Master thesis for the degree of Master in International and European Law University of Amsterdam
Author: Joyce Schreiner Supervisor: Dr. Catherine Brölmann
July 26, 2019
International law as a tool to protect women from
domestic violence
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Abstract
In this thesis international law protecting women from domestic violence will be critically analyzed. Despite the adoption of international instruments addressing violence against women, the prevalence of domestic violence is still high and widespread. At least one in every three women experiences some sort of violence against them, which most often occurs in the home. With the use of international law, the United Nations tries to eliminate this violence. However, widespread nature and high prevalence shows us the protection is not adequate. This thesis shows that the normative content of the norm has been sufficiently developed within both regional and international instruments, and therefore the inadequacy of international law is due to its weak enforcement mechanisms. This thesis not only provides for several options to strengthen these enforcement mechanisms, but also discusses the option and value of a treaty on violence against women.
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Contents
1. Introduction 4
2. Domestic violence in international law 6
2.1 Definition of domestic violence 6
2.2 Why should international law be invoked to eliminate domestic violence? 6 2.3 Domestic violence in international instruments and bodies 7 2.4 Domestic violence within regional human rights law 10
3. The Due Diligence Standard 15
3.1 Development of the due diligence standard 15
3.2 Content and Scope 16
4. Enforcement and implementation of CEDAW 22
4.1 Reservations 22
4.2 Enforcement of CEDAW 23
5. How to improve protection of women from domestic violence? 28
5.1 Treaty on violence against women 28
5.2 Strengthening enforcement mechanism 30
5.3 Reservations 32
6. Conclusion 34
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Chapter 1
Introduction
One would assume home as a safe place for all family members. Unfortunately, around the world at least one in every three women has been beaten, coerced into sex, or otherwise abused in her lifetime.’1 Violence against women occurs in every society in the world. It cuts across boundaries of wealth, ethnicity and culture. Violence against women occurs in the community, which includes violence at work, educational institutions and elsewhere, but can also be conducted by the state or state-actors like police, prison guards, soldiers and so on. However, in most cases girls and women are abused by someone they know. They become victim of domestic violence. Although the term domestic violence seems gender neutral, it is mainly women who become victim to this type of violence.2 A long history of unequal power relations between men and women could be one explanation for the high prevalence of violence against women, which is both structural and systemic. This deeply rooted practice inhibits women worldwide from fully enjoying their human rights. Despite the widespread nature and prevalence of domestic violence, it is often considered a private matter and many governments have been reluctant to interfere.3 This noninterference involves an acceptance of violence against women and contributes to its continuance.4 Over the years, it has become the norm in human rights law that states are accountable for acts committed by non-state-actors.5 Therefore, governments, courts and
policy-makers have increasingly recognized their responsibility to fight domestic violence. Nowadays, violence against women is considered a violation of women’s human rights under the international human rights system. Multiple United Nations (UN) bodies have adopted resolutions, reports and general recommendations to prevent this type of violence. Multiple regions even have adopted a treaty on the matter. However, the violence is still widespread, and the non-diminishing prevalence seems to imply that the existing framework does not adequately protect women from violence. Therefore, by analyzing international and regional instruments, bodies and law, the goal of this thesis is to find an answer to the following research question:
1 Alice Edwards, Violence Against Women Under International Human Rights Law (Cambridge University Press
2013) p. IX.
2 UNFPA, <https://www.unfpa.org/gender-based-violence> accessed 3 May 2019.
3 Catherine Moore, 'Women And Domestic Violence: The Public/Private Dichotomy In International Law'
(2003) 7 The International Journal of Human Rights, p. 95.
4 Idem.
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Despite the adoption of international instruments addressing violence against women, why are women still suffering from domestic violence and how could these instruments be improved?
In order to answer the research question, this thesis will explore two pathways, namely whether this is caused by 1) unclarity of the normative content of the norm prohibiting domestic violence, or 2) the way this norm is enforced. Therefore, this thesis provides a descriptive, analytical and critical overview of the important provisions of international human rights law related to violence against women. The descriptive approach is employed to give an overview of the existing legal framework to fight domestic violence. The analytical and critical approach is employed to evaluate the CEDAW Convention, the Optional Protocol and CEDAW jurisprudence can effectively protect women from domestic violence. This research will be carried out on the basis of global and regional instruments, such as the CEDAW, its Optional Protocol and the Committee’s general recommendations. Besides the primary sources, also secondary sources such as case law, reports, academic articles and books will be used to investigate the content and enforcement of a legal norm prohibiting
domestic violence.
