Populist Presidents

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By: Aron de Jong

MASTER’S THESIS UNIVERSITY OF GRONINGEN STUDENT NUMBER: S2455013 02-03-19

Populist Presidents

AN IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF THE RHETORIC USED BY RONALD

REAGAN AND DONALD TRUMP

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Introduction

“Today’s ceremony, however, has very special meaning. Because today we are not merely transferring power from one Administration to another, or from one party to another – but we are transferring power from Washington, D.C. and giving it back to you, the American People.” (Donald Trump, Inaugural Address, 2018)

The political landscape of the United States has recently gone through some profound changes. One of the key elements that caused this change was the election of Donald Trump in 2016. The election of Trump is seen as special for several reasons. Jennifer Sclafani writes in her analysis on Trump that the current president is considered to be one of the most ‘rhetorically unconventional, controversial and divisive candidates in US presidency’ (Sclafani, 2018, p. 1). Despite this, Trump still managed to win the elections. In fact, it was his rhetoric approach to politics that is widely considered to be an attributing factor to his success. His name calling, demonizing of immigrants and spurning of several media outlets did not bother his audience (Kivisto, 2017). With his message Trump managed to gain popularity among Republican voters and displeased working-class and blue-collar voters (Olivia & Shannon, 2019, p. 2]. The central word in the previous sentence is ‘displeased’, as Trump ‘spoke to and capitalized on the discontent, angst, and anxiety among voters that was associated with these trends’ (Campbell, 2018, p. 17).

The election and presidency of Trump prompted Manuel Anselmi to state that 2016 will be ‘remembered as the year of populism’ (Anselmi, 2018, p. 1). Anselmi could be right, as the election of Trump not only resulted in the swearing-in of a populist president, but also caused a large influx of new academic literature on populism. Authors dived into the curious case of Trump, examining his relations with the media (Boczkowski & Papacharissi, 2018), his voters (Volle, 2018) and even his mental health (Lee, 2017; McCarthy, 2017). Nearly all of these studies have in common that they wish to explain how Trump managed to win the presidency, despite his unconventional populist rhetoric.

In order to explain this phenomena, many authors turn to the past in order to look at the development of the political climate and previous presidencies. In recent years the presidency of Reagan, and especially his rhetoric, has been compared to Trump’s. The main reason for this comparison is because Trump and Reagan are both identified as populists. As a result, several

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authors draw a direct connection between the two presidents. For instance, David Bryne (2018) writes that ‘Ronald Reagan was the Trump of his age’. Iwan Morgan (2019) states that ‘the so-called Age of Trump looks like nothing more than the continuation of the Age of Reagan’ and Catherine Scott argues that Trump’s ‘flourishes of exaggerated hyperbole recall Reagan’s masterful

manipulation of the media’ (Scott, 2018, p.246).

This manipulation made Reagan, as well as Trump, exceptional in terms of a president’s rhetoric and oratory style. He was known as the ‘Great Communicator’, a title that he earned for his effective rhetoric and manipulation of news media (Johns, 2015, p.74). Reagan’s oratory talents are considered to have been ‘central to his of presidency’ (Ritter and Henry, 1992), even though Reagan himself downplayed the importance of his rhetoric ability (Reagan, 1989). In addition to their

trademark rhetoric style, Reagan and Trump are considered to have a similar political approach. Both presidents are considered to be conservatives and both are considered to be in the right-wing politicians (Bryne, 2019; Hawley, 2017).

This thesis will broaden the field of these comparisons, as I will do an in-depth analysis of both presidents’ populist rhetoric. Despite the similarities between Reagan and Trump, it is only fair to ask whether this comparison between the two presidents is justified, as both presidents serve more than thirty years apart. Both presidents serve in a different social and political climate.

Moreover, these two presidents could just be two different individuals with different approaches to politics. Despite these remarks a comparison between these two presidents has its functions. First of all, Reagan is continuously one of the first names to appear when Trump is put in a historical

perspective. Despite the previously mentioned similarities, there is also another reason. In comparison to Europe and Latin America, the United States has a far less developed theoretical framework on populism (Kaltwasser, 2017), especially concerning populism in the American presidency. As Reagan has already been defined as a populist (Kazin, 1995; Bimes, 2002), a

comparison of the two presidents is a necessary point of departure. Secondly, by comparing these two presidents, we will be able to gain more insights concerning populism in the U.S. presidency. And, finally, comparing these two presidents will result in a better understanding of both presidents’ individual rhetoric.

First there will be a focus on theoretically establishing how populism as a concept can be defined. Subsequently, a critical discourse analysis of both presidents’ rhetoric will be done by analysing three comparable speeches per president. The goal of this thesis is to not only provide more insight into the political rhetoric of Ronald Reagan and Donald Trump, but also to establish if the comparison between the two presidents is justified. Another aim of this thesis is to test a comparative model for populist rhetoric. In comparing the language of both presidents we will achieve a better understanding of the concept of populism, how it manifests itself in the American

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presidency and what role it plays in the political rhetoric of both individuals. Finally, this study will also contribute to the populist framework for America.

Theoretical Framework

The state of research into populism is fittingly captured by Michael Kazin (2017, p.3) when he writes that ‘the history of the populist persuasion is complex and full of ironies and contradictions.’ The subject of populism has been widely studied through various approaches, yet it remains one of the most debated terms in academia. Despite the popularity of this subject, populism is not something that is easily defined. Mudde and Kaltwasser stated that populism is ‘one of the most used and abused terms in academia’ (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2016, p.1). Besides that it is ‘used and abused’ in academic writings, it also is commonly misused in current politics and news coverage. For that reason Mudde and Kaltwasser (2016) write that ‘at times it seems that almost every politician, at least those we do not like, is a populist’.

In this thesis there is a focus on two American presidents who are known for their populist political style: Ronald Reagan and Donald Trump. Various authors consider Ronald Reagan to be the last populist president up until Donald Trump, even drawing a direct comparison between the two presidents (Bryne, 2018; Olivia & Shannon, 2019). However, none of these authors have done an in-depth analysis of both presidents’ rhetoric. By comparing the rhetoric of these two presidents, it is possible to achieve a better insight into populism and how both presidents utilize populism in their speeches.

However, before we can study this issue, we need to define what populism actually is. As researcher of the subject, I am lucky to live in a time where populism is increasingly subjected to research. Fed by current populist developments in global politics, a large amount of works on

populism has appeared. Especially when compared to a few decades ago, there has been a significant increase in literature on populism. Manuel Anselmi even writes that 2016, with the election of Donald Trump, will be remembered as the year of populism (Anselmi, 2016, p. 1). In this section I will cover the most important theories for my research.

