Tilburg University
International Corporate Strategy in Network Based Industries
Fladung, M.
Publication date:
2004
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Citation for published version (APA):
Fladung, M. (2004). International Corporate Strategy in Network Based Industries: A Case Study for the
Emerging Multimedia Industry. [n.n.].
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INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE
STRATEGY
IN
NETWORK BASED
INDUSTRIES
ACASESTUDY FOR THEEMERGINGMULTIMEDIAINDUSTRY
Proefschriftter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de Universiteit van Tilburg, op gezag van de rector magnificus, prof. dr. FA. van der Duyn Schouten
inhet openbaar te verdedigen ten overstaan van een door het collegevoorpromoties aangewezen commissie in de Ruth First zaal van de Universiteit op vrijdag 30januari 2004 om 14.15 uur door
Michael
Fladung
Cover design by Stefan Wagner
...
UNIVERSITEIT * * VAN TILBURG
...
BIBLIOTHEEKINTERNATIONAL CORPORAT TRATEGY
IN
NETWORK
BASED INDUSTRIES
Table
of
Contents
INTRODUCT[ON 1
STRATEGICQUERTTON INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE STRATEGY...4
METHODOLOGY... 7
STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK... 8
PART I:EVOLUTION OF THETELECOMARENA 1 THE TELECOMARENA 1.1 TELEPHONESERVICESAS STATEMONOPOLIES ... ... 13
1.1.1 Development ofthetelephoneservicemonopoly in the US ... ... ... .. 15
1.1.2 Development of the telephoneservicemonopolyinGermanyandAustria. .17 1.1.3 Development of the telephoneservicemonopolyinSwitzerland.... .... .18
1.1.4 Consumeracceptanceduringthefirstperiodoftelephoneservices. .... .19
1.1.5 Summary -Thefirstperiod oftelephony... ... ... ... .. 21
1.2 THECLASSICTELECOM OPERATOR 77 1.2.1 Definition ofthetelecomoperator... .... ... 24
1.2.2 Customer base. ... ... 26
1.2.3 Portfolio... ... ... ... ... 27
1.2.4 Verticalvaluechain... .... ... . 29
1.2.5 Internationalaspects. ... ... . 33
1.2.6 Conclusion-Characteristics oftelecomoperators... ... 36
1.3 INTERNATIONALTELECOMDEREGULATION 37
1.3.1 Deregulation in the US. .39 1.3.1.1 The telecommunication act of 1996... ... . 40
1.3.1.2 Predictions fortheAmericantelecommunicationmarket.. ... ... .42
1.3.2 DeregulationinEurope ... .... ... ... .... 43
1.3.2.1 TheEuropeanUnion in 1998... .... ... ... 44
1.3.2.2 Deregulation inthememberstates-Example „ Austrik. .46 1.3.2.3 Deregulationin Switzerland... ... .... . 48
1.3.2.4 Predictions fortheEuropeantelecommunicationsmarket . ... . 49
1.3.3 Global deregulation -WTO/GATT. ... .... ... . 50
1.3.4 Conclusion -TheGlobalDeregulation intheTelecomArena.. .... . 52
2.4 THE FUTURE OF TELECOM REGULATION 76
2.4.1 Problemswithcurrentderegulation..., ,... ...79
2.4.2 Futureregulation.. 81
2.5 ECONOMICSINREGULATIONANDINTERNATIONAL STRATEGY... 84
3 TRENDS INTHE TELECOM ARENA...86
3.1 PERSPECTIVESON TELECOMTRENDS... 88
3.1.1 Telecomtrendsbased upontheresults ofamanagementworkshop... ... 89
3.1.2 Web research. ... .... ... ... ... ...89
3.1.3 Uteratureresearch:genericindustrytrends... ... ...90
3.1.4 European Commissionpublication... ... ... ....92
3.1.5 Conclusion... ... ... ... ...93
3.2 CONVERGENCE...95
3.2.1 Convergence andthemultimediamarketplace... ... ...98
3.2.2 Convergence on the activitylevel. .... ... ... ... ..100
3.2.3 Conclusion-Convergence... ... ... ..103
3.3 TECHNOLOGY 105 3.3.1 Improvementsinprocessing,accessandbasictransmissiontechnologies... ...105
3.3.2 Technologies within the media sector.. ...106
3.3.3 Wireless .108 3.3.4 Software re-configurabletechnologies... .... ... ..109
3.3.5 Conclusion-Technology. .... ... ... ..110
3.4 GLOBALISATION 111 3.4.1 Globalisation drivers inthemultimediaindustry... ...113
3.4.2 Multimedia industry globalisationattempts .... ... 3.4.3 Conclusion-Globalisation.. ... ... ... ... ... ..122
3.5 INDUSTRYSTRUCTURE...,..,„123
3.5.1 Mergers andacquisitionchangingtheindustly structure... .... ...124
3.5.2 TheInternetchanging theindustrystructure .. ... ..125
3.5.3 Futureindustrystructure. ... ...127
3.5.3.1 Scenario one: Smallcompanies,large networks... .... ...128
3.5.3.2 Scenariotwo:Virtual countries, mega play . ... ...129
3.5.4 Conclusion-Industry structure... .... ... ... ..131
PARTH:
MULTIMEDIA
INDUSTRYFRAMEWORK 133INTRODUCTION: PROBLEMS IN THE INTERNATIONALCORPORATE
STRATEGY PROCESS...134
4 INTERNATIONAL MULTIMEDIAACTIVITIFR 137 4.1 DECONSTRUCTION OFTHE"VALUECHAIN"... ...139
4.2 CORPORATEACTIVITY LEVFI 142 4.2.1 Empiricalreasoning... .142
4.2.2 Regulatory perspective. .143 4.2.3 Graphicalpresentation ofthe corporate multimediaactivities.. .144
4.3 GEOGRAPHICALSCOPE OFTHE MULTIMEDIAACIWITIES...146
4.3.1 Globalisationpotential. ... . 146
4.3.2 The dynamicsofnetwork-based business... .... ... ... . 148
4.3.2.1 Zeroconcentration.. .148
4.3.2.2 Lane concentration. ... . 149
4.3.2.3 Zone concentration... ... ... .150
4.4 GLOBALISATION PO'rEN'r[ALOFTHE MULTIMEDIAACTIFTIES... 151
4.4.1.1 Terminalvending... .152
4.4.1.2 Contentoriginating... ... .... ... ...155
4.4.1.3 Content&servicepackaging... ... ... .158
4.4.1.4 Serviceprovisioning... ... ... ... ... .160
4.4.1.5 Infrastructureprovisioning... .... ...162
4.5 ACITVITYFRAMEWORK FORTHE MULTIMEDIAINDUSTRY... 164
5 MULTIMEDIA INDUSTRYORGANISATION 167 5.1 STRATEGY UNDERUNCERTAINTY. 169 5.2 SCENARIOPLANNING...173
5.2.1 Step 4: Rankbyimportanceanduncertainty... ... .176
5.2.2 Step5:Selecting scenariologics... ... ... .179
5.2.3 Step6:Fleshingoutthescenarios... .... ... ... ...180
5.3 DEVELOPINGMULTIMEDIANDUSTRY SCENARIOS...182
5.3.1 Multimediadriving forces. .183 5.3.2 Application of theextendedimpact/uncertaintymatrix.. .185
5.3.3 Selectingscenariologic. .188 5.3.4 Multimediascenarios... .... .... .190
5.3.4.1 Multimediascenario 1:TheNoVodaWaandETeBecountries... .192
5.3.4.2 Multimedia scenario2:GlobalAnyweb.. .193
5.3.4.3 Multimediascenario 3:TheOrchid Net.. ... . 194
PART MI: IMPLICATIONS FORTHE INTERNATIONALCORPORATE
STRATEGY 197
6 INTERNATIONALCORPORATESTRATEGY INTHE EMERGING
MULTIMEDIA INDUSTRY 198
6.1 IMPLICATIONS OF THE SCENARIOSFOR THECORPORATE STRATEGY...199
6.2 SMALUMEDIUMTELECOM OPERAIORINTHE"GLOBALANYWEB"SCENAR10... 201
6.2.1 Positioning inthemultimediaactivity framework . ... ... ...202
6.2.2 Activities with high globalisation potential.... ... ...204
6.2.3 Activities with high national differentiation needs. ... ... ...205
6.2.4 Activities out of the current telecom operator scope.. ... ...207
6.2.5 Integrating thetechnologytrends inthecorporatestrategy. ...209
