COUNTERING DA’ESH MESSAGING:
CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF DA’ESH DEFECTOR
Countering Da’esh Messaging:
Critical Discourse Analysis of Da’esh Defector Counter-Narratives
Abstract: The Hedayah Center houses the Da’esh Defector Collection inside its Counter- Narrative
Library, where counter-narratives that use the first-hand accounts of defectors have been curated. Counter-narratives are a form of counter-messaging, which, in this context, deals with preventing and countering terrorism and (violent) extremism. In the field of counter-terrorism, counter-(violent) extremism and prevention, strategic communications can be used to directly address radical, terrorist and (violent) extremist propaganda in the form of counter-messaging. This research seeks to gain a greater understanding of how these counter-narratives are framed to address Da’esh propaganda. In order to do so, the discursive framing of the Collection will be examined using the theory of collective action frames and the method of critical discourse analysis. The working hypothesis is that, by design, these counter narratives are framed to direct social change in accordance with strategic communications. The thesis demonstrates how these counter-narratives influence social action based on discursive framing tasks and devices. This is done using the core framing tasks that support a framework that counters Da’esh, its propaganda and its propagandists in an ideological hegemonic struggle for power.
Keywords: Da’esh / Defectors / Strategic Communications / Counter Messaging / Counter
Narratives / Critical Discourse Analysis / Hegemonic Struggle
Student: Khadidjatou Camara Thesis Advisor: Martijn Dekker Date: 26-06-2020
Student ID Number: 11235888 Second Reader: Floris Vermeulen
Institute: University of Amsterdam- Graduate School of Social Sciences (GSSS) Master’s Program: Conflict Resolution & Governance (MSc)
“The Party seeks power entirely for its own sake. We are not interested in the good of others: we are interested solely in power- pure power.”
Table of Contents Introduction
The War of Ideas
“Da’esh”
Strategic Communications:
Counter Terrorism Strategic Communications (CTSC) Project Counter Messaging
The Hedayah Center:
Counter Narrative Library
Da’esh Defector Collection
Theory:
Framing
Collective Action Frames Core Framing Tasks Framing Functions Ideology
Ideological Discourse
Theoretical Limitations
Methodology:
Critical Discourse Analysis Fairclough’s CDA Model Fairclough’s Research Design
Methodological Limitations
Research Design:
Operationalization Modes of Interpretation
Crimes Against Humanity Just War Theory
Analysis: Diagnostic Frame Visual Images Prognostic Frame Motivational Frame Summary Conclusion Further Discussion References: Primary Literature Secondary Literature Appendix:
Da’esh Defector Collection ATLAS.ti Code Information
ATLAS.ti Codebook ATLAS.ti Code Occurrence ATLAS.ti Framing Tasks ATLAS.ti Functions
Introduction
Terrorism and (violent) extremism continue to be a source of global conflict- both domestic and foreign. The worlds in which terrorism and (violent) extremism take place, as well as the efforts to counter and prevent them, include physical and virtual realms. These realms can serve as a means to both encourage one or the other. The West continues to play its dual role as a major target and major challenger to jihadist groups, such as Da’esh. Even with the loss of Da’esh territory and its recent “leadership decapitation” (Ingram & Whiteside, 2016), the war that has been waged by the “virtual caliphate” is predicted to be perpetual (Ingram & Whiteside, 2019b; Ingram & Whiteside, 2017).
Currently, there is no universal definition in place for this phenomenon in international law (Boaz, 2018), or in academics. However, Alex P. Schmid provides the following academic definition of terrorism:
Terrorism is an anxiety-producing method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individuals, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby- in contrast to assassination- the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators.
- Schmid (2011), pg. 61.
Based on this definition, Da’esh, its members and activities can be qualified as such a terrorist organization.
The War of Ideas
As such, the West have been fighting a “battle for the hearts and minds” of, essentially, all the world in order to bring an end to anti-Western aggression, promote democratic rule of law and enable nation building (Ingram, 2016: 38). This has been attempted through the selective use of hard-power, which creates the “time and space” for soft-power to address, provide for and/or maintain these principles (Ingram & Whiteside, 2019a). The use of soft-power includes information warfare (Ingram, 2016: 34), as well as an overall modernization and development of affected regions (Cohen, 2012: 253; Ingram, 2016: 27).
The war of ideas between the West and Da’esh can be described as an attempt to defeat the ideas that are used to justify its cause (Siame, et al., 2017: 3). This war is a major fight to be fought given that certain modern-day jihadist groups have “an extraordinary propaganda strategy that affords it a central role in its broader politico-military campaign” (Whiteside, 2014; Ingram, 2016: 31). Jihadist groups in Africa, the Middle East and Asia use propaganda as “a means to magnify their presence and influence” (Ingram, 2016: 4). Their trends are said to be “indicative, to varying degrees, of the effectiveness with which [they] have historically used propaganda to appeal to
and mobilize supporters” (Ibid). In 2016, the case for Da’esh was made and said to be “at least in part, reflected in the number of foreign fighters that travelled to [Da’esh occupied territory], as well as a surge in similarly inspired home-grown terrorists” (Ibid: 3).
According to researchers, even with loss of territory and membership, and its “leadership decapitation” last year, Da’esh has a history of recuperating after experiencing failures as part of its overall strategy (Ingram & Whiteside, 2019a). Therefore, the organization, even in a weakened state, should not be underestimated (Ibid). A shared opinion is that implications for the ultimate defeat of Da’esh and the prevention of similarly inspired organizations can be found in further researching the phenomenon (Ibid).
In related efforts, numerous actors have employed strategic communications in their global counter-terrorism and violent extremism (CT-CVE) initiatives, and preventative (P) measures. What is communicated here is similarly intended to inform or persuade target audiences (Ibid: 34-5). Experts in the field have argued that strategic communications is central to these objectives (Ingram, et al., 2017: 9).
In this case, counter-messaging in strategic communications is a means to directly address existing jihadist propaganda (Ibid: 7). This is said to be done by discrediting the message itself (Briggs & Feve, 2013; Ingram, et al. 2017: 10) and/or its messenger(s) (Ingram, et al., 2017: 27). For this plan of action, it is important to understand how strategic communications counter-messaging is designed. The significance of being successful in this manner, by first understanding Da’esh propaganda itself and how opposing messaging can be employed, becomes self-evident (Ibid: 7).
My research will build on the premise that counter-messaging can be used against Da’esh propaganda. In order to study this, I will use the resources made available to me by the Hedayah Center of Excellence. In general, the Hedayah Center assists actors of strategic communications messaging campaigns in building concrete plans of action for countering propaganda (Ibid: 7). The Center does this by offering insights into messaging format and design while serving as a material resource (Ibid: 27).