Populism

For my research there will be an explicit focus on populism in the US presidencies of Ronald Reagan and Donald Trump. However, populism has been around for many more years. I will start by providing a short overview of academic developments on the concept of populism, how it has been studied in various regions of the world and finally the state of populism in the United States. Although populism has seen a recent surge in academic works, the search for a concrete definition of populism is not a recent development. In the 1960’s academics tried to find a good

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definition for the concept of populism, which resulted in a gathering of social scientist at the London School of Economics in May 1967. What followed was a bundle compiled by Ghiță Ionescu and Ernest Gelner that focussed on answering the question what populism is. The book starts with an ominous sentence that quickly establishes the reputation of populism at the time. Both authors see populism as ‘a spectre’ that haunts the world (Ionescu & Gellner, 1969, p.1). The work itself contains various essays on populism in different parts of the world and on the conceptual meanings of populism. However, as one may suspect, a concrete definition of populism could not be defined, nor can it be found in the work. The essence of the difficulty in defining populism is fittingly captured by Manuel Anselmi who writes: ‘One of the most common mistakes made when analysing the populist

phenomenon is to think of it simply as a political issue. Considering it an anomalous presence in the democratic system, detached from the country’s social and cultural reference framework, is a reductionist and unfruitful vision’ (Anselmi, 2016, p. 78). Populism is much more than just a type of politics. As Anselmi writes, considering populism to be detached from a country’s social and cultural reference framework is very unproductive. Much of what populism stands for originates from the cultural and social aspects of a country. This was perhaps also one of the reasons why the authors did not manage to find a conclusion. They defined populism as a ‘spectre haunting the world’, an

anomaly that exists in politics and influences society in a bad way.

Several years later various authors argued that it may not be correct to look for a definitive definition. Ernesto Lacleau (1977) stated that by looking too closely or precisely at populism in order to find a definition, we might lose the concept. He explains this by describing that whenever we study populism we try to define it by looking for examples. However, while looking at these examples we refine our definition of populism in order to make them fit our examples. I recognize the warning Laclau issued, but in recent years some definitions of populism have been provided that seem to be able to stay clear from this circularity.

One of the main reasons for this success was the arrival of a general consensus on certain aspects and characteristics of populism. Not every author has the same definitions and usually there are several small variations. However, three characteristics keep returning in literature throughout history. These three are: the concept of pure people; the idea of a corrupt elite and the antagonistic relationship between the people and the elite; and finally, the idea of popular sovereignty. In

general, these characteristics are attributed to populism and serve as a framework for the concept. A definition of populism is usually not possible when only one or two characteristics are present. For example, Paul Taggart argues that by solely focusing on the concept of ‘the people’ may lead to a dead end. The concept of the ‘people’ is too broad and does not give any substantial information about the real nature of populism (Taggart, 2000, p. 98). When seen this way, the way populism manifests nowadays is commonly defined by attributing its value to its characteristics.

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However, a single, clear-cut definition of populism still has not been found. What strikes me is that most disagreements about the definition of populism come from a lack of clarity concerning key concepts, such as ‘the people’, the ‘elite’ and ‘general will’. In order to recognize and research populism it should be clear what the key concepts are and how they can be recognized. As I have previously stated, the definition is for the most part based upon these definitions. At the moment there are too many small variations on these core concepts.

The concept of the people, and the appeal to them, is without a doubt the most contested one. It can be considered as the central element of populism. According to Jan Jagers and Stefaan Walgrave, populism always refers to ‘the people’ and justifies its actions by appealing to and identifying with ‘the people’ (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007, p. 322). However, who are these people? Trying to define this concept has proven to be just as difficult as trying to define populism. Building on this theory of the people as a homogeneous unity, Abts and Rummens argue that populism actually follows the model of three types of logic. In their view, which is largely based on the work of French philosopher Claude Lefort, democracy is characterized by its own, consistent logic. This logic is essentially fed by the demand that in a democracy the locus of power should remain in an empty place, as that prevents the misuse of power. According to Abts and Rummens this logic divides itself in two parts: the logic of liberalism, in which the locus of power disappears and in which it is replaced by the ‘totally anonymous’ rule of law. Second is the logic of populism, whereby the empty place of power is replaced by the idea of the people as a homogeneous entity (Abts & Rummens, 2007, p. 406).

A researcher who has specifically tried to define who the ‘people’ are, is Margaret Canovan. She argues that the definition of ‘the people’ is hard to find, because every populist politician can associate a different group with this concept. That is why the ambivalence of the concept actually turns out to be very useful for politicians. The vagueness of ‘the people’ enables politicians to shape it into a form that’s neatly fit for their story (Canovan, 2005, p. 3). Despite the vagueness, there is some consensus about who these people actually are. For a populist the people do not consist of literally all the people in a country. ‘The people’ are actually a small percentage that are represented by the populist. In a way, it could be said that the populist identifies the people (Müller, 2016, p. 22-23). The populist tends to define ‘the people’ as honest, pure, hardworking and innocent. Hereby they are in conflict with various other groups in society that according to the populist vision do not conform with these attributes. Usually these groups consist of ‘the elite’, on which I will elaborate further, but also minority groups. These groups can be considered as a threat to the ‘pure’ people as they do not share the same values (Engesser et al, 2016, p. 1112).

The other group is the polar opposite of the people: ‘the elite’. This group forms the second core concept of populism. However, who are these elites? In populist terms the elite are considered

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to be the enemies of the ‘people’ and much of their identity is established by being this nemesis (Albertazzi & McDonnel, 5, 2008). With the term ‘elite’, several groups are merged together. Populists do not only criticize the elites that have political power, but also the ones who have influence in economics, culture and media. These groups of power are portrayed as a homogenous group that works against the people and their general will. In this sense the elite is considered to be ‘corrupt’ and responsible for the misery of the people (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, p. 11-12,). Finally, we have the third characteristic, which is the belief that the people should have political sovereignty. This idea dates back to Rousseau’s notion of the general will, the volonté

générale. By making a distinction between the pure people and the corrupt elite, populist reinforce

the idea that there is a general will of the people (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). Lawrence Goodwyn showed that this now common concept dates back to grassroots movements in the nineteenth century, in which populism was portrayed as a popular social mobilization in which the ideals of the people as sovereign against a small elite predominated (Goodwyn, 1978). Canovan stresses that this idea of popular sovereignty is actually a very difficult subject, as it contains many contradictions. First of all, ‘the people’, who have the sovereign power, are on the one hand a collection of individuals, but at the same time a collective body. Secondly, this body is normally absent from the political stage, and it ‘dwells in reserve in the realms of abstraction’. In practice, the moments when individuals unite together in a large-scale movement are actually very rare. These moments are situational, and according to Canovan, only happen in times of great political importance (Canovan, 2005, p. 121). Nevertheless, populist politicians claim much of their power because of their

representation of these individuals.