In addition, chapter two addresses another goal, namely: 1) to define domestic violence more specifically, 2) to show why international law should be invoked to combat this violence and 3) to explain how global and regional instruments address the issue. The third chapter addresses the development, content and scope of the due diligence standard that places an obligation on states to prevent, protect, prosecute and provide remedies for victims. After explaining the normative content of the legal norm in chapter two and three, chapter four addresses the ways in which this norm can be enforced and what difficulties CEDAW faces in this enforcement. The fifth chapter dives into proposals to either further clarify the content of the legal norm or strengthen the enforcement mechanisms. The thesis concludes with a summary in chapter six.
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Chapter 2
Domestic violence in international law
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an introduction to domestic violence and the development of its prohibition in international law. First, I will provide the reader with the definition of domestic violence, which will be used in this thesis. I will continue with explaining why domestic violence should be addressed by international law and not be regarded as a private matter. The last and biggest part of this chapter will discuss the development of the recognition of violence against women, and specifically domestic violence, as a human rights violation within United Nations instruments and bodies as well as in regional human rights systems.
2.1 Definition of domestic violence
The United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (the Committee) defines gender-based violence in its General Recommendation no. 19 as ‘violence that is directed against a women because she is a woman or that affects women disproportionately.’6 Although the notion of domestic violence is gender neutral, since men
can also be victims of domestic violence, it is generally women who are victimized. Therefore, when referring to domestic violence in this thesis, this solely means violence against women. The Declaration on Elimination of Violence Against Women (DEVAW), uses a more extensive definition of violence in article 1; ‘any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life.’7 The inclusion of violence occurring in private life is of
importance for the definition of domestic violence because it states that domestic violence is a type of behavior that is used by one person in a relationship to hurt or dominate the other person. This applies to relationships based on marriage, intimacy or blood relation and includes physical and sexual violence as well as psychological violence such as intimidation, emotional abuse, isolating victims from others, economic abuse and so on.8
2.2 Why should international law be invoked to eliminate domestic violence?
6 CEDAW General Recommendation No. 19, U.N. Doc A/47/38 , 11th session 1999, par. 6.
7 UN General Assembly, Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women (DEVAW) 1993,
A/RES/48/104, art. 1..
8 'Domestic Violence' (LII / Legal Information Institute, 2019)
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A fundamental question to this thesis is whether it is useful to formulate a norm prohibiting domestic violence in international law, and if so, why. Is international law an effective instrument to protect women from violence? Domestic violence is worldwide the most common form of violence against women and poses one of the greatest international health risks for women.9 The widespread prevalence of domestic violence internationally is sufficient for it to be considered as an issue that needs to be regulated by international law.
The 19th century was mainly dominated with notions of liberal philosophy and politics. In practice, this meant that only the public sphere of government, politics, economics and the workplace were regarded as a sphere that could be regulated by the state and the international community. On the other hand, the home and family were conceived as the private sphere in which the state should not interfere.10 Nevertheless, one out of three women experiences
violence against them in their lives, which most often occurs in their homes. If the public-private distinction had continued to be so strongly supported, there would be too little progression on the protection of women’s rights. International law has addressed this distinction and stressed that states should also eliminate violence that occurs in the private sphere, 11, as will be further discussed in the next chapter. Unfortunately, many states have still not taken all the steps they could and should to eliminate violence against women in the private sphere. For example, in 2017 they were still 112 countries that have not criminalized marital rape.12 Domestic violence is a breach of a woman’s fundamental and universal rights, and therefore international law should be used to encourage and compel states to reform their legislation in order to prevent and prosecute domestic violence, while at the same time effectively enforce these laws.13
2.3 Domestic violence in international instruments and bodies
There are numerous international and regional human rights instruments, bodies, reports and statements that address violence against women as a human rights issue, the most important document to end discrimination and violence against women within the UN, is the Convention on Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). However, any reference to express violence against women had been excluded from this convention. The aim of CEDAW is to end inequality, and ‘to ensure that women are treated equally to men
9 Bonita Meyersfeld, Domestic Violence and International Law (Hart Publishing 2010) pp. 252-254. 10 Catherine Moore, supra note 3, p.95.
11 General recommendation No 19, supra note 6, par 9. 12 'Data | The World Bank' (Datatopics.worldbank.org, 2019)
<http://datatopics.worldbank.org/sdgatlas/archive/2017/SDG-05-gender-equality.html> accessed 9 June 2019.