6.2.6 Conclusion-International strategy forthesmall/medium telecom operator in the "Global Anyweb"scenario. ... ...211
6.3 MAPPING MULTIMEDIA PARTICIPANTS WITHTHESCENARIOS... 212
6.3.1 Small/mediumtelecomoperator intheNoVodaWascenario. ...213
6.3.2 Small/mediumtelecomoperator intheOrchidNet scenario.. ...214
6.3.3 Large telecomoperators in theNoVodaWascenario.. ...215
6.3.4 Large telecomoperator in theGlobalAnywebscenario ...217
6.3.5 Large telecomoperator in theOrchidNetscenario... ... ...218
6.3.6 Other multimediaparticipants inthe scenariologic... ...219
6.3.7 Other multimediaparticipants inthe OrchidNetscenario.. ... ...220
6.3.8 Conclusion-multimedia participants inthescenariologic.. ... ... ...221
6.4 SELECTION OF LEADING INDICATORS AND SIGNPOSTS ... 222
6.5 CONCLUSION-INTERNATIONALCORPORATE STRATEGYINTHEMULTIMEDIAINDUSTRY.... 774 7 REFLECT[ONAND CONTRIBUT[ON 997 7.1 A NEWAPPROACH TOINTERNATIONALCORPORATE STRATEGY... 228
7.1.1 Thenewinternationalcorporatestrategyprocess... ... ... 230
7.1.2 Comparison oftheconcepts... ... 232
7.2 APPLICATION IN OTHER NETWORK-BASED INDUSTRIES... 233
7.2.1 Thepowersupplyarena... ... ... ..234
7.2.2 Internationalutilityactivities.. .... ... ..235
7.2.3 Utilityindustryorganizationandinternationalcorporatestrategy ... 237
7.2.4 Conclusion... ... ... 238
7.3 OUT! nOK 779 8 APPENDIX 941 8.1 A PENDIX-TELECOMDEE[NmONS...242
8.2 APPENDIX-SWISSCOMCOMPANYPROFIT F 747 8.3 APPENDIX -TOGEWANEr- TWO WAY INTERCONNECrION...248
8A APPENDIX-UNIVERSALSERVICE... 249
List
of figures
Figure1:Integrationoftheoretical concepts intothe strategy process...7
Figure2: Structure of the book... 9
Figure 3:Thefirsttwopages ofthe patentfrom AlexanderGraham Bell. ... ...13
Figure 4:ThefirSt telephone system... 14
Figure 5: Spreadoftelephoneservice, 1880-1920... ... ...19
Figure6:Growthoftelephoneinstallations...20
Figure 7: Top10public telecommunicationoperators...24
Figure 8:Asimplified viewofprocesses used byaserviceprovider .29 Figure9:Swisscom international holdings... ... .... ...34
Figure10:Telekommunikationsgesetz § 111. 46 Figure11:Steps towards deregulation...52
Figure12:AcccesstypeSforinterconnection. 79 Figure13:Fixed-Telephony operatorsinAuft·ri. 76
Figure14:Incumbent operator marketshare...77
Figure15:Integrating policy trendsintodynamic advantage... ...85
Figure16:Industrytrends... 94
Figure 17:Thestagesofconvergenrp 97
Figure18:Turnover intheconverging IT,telecom andbroadcastingsectors ...99
Figure19:I.ncation of the ma orplayers in the value chain andrelationshipbetween them... 100
Figure 20: Theemergingvalue chain... 101
Figure 21: Thestagesofconvergence. 103 Figure 22:The emergingvalue chain...103
Figure23:Industryglobalization potential...113
Figure 24: Key global telecom indicators fortheworldtelecommunication service sector... 114
Figure25:StockpricesforI.evel 3 and Qwest... ...121
Figure 26:The emergingvaluechain... 137
Figure 33:The anatomy ofatransnational-Content&service packaging...159
Figure 34:The anatomy ofatransnational-Service provisioning...161
Figure 35: The anatomy ofatransnational-Infrastructureprovisioning...163
Figure36:Globalisation potential intheindividualactivities...165
Figure 37: Theactivity framework forthemultimediaindustry...166
Figure38:Levelofuncertainty... ... ...170
Figure 39: How to use the fourlevelsofuncertainn·...171
Figure40:Impact/Uncertainty matrix. ... ...177
Figure41:Extendedimpact/uncertaintymatrix ... ...178
Figure42:Industrytrends... .... .183
Figure43:Positioning of trends... .... Figure 44: Scenario logic of the multimedia industry organisation... ...189
Figure 45:Themultimedia industry organisationscenarios... .... ...191
Figure 46:Themultimedia industry organisationscenarios. 195 Figure 47: Positionaclassictelecomoperator in the multimedia activityframework... ...202
Figure48:Activitieswith high globalisationpotential-Service provisioning... ...204
Figure49:Activities with high national differentiationneeds-content&service packaging...206
Figure50:Activities out ofthecurrenttelecomoperators scope-content...208
Figure51:Positioningoftrends... ... ... ... ...209
Figure 52:Thestrategicoptions.. ... ... ...212
Figure53:Recommended strategicoptions. ... .... ...221
Figure54:Development of the scenarios. ...222
Figure55:Recommended strategic options... ... ...224
Figure56:Industry globalisation potential. ...228
Figure57:Integrationoftheoreticalconcepts intothe strategyprocess... ...231
Figure58:Comparison oftheglobalisationpotential analysis with the new framework...232
Figure 59:The powersupply value chain... 234
Figure 60:The anatomy ofatransnational-Utility industn'...235
...256
Figure 61:Thevalue chain. Figure62:Value system... ... 957
List
of figures
Figure1:Integrationoftheoreticalconcepts intothe strategyprocess.. 7
Figure2:Structure of the book... ...9
Figure 3:The firsttwopages ofthepatentfromAlexanderGraham Bell.... 13
Figure 4:Thefirst telephonesystem...14
Figure5:Spreadoftelephone service,1880-1970 19
Figure6:Growthoftelephoneinstallations...20
Figure 7: Top10public telecommunicationoperators...24
Figure 8:Asimplified viewofprocesses used by a service provider...29
Figure9:Swisscominternationalholdings... Figure10:Telekommunikationsgesetz § 111 46
Figure11:Stepstowardsderegulation...52
Figure12:Acccess types for interconnection...72
Figure13:Fixed-Telephony operators inAustria ...76
Figure 14: Incumbent operator marketshare...77
Figure15:Integrating policy trends into dynamicadvantage...85
Figure16:IndustrytrenA 94
Figure 17:Thestagesofconvergence... 97
Figure18:Turnover intheconverging IT, telecomandbroadcastingsectors ...99
Figure19:Incation of themajorplayers in the value chain andrelationshipbetween them... 100
Figure 20:The emergingvaluechain... 101
Figure 21:Thestagesofconvergence... 103
Figure 22:The emergingvaluechain...,..,,... ...,...,... ...,...,... 103
Figure 23:Industry globalizationpotential... 113
Figure 24:Key global telecom indicators fortheworld telecommunicationservice sector... 114
Figure 25:Stockprices for kvel 3 and Qwest... 121
Figure 26:Theemerging value chain... 137
Introduction
There weretworeasons that led me to conduct research onthe topicofinternational
corporate strategy amidst an uncertain organisational structure within the
telecommunications industry. First,my professionasbusiness development manager andconsultant demand an extensive knowledge about the ongoingchanges within
the industry. Secondly, my MBA curriculum, particularly the course about
international marketing, provided valuableinsights intothe topic,butincreased my
appetite foradditionalknowledge.