These three characteristics are the most common characteristics with regard to the concept of populism. However, they are not the only ones. Many more small variations exist on the

characteristics and properties of populism. Paul Taggard provided another characteristic of populism that is widely accepted, namely the concept of the ‘Heartland’. This is a much used concept by populists that represents an ideal state of the country that is no longer there. This country is inhabited by ‘the people’ and it serves as a frame of reference for the populists. In other words, it gives meaning to their message (Taggart, 2000, p. 3). Another characteristic of populism which I consider to be important is the so-called ‘Dangerous Other’. This concept was introduced by Albertazzi and McDonnell and stands for a group of people who are, together with the elites, depicted as depriving the sovereign people of their rights, values, prosperity, identity and voice (Taggart, 2000, p. 3) Usually these groups of people consist of minorities or immigrants.

Following from the first three characteristics, Cas Mudde provided one of the currently most used definitions of populism. His theory is a reaction to Kurt Weyland, who argued that a minimal agreement on the conceptualization and definition of populism is in fact an important aspect for

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scholarly communication, debate, criticism and the accumulation of knowledge (Taggart, 2000). Weyland stresses the importance of the populist leader and states that populism emerges ‘when personalistic leaders base their rule on massive yet mostly institutional support from large numbers of people’ (Weyland, 2001, p. 18) . While Mudde states he partly agrees with Weyland, he thinks Weyland attributes too much importance to the role of leadership in populism and too little to the ‘supply and demand-side’ of the concept (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012, p. 10). As a result, Mudde came up with the following definition of populism: ‘A thin-centred ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic camps, the ‘pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the general will of the people’ (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012). Drawing from Paul Taggarts vision of populism as a

chameleonic concept, Mudde stresses that populism is different from ‘thick’ or ‘full’ ideologies, such as liberalism, communism or socialism. These ideologies can be understood as ‘wide-ranging

structural arrangement that attributes ‘decontested meanings to a range of mutually defining political concepts’ (Freeden, 2003, p. 54). Mudde stresses that by looking at populism as a thin-centred ideology, we can understand that populism in itself does not have a ‘pure’ form. Because of populism’s flexible nature, it appears in many forms and can attach itself to various other ideologies, while at the same time retaining specific characteristics.

In his definition Mudde explicitly focuses on the conflict between the people and the elite, as according to him populism is in essence a form of moral politics. In a historical overview, Mudde and Khosravinik argue that almost all concepts of populism share the idea that in populism there is a confrontation between the people and the establishment (Wodak, Krohsravinik & Mral, 2013, p. 13). This is based on the notion that almost all concepts of populism share the idea that there is a conflict between ‘the people’ and ‘the establishment’, which was indicated by Canovan (Canovan, 1981, p. 284). Mudde sees populism as a manifestation of the ‘people’ against certain powerful minorities who are obstructing their will and wishes. Building on that idea, Mudde also recognizes the three previously mentioned core concepts within populism: ‘the people’, ‘the elite’ and ‘the general will’. For Mudde, the strength of this approach is that it bridges the geographical gaps of populism; the theory of populism as an ideology can therefore apply to politicians in America, Europe and South America, despite each continent having its own ‘form’.

However, seeing populism as a thin ideology creates some problems when doing research. The premise of the definition is in a sense quite paradoxical. By defining populism as an ideology, the concept requires further clarification. Yet usage of the term ideology results in anything but clarity. Moffit and Tormey rightfully remark that because the term (ideology) is used so unproblematically in literature on populism, it functions as a ‘catch-all term that implicitly swallows up other approaches along the way’ (Moffitt & Tormey, 2014, p. 383). Because populism lacks a certain pure form, it

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makes it impossible to recognize it as a full ideology, but rather appears as a ‘limited set of concepts that is always combined with other thick ideologies’ (Moffitt, 2016, p. 19). Additionally, populism as a thin ideology fails to thicken itself by adding more conceptual intellectual legacy to the theory. According to Moffitt there is a lack of common historical and genealogical referent, except for the case of the People’s Party of the 1890s, which makes it even more difficult to conceptualise populism as a distinct ideology (Moffitt, 2016). Even in the case where we agree on seeing populism as a thin-ideology and ignore the theoretical implications on the definition of populism, there continues to be problems with it. This is made clear by British academic Ben Stanley, as he agrees with the vision that populism is a thin ideology, but doubts the actual potential (Stanley, 2008, p. 106-107). The main problem for him is the lack of comprehensible core concepts. He especially considers the concept of ‘the people’ to be very vague and he argues that by relying on this concept the development of populism is actually hampered, as the concept of ‘the people’ plays such a large role in the narrative of populism.

Moffitt and Tormey thus opt for a different approach in order to define populism, namely to see it as a form of political style. They define political style as ‘the repertoires of performance that are used to create political relations’. (Moffitt & Tormey, 2014, p.387) The approach Moffitt and Tormey use is a variation of perhaps one of the most common approaches to populism. Most academics who research populism consider the concept to be a discursive style and of

communicative nature. According to Anselmi the use of this approach makes populism a rhetorical macro-device which tries to change and overturn the people’s subalternity to the dominant class (Anselmi, 2017, p. 43). It is important to note that Moffitt and Tormey are not the first academics who consider populism to be a political style. Other authors who have considered populism to be something of a political style are Alan Knight (1998), Carlos de la Torre (2010), Margaret Canovan (1999) and Jagers and Walgrave (2007), the latter defining populism in a somewhat different way than Moffit and Tormey, namely: ‘a political communication style of political actors that refers to the people’ (Jagers & Walgrave, 2005, p. 3) In the same line of thought, Jansen defined populism as ‘a specific set of actions that politicians and their supporters do, rather than as a type of movement, party or regime’ (Jansen, 2011, p. 83). All of these definitions consider populism through its outward expression and how it rhetorically manifest itself, rather than the thought behind it.

What distinguishes Moffitt and Tormey is that they created a concept of political style that can be used for comparative political analysis (Moffitt & Tormey, 2013, p.386-387). Both authors argue that the benefits of looking at the performance of populist politicians are that we are able to contextualise populism’s position in a historic overview in the contemporary ‘stylized’ political landscape’ (p. 387). By using this approach, they also write that they are not strictly interested in the content of the populist ideology, but rather in how the performative repertoires of populist leaders

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and their followers interact, and how this affects their relationship’. (p. 388) In the practical sense, Moffit and Tormey also analyse these repertoires also by looking at characteristics. The

characteristics they mention are an ‘appeal to the people’, ‘an impetus in times of crisis’, ‘breakdown or threat’ and ‘Bad Manners’. What these characteristics mean, is something I will elaborate on in my methods section. For now I will stick to the theoretical implications of the theory. By using their model, both authors try to find out ‘how the performances of those involved influence the relationship between the populist leader and ‘the people’, and vice versa (p. 388).

