ‘business controller role’ and ‘future change perception’. The codes applied for ‘business controller role’ were only used limited, furthermore it was found that context factors were important in this topic. The topic ‘future change perception’ was not analyzed in this way as the topic was not mentioned nearly as often as any of the other topics and thereby was not deemed to have an important impact, this can also be indicated by the number of times the relevant code was used.

One topic, that was indicated to be resulting from the implementation of the PMS, was added as it was found to have an important impact. During the analysis of the interview and additional code was created for this topic as the topic was mentioned often. This can also be seen from the number of times the code is used. This topic was thereby not analyzed using an analysis scheme, but directly when applying the newly added code. The code that was added is ‘communication with stakeholder’ and the related, added, topic is ‘communication with stakeholders.’

The topics and their relation to the enabling versus coercive bureaucracy as found in the interviews are lined out below, the results are supported by quotes from the interview that give an indication of the perception of the business controllers.

5.1 Analysis per influencing factor

5.1.1 Senior management behavior (perception on)

Literature describes commitment by senior management and awareness created by senior management as important for successful PMS implementation. In case of the implementation of benefit tracking one senior management member, the CFO of ABC 1, in specific showed great commitment by being sponsor of the implementation. While one might expect the balance between enabling and coercive to lean more towards the enabling aspect, because of this, in practice other results were found. The business controllers for ABC 1 explained that they felt somewhat coerced as they had to show that they achieved the results as presented by the PMS, one of the controllers explained this as follows: “It is fine that we have this process in which I

sign off on savings, but I also know that reporting is send to my boss (the CFO), this really scares me. As he now thinks: ahh, that is nice. [...] If he forgets to ask, I hang.“ This shows the

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difficulties is shown by the following quote: ‘’He [CFO ABC 1] does not look at these savings

as being already implemented in the budget, or already implemented in a target, like I do.’’

What are striking for these quotes are the differences that can be seen with the controllers working for other departments. While all controllers working for ABC 1 explained the need to explain their savings as derived from the PMS, other controllers very rarely talked about this. That the commitment from senior management of ABC 1 in the person of the CFO was great is evident as he was one of the key persons (as sponsor) in the implementation of the PMS. In other departments it was sometimes very clear that low commitment, let alone any kind of pressure, was present: “For example in June we had some workshops for L&D opportunities and one or

two lines were not estimated, there was no saving, while all of us knew that there was something possible. My boss very hardly tries to act on this. It is more like a cooperation.“ This is an

example where no coercion was felt and there was low commitment in using the outcomes from the PMS. In one instance other than at ABC 1 a coercive perception was present, the manager of this controller was no direct sponsor, but showed great commitment resulting in this coercive perception: “You need to clarify you just you can't go and say we saved all this money, you need

to have a story behind it.”

To conclude, it can be seen that senior management commitment, especially by a close sponsor, leads to a coercive perception of the PMS. When commitment by senior manager is lower the pressure felt is lower and thus the balance shifts away from the coercive perception.

Literature shows that constraints by resources should be limited at most and that in situations where there are resource constraints this might lead to a situation where the administrative load might be bigger than the perceived benefit, resulting in less or even unsuccessful PMS implementation. Indeed the input of resources was linked to the quality (successful implementation) of the PMS by most controllers. Very clear was that using the PMS when there was too little outcome (a low amount of savings) was not beneficial, as indicated by the following quote: “Yes, I think we should implement a threshold. You really need the trade-off,

what is the benefit versus what is the size of the investment [of resources].” Although it was very

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the following way: “Yes, maybe I would go in more depth more often. Now I do it for budget

purposes for example. Maybe also I could receive the draft form [part of the PMS] in advance that would help, I would better know what is going on. I could also somehow step in in the process, because sometimes I don't know how the current business is running.” The general

reasoning given by the business controllers was that they wanted to see significant (therefore the threshold) and recognizable savings. The recognizable savings on the one hand could be reached by improving the PMS on the other hand these could be realized by putting in more resources. The input of resources was indicated to be twofold, first resources could be inputted to be more directly involved in the PMS, second resources could be used to add another step to actually track the savings communicated by the PMS in the Profit and loss statement (P&L). One of the business controllers noted the following on this: ’’Yeah now it would be beneficial to have

somebody who would do a sort of like a review of the numbers. So now and then we as an IP are claiming all these numbers we achieved last year, is this still valid or not. To do like you know a project review like you do with a normal project basically just at the end of it you just have to go back and see if the assumptions were right and how it went.” Although this was noted it was

always combined with the need for a higher PMS quality. Nonetheless others debated this by stating that more input was not needed as they trust the saving and only need a form of communication to see the savings: “As mentioned, I would rather be less involved than more

involved, just emailing me with the savings would have my blessing.’’

