The impact of status hierarchy on individual behavior and team processes
Doornenbal, B.M.
2021
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Doornenbal, B. M. (2021). The impact of status hierarchy on individual behavior and team processes.
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CHAPTER 4
DIFFERENT STROKES FOR DIFFERENT FOLKS:
THE ROLE OF GOAL ORIENTATION IN UPWARD STATUS-BASED DEFERENCE
ABSTRACT
Expertise and insights are often spread across individuals in organizations. In efforts to capitalize on expertise and insights, individuals engage in upward status-based deference – that is, a mechanism in which individuals go along with the input of higher-status partners. Upward status-based deference hinders performance when the input of higher-status partners is of low quality. In this chapter, we examine the extent to which the relationship between partner status and deference to low-quality information is moderated by individuals’ goal orientation – that is, the motivation of individuals in achieving personal objectives. In an experiment, we provide first support for an impact of goal orientation, together with self-efficacy, on upward status-based deference to low-quality input. This finding suggests that not all individuals defer more to higher-status partners. Moreover, because upward status-based deference is argued to mediate the impact of status hierarchy on team outcomes, it suggests that the characteristics of team members may affect the impact of status hierarchy.
INTRODUCTION
Expertise and insights are often spread across individuals in knowledge-intensive organizations (Barton & Bunderson, 2014; Van Knippenberg et al., 2004). These organizations perform better when their employees integrate the most valuable insights and expertise (Van Knippenberg et al., 2004). In the process of integrating insights and expertise, individuals usually go along with the input of partners with the highest status (Driskell & Salas, 1991; Joshi & Knight, 2015; Kalkhoff & Barnum, 2000) – that is, individuals who receive the most prestige, respect, and esteem (Anderson et al., 2015). The tendency of upward status-based deference occurs because individuals heuristically perceive the input of higher-status individuals as more valuable (Barton & Bunderson, 2014; Correll & Ridgeway, 2006). By deferring to higher-status partners, individuals believe they can capitalize on more valuable insights and expertise. However, deference to others can result in lower performance when others provide low-quality input.
Even though upward status-based deference is a widespread phenomenon in the hierarchy literature (Anderson & Brown, 2010; Anderson & Willer, 2014; Magee & Galinsky, 2008), some scholars have hypothesized that contingencies moderate the impact of partner status on deference to that partner (Driskell & Salas, 1991; Joshi & Knight, 2015). A central reason behind this moderation hypothesis is that deference to others comes at a personal cost: loss of decision-making rights (Driskell & Salas, 1991; Joshi & Knight, 2015). Because of this cost, individuals might defer less to higher-status partners when they do not perceive the benefits of deference. Until now, scholars did not uncover moderators of upward status-based deference. However, the uncovering of moderators is
necessarily for two main reasons. First, it can help prevent individuals from using low-quality information. Individuals often defer to others on the basis of diffuse status cues, which are characteristics related to social categories such as gender and ethnicity (DiTomaso et al., 2007) which are weakly related to the value of someone’s insights and expertise (Barton & Bunderson, 2014; Berger et al., 1980). Second, the uncovering of moderators will help to explain the impact of status hierarchy on coordination. The hierarchy literature describes upward status-based deference as a mechanism that transmits the positive impact of status hierarchy on coordination (Anderson & Brown, 2010; Anderson & Willer, 2014; Halevy et al., 2011). Meta-analytical evidence suggests, however, a negative relationship between hierarchy and coordination (Greer et al., 2018). If upward status-based deference does not always occur, this would imply that upward status-based deference does not always mediate the relationship between status hierarchy and coordination.
Previous studies have focused on both mediators and moderators of upward status-based deference (Driskell & Salas, 1991; Joshi & Knight, 2015). Related to mediators, scholars have found that individuals defer to higher-status partners because they believe that these partners have resources that benefit performance (Joshi & Knight, 2015). Related to moderators, scholars have hypothesized that individuals are more likely to defer to higher-status partners when they are part of a larger team, because these teams are more in need of a coordination structure (Driskell & Salas, 1991; Joshi & Knight, 2015), and when they experience more stress, because deference reduces stress by creating shared
responsibility for decisions (Driskell & Salas, 1991). However, no support has been found for moderators of upward status-based deference.
Expectation states theory provides useful insights that can help to uncover moderators of the relationship between partner status and deference to that person (Barton & Bunderson, 2014; Berger, Fisek, Norman, & Zelditch, 1977; Correll & Ridgeway, 2006). A central proposition of expectation states theory is that individuals defer more to higher status partners because they believe these partners can help them to maximize their performance (Barton & Bunderson, 2014; Berger et al., 1977; Correll & Ridgeway, 2006), which is a proposition supported by the previously mentioned research on mediators (Joshi & Knight, 2015). The focus on maximizing performance is thus an important precondition for individuals to engage in upward status-based deference (Barton & Bunderson, 2014; Correll & Ridgeway, 2006). However, the goal orientation literature – which addresses how people define, experience, and respond to achievement situations – shows that maximizing task performance is not equally important to all individuals (Hulleman et al., 2010; Payne et al., 2007). For example, some individuals focus more on their personal development (Hulleman et al., 2010; Payne et al., 2007). Therefore, some individuals may feel less motivated to engage in upward status-based deference. Hence, goal orientation is a very relevant variable for upward status-based deference.
