Zimbabwe-South Africa Interstate Relations, 1980-1999
Lotti Nkomo
THIS THESIS HAS BEEN SUBMITTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE FACULTY OF HUMANITIES, FOR THE CENTRE
FOR AFRICA STUDIES AT THE UNIVERSITY OF THE FREE STATE
DECEMBER 2018
SUPERVISOR: PROFESSOR NEIL ROOS
Declaration
I declare that this dissertation is my own independent work and has not previously been submitted by me at another university or institution for any degree, diploma or other qualification.
Signed………...
Date………
Lotti Nkomo
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abstract ... I Opsomming ... II Acknowledgements ... III Glossary ... VI Map Showing Geographical Locations of Zimbabwe and South Africa... IX Chapter One
Introduction ... 1
Introduction and Background ... 1
Literature Review ... 5
Sources ... 16
Structure ... 18
Chapter Two ‘A Country Can Only Have a Foreign Policy It Can Afford’: The Impact Of Zimbabwe’s Independence on Its Relations With South Africa, 1980-1982 ... 22
Introduction ... 22
Background to Zimbabwe’s Relations With South Africa ... 23
End of Diplomatic Links ... 27
Ideological Differences ... 29
Zimbabwe’s Support For ANC ... 32
Zimbabwe’s Solidarity With Namibia ... 35
Railway Diplomacy ... 38
Trade Diplomacy ... 46
South Africa’s Destabilisation Campaign ... 50
British Commitment To Zimbabwe ... 55
Conclusion ... 60
Chapter Three ‘We Will Fight To The Last Man’: Zimbabwe’s Sanctions Campaign Against South Africa, 1983 To 1989 ... 62
Introduction ... 62
Zimbabwe’s Sanctions Foreign Policy and Diplomacy ... 62
Challenges To The Implementation Of Sanctions ... 83
South Africa’s Response To Zimbabwe’s Actions ... 92
Impact of Zimbabwe’s Efforts ... 99
Zimbabwe’s Scepticism Over South Africa’s New Regional Policy ... 101
Conclusion ... 103
Chapter Four ‘Do We All Understand The Games The Boers Are Playing?’: De Klerk’s Reforms and Zimbabwe’s Continued Hostility, 1989-1994 ... 104
Introduction ... 104
De Klerk’s Reforms and Zimbabwe’s Immediate Reaction ... 105
Zimbabwe’s Continued Diplomatic Hostility ... 109
Zimbabwe’s Continued Sanctions Campaign ... 112
Significance of The 1992 Referendum In South Africa ... 119
Zimbabwe’s Interactions With Liberation Movements In South Africa ... 124
Zimbabwe’s Moments of Flexibility ... 125
Zimbabwe’s Policy On The Eve Of Democracy In South Africa ... 126
Conclusion ... 128
Chapter Five ‘South Africa’s Foreign Policy Is Not Down To Earth’: Zimbabwe, South Africa And The Struggle For Regional Dominance, 1994 To 1999. ... 130
Introduction ... 130
End Of Apartheid: Promise Of Positive Relations? ... 131
Differences Over The Nigerian Crises ... 147
Differences Over The OPDS ... 154
Differences Over The Congo Crisis ... 160
Mbeki: Promise Of a New Direction? ... 173
Conclusion ... 175
Chapter Six ‘We Have Been Short-Changed By South Africa’: South Africa’s Domination of Zimbabwe, With Particular Reference To Trade, 1994-1999 ... 177
Introduction ... 177
Zimbabwe-South Africa Trade On The Eve Of Democracy ... 178
Trade Negotiations ... 184
Entrenched South African Protectionism ... 190
Impact Of South African Protectionism On Zimbabwe ... 194
South African Rhetoric ... 196
South African Economic Concerns, Business Interests And Union Pressure ... 199
Regional Factor In Trade Relations ... 202
Implications Of Zimbabwe’s Overreliance On The South African Market ... 209
Zimbabwe’s Attempts At Persuasion ... 210
Zimbabwe Considers Retaliatory Measures ... 213
Conclusion ... 217
Chapter Seven Conclusions ... 219
i Abstract
The thesis is an examination of Zimbabwe’s interstate relations with South Africa between 1980 and 1999. Using sources that include diplomatic correspondence, newspapers, legislative debates, official reports and scholarly works, it demonstrates that independent Zimbabwe’s relationship with pre-and post-apartheid South Africa was complex, multifaceted and shifted depending on time and context. Zimbabwe’s independence provoked contestation and hostility so intense that elements persisted after 1994. Broadly speaking, the interstate relations fall into two phases, 1980 to 1994 and 1994 to 1999. The first phase of relations was marked by Zimbabwe’s hostile posture towards South Africa. This hostility was informed by historical and ideological factors. Of particular importance was that throughout this period Zimbabwe invested heavily in the struggle against apartheid and South Africa’s occupation of Namibia. South Africa reacted by subjecting Zimbabwe to economic and military pressures designed to force it to abandon its stance. Yet, Zimbabwe remained one of the most vocal anti-South Africa campaigners up to the end of apartheid in 1994.
The post-1994 phase saw overt hostility giving way to cordiality. However, behind the harmony were strong undercurrents of tension. The incompatibility manifested over several regional issues and dynamics. Locked in competition for regional dominance, the two states clashed over the Nigerian crisis, the Congo war and the structure of regional institutions such as the Southern African Development Coordination Community. On Zimbabwe’s part, the underlying refrain in the contestations was that South Africa sought to perpetuate its apartheid era political and economic regional dominance, disregarded Zimbabwe’s contribution to the struggle against apartheid, and ultimately ignored Zimbabwe’s interests. Throughout the period under consideration, interstate relations between Zimbabwe and South Africa were rarely free of friction as the two countries perpetually competed for regional leadership.
Key words: apartheid, Zimbabwe, independence, democracy, interstate relations, South Africa, hegemony, Namibia
ii Opsomming
Hierdie tesis is an ondersoek van Zimbabwe se interstaatlike verhoudings met Suid-Afrika tussen 1980 en 1999. Hierdie studie maak gebruik van diplomatieke korrespondensie, koerant artikels, parlementêre debatte, amptelike verslae en akademiese werke. Daardeur word gedemonstreer hoe kompleks, veelsydig, en afhanklik van tyd en konteks die verhouding tussen onafhanklike Zimbabwe en `n pre- en post-apartheid Suid-Afrika. Zimbabwe se onafhanklikheid het betwisbaarheid en vyandigheid aangehits wat so intens was dat elemente volgehou het na 1994. Breedweg gesproke was daar twee fases van interstaatlike verhoudings: 1980 tot 1994, en 1994 tot 1999. Die eerste fase van verhoudings was gekenmerk deur Zimbabwe se vyandige houding teenoor Suid-Afrika. Hierdie vyandigheid was ingelig deur historiese en ideologiese faktore. Van spesifieke belang was dat gedurende hierdie periode het Zimbabwe swaar belê in die stryd teen apartheid en Suid-Afrika se besetting van Namibië. Suid-Afrika het gereageer deur Zimbabwe onderworpe te stel aan ekonomiese en militêre druk wat ontwerp was om hulle van hulle standpunt te laat wegstap. Tog het Zimbabwe een van die mees prominente anti-Suid-Afrikaanse kampvegters gebly tot die einde van apartheid in 1994.