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across a wide range of areas, such as political and public life, education and employment.’14 The convention defines the term discrimination as an act towards women that has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the enjoyment of her human rights and fundamental freedoms.15 To deal with the omission of violence against women in the Convention, the Committee has interpreted several of the Convention’s provisions in multiple general recommendations in such a way as to classify violence against women as discrimination.16 Since the adoption of the Convention in 1979, it has been signed and ratified by almost all UN member states17. However, it has one of the highest rates of reservations. Some states have even made reservations to the Convention’s core provision, that calls upon states to condemn discrimination in all its forms. This undermines the idea that women’s rights are as universal as men’s rights.18
As noted above, CEDAW does not explicitly refer to violence against women as a form of discrimination, aside from the provision regarding prostitution and trafficking.19 The
Committee addressed this omission in several general recommendations. In 1989 it issued No 12, in which it stated that ‘articles 2, 5, 11, 12 and 16 of the Convention require state parties to protect women against violence of any kind occurring within the family, at the work place or in any other area of social life.’20 However, since the provisions it refers to do not contain
any express mentioned whatsoever of violence against women, and the Committee did not provide a reasoning on how these provisions can be interpreted as to include violence, it can be argued that the general recommendation was vague.21
Three years after No 12, the Committee produced general recommendation No 19, in which it was more precise in its reasoning. It clarified that ‘gender-bases violence is a form of discrimination that seriously inhibits women’s ability to enjoy rights and freedoms on a basis of equality with men’22 and that ‘the full implementation of the Convention required States to
take positive measures to eliminate all forms of violence against women.’23 Furthermore, it broadened the definition of violence against women by not merely including physical, sexual
14 Ronagh J.A. McQuigg, 'Is It Time For A UN Treaty On Violence Against Women?' (2017) 22 The
International Journal of Human Rights, p. 2.
15 UN General Assembly, Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (1979)
A/RES/34/180, art. 1.
16 See for example general recommendation No. 19, supra note 6.
17 'OHCHR Dashboard' (Indicators.ohchr.org, 2019) <http://indicators.ohchr.org/> accessed 10 May 2019. 18 Daniel Moeckli, supra note 5, p. 328.
19 CEDAW, supra note 15, art. 6.
20 UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), CEDAW General
Recommendation No. 12, 1989, available at <https://www.refworld.org/docid/453882a73.html>
21 Ronagh J.A. McQuigg, supra note 17, p. 4.
22General Recommendation No. 19, supra note 6, par 1. 23 Idem, par. 4.
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and psychological harm, but also threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty24 committed by any person, organization of enterprise.25 In other words, this general recommendation claims that the states which have ratified CEDAW are under the obligation to take appropriate and effective measures to eliminate violence against women, whether by public or private acts. What these private acts entail is explained in the same General Recommendation. It elaborates on the forms, prevalence and consequences of violence in the family26, or as it is referred to in this thesis, domestic violence. In July 2017, the Committee took a big step forward in its response to violence against women by issuing general recommendation No 35 on gender-based violence, updating general recommendation No 19.27 By prioritizing the elimination of gender-based violence
against women, the Committee acknowledged the advances reached by civil society. However, acts of violence against women remained pervasive in all countries, with high levels of impunity. With the updated general recommendation, the Committee aims to provide further guidance for state parties to accelerate the elimination of violence against women.28 One of the most important updates of No 35 is the newly adopted definition of violence against women. Whereas in No. 19 has been referred to ‘violence against women’, No. 35 recognizes that this violence is gender based and, therefore, finds the expression ‘gender-based violence against women’. A more precise and suitable one since it stresses the gendered cause and impacts of the violence.29 Furthermore, it adapts to modern times by acknowledging that violence also occurs on the World Wide Web and digital sphere. It stresses that gender-based violence against women is not a self-contained incident but rather a social problem, which is ‘rooted in gender-related factors such as the ideology of men’s entitlement and privilege over women, social norm regarding masculinity […] and to discourage or punish what is considered to be unacceptable female behavior.’30 The
elimination of this social problem requires a holistic respond, which goes beyond specific events, individual perpetrators and victims/survivors.31 In addition, it addresses the problematic nature of reservations maintained by state parties to the Convention. Especially towards article 2, since compliance with this article is of a crucial importance in efforts to eliminate violence against women. This type of reservation is incompatible with the object
24 Idem, par 6. 25 Idem, par 9. 26 Idem par 9.
27 CEDAW General Recommendation No. 35, U.N. Doc CEDAW/C/GC/35 , 2017. 28 Idem, par 3.
29 General Recommendation No. 35, supra note 32, par. 9. 30 Idem, par. 19.
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and purpose of the Convention and is therefore assessed to be impermissible.32 Finally, No. 35 carefully describes the general obligation of state parties under CEDAW. State parties must take all appropriate measures to prevent acts of gender-based violence against women, or when failing, investigate, prosecute and punish and provide reparations.33 This due diligence obligation will be further discussed in the next chapter.
Not only the Committee addresses domestic violence. First of all, the UN General Assembly adopted DEVAW in 1994. This - non-binding - declaration refers to violence against women occurring in the family, in the public and violence attributable to the state. Domestic violence as well as non-spousal violence are specifically named in the text and includes physical, as well as sexual and psychological violence.34 It calls upon states to
prevent this violence from happening and when it does occur, to investigate, prosecute and punish the perpetrators, and provide remedies for victims.35 Furthermore, both the Commission on Human Rights and, when the Commission was replaced in 2006 by the Human Rights Council, issued resolutions relating to violence against women.36 The importance of the subject has been stressed even more by establishing the office of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women (SRVAW). The Special Rapporteurs that have held office since 1994 have issued multiple detailed reports on ‘violence against women and its
causes and consequences’.37
2.4 Domestic violence within regional human rights law
Not only UN instruments have included laws about domestic violence and violence against women, also several regional human rights instruments and bodies have included this in their work. This subchapter will examine instruments and bodies in three different regions of the world, namely the America’s, Africa and Europe. These regions are the only ones that have adopted conventions that specifically address the eliminations of violence against women.