In this chapter, we propose that the goal orientation of individuals moderate the relationship between partner status and deference to that partner. We examine the influence of goal orientation in an experiment in which individuals can only defer to partners providing low-quality input. By testing goal orientation as a
moderator, we aim to understand when individuals engage in upward status-based deference. This understanding can help both to intervene with upward status-based deference and to explain the impact of status hierarchy. By testing our expectations in a context where individuals can only defer to low-quality input, we aim to show that upward status-based deference can have negative
consequences for individual performance. By showing these negative consequences, we want to challenge previous suggestions that upward status-based deference enhances team performance because it helps to integrate high-status information (Bunderson, 2003; Joshi & Knight, 2015). By demonstrating the contingency-dependence of upward-status based deference, we want to nuance previous suggestions that hierarchy facilitates coordination because it results in upward status-based deference (Anderson & Willer, 2014; Halevy et al., 2011).
THEORY Deference
Deference, which we denote in this chapter as “yielding to one another’s opinions, beliefs, and decisions”2 (Joshi & Knight, 2015, p. 59), can have multiple
motives that we classify in two prevailing types: instrumental deference and political deference. Individuals engage in instrumental deference when they defer to someone to capitalize on the insights and expertise of this person. This type of deference can be present when individuals believe that the input of the other
2 Others scholars have conceptualized deference as the extent to which individuals
prefer a lower-status rank within a hierarchy (Anderson et al., 2012). Although we expect that individuals with a preference for a lower-status rank indeed defer more to others, this chapter focuses on the degree to which individuals actually yield to other’s input. Individuals’ preference for a status-rank thus falls beyond our scope.
person helps in improving the task performance (Barton & Bunderson, 2014; Correll & Ridgeway, 2006; Joshi & Knight, 2015). In contrast, individuals engage in political deference when they defer to someone to strengthen their own social position. This type of deference can be present in various situations. First, it can be present when individuals believe that deference to someone results in more positive appraisals from this person (Halevy et al., 2011; Joshi & Knight, 2015). Second, it can be present when individuals believe that it prevents conflicts because it conveys a message of acceptance of the other’s input and hierarchical position (Anderson et al., 2006; Fragale et al., 2012). Third, it can be present when individuals believe that it reduces punishment because it creates a shared responsibility for decisions (Driskell & Salas, 1991). Fourth, it can be present when individuals believe that deferring to others they identify with creates a more favorable social identity (Joshi & Knight, 2015; Kalkhoff & Barnum, 2000). Fifth, it can be present when individuals unconsciously defer to someone because of oppressing social norms (Colburn, 2011; Cudd, 2006).
Joshi and Knight argued that the type of deference explains whether deference to someone helps or hurts the task performance (2015). They claim that instrumental deference benefits performance, while political deference hurts performance. We agree that political deference can hurt performance because it focuses on strengthening the social position rather than on making use of the most valuable insights and expertise. However, we extend the understanding about instrumental deference by noting that this type of deference does not always benefit performance. If individuals defer to another who possesses the relevant input needed, they are indeed apt to use insights and expertise in effective ways
(Bunderson, 2003). If the value of the input of others is estimated inaccurately, instrumental deference can hurt performance.
We propose that instrumental deference is prone to hurt performance. In deferring to others, individuals heuristically focus on partners with higher levels of status (Correll & Ridgeway, 2006; Joshi & Knight, 2015). Status can help in capitalizing valuable input if individuals ascribe status based on legitimate specific cues, task-relevant characteristics that signal competence (Bunderson, 2003; Joshi & Knight, 2015). However, ascribing status based on competence requires deliberate cognitive effort (Barton & Bunderson, 2014; Berger et al., 1972). Instead of engaging in this effort, individuals commonly default to diffuse cues, highly salient and immediately accessible social category characteristics (Bunderson, 2003), that relate weakly to knowledge and insights (Correll & Ridgeway, 2006; van Dijk & van Engen, 2013). Involving in instrumental deference is thereby prone to hurt performance.
Upward status-based deference and goal orientation
We argue that upward status-based deference, which we denote from here onwards as deference, is moderated by individuals’ goal orientation. According to the goal orientation literature, individuals have different tendencies regarding interpreting feedback, reacting to challenges, and responding to task outcomes (Elliot & McGregor, 2001; Hulleman et al., 2010; Payne et al., 2007). For example, some individuals pay main attention to their task outcomes, whereas others focus mainly on their learning curve. Because benefitting the task outcomes is the key reason for instrumental deference (Barton & Bunderson, 2014; Correll & Ridgeway,
2006), we argue that some individuals experience less reason to engage in deference.