Concluding it could be said that in terms of resources there are quite some differences in perspective. The business controllers do agree on two points, first and very specific a threshold for which the PMS should be used should be implemented, thus resources should only be used if the benefit would be great enough. Second and less implicitly stated, the business controllers are willing to put in resources as long as the quality is well enough and they recognize what is being done, currently this is lacking. All in all it could be said that resources constraints were not a direct indicator of a PMS being perceived as coercive, it rather led to the business controllers not using the system. This was however only the case when the quality of the PMS was perceived as being lacking, when the quality was good, the business controllers were willing to put in resources, thus allowing the system to be perceived as enabling. Resource constraints might thereby be seen as having a moderating impact.

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process of implementation, four of the five indicated having raised concerns and having given feedback. These four business controllers indicated that their feedback was mostly not processed in the design, creating some kind of resistance as pictured by the following quote: ‘’I had no

opinion whatsoever until the moment of the first explanation, after this I thought, this will cause a lot of extra work. In practice it is all very limited. The way it was communicated was as an extra administrative moment for the controller, of course that is not ok, the question arising then is do I do this for you or for myself?” In general the first instance of communication was not

received very positive. The initial goal was questioned as indicated as follows by one of the business controllers who had been working with the PMS since the moment it was introduced:

“Apparently there also is an issue with bringing on stage what the actual savings are that IP generates.” For controllers who had not been working with the PMS from the start also

questions arose when first getting familiar with the system: “What should I do with this? When I

first opened it and found out the size of the file en found my name I started reading and indeed saw that it was related to savings. So mostly what is it, as there is no explaining text accompanying it.” These quotes give a general indication of the first perception of the business

controllers. While most raised questions and were not clear about the goal, work associated and the way in which the systems works, most did not show clear resistance, hence employee unwillingness. Only one of the controllers clearly indicated being against the system and showed quite directly that her perception of the PMS was coercive. Most controllers were indifferent with regards to their perception, while not being unwilling. Three controllers even indicated having a first perception of the PMS as enabling as it was a step forward. All in all it is interesting to notice that the employee willingness shows some link to employees having an enabling perception, even when the level of support needed by them (as defined as employee willingness) is unclear or even incorrectly communicated. What was further interesting to notice was the change over time, as initial employee willingness could very quickly be adjusted as shown by the following quote: “Yes I have been heard, there was just decided by IP to report

other things than on what I report. There was decided to do nothing with each other.” That this

means that the PMS is being perceived as coercive can be seen from the following response when the same business controller was asked about his feeling regarding the PMS: “That it is an

extra administrative load, I purely sign off, just to keep IP satisfied, I have spoken up about this as well.”

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than support after implementation. This can be strongly linked to the quality of the PMS and updating this quality through support as well.

Some form of contingency related to the role of the business controller is expected based on the literature, both size of the department and the level of (de)centralization are expected to have an impact on the implementation of a PMS. Thereby it is also expected to have a role in if the PMS is being perceived as coercive or enabling. Based on the literature these effects could have multiple results. (De)centralization was noted with regards to the level of commitment by the senior management. Another (de)centralization effect was noted when comparing the differences between the Dutch and non-Dutch controllers. The non-Dutch Business controllers noted the role of the IP country lead in discussing the results and reporting based on the PMS. Because the department outside of the Netherlands is organized decentrally a IP country lead was appointed. Because of this and because of the local communication between IP and the business the results of the PMS were discussed more often. This resulted in a generally more positive view on the PMS, better use of the PMS and overall feeling of the PMS as being more enabling, as indicated by the following quote: “Yes, definitely, those agreed savings we go through the list with the IP