In 1997, asbusiness development manager at Unisource, adivisionof Swiss PIT, I
had the opportunity to define the division's international expansion strategy for
entering Austria. Simultaneously, I attended Professor Philippe Naert's marketing
strategy course through the University of Bern's MBA Program. He presented
several interesting strategy concepts and asked the course participants to write a
case study as our final exam. My case study
dealt with
the issue ofUnisource'sentrance into theAustrian market, specifically an analysis oftelecommunications
activities anda definition ofaninternational strategyto expanda company's value chaininternationally.
Both thecase study and my business development work were successful, that is, I
succeeded in my marketing case and the company implemented its expansion strategy.However,thisstrategy proved tobeunsustainable.
From an academic perspective, my marketing case applied various globalisation
methodologies. However, the chosen methodologies raised several new issues that
could notbeaddressedwithinthescope ofamarketing case, forexample, theimpact
of convergence, upcoming deregulation, and new technologies upon the industry
landscape, the entranceof competitors into theAustrian market andtheirstrategic approach, and theimplications ofthesedevelopments for Unisource's strategy. The Unisource division in which I worked was eventually re-integrated into Swiss
PTT. At the same time, Swiss FITwentthroughareorganisation and renamed its
telecomunitSwisscom. Thestrategy thatwasoriginallyapproved by Unisource was
stillbacked by senior management, butwasimplemented under the nameSwisscom.
Swisscom's
first
subsidiary, SwisscomAustria,existed for only one year before it was integrated into a newjoint venturebetween UTA andSwisscomin Austria. This jointventure has now been divested and Swisscom is currently conducting acquisition
talkswithTelekomAustria.
All
ofthesedevelopments occurredwithin a time span ofsixyears.My motivation forwriting this bookis,based upon my ownexperiences, toassist managersindefining a
Strategic question
Until 1998, thetelecomindustry
in
Europewasclearly defined and characterised by national verticallyintegrated monopoliesthatprovided telephony and leasedline services. Historically, telecom operators were often anintegral part of the
national postal operator. Following deregulation inmost European countries in
1998, telecom operators facedmanychanges
within
the industry.At that time, new players like AOL, Colt, MCI, Qwest, Level 3 and Yahoo were
emerging. For some of the new entrants, the second development stage with
mergersandacquisitionshas already taken place.A well-known example in the
press was theVodafone andMannesmann takeoverbattle in2000. Furthermore, the scope of telecom operators has been extended into other areas through
mergers with computer companies or media services, as in the case of Olivetti,
which boughtTelecomItalia in 1999.
The rules of thegame remain unclear toall participants. Uncertainty about the
best strategic move and the future structure ofthe industry can also be drawn from the extremely volatile stock market development ofincumbents' and new
entrants'shares.
Telecomoperators who were formerlymonopolyoperators have lost partoftheir
100% marketshare in their nationallyprotected market.Toreact tothischange,
these telecom operatorshaveattemptedtoexpand thescopeoftheirbusiness, for which entering new geographical markets is one of the strategic options.
These industry changes also set the stage for Swisscom, the former monopoly
telecom operatorinSwitzerland. Swisscom wasunder thesamepressureasother European telecom operators, in that deregulation enabled competitors to enter
their formerly protected home market. Consequently, Swisscom considered the
entrance into
the Austrian telecommunicationsmarket as one
of theirinternationalextension strategies.
The research for Swisscom's entrance into the Austrian telecommunications
marketdefinesthe empirical question that is the subject of thisbook,namely:
What are the nature and problems of vertically integrated incumbent telecom
operators?
Howdoesderegulation affect theindustry?
What is the globalisationpotential inthe telecommunications industry?
Whatother trendsarereshaping theindustry?
The answertothesequestions provides the basis for the strategicdiscussion. Intense research wasconducted onthe emergingmultimediaindustry, includingthe nature of the telecom arena, the economics of network based industries and the ongoing
trends inthe industry.
This research led totherealization that a highdegreeof uncertaintyexistsabout the
future of the industry's organisation. Merger and de-merger activities, as well as
several failed strategicmoves on the part oftelecom operators, provide evidence of
the uncertaintywithintheindustry (VodafoneMannesmann, Global Crossing, AOL
Warner, AT&T Unisource, KPN Qwest, Level 3). The uncertainties involved in
dealing with the future demand the application of appropriate methodologies and
concepts.
The internationalcorporate strategyprocess wascarried out through all phases to
makethe described conceptsplausible and provideintegrated answers tothe above
questions. Theories about the economics ofnetwork business, globalisation and
handling uncertaintysupportedthisprocess.
This conceptual basis created the framework for the book. Numerous discussions
with industryexperts and myconsulting work intheindustry furtherdeveloped the
frameworkand stabilised the argumentation. The process of defining international
corporate strategy in an uncertain industry environment is applied to several
concreteexamples thatgive specificanswers to theabove questions.
It is hoped that the concepts and strategic advice developed in this thesis make
substantial contributions to managerial practice and the academic
field of
International
Corporate
Strategy
The title of one of Michael Porter's publications (Porter 1996) is What is strateg.2 It is alsoapertinent questionrelated to thisbook. Porter has the following tosayabout
corporate strategy:
"Corporate strategy, the overall plan for a diversified company, is both the darling and the stepchild of contemporary management practice" (Porter
1987:43).
Accordingto Porter, corporate strategy issimultaneously a 'darling', as CEOs have
been obsessedwith diversification, anda'stepchild', since noconsensusexistsabout
whatcorporate strategy is or how toformulate it.Other authorsagree that the term
corporatestrategy is not clearly defined. Consequently, theyprefer to formulate the purpose ofcorporate strategy as a question (Mintzberg 1998, Porter 1980, Grant 1998). This chapter
will
first define the usage of the term corporate strategy andthen integrate theissuesofinternationalstrategy.
'Next comes the question of what strategies of a generic nature are available to extend and reconceive that core business. These are approaches designed to
answer the corporate level question, "What business should we be in?"