2.4.1 Organization of American States
32 Idem, par. 13.
33 Idem, par. 21 – 47.
34 DEVAW, supra note 7, art.2. 35 Idem, art. 4.
36 Resolutions of the Human Rights Council on violence against women; see for example Resolution 7/24 (2008)
‘Elimination of violence against women’; Resolution 11/2 (2009) ‘Accelerating efforts to eliminate all forms of violence against women’; Resolution 14/12 (2010) ‘Accelerating efforts to eliminate all forms of violence against women: ensuring due diligence in prevention’.
37 'Reports Of The Special Rapporteur On Violence Against Women' (Refworld, 2019)
<https://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?page=search&skip=0&query=report+of+the+special+rapporteur+on+violence+against+wo men&coi=> accessed 14 June 2019.
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The Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence against Women of 1994, known as the Convention of Belém do Para, is one of those three conventions.38 Being the first international treaty addressing violence against women, the Convention received a lot of attention. Besides, it was ratified by a high number of member states of the Organization of American states, except two; Canada and the United States of America. The Convention affirms that violence against women constitutes to a violence of their human rights and fundamental freedoms and formulates the right of women to be free from violence in both the public and private sphere. Furthermore, the state duties under the
Convention in securing this right are defined.
2.4.2 African Union
Women’s rights in the African Union system are found in the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights and the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, also known as the Maputo Protocol.39 The provisions of the Maputo Protocol are almost identical to the provisions in CEDAW. However, in comparison to CEDAW, it encompasses a more nuanced approach to culture and tradition, by acknowledging the positive role that culture and tradition can play in women’s live. Despite the similarities, a noteworthy difference between CEDAW and this Protocol is the explicit definition of violence against women. The states coverd by the Protocol have the obligation to ‘adopt such other legislative, administrative, social and economic measure as may be necessary to ensure the prevention, punishment and eradication of all forms of violence against women.’40 Violence against women means all acts perpetrated against women which
causes or could cause them […] harm […] in private or public life in peace time and during
situations of armed conflict or war.’41
In July 2018, the African Court issued its first judgement on women’s rights and for the first time in its history, found a violation of the Maputo Protocol. For the protection of women’s rights in the African Union, this was an important progress. The judgement established the authority of the Protocol as a binding human rights instrument while adopting a liberal interpretation of procedural matters for the benefit of a more effective protection of
38 Organization of American States, Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence against Women (1994) accessible at: <https://www.oas.org/en/mesecvi/convention.asp >
39 African Union, Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in
Africa (2003)
40 Idem, art. 4. 41 Idem, art. 1.
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human rights. This liberal approach could potentially open the door to a much larger number of cases becoming admissible before the court.42
2.4.3 Council of Europe
From 1985, the Council of Europe has taken several actions. For example, the Committee of Ministers issued a recommendation on ‘Violence in the Family’, an ‘Action Plan to Combat Violence against Women’ and series of large-scale campaigns and awareness-raising activities. In 2006, a ‘Task Force to Combat Violence against Women’ was conducted, which examined the need for a legal instrument on violence against women within the Council of Europe.43 The European Convention of Human Rights does not contain a specific article dealing with violence against women. However, by interpreting the ECHR as a living instrument, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has read Article 3 (prohibition against torture, inhuman or degrading treatment), Article 8 (respect for private and family life) and Article 14 (non-discrimination) as to include a prohibition on violence against women. In several cases the Court has found domestic violence to be a violation of these provisions and has defined states’ positive obligations with respect to domestic violence.44 Decisions of the court are binding, and under article 46(1) of the ECHR, state parties have ‘to abide by the final judgement of the court.’45 If a violation of rights is found, the Court transmitted the
responsibility to prescribe what exactly should be done to correct the violation by the national authorities.46 The execution of these final judgements is supervised by the Committee of Ministers. When the meaning of the judgement is unclear, or when the Committee finds state compliance with the judgement insufficient, the Court may be called upon to provide further clarification.47 However, when a state persists in violation, there is not much the Council of Europe can do, besides suspending voting rights or expelling it from the Council altogether, which would be most likely counterproductive for the protection of human rights. In 2011, the Council of Europe adopted the ‘Convention on Violence Against Women
42 'African Court Issues Its First Judgment On Women’S Rights' (IntLawGrrls, 2019)
<https://ilg2.org/2018/09/13/african-court-issues-its-first-judgment-on-womens-rights/> accessed 19 May 2019.