The goal orientation literature has proposed a basic distinction between learning goal orientation (LGO) and performance goal orientation (PGO) (Dweck, 1986). Whereas LGO individuals compare their achievements and task outcomes to an intrapersonal standard (i.e. the self), PGO individuals compare their achievements and task outcomes to an interpersonal standard (i.e. others). This basic distinction was further developed by educational and developmental psychologists in a 2 (approach / avoid) x 2 (mastery / performance) framework consisting of four goal orientation types (Elliot & McGregor, 2001; Hulleman et al., 2010). In organizational contexts, scholars have concentrated primarily on three goal orientation types that apply most to organizational behavior: learning approach goal orientation (LGO), performance approach goal orientation (PAPGO), and performance avoidance goal orientation (PAVGO) (Alexander & van Knippenberg, 2014; Dragoni & Kuenzi, 2012; Payne et al., 2007). LGO denotes the desire to develop competence and gaining new skills. Individuals with a LGO seek challenges and difficult situations that provide them with greater opportunity to learn. They do not see failure as problematic, because failure can also lead to learning. PAPGO denotes the desire to show greater competence and more favorable judgments of ability compared to others. Individuals with a PAPGO seek situations that provide them with the opportunity to outperform others. They see failure as discouraging because it can hurt their reputation. PAVGO denotes the desire to avoid looking more incompetent and more unfavorable compared to others. Individuals with a PAVGO shy away from challenges because it can unmask
them as more incompetent and unfavorable. They try to prevent failure because it confirms their relative incompetence (Alexander & van Knippenberg, 2014; Elliot & McGregor, 2001; Payne et al., 2007). Goal orientation manifests itself as both stable traits and situational states (Button et al., 1996; Payne et al., 2007). Goal orientation trait and goal orientation state can co-exist (Button et al., 1996; Payne et al., 2007). The influence of goal orientation trait on self-regulation and performance operates through states (Alexander & van Knippenberg, 2014; Kanfer, 1990; Payne et al., 2007).
We expect low levels of deference by LGO individuals because simply copying someone else’s input would not help them in developing their competence and in gaining new skills. Instead, LGO individuals tend to seek difficult situations that provide them with greater opportunity to learn (Elliot & McGregor, 2001; Senko et al., 2011). In seeking these situations, they try to create their own ideas about tasks at hand (Elliot & McGregor, 2001; Senko et al., 2011) and challenge the authenticity of others’ input (Coutinho & Neuman, 2008). If LGO individuals would defer to others, we would thus expect that they would rather do this based on a positive evaluation of the content of the input than solely based on the status of the input provider.
Similar to LGO individuals, we expect low levels of deference by PAPGO individuals because they also tend to develop their own ideas and challenge others’ information in the pursuit of comprehension (Diseth, 2011; Elliot & McGregor, 2001; cf. Sins et al., 2008). PAPGO individuals try to increase their comprehension as a mean to perform well. Sometimes, PAPGO individuals imitate partners or copy their input (Elliot & McGregor, 2001; Meece et al., 1988), which is
a type of deference (Driskell & Salas, 1991). Before involving in this behavior, however, they strictly assess the quality of others’ input (Poortvliet et al., 2007). The ultimate purpose of the instrumental deference is a political gain. Only when they expect that imitating or copying helps in showing greater performance compared to others, they will involve in this behavior (Poortvliet et al., 2007). Therefore, when higher-status individuals do not provide higher quality input (Barton & Bunderson, 2014; van Dijk & van Engen, 2013), we do not expect more deference by PAPGO individuals.
In contrast to LGO individuals and PAPGO individuals, we expect high levels of deference across PAVGO individuals. PAVGO individuals often have a great fear of failure (Payne et al., 2007) and try to avoid failing or performing worse than others (Elliot & Harackiewicz, 1996; Elliot & McGregor, 2001; VandeWalle, 1997) by using simple sets of rules (Chaiken, 1980; Chen & Chaiken, 1999), such as copying down others’ input (Elliot & McGregor, 2001; Meece et al., 1988) and applying heuristics (Nederveen Pieterse et al., 2013). Deference is a heuristic, based on status, in which individuals copy down others’ input (Joshi & Knight, 2015). Through deference, PAVGO individuals avoid challenges that can unmask them as incompetent and unfavorable (Elliot & McGregor, 2001; Meece et al., 1988). Moreover, through deference they ensure not to perform worse than at least one high-status person (Driskell & Salas, 1991). Hence, we expect that PAVGO individuals engage more in deference.
The moderating influence of self-efficacy
A fundamental assumption underlying our expectations is that individuals believe that instrumental deference helps to benefit the task outcomes. In practice, however, some individuals will have a high task self-efficacy – that is, a strong confidence in that their capabilities are sufficient in accomplishing a specific task (Bandura, 1997). Deference is less necessary for these individuals. Therefore, in line with previous research (Brusso et al., 2012; Dierdorff et al., 2010), we propose that task self-efficacy, which we denote in this chapter as self-efficacy, moderates the effects of goal orientation. More specifically, we propose that goal orientation moderates deference only when individuals have a lower self-efficacy.