The resources accumulated by and made available through this platform facilitate the production of messaging, which can be found in the online Counter-Narrative Library (Ibid: 15-6). The Library grants access to materials for purposes of employing messaging campaigns, designing counter messaging, conducting research and analysis, as well as review (“Counter Narrative Library”, Hedayah, 2019). Hedayah’s collections, publications, reports and deliverables serve as part of its mission to build the capacity of P/CT-CVE actors who intend to undermine this sort of propaganda (Ibid).
What is of great interest is what can be found in Hedayah’s Da’esh Defector Collection inside its Library, which contains first-hand accounts of (foreign) fighters that deserted Da’esh (Ibid). Hedayah explains that narratives that undermine popular Da’esh claims and appeals are provided for by these accounts (Ibid). Furthermore, they highlight the “untruths” put forth by the
organization in comparison to the realities on the ground (Ibid). It is further argued that reporting by those who served in this capacity can then be used to (de)mobilize and (re)direct recruitment when incorporated into strategic communications messaging campaigns (Ibid; Ingram, et al., 2017).
I’m studying counter-messaging in the form of counter-narratives, because I want to investigate how they are framed as part of larger strategic communications messaging campaigns. The narratives are in direct response to Da’esh propaganda and the organization itself (Ibid). Therefore, it is my hypothesis that they align with P/CT-CVE objectives to (re)direct recruitment and mobilization of (foreign) fighters. My proposal is such that the reader will gain an understanding as to how this type of critical discourse is framed, on the basis that it intends to significantly impact social action in accordance with P/CT-CVE objectives. Therefore, the research question that I would like to answer is how are Da’esh defector counter-narratives framed? In order to describe how this is done, I’ll be researching the framing of discourse using the theory of collective action frames by Benford and Snow (2000). Although there are other perspectives in conflict studies that may apply, I’m interested in showing how this theory allows for the investigation into the framing of narratives that aim to direct or redirect action (Benford & Snow, 2000). The concept of collective action frames will help to explain how the discursive framing of these counter-narratives can impact decision-making processes that invoke action; critically. I will use the critical discourse analytic method based on the theory and model by Fairclough to examine the discourse itself (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002).
This research paper outlines the concept of strategic communications according to academic and related definitions, and goes into greater detail about counter-messaging and the Hedayah Center. Firstly, it will describe the term “Da’esh” as it relates to the terrorist organization that is contested in regards to their propaganda and ability to mobilize audiences. The theory of collective action frames will be tried according to my hypothesis using the theoretical method of critical discourse analysis. After examining my research findings, the paper will present a summary, a final conclusion and a section for further discussion.
“Da’esh”
The term “Da’esh” is the acronym for al-Dawla al-Islamiya fil Iraq wa al-Sham, and refers to the organization known as the “so-called” Islamic State (IS), Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Isil or ISIL), and Islamic State in Syria (Isis or ISIS) (BBC, 2015). It is said that the pronunciation of the term “Da’esh” is similar to the Arabic verb, meaning “to tread underfoot, trample down or crush” (Ibid). It is argued that this terminology and the reference to the “so-called” state is preferred amongst those that actively resist Da’esh expansion and challenge its legitimacy (Ibid).
Those in a power struggle with Da’esh typically refer to the organization by this term. This group includes academics, researchers, defectors, scholars, and politicians, to name but a few. The following section describes the method by which those involved in the field of P/CT-CVE use strategic communications in response to Da’esh.
Strategic Communications
Strategic communications as an academic concept can be defined as the “purposeful use of communication by an organization to fulfill its mission. Six relevant disciplines are involved in the development, implementation, and assessment of communications by organizations: management, marketing, public relations, technical communication, political communication, and information/social marketing campaigns” (Hallahan, et al., 2007). When researchers and practitioners apply this to the field of P/CT-CVE, it refers to messaging that is deployed with the specific intent of informing or persuading target audiences according to P/CT-CVE objectives (Ingram, 2016: 3). One organization that has done this is the International Center for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT).
Counter Terrorism Strategic Communications (CTSC) Project
The International Center for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) describes itself as a think-tank dedicated to providing policy advice and practical support for the implementation of preventing terrorism and (violent) extremism with an emphasis on the rule of law (“About”, ICCT, 2020). In 2016, the ICCT launched the Counter-Terrorism Strategic Communications (CTSC) project to research how propaganda messaging of terrorists and (violent) extremists could be understood and confronted (CTSC, ICCT, 2020). The project is described as using empirical research to test and evaluate past campaigns in order to develop key guidelines for P/CT-CVE strategic communications efforts (Ibid). The following literature describes the ideas that can be found in the CTSC project.
A Brief History of Propaganda:
The major findings of this project began with “A Brief History of Propaganda During Conflict: Lessons for Counter-Terrorism Strategic Communications” by Haroro Ingram (2016). The central question of Ingram’s research is concerned with what can be learned from the history of propaganda during conflict times that will make strategic communications messaging campaigns more effective (Ibid: 32).
According to the text, one recurring theme is that words and images are used to shape the perception and influence the behavior of target audiences (Ibid: 5). Another observation is that messaging seems to resonate with audiences when it’s consistent, with little to no “say-do” gap in the messenger’s action(s) and message(s) in comparison to the realities on the ground (Ibid: 30). It is argued that not only is credibility lost when there are inconsistencies between the message and the “truth”, but also in one’s actions and message (Ibid: 35).
The concerns of (perceived) censorship are also noted given that it and information control are said to “become increasingly difficult to implement” (Ibid: 37). Censorship, whether perceived or intentional, can be further interpreted as an abuse of power by the party who authorizes it. Ingram explains that when dealing with one’s credibility, open discourse is preferable considering the “say-do” gap, historical context, and decision-making processes of audiences (Ibid). Meaning
that an audience that is not subject to censorship can make informed decisions based on the merits of an argument and act on it should they so choose.
According to Ingram, history suggests that the potential success of a messaging campaign is optimized if it: (i) produces a diversity of messaging that leverage both rational-choice (based on cost-benefit considerations) and identity-choice (based on one’s identity) appeals, defensively and offensively; (ii) messaging is tied to some core themes and a grand narrative; and (iii) various means of communication are used to optimize the message’s reach, relevance and resonance (Ibid: 5). When used cohesively and calibrated to maximize the desired outcome of one’s own efforts, Ingram argues that messaging campaigns can nullify the effects of an adversary’s (Ibid). Ingram describes “strategic communications” as an “overarching term for any messaging that is deployed with the intent of informing or persuading a target audience in support of strategic-policy and/or politico-military objectives” (Ibid: 3). It should be noted that Ingram uses the term “propaganda” in the text to refer to any “messaging that is designed to influence the behavior and attitudes of a target audience to achieve politico-military ends during conflict” (Ibid: 5). Rather than re-appropriating the term “propaganda”, Ingram applies the term “strategic communications” to P/CT-CVE messaging, exclusively (Ibid: 34).