43 Rashida Manjoo and Jackie Jones, The Legal Protection of Women from Violence, Normative Gaps in
International Law (2018), Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, accessed on: <https://bookshelf.vitalsource.com>,
chapter 5
44 Ibidem.
45 Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(1950) art. 46(1).
46 Daniel Moeckli, supra note 5, p. 433. 47 Idem, p. 434.
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and Domestic Violence, also known as the Istanbul Convention.48 This Convention is a result of years of work of the Council of Europe to end violence against women and is regarded as ‘the most comprehensive victim supporting regional treaty that currently exists.’49 The
Istanbul Convention contains legal provisions that guarantee access to justice and support women subjected to violence. It amplifies the states’ obligations in relation to domestic violence and has codified important cases from the ECtHR, such as Opuz v Turkey that spells out the due diligence standard in the European system.50 The Convention also established a monitoring body; the ‘Group of Experts on Action against Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence’ (GREVIO).51 This Committee adopt recommendations on the measures
to be taken by state parties and is permitted to undertake country visits to monitor the implementation of the Convention. However, differently from the CEDAW Committee, GREVIO cannot hear individual claims.52 Up till today, 34 Council of Europe member States have ratified the Istanbul Convention, with a further 12 states having signed but not yet ratified.53 The Convention is open for signature to any state in the world and international bodies, but so far only member states of the Council of Europe and the European Union have
signed or ratified the Convention.54
This chapter has shown that both international and regional human rights bodies address violence against women in multiple conventions, general recommendations and reports. The question is what these effectively implicate for the protection of women against domestic violence. Whereas the three regions have adopted conventions that explicitly mention violence against women, the text of CEDAW does not. Therefore, a strict interpretation of international law in which only the treaty text is taken into consideration, would lead to the conclusion that domestic violence is not prohibited under international law. On the other hand, the general recommendations have defined domestic violence as a form of discrimination against women and thereby, included it in the state obligations covered by the convention. However, these general recommendations are not binding upon states party to CEDAW.55 Yet, they provide importance guidance on how to interpret and apply the
48 'Council Of Europe' (Istanbul Convention: Action against violence against women and domestic violence,
2011) <https://www.coe.int/en/web/istanbul-convention/home?> accessed 23 July 2019.
49 Rahida Manjoo and Jackie Jones, supra note 43, chapter 5. 50 Istanbul Convention, supra note 51, art. 12 – 61.
51 Idem, art. 66
52 Rashida Manjoo and Jackie Jones, supra note 43, chapter 5.
53 Council of Europe <https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/210/signatures>
accessed 9 June 2019.
54 Ibidem.
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convention and have been relied on in the individual complaint procedure.56 The content and value of the Committee’s jurisprudence will be discussed in the next chapter.
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Chapter 3
The Due Diligence Standard
Over the years, in various areas of law standards of due diligence have been developed. The goal was to provide an instrument, a so called ‘measuring stick’, to assess whether a state has met the obligations it has under international law. In the area of law on domestic violence, the development of the due diligence standard has been going on for more than 25 years, with General Assembly’s adopted Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women (DEVAW) as the first UN instrument mentioning the due diligence obligation in relation to domestic violence. A standard against which state actions or omissions can be judged and evaluated has been set out in this landmark declaration: ‘States should pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating violence against women and, to this end, should exercise due diligence to prevent, investigate and, in accordance with national legislation, punish acts of violence against women, whether those acts are perpetrated by the State or by private persons.’57 This chapter will describe the development of this ‘due
diligence standard’ for states to prevent and respond to domestic violence against women.
3.1 Development of the due diligence standard
Before DEVAW adopted the concept due diligence regarding state responsibility for non-state acts, it was introduced by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) in the Velasquez Rodriquez v Honduras case of 1988.58 This case concerned the disappearance of Angel Manfred Velasquez Rodriquez, a Honduras citizen who was abducted in 1981 and never seen again. Even though the court found government agents responsible for the abduction of Mr. Velasquez Rodriquez59, it clarified that also an act, which violates human rights but is initially not directly attributable to a state, can lead to international state responsibility. This responsibility does not flow from a wrongful conduct of the state itself, but from a lack of due diligence to prevent the violation or to respond to it as is required by the Convention, also when it considers an act of a private person.60 This state responsibility flows from the obligation of article 1 of the Inter-American Convention of Human Rights, which obliges states to ensure the full and free exercise of the rights recognized in the
57 DEVAW, supra note 7, art. 4.
58 Velasquez Rodriquez v Honduras (1988) Inter-American Court of Human Rights. 59 Ibid, par. 148.
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convention to every person in its jurisdiction.61 The court elaborates what this means: ‘The State has a legal duty to take reasonable steps to prevent human rights violations and to use the means at its disposal to carry out a serious investigation of violations committed within its jurisdiction, to identify those responsible, to impose the appropriate punishment and to ensure the victim adequate compensation.’62 To fulfill this legal duty, the mere existence of a legal
system to make this possible in itself is insufficient. Governments are also required to act in a way to effectively ensure and realize the free and full exercise of human rights as set out in the Convention.63 This case laid down the legal foundation for the due diligence standard and has been adopted by both the international human rights system as well as other regional
human right systems.