(Mintzberg 1998:347)
Instead ofdefining the term corporate strategy, Mintzberg investigates what the scope of the corporation should be. He then goes a stepfurtherand points out the
existenceofverticalandhorizontal strategic paths.
"Strategies designed to take organizations beyond their core business can be pursued in so-called vertical or horizontal ways, as well as combinations of the two." (Mintzberg 1998:347)
Porter and Grant both agree that corporate strategy should answer the question
"what business should we be in?". In addition, Porter considers the role of the
corporateoffice.
"Corporate strategy concerns two different questions: what businesses the
V
"Corporate strategy defines the scope of the firm in terms of the industries and
markets in which it competes. Corporate strategy decisions include
investment in diversification, vertical integration, acquisitions, and new
ventures, the allocation of resources between the different businesses of the firm; and divestments."(Grant 1998:19)
The second field of strategic management is called "business strategy" or
"competitive strategy". Business strategy supports the managerial process in the
positioning ofafirm'sscope inthe market.
Business strategy is concerned with how the firm competes within a particular
industzy or market. If the firm is to prosper within an industrs it must
establish a competitive advantage over its rivals. Hence, this area of strategy is also referred to as competitive strategy (Grand 1998:19)
The focus of this bookis corporate strategy. Businessstrategy, on theother hand, is
setwithregards toafirm'schosenposition.
The international aspect ofcorporate strategy is pertinent to the question "what
business should we be in?".Thisquestion includes both thescope ofthe corporation
as well as
its geographical perspective. Existing literature provides structuredapproaches about how to analyse the industry and define international strategy
(Porter 1985, Yip 1992, Bartlett 1998). George S.Yip, one of theleading researchers
in international strategy, provides generic strategy levers for expanding a firm's
businessinternationally.
"Globalisation strategy is multidimensional. Setting strategy for a worldwide business requires choices along a number of strategic dimensions. Some of these dimensions determine whether the strategy lies toward the multilocal
end of the continuum or the global end. "(Yip1992:15)
Yip specifies the dimensions forall elementsofinternational strategy. However, he
doesnotdifferentiatebetween corporate and business strategy In fact, few authors of
international strategydifferentiatebetween the two levels. Instead, theyfocustheir
discussionofinternationalstrategy on the business level. The mainfocusofexisting
literature is the implementation ofinternational strategy in the current business
context (Hame]/Prahalad 1989,Bartlett/Ghoshal 1998, Quelch/Hoff 1986). This book applies some of theinternationalstrategy conceptsinorder to answerthe previously
posedstrategic question(Bartlett/Ghoshal1998/ Coyne 1998).
Thefundamental reorganisation of theindustry afterderegulation (c.f. Part I) pose a challengeindefining thescope ofatelecom operator'scorporate strategyprocess. Of
particular interest istheintegration oftheinternational aspect at thebeginning of
V
A definition of international corporate strategy needs to address the following
questions:
- Whatinternationalbusinessshouldthe corporation be in?
- How should the corporationbestructuredtomanagethisbusiness? - How doesthe corporationget there?
The strategic questionhasshownthattelecommunicationsoperators havesignificant
problemsindefiningtheir internationalcorporate strategy. Therefore, thefinal title,
incorporating both the developments
within
the telecommunications industry, andinternational corporatestrategy, is:
InternationalCorporate Strategy
in
NetworkBasedIndustries- Acasestudy for the EmergingMultimedia Industry
Asthetitle implies, the main topic of this bookisinternationalcorporatestrategy in
the multimedia industry. However, during the industry analysis phase, itbecame
clear thattheprimaryissueininternationalstrategy is theuncertainty inthefuture
organisation of the industry. The goal of achieving sustainable guidelines in the
strategy process requires placing an emphasis on globalisation potential in the
multimedia industry and the uncertainty of the future organisation within the
industry.
The answer to the strategic question is presented in several steps. The first step
(Part I) in the process is the definition of the industry arena, the underlying
economics and the analysis of industry trends based on current literature and
management workshops. The second step defines the problems and potential
solutions, and is themaintopic of part II of this book. The final stepcombines the
analysis of part I andthesolutions of part II intothe corporate strategy process for
guidelines in theinternationalcorporate strategy.
From an academic viewpoint, the book delivers a complex, but real case,
in
which theorymeetspractice. From apracticalviewpoint, the framework canbe applied in defining strategies that are more sustainable than those currently implementedMethodology
The currenttrendtowards deregulationcreates ahighlevel ofuncertaintyabout
the future organisation
within
network-based industries.However, the
integration of industryknowledgewiththeoreticalconceptshelps to overcome the
challengesrelated to the uncertainty and makeacompany'sstrategic moves more sustainable.
The methodology chosen for this bookis aligned with managerial practice. The book followsthecorporate strategy processfromindustryanalysis, then toafocus
on specific problems, and lastly, strategic advice. The conceptual base is
integrated intotheprocessatthose stages whereitstrengthens the reasoning or
provides tools for overcoming specific problems. Consequently, this approach contributes toacademictheorybuilding throughthe application andintegration of
currentconceptualtools,and benefits both managerial and consulting practice.
The diagram below showsthe interactionbetweenthe strategy process, industry
trends andtheconceptual base.
Figure1:
Integration of
theoreticalconcepts intothe strategyprocessStrategy Process m
E Deregulation Industry Activity Globalisation Industry & Analysis Framework Potential Scenarios
E Convergence International
8 corporate
Globalisation Strategy
H + 4 7
Technology 1
Conceptual Base Economicsin Global Strategy Uncertainty in Telecommunications Industry Regulation Organisation
Theindustryanalysis shows that thefuturetelecomarena will be anintegrated part
of the emerging multimedia industry. At the same time, the current managerial
perspective of a telecom operator is maintained in the argumentation, and is
supported bypractical examples,basedupon personal experience in theinternational
Structure of the book
The research areas covered in this book span a wide area with different
methodologies, periods andlevels ofdetail. The bookis organisedinthreeparts
that cover the overallstrategy process. Figure 2provides a graphical overview of the structure.
Part I contains thegenericindustry analysis withtwo goals,namely to:
1. providethe background of the industry, and to
2. define thenature ofthe problem in thestrategy process
Chapter 1 covers the results ofa literature search on the history, organisation and regulatory developments of the classical telecommunications industry.
Chapter2 looks at thespecific economicsinvolvedin networkbasedindustries, from
the reasoning behind natural monopolies to the economics of deregulation, contestabilitytheory,infrastructurecharacteristics andnetworkexternalities.
Chapter 3 looks at the trends reshaping the current telecommunications industry.
The important trends analysed are convergence, technology, globalisation and the
changes in industry structure. An important issue covered in this chapter is the changein focus fromthe telecom to themultimedia industry duetoongoingindustry
changes.
Part IIisbased onthe results of Part I. Toovercomethe problems in the strategy
process, analyticaltoolsare selectedand appliedtocreateanindustryframework as part of theindustryanalysis.Twoprimarytopicsare covered,namely the:
1. logicof globalisation in themultimediaindustry, and
2. dealing withtheuncertainty in industryorganisation
Chapter 4 contains the problem statement for the globalisation aspects in the
multimedia industry The underlying conceptual base is used to solve the stated
Chapter6shifts the focus from theindustry tothe corporation. The elements of the industry analysis and the multimedia industry framework are tied together to show howthose componentsinteract inthecorporate strategy process.