Lessons Learned from History:
The subsequent policy brief, entitled “Lessons from History for Counter-Terrorism Strategic Communications” by Haroro Ingram and Alastair Reed outlines the key guidelines for developing strategic communications campaigns and messaging design (2016). This was done by presenting a framework of interrelated macro-, mezzo- and micro-level factor considerations (Ibid). It is argued that the efficacy of a campaign is projected to have more major successes if it’s based on the cumulative effects of a multidimensional messaging strategy that utilizes these considerations (Ibid: 7).
The macro-level factors refer to “reach”, the ability of a message to access target audiences, “relevance”, the timeliness of the message and its contextual significance, and “resonance”, the message’s influence on the audience’s perception by leveraging identity and socio-historical markers (Ibid: 4). Mezzo-level factors, as they relate to macro-level factors, refer to the “medium” or means of communication (which should be selected to maximize the reach of the message), the “messenger” (who is selected to deliver the message based on their credibility, authority or anonymity), and “format” (which may vary from spoken, sung or written word, to still or moving imagery) (Ibid: 4-5). The micro- level factors make up a range of considerations that are implemented into the actual message. These factors are said to be deployed in order to shape an audience’s perception and behavior, and include rational- and identity-choice appeals, defensive and offensive approaches, employment of the “say-do” gap, and anticipation of first-, second- and third-order effects (Ibid: 5-7).
It is argued that an ideal campaign deploys a variety of messaging that incorporates both rational- and identity-choice appeals in a comprehensive manner, which, if synchronized efficiently align
with choice decision-making processes of audiences (Ibid: 6). Furthermore, past messaging campaigns that have successfully guided audiences to engage in action have been shown to deploy both of these (Ibid). This can be understood as connecting the performance of communication to the act of mobilization.
According to the authors, the ratio of defensive to offensive messaging may represent a “useful metric for measuring the dominance of one side over the other in the information theater”, and in their struggle for meaning and control (Ibid: 6; Ibid: 8). The text states that when it comes to counter-narratives that respond directly to an adversary’s messaging, these types of narratives are considered inherently defensive in nature (Ibid: 6). On the other hand, offensive messaging that is designed to deliver specific objectives, control the narrative, and elicit defensive counter-messaging from adversaries is highly recommended (Ibid).
When concerned with the “say-do” gap, a common trend that is said to emerge is the deployment of messaging that highlights the disparity between an adversary’s words and actions (Ibid). Additional emphasis is placed on how one’s own actions match one’s words (Ibid). Minimizing one’s own “say-do” gap while maximizing that of an adversary is a strategy that directly addresses the issue of comparative credibility and trustworthiness, and also imbues audiences with a greater sense of certainty in their decision-making process (Ibid).
According to the text, awareness of one’s own “say-do” gap acts as a precaution to avoid negative repercussions of “imprudent politico-military actions” in the field (Ibid: 7). This relates to “misguided messaging [that] have inadvertent second- and third- order effects” (Ibid). The example provided in the text refers to narratives of adversaries that are designed as a “type of baiting strategy that is then leveraged in waves of secondary messaging” (Ibid).
It is noted that campaigns tend to be more successful when they combine a diverse array of messaging that take complex audiences into account and are carefully synchronized, so that they’re mutually reinforcing (Ibid). Also, if communication and action align, then these actions themselves become messages, i.e. communication by action or “propaganda by deed” (Ibid: 8-9).
Countering Terrorist Narratives:
In the 2017 study entitled “Countering Terrorist Narratives”, Haroro Ingram, Alastair Reed and Joe Whittaker present an overview of the current approaches in counter-narratives. In this study, acts of terror and (violent) extremism are considered a form of communication, and, “as such, strategic communications is argued to be a central” in countering and preventing this phenomenon (Ibid: 9).
In the text, the “prolific use of [readily available online Da’esh] propaganda” is considered a serious problem given their successful recruitment abilities (Ibid: 43). Therefore, strategic communications is said to come into play, where there would otherwise be a vacuum created if this activity were to be restricted or disrupted (Ibid: 7-8). While it is said that action, itself, is a
form of performance and communication, strategic communications is considered a “force multiplier [for] desired operational, strategic and policy effects, and a means to mitigate undesired [ones]” (Ibid).
Based on this, it is argued that the top-down and bottom-up dynamic of the field plays a role (Ibid: 43). It is further recommended that coordinating both lines can create an opportunity for more successes and desired results in the field (Ibid). The organization at the center of the international network, which is primarily concerned with P/CT-CVE in response to Da’esh, is the Global Coalition Against Da’esh (Ibid: 16). Organizations concerned with strategic communications counter-narrative centric campaigns and messaging design (Ibid: 40), include the Hedayah Center (Ibid: 15). As part of the Global Coalition Against Da’esh, the Hedayah Center specializes in preventing and countering terrorist and (violent) extremist propaganda (Ibid). These texts explain how researchers conceptualize strategic communications in the field of P/CT-CVE. The texts describe key observations, guidelines and recommendations for counter-messaging in response to relevant propaganda. The international network of organizations and institutions in the field are outlined as well. In the following section, the use of counter-messaging will be described in greater detail.
Counter-Messaging
According to Peter Neumann, counter-messaging can be defined as “messages that aim to ‘mock, ridicule or somehow undermine [violent extremists’] credibility’; contrasts between violence extremists’ grandiose claims and the reality and/or consequences of their actions; or positive alternatives that cancel out or negate the violent extremists’ ideology or lifestyle” (2013; 447). Counter-messaging can be found in the form of alternative- and counter-narratives.
Alternative-narratives are said to offer alternative solutions and courses of action to audiences (Briggs & Feve, 2014: 12). While these should be realistic, have cultural resonance and maintain the principles of strategic communications, the subject matter can be vast, if not limitless (Ingram, et al., 2017). Alternative-narratives are traditionally considered government messaging that is produced and disseminated by the state as the primary messenger (Briggs & Feve, 2014: 19-20).
Counter-narratives, on the other hand, are far more direct, in that they base their argument on existing narratives (Ibid: 22). The content of counter-narratives varies, but all use the existing narrative to disprove the original messaging (Briggs & Feve, 2013; Ingram, et al. 2017: 10) and/or its messenger(s) (Ingram, et al., 2017: 27). The primary messengers of counter-narratives vary as well, and are subject to different considerations, including their credibility (Ibid: 24-6).
According to researchers, the primary objective of counter-narratives is to “sow seeds of doubt” in the hearts and minds of audiences, by attempting to undermine the credibility and legitimacy of messengers and the party they represent (Ibid: 22). This can be accomplished by using the
“say-do” gap, which emphasizes the discrepancy between what is said and done by an opponent (Ingram, 2016). The say-do gap can highlight how a party negatively impacts the constituencies they claim to protect and represent, reveal inconsistencies in the strategies employed in relation to the party’s own laws and doctrines, and question the overall successes achieved in relation to a party’s ultimate mission.