General recommendation No. 19 reiterated that under general international law and specific human rights covenants, states have a due diligence obligation. In addition, they may be responsible for private acts if they fail to prevent violations of rights, to investigate and punish acts of violence, and for providing compensation.64 Furthermore, the general comment elaborates on how social patterns and traditional attitudes may perpetuate practices of violence or coercion from a philosophy that gender based violence can be justified as a form of protection or control. A consequence of this violence is maintaining women in subordinate roles and hindering women’s equality. Therefore, the Committee calls on states to introduce education and public information programs to help eliminate these traditional attitudes.65 The former Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women (SRVAW), Yakin Ertürk, has also included this in her reports for the General Assembly, by stating that the due diligence obligation to prevent violence against women entails an obligation to engage in the root causes of violence against women.66 This argument will be further discussed in the next section of this chapter. In the years to follow, several SRVAW’s have published thematic reports in which they discuss the content and scope of the due diligence standard.
3.2 Content and Scope
61 Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights (1969), art. 1. 62 Rodriquez supra note 61, par. 174.
63 Ibid, par. 167.
64General Recommendation No. 19, supra note 6, par. 9. 65 Idem, par 11.
66 Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, its causes and consequences, Yakin Ertürk for
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In order to analyze the real effect of the due diligence standard on the elimination of domestic violence, the content and the scope of this standard need to be specified.
The first SRVAW, Radhika Cooramaswamy, developed a list of considerations to asses states’ compliance with their due diligence obligation. This list was part of her 1999 report on domestic violence and mainly focused on violence that had already occurred.67
However, in 2006, Coomaraswany’s successor Yakin Ertürk, put more emphasis on the prevention of violence against women in her report on using the due diligence standard as a tool for the elimination of violence against women.68 In this report, Ertürk sets up a framework of due diligence obligations under four principles, namely, prevention, protection, punishment and reparations.69 These four principles have been further elaborated in both
regional human right court cases and cases before the Committee.
3.2.1Prevention
To comply with this first obligation under the due diligence standard, CEDAW calls on states to end gender inequality and the idea of the inferiority or superiority of either of the sexes by modifying the social and cultural patterns.70 Ertürk labels this as the root causes of violence against women and finds that the UN mandate for the elimination of violence against women entails tackling these root causes at all levels, from the home to the transnational level.71 This is not an easy task, since patriarchy is deeply imbedded in many societies around the world. To overcome the difficulty of this task, there is a role for all different powers of the state. Judiciary and prosecutors for example, can take a strong stance with consistent statements condemning domestic violence. As judges and prosecutors can been seen as the opinion leaders of society, their condemnation could society make less patriarchal.72 Ertürk also stresses the need to make a distinction between two categories; individual due diligence and systematic due diligence. Individual due diligence must reflect the needs of an individual concerned by providing services as telephone hotlines, legal assistance, restraining orders, etc. Systematic due diligence on the other hand, refers more to the need to tackle the root causes of violence against women. A holistic and sustainable model to prevent
67 Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, its Causes and Consequences, Integration of the Human
Rights of Women and the Gender Perspective: Violence Against Women: Violence against women in the family by Radhika Coomaraswamy (1999) par. 25.