Chapter7returns to the original strategic question and providesanoverview of how
different theoretical concepts support the international corporate strategy process,
and how the framework developed can be transferred to other industries like the
utilityandtransportationindustries.
Figure2: Structure of the book
Strategic Question
Q Economics in @ @
Trends in the
Part I The Telecom Arena Network Based
Industries Telecom Arena -PTT's -Monopoly - Convergence - ClassicTelecom -Deregulation - Globalisation - InternationalDeregulation -Contestability -Industry Structure
-Future Regulation -Infrastructurecharacteristics - Technology
4
Problems intheInternational Corporate Strategy
0 ®
Part 11
International Multimedia Industry Multimedia Activties Organisation - Deconstructionof ValueChains - Uncertainty -Geographical Scope -Scenario Planning -Globalisation Potential -Multimedia Industry Scenarios
-Multimedia Activity Framewom 4
Implications for the InternationalCorporate Strategy
® ®
Part Ill International Reflection and
CorporateStrategy Contribution
Implications - Comparisonof Strategy Concepts .Global Anyweb Activities - Applicationinother Network Based Industries
-Mapping MultimediaParticipants - Outlook -Integrating Technology
Theinternational corporatestrategyprocess is carried out onthebasisofexamples
from thefirst step ofthe analysis to the pointwhereconcrete strategystatements can be formed. The book asa whole isacombination ofeconomic concepts and business
theory andmethodologiescomplemented by empirical reasoning thatisderived from
more than ten years of personal managerial and consulting experience in the
Part
I:
Evolution of
the
Telecom
Arena
Strategic Question
0
Economics in 0 ®Trends in the TheTelecomArena Network Based
Telecom Arena
Part I
Industries-PTT's -Monopoly - Convergence
-Classic Telecom -Deregulation - Globalisation
-International Deregulation -Contestability -Industry Structure -Future Regulation -Infrastructurecharacteristics - Technology
'1
Problems intheInternational Corporate Strategy
@
International Multimedia Industry Part 11 MultimediaActivties Organisation
Deconstructionof ValueChains Uncertainty GeographicalScope ScenarioPlanning
-Globalisation Potential - MultimediaIndustryScenarios - Multimedia Activity Framework
4
Implications for the International Corporate Strategy
0 0
International Reflection and Part 1 1 1 Corporate Strategy Contribution
-Implications - ComparisonofStrategy Concepts
- .GlobalAnyweb" Activities - ApplicationinotherNetworkBased Industries
1 The
Telecom
Arena
The strategic questionthat motivated me towrite this book is set inthe context of
developments in what I call the "telecom arena".
The term "arena" is well suited to describe what is currently taking place in the
telecommunication services industry. Meriam-Webster Online Dictionary lists the
following entries for"arena":
1 : an area in a Roman amphitheatre for gladiatorial combats, and
. . . .
3a:a sphere ofinterest, activity, or competition (Meriam-Webster 2003) The description"a sphereof interest, activity orcompetition" serves asthe basis for defining theterm"arena" inthisbook. 1
A decade ago,thetelecomarenawaseasily described, in that the189member states of theInternationalTelecommunicationUnion (ITU) each had amonopoly operator
that provided communication services (ITU 2003). Deregulation in the majority of
the member states reshaped the picture significantly. Tbday, there are numerous companies who wishtoenter intoacountry inwhich deregulationhastaken place, or who already poseathreat totheincumbent. InAustria, one of the smallest European
Union member states, nearly 500telecommunication licences were granted to new
entrants in2002. Currently, the telecom arena is wide open for the creation of a new
industry.
In thischapter, I
will
development of theindustryenvironment and explain the needfor change for the involvedindustry participants. This part oftheindustry analysis
will
bepresentedinthreesteps:- The firststepprovides thehistoricalperspective on thetransportofpeople, goods
and information inthe monopoly areaofpostal,telegraphy and telephonyservice
providers (FIT).
- The second step describes the main activities and specifics of what I call the
classic telecom operator preceding the first major round of deregulation, and
provides the basis for the remainder of this book.
- Step three analysesthe impact ofderegulation and thedriving forceforchange
withinnetwork-basedindustriesduring the last decades,upontelecomoperators'
need toconsiderinternationalstrategy.
'
1.1
Thlephone services
as
state
monopolies
The beginning of telephony dates back toMarch 7, 1876, when Alexander Graham
Bell patented the "Improvement in Telegraphy" under Nn 174465 in the United
States ofAmerica (USPTO 1876). The picture belowshowsthe
first
twopages of his patent.Figure 3: Thefirst twopages ofthe patent from Alexander Graham Bell
-'..':- ='... ,.:" .".':'.
I·<t. 1 i . 6.
TK..1,16'SY- ...8/=5. e :t;.k
S...S'.,&; A#dk,2,8 S...,4:. ...e ...., /. "#.
·41 ... ..,.:.'... -..· - ... -- ·· ···, «·---3 'f- .- --- .... ... ...- - - ....-. 1_ 1 1. 1 7 ./ .. .. .. I ... -.., 9 - - ... V .... ... + .... - , 11'\ i t, i ' ·. 43 I q- - - V* „· ···· ·-· • --.'.,- I I -. -I : ; l: :i : # ,1 ».. ..C:- A.r:' t-· fil'' '4'4rt: *44.:4 .*/ lf,2. . &4*:1:··: 3..., ....: ' -. :... t....t..1 z , 1 '···'·8K*44<AL»1/Lt 42::., k /\ /\ «k'. i A-,t:, 1.:»*'. y:- f.4--\..:7.-1.2.-,2
'.--„. „A
'.«.: 11.4 .»3.-%¢.=11» , L .,l., t.,=t··-···-...T-·-··. ,J
...,..'..., IN'leI- '...'.*'. I '""-e 6-444/4.0 : 4=4-.441 "='. 6,l,&.*•6:'.*... ..bu•·•3,•W.649*2
6„..3 *2.:'+ 1 .'.8-+45*.... 4,4 ,&414 / Source (USPTO 1876)The
first
telephonytrials were exclusivelywithincities, andregulationwashandled by the local government. Few peoplerealized howimportantBell's inventionwould become for our society In fact, its relevance was initially so marginal, that thehandlingof telephony companieswithinthe regulatory environment was not defined.
The invention of thetelephone led to a new meansof communication. Oneimportant
question thatwasraised was
if
telephony,liketelegraphy, wouldbecomeamonopolybusiness.
During most of the 208 century, the majorityofdevelopedcountries had monopoly
telephony services. The service quality was low compared to today. For example,
people had to wait for months
until
theyreceiveda telephone line, and the colour ofone's telephone wasextremelylimited. Figure 4: The
first
telephonesystem- .,T.2-2- 1- - - . ' A ....·' igh
t »- --4.- --'-th,; 2 .4
15;Ellaillili AM*=
1-i r
hl .,Axf 1
*(:4% . 4 ' 11 1 t%**mi# /116, 1,4. N·f.11.1 I
...„-...„...Source:Scientific America,October 6. 1877
Onthe other hand, the telephone almost always functioned, andusers never had to
refer toa manual, recharge abattery, orchangeanyother usagebehaviour. During
the period of monopoly telephonyservices,therewas
little
innovation, but also a highreliability
ofservice.It is interesting to notethatpeople,regardless of thecountry inwhich they lived, had the same experiencewithmonopoly telephony services. The next sectionprovides a
historicalbackground about the development of telephonyservice monopolies in the
1.1.1 Development of
the
telephone service monopoly in the US
In theUS,GrahamBellwanted to se]1hisinventionto Western Union,which, at that
time, was the most powerful telegraph company. However, Western Union did not
buy theBellpatent,believing thedevicewasnothing more thanapassing novelty. In 1877, GrahamBellestablished monopoly services withaprivatecompany, secured by his patent, foraperiod offifteenyears.