Populism in Europe and South America

Despite this discussion about how populism should be approached, many studies concerning populism have been conducted. Pierre-André Taguieff stated that in total three forms and waves of populism can be distinguished throughout history: agrarian populism, Latin American populism and new-right populism (Taguieff, 1998). These three forms make up the main research fields into the concept. Agrarian populism is a form of populism that took place in the second half of the nineteenth century. In general, agrarian populism can be divided into two groups. First of all, there were several agricultural movements in America that united as a populist movement. From a historical point of view, the roots of populism in the United States trace back to the rise of the People’s Party. The People’s Party was a mass movement led by farmers, who demanded radical a change of the political system. The impetus for this populist front was the uneven development of U.S. agriculture, the particular state and federal institutional responses to this uneven development and the economic crisis that took place between 1872 and 1890 (Bauerly, 2017). Despite the fact that this movement was more than a hundred years ago, it still bears some similarities to modern populism. The People’s Party invoked the image and the old ideal of the American farmer. The farmer was portrayed a ‘hardy pioneer, a good citizen, close to the soil, energetic, hardworking, devoted to the family worked with him, simple, reliable, and honest’ (Hofdstadter, 1969, p. 14). The second form of agrarian populism was situated in Russia, which followed from the Russian intellectual group of Narodniki. The Narodniki engaged in an egalitarian struggle on behalf of Russian peasants.

In South America populism became a political force after the shift from military rule to democratic systems. In 1971, Italian sociologist Gino Germani argued that populism in South America was a phase that happened during the transition to modernity. During this period most of the South American countries were ruled by military dictatorships, which roughly lasted until the 1970s. Germani states that ‘the political incorporation of the popular masses started under totalitarianism. It gave workers an experience of political and social participation in their personal lives, annulling at the same time, political organizations and the basic rights that are the pillars for any genuine

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democracy’ (Germani, 1971, p.331). According to Germani these new politicians changed their methods by focusing on the ‘people’ instead of the working class as done by the Marxist parties (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012, p. 2). Another important aspect which facilitated the rise of populism in South American was the emergence of a ‘leader’, someone who the people could look up to and who would represent them. One of the main reasons that the concept of a populistic leader was present in South America was the economic situation in the countries. Due to the large amount of

unemployment and poverty, the patronage relationships of rural areas in South American countries increased the patronage institution (Ionescu & Gellner, 1969, p. 33). The established order could no longer legitimize their power and people therefore turned to populist politicians. With their

charisma, they empowered their own position of exercising power in the name of the people (Conniff, 2012, p. 2).

In Europe the sharp rise of populism is a more recent phenomena, hence the name new-right populism. Populism had been present before that, but only in recent years have many parties

achieved electoral success, which roughly happened at the same time of the expansion of the European Union. This success of populism in European politics can be seen as a result from the growing interconnectivity in the European Union. This development resulted in various conditions which led to the continuing rise and success of right-wing populists. Inhabitants experienced economic fears and ‘these new fears merged with traditional racist and antisemitic beliefs and discrimination against minorities that had already lived for many decades inside Western EU member states’ (Wodak, 2013, p. 11).

A large amount of the research on populism in Europe and South America appeared in the 1990s. During that time there was a renewed interest in the subject. Between 1950 and 1960 about 160 new publications on populism were published, whereas between 1990 and 2000 there were more than 1,500 (D’Eramo, 2013).

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Populism in America

As one may have noticed, most of this research has been focussed on the continents of Europe and South America (Kaltwasser et al, 2017, p. 7). Kaltwasser and his co-authors even describe this lack of modern research into US populism as a ‘dearth of systematic scholarship of populism as a

contemporary phenomenon (p. 9).

Strikingly enough, the United States seem to lack a certain quantity on research into modern populism and especially the role of populism in the American presidency. This is exemplified by the fact that in two large, American journals in political science, The American Journal of Political Science and American Political Science Review, almost no publications on this topic have appeared (p. 11). This lack of academic research into American populism creates the idea that there has not been any populism in the United States in the modern era, while has been proven to be not true. In 2016, Bart Bonikowski and Noam Gidron showed that the use of populist rhetoric was continuously present during presidential campaigning between 1952 and 1996 (Bonikowski & Gidron, 2016, p. 1605). Moreover, during the financial crisis of 2008 several populistic movements who critiqued the current American government rose to prominence, most notably the Tea Party and the Occupy Wall Street movement.

The most recent example of populism in American politics is the presidential election of Donald Trump. His presidency marks a sharp contrast with previous presidencies and is therefore also called a ‘phenomenon’ (Kellner, 2016, p. 4). This is mainly based upon his populistic rhetoric and his political behaviour, but also on the management of his administration which is considered to be ‘unorthodox’ (Lewis, Bernard & You, 2018, p. 496). It is not without reason many authors paid attention to Trump’s political ‘incorrectness’, which automatically implies he shows behaviour that is out of order in politics. Trump strongly beliefs this ‘incorrectness’ is actually something good,

because expressing oneself in this way does not result in ‘wasting valuable time’ (Donald Trump, 2015). Goodheart (2012, p. 22) argues that Trumps rhetoric can be categorized as cultural, rather than political or of economical nature. He refers hereby to Trumps use of social media channels in order to express his own opinion, without having to conform to the societal standards of objectivity. Most of Trump’s uniqueness can be found in his rhetoric. He is considered to be an ‘emotions candidate’, as he often appeals to the emotion of his public. Even in this case he is an exception as ‘the emotions he embodies and articulates are highly unusual in the history of American politics’ (Bozckowski & Papacharissi, 2018, p. 80). According to both authors Trump’s emotional focus is specifically directed at so called ‘public displays of disaffection’, which in his case is a narrow cluster of emotions centred on anger. In order to display this disaffection Trump’s political rhetoric is

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crammed with characteristics of populism. In his campaign for and during his presidency he would continually evoke the image of the white working-class Americans who made the country great. On the other hand, various Moreover, Trump constantly paints the image of this group to be unfairly treated and deprived of what is rightfully theirs (Goethals, 2018, p. 2). He blames elite groups for open borders which according to him allow immigrants to enter the country and steal jobs from American workers (Kazin, 2016, p. 2). Meanwhile he presents himself as the person who can make America great again, as opposed to the other politicians (Korostelina, 31, 2016). According to him, this will be done by economically focussing on America, bringing back manufacturing jobs and alter trade agreements that will benefit the United States (Trump, 2017).