Alternative- and counter-narratives are forms of counter-messaging that are used in strategic communications, as defined previously. Given these concepts, the reader can understand how strategic communications in the form of counter-messaging can be used to address Da’esh propaganda, with special consideration given to counter-narratives. In the following section, I will describe how the Hedayah Center provides counter-narratives that can be incorporated into larger strategic communications campaigns.
The Hedayah Center
A major element of Hedayah’s work is campaign and messaging design being one of four current trends in P/CT-CVE efforts (Ingram, et al., 2017: 7). Hedayah promotes that their commitment to develop effective measures to counter Da’esh messaging involves platforms such as their Counter-Narrative Library, programs involving Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning (ML), and literacy training of credible messengers (“Strategic Communication and Messaging”, Hedayah, 2019). One of the mechanisms that belongs to the Hedayah Center is its Counter-Narrative Library where actors are encouraged to design their own sets of counter-messaging deployed within a larger campaign (“Counter-Narrative Library”, Hedayah, 2019).
Counter Narrative Library
The Counter-Narrative Library is described as a comprehensive portal through which P/CT-CVE content, materials, toolkits and good practices are accessed (Ingram, et al., 2017: 15-6). This resource offers a framework for campaigners and their campaigns by hosting ready-made videos, movies, television shows, cartoons, books, websites, magazines, blogs, social media posts and articles (Ibid: 27; Ibid: 34). These materials can then be re-used or serve as inspiration in the design of new counter-messaging against a specific propaganda, group or in a certain geographic region.
The Library is said to be organized as a user-friendly interface, which contains the following features: (1) search capabilities using popular tags that’re linked to keywords and information, which can be added to and on by users for faster and better search results, (2) a numerical ranking system where users rank narratives on a scale of 1 to 10 (10 being the highest), (3) new alternative- and counter-narratives uploaded by users, which are available (4) in multiple languages, and can be translated and edited for accuracy (“Counter Narrative Library”, Hedayah, 2019). Various collections have been curated herein, including the Da’esh Defector Collection, which features returning (foreign) fighters who provide first-hand accounts (Ibid).
Da’esh Defector Collection
The Da’esh Defector Collection consists of a total of 169 narratives that delve into the actual experiences of former (foreign) fighters and their own journeys as active members of Da’esh (“Counter Narrative Library”, Hedayah, 2019). Hedayah can be quoted as saying that these defectors and “their voices against the organization may highlight […] weaknesses […] and reveal the atrocities of the violence and suffering taking place on the ground. Moreover, since they have experienced the so-called “Islamic State” first hand, they are credible to perhaps some of the most vulnerable to violent extremist recruitment” (Ibid).
Hedayah suggests that the narratives that are found here can be a powerful tool given that they lend the nuance and insight needed for a compelling counter-messaging campaign should this campaign have the desired outcome (“Counter Narrative Library”, Hedayah, 2019; Ingram, et al.,
2017). As such, deploying a campaign consisting of narratives that reveal insider knowledge might be impactful on the organization’s recruitment capabilities and active membership.
The ultimate goal would be to diminish Da’esh’s ability to persuade and indoctrinate recruits, and appeal to and satisfy active members. Hypothetically, this can be done through the use of counter-arguments that make Da’esh membership, its institutions and ideology undesirable. Furthermore, this could result in the number of recruits lessening, membership declining, and more defections occurring.
These counter-narratives will constitute my research materials. I will be using the 43 English-language counter-narratives available here. The narratives include videoed interviews of defectors, short films, and filmed or written news articles. After transcribing the audio data, I will analyze these counter-narratives by looking at the discursive frames that are used.
Theory
The response to Da’esh propaganda and propagandists using counter-messaging is one of the ongoing efforts at (re)directing recruitment and mobilization of (foreign) fighters (Ingram, et al., 2017). The theoretical considerations for my research primarily involve the relationship between discourse, ideology, and framing based on action orientation. This is in line with my research topic, which deals with the framing of counter-messaging in strategic communications that responds to Da’esh and its propaganda practices.
Framing:
According to Erving Goffman, a leader in framing analysis, frames are synonymous with “schemata of interpretation” (Goffman, 1974: 21; Benford & Snow, 2000: 614). These are the patterns of organizing one’s experience of events into categories that then guide (re)action based on this categorization (Ibid). The categories and the relationships between them give meaning and understanding that lend to the interpretation of previous and future events, which go on to inform behavior related to these events (Ibid).
I will be testing whether these counter-narratives are theoretically able to (re)direct action, by using the theory of collective action frames (Benford & Snow, 2000). Byrd and Snow applied this theory to radical, terrorist and (violent) extremist groups in their analysis of these groups’ ability to invoke action through framing processes (2007). In parallel, I am looking at the general framing of discursive counter-narratives developed from Da’esh defector interviews and interrogations.
Collective Action Frames:
As I’m interested in investigating the framing processes of counter-messaging that relate to action, I have chosen to rely on the theory of framing as defined by Robert Benford and David Snow (2000). Those in the field of P/CT-CVE participate in this practice in an attempt to (re)direct Da’esh recruitment and mobilization, according to their own statements (“About”, Hedayah, 2019; “Mission”, ICCT, 2020; Ingram, et al. 2017). Therefore, the theory collective action frames can help explain how counter-messaging are framed in a manner that may influence the thinking and behavior of target audiences, as is its intention.
Benford and Snow describe framing as the “active, processual phenomenon that implies agency and contention at the level of reality construction” while the end product of this process is referred to as collective action frame” (Benford & Snow, 2000: 614). This implies that one’s reality of the social and material world is influenced by previous experiences and how one choses to organize the information from these experiences into categories (Ibid). From this, one interprets new information and decides how and how not to (re)act to it (Ibid).
Although my primary interest is in how this framing process is done, an important component of the content that is being communicated here is oriented in the prevention and countering of
Da’esh propaganda and its propagandists. Therefore, the theory of collection action frames, which deals with (social) action and change, is relevant to my research.
Collective action frames are similarly interpretive in this respect, but function in a manner that means to both (de)mobilize audiences and (re)direct action (Benford & Snow, 1988: 198; Benford & Snow, 2000: 614). The framing may become a site for contention or hegemony, depending on whether or not this process and its production is accepted (Ibid). Antonio Gramsci describes “hegemony” as the subtle manner of managing and persuading the minds of the masses (van Dijk, 1998: 3). The implication is that a power struggle exists within and between societal groups or classes outside of this process.
The authors define collective actions frames as “action oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate activities and campaigns” (Ibid), while “interactive, discursive processes” allow for this function (Gamson, 1992a; Benford & Snow, 1992; Benford & Snow, 2000: 615). This applies to collectives and their active attempts to further their objectives through the framing of (counter) messaging that connect to, inform and appeal to target audiences (van Dijk, 2006). The core framing tasks of collective action frames that are concerned with their action-oriented function include diagnostic, prognostic and motivational framing (Benford & Snow, 2000: 615).