In1880, TheodoreVailassumedthe position as COO of theBell Company. Through Vail's vision and management capabilities, Bell Telephone Company eventually became AT&T
The company that became AT&T began in 1875, in an arrangement among
inventor Alexander Graham Bell and the two men, Gardiner Hubbard and
Thomas Sanders, who agreed to finance his work. Bell was tzying to invent a
talking telegraph -- a telephone. He succeeded, earning patents in 1876 and 1877. In 1877, the three men formed the Bell Telephone Company to exploit
the invention. The first telephone exchange, operating under license from Bell Telephone, opened in New Haven, CT in 1878. Withinthreeyears, telephone
exchanges existed in most major cities and towns in the United States, operating under licenses from what was now the American Bell Telephone Company In 1882, American Bell acquired a controlling interest in the
Western Electric Company, which became its manufacturing unit. Gradually, American Bell came to own most of its licensees. Collectively the enterprise
became known as the Bell System. The American #lephone and #legraph
Company was incorporated on March 3, 1885 as a wholly owned subsidiary of American Bell, chartered to build and operate the original long distance telephone network. Building out from New York, AT&T reached its initial goal of Chicago in 1892, and then San Francisco in 1915. On December 30, 1899,
AT&T acquired the assets of American Bell, and became the parent company of the Bell System (AT&T 2003).
Duringthe period from1894until 1913, thepatentmonopolyareagradually came to
an end,and competitionaroseinseveralUS cities.Around1900, there were over 200
telecom operators in the US.
By 1913, AT&T had grown to such a large size that the company was given a
warning thatitcould comeunder
antitrust
observations followingthe Sherman Act.However, Theodore Vail was able to influence the government in such a way that AT&T received the opportunity to grow furthen In the years that followed, public opinion changed in a waythattelecommunication was seen as a natural monopoly (c.f.2.2.1). In 1921, this wasmadeofficialthrough the Graham Wills Act.
The Depression in the 1930sprompted anew thinking within theU.S. government
andbusiness circles. Policy makersbelieved that the Depressionwaspartlycaused
by competitive markets and could be solved through government intervention.
During the period of Franklin Roosevelt's "New Deal", the US experienced a
1.1.2 Development of the telephone service monopoly
in Germany and
Austria
The existence of state monopolies for the transportation ofgoods and people has a
long history in Europe. Voice and data services were initially regulated as one
category.
The original set-up of voice and data services was developed in the "Heiliges
RBmisches Reich Deutscher
Nation". In
1597, Emperor RudolfII
granted the"Kaiserliche Postregal"2 to the family which isnow known under the name
'Thurn
und Taxis".Thisfamilydominated the postal servicesinGermany andAustriauntil
1867 Prussia bought back the rights and took over the postal monopoly. The area
that "Thurn
und Taxis" originally covered with its services changed with thedevelopment of the political map in Europe. In Austria, Kaiser Karl VI declared postalservicesastate monopoly in 1722, and separated theservicefrom"Thurn und
Taxis" management.
The contentofstatemonopolieschanged over time. Thetransportationof people led
to a growing importance of steamboats and railways. The transportation of
informationreceivedgreaterimportancethroughtheinventionoftelegraphy. Samuel
Morse's invention in 1830 gave rise to telegraphy services. In many countries,
telegraphy services were a part of the postal monopoly, as the
definition of
telegraphy, like the post, was thetransportation ofmessages.
In Germany, the
first
telephone connection was established by the generalpostmasterHeinrichv. Stephan and the general telegraph director Budde, who with
the help of twotelephonesfrom Graham Bell, calledoneanotheronOctober26,1877.
After their successful telephone call, v. Stephan and Buddeimmediately requested
the company Siemens & Halske to produce more of the Bell technology-based telephones. On December 14, 1877, Germany's Werner von Siemens received the
Patent Nr. DRP 2399, entitled 'Telephone und Rufapparate mit magnetischer
Gleichgewichtlagederschwingenden Teile"( Telefonmuseum-Hittfeld 2003).
In 1855, the role ofthe government
in
telegraphyserviceswas discussedwithin the
various German states.
In
Prussia, thefirst
proposal for a telegraphylaw includedthe reasoning for a monopoly service, namely that telegraphy
carries with it the
character of a state institution that cannot be given to the private industry for
Telephone services, which were introduced by the 'Deutsche Reichspost and
Telegraphenverwaltung", and considered an evolution oftelegraphy services, were integrated into the state monopolyin1877(Feyerabend 1929).
In that sameyear, Graham Bell's telephone technology was introducedin Austria,
and thereafterinGermany. However,theinitialcommercial usage did not takeplace
until 1881. The "Wiener-Privat-Telegraphen-Gesellschaft" applied for a licence in
1879, but it took the ministry oftrade until June 3, 1881 to grant a licence for a
radius of15kilometres around the"Stephansturm" inVienna. In 1892,atwhich time
five companies offered telephone services in Austria, the government decided to nationalize all telephone companies. By 1895, all ofthe telephone companies were
integrated into the "Ostereichische Post- und Telegraphenverwaltung"(Gunther
1992).
1.1.3 Development of the telephone service monopoly
in
Switzerland
During the period of "Thurn und Taxis", the "Eidgenossen" of Switzerland were
politicallyindependent from the surrounding"Heiliges R8misches Reich Deutscher
Nation", therefore, regulationdevelopedindependently.
'IblephonyservicesinSwitzerland were part of the country's telegraphy services, and beginning in 1878, runasstate-owned monopolies(Spiech 1999), asthe government
did not want to assume the risk ofbuilding up telephonyinfrastructure without
knowing ifthe technology would succeed. As a result, the 'Telegraphen-Direktion"
issuedlicencestoprivatecompanies.The
first
telephonyservicewasintroduced by aprivatecompanyinZurich.
However, customerscomplained about the qualityofserviceandspeedof execution providedbyprivatecompanies,which in 1880 led to thedecision toconstructa
state-owned telephony network. In 1885, theprivatetelephonenetworkwasbought by the "Eidgenossenschaft" with the goalofovercoming the comparablyslowgrowthrates. In 1920,the"Bundespost" and the'TelegraphenDirektion"wereintegrated into one
national monopoly company known as P'IT (Post, Telegraph and Telephony)
1.1.4
Consumer
acceptanceduring the
first
period
of
telephone
services
Theeconomicimplications ofaregulatedintroductionof telephonyservicescompared
tothe introductionof telephony services in anopen marketaredifficultto measure,
since telephony services were
introduced in most of
the observed countries asmonopolyservices. Themost consistent set of data available was that on the spread
oftelephony services in theUS.During thepatent-protected era from 1880 to 1895
acceptance of telephony services was slowly rising. The period of competition
following1895brought gains unimaginable just a few years earlier.
"After seventeen years of monopoly, the United States had a limited telephone system of 270,000 phones concentrated in the centers of the cities, with service generally unavailable in the outlying areas.