68 Yakin Ertürk, supra note 69. 69 Idem, par. 70.
70 CEDAW, supra note 18, art. 5.
71 Carin Benninger-Budel, Due Diligence and Its Application to Protect Women from Violence (2009) p. 27 -46. 72 Ibidem.
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violence must be put in place, in which the state is actively involved in overall societal transformation to put an end to discrimination and gender inequality. This can be achieved by, among other things, adopting or modifying legislation; developing strategies, action plans and awareness-raising campaigns and adequately resourcing transformative change initiatives. The systematic due diligence obligation has been confirmed by the Committee in the Vertido
v. Philippines, in which it reconfirmed the General Recommendation of 201073; states have an
obligation under CEDAW to ‘take appropriate measures … to modify or abolish not only existing law and regulations, but also customs and practices that constitute discrimination against women.’74 In Vertido v. Philippines, the Committee condemns the customs and practices in the Philippines that form the root causes of discrimination against women, which establishes itself in power imbalances and structural inequality.75
3.2.2Protection
In 2005, the CEDAW Committee heard a case, A.T. v. Hungary, in which the applicant described years of abuse from her former husband and argued that the Hungarian authorities had failed to provide effective protection for her and her two children. Even though the Committee recognized Hungary’s adoption of an action program against domestic violence, it found it clear that this program did not benefit the applicant. Therefore, the Committee found that indeed the Hungarian state had failed its obligations to protect the applicant from domestic violence, by lacking specific legislation to combat domestic violence and not providing a shelter that was equipped to take in the petitioner and her disabled child.76 Furthermore, it noted the low priority cases of domestic violence were given in Hungarian court proceedings emphasizing that: ‘Women’s human rights to life and physical and mental integrity cannot supersede by other rights, including the right to property and the to privacy’.77
Whereas in A.T. v. Hungary the Committee concluded a lack of specific legislation to combat domestic violence, it did find an extensive legal framework in place in Austria in the Yildirim v. Austria case it heard in 2007.78 However, the Committee held, ‘notwithstanding
73 CEDAW General Recommendation No. 28, U.N. doc CEDAW/C/GC/28 2010, par. 15.
74 Vertido v. Philippines (2010) Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, par. 8.). 75 Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, its causes and consequences, Rashida Manjoo
for the United Nations General Assembly (17th session 2011) par. 16. 76 A.T. v. Hungary (2005) supra note 59, par. 9.4.
77 Idem, par 9.3.
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the comprehensive set of legislative and policy measures adopted to address violence in the family, the Convention required that State officials in practice observe the State Party’s obligation of due diligence.’79 Refuting the states argument that is difficult to determine the
degree of dangerousness of an offender, the Committee stated that in this case the lack of coordination between law enforcement and judicial personal, combined with insufficient education in these bodies about domestic violence, are what ultimately lead to the death of Ms. Yildirim. If communication between law enforcement and judicial personal had been better coordinated, it would have been established that Mr. Yildirim posed a real threat on Ms. Yildirim’s life, and the state could have acted in order to protect her life. On Austria’s refusal to put Mr. Yildirim in detention because of the massive interference with a person’s fundamental freedoms, the Committee repeated its reasoning of A.T. v. Hungary; ‘the perpetrator’s right cannot supersede women’s human rights to life.’80
From these two cases heard by the Committee, we can conclude that the due diligence obligation to protect women from domestic violence does not only entail the mere existence of legislation combatting domestic violence, but as well the proper functioning of legislation to effectively protect women.
3.2.3 Punishment
In her 2011 report, the SRVAW Rashida Manjoo emphasized the importance of punishment and prosecution of perpetrator of violence against women; ‘Low levels of prosecution of crimes against women reinforce the believe among victims that there is no systematic and guaranteed judicial response to violence against women and that there might be no punishment for their abusers. This results in underreporting, further minimization and invisibility of these crimes, and the reinforcement of the continuum of violence affecting women.’81 The judicial response to gender-based violence needs to be free of discrimination.
For example, in the earlier mentioned Vertido v Philippines case, the Committee held that stereotyping affects women’s right to a fair trial and the inflexible standards, of what women should be or what they should do, that are present in the Philippines’ courts contributed to the Philippines failing to fulfill its due diligence obligations.82 The SRVAW Rashida Manjoo
points out that she has heard of court decisions about domestic violence being influenced by
79 Ibidem.
80 Idem, par. 12.1.5.
81 Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against women on Advancement for women by Rashida
Manjoo for the United National General Assembly (2011), par. 63.
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patriarchal standards. In these cases, some judges take the men’s role as ‘breadwinner’ in consideration and the financial support needs of the family. However, the concerns of the men as ‘breadwinner’ and the financial need of a family are not taken in consideration if the case would involve other crimes such as drugs offences or robbery.83 This suggests that criminal justice systems deem these types of offences more serious that violence against women crimes. Therefore, Manjoo calls for a comprehensive judicial training on violence against women.84
In another case against Austria, Goecke v Austria, the Committee made the connection between prosecution and prevention and protection. When criminal and civil remedies are effectively used in cases where the perpetrator poses a serious and dangerous threat to a victim of domestic violence, a victim’s life can be saved. Furthermore, the actively and speedy prosecution of perpetrators of domestic violence will transmit to offenders and the public that society condemns domestic violence and does not tolerate it.85
3.2.3 Reparations
Just as the due diligence standard requires the other three principles to not only formally exist, but also to be available and effective, also remedies need to be available and effective. The basic principal reparations in international human rights law is to return the victim, if possible, to the situation before a breach of their right occurred.86 However, SRVAW Manjoo finds this not sufficient when it comes to violence against women, since she argues that remedies should also contribute to transforming gender norms. In order to do so, ‘remedies should, to the extent possible, subvert instead of reinforce pre-existing patterns of gender hierarchies and structural inequalities that can be seen as the root causes of domestic violence.’87 In Goecke v. Austria for example, after finding a violation of the Convention, the
Committee went further than providing a remedy directed at the loss that Ms. Goecke’s life represented. They recognized there had been a violation or recommending compensation or an apology. Instead, the Committee went on to recommend a wide range of measures that intended to address the systemic problems that in this case lead to the death of Ms. Goecke.88 These measures included; to strengthen implementation of existing legislation, prosecute
83 Rashida Manjoo, 'State Responsibility to Act with Due Diligence in The Elimination of Violence Against
Women' (2013) 2 International Human Rights Law Review, pp. 257-258.