country lead and the supply chain department. If we agree that the lines are correct, the total savings in budget become priority and there is no discussion.” Even the two controllers who

indicated to not be working with the PMS in the present, indicated that they could see how it would be enabling when they would be working with it more: “I think it is really handy that the

reports [from the PMS] are there, that you get an insight in what is happening, this is something I can use really nice. It is also something for the future though, problem right now is that there is no marketing director anymore. The idea would be to have a bi-weekly meeting with me, the marketing director and the country lead for IP to discuss the tracked savings bi-weekly. The marketing director got fired so we don’t have these meetings right now, that is a pity. When we implement these again, we will be tracking everything indeed, that seems really handy to me, to do this with the country lead from IP.“ While on the basis of (de)centralization some

consequences can be noted, the size of the department does not seem to be impacting the perception. Both in the two larger departments and the two smaller departments no relation was shown with the size of the department. While one might expect, in terms of contingency, that the smaller department would be less inclined to use a threshold, both controllers indicated that this would be needed to better work with the PMS, as can be seen above.

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business controllers were inclined to better use the PMS, have a more positive view on the PMS and sooner had an enabling perception on the PMS.

Based on the literature the link between the four aspects mentioned above was sought with the successful implementation of the PMS. The successful implementation of the PMS was defined as attaining the goals of the implementation, in this research creating higher quality of budgets as prepared by the business controllers. The interviews focused on finding out what possible relation could be derived from the enabling or coercive perception on this quality. What was striking that all business controllers were not (fully) satisfied with the PMS in terms of quality, as shown by the following quote: “No, there is no historical spend, and that is with all output.

The savings should be in a standard format, this should not be exciting. The regular prices almost exclusively is derived from a pilot, that is strange.” This shows one of the greater

problems with the system, savings on capital investments (Capex savings) are not calculated correctly from the business controller perspective. Two business controllers who are solely responsible for Capex spend indicated that they could not use the PMS in its current form for the budget. Besides this, others also indicated the lack of quality for the PMS: “The framework is too

strict, it should be exactly the same appliance against a lower price. This description is not conclusive in my opinion, I think you could make it well quantified and also broader. If you then apply the right context it would even be better.” What made this perception of lacking quality

surprising was the result that almost all business controllers used or were planning to use the PMS to improve their budget. The use of the PMS for their budget was both caused by a coercive and an enabling perception. A good example for the three controllers who indicated that they use the PMS whilst having a coercive perception is the following:“So the SVP Finance [Responsible

for IP] talks to the CFO and he shows 30 million worth of savings and says, it is in there and there and there. He indicates so much is in overhead [...] I find it difficult that there is 2 million coming my way […] I now have 2 million to chew and put in my budget.” Others indicated a

enabling perception: “When I look at the saving to realize, purely the savings from simplicity, I

want to know how this amount is composed, because I always put it in my budget. For example I have a saving of one million on energy, that is a saving to be realized in 2016. Well, will I realize this or not. I will first look at the price and the volume up front and eventually look at how to see if the benefit tracking equals what I had expected up front.” Thereby it can be shown that both

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The conclusion relating to quality of the PMS is disputing the expectation based on the theory, while the quality might be lacking in perception of the user (and thus not having a fully successful implementation) of a PMS, this might still lead to the PMS being of good quality in terms of outcome, as the controllers will use it to improve their budget in one way or another.

While an effect on the future change perception is based on the literature, this was not found in the interviews. Some controllers did indicate not to be more positive or negative in the future, while most did not indicate this having any effect at all and not even considering this as a factor. The topic simply was put aside and not deemed important. One of the thrifty responses was as follows: “If I would be in that point of time there again it would not be much different, but off

course it is always about priorities, if you know you don't have the resources and priorities are not there then you are ok with the tool.“ This is one of the seldom responses that could

somewhat be linked to and enabling or coercive perspective or one of the topics influencing this topic, namely resource constraints. Another controller when asked the same question answered with a good approach of implementing a PMS, whilst not commenting on any impact on his perception:“When the assumptions are clear and ready, we are able to start looking together,

how will we report, what actions will we take. Who has to do certain actions and in which frequency, put together the RACI en you are ready.” All in all these comments might be helpful

for a future change implementation but did link so limitedly to the actual perception on a future change, let alone to an enabling or coercive perspective that no conclusion whatsoever could be drawn.