Across LGO individuals, we do not expect that self-efficacy affects deference. Although LGO individuals with a lower self-efficacy have less confidence in their abilities, we expect that this lower confidence does not affect their deference because they focus on actively developing competence and gaining new skills (Elliot & McGregor, 2001). Even though LGO individuals could expect that they can learn more from their higher-status partners, they tend to create their own solutions (Elliot & McGregor, 2001; Senko et al., 2011) and challenge input of others (Coutinho & Neuman, 2008). Regardless of their self-efficacy, we thus expect low levels of deference across LGO individuals.
Previous studies suggest that a lower self-efficacy affects the impact of PAPGO because it elicits a performance threat (Brusso et al., 2012; Dierdorff et al., 2010). Low self-efficacy PAPGO individuals believe that they are less able to perform well. A larger threat can result in withdrawal behavior (Stevens & Gist, 1997) and pressure to change work tactics (Midgley et al., 2001). One tactic
through which individuals can withdraw is deference. However, as previously argued, we do not expect that PAPGO individuals defer more to higher-status partner because they actively assess the quality of the content of other’s input before using it (Poortvliet et al., 2007). Therefore, we expect also lower levels of deference when PAPGO individuals have a lower self-efficacy.
Similar to PAPGO individuals, a lower self-efficacy also affects the impact of PAVGO because it elicits a performance threat (Brusso et al., 2012; Dierdorff et al., 2010). In contrast to PAPGO individuals, however, low self-efficacy PAVGO individuals believe that they are less able to demonstrate that they are not more incompetent and unfavorable than others. This threat motivates them to put more effort in hiding their performance (Brusso et al., 2012; Dierdorff et al., 2010). A way to hide performance is to defer to someone else. Therefore, we expect even more deference across PAVGO individuals when they have a lower self-efficacy. In sum, we expect a three-way interaction effect among partner status, goal orientation, and self-efficacy on deference to low-quality input.
Hypothesis: Among low self-efficacy individuals, goal orientation moderates the positive relationship between partner status and deference to this person such that, in contrast with LGO and PAPGO individuals, the effect is stronger for PAVGO individuals. Among high self-efficacy individuals, goal orientation does not have a significant bearing on the relationship between partner status and deference to this person.
METHOD Participants and design
Hundred and sixty-two students (80 women; age M = 21.6, SD = 2.5) from a Dutch university took part in this experiment for payment (5.00 EURO,
approximately 5.50 USD) or course credit. We randomly assigned participants to one of the six conditions of the 3 (goal orientation: PAVGO vs. PAPGO vs. LGO) x 2 (partner status: low vs. high) design.
Procedure
The participants conducted a computerized solving basic problems test, similar to a subset from the Scholastic Assessment Test (SAT), In which we asked them to compare the two quantities given in a table consisting of two columns. We asked participants to indicate whether: (A) the quantity in the left column was greater, (B) the quantity in the right column was greater, (C) both quantities were equal, or (D) insufficient information was given to determine which quantity was greater. While comparing the two quantities, the participants had to consider additional information provided. The participants were asked to solve each problem within a total of 45 seconds. We instructed them that their answer would be incorrect if they were to exceed the time.
The experiment consisted of two rounds in which the participants had to solve 5 and 20 problems respectively. After the first round, we instructed participants that we assigned them to a partner from a different institute. We told them that, in the second round, they would see the answer of these partners every time they gave the initial answer themselves. Initial answers had to be given within
35 seconds. After these 35 seconds, 10 seconds were left to provide a final answer. To ensure that the participants understood that their partner was not a competitor and that no political deference was possible, we instructed them that we obtained the answers of their partners during a similar previous experiment at another institute. We designed experiment such that the partner always provided an incorrect answer. When the initial answer of the participant was incorrect, the partner provided the same incorrect answer. We presented the partner’s answers as follows: "Your partner's answer: D." The order in which the problems were presented was random. Between the first and the second rounds of the test, we measured participants' self-efficacy and manipulated both the goal orientation state, the goal one has in one specific situation (Ames & Archer, 1988), and the partner status. At the end of the experiment, we assessed whether the manipulations affected individuals’ goal orientation and their perception of the status of their partner. After the experiment, we debriefed the participants by telling them the goal of the experiment and that the partners in the experiment were fictional.
Goal orientation manipulation
Compared to studying goal orientation trait, manipulating goal orientation state is relevant in the current context because individual’s behavior is driven by goal orientation state in situations where a difficult task needs to be executed and individuals have (initially) a minimal degree of self-efficacy (Kanfer, 1990).