In die post-1994 fase het openlike vyandigheid pad gegee vir vriendskaplikheid. Tog, benede hierdie vreedsaamheid was sterk onderstrominge van spanning. Die onversoenbaarheid het het oor verskeie streekskwessies en dinamika gemanifesteer. Vasgevang in kompetisie vir streeksdominansie het die twee state gebots oor die Nigeriese krisis, die Kongo-oorlog, en die struktuur van streeksinstellings soos die Suider Afrikaanse Ontwikkeling Koördinasie Gemeenskap. Op Zimbabwe se beurt was die onderliggende teenstand in die betwisting dat Suid-Afrika gepoog het om sy apartheidsera politieke en ekonomiese streeksdominansie in stand te hou, en sodoende Zimbabwe se bydrae tot die stryd teen apartheid te verontagsaam, en uiteindelik Zimbabwe se belange te ignoreer. Gedurende die periode onder bespreking was interstaatlike verhoudings tussen Zimbabwe en Suid-Afrika skaars vry van wrywing aangesien hierdie twee lande voortdurend kompeteer het vir streeksleierskap.
Sleutelterme: apartheid, Zimbabwe, onafhanklikheid, demokrasie, interstaatlike
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Acknowledgements
Researching and writing a doctoral thesis is usually a solitary effort. However, the long and arduous hours involved makes it impossible to do it singlehandedly. Fortunately, I have met several people who have helped me endure the challenging times and make the process rewarding. I want to thank them giving generously of their time and contributing in many ways in the making of this thesis.
My first academic debts go to the trio of Professor Neil Roos, my main supervisor, Dr Clement Masakure and Dr David Patrick, the co-supervisors. Thank you for being outstanding advisors. Your encouragement, advice and patience especially in challenging times is greatly appreciated. I am greatly grateful for your important insights and feedback on all drafts. Words may not fully capture the depth of my appreciation. This was teamwork and this thesis is also yours.
Researching and writing a PhD is financially taxing. It involves a lot of travelling, document copying and internet services. As such, this academic journey could not have been possible without a generous studentship from the University of the Free State. It is greatly appreciated.
I am also indebted to Professor Ian Phimister, Senior Research Professor in the International Studies Group, for having faith in me and agreeing to take me on as a student. Beyond this, your close reading and commenting on my later drafts sharpened my ideas and enhanced the quality of this thesis.
The material that sustained this thesis was drawn from a number of institutions. These are the National Archives of Zimbabwe (NAZ) (Harare), The National Archives (TNA) (London), and the National Archives of South Africa (NASA) (Pretoria), Zimbabwe Newspapers Company (Harare) and Parliament of Zimbabwe Library (Harare). Retrieving material for researchers is an endless task. I would like to thank particular individuals for going out of their way to ensure that I accessed material relevant to the study. At the National Archives of Zimbabwe Lawrence Mukusha, Simbarashe Mutenha, Livingstone Muchefa, Tryson Nyoni and Emmanuel Takura were very helpful. The footnotes in this thesis demonstrates that it largely relied on newspapers and parliamentary debates. At the Zimbabwe Newspapers
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Company, Kudakwashe Mazuru facilitated access to hundreds of newspaper cuttings. At Parliament of Zimbabwe Library, Kingstone Mvundura made available Hansard whose debates greatly informed this study. Thank you Comrades.
The ISG has been my home for five years. It offered a perfect research and writing environment. This was made possible by the ever helpful administrators, Mrs Ilse Le Roux and Ms Tarisai Gwena. They never got tired of the strenuous duties of setting up appointments, organising seminars and facilitating research trips. Your excellent administrative work is deeply appreciated.
My completion of this project could not have been accomplished without the support of many friends and colleagues in the International Studies Group. My interactions with the post-doctoral cohort, in seminars and in the corridors, stimulated conversations that shaped the ideas expressed in this thesis. Thanks to Dr Duncan Money, Dr Abraham Mlombo, Dr Tinashe Nyamunda, Dr Lazlo Passemiers, Dr Kundai Manamere. To all the others I have not mentioned, your moral support and encouragement is noted. My cohort of PhD students helped me survive the pressures that come with researching and writing. Victor Gwande, George Bishi, Sibanengi Ncube, Miyanda Simabwachi, Joseph Kachim, Eleanor Brown-Swart and Bryson Nkhoma, you all made the load lighter. To Joyline Kufandirori, Unaludo Sechele and Miyanda Simwabachi, my comrades in the ‘dungeon’, thank you for the encouragement. You spurred me to go on. My friends, Kudakwashe Chitofiri and Tapiwa Madimu, thank you for always assuring me that the task is achievable.
I would also wish to thank my wife, Florence, for putting up with an absentee husband during this process. She has been unfailingly supportive and has borne the burdens which had fallen on her lap as I spent my time and energy pursuing goals that took me away from her and the family. Her encouragement when the times got rough is duly noted. My heartfelt thanks.
To my kids, Stephanie and Andile, apologies for not giving you the attention you deserved. You gave me the strength to carry on. This is for you.
Without my family’s constant support, encouragement and understanding, it would not have been possible for me to achieve my goal. This ‘supporting cast’ includes my sister, Tilda, my mother, Anna, and my father, Madoda Nkomo, who never lived to see the fruits of
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his advice. Your support and inspiration was key. To my brother Melusi, who attained his PhD a few months earlier, thank you for the inspiration.
It would be impossible to name individually all the kind people who have helped in many different ways. I would like to express my collective thanks to all who have not been named above.