Core Framing Task:
In general, diagnostic framing deals with problem identification and attribution (Ibid), while prognostic framing involves the articulation of a proposed solution and plan of action (Ibid: 616). Motivational framing provides the “call to arms” for engaging in collective action (Ibid: 617). The diagnostic framing task identifies and attributes culpability and causality to opposing actors, agents or collectives for being the source of the problematic situation at hand (Ibid: 616). This task allows for “boundary framing” (Hunt, et al., 1994a: 194; Ibid) and “adversarial framing” (Gamson, 1995; Benford & Snow, 2000: 616). These are described as attributional processes that delineate the boundaries between “good” and “evil”, and assign “protagonists” and “antagonists” (Ibid), respectively.
Prognostic framing relies on the identification of specific problems and their causes, from which solutions are introduced (Benford & Snow, 2000: 616). Here, the identification of specific problems and causes may constrain the number of possible solutions and strategies (Ibid). This framing activity typically results in “counter framing”, which is the refutation of logical or reasonable solutions advocated by opponents (Benford, 1987: 75).
The motivational framing task is concerned with the construction of lexicons of motive (Ibid), participation, collective identity and other framing activities (Ibid: 617-8). In pursuing these core tasks, actors, agents and collectives attend to the interrelated problems of “consensus mobilization” in fostering agreement and “action mobilization” by fostering action (Klandermans, 1984: Ibid: 615).
Benford and Snow explain that there are three main sets of framing processes outside of the core framing tasks (Benford & Snow, 2000: 615). These influence the development, generation and elaboration of collective action frames, and are discursive, strategic and contested processes (Ibid: 623). The function of collective action frames are the interactive, discursive processes that produce collective action frames themselves (Ibid: 615).
Framing Functions:
The discursive process is concerned with communication and language usage as it relates to “talk” and “text” (Benford & Snow, 2000: 623). Discursive frames can link certain events and meanings to one another to form logical and structured stories, or narratives (Benford & Snow, 2000). Strategic processes are described as the “deliberative, utilitarian and goal directed” objectives of framing that are developed and deployed by collectives (Ibid: 624). Their strategic efforts link their interests and frames with those of audiences through “frame alignment processes” (Snow, et al., 1986; Ibid: 624-5).
These processes all aim to mobilize audiences using discursive framing, but in distinct ways (Benford & Snow, 2000: 624-5). Contested processes deal with the “development, generation and elaboration” of collective action frames (Ibid). Here, all actors who engage in reality construction are said to be participating in politics of signification (Ibid), which can be hegemonic (van Dijk, 1998: 3).
Locus of Attribution:
The locus of attribution is another feature that can be described as the scale and quality of the actual problem at hand. A greater locus of attribution has a greater amount of influence as more attention is paid to it and has more of an ability to make progress (Gerhards & Rucht, 1992: 580). Meaning, the greater number of people who share in this problematic experience, the greater potential to mobilize (Benford & Snow, 2000: 618).
Flexibility and Rigidity, Inclusivity and Exclusivity:
Flexibility and inclusivity are features which give a frame additional influence on audiences, based on reach and relatability (Benford & Snow, 2000: 618). The less rigid and exclusive a frame, the greater it is able to persuade heterogeneous audiences at a greater scale (Ibid). The emphasis on flexibility and inclusivity as opposed to rigidity and exclusivity either expands or constrains its reach and relatability (Ibid: 619).
Resonance:
Resonance is an important quality that impacts the mobilizing potency of frames (Benford & Snow: 619) and grand narratives (Ingram, et al., 2017). Benford and Snow explain that two sets of interacting factors that affect resonance are the credibility and relative salience of a frame
(2000: 619). When it comes to credibility, in addition to status and knowledge, all have been linked with the degree of persuasiveness messengers have (Hovland & Weiss, 1951; Aronson & Golden, 1962; Hass, 1981; McGuire, 1985; Ibid: 620-1). The greater the narrative fidelity, or “cultural resonance”, of the framing, the greater the salience and prospect of mobilization (Benford & Snow, 2000: 622).
Collective Identity:
Benford and Hunt state that “not only do framing processes link individuals and groups ideologically, but they proffer, buttress and embellish identities” (1994a: 185; Benford & Snow: 632), while connecting audiences to them and one another. This collective identity is based on ideology that can be found in the common beliefs, values and central cause that “anchor” audiences (Ibid). Collective identity is said to attribute characteristics to sets of actors that define their relationship and lines of action (Benford & Hunt, 1994a: 185). This is said to occur during discourse when identity, related themes (Benford & Hunt, 1994b), and activities are communicated to audiences (Benford & Snow, 2000: 632). When audiences share in this identity, they may be more inclined to align with the group and act accordingly.
This is relevant to my research as those that have participated in and around these counter-narratives share some form of the ideology that inform P/CT-CVE efforts, based on the idea that Da’esh needs to be countered. Aside from their participation, features of identity can be observed in the groups of people who counter Da’esh.
The interaction between Da’esh defectors and Da’esh can be conceptualized as the framing of action oriented sets of beliefs and meanings (Benford & Snow, 2000: 614). The theory of collective action frames allows for the more general examination of the discursive frames produced here, which may or may not have a critical or ideological component to them. Given the discursive function of framing processes, however, collectives can give meaning to their mission, members and means of action through ideological discourse. Thus, I will conceptualize the ideological implications of this framing for further consideration.
Ideology:
The theory that ties collective action frames, discursive framing and the method of critical discourse analysis together is ideology, as described by Teun van Dijk (1998; 2006). Traditional approaches consider ideology to be a set of false beliefs that conceal real social relations and serve to deceive others that’re considered outsiders (van Dijk, 1998: 2). These false beliefs are either imposed by the ruling class or in terms of hegemony (Ibid: 3). van Dijk explains that academic definitions are still based in this classical tradition, for example, when looking at the following:
Ideology of science, which tries to conceal its interests and wants its own beliefs to be accepted as truth by those who recognize its power and dominance, is, thus,
hardly different from other ideologies that are developed to achieve hegemony, to legitimate power or to conceal inequality- if only in the domain of knowledge.
-Teun van Dijk (1998) pg. 3. However, I’ll be using a more contemporary definition that describes ideology as a political or social system of ideas, beliefs, or values of collectives that function in the organization or legitimization of their actions (Ibid). This applies to different kinds of collectives including social movements, political parties and professions (van Dijk, 2006: 116), different kinds of systems including religious, political or professional ideologies (Ibid: 118), and can function as the basis of a group’s code of conduct (Ibid: 117). Furthermore, ideologies form the basis of a collective’s self-image and organize its identity, actions, objectives, norms, values and resources in relation to others (Ibid: 115). They are then expressed, produced and reproduced in the practices performed by and the discourse of group members (Ibid).