Furthermore, by studying goal orientation state, our findings might have a stronger practical relevance because state orientations have the managerial advantage that
they are dynamic and malleable (Alexander & van Knippenberg, 2014). We manipulated goal orientation state similar to Elliot and Harackiewicz (1996). More specifically, we told participants first that previous research has suggested that: “most students are fairly comparable in their ability to solve problems but that some students stand out because they do so poorly” (PAVGO), “most students are fairly comparable in their ability to solve problems but that some students stand out because do exceptionally well” (PAPGO), or “some students are able to significantly improve their problem solving ability” (LGO). In accord with previous manipulations of Darnon et al. (2007) and Poortvliet et al. (2009), we subsequently induced goal orientation by telling participants that we would select three participants to win 50 EURO (approximately 55 USD) that demonstrate to: “NOT belong to the group of poor problem solvers” (worse 5) (PAVGO), “belong to the group of great problem solvers” (best 5) (PAPGO), and be able to improve their “problem solving ability compared to the demonstrated ability on the first task” (LGO).
Status manipulation
In line with suggestions of Cheng, Weidman, and Tracy (2014), we manipulated partner status through a narrative. Following suggestions of Sadalla, Kenrick, and Vershure (1987), we manipulated status by describing higher-status individuals as more competitive in athletic and social contexts. We introduced high-status partners as an “Ivy League lacrosse player. Investor in high-tech start-ups.”, whereas we introduced low-status partners as “I have an on-the-side job as cook assistant in a diner. In my spare time I like to play on my PlayStation.”
Furthermore, similar to Kalkhoff and Barnum (2000), who manipulated status by describing higher-status individuals as higher educated, we manipulated status by describing higher-status persons as being enrolled in a more prestigious educational program. We introduced high-status partners as “Your partner (1987) is enrolled in a doctoral program in Business Administration at Harvard Business School”, whereas we introduced low-status partners as “Your partner (1987) is enrolled in a vocational program in Business Administration at St. Veni Community College.” To convince the participants that their partner was a real person, we asked them to introduce themselves (in writing) to their partner before providing them with the description of their partner.
Measures
We measured self-efficacy using a scale from Ford and colleagues (1998). Following Bandura’s suggestion (Bandura, 2006), to tailor self-efficacy scales to the task of the participants, we adjusted this scale into five items that participants could answer on a 7-point scale ranging from strongly disagree (= 1) to strongly agree (= 7): “I am confident that I can cope well with the second tasks”, “I am convinced I am able to meet the challenges of the second task”, “I believe I will fare well in the second task”, “I feel confident about my ability to perform well on the second task”, and “I believe I can handle the second task well” ( = .97).
To measure deference, we adopted a measurement used by Driskell and Salas (1991). More specifically, we measured deference as the proportion of other-resolution, that is the relative amount that participants changed their initial answer
into the answer of their partner. We computed performance as the proportion of times that individuals correctly compared the quantities.
Goal-orientation manipulation check
We assessed the goal orientation manipulation by asking participants to indicate which of the following goal they had during the second task: “It was my goal to avoid being among the worse problem solvers” (PAVGO), “It was my goal to prove that I am among the best problem solvers.” (PAPGO), “It was my goal to improve my problem-solving ability.” (LGO), or “I did not have a specific goal.” To gauge the success of our goal orientation manipulation, we conducted a chi-square test in which we examined how often participants indicated a goal orientation that was in line with the manipulation. This test indicated that the goal orientation manipulation was successful, (2 (4, N = 162) = 265.08, p < .001). In
total, 93.2% of the participants confirmed the induced goal orientation. We conducted a two-way ANOVA-test to compare the extent to which participants approximately equally often recalled their goal orientation across the six conditions. This test suggested that goal orientation was approximately equally often recalled across the conditions (F(2, 160) = 0.68, n.s).
Status manipulation check
We assessed the partner status manipulation following suggestions of Singh-Manoux et al. (2003). More specifically, we first showed participants a ladder with 21 rungs that represented where people stand in society concerning their status. Second, we asked them to indicate where they would put their partner on this ladder. We described the people at the top of the ladder as those who hold
the highest level of status (i.e. prestige, esteem, and respect), and those at the bottom as those who hold the lowest level of status. To assess whether the status manipulation affected the participants’ status perception as intended, we conducted a t-test to compared the average status ascribed to the high-status partners and the low-status partners. This test indicated a successful status manipulation. The high-status partners (M = 15.32, SD = 2.90) received
significantly more status than the low-status partners (M = 11.65, SD = 3.22), t(160) = 7.63, p < .001. We conducted a one-way ANOVA to examine the difference in status the participants ascribed to their partners across the goal orientation conditions. This test revealed that there were no significant status differences across the goal orientation conditions (F(2, 118) = 0.29, n.s). Similarly, a two-way ANOVA indicated that the perceived status-difference between high-status and low-status partners were not significantly different across the goal orientation conditions (F(2, 160) = 0.20, n.s).
RESULTS
Table 1 describes the means, standard deviations, and correlation among the variables. This table shows that self-efficacy was not significantly associated with goal orientation (PAVGO: r = .07, n.s.; PAPGO: r = -.08, n.s.; LGO: r = .00, n.s.). Table 1 furthermore shows that partner status had no significant association with deference (r = .05, n.s.) and that – as intended – deference and performance had a significant negative association (r = -.50, p < .001). To test our hypothesis, we conducted a hierarchical multiple regression analysis (Table 2). In the first step of this analysis, we regressed deference on the first-order terms partner status, goal
orientation, and self-efficacy. In the second and the third step, we respectively added the second-order interaction terms and the third-order interaction term. In the analysis, partner status and goal orientation were used as dummy variables, with low status and the combination3 of LGO and PAPGO as the reference
category (0). To facilitate interpretability of the results, we mean-centered self-efficacy before creating the cross-product term (Dalal & Zickar, 2012).
