Bijlagen
Directie L’Oréal NL
Figuur 11, organogram L’Oreal NL
Managing Director Divisie Directeur Professionele producten Hoofdafdeling Finance and Controlling Legal & PurchasingScientifique Hoofd afdeling Facility and Services Hoofd afdeling HR Marketing Divisie Directeur Consumenten producten
Verkoop Controlling Category
management PR and
Figuur 12, organogram afdeling Marketing, divisie Consumentenproducten
Marketing Manager Merk R t/m Z Marketing Manager Merk A t/m Q Marketing Manager Merk AA + AB Product Manager Merk R + S Product Group Manager Merk A t/m D Product Group Manager Merk E Presentation Manager Merk E Presentation Manager Merk AB Product Manager Merk T + U Product Manager Merk X + Y + Z Product Manager Merk AB Product Manager Merk N + O + P + Q Product Manager Merk C + D Product Manager Merk B Product Manager Merk A Product Manager Merk F + G Product Manager Merk J + K + L + M Product Manager Merk E Product Manager Merk H + I Product Manager Merk V + W Product Manager Merk AA Divisie Directeur Consumenten productenBedragen in 1=1000
Gross Sales
100.000
Discounts, rebates and allowances
57.609
Consolidated net sales
42.391
Standard Cost of Sales
10.548
Environmental contribution & Royalties
2.827
Total
13.375
Product contribution
29.016
Pure Media (TV, magazines etc.)
5.763
Coop Advertising
132
Samples
543
Other Advertising
1.505
Total Advertising
7.942
Consumer relation marketing
231
Promotion / Animation
2.106
Pre-pack displays
1.357
Other POS advertising
1.973
Total POS advertising
3.330
Other marketing expenses
1.256
Obsolete / Slow movers / Returns
265
Total
15.131
Marketing contribution
13.885
Sales Costs
1.787
Logistic Costs
1.539
Fixed costs
2.615
Total operating costs
5.942
Amortization & exchange gains & loss.
32
Reserve
448
Net gain/loss
417
Profit before TAX
7.527
Hoog
Inlvoed op financieel resultaat
Laag
Laag Complesxiteit van de markt / toeleveringsrisico Hoog
Figuur 13, de inkoop – en leveranciersportfolio van Kraljic
11 Uit: Weele, Prof. Dr. A. J. van, Inkoop in strategisch perspectief, Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer bv, 2005
Hefboomproducten
• Alternatieve leveranciers beschikbaar • Substitutie mogelijk
Concurrentiestelling
Strategische producten
• Moeilijk om te wisselen van leverancier
• Kritisch voor kostprijs en levering Samenwerking
Routineproducten
• Groot aanbod
• Grote diversiteit aan producten • Bewerkelijk
Systems contracting + elektronisch bestellen
Knelpuntproducten
• Monopolistische markt • Hoge entreebarrières
Veiligstellen levering + ontwikkelen alternatieven
Market based pattern Bureaucracy based pattern
Trust based pattern Contact phase Competive bidding Preselection of potential
suppliers; bidding procesures; detaled selection criteria
Trust. stemming from friendship, former
contractual relationships or reputation
Contract phase No detailed contractng: payment based on standardized activities or output Detailed and comprehensive contracting; payment based on real activities or output
International contracting; framework contracts; contractual trust; loose links between payment and activities and output
Execution phase Periodical, ex post competitive bidding Supervision: performance measurement and evaluation; detailed ex post information processing; direct intervention
Personal consultation and coordination; development of competence trust and goodwill trust; process oriented and culture based control mechanisms
Tabel 22, de Management Control patronen bij relaties tussen organisaties
Market based pattern Bureaucracy based pattern
Trust based pattern Transaction
characteristics
Low asset specifity; high repetition; measurability of activities and output; short to medium term contract
Medium to high asset specifity which can be protected by contractual rules; low to medum repetition; measurability of activites or output based on contractual rules; medium to long term contract
High asset specifity; low repetition; activities or output cannot be measured well; long term contract
Transaction enviroment characteristics
May potential transaction parties; market price contains all the market information; social embeddedness and institutional factors are not relevant
Future contingencies are more or less known; medium to high market risks; institutional factors influence the contractual rules
Future contingencies are unknown; high market risks; social embeddedness; institutions; factors influence the relation
Party
characteristics
Not important, because there are many parties with the same characteristics due to which switching costs are low
Competence reputation; medium risk sharing attitude; asymmetry in bargaining power
Competence reputation; experience in networks; experience with contracting parties; risk sharing attitude; no asymmetry bargaining power