84 Ibidem.
85 Goecke v Austria (2007) Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, par. 12.3. 86 Malcolm N Shaw, International Law (7th edn, Cambridge University Press 2014) p. 583.
87 Rashida Manjoo, supra note 83, p. 264.
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perpetrators of domestic violence effectively to convey a message towards society and strengthen training programs and education on domestic violence for those involved in the
legal system.89
However, these remedies ordered by the Committee are broad and despite their potential as advocacy tools, their implementation might be difficult to monitor. Therefore, I agree with the statement that mechanisms must be created to assess both the quality and effectiveness of these remedies. If not, states will be able to find an easy way out of their due diligence obligations without meaningfully addressing root causes of domestic violence.90 Both this chapter and the previous one, show us that domestic violence has extensively been addressed in conventions, general recommendations by the CEDAW Committee, and reports of the Special Rapporteur. Furthermore, in cases the Committee has heard, it has elaborated on the content and scope of the due diligence obligation, thereby extensively formulating the obligations states have to prevent and respond to domestic violence. Therefore, it seems that the norm that prohibits domestic violence and the legal norm to prevent and respond to it, are sufficiently clear. Nevertheless, the prevalence of violence against women and the level of impunity are still high. The next chapter will discuss whether this is a consequence of the functioning of the CEDAW enforcement mechanisms.
89 A. Byrnes and E. Bath, 'Violence Against Women, The Obligation of Due Diligence, And the Optional
Protocol to The Convention on The Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women--Recent Developments' (2008) 8 Human Rights Law Review, pp. 521 – 525.
90 J. Goldscheid and D. Liebowizm, ‘Due diligence and gender violence: parsing its power and its perils’ (2015)
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Chapter 4
Enforcement and implementation of CEDAW
All human rights treaties face issues regarding their implementation and enforcement, and CEDAW is no exception to this.91 This chapter will discuss which specific difficulties CEDAW faces, what the causes of these difficulties are and what steps can be taken to tackle them.
4.1 Reservations
In accordance with article 19 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 28 (2) of CEDAW allows states to enter into reservations upon ratifying the convention, unless these are incompatible with the object and purpose of the present Convention.92 However, there is no specification of the legal consequences of an incompatible reservation. This has left CEDAW to be one of the main UN treaties, to which the highest number of reservations have been made.93 Of these, there are many reservations to articles 2, 9, 15 and 16, which are
regarded to be incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention. This has been addressed by the Committee in multiple general recommendations94, which for example underlines that article 2 forms the very essence of convention, and therefore reservations to this article are in principle incompatible with the object and purpose of the convention.95 However, it has not always been this outspoken on the incompatibility of reservations and it could be questioned if it should be. It has been argued that it cannot be justified that a monitoring body, such as the CEDAW Committee, which does not have binding powers in the first place, would have such competence as to regard the compatibility of reservations.96
Over the years the Committee has started to increasingly express its concern on certain reservations by not only issuing general recommendations but also within the evaluation of States’ periodic reports, thereby encouraging states to withdrawal its declarations and
91 H. B. Schopp-Schilling, 'Treaty Body Reform: The Case Of The Committee On The Elimination Of
Discrimination Against Women' (2007) 7 Human Rights Law Review, pp. 202-205.
92 CEDAW , supra note 15, art. 28.
93 Marijke de Pauw, 'Women’S Rights: From Bad To Worse? Assessing The Evolution Of Incompatible
Reservations To The CEDAW Convention' (2013) 29 Utrecht Journal of International and European Law, p.55.
94 CEDAW general recommendation No 21, U.N. Doc A/49/38, 13th session 1994. 95 General recommendation No 28, supra note 76.
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reservations to the core articles of the convention.97 Despite the Committee efforts, few reservations to article 2 have been withdrawn and even less reservations to article 16 have been withdrawn.98 There has even been an increase in entering into reservations to the core provisions of the Convention for newly ratifying states.99 Nevertheless, it can be argued that the Committee’s fight against reservation did contribute to the increase of objections made by other State parties and on the reservations of those States who ratified the Convention during the first two decades after it entered into force. Of those states, many have withdrawn or modified their reservations, even though rarely those to the core provisions.100 The high number of reservations remains problematic for the effectiveness of the Convention and therefore alternative methods to deal with reservations under CEDAW will discussed in the next chapter.
4.2 Enforcement of CEDAW
Until the adoption of the