Table 1: Means, standard deviations, and correlations among the variables
Variables Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 1. Partner status – – 2. PAVGO – – .01 3. PAPGO – – -.01 – 4. LGO – – .00 – – 5. Efficacy 4.40 0.51 .02 .07 -.08 .00 6. Deference .19 .22 .05 .01 -.15 .14 -.33*** 7. Performance .31 .15 .02 -.11 .16* -.06 .36*** -.50***
Note. N = 162. Partner status = Dummy High Status; PAVGO = Dummy performance avoidance goal orientation; PAPGO = Dummy performance approach goal orientation; LGO = Dummy learning goal orientation.
p <.10. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001.
3 A post-hoc analysis indicated that the upward status-based deference patterns
were not significantly different between these goal orientation conditions.
Table 2: Results of regression analysis upward status-based deference
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3
Variables
Partner status .02 .03 .00 .04 .00 .04
PAVGO .02 .04 -.02 .05 -.01 .05
Efficacy -.07*** .02 -.03 .03 -.06 .03
Partner status x Efficacy -.05 .03 .00 .04
Partner status x PAVGO -.09 .07 .10 .07
PAVGO x Efficacy -.07 .04 .03 .05
Partner status x PAVGO x Efficacy -.18* .07
R2 .10 .12 .19
F 6.82*** 4.60*** 5.01***
Note. N = 162. Unstandardized regression coefficients (i.e. B) were used. Partner status = Dummy High Status; PAVGO = Dummy performance avoidance goal orientation.
p <.10. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001.
The hierarchical multiple regression analysis indicated that lower self-efficacy individuals deferred marginally more to higher status partners (B = -.06, SE = .03, p = .05). The other first-order terms did not have a significant bearing on deference. Note that we focus on the full model in this interpretation. Although scholars often interpret first-order terms before entering interaction terms in the model, the predictors involved in interactions have a range of effects that vary according to the levels of the moderating variables, rather than a single unique
effect (Aguinis et al., 2016). Hence, interpreting the first-order effects based on the full model is more meaningful (Aguinis et al., 2016).
Figure 1: Interaction effect partner status and goal orientation on upward status-based deference, low self-efficacy individuals
In support of Hypothesis 1, we found a significant positive three-way interaction effect between partner status, PAVGO, and self-efficacy on deference (B = -.18, SE = .07, p = .01). To explore this interaction further, we plotted the influence of status on deference for both low efficacy individuals and high self-efficacy individuals (± 1 SD). On face value, the plot of the effects across the low self-efficacy individuals (see Figure 1) suggests that only PAVGO individuals deferred more to higher-status partners. The plot for the effects across the high self-efficacy individuals (see Figure 2) does not indicate clear differences in the influence of status on deference, or more deference to higher-status partners.
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Low status partner High status partner
D ef er en ce PAVGO LGO + PAPGO
Figure 2: Interaction effect partner status and goal orientation on upward status-based deference, high self-efficacy individuals
To quantify the direction and significance of the plotted effects, we performed a simple slope analysis following Aiken and West (1991). This analysis suggested that, across the low self-efficacy individuals, the influence of status on deference was indeed positive and significant across PAVGO individuals (B = .28, SE = .08, p < .001) and non-significant across LGO and PAPGO individuals (B = .28, SE = .08, p < .001). Across the high self-efficacy individuals, status did not have a significant bearing on deference, both for PAVGO individuals (B = -.07, SE = .08, n.s.) and for LGO and PAPGO individuals (B = .01, SE = .06, n.s.). To compare the difference in upward status-based deference, we conducted t-tests. Across low self-efficacy individuals, the t-test confirmed that the influence of status on deference was, in contrast to LGO and PAPGO individuals, different for PAVGO individuals (t(158) = 2.78, p < .01). Across high self-efficacy individuals, the test did not suggest a significant difference in the influence of status on deference (t(158) =
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Low status partner High status partner
D ef er en ce PAVGO LGO + PAPGO
-0.81, n.s.). We thus found support for our hypothesis that the three-way interaction among partner status, goal orientation, and self-efficacy affects deference. Across low self-efficacy individuals, goal orientation moderated the relationship between partner status and deference such that, in contrast to LGO and PAPGO individuals, the effect was stronger for PAVGO individuals. Among high self-efficacy
individuals, goal orientation did not have a significant bearing on the relationship between partner status and deference.