After thirteen years of competition, the United States had an
extensive system of six million telephones, almost evenly divided between Bell and the independents, with service available practically anywhere in the country(Brock 1981)."
Industry historians Leonard S. Hyman, Richard C. Tbole, and Rosemary M. Avellis
summarise the overall effect ofthisperiodby stating,
"It
seemscompetition helped to expand the market, bring down costs, and lower prices to consumers." Figure 5illustratesthe growth of telephone service in the US between 1880 and 1920.
Figure5:Spreadoftelephone service, 1880-1920
Year AverageDailyCalls 'Iblephones Per 1,000 of
Perl,000Population Population
Average daily calls increased 100-fold over the 40-year period, and the number of telephones increased from 1tonearly 124 per1000population.
Figure6provides a graphical presentation of the data, inwhich the increase in the
growthrate beginning in 1895 can be seen.
Figure6:Growth oftelephone
installations
Telephones Per1,000Population
140 r 120
-1
1 1
80 60l
u - I
t
20O ..I- , -1-__ //
1880 1885 1890 1895 1900 1905 1910 1915 1920This growthoccurredafter the protection period of Graham Bell's patentended.
However, the data does not prove that deregulation was the reason for the
growthoftelephonyservices, as theshape of thecurve isalsorepresentative for a
typicallifecycle for theintroduction and growthphaseoftechnology services.
It would be incorrect to assume that the growth rate was purely a coefficient of
competition following the expiration of Bell's patent. Other factors, such as the
economic situation and consumer adoption rates during the early stage of a new
technology, can alsosignificantlyinfluencegrowthrates.
Thisdata clearlyshowsthesignificantgrowth intheacceptanceof telephoneservices
andtheresultingimportanceonother markets as of the start of the208 century.
1.1.5 Summary - The
first
period of
telephony
GrahamBell invented the telephone in 1876. The technology spread within one year from the USto Germany,SwitzerlandandAustria.
In the US, Bell was able tobuild up monopoly services during the 15-year patent protectionperiod,whichwasfollowed byaperiod ofopenmarkets.
In Europe, the situation was different, as telephony services were seen as an
improvement of telegraphy, and which started as state-owned monopolies and remainedmonopoliesuntil the1990's.
There is not much statisticalevidence aboutthe economicimplications ofmonopoly
services compared toopen markets in the build-up phaseof telephony services. In
Europe, there are no comparable examples, and the periods of regulated and
deregulated markets in the US canhardlybecompared. The onlyknown fact from that period isthat growthratesoftelephony users in the US were byfarhigherafter
Graham Bell's patent expired and competition intensified. However, there is no
statistical evidence that this growth rate was the result of emerging competition.
Economic, political and technology life cycles could just as wellbe reasons for the
1.2
The Classic
Telecom
Operator
I tooktheperspective ofanincumbenttelecom operator
in
Europein formulating thestrategic question for this book. The characteristics of telecom operators weresimilar in European countries, such as Germany, Switzerland andAustria. I will base the
description of a classic telecom operator on the Swiss incumbent telecom operator
anditsorganisationbeforederegulation (1996).
An organisation can be described on the basis of several factors, for example the
organisational set-up, management and employees, geographical reach, customers,
products, brands, and unique selling propositions or processes. The literature
provides various suggestions on how to describe a company from the corporate
perspective (Fischer & Lorenz 2000, Porter 1980). This chapter
will
focus on thetelecom specific points relevant for the strategic question by setting them into the
broadercontext.
Fischer & lorenz. investigated the typical incumbent telecom operator for the
definition ofthefuture European policy framework (Fischer & Lorenz 2000). They
indicate thattheincumbentisusually incontrol of
- the local loop,
- strong customer relationships/contacts in theretailmarket, which is seen as a
very valuableasset,
- thenational
tariff
structure, and- thecellularnetwork and datainfrastructure.
These characteristics make telecom operators unique and are characteristics in
which theydifferfromother productioncompanies.However, one specificfactor that
Fischer & Lorenz donotconsider is the
full
vertical integration ofthe value chain for telecommunication services. Typically, a telecom operator dominatesthe market inevery aspect ofits value chain, and isa characteristic that is very relevant to this
book.
To specifyabusiness' strategyprocess,Porter recommends that anindustryanalysis
onthe description ofa companybeconducted. Forthisreasonheintroduced the five
forces model(Porter 1980) and the value chain (Porter 1985).
The five forces model, which is based on competition, new entrants, substitutes, supplier power and buyer power, is of limited use in a monopoly environment. Competition, new entrants and substitutes were non-existent over a period of
decades forthe classic telecom operator. Suppliers of telecommunication equipment like telephones or modems were not allowed to enter the market. The monopoly
situation inthe telecommunicationsindustrytherefore reduces the fiveforces model
Porter'sother known concept,the value chain analysis, is importantlooking at the
characteristicsoftelecom operators. Specifically the strongvertical integration from
infrastructureownership toserviceprovisioning and customer contact is unique and
has a strong impact upon the operator's corporate strategyprocess is. This section
provides a description of the telecommunication value chain and the products supplied through that value chain.
In
addition, the international activities of1.2.1 Definition of
the telecom operator
Telecom operators design, build and operate telecommunication networks for
households and businesses. Traditionally, corporations emerged from postal service
organisations and were set up as national monopolies with a universal service
obligation. Due to the growthoftelephone and data services, the complexity of the
industry increased and the importance and size telecom operators became more
significant. Today, telecom operators are among the largest
national and
multinationalcorporationsinEurope.
The size of the telecom operator in Europe has been
primarily
dependent on thenumber of households and businesses in the respective country. The table below
shows the ranking of the ten biggest public telecommunication operatorsbased on revenue in 1999. Operators'revenues, which were
fairly
stable in monopoly times,are, following deregulation,permanentlyfluctuating Intense merger and acquisition activities, as well asdivestments, are lead to achange
in
telecom operators'marketposition.
Figure 7: Top 10public telecommunication operators Ranked by1999revenue
Rank Telecomrevenue Net income Employees
199 Operat,r(Countty) :™i i,„,) Change(98'99) ™ -, la,ange(98-99) Total(000@ Change08-99)
1 NTT (Japan) a 97'953 6.7% 2'821 -46.0% 223.9 -0.2% 2 AT&T(UnitedStates) 62'391 17.296 3'428' -34.5% 147.8 37.1%
3 SBC(UnitedStates) 1 49'489 7.190 8'159. 6.1% 204.5 2.1%
MCI Worldcom (United
37'120
104.3% 3'9411 * 77.0
4 States) 5 DeutscheTelekom 35'750 1.196 1'309 -40.996 195.8 O.0% (Germanp 1 6 _ BT (United Kingdom) a :34'955 20.2% 3'264 -31.9% 136.8 9.7%' BellAtlantic(United '
7 33'174 5.1% 4'202 41.7% 145.0 3.6%
States)
8 ChinaTelecom(China)
i
27'539 14.5% ... ... 444.5 ...
9 FranceTildcom(France)
|
2T344 10.5% 2786 20.5% 174.3 3.1%
;10 TelecomItalia (Italy) |
27229 8.2%
1'745 -12.2% 122.7
-1. 1%
Abte· United Statesdollarvalues areobtainedbyusing operator suppliedexchangeratesor ending period exchange rate. Net
incomeisafter tax-tindicates that NetIncomewasnegative in1997and/or 1998. a Year beglnning l April. b Year ending 30
June. * = 1997 data.