Since the election of Donald Trump there has been a resurgent interest in (modern) populism. A large number of scholarly articles appeared on the subject in recent years. When we compare this to the research done after populism in South America and Europe it turns out that there has been a profound lack of research into populism. As a result, the theoretical framework of populism in contemporary US politics is not as nearly well developed, especially concerning populism in the American presidency. As for the reason why there has been significantly more research done on populism in Latin America and Europe, many authors point to the history of both continents which influenced the political climate.

However, Trump is far from being the only American politician who can be defined as a populist. Another president whose name keeps returning when covering the subject of populism is Ronald Reagan. Reagan was known as the ‘Great Communicator’, a title that he earned for his enchanting performances as a politician and his effective rhetoric (Welch, 2015, p. 74). Moreover, this rhetoric is considered to contain evident populist characteristics (Guardino, 2018, p. 444). He characterized communism and communists as the ‘dangerous other’ by calling the Soviet Union an ‘Evil Empire’. He spoke against the political elite in Washington and praised the individualistic American citizen, because according to him, every individual could make a difference in the world (Ritter & Henry, 1992, p. 119). It was not the government who was responsible for America’s fortune: it were the American people. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Reagan would continuously invoke imagery of a ‘classic’ America, which was the ‘The Heartland’. Kazin stresses that Reagan ‘revitalized the myth of the national community as a homogeneous small town, stocked with friendly people who had a quiet, unselfish devotion to our families, our neighbors and our nation’ (Kazin, 2017, p. 262). One of the most iconic examples that make this clear is Reagans visit to his hometown Dixon, IL in 1984. His visit may have served as a campaigning act, but his choice to visit Dixon was more than that. It served his style, namely returning to a nostalgic place. A place where he grew up in a time when America was great. ‘Dixon was the perfect setting to make that imagined past believable to million who saw the image. The simple but comfortable clapboard white house conjured up our

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collective imagery of the past, of quiet summer nights with safe streets, no pollution and families together in the parlor playing the piano and singing’ (Combs, 1993, p. 2).

Throughout history many authors argue that Reagan can be identified as a populist. For example, David Bryne described Reagan as being ‘at the vanguard of a new conservative movement, one deeply committed to democracy, equality and populism’ (Bryne, 2018, p. 83). John Sloan states that Reagan ‘expanded the electoral appeal of conservatism by adding populism’ (Sloan, 1993, p. 796). Also during his presidency, his rhetoric was compared with previous presidents who were considered to be populistic. New York Times’ author Richard Reeves (1984) stated that Reagan bears striking resemblances to presidents like Andrew Jackson, Franklin D. Roosevelt and George Wallace. However, some authors disagree with this popular vision. In a 2016 study it is argued that in spite of Reagan being usually seen as a populist, his campaigns were rarely framed in a morally confrontational manner that focussed on attacking elite groups (Bonikowski & Gidron, 2016, p. 1617). The study by Bonikowski and Gidron consisted of a quantitative measurement of populistic language by using a so-called dictionary analysis. The populistic dictionary was developed by doing an initial round of coding whereby populistic relevant terms were selected. Eventually this led to the development of three categories of populistic claims: Economical, anti-static and general (p. 1607). These three categories were than applied in an ‘dictionary based analysis to automatically detect populist language’ (p.1600).

The above mentioned research by Bonikowski and Gidron can be seen as a representation of research into populism in the United States. It arrived in a time where populism is once again very prevalent in American politics, yet at the same time it shows us that it has been there for quite a while. Consequently, many authors turn to the past in order to explain the presidency Trump. As mentioned in the introduction, several authors compared Trump’s presidency to that of Ronald Reagan. Despite touching upon both presidents as a comparable case-study, no study has yet done an in-depth analysis of both presidents rhetoric based on an empirical method. This thesis will analyse the rhetoric of both presidents through the aforementioned comparative model by Moffitt and Tormey. By comparing the rhetoric of both presidents we will able to achieve several things.

First of all, the analysis of Reagan’s and Trump’s rhetoric will add to our understanding of how the individual presidencies characterized themselves. Secondly, this analysis will lead to more insight in the modern US presidency. And finally, the research will lead to an addition of the

theoretical framework of populism in the American presidency. In my methods section I will explain how I intend to do this analysis more thoroughly.

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Methodology

Now we have determined what the current theoretical ‘state of the art’ regarding populism is, we can formulate our research question: In what way do Reagan and Trump show similarities in

populistic rhetoric?

In order to answer this question, six presidential speeches will be analyzed through the means of discourse analysis. Just as the concept of populism, discourse analysis is a very varied field, but in its essence discourse analysis can be defined as ‘the study of the meanings we give language and the actions we carry out when we use language in specific contexts’ (Gee & Handford, 2012, p. 1). By using this method, it is possible to analyze various speeches by Reagan and Trump and detect in which way populism is present in their rhetoric.

Research samples

The research samples consist of three speeches by Ronald Reagan and three by Donald Trump. All six speeches were carefully chosen in order to find comparable situations for both presidents. The aim of this is to create somewhat of an equal footing between the presidents, despite the fact that there is more than thirty years between them. As a result, both presidents will have their inaugural address analyzed. There are multiple reasons for the decision to analyse this specific moment. In an inaugural address, a president sets his tone for the first official time. He states his vision on the country and what he hopes to achieve in order to make the country better.

Moreover, inaugural addresses represent an ‘essential part of America’s memorial culture and architecture’. In an inaugural address presidents, have the chance and the ability to symbolize the connection between the discourse and their symbolic role. Or, as Austermühl (2014, p. 105) puts it: ‘It is, first and foremost, a cultural event, marking the induction of the high priest and establishing the president as the interpreter-in-chief of the nation’s past, present and future’ .

Ronald Reagan had two terms; one starting in 1981, and the other starting in 1985. For this research will only focus on his first inaugural address on January 20, 1981. The reason for this is, once again, because it creates more of a parallel between Reagan and Trump, as the latter is currently in his first term. The inaugural address of Trump was on January 20, 2016.

Besides the inaugural address of both presidents, I will also look at a speech directed toward union members for the building trade. Ronald Reagan gave a speech in his first presidential term, on March 30, 1981, at the National Conference of the Building and Construction Trades Department. Donald Trump held a similar speech on April 4, 2017 at the North America’s Building Trades Unions.

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The latter is actually the same company where Reagan held a speech. Both of these speeches were focused on the economic situation of the country, the future of these union members and what the United States intended to do for these workers. As these speeches are both directed at the same audience, they provide excellent material for comparison.