DISCUSSION
In this chapter, we provide first support for that goal orientation moderates the relationship between partner status and deference to that person. The results of the experiment suggested that low self-efficacy individuals with a performance avoidance goal orientation (PAVGO) defer more to low-quality information of higher-status partners than low self-efficacy individuals with a performance approach goal orientation (PAPGO) or a learning goal orientation (LGO). By examining the conceptual model in a setting where individuals can only defer to low-quality input, we demonstrate that deference can lead to lower performance. Theoretical implications
The primary implication of this study is that characteristics of individuals can affect the degree to which individuals defer to partners that hold more status. Scholars have previously argued that deference is moderated by personal characteristics (Driskell & Salas, 1991; Joshi & Knight, 2015). However, little is known about when individuals engage in deference (Driskell & Salas, 1991; Joshi & Knight, 2015). In this chapter, we expand the understanding of deference by
demonstrating that goal orientation and self-efficacy jointly moderate the relationship between partner status and deference to that partner. These findings indicate that the examination of personal characteristics can help to uncover when individuals engage in deference. Our finding that goal orientation only affects deference among low self-efficacy individuals suggests that individuals might defer only when they believe that they cannot successfully accomplish the task themselves (Bandura, 1997). This may explain why previous studies have not found support for moderators such as stress (Driskell & Salas, 1991). Possibly, stress was not found to affect upward status-based deference because scholars did not include self-efficacy in their conceptual model.
By demonstrating that characteristics of individuals can affect the relationship between partner status and deference to that partner, we contribute to the hierarchy literature (Anderson & Willer, 2014; Halevy et al., 2011; Magee & Galinsky, 2008). Status hierarchy is theorized to benefit team coordination through deference (Anderson & Willer, 2014; Halevy et al., 2011; Magee & Galinsky, 2008). Our finding that deference depends on personal characteristics implies that personal characteristics might moderate the impact of status hierarchy. This insight provides an explanation of why the meta-analysis of Greer and colleagues (2018) did not support the theorized positive relationship between status hierarchy and coordination. Moreover, given that coordination benefits performance (LePine et al., 2008), this insight provides an explanation for the inconsistency across studies on the relationship between status hierarchy and team performance (Anderson & Brown, 2010; Anderson & Willer, 2014; Greer et al., 2018). Possibly, the influence
of the status hierarchy on team processes and performance depends on the personal characteristics of the members of the hierarchy.
This chapter also contributes to a debate on instrumental deference. In this debate, scholars argue that instrumental deference is, as opposed to political deference, a mechanism that benefits performance by integrating the input of high-status members (Bunderson, 2003; Joshi & Knight, 2015). By examining the hypothesis in a setting where political deference is highly unlikely, we respond to this debate by demonstrating that instrumental deference can hurt performance if high-status members provide low-quality information. This demonstration implies that the impact of the status hierarchy depends on the alignment of status and competence. More specifically, if status is less aligned with competence, the status hierarchy is more likely to harm performance through upward status-based deference. Our approach to upward status-based deference as a mechanism that has the potential to harm teams challenges the common assumption that upward status hierarchy benefits teams through upward status-based deference (Anderson & Willer, 2014; Halevy et al., 2011; Magee & Galinsky, 2008). However, our approach helps to explain the overall negative impact of the hierarchy (Greer et al., 2018). Hierarchy may have a more negative impact than expected because deference has a more negative role than previously assumed.
The study findings contribute to the goal orientation literature by expanding the empirical evidence of the direct influence of goal orientation on the copying behavior, of which deference is a type (Driskell & Salas, 1991). In support of previous work (Poortvliet et al., 2007), we found that PAPGO individuals copied low-quality input less than LGO individuals ( = .09, p < .05). In the extension of
previous work, we demonstrated that PAVGO individuals do not have a significant different tendency to copy low-quality input than LGO individuals ( = .04, p = .34) and PAPGO individuals ( = .05, p = .23). These findings, which we infer based on average deference to low-status partners and high-status partners, do not support the notion that PAVGO individuals are more inclined to copy the input of others (Elliot & McGregor, 2001; Meece et al., 1988). However, we expect our findings to be different from previous suggestions because we manipulated goal orientation. By manipulating goal orientation, which is common practice in experimental goal orientation research (Button et al., 1996), scholars affect state goal orientation, the goal orientation in a specific situation (Ames & Archer, 1988), rather than trait goal orientation, the relatively enduring and cross-situation consistent goal orientation4. In previous research on the copying behavior of
PAVGO individuals, scholars described goal orientation more as a trait (Elliot & McGregor, 2001; Meece et al., 1988). Individuals with a trait PAVGO often have lower self-efficacy (Payne et al., 2007), which we argued is a critical precondition for deference to others. In our study, state goal orientation was not significantly related with self-efficacy. However, PAVGO individuals with a lower self-efficacy showed more upward status-based deference. We thus expect PAVGO to have a direct influence on copying behavior in studies that conceptualize PAVGO as a trait.