Sourre International Telea,mmunlcation Union FrO Database. CITU, 2001. Last update: 14·Feb-01
Incumbentoperatorsweretraditionallycalled "FIT<, based upon the combination of postal, telephoneand telegraphy services, and the name of thecountryinwhich the
organisationalset-upoftelecomoperatorswasoriginally nationallyoriented and the headquarterswerelocated in the country's capital.Inaddition, different departments handled postal,telecomand telegraphyservices.
When deregulationbecame the subject ofpolitical discussions and itbecame clear
thattelecommunicationsmarkets would eventuallybederegulated,change began.
In 1992, SwissFIT underwent its first major reorganisation after fortyyears. The
different nature and regulatory treatment of postal services, telephone and
telegraphy (telecom) services led to an organisational differentiation. Theunits for
postal services and telecom were separated from each othen Following the reorganisation, the telecom unit was named "Swiss Telecom PTT'. With time,
branding became more important, and "Swiss
Telecom P[T
was renamed1.2.2 Customer base
In a traditional retailbusiness, the customerbasedictates part ofthepositioning of
the corporation.Thesuccessoftoday'sretailbusinessoften lies ina strongcustomer
focus and successful application of concepts like "One to OneMarketing" (Gilmore et.al. 2000; Pepperset.al.1999 and"Customer RelationshipMarketing" (Curry 2000; Brown 2000).
For a classic incumbent telecom operator, thesituation was significantlydifferent.
The monopoly regulation and universal service obligation specified that telecom operators hadtoensurethat telecommunicationservices werereasonablyaccessible
to allpeople
within
the geographical area regulated by the government.Tariffs hadto be set on an equitable basis, regardless ofwhere a citizen resided or ran his
business.
Due tothemonopoly situation, marketshare was 100%, with agrowing penetration
rate in
the countries under study. In Switzerland, there were 4.2 million analogueexchange lines (Swiss FIT 1996) for around 3.5 million households and 300,000
businesses(Bundesamtfur Statistik 2003). Intheinternationalcontext,Switzerland
has traditionally had a highpenetration rate fortelephones andcomputers. All of the lines and relatedserviceswere ownedand maintained by Swiss FIT.
Customer segmentation,which inmost cases is the keyto successfulmarketing, was not necessary in a monopolymarket. However, ascompetition increased, customer
focus became moreimportant. Competitors who enter a newmarket target the most
profitable customer segments (cherry picking). Therefore, to protect its customer base, Swiss
PIT
implemented for thefirst time, in 1992,
an organisation thataddressed different customer segments, the
first
of which was the segmentationbetweenresidential andbusinesscustomers, andmultinationalcorporations. 1bday, these segments are addressedby severalsalesorganisations,shopsandpartners.
1.2.3 Portfolio
Therearecertain products that are common among classic telecomoperators. Swiss
P'ITs1996annualreportlistssixareasinwhichSwiss FIT wasactive4(Swiss FIT
1996):
- Voice-Transporting voice overafixed telephone network is thecorebusiness
of a classic telecom operatorand generated themajority of itsrevenues. Voice services include the connection of calling parties, physical connection of
households, equipment maintenance, phonebooks, and information services.
In 1996, internet services were also part of voice services, since the connection to the internet was done viavoicedial-up lines.
-Customer Equipment-Customer equipment was the product area
in
whichprivate automatic branch exchanges (PABX) for business customers were
installed,leasedandmaintained.
- Data Services - Data services,thetransport of dataoverdifferentnetworks, evolved in the 1980's and 1990's with thegrowth ofthe computerindustry.
The networks were based on several technologies for specific purposes.
Leased line networks made up the majority ofdata services, while X.25 5 , Ip6, A™7 and Frame Relaynetworks were in the developing stage. Value
added services, an add-on to data networks, are important value drivers
today, but werelesssignificant in 1996.
- Networks - Theclassictelecom operator used to own all of theinfrastructure,
from the local loop to the switch and the long distance cable. Swiss PT['
differentiated between the units that provided the service to the customer
and the unit that owned and maintained the network. "Networks" was the
unit that set up thenetworks for voice and data services. This activity was
the most capitalintensive product area and provided the reasoning for the
natural monopoly status.
-Mobile Communications-Mobile telephony was the highest growth area. As
early as 1996, more than 600,000 mobile phones were sold
in
Switzerland,where the population was less than 8 million inhabitants. The mobile unit
provided all of theservicesfor operating the "Natel80serviceinSwitzerland.
- Radio and Television - Radio and television transmission was handled
and maintained the transmitter. The television channels were transmitted
overtheterrestrial network thatwasbuilt so thatthecostscouldbejustified
in the alpine regions. The FIT also collected licence revenues. Radio and television is not necessarily a telecom activity. In somecountries, radio and
televisionserviceswerehandled by other corporations.Duringtheprocess of
deregulation,telecom operators wereforcedtosplit theirradio and television networksfromtheirtelecomorganisation.
The above list is different than the hierarchy used by the EC for its monitoring of
telecom operators (EU 2002 IDC). The EC uses the categories fixed telephony,
mobile, internet, broadband, cable TV and leased lines.9 A comparison of both
hierarchies shows that most of thecontent is similar. Thetwo hierarchies cover the
same product areas and services, which is not surprising, given the underlying
technologies and needs for interoperability on a global scale. Two major differences
areworthnoting here:
-Customer Equipment,a
category ofSwiss FIT, is notlisted by the EC. The equipment marketwas liberalised several years ago and is nolonger under theregulatorymarketperspective.
- The EC listing has a separate category for internet. In 1996, Swiss PTT's
internet service was part of its voice product area, with 10,000 customers
usinganalogueordigitalvoicelines to dial into theinternet.
An interestingfactamong telecomoperators is thata singlephysicalentitycan serve
multiple purposes andcan generate revenues for different products. For example,
based upon special multiplexingtechnologies, afibre opticcablecansimultaneously
transfer numerous phone
calls from fix
and mobile users, as well as fixed dataconnections, and canalsoserve as part of theinternetbackbone.
1.2.4
Vertical
value chain
This section looks at the primary activities 10 that a telecom performs so that a
customer is able tousetelephoneservices,transfer data, or watch TV.
All functions, from
the management of the physical network to customer care activities, are completely vertically integrated at a classic telecom operaton TheNetwork Management Forum (NMF) developed the 'Telecom Operations Map" 11,
that provides a standardisation for efficiency in information systems management.
The figure belowshowsthedifferentprocessesandresultingactivities:
Figure 8:
A
simplified view ofprocesses used byaserviceproviderCustomer
1
-Customer Interface Management Process
Order Problem Customer
1 1 ....in,
Sales QoS Handling Handling
Management Collection Customer Care Processes
Information Systems Service Service Service
Rating and
Service Management Planning/ Configuration Problem Quality
Discounting Processes Development Resolution Management
Service/Product Development and Maintenance Processes
Network Network Network
Network Data Planning/ Network
Provisioning Inventory Maintenance Management Development Management & Restoration
Network and Systems Management Processes
Physical Network and Information Technology
soume: Network Management Forum (NMF1998)
" The term primary activity"isbased on the value chain definition from Michael Porter. He differentiates in the generic value chain between primary- and support activities.