5.1.7 Communication with stakeholders

Based on the interviews another topic was found to be important as an outcome of the implementation of the PMS. This was found to strongly be the result of having an enabling perception on the PMS and was an enhanced communication with stakeholders. Stakeholders in this view, most importantly, were the IP buyers, but also business managers involved in the IP projects. One of the controllers answered the following when asked if the IP department should be better integrated: “For sure, 100% they should. But they are already doing this better since

about a year or one and a half.” Whilst this is not yet linked to either the PMS or an enabling

perception, it already gave some indicated as the PMS was implemented one and a half year before the interview. Another controller indicated the following more clear link to the enabling perception on the PMS: “It’s really good as a communication tool, really good. Because as I said

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of the business in terms of benefits but there wasn't a formal tool saying yes this is what they've done so I think it's really good.”Yet another business controller indicated that even though he

was already communicating with IP buyers, he found it a good aspect of the PMS that it also got others in his department involved with IP: “Also I would like to stress that we are measuring

now and that for the first time people outside of finance see IP, like format or support, people who work with technical maintenance.” All in all most controllers indicated that the PMS

improved the communication, although often slightly. The business controllers indicated that this was just slightly as still improvements were needed to see the PMS as fully enabling and thereby able to communicate even better: “It [the PMS] is not yet so sophisticated and sharply defined,

the interaction between IP buyer and business controller as I have described earlier that should be better.”

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6. Discussion

6.1 Discussion per influencing factor

In this section there will be further elaborated on the outcomes of the interview and analysis based on this. The analysis will be linked to current relevant literature.

6.1.1 Senior management behavior (perception on)

As mentioned in the literature review previous research has found that awareness created by senior management and commitment by senior management are important success drivers in the implementation of a PMS (Charan, Shankar & Baisya, 2008). Also the possible link to the enabling versus coercive bureaucracy was mentioned. The enabling dimension could possibly be linked to the importance of interest and motivation shown by senior management as mentioned by Van Camp & Braet (2016) for a successful PMS implementation. What was interesting is that the greater commitment led to a coercive perception, as the commitment did not result in motivation or interest as might have been expected. While it was not necessarily excluded that the result of senior management commitment could result in a feeling of coercion, it is interesting that senior management commitment led to a very strong coercive perception and nearly no enabling perception. That this coercive perception might also contribute to the positive outcomes is discussed later, but does mean that factors as motivation and interest as result as management commitment do not always have to be a part of management commitment for it to be successful. What might be the cause of this is the need for all management layers to be showing commitment (e.g. Emiliani, 2003), although not specifically mentioned as such this might have something to do with the relation found at ABC. What might also have caused the coercive perspective is the way in which commitment was shown, it was found for example that commitment to the responsibility is important (Gill, 2002). Based on the experiences within ABC it cannot be said that this was specifically shown. Yet, management commitment and how it can work through coercion to create (a level of) success is an under researched topic that is interesting for further research as can be seen in this case.

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situation (Ittner & Larcker, 1997). What also became clear was that the business controllers were willing to put in resources as long as the quality of the PMS was well enough and they recognized what was being done, this led to the indication of resources constraints being a moderated by the quality of the PMS in creating an enabling perception on the PMS. This is as might be expected based on the literature stating that resources constraints might lead to a biased, incomplete and ineffective PMS (Perera & Baker, 2007; Van Camp & Van Braet, 2016), hence not enabling. Finally, based on the literature it also became clear that already anything more than very little constraints in terms of resources would lead to difficulties in implementing a new PMS (Jordan & Messner, 2012, Ittner & Larcker, 1997). One might expect that little or no resource constraints might enable an enabling perception of a PMS, while anything larger than little constraints might lead to a coercive perception when still asked to work with the PMS. What was interesting is that based on the interviews it became clear that for the business controllers resource constraints were no source of viewing the PMS as coercive. Concluding, the outcome for resource constraint was not startling as most of the answers were in line with the expectation based on the literature. Although this is true the answers that were given might also form an interesting base for future research.