Finally, I will analyze their State of the Union Address, specifically their first one, because at the moment of writing Trump has only been president for one year. The State of the Union Address is a tradition in U.S. politics, in which the president presents a speech to a joint session of the United States Congress, wherein he will reflect on the economic situation of the country, the legislative agenda and national priorities. Just like the Inaugural Address, the State of the Union is a moment in which the president can outline his vison and plans for the country. During the analysis of these speeches the context in which they were given is also taken into consideration, because ‘a discourse analysis is based on the details of speech (and gaze and gesture and action) that are arguably deemed relevant in the context where the speech was used and that are relevant to the arguments the analyst is attempting to make’ (Gee, 2014, p.3).

Method

All six speeches will be subjected to a discourse analysis. As the goal of this research is to determine how populism developed in the U.S. presidency, there will be a focus on discourses that exhibit signs of populism. Discourse analysis as a whole has a long and varied history of usage. It has an

interdisciplinary character and as a creative method it offers different uses for each individual case. The approach I will be using for my discourse analysis is the ‘Qualitative Discourse Analysis’. This is seen as a normative and explanatory critique, as it not only describes discourse and its implications but also evaluates them (Fairclough, 2012, p.9).

A more specific method in this branch of discourse analysis is Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). According to Carvalho CDA is ‘the single most authoritative line of research regarding the study of media discourse’ (Carvalho, 2008, p. 162). Much of this attributed to the word ‘critical’, that is central in the description of this method. Wodak (2001, p. 9) states that critical should be

understood as ‘having distance to the data’, ‘embedding the data in the social’ and ‘a focus on self-reflection as scholars doing research.’

According to Teun van Dijk, it is a misconception that CDA is a special method of doing discourse analysis. CDA rather uses ‘all methods of the cross-discipline of discourse studies, as well as other relevant methods in the humanities and social sciences’ (Van Dijk, 2015, cited in: Tannen et al, p. 467). As a result, analysis through CDA can be conducted from varied perspectives, ranging from social to cultural approaches (Fairclough, 2012, p. 10). This resulted in a wide field of previous

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studies, especially in regard to analysis of populist discourse. The broad range of previous studies was one of the reasons for choosing CDA, as it provided a broad range of studies and methods to draw from. Through CDA this study has the tools to ‘view the systematic analysis and interpretation of texts as potentially revelatory of ways in which discourses consolidate power and colonize human subjects through often covert position calls’ (Locke, 2004, p. 2)

Some noteworthy academics who contributed to this research field are Kirk Hawkins and Ruth Wodak. Kirk Hawkins analyzed the populism of late Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez, by using ‘holistic grading’. For his research he analyzed two hundred speeches from forty different chief executives. By using this holistic approach, he did not count content at the level of words or

sentences, but interpreted the text as a whole. The benefit of this, according to him, is that

If certain discourses reflect latent aspects of any culture that are activated only at certain moments, then (so the argument goes) the presence or absence of these views in a survey response may not mean very much. A study of speeches or similar texts sidesteps this problem by considering long statements of ideas that were widely communicated and accepted in a known political context. Long texts also allow us to complement quantitative measurement with qualitative assessments of specific language and themes (Hawkins, 2010, p. 70-71).

Wodak on the other hand is known for her focus on the discourse of populist right-wing parties. For her research she and Martin Reisigl developed a specific type of discourse analysis which is called the ‘Discourse-Historical Approach’. One of the main goals of this approach is to establish how the positive ‘self’ and the negative ‘other’ is created (Reisigl & Wodak, 2018, p. 24). This is a key trait of populism, as the rhetoric of populist is almost always full of conflict between the ‘pure people’ and the ‘corrupt’ elite (Mudde, 2012).

Besides qualitative research, various authors also took a quantitative approach toward research into populism. Jagers and Walgrave did a comparative discourse analysis of the discourse of political parties in Belgium, in which they classified populism as a political style adopted by political actors (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007). In order to measure populism, they constructed a people-index in which certain codes of populism were included.

A more recent theoretical approach that shares similarities with the approach of Jagers and Walgrave is the theory by the previously mentioned Moffit and Tormey. According to their theory, populism can be seen and measured as a political style by focusing on several perceptible

characteristics of populism. As mentioned in the theoretical framework, Moffitt and Tormey identify populism as ‘the repertoires of performance that are used to create political relations’ (Moffitt &

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Tormey, 2014). Furthermore, they propose a model of populism based on multiple populist

politicians from 1990 onwards. This model consists of three characteristics that altogether resemble a populist style of politics. These characteristics are ‘Appeal to the people’, ‘Crisis, Breakdown, Threat’ and ‘Bad Manners’. By using this approach populism can be empirically measured by looking at the presence of these characteristics, which makes it very suitable and applicable to critical discourse analysis. In this thesis the six speeches will be analyzed through the model as proposed by Moffitt and Tormey.

Although I consider this to be an adequate theory, I disagree with their approach to the previously mentioned focus on ‘performative repertoires’ of politicians. Moffitt and Tormey (2014) state that ‘we are not purely interested in the ‘content’ of so-called populist ideology, or just the organizational forms political logic that populism might utilize, but rather how the performative repertoires of populist leaders and their followers interact, and how this affects their relationship’. When trying to discover how populists, and in my case presidents, convey their message to the public, it is in my opinion vital to not only look at the form, but also focus on the contents. These previously mentioned characteristics of populism are usually expressed in speeches or debates by politicians, as populism is primarily identified by rhetoric. However, as Wodak (2015) remarked, ‘these factors do not suffice at all in defining the complex phenomenon of populism. It is the

contents, that is, the ideologies and beliefs, the proposals and imaginaries conveyed by such rhetoric, that have to be observed, analyzed and understood’. Only by having a more thorough look at the meaning of these expressions we will be able to determine the way in which populism developed. Additionally, I also consider the three categories by Moffitt and Tormey to be not sufficient enough to determine the populistic development in the American presidency. Therefore, I will add more characteristics to the model. These characteristics have been introduced by various other authors, as shown and discussed in the theoretical framework. The additional characteristics consist of: ‘Dangerous Other’; ‘The Pure People versus the Corrupt Elite’; ‘Power to the People’; and ‘The Heartland’. Some of these are combined in the analysis, as they often appeared together.

In addition to the characteristics that have been added based on the literature, several other characteristics have been discovered during the analysis. These characteristics are ‘American

Exceptionalism’ and the ‘Invocation of Religious Imagery’. This type of qualitative discourse analysis into presidents has not been done before.