An ideological group refers to a collective that is defined primarily by its shared ideology and the social practices based on them, whether or not they are organized or institutionalized (Ibid: 120). Other groups, such as professional groups, may first organize themselves, possibly in order to promote or protect their interests, and develop professional ideologies to sustain such practices (Ibid). P/CT-CVE can be considered a hybrid ideological and professional group that consists of various actors, organizations and institutions. What makes them so is their shared sets of beliefs, values and objectives. Their ideology aligns with counter-terrorism and counter- (violent) extremism objectives, despite their roles, contributions and motives to form this collective varying to some degree.
It should be noted that many P/CT-CVE actors and organizations, such as Hedayah, claim to be “independent, apolitical and non-ideological” (“About”, Hedayah, 2019), seemingly due to the prevalence of the classical definition of ideology. They are nevertheless ideological according to the contemporary definition (van Dijk, 2006: 2). For example, their “sets of beliefs” are expressed in the form of P/CT-CVE strategic-policy and politico-military “objectives”, and their organizational “mission statement” is in stark contrast with Da’esh doctrine (Ingram, et al., 2017). As it was noted previously, the act of not recognizing Da’esh as a legitimate authority or state, as is evidenced by the phrase “the so-called Islamic State”, is commonly used in the field and among actors (“Counter Narrative Library”, Hedayah, 2019; Ingram, 2016a; Ingram et al., 2017). This is based on their “shared belief” that Da’esh is not, in fact, a legitimate authority or a recognized state. Lastly, the manner in which counter messaging in strategic communications is framed, is explicitly intended to shift and change socio-political practices that adhere to Da’esh. This is based on the idea that because Da’esh is a radical, terrorist and (violent) extremist organization, the countering and prevention of their activities and the organization as a whole is a legitimate act (Benford & Snow, 2000: 614).
Since these legal and political prescriptions are based in the ideology that the collective follows (Benford & Snow, 2000: 613), they serve as part of the hegemonic whole that is in a power
struggle with Da’esh (van Dijk, 1998: 3). The very nature of counter-messaging reflects the struggle over the production of mobilizing ideas and actions (Benford & Snow, 2000: 613 & 614). Simultaneously, the general principle of ideology that maintains its “critical edge” as a more explicit theory is better equipped to critically examine ideologies and their discursive practices in a power struggle such as this (van Dijk, 2006: 138-9).
Ideological Discourse:
When it comes to discourse, ideologies are referred to as foundational beliefs that determine the shared social representations of collectives, while these representations are the basis of discourse (van Dijk, 2006: 120-1). Discourse is used in group ideologies that are conveyed and produced by discursive interaction (Ibid). So, when group members explain, motivate or legitimate their actions, they typically do so in terms of ideological discourse (Ibid). This type of discourse is then expressed in order to influence social or political policy, or promote a cause (Ibid: 123).
Similar to discursive frames, mental models refer to the subjective interpretations by audiences of a situation or event that can lend to ideological discourse (Ibid: 121). They differ in that frames assign meaning to the experiences and information gathered (Goffman, 1974: 21; Benford & Snow, 2000: 614), while mental models control the meaning of discourse itself (van Dijk, 2006: 121). As van Dijk explains, language usage and discourse production, as well as comprehension, depend on and influence the relevant properties of communicative situations as interpreted by audiences (Ibid). The audiences’ subjective definitions of contexts are represented as specific models in episodic memory (Ibid).
Collective ideologies are acquired through socialization and numerous social and discursive practices that are taught to new members using various kinds of discourse (Ibid: 133-4). This is done through generalized mental models such as experiences, grand narratives and mental representations, or explicit ideological instruction by ideologues (Ibid). Didactic ideological discourse is explicit in formulating the general contents, as opposed to context, of the ideological schema or frame of a collective (Ibid). Defining who “we” are and who “we” are not, what “we” do and do not do, what “we” do and do not stand for, what “our” norms are and what they are not, who “our” friends are and who they are not, and where “our” power resources lie and where they do not (Ibid).
Ideology then transitions into ideological discourse through socio-cognitive processes that may depend on ideologically biased contexts (Ibid: 124). Or, in the ideological way participants interpret events as subjective mental models, to more direct ways in general collective beliefs that are ideologically controlled, or even from the communicative context participants belong to (Ibid). The terminology, practices and objectives of the P/CT-CVE field and as a collective comprise of ideology that are produced and reproduced discursively.
According to van Dijk, “ideological discourse gradually develops the general ideological framework of the group, while ideological markers orient recipients in the way ingroup and
outgroup actors are represented in mental models” (Ibid: 134). Therefore, in ideological discourse, both the text and context of repeated communications that condition members may lead to the generalization and abstraction of mental models to more general, group-based attitudes (Ibid). These attitudes then inform the discursive ideological frames that are used by groups and collectives in their hegemonic struggle for meaning (Ibid; Benford & Snow, 2000: 614). Considering ideology is non-deterministic, in that members don’t necessarily and always express or enact the beliefs of the groups they identify with, ideological discourse is personally and contextually variable (van Dijk, 2006: 121). Ideologies may be complex or even inconsistent, and so ideological discourse may not be direct, coherent or transparent in communicating the ideology at its core (Ibid: 138). Context, while subjective, is the best manner to determine this (Ibid).
van Dijk writes that “ideological control is not deterministic, but strategic” (Ibid), and that despite this variability, it is still possible to scrutinize ideological discourse by looking at the discursive framing of meanings (Ibid: 126). In addition to these meanings, the underlying structures of discursive framing is also examinable (Ibid: 139). Given this variability, van Dijk explains that ideology can be coded in “talk” and “text”, while meanings are more constant and recognizable as they are ideologically marked (Ibid: 126). The ability to recognize and interpret ideological discourse is due to ideologies themselves being belief systems, and beliefs characteristically tending to be formulated as meanings of discourse (Ibid).
Syntactic structures, literary devices and rhetorical figures are used in discourse to communicate ideological meanings to an audience (Ibid). Mechanisms such as euphemisms, hyperboles, rhetoric and metaphors add emphasis, or conversely deemphasize, meaning in this context (Ibid). In turn, it can be assumed that ideological discourse is organized in the form of impression management, or the general strategy of ingratiating the “self” or in-group, and derogating the “other” or the out-group (Ibid).
This is a general polarizing principle that affects forms and meanings when applied to discourse (Ibid). The principle is related to the attributional processes of diagnostic framing that distinguish the “good” of the in-group and the “evil” of the out-group, and assigns the “self” as the “protagonist” and the “other” as the “antagonist” (Benford & Snow, 2000: 616). These are encoded in discursive frames and ideological discourse that can be extracted for further interpretation, as was done in previous research.
In critical discourse analysis, the use of hegemonic (Benford & Snow, 2000: 619) and discursive frames marks the discourse ideologically (van Dijk, 2006: 127). Simultaneously, ideology serves as the foundation for discourse as well as social groups and collectives (Ibid: 131). Systematic discourse analysis is said to offer ways through which the study of structures and functions of ideologies can be done (Ibid: 115). Namely, in the ideological polarization of ingroups and outgroups that emphasize the “good” of the self and the “evil” of the other, while mitigating the “evil” of the self and the “good” of the other (Ibid).
The aforementioned properties of ideological discourse can be found in the example the author gives about “radicals”, “terrorists” and “violent extremists” who’re reported on negatively by Western news outlets using formal linguistic characteristics (Ibid: 126). In comparison, the terms “freedom fighters”, “warriors” and “liberators” would be reported on and referred to in this manner by some news outlets (Ibid). This discursive framing enhances Da’esh’s negative properties and activities by assigning “gruesome, reprehensible” acts to them (Ibid). It provides detailed descriptions at great length on the front page with a big headline, which is reinforced by linking the article to graphic and impactful pictures of the events in question (Ibid).
Syntactic structures, on the other hand, include reporting on “their” acts committed by “them”, which are primary, topical position clauses (Ibid). They explicitly indicate that “they” are the active agents responsible for these acts (Ibid). This in comparison to secondary, non-dominant position clauses that imply that there are passive agents out there, somewhere who may have been involved in the events in question (Ibid).
In order to examine and analyze the example given, van Dijk uses the theoretical principles of ideology, discourse and discursive framing to do so. Here, Western ideology informs how the actors are reported on by mass media. This can be interpreted as such given the terminology that is used to identify the actors as “radicals”, “terrorists” and “violent extremists”, as opposed to “freedom fighters”, “warriors” and “liberators” (Ibid).
Da’esh would similarly report these acts as “gruesome” based on their own ideological framework that justifies violence as a sense of duty (Ibid). In contrast, Western news considers them to be “gruesome and reprehensible” acts (Ibid). This difference is accounted for as the ideology that informs the discursive framing produces polarized ideological discourse for the same act. Discursively framing Da’esh as a negative actor is a form of impression management according to the general polarizing principle (Ibid).
The West is distinguishable from Da’esh, whose bad acts are emphasized in this example. The purpose of framing the narrative using visual cues and images creates a greater perceptual impact on audiences. The role of Western mass media assigning blame to Da’esh delegitimizes the organization and its ideological propensities to a larger audience. The authority of mass media builds the resonance and salience of the narrative being framed. Lastly, the attitude towards Da’esh signifies the hegemonic struggle that exists between the West and Da’esh. The ideology that devalues that which aims to obstruct or destroy the West is integrated in P/CT-CVE objectives. All of these components align with the aforementioned P/CT-P/CT-CVE objectives developed for strategic communications (Ingram, et al., 2017). These can be found throughout the previous example that describes how Da’esh would be reported on by Western media.
Theoretical Limitations:
The main concerns and criticisms of ideological discourse analysis include intentionality, internal validity, ideological (over)interpretation, contextualization, ideology itself, and knowledge (van
Dijk, 2006: 127-31). All these concerns can be mitigated in my use of coding, as the qualitative component of intention, interpretation, over-interpretation, context, ideology and knowledge are not part of the method process in and of itself. Considering the conclusions I may draw are subject to my interpretation of the material, all one can do is be transparent about research biases and subjective interpretations.
Additionally, I will argue that the critical component attributed to the nature of P/CT-CVE counter-messaging is crucial, which already lends to a research bias that might otherwise not exist. It is also important given the nature of counter-narratives already being in a power struggle with existing narratives. Generalizability, or the ability to project these findings from sample data to the general population, might be an issue as well considering how small the sample size is and the statistical significance my findings will, therefore, have. Regardless of this, I think that the method of critical discourse analysis is an important tool for analyzing information from documents and written bodies of work, as well as audio and visual images in my research.
Methodology
In order to examine the ideological discursive framing of Da’esh defector counter-narratives, I need a reliable method that matches my theoretical framework. As van Dijk suggests, discourse analysis is closely linked to ideology (2006). Ideological discourse analysis is a widely-accepted method that can be used, despite its various limitations (Ibid: 127). I will explain my options in greater detail using the text by Marianne Jørgensen and Louise Phillips (2002).
According to the text, discourse analysis can be generally described as an analysis of the linguistic patterns that belong to different domains of social life that groups participate in (Jørgensen and Phillips: 1). Discourse is the pattern in which the social and material world is understood and referred to by language users (Ibid). Various forms of discourse analysis exist, including poststructuralist theory, critical discourse analysis and discursive psychology (Ibid: 6-7). Although other forms may apply to my research, I will be using critical discourse analysis to examine the research materials.
Critical Discourse Analysis:
Critical discourse analysis (CDA) can be described as the empirical study of the relationships between discourse and social developments in various social domains (Ibid: 60). The theory takes the ideological effects of discursive practices into account (Ibid: 17-8), as well as Antonio Gramsci’s definition of hegemony (van Dijk, 1998: 3). This assigns a degree of agency to all social groups in the production and negotiation of meaning, as well as their acceptance of or resistance to ideology (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002: 16).
Jørgensen and Phillips explain that discursive practices are viewed as social practices that contribute to the constitution of the social world, as well as social identities and relations (Ibid: 61). Some social practices are linguistic-discursive, which CDA aims to elucidate (Ibid: 61). CDA is distinct in that it deals with linguistic textual analysis of language usage, while the other theories do not (Ibid: 62-3). Discursive frames in CDA are able to mark linguistic patterns, ideologically (van Dijk, 2006: 127).
CDA also varies in that it is politically committed to social change (Ibid: 64), as critical research investigates existing power relations in society, whose critique can contribute to this change (Ibid: 2). Therefore, CDA is not described as politically neutral (Ibid: 64). This is related to the aspect of collective action frames which is concerned with social action and change (Benford & Snow, 2000: 614). The critical aspect of this theory aims to reveal the role of discursive practices in the social world, including social relations that have unequal “relations to power” (Ibid). Simultaneously, it aims to contribute to social change in the equalizing of power relations in communication and other social practices (Ibid). CDA is largely based on the work by Norman Fairclough, who is considered a major contributor to the theory and method.
Norman Fairclough is considered a major contributor to CDA in his development of a distinct theoretical method and model. His work can be described as the study of the socio-political implications language has as a producer and product of social practices (Marko, 2001: 230). Fairclough’s framework addresses both the hegemonic and ideological components of discursive framing (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002).
Fairclough’s CDA Model:
Fairclough’s theoretical model analyzes discourse as a social practice (Ibid: 64). Although text-oriented, this approach does not consider text analysis, alone, to be sufficient for discourse analysis, as it does not explain the link between texts and societal context (Fairclough, 1992b; Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002: 66; Ibid: 70). Therefore, Fairclough found an interdisciplinary perspective that connects textual and societal analysis (Jørgensen and Phillips: 70). This perspective also incorporates the relationship between discursive practice and social practices, which are considered complex and variable across time (Ibid).
CDA is concerned with the linguistic-discursive social practices that aims to examine the link between discourse and social practice (Ibid: 61 & 69). Fairclough’s CDA model is described as “an analytical framework for empirical research on communication and society” (Ibid: 68). Its purpose is to provide this analytical framework for critical discourse analysis (Ibid: 70).
Discourse in CDA is described as encompassing both “talk” and “text”, as well as visual images; images which are then analyzed as if they were linguistic (Ibid: 64). Language as discourse is considered a form of action while in a dialectical relationship with other social dimensions (Ibid: 61-2). Discourse, itself, is considered a form of social practice that constitutes and is constituted by the social world and social practices (Ibid). Discourse contributes to the construction of social identities, social relations and systems of meaning (Ibid: 67). Discourse functions ideologically as discursive practices are said to contribute to the production and reproduction of unequal power relations between groups (Ibid: 63-4). The effects of discursive practices are understood to be ideological (Ibid).
In the analysis of discourse, it is said that two dimensions are emphasized (Ibid: 67). The focal points include the communicative event and the order of discourse (Ibid). The “communicative event” is the instance when language is used, while the “order of discourse” is the configuration of discourses that are used within a social structure (Fairclough, 1995b: 66; Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 67).
It is explicitly stated that the three dimensions of Fairclough’s model “should be covered in a specific discourse analysis of a communicative event” (Ibid: 68). This is because the model is based on the principle that asserts that “text can never be understood or analyzed in isolation” (Ibid: 70). The three dimensions include the “text” (spoken word, written word, visual image or in combination), the “discursive practice” (the production and consumption of the “text”), and the “social practice” (Ibid). The analysis of such an event incorporates the text and its linguistic features, the discursive practice and the processes relating to the production and consumption
of text, and the social practice and the wider context to which the communicative event belongs (Ibid: 69; Ibid: 70).
Text analysis is concerned with the formal features, such as vocabulary, grammar, syntax and sentence coherence, from which discourse is identified linguistically (Ibid: 69). Texts, according to Fairclough, have several potential meanings, depending on context and a number of other variables, that may result in different interpretations and contradictions (Ibid: 75). The text influences the discursive practice (Ibid). The analysis of discursive practice concentrates on how the messenger draw on existing discourse to create a text, and how audiences apply existing discourse in their interpretation of a text (Ibid). Discursive practice is the intermediary to text and social practice (Ibid). Texts constitute and are constituted by social practice through the discursive practice of producing and consuming text (Ibid).
Two important components of discourse that belong to this model are intertextuality and interdiscursivity (Ibid: 73-5). “Intertextuality” is the condition of communicative events drawing from earlier events or established narratives (Ibid: 73). Intertextuality refers to the influence of history on a text and is seen as a sign of both stability and instability, or continuity and change (Fairclough, 1992b: 102; Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 74). Interdiscursivity is a form of intertextuality, and is said to occur when difference discourses are articulated in a communicative event (Ibid). Interdiscursivity is a sign of and signifier for socio-cultural change or stability (Ibid).
The concept of hegemony allows for the analysis into how a discursive practice fits into a larger social practice involving power relations (Ibid: 76). Discursive relations are similarly described as sites of social struggle where the discursive practice is limited and constrained by the state of hegemonic relations (Fairclough, 1995b: 56; Fairclough, 1993: 137; Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002: 74). Fairclough explains that orders of discourse can be seen as one domain of potential cultural hegemony, with dominant groups struggling to assert and maintain particular structuring within and between them (Ibid). Regardless of this struggle, discourses are not created equal as they vary in the resonance they have with audiences (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002: 74).
Fairclough’s research design will help decode the ideological elements that are used in the process and production of discursive frames of Da’esh defector counter-narratives. Ideology is defined here as “constructions of meaning that contribute to the production, reproduction and transformation of relations of domination” (Fairclough, 1992b: 87; Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002: 75). Ideologies are considered societal creations where relations of dominance come from social structures and processes (Ibid). Ideological discourse is said to contribute to the “maintenance and transformation” of power relations that are created through societal practices (Ibid). This is related to van Dijk’s understanding of ideology and ideological discourse in reality construction and the power struggle for control and meaning (1998).
Fairclough’s CDA research design is composed of a number of steps researchers are asked to follow. First is the choice of research problem, second is the formulation of the research question, third is choice of research materials, fourth is transcription, fifth is the actual analysis, and last is the results (Ibid: 76-89).
The research problem addresses a societal problem that the research should help solve as it is intended to generate critical social research that contributes to the rectification of this problem (Ibid: 77-8). In order to formulate the research question using this model, it is required that the social practice to which the relevant discursive practice belongs to be conceptualized (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002: 78). Identifying the actual social practice can be done by referring to the discipline that studies it (Ibid). The research materials should be chosen based on the research question, the researcher’s knowledge, and whether one can gain access to this material (Ibid). The transcription process includes selecting and transcribing the materials that will be subject to research and analysis (Ibid: 80). These transcriptions will be interpreted by the researcher (Ibid). This step has its limitations because it is subject to the researcher’s interpretations as a consumer rather than the producer’s self-analysis (Ibid).
CDA consists of three levels, the discursive practice, text and social practice (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002: 81-8). By analyzing the discursive practice, one focuses on how text is produced and consumed (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002: 81). The analysis of the linguistic characteristics of text explains how discourse is framed textually while providing a sound interpretation of the text (Ibid: 83). The tools that can be used in text analysis give insight into how the text treats the event and the social relations related to this event (Ibid). These tools include interactional control or the relationship between producers (Fairclough, 1992b: 152), ethos or how identities are constructed through verbal and non-verbal communication (Ibid: 166), metaphors (Ibid: 194), wording (Ibid: 190) and grammar (Ibid: 158 & 169) (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002: 83).
Grammar is comprised of several elements, two of which are key: transitivity and modality (Ibid). “Transitivity” is the connection or disconnection between subjects or objects, and social events or processes (Ibid). Different forms of transitivity have ideological implications for the producer and consumer of text (Ibid). “Nominalization” is a related linguistic feature that reduces agency in the action or process that causes an effect while emphasizing said effect (Ibid). Here, a noun replaces the action or process responsible (Ibid). “Modality” is concerned with the messenger’s degree of affinity with or affiliation to the text (Ibid). One type of modality is truth, where the messenger commits fully to the text (Ibid: 84). The use of categorical, objective modalities is said to both reflect and reinforce the messenger’s authority (Ibid).
The analysis of the social practice that the discursive practice and text belong to is comprised of two elements (Ibid: 86). First is the relationship between the discursive practice and its order of discourse (Fairclough, 1992b: 237; Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002: 86). This relationship answers the questions, what kind of network of discourses does the discursive practice belong to and how are the discourses managed across texts (Ibid)? Second is the mapping of the “social matrix of discourse” or the non-discursive, social and cultural relations and structures that constitute the