A final implication of this chapter relates to our non-competitive study setting. In previous goal orientation research focused on hierarchical collaboration,
4 Instead of controlling for trait goal orientation, we reduced the likelihood of
systematic trait differences by randomly assigning participants to one of the six conditions.
scholars have demonstrated that goal orientation affects individuals’ behavior towards partners’ input when they are in an interpersonal competition (Poortvliet, 2013; Poortvliet et al., 2009). Collaborators are, however, not always in
competition. Several scholars even theorize that status hierarchy, which form the context for deference, creates a non-competitive working environment (Halevy et al., 2011; Tyler, 2006). It is thus essential to understand the influence of goal orientation on hierarchical collaboration between non-competitors. In this chapter, the influence of goal orientation on individuals’ behavior towards input of partners was studied in a context without interpersonal competition. We contribute to the literature by theorizing and demonstrating that the goal orientation is also critical for the collaboration between non-competitors. Possibly, goal orientation affects outcomes, such as conflict intentions and cooperation intentions, differently in non-competitive contexts.
Practical implications
This chapter highlights a severe danger of status hierarchy. More
specifically, we theorize and demonstrate that status hierarchy has the potential to reduce performance by motivating individuals to defer to low-quality input from high-status members. This danger is particularly present in situations where individuals have a low level of self-efficacy. Managers can cultivate the self-efficacy of individuals, for example by offering training and feedback that directly improves the individual's abilities (Gist & Mitchell, 1992). In order to further reduce the chance that status hierarchy is detrimental to performance, we advise managers to induce goal orientation such that their employees have an LGO or a PAPGO rather
than a PAVGO. Managers can do this, among others, by rewarding improvement and effort and creating opportunities for developing skills (Dragoni, 2005). Typical practices that may lead to PAVGO are related to detecting and penalizing incompetence, and should therefore be avoided (Dragoni, 2005). In addition to inducing goal orientation and self-efficacy, we advise managers not to be eager to recruit low efficacy PAVGO individuals. Recruiters can measure both self-efficiency and objective orientation. We expect that these practical
recommendations will not have substantial adverse side effects. Previous research even suggests that a weaker PAVGO and a higher self-efficacy (Stajkovic & Luthans, 1998) results in better overall performance.
Limitations and suggestions for future research
Our study is not without limitations. A first limitation relates to the large effort the task in the experiment required. The task was difficult, as illustrated by the overall performance (M = 31%, SD = 15%), and required participants to make extensive use of mathematical methods. Above and beyond the theorized explanations for deference, we expect these task characteristics to increase deference among PAVGO individuals because they prefer low effort expenditure (Elliot & McGregor, 2001; Meece et al., 1988). By deferring, the participants were able to reduce their efforts drastically. Therefore, to test the generalizability of our findings, we suggest that future research should examine our conceptual model using a test that requires less effort.
A second limitation relates to a cue that we described in inducing partner status. Following suggestions of Sadalla et al. (1987), we induced status by
describing higher-status individuals as more competitive in athletic and social contexts. As part of this manipulation, we introduced higher-status partners as being enrolled in a more prestigious educational program. However, we theorized that deference is likely to hurt performance because individuals often defer to others on the basis of diffuse (i.e. social category) cues. Rather than a diffuse cue, education level can be seen as a specific (i.e. task-related) cue (Bunderson, 2003). Therefore, in examining the generalizability of our findings, we encourage scholars to test our conceptual model through an experiment in which status is induced through characteristics that are less explicit in relation to competence. When selecting cues, we advise scholars to be cautious of inadvertently causing in-group bias. Sometimes, individuals defer to those with whom they identify instead of those who have more status (Bettencourt et al., 2001; Joshi & Knight, 2015). To reduce the likelihood of in-group bias, we recommend inducing status by describing the social position of a person, as Blader and Chen did in their studies (2012).
A third limitation is that we measured deference as the degree to which individuals changed their initial response to their partner's response. Although previous studies measured deference similarly (Driskell & Salas, 1991; Kalkhoff & Barnum, 2000), participants were stimulated to solve problems themselves first. By solving the problems, the participants were able to uncover the actual quality of the input of their partners. Given that partners provided low-quality information, first encouraging participants to solve a problem could have reduced their deference tendencies. Therefore, in order to test the generalizability of the
findings, we encourage scholars to examine the conceptual model in a context in which the participants do not first need to provide an initial response.
CONCLUSION
This chapter examines the role of goal orientation in the influence of partner status on deference to that partner. In an experiment, we found more upward status-based deference across low-self efficacy PAVGO than across low self-efficacy PAGO individuals and low self-self-efficacy LGO individuals. The (difference in) influence of partner status on deference to that partner was not significant across high self-efficacy individuals. The findings suggest that upward status-based deference, which is theorized as a key mechanism that transmits the impact of the status hierarchy to team outcomes and performance (Anderson & Willer, 2014; Halevy et al., 2011), might depend on personal characteristics. Hence, if status hierarchy affects teams through upward status-based deference, the findings suggest that the characteristics of team members might moderate the impact of status hierarchy. Because the deference in this chapter was always to low-quality input, we demonstrated that low self-efficacy PAVGO individuals have the potential to worsen performance through deference. Beyond other negative effects (Elliot & McGregor, 2001; Hulleman et al., 2010; Payne et al., 2007), having a PAVGO can thus hurt performance through deference when higher-status persons are less competent.