The analysis will be done by carefully reading the six speeches and coding them based upon the characteristics mentioned above. After an initial round of coding, the identified characteristics will be analyzed further by applying various tools. For instance, I will also make use of the

politolinguistisch approach as envisioned by Reisigl (2008, p. 99). This approach is persuasion-orientated and is useful for analyzing populistic rhetoric. The approach by Reisigl functions as an

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addition to the coding and helps to further understand the characteristics that are present in the speeches. By following his model of systematically answering the upcoming five questions, we will be able to identify how social actors are presented in discourse. As established in the literature review (Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2008), building and condemning identities is a key characteristic of populism and paying extra attention to it will benefit the analysis.

1. How are social actors – either individual person or groups – linguistically constructed by being named (nomination)?

2. What positive or negative traits, qualities and features are attributed to the linguistically constructed social actors (predication)?

3. Through what arguments and argumentation schemes do specific persons or social groups try to justify or delegitimize claims containing specific nominations and predications (for example claims of discrimination of the other)?

4. From what perspective or point of view are these nominations, predications and argumentations expressed (perspectivication)?

5. Are the respective utterances (nominations, predications, argumentations) articulated overtly, or are they intensified or are they mitigated (mitigation versus intensification)?

Furthermore, I will also use several tools that James Paul Gee’s introduced in his 2014 work How to

Do Discourse Analysis: A Toolkit. For example, I will analyze the rhetoric by using the ‘Identity

Building’ method. Practically this means I will look at how Reagan and Trump try to enact socially recognizable identities and treat other people’s identities. Moreover, I will also pay attention to what sorts of identities they recognizes for others in relationship to their own and how both presidents position others (Gee, 2014, p. 116). Other tools by Gee include the ‘Politics Tool’, which focuses on how words and grammatical devices are being used to build what counts as a social good and to distribute this good to withhold it from listeners or others (p. 126). Also the ‘Why This Way and Not That Way Tool’ is used. This helps identifying how ‘the speaker built and designed with grammar in the way in which he or she did and not in some other way’ (p. 63). Finally, also the ‘Significance Building Tool’ is utilized. By asking ‘how words and grammatical devices are being used to build up or lessen significance for certain things and not others’ one can identify the underlying meaning and implications of rhetoric (p. 98). By combing these approaches it is possible to measure the presence of populist rhetoric and how both presidents utilize it.

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Methodological limitations

By carefully choosing my methodology, I tried to be as effective and adequate as possible. Still, it needs to be noted that this type of research is somewhat limited in certain ways. By doing this discourse analysis the main focus will be the written text from the speeches. I recognize that a speech is more than just written text and that the delivery is also largely influenced by mimic, intonation and gestures. However, for my research I intend to mainly look at the written text as I consider that to be the main way the presidents conveyed their message. The main focus is on the words and the contents of the presidential speeches.

Also, what a qualitative discourse analysis provides in terms of deep insight into its subject, it lacks in quantity. This research provides a thorough look at the rhetoric of the current U.S.

presidency and how it relates itself toward the previous presidency of Reagan, who was also

considered to be populistic. The results provide insight into how populism developed throughout the years in U.S. presidency, yet it needs to be noted that this research is only a comparison between two presidents, and that other presidencies have not been researched in this way. Providing a total overview of all the American presidencies and how they held up in regard to populism is beyond the scope of this research.

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Analysis

This research was conducted in order to achieve a better understanding of populism, especially in the modern U.S. presidency. The following section focusses on the results from analysing six speeches – three by Ronald Reagan and three by Donald Trump. The results were gathered by doing a critical discourse analysis of the speeches. As mentioned in the methods section, the analysis was focussed on identifying characteristics of populism. These characteristics were based upon literature that tried defining populism. However, during the analysis of the speeches it became apparent that other, non-categorized elements were also present in both presidents’ speeches. This resulted in the creation of the American Exceptionalism and Religious Imagery category.

Each speech was analyzed individually, whereby there was attention for the speech as a whole, but also within its parts. The methods for this research have mostly been derived from the book How to do discourse analysis: a toolkit by James Paul Gee. Additionally, certain tools provided by Martin Reisigl (2008) were also used. Mainly in order to define the presentation of social actors in both presidents rhetoric.

In the following segment the differences and similarities between the two presidents with regard to the presence and execution of the populistic characteristics will be further explored. First, there will be an overview of the different populistic characteristics and how they are present in the speeches of both presidents. Subsequently, a discussion concerning the findings will be constructed.

3.1 Corrupt Elite

One of the most central themes in populist rhetoric and discourse is the so-called ‘Corrupt Elite’; a homogeneous group of people who are usually in political, cultural and financial control. By using their power from this position, they work against the people and their general will. Reagan and Trump both utilized this theme in order to convey their message. As Moffitt and Tormey (2014, p. 111) stated in their research, the corrupt elite is often used as an appeal to the people.

The primary target that has been portrayed as an elite group by both presidents is the government, and specifically the government and previous presidential administration. The image they created portrayed the government as corrupt and as an institution that did not listen to the needs and wishes of the people. According to them, many of the national problems that persist in their day and age are a result of the policies of these elites.

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3.1.1 Reagan and the Corrupt Elite

In his Inaugural Address Reagan explicitly stated that the U.S. government consisted of a group of elites. In the same segment, he also argued that this group of people contributed to the economic problems the United States suffers from.

In this present crisis, government is not the solution to our problem; government is the problem. From time to time we've been tempted to believe that society has become too complex to be managed by self-rule, that government by an elite group is superior to government for, by, and of the people. Well, if no one among us is capable of governing himself, then who among us has the capacity to govern someone else? All of us together, in and out of government, must bear the burden. The solutions we seek must be equitable, with no one group singled out to pay a higher price (Reagan, Inaugural Address 1981).

The aforementioned example carries a very pejorative tone. By using the qualitative discourse method from Reisigl (2008) we can analyze how the social actors are presented in the discourse. We apply the five questions that have been mentioned in the methods section. As a result, it becomes clear that Reagan linguistically constructs the government as an elite group, as he literally uses the word elite. Several negative traits are attributed to this group. First of all, Reagan presents them as problem that led to for the current crisis. Moreover, the elite are presented as deceitful. This is exemplified by stating that ‘we’, as in ‘the American people’, have been misled into believing that a government consisting of a small select group of people was the best for the country. ‘Tempted to believe’, indicates that the people have been purposely deceived by the government, which

reinforces the image of a corrupt institution. The usage of the word ‘tempted’ also suggests that the American People are victims. They have been targeted by a malicious group that persuaded them into a believe against their own interests.