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Based on the literature multiple forms of contingency were expected to be shown. An important one is the impact of firm size (Taylor & Taylor, 2013; Pekkola, Saunila & Rantanen, 2016). As the research has been performed within one company firm size differences cannot be researched, yet a difference in departments based on size might be expected. This is also one of the reason to interview within multiple departments of different sizes (two larger, two smaller). Although it might be expected no form of contingency based on the size of the department was found. Almost never was anything remotely related to this form of contingency mentioned, let alone that a general pattern could be found.

The second form of contingency that was noted strongly in literature was the centralization of a department. By creating a certain attitude decentralized departments might sooner tend to be negative towards a new (centrally initiated) implementation and might thereby develop a coercive perception (Campel & Strikwerda, 2013). Cambel and Strikwerda (2013) mention the effect of silo thinking in this manner. Surprisingly the decentralized department seemed to be more positive towards the implementation and seemed to have a stronger tendency of seeing the PMS as enabling.

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A strong base of literature suggests that not fulfilling promises to employees, as might be the case with an unsuccessful PMS implementation might lead to a worsened future change perception by creating, for example, resistance to change (Heuvel & Schalk, 2009; Zhao,2007; Peccei, Giangreco & Sebastiano, 2009). What was surprising was the very limited effect, while most business controllers disputed that the implementation was successful by stating that there was a lack of quality of the PMS. As there could not be found any possible effect on the future change perception it could neither be linked to the coercive or enabling perceptions the business controller had, as discussed before, on the PMS.

6.1.7 Communication with stakeholders

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7. Conclusion

Based on the outcomes that is discussed above and link of these outcomes with the theory it can be seen that the initial theoretical model is not fully supported by the outcome of the interviews. Some factors were found no to have an influence, although this initially was expected based on the literature, for others a relation was found. Besides, two influencing factors that were expected to have an impact, based on the literature, did show to have an impact, but this effect was only there for a part of the factor. For business controller role & responsibility only an effect was found for the role in terms of decentralization, for senior management behavior an effect was only found for the commitment given by senior management. Senior management commitment is the only factor with a relation to a coercive perception of the PMS. Based on the interviews this relation was found to be positive. Decentralization and employee willingness were found to have a positive relation with an enabling perception of the PMS, while resource constraints were found to have a negative relation. Furthermore for the two of the influencing factors a moderating factor was found to be of importance. Quality of the PMS was found to have a negative moderating effect on the relation between resource constraints and the enabling perception of the PMS. The degree in which expectations are being met (over time) has a positive effect on the relationship between employee willingness and the enabling perception of the PMS.

In terms of outcomes the future change perception was found be very limitedly effected by either the enabling or coercive perception of the PMS. The quality of budgets was, as was expected based on the literature, mentioned as an important outcome. Both the enabling and coercive perception of the PMS were shown to have a positive relation with the quality of budgets. Finally another outcome was deemed important by the business controllers, communication with stakeholders. Communication with stakeholders was initially not indicated based on the literature, but based on the interviews was shown to be an outcome that is positively influenced by an enabling perception of the PMS. Most important in this case is the indication that not only the direct communication between business controllers and IP buyers was improved, but also with other stakeholders. Thereby showing a quite large effect.

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7.1 Implications

Concluding it can be said that a small extra step has been set by means of this research. This step gave clarification in the implementation of PMS by showing factors that influence the balance of an enabling versus a coercive perception of a PMS. This leads to practical added value and opens new areas for research that are valuable to discover.

7.1.1 Theoretical implications

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step in identifying what factors have an impact and in which way these have an impact on the creation of an enabling or coercive perception is set. This also leads to a very large opening of new research potential in which a quantitative study on these factor is the most obvious.

7.1.2 Practical implications

The most surprising result of this research was a very practical one which led to an important practical implication. With al positive aspects that have been provided by the implementation of benefit tracking, the need for more quality was evident. In the current situation most business controllers dispute the ideas set by senior management, thereby showing that while a tool might be aimed at helping them for a large part, this might not always directly be the case. Nevertheless results might still be valuable, thus creating a practical tension. It will be very interesting to see how benefit tracking will be developed and used in the future and what this will mean for this tension.

7.2 Limitations

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