vi Glossary
ACP African, Caribbean and Pacific
AFZ Air Force of Zimbabwe
ANC African National Congress
ANOC Association of African National Olympic Committees
AWB Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging
CAfD Central Africa Department
CAZ Conservative Alliance of Zimbabwe
CHOGM Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting
CODESA Convention for a Democratic South Africa
CONSAS Constellation of Southern African States
CSO Central Statistics Office
CZI Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries
DP Democratic Party
EEC European Economic Community
EU European Union
FCO Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FRELIMO Mozambique Liberation Front
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GEIS General Export Incentive Scheme
IAAF International Amateur Athletic Federation
IAAF International Association of Athletics Federations
ICAAS International Campaign Against Apartheid Sport
ICAAS International Conference Against Apartheid Sport
ICC International Cricket Conference
IFP Inkatha Freedom Party
IMF International Monetary Fund
IOC International Olympics Committee
MK uMkontho WeSizwe
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MNR Mozambican National Resistance
NAM Non-aligned Movement
NAZ National Archives of Zimbabwe
NP National Party
NPSL National Professional Soccer League
NUCI National Union of the Clothing Industry
OAU Organisation of African Unity
OPDS Organ on Politics, Defence and Security
PAC Pan-Africanist Congress
PF-ZAPU Patriotic Front-Zimbabwe African People’s Union
PTA Preferential Trade Agreement
PTA Preferential Trade Area
RBZ Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe
RDP Reconstruction and Development Programme
SACOS South African Council on Sports
SACP South African Communist Party
SACTWU South African Clothing and Textile Workers’ Union
SACU Southern African Customs Union
SADC Southern African Development Community
SADCC Southern African Development Coordination Conference
SADF South African Defence Force
SAFTO South African Foreign Trade Organisation
SAN-ROC South African Non-racial Olympic Committee Against Apartheid
SARRA South Africa Road Runners Association
SWAPO South West African People's Organisation
TAZ Tennis Association of Zimbabwe
TNA The National Archives, Kew
UANC United African National Congress
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UN United Nations
UNITA National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
UNSC United Nations Security Council
US United States
WEF World Economic Forum
WMMI Willowvale Mazda Motor Industries
WTO World Trade Organisation
ZANLA Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army
ZANU PF Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front
ZANU-Ndonga Zimbabwe African National Union-Ndonga
ZCC Zimbabwe Chamber of Commerce
ZCC Zimbabwe Clothing Council
ZCTU Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions
ZDF Zimbabwe Defence Forces
ZIMPAPERS Zimbabwe Newspapers Company
ZIPRA Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army
ZNA Zimbabwe National Army
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Map showing geographical locations of Zimbabwe and South Africa.
Source: https://www.adventuretoafrica.com/countries/map-of-southern-africa, accessed 10 December 2018.
1 Chapter One Introduction
Introduction and background
The coming to power of Robert Mugabe and his Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) as the first majority rule government in Zimbabwe in April 1980
complicated Zimbabwe’s relations with South Africa.1 Departing from the general cordiality
of old, the relations instantly degenerated into intense hostility, whose source was in both states. First, as South Africa was a state based on racial superiority it felt insecure having a black-ruled country as a neighbour. Second, Pretoria also feared that Mugabe, who had portrayed himself as a committed Marxist, would join Mozambique and Angola in creating a
Marxist block that would surround South Africa.2 Third, Mugabe had vowed to help in the
simultaneous efforts of dismantling apartheid and liberating Namibia from South African rule. Fourth, save for the last three years of the war, South Africa militarily supported Ian Smith’s government in its fight against Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), ZANU PF’s military wing, and Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), which was under Patriotic Front-Zimbabwe African People’s Union (PF-ZAPU). Zimbabwe’s independence, in this respect, marked a radical turn from 90 years of generally warm relations. Focusing on the Zimbabwean perspective, this thesis is an attempt to understand the development of Zimbabwe's post-independence interstate interactions with South Africa from 1980 to 1999.
The focus of this study is important in several respects. Historically, and prior to 1980, colonial Zimbabwe and South Africa’s economic, political and social structures were closely related. Since the early 1940s South Africa replaced Britain as Zimbabwe’s biggest trading
and economic partner, a situation that still continues to this day.3 Second, Zimbabwe
1 Previously known as ZANU, the party assumed the ‘PF’ suffix towards independence.
2 TNA, FCO 105/684, Political Relations Between South Africa and Zimbabwe, Part A, N. Browne, Salisbury, to Chancery, Pretoria, 27 April 1981.
3
Mlombo, A., ‘Southern Rhodesia’s relationship with South Africa, 1923- 1953’ (PhD, University of the Free State, 2017), 137-8; and D. Games, A nation in turmoil: The experience of South African firms doing business in
2
borrowed heavily from South Africa’s governmental and administrative systems.4 Third,
Zimbabwe’s pre-1980 racialised society substantially mirrored the apartheid system of South Africa. Fourth, both states resented ideas of majority rule and shared the fear of Marxism propagated by key black nationalist groups, including PF-ZAPU and ZANU PF, since
the 1960s.5 The relations were cemented not least by the geographical connections. On the
whole, with the exception of the very last years of settler rule in Zimbabwe, shared social, political and economic aspirations drew the two states together. It is therefore important to examine how this embeddedness fared in light of post‐1980 political developments in Zimbabwe, which will be detailed as the discussion unfolds, and what changes and continuities emerged to reshape the ‘special’ relationship in the period up to 1994, and after.
While literature for the period under study captures aspects of the relations, it is deficient in several respects. Comprehensive historical studies of interstate relations have mainly considered the period up to Zimbabwe’s independence. The small corpus of scholarly literature which focuses on the period after 1980 is dominated by social scientists, mainly with political science and international relations backgrounds. Historians are yet to fully
engage this subject.6 Available works focus on either a particular period or on a narrow
aspect of the relations, and do not connect events over time. Furthermore, the subject is dominated by articles rather than monographs. This study’s longue durée approach enables it to trace the continuities and changes in the relations over a twenty-year period, thus contributing to filling a historiographical lacuna.
Also, what little is there on Zimbabwe’s post-independence relations with South Africa is usually found in literature discussing the latter’s overall foreign policy. Zimbabwe’s interstate relations with South Africa are thus ‘hidden’ within broader and generalised South Africa-oriented writings. Neither J. Dzimba’s South Africa’s destabilisation of Zimbabwe, the Southern African Liaison Office’s South Africa-Zimbabwe relations nor J.
4
See D. Murray, The governmental system in Southern Rhodesia (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970); and C. Palley, The constitutional history and law of Southern Rhodesia, 1888-1965, with special reference to imperial
control (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966).
5 Z. Sadomba, War veterans in Zimbabwe's revolution: Challenging neo-colonialism and settler and
international capital (Harare: Weaver Press, 2011), 14-15; and M. Graham, The crisis of South African foreign policy: Diplomacy, leadership and the role of the African National Congress (London: I.B. Tauris, 2015), 9-10.
6
3
Hanlon’s Beggar your neighbours pay due regards to Zimbabwe’s role in shaping relations.7
By contrast, this study examines relations by writing against the grain of prevailing studies which overwhelmingly focus on South Africa to the neglect of Zimbabwe. It emphasises Zimbabwean perspectives. The deficiencies discussed above justify the need to enrich the historiographically underdeveloped theme of Zimbabwe’s post-independence relations with South Africa.
The end of colonial rule and the rise of a majority government signified the beginning of a new social, economic and political order in Zimbabwe. It would be, therefore, important to find out how this impacted on Harare’s external relations. 1999 is an ideal cut‐off date because the beginning of the year 2000 radically transformed both Zimbabwe’s domestic and international politics such that there was a marked departure from what had obtained in the previous 19 years. While focus is on Zimbabwe, developments in South Africa also made it easy to establish 1999 as a cut-off date. 1999 marked the end of South Africa’s first five years as a democracy. Furthermore, that is when Nelson Mandela, South Africa’s first democratic president, stepped down as the leader of South Africa. As such, the period 1994‐ 1999 is a useful period in which to measure how relations developed after the end of apartheid. Moreover, Mandela’s successor, Thabo Mbeki, was identified with a new brand of South African regional politics significantly different from Mandela’s. This too makes 1999 a convenient end date as does the radically new politics emerging in Zimbabwe from 2000
onwards.8
7 J. Dzimba, South Africa's destabilisation of Zimbabwe (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998); Southern African Liaison Office, South Africa-Zimbabwe relations, Vol. One, Pre-colonial to 2006 (Auckland Park: Jacana Media, 2013); and J. Hanlon, Beggar your neighbours: Apartheid power in Southern Africa (London: James Currey, 1986).
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The complexities that come with this period are so immense they warrant a separate study. The period was characterised by the governance and economic crisis that emanated from Zimbabwe’s land reform programme. Books and articles on the Zimbabwean ‘crisis’ include D. Moore, ‘Is the land the economy and the economy the land? Primitive accumulation in Zimbabwe’, Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 19, 2 (2001), 253-66; A. Hammar, B. Raftopoulos and S. Jensen (eds), Zimbabwe’s unfinished business: Rethinking
land, state and nation in the context of crisis (Harare: Weaver Press, 2003); P. Bond and M. Manyanya, Zimbabwe’s Plunge: Exhausted nationalism, neoliberalism and the search for social justice (London: Merlin
Press London, 2002); M. Meredith, Our votes, our guns: Robert Mugabe and the tragedy of Zimbabwe (New York: Public Affairs, 2002); B. Raftopoulos and I. Phimister, ‘‘Zimbabwe now’: The political economy of crisis and coercion’, Historical Materialism, 12, 4 (2004), 355-82; A. Mlambo, “Zimbabwe is not a South African province’: Historicising South Africa’s Zimbabwe policy since the 1960s’, Historia, 61, 1, (2016), 18-40; and I. Phimister and B. Raftopoulos, ‘Mugabe, Mbeki and the politics of anti-imperialism’, Review of African Political
4
Against this historiographical background, this thesis seeks to make a number of interventions. Firstly, it aims to understand historically how bi-lateral, regional and international socio-political and economic contexts converged to shape interstate relations between Zimbabwe and South Africa. In particular, connections between domestic social and political policies in each country and how they may have influenced their respective foreign policy towards each other will be examined.
The study also examines continuities and discontinuities shaping the two states’ historical ‘special relationship’, particularly on the economic front. Both countries were economically intertwined to such a degree that Zimbabwe’s survival depended on continued economic ties with South Africa. For its part, South Africa had extensive financial and commercial interests in Zimbabwe. As conflict promised to be mutually damaging, this study will focus on the contradictions that characterised the two states’ relations, even as they were influenced by the ever changing political circumstances in both Zimbabwe and South Africa. The thesis also analyses the competing interests between the two states, and the extent to which this influenced the form of relations that emerged over time. Among other topics examined it looks at Zimbabwe’s championing of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) in 1980, which was widely seen as a counter to South Africa’s unsuccessful attempts to establish the Constellation of Southern African States
(CONSAS)9 in 1979. For the period after 1994 and majority rule in South Africa, this study
assesses the extent to which the advent of democracy in South Africa dissipated the hostile atmosphere precipitated by Zimbabwe’s own independence.
As evident throughout the thesis, the contribution of local non-state actors to the construction of various forms of relations between Zimbabwe and South Africa is another intervention this thesis makes. For instance, in the 1980s Zimbabwean businesses, represented by Zimbabwe Chamber of Commerce (ZCC) and Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries (CZI) were concerned about potentially damaging consequences of government’s anti-South African sanctions policy, and in the 1990s labour unions in South Africa, led by the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), influenced the government’s trade decisions as regards Zimbabwe. It is important that their place in the interstate relationship
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be examined. In the same vein, the influence of factors which were neither Zimbabwean nor South African will also be discussed. Indeed, institutions and states such as the United Nations (UN), the Commonwealth, Britain and the United States of America (US) intervened either directly or indirectly in the post-colonial history of Zimbabwe’s relations with South Africa. Discussing the involvement of these states and institutions allows for an appreciation of the international dimension of the relations.
By paying attention to the interplay between personalities and structure in shaping interstate relations, this thesis goes beyond those histories that focus on one aspect or the other (See literature review). As A. Alao observed, Mugabe’s radical and hardline personality
was important in shaping Zimbabwe’s own liberation struggle.10 This contrasted with the
calm, even-keeled and diplomatic Mandela, at least as he portrayed himself in his
autobiography Long walk to freedom.11 This thesis will seek to ascertain the extent to which
such characteristics influenced Zimbabwe’s posture towards South Africa throughout the
period under review.
Literature Review
Existing literature on Zimbabwe’s post-independence relations with South Africa is limited and uneven. Generally, it is ahistorical; picks a particular period or aspect to the neglect of historical connections; emphasises the South African perspective to the neglect of Zimbabwe’s; tends to present the relations as an incidental ‘sub-product’ of broader discussions on South Africa’s foreign policy; and emphasises structure to the neglect of personalities. Despite these factors, historians have failed to maintain a sustained scholarly interest in the subject. This dearth of literature contrasts greatly with the colonial period. Relations between colonial Zimbabwe and South Africa in the period between 1890 and
1979 have enjoyed considerable scholarly attention.12 These are studies of social, political
10
A. Alao, Mugabe and the politics of security in Zimbabwe (London: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2012), 18.
11 N. Mandela, Long walk to freedom: The autobiography of Nelson Mandela, (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1994); However, some observers did not see Mandela as entirely a ‘softie’, but someone who sometimes demonstrated a bossy and autocratic streak. See https://mg.co.za/article/2013-12-12-saluting-mandela-an-autocratic-democrat, accessed 11 June 2018.
12 The literature on the relations during Zimbabwe’s colonial period includes R. Hyam, The failure of South
African expansion, 1908-1948 (London: Palgrave-Macmillan, 1972); M. Chanock, Unconsummated union: Britain, Rhodesia and South Africa, 1900-45 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1977); R. Blake, A history of Rhodesia (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978); Palley, The constitutional history and law of Southern
6
and economic relations between the two countries for much of the period. In this regard, this thesis seeks not only to contribute to the existing historiography but also to stimulate historical inquiry for the period after Zimbabwe’s independence.
1980-1990: South African destabilisation
South Africa’s regional destabilisation campaign was a key theme in Zimbabwe’s early post-independence period. This military/security policy intensely affected all the states in the region, Malawi excepted, economically, politically and socially. While the campaigns started before Zimbabwe’s independence, with Angola and Mozambique as key targets, they intensified in the course of the 1980s. Independent Zimbabwe was an important factor in this process.
Scholars who have comprehensively examined destabilisation are Hanlon, P. Johnson and D. Martin, and Dzimba. All of them document how Pretoria, in order to force regional states to abandon support for anti-apartheid and liberation forces, carried out overt and covert
economic and military warfare against its neighbours.13 They show how South Africa,
already facing internal unrest, was forced by the hostility of most states in the region to
open a ‘second front’ beyond its borders.14 The three books demonstrate that Zimbabwe
was at the receiving end of South Africa’s aggression because it had assumed a spirited anti-South African posture. Zimbabwe was subjected to economic blockages, assassinations and bombings, among other South African destabilisation activities. It was, to a degree, ‘South Africa’s hostage’.
Rhodesia; P. Warhurst, ‘Rhodesia-South Africa relations, 1900-23’, South African Historical Journal (2009),
93-108; K. Good, ‘Settler colonialism in Rhodesia’, African Affairs, 73, 290 (1974), 10-36; A. Di Perna, A right to be
proud: The struggle for self-government and the roots of white nationalism in Rhodesia, 1890-1922 (Bulawayo:
Books of Rhodesia, 1978); A. Mlambo, “We have blood relations over the border’: South Africa and the Rhodesian sanctions, 1965-1975’, African History Review, 40, 1 (2008), 1-29; I. Phimister, ‘Rhodes, Rhodesia and the Rand’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 1, 1 (1974), 74-90; I. Phimister, ‘Secondary industrialisation in Southern Africa: The 1948 Customs Agreement between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa’, Journal of
Southern African Studies, 17, 3 (1991), 430-42; and Mlombo, ‘Southern Rhodesia’s relationship with South
Africa’.
13 J. Hanlon, Beggar your neighbours and its abridged version Apartheid’s second front: South Africa’s war
against its neighbours (New York: Penguin Books, 1986); P. Johnson and D. Martin (eds), Destructive engagement: Southern Africa at war (Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1986); and Dzimba, South Africa's destabilisation of Zimbabwe.
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Both Hanlon and Johnson and Martin’s accounts treat the subject regionally. As a result, the case of Zimbabwe tended to be somewhat lost in the vast amount of information covering all Frontline States. By way of response, Dzimba contributed to the destabilisation narrative
by providing a specifically Zimbabwe-South Africa account.15 Departing from the regional
approach, he set as his key task measurement of the extent to which destabilisation succeeded in Zimbabwe. However, Dzimba does not acknowledge that South African destabilisation activities differed in intensity across the region. Zimbabwe was not affected as much as Angola and Mozambique because Pretoria’s aims differed from country to country. Moreover, while noting Zimbabwe’s pragmatism in its interactions with South Africa, all three scholars do not consider systematically the interplay between the various layers of domestic developments in both South Africa and Zimbabwe. Yet, only by understanding the internal mechanics of each state is it possible to better appreciate its foreign engagements. Like Hanlon and Johnson and Martin, Dzimba focused more on South African strengths and relegated the capacities developed by the Zimbabwean state to force South Africa to reconsider aspects of its destabilisation policy. Although he discussed the schism between Mugabe and most of the Ndebele people in the 1980s, he largely ignored the murderous impact of Gukurahundi on the people in Matabeleland and how it offered
South Africa opportunities of infiltrating Zimbabwe without much difficulty.16
All of them neglect key aspects of Zimbabwe’s domestic troubles, not least the brutal Zimbabwean government interventions in Matabeleland in the early- to mid-1980s and how this provided South Africa with opportunities to further involve itself in the destabilisation of the country. To an extent, destabilisation scholars were politically sympathetic to the Zimbabwean government. Johnson and Martin’s book, for example, was partly sponsored
15
Dzimba, South Africa's destabilisation of Zimbabwe.
16 Loosely, Gukurahundi refers to disturbances that affected Matabeleland and Midlands regions of Zimbabwe in the 1980s whereby the government deployed the army to quell reported dissident activities there. However, it has been alleged that over 20000 Ndebele people, most of them civilians, were killed during this operation. Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe, Breaking the silence: Building true peace –
A report on the disturbances in Matabeleland and the Midlands, 1980-1988, (Harare: Catholic Commission for
Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe, 1997); and J. Alexander, J. McGregor and T. Ranger, Violence and memory:
One hundred years in the ‘dark forests’ of Matabeleland (Oxford: James Currey, 2000), 180-231, offer valuable
8
by the Zimbabwean government, and Dzimba was once arrested in South Africa for
anti-apartheid activity in the 1980s.17
South Africa’s relations with its neighbours during the apartheid era had a pronounced economic dimension. The various essays in R. Rotberg, H. Bienen, R. Legvold and G. Maasdorp’s edited book focused on economic aspects of South Africa’s regional
excursions.18 While they acknowledging the security dynamics of the war, the essays
concurred that South Africa primarily used economic pressure to limit the capacity of its neighbours to pursue policies independent of South Africa. This was a key control mechanism against hostile states like Zimbabwe who were forced to be cautious when confronting South Africa. As H. Bienen noted, South Africa was able ‘to wield a large
economic stick’ or offered ‘carrots’ to its neighbours depending on the dynamics at play.19
G. Marsdoop re-emphasised that South Africa prevailed against its neighbours because ‘SADCC states are a disparate lot’ who, because of different colonial backgrounds, ideologies
and economic status, had different economic ties with South Africa.20 While they mention
the Zimbabwean case in passing, their analysis was confined to remarking that Harare was forced to give a measured response to South African provocation for fear of inviting a debilitating economic backlash.
Even where interstate cooperation against South Africa initially thrived, it eventually collapsed under the weight of pressure from Pretoria. The essays edited by M. Sejanemane, although focused on Angola, Botswana and Lesotho, also capture the Zimbabwean situation and how its determination to promote effective regional co‐operation was weakened by
destabilisation.21 Zimbabwe, though vocal, sometimes put national interests over regional
concerns in relation to South Africa.
17
D. Coger, Review of J. Dzimba, South Africa's destabilisation of Zimbabwe, 1980-1989, Africa Today, 47, 2 (2000), 189.
18
R. Rotberg et al (eds), South Africa and its neighbours: Regional security and self-interest (Toronto: Lexington Books, 1985).
19 H. Bienen, ‘Economic interest and security issues in Southern Africa’, in Ibid, 69.
20 G. Maasdorp, ‘Squaring up to economic dominance: Regional patterns’, in Rotberg et al (eds), South Africa
and its neighbours, 98.
21 M. Sejanemane (ed), From destabilisation to regional cooperation in Southern Africa? (Roma: Institute of Southern African Studies, 1994).
9
South Africa’s cross-border economic, political and economic engagements and incursions in
the 1970s and 1980s were underpinned by its search for security.22 When chronicling South
Africa’s foreign policy between 1945 and 1988, J. Barber and J. Barratt observed how it changed from being predominantly inward-looking to, after 1948, focusing on regional neighbours whom it perceived to be actively supporting anti-apartheid and liberation movements. For Barber and Barratt, Zimbabwe’s independence drastically changed the regional context and caused Pretoria to further reassess its regional policy and make
security an overriding factor.23 Like most existing works, because the book looks at South
Africa’s foreign policy across the world, its discussion of Zimbabwe is thin.
Moving away from security issues, C. Legum assembled a collection of essays giving a diplomatic perspective to destabilisation, blaming Western countries for their reluctance to
acknowledge the central role of South Africa in the region’s difficulties.24 His year-by-year
assessment of diplomatic efforts of the various actors involved accounts for the disposition of international players towards the South African question. Zimbabwe and South Africa competed on the international diplomatic scene, each advancing their particular views on apartheid and the Namibian problem. Both separately engaged the major powers, particularly Britain and the US, but they did not have direct political contact with each other as Zimbabwe had cut diplomatic ties with Pretoria. Here too, Zimbabwe factor is lumped together with reviews of other states, leaving little space for in-depth analysis.
1980-1990: Regional attempts at sanctions against South Africa
Pretoria’s obstinacy provoked international hostility culminating in calls for sanctions as far back as in the 1960s. In some instances, however, by the time Zimbabwe attained independence, sanctions were yet to be effectively implemented. From 1980 onwards, Harare became the most vocal regional, if not global, champion of sanctions against Pretoria. During this period, the subject provoked great debate, broadly divided between those who supported the implementation of sanctions and those who believed they would not work or that they would hurt those states which economically depended on South Africa. Focusing on the 1980s sanctions campaign, R. Gibb warned that a cornered South
22 J. Barber and J. Barratt, South Africa’s foreign policy: The search for status and security, 1945-1988 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
23 Ibid, 266. 24
10
Africa would threaten repercussions particularly for regional states, most of whom had long-established links with it based on investments, trade, transport and communications
networks.25 With a fair degree of accuracy, Gibb predicted that regional countries, including
Zimbabwe, would not impose sanctions on Pretoria.
Other scholars believed it was possible for states like Zimbabwe to successfully implement
sanctions. T. Lines identified advantages for Zimbabwe if it embargoed South Africa.26 He
argued that Zimbabwe would not only garner a foreign policy credit by isolating South Africa, but might also prompt international capital domiciled in South Africa to relocate to Zimbabwe. He suggested that Zimbabwe could reduce South Africa’s presence by blocking Pretoria’s way to the north, reducing the amount of South African shareholding in Zimbabwe-based companies, eliminating white South African management, and by stopping any more South African investments in Zimbabwe. However, Lines’ account was largely idealistic, especially as it underplayed South Africa’s brutal military responses against actively hostile states and failed to recognise that Zimbabwe was one of South Africa’s
economic ‘hostages’.27 Zimbabwe had to weigh its wish to quicken the fall of the apartheid
regime against the need to protect its national interests. Lines’ essay, however, provoked this study to think further about why Zimbabwe chose certain positions over others in its interactions with South Africa.
Although Zimbabwe was one of the states that did not impose comprehensive mandatory sanctions on South Africa for fear of debilitating consequences, it has sometimes been argued that by cutting off diplomatic links with Pretoria it had actually implemented sanctions of a kind. This is the point A. Christopher makes in his brief study of diplomatic sanctions as a defining feature of the world’s relations with South Africa from 1948 to
1994.28 D. Geldenhuys concurred, pointing out that diplomatic delinking by some states,
25 R. Gibb, ‘The effect on the countries of SADCC of economic sanctions against the Republic of South Africa’,
Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 12, 4 (1987), 398-412.
26
T. Lines, ‘Investment sanctions and Zimbabwe: Breaking the rod’, Third World Quarterly, 10, 3 (1988), 1182-1216. This essay contrasts with J. Barber’s ‘Supping with the devil: Zimbabwe-South Africa relations’,
International Affairs Bulletin, 6, 1, (1982), 4-16, which emphasised how Zimbabwe, regardless of its hatred of
the South African regime, had to continue interacting with it economically for its own survival, especially as South Africa was its key trade, investment and transportation partner.
27 J. Halpern, South Africa's hostages: Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland (Harmondswoth: Penguin
Books, 1965) popularised the idea of regional states being economic and political ‘hostages’ of South Africa.
28 A. Christopher, ‘The pattern of diplomatic sanctions against South Africa, 1948–1994’, GeoJournal, 34, 4 (1994), 349-446.
11
although mainly symbolic, managed to render it a ‘pariah state’.29 These observations gave
this study an entry point for in-depth discussion of this important aspect of Zimbabwe’s interstate relations with South Africa.
Issues of joint concern for both Zimbabwe and South Africa have been incorporated into discussions of regional groupings, especially SADC and the African Union. The collection of essays edited by S. Amin, D. Chitala, and I. Mandaza, SADCC: Prospects for disengagement and development, encouraged SADCC members to economically disengage from South Africa. Contributions by S. Mongula and C. Ngandwe, J. Wagao and Mandaza and Amin separately argued that delinking was possible but only if their development efforts were efficiently coordinated at the regional level. Mongula and Ngandwe pointed to energy, transport and communications as areas were regional states could pull their resources
together in order to successfully by-pass South Africa.30 On the other hand, they noted that
rather than decreasing, trade imbalances between South Africa and the region were
increasing in favour of the former.31 Building on these narratives, this thesis will engage with
the idea that Zimbabwe’s reluctance to impose the sanctions it vehemently campaigned for was shared by its regional neighbours.
1994: The fall of apartheid and its aftermath
The fall of apartheid in 1994 introduced a new era not only in the history of South Africa, but also of the region. As apartheid had been the key reason for Zimbabwe’s anti-South Africa posture, its fall prompted the reorganisation of the two states’ relations. For this reason, it has attracted scholarly attention. As regards Zimbabwe-South Africa interstate relations, the literature is dominated by the idea that despite the emergence of cordiality, older tensions persisted after 1994, albeit in different and subtler forms. However, the hidden tensions proved central to the relevant political dynamics of the period. For the purposes of this study, the tensions are traced through economic conflict and political differences, both of which pointed to an undeclared struggle for regional leadership. As
29
See D. Geldenhuys, ‘The special relationship between South Africa and Zimbabwe’, in M. Hough and A. Du Plessis (eds), State failure: The case of Zimbabwe (Pretoria: University of Pretoria, 2004), 102-44.
30 S. Mongula and C. Ngandwe, ‘Limits to development in Southern Africa: Energy, transport and communications in SADCC countries’, in S. Amin et al (eds), SADCC: Prospects for disengagement and
development in Southern Africa (London: Zed Books, 1987), 85-106.
31 J. Wagao, ‘Trade relations among SADCC countries’, in Amin et al (eds), SADCC: Prospects for
12
before, the existing literature for the period between 1994 and 1999 is thin, South African-oriented and lacks historical perspective.
Although his discussion was not Zimbabwe-oriented, I. Taylor captured the essential determinants of South Africa’s foreign policy after 1994 when arguing that there were significant contradictions and ambiguities in South Africa’s attempts to establish new domestic and foreign policies, and that the reason is embedded in its history and the
compromise nature of the 1994 government.32 For Taylor, the foreign policy devised in 1994
was a balancing act that sought to reflect the new political dispensation, while not scaring foreign capital. Although, Taylor did not consider foreign relations in a regional political context, the idea of contradiction and ambiguity at the point of ‘liberation’ and afterwards can be used to discuss South Africa’s responses to Zimbabwe.
Diplomatic relations between Zimbabwe and South Africa were instantly transformed in 1994. As C. Landsberg’s The diplomacy of transformation notes, the apartheid era’s ‘diplomacy of isolation’ came to an abrupt end. But, as before 1994, the attitude of Zimbabwe and South Africa towards the other was shaped by the interplay between each’s
domestic and foreign policy.33 Zimbabwe and South Africa reworked various aspects of their
relations, including diplomatic and social engagements. Although Landsberg conceded that South Africa retained elements of its old domineering regional policy, his study does not capture the continuities in South Africa’s Zimbabwe policy. South Africa tried to outmanoeuvre Zimbabwe economically and politically. This is another strand that this thesis seeks to explore.
Non-state actors featured intermittently in shaping Zimbabwe’s post-1994 relations with South Africa. Labour unions and businesspeople, for instance, were identified by Landsberg
as actively defining aspects of South Africa’s foreign policy.34 J. Siko complemented
Landsberg by looking Inside South Africa’s foreign policy after 1994. He focused on such institutions as the press, academia, business and general public opinion and how they
32
I. Taylor, Stuck in the middle gear: South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign relations (London: Praeger, 2001). 33 C. Landsberg, The diplomacy of transformation: South African foreign policy and statecraft (Johannesburg: Pan Macmillan, 2004); and D. O’Meara, Forty lost years: The apartheid state and the politics of the National
Party, 1948-1994 (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1997), also takes this approach and is more interested in the
inner mechanics of the apartheid state.
34 C. Landsberg, The quiet diplomacy of liberation: International politics and South Africa’s transition (Johannesburg: Jacana, 2010).
13
participated in South Africa’s foreign policy making processes.35 The South African state had
to contend with these various and sometimes competing constituencies. Some of them were closely interested in Pretoria’s ability to balance competing domestic aspirations with
its neighbours’ expectations.36 This thesis benefits from this analysis when discussing why,
despite Zimbabwe’s support for the anti-apartheid struggle, business and labour in South Africa resisted the idea of rewarding Harare with easy trade and economic deals.
Zimbabwe and South Africa were at the heart of the regional politics that emerged after 1994. For instance, an examination of the Frontline States organisation, later transformed into the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS), help frame Zimbabwe’s relations with South Africa in the immediate post-apartheid years. In this respect, the existing literature focuses on the notion of the two states’ presumed struggle for regional hegemony. For example, H. Dashwood studied Mugabe’s attempt to dominate the region politically by virtue of his past position in regional liberation politics, C. Nkiwane suggested that both Zimbabwe and South Africa believed that whoever controlled the two key regional institutions, SADC and the OPDS, would be the regional leader, while L. Nathan saw
on-going regional security threats as providing a site of struggle between the two states.37
Although many of the debates have identified ‘hegemonic contests’ in Zimbabwe-South Africa relations, they fail to do justice to the fact that they were a product of long running historical processes. Laying claim to the success of the 1980s reinvigorated global anti-apartheid movement, Zimbabwe believed it deserved more say in regional affairs than
35 J. Siko, Inside South Africa’s foreign policy: Diplomacy in Africa from Smuts to Mbeki (London: I.B. Tauris, 2014).
36 Scholars who have written about various aspects of the two states’ relations after 1994 include Graham, The
crisis of South African foreign policy, M. Schoeman, ‘South Africa in Africa: Behemoth, hegemon, partner or
‘just another kid on the bock?’, in A. Adebajo, A. Adedeji and C. Landsberg (eds), South Africa in Africa: The
post-apartheid Era (Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2007), 92-104; K. Matlosa, ‘South
Africa and regional security in Southern Africa’, in Adebajo et al (eds), South Africa in Africa, 105-127; C. Alden and G. le Pere, ‘South Africa's post-apartheid foreign policy: From reconciliation to ambiguity?, Review of
African Political Economy, 31, 100 (2004), 283-97; A. Cooper, ‘The multiple faces of South African foreign
policy’, International Journal, 53, 4 (1998), 705-32; J. Hamill, ‘A little local difficulty’, The World Today, 57, 6 (2001), 11-13; K. Deug Hwang, ‘The mechanisms of politico-security regionalism in Southeast Asia and Southern Africa: A comparative case study of ASEAN and SADC’ (PhD, University of Pretoria, 2005); D. Francis,
Uniting Africa: Building regional peace and security systems (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006); and M. Szeftel, ‘Two
cheers? South African democracy's first decade’, Review of African Political Economy, 31, 100 (2004), 193-202. 37 H. Dashwood, ‘Mugabe, Zimbabwe, and Southern Africa: The struggle for leadership’, International Journal, 57, 1 (2001/2002), 78-100; C. Nkiwane, ‘Contested regionalism: Southern and Central Africa in the post-apartheid era’, Special Issue: ‘Politics in Central Africa’, African Journal of Political Science, 4, 2 (1999), 126-42; and L. Nathan, Community of insecurity: SADC’S struggle for peace and security in Southern Africa (Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press, 2013).
14
South Africa. On the other hand, South Africa believed that since it was a much bigger state than Zimbabwe it automatically it deserved to be the regional leader. Missing from many studies is consideration of the possibility that Zimbabwe’s hostile relations with South Africa in the 1980s were part of the struggle for regional hegemony, a contest that continued in the post-1994 period.
Generally been absent from the current literature is a long view of Zimbabwe’s post-independence relations with South Africa. Nonetheless, R. Schwartz’s Coming to terms, L. Mayihlome’s Impact of Zimbabwe-South Africa trade relations, Southern African Liaison Office’s South Africa-Zimbabwe Relations, and N. Bhebe and G. Mazarire’s ‘Paying the
ultimate price’ have all looked at important aspects of Harare’s foreign policy.38 Schwartz’s
thesis surveys Zimbabwe’s relations with several global states and international organisations. By its nature, this broad framework only discusses relations with South Africa and then only in a few pages. As such, it misses some key issues which can only be effectively captured by a detailed study focused of Zimbabwe-South Africa relations. Even Schwartz’s brief conclusions emphasise how the two states, by virtue of history and ideological make up, were bound to be rivals after 1980. Mayihlome’s work is heavily technical in its discussions of trade relations between Zimbabwe and South Africa. Mayihlome’s attempts to understand trade relations from the pre-1980 period to the mid-1990s largely neglects the political environment in which they existed.
According to Mazarire and Bhebe, Zimbabwe suffered at the hands of the South African
state for its solidarity with anti-apartheid movements.39 They argue that Zimbabwe’s
proximity to South Africa, together with its hostile posture, made it an easy target for punitive South African responses. Indeed, Zimbabwe had neither the wherewithal to provide material support for liberation movements, nor the capacity to do it without detection by South African spies who were heavily present in Zimbabwe. However, their work is more of a survey than a comprehensive in-depth study.
38
R. Schwartz, ‘Coming to terms: Zimbabwe in the international arena (1980-1994)’ (PhD, London School of Economics and Political Science, 1997); L. Mayihlome, ‘Impact of Zimbabwe-South Africa trade relations: A bilateral, regional, or multilateral approach? (MSc., Naval Post-graduate School, 1997); and N. Bhebe and G. Mazarire, ‘‘Paying the ultimate price’: Zimbabwe and the liberation of South Africa, 1980-1994’, in South African Democracy Education Trust (eds), The road to democracy in South Africa, (Pretoria: University of South Africa Press, 2013).
39
15
Southern African Liaison Office book is an overview of the relations from the precolonial times to 2006. It is more a reference book than a rigorous academic treatise. For instance,
the pre-colonial period to 1994 is discussed in only fifteen pages.40 The only chapters that
are fairly comprehensive are the last two, ‘The early Mbeki years’ and the ‘Middle Mbeki years’, whose discussion as regards Zimbabwe focus on the post-2000 period, which is
beyond the scope of this study.41 However, its chronological approach is a useful point of
reference. The gaps identified in all the literature discussed above include the absence of a systematic analysis of the period 1989-1994, the F. W De Klerk years. For example, post-1994 trade issues between Zimbabwe and South Africa during this period were not placed in a political context, historical perspective is missing, and the South African perspective is more dominant. These identified gaps in literature also motivated this study.
Biographical works were also consulted and were important in bringing some of the actors closer to the study. The events, impressions and opinions of, and about, such characters as Mugabe, President P. W. Botha and Mandela emerged in biographical literature in
captivating ways.42 K. Woods’ The Kevin Woods Story and H. Holland’s Dinner with Mugabe
are some of the biographies that enriched this study by emphasising the role of individuals
and personalities in constructing Zimbabwe’s relations with South Africa.43 For instance,
Woods’ is an insider’s account of how in the 1980s South Africa invested in subversive activities in Zimbabwe. By situating himself at the centre of subversive politics, Woods provided unique and personal insights about Zimbabwe-South Africa relations that general historical studies may not offer. Dinner with Mugabe, a psycho-biography of Mugabe, provides insight into his personality and is important to understanding his personal relationship with Mandela. However, biographies, like all historical sources, should be handled carefully as they are not immune to challenges involving objectivity, subjectivity and truth. Some biographers may fail to rise above their own prejudices. For instance,
40
Southern African Liaison Office, South Africa-Zimbabwe relations, 45-60. 41 Ibid, 95-136 and 137-78.
42
To differentiate between the two Bothas, PW Botha will be referred to as President Botha, while his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pik Botha, will be referred as such.
43 K. Woods, The Kevin Woods story: In the shadow of Mugabe's gallows (Johannesburg: 30° South Publishers, 2007); and H. Holland, Dinner with Mugabe: The untold story of a freedom fighter who became a tyrant (Johannesburg: Penguin Books, 2009); See also A. Immelman and A. Beatty, ‘The political personality of Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe’, Paper presented at the annual scientific meeting of the International Society of Political Psychology, Boston, 2003.
16
Holland assumed a clearly anti-Mugabe posture, while Smith never conceded that he made
mistakes during his tenure as the Prime Minister of Rhodesia.44
Sources
This dissertation is based on extensive primary and secondary research conducted in Zimbabwe, South Africa and Britain. In Zimbabwe, National Archives of Zimbabwe (NAZ), Zimpapers library and the Parliament of Zimbabwe library provided the bulk of the primary material that informs the study. In Britain, The National Archives (TNA) provided material which covers the first three years of the period under study. In South Africa, the National Archives in Pretoria were also consulted. As much material on the post-1980 history of Zimbabwe is either still embargoed or not yet catalogued, it was imperative to visit a range of archives and libraries to glean as much as possible.
As regards primary data, the thesis relied on Britain’s TNA. However, because of the 30-year rule, which also affected research endeavours in Zimbabwe and South Africa, the material accessed only went up to 1983. However, so rich were these files that they were crucial for setting the base for the entire study. For instance, at TNA files FCO 105/685, Political relations between South Africa and Zimbabwe, 1981 and FCO 105/1364, South Africa-Zimbabwe Relations, 1983, contain letters, minutes and memoranda which reveal the early British mediating role in the emerging hostilities between the two states. These files, mainly generated by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), and British diplomatic offices in South Africa and Zimbabwe, were particularly important for Chapter Two. One major challenge encountered in using archival records generated by diplomatic offices is that at times they did not contain the full details of the authors or the recipients. For instance, the letter by Solesby, CAfD, to M.K. Ewans, High Commission, would be written without revealing the positions or job titles of the people involved in the correspondence. Sometimes only the surname of the people involved would appear in the letter without the first names or the initials. For instance a Killen, part of the South Africa diplomatic structures, was only quoted as ‘Killen’, without the surname or the job title. Importantly, however, in almost all instances, the offices involved would be named in the correspondence.
44
17
It should be highlighted that, as regards some records that are out of the embargo period, some archives consulted were suffering a processing backlog. For instance, NAZ was still processing the 1950s and 1960s material, and was yet to commence with the 1970s. Therefore, primary material such as government correspondence was not accessed. Indeed, the study of contemporary history is extremely challenging for historians. As government and other documents were not accessible, the thesis turned to those written sources that are available in the public domain. These include newspapers, parliamentary debates and official public statements.
As this thesis was concerned with examining Zimbabwean perspectives on its relations with South Africa, it paid close attention the Zimbabwean government’s rhetoric and actions. This was done by focusing on The Herald and The Sunday Mail, both essentially mouthpieces of the Zimbabwean government. This was in the context of a public media restructuring that saw the government replacing critical journalists and editors with pliant successors, and
interfering with editorial content.45 The two newspapers strongly supported the
government in its struggle against apartheid South Africa. Internationally, leading American, British and South African newspapers were themselves very interested in Zimbabwean. The Telegraph, New York Post and The Transvaler all discussed issues that affected Zimbabwe’s relations with South Africa. Generally, British newspapers tended to support Mugabe against South African ‘bullying’, while South African papers castigated him as a Marxist who threatened white security across the Limpopo. Not all South African newspapers, though, were hostile towards the Zimbabwean government. For instance, the liberal Rand Daily Mail often castigated Pretoria’s confrontational Zimbabwe economic policy in the early 1980s. Zimbabwe’s parliamentary debates also allowed this study to obtain a local perspective of how Zimbabwe perceived South African state throughout the period under study. Zimbabwe’s international engagements, including its relations with South Africa, were extensively debated. As regards the South African question, discussions included trade,
apartheid, sanctions and national security, among others.46 In this respect, Hansard was a
45 See R. Saunders, Dancing out of tune: A history of the media in Zimbabwe (Harare: Edwina Spicer Productions, 1999), for a longer history of the media landscape in both colonial and post-colonial Zimbabwe. 46 For instance, Parliamentary Debates, Zimbabwe, 23 July 1986, Col. 500-584 intensely debated the anti-South Africa sanctions campaign; Parliamentary Debates, Zimbabwe, 20 February 1990, Col. 3400-20 debated about the sincerity of De Klerk’s political reforms in South Africa; and Parliamentary Debates, Zimbabwe, 4 November 1998, Col. 1694 considered the impact of South Africa-EU trade deal on Zimbabwe.