The last sentence from this example of Reagan’s rhetoric emphasizes that one group, the American people, was the main victim of the current crisis. They were the group who ‘bear the burden’. He also implies that one group was ‘singled out to pay a higher price’, which suggests that the people sacrificed more than the elite group. Reagan pledges for ‘equitable’ solutions, which implies that the current solutions are not. This is even clearer in the following example in which Reagan clearly states that the government is not cooperating with the American people.

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Now, so there will be no misunderstanding, it's not my intention to do away with government. It is rather to make it work--work with us, not over us; to stand by our side, not ride on our back. Government can and must provide opportunity, not smother it; foster productivity, not stifle it.’’ (Reagan, Inaugural Address, 1981)

This example carries various implications concerning the role of the American government with respect to the American people. For example, the second sentence states that the government does not work. In other words, it does not function the way it should be according to Reagan. He states that the government has a function, namely to work with the American people. The government is presented as something that absolutely does not work with the American people, and even opposes them. He accuses the government of not providing economic opportunities and states that they ‘smother’ and ‘stifle’ economic opportunities, which paints the image of the government choking the economic success that is available for the American people. According to him, the government works the American people over, which suggests the government is giving its citizens a difficult time by not considering their interests.

Furthermore, the term ‘ride on our back’ implies that the government, and the people being part of it, make the American people do the work, while they rest on their laurels. In general, the sentiment he creates is that the government opposes the people, instead of helping them. This is highlighted even more by his implications between the lines. By providing examples of what the government does wrong and how it abstains from doing the right thing, Reagan adds to this image of an opposing force.

In other speeches, Reagan continues from this standpoint by stating that the government of the United States can be held accountable for its economic problems, which is illustrated by the following sentences.

We are in today's economic mess precisely because our leaders have forgotten that we built this great Nation on rewarding the work ethic instead of punishing it. We've gone astray from first principles. We've lost sight of the rule that individual freedom and ingenuity are at the very core of everything that we've accomplished. Government's first duty is to protect the people, not run their lives.’’ (Reagan, Remarks, 1981)

In this excerpt Reagan fiercely condemns the American leaders for their role in the economic situation. It is a ‘mess’ which creates a picture of a very chaotic situation, that takes a long time to sort out. This excerpt also contains a recurring theme in Reagan’s speeches, which is the view that the government has too much influence, yet at the same time it is not using its influence for the good of the American people. Reagan creates an image of a government that is distanced from the

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American people and its values. However, the way he conveys this message is interesting. The government is blamed for this distancing and the economic situation, yet he tells it in such a way that the government at the same time is not directly blamed. He uses words as ‘forgotten’, ‘strayed away’ and ‘lost sight’. These words have a neutral tone to them, that indicates that the government did not do these things fully intentional.

3.1.2 Trump and the Corrupt Elite

The group portrayed by Trump as elite is roughly the same as the one targeted by Reagan. Although Trump does not explicitly state that the government consists of ‘elites’, he implies this by describing the government as a small group that is in power in Washington D.C..

For too long, a small group in our nation’s Capital has reaped the rewards of government while the people have borne the cost. Washington flourished – but the people did not share in its wealth. Politicians prospered – but the jobs left, and the factories closed. The establishment protected itself, but not the citizens of our country (Trump, Inaugural Address, 2017).

In this example Trump does several things. First of all, he creates two socially recognizable identities to establish an us-versus them sentiment. The first one is the elite, which is presented as a small

group. The elite are exposed as a group of people residing in Washington, D.C. who were successful

and who have been in power for too long. The other group, referred to as ‘the people’ (consisting of American citizens), have ‘borne the cost’. Trump places the two parties against one other, as he makes clear that they are very different. This is done by stating that the small group reaped the rewards, whereas the people have borne the cost. These last words paint a picture of citizens

working extremely hard, suffering because of this and yet receiving no reward from it. Trump tries to get his audience to recognize that the elite are bad people who exploited the people. These ‘people’ are also presented as a recognizable identity. It is implied that they are working class people, who specifically worked in factories.

Trump subsequently uses grammatical devices in order to express his viewpoint on how wealth should be distributed in society. Gee’s politics tool (2014) questions how ‘words and

grammatical devices are being used to constructs what counts as a social good and to distribute this good to or withhold it from listeners or others’. Trump presents wealth as social good and according to him it should be equally distributed in society, or at least among the American people, who have borne the cost. In this example, he does not say this explicitly, yet between the lines he creates a sense of injustice: the distribution did not happen in a fair way. This is done by focusing on the

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difference between the people and the elite in terms of wealth. Trump uses several words to stress this difference such as ‘flourished’ and ‘prospered’. This creates the image, in combination with the subject ‘a small group of people’, that the politicians have enjoyed great luxury, whereas on the other hand the American people, who work hard, have suffered economically. This image is reinforced by the next sentence. Trump says: ‘Politicians prospered – but the jobs left, and the factories closed. The establishment protected itself, but not the citizens of our country.’The establishment, which consists of politicians, enjoyed the wealth. On the other hand, the have factories closed and caused unemployment. Once again, there is no explicit reference and link between the closing of the factories and the unemployment, yet by positioning these words and actions against the politicians who ‘prospered’, it can be connected to the previous antithesis of the people who ‘have borne the cost’.

Similar to Reagan, Trump also blames the government for the economic downfall of the United States. The difference in this subject is that Reagan accused the government of spending too much and neglecting traditional American values, while Trump argues that the American government was responsible for many bad trade deals that put America at a disadvantage in comparison with other countries. These accusations usually go hand in hand with several adjectives and hyperboles that stress the injustice and incompetence of the government, as illustrated by the following example.

And you know, for many years, we’ve been taken advantage of by other countries. All over the world they took advantage of us. We had leaders that didn’t have a clue or worse. That’s not going to happen anymore, folks (Trump, North America’s Building Trades Union Address, 2017).

In this example several things happen. With ‘we’ Trump speaks about the United States and the American people. ‘They’ refers to other countries all over the world, although he does not mention specific countries. The government is presented as clueless, which invokes the image that the people in power acted without critically thinking. This image feeds the belief that the people and the elite are very different and opposed to each other. Moreover, it states that the elite are incompetent. In terms of identity, Trump also creates an identity of America, the ‘we’. Trump enacts an image of America as a victim. This is for instance done by making ‘we’ a subject in a passive construction. ‘We have been taking advantage of,’ and ‘We had leaders that didn’t have a clue or worse.’ By making the ‘we’ a subject, he creates an image of a group of people, or even a country, that had things happen to them, instead of having an active role in them.

Another thing that is very significant in this abstract is the tone Trump uses for his speech. He speaks in a very informal way. Trump starts his sentence with ‘and you know’, which is very casual. Another sign of this informal approach is the way he concludes his sentence with the word,

Populist Presidents

By: Aron de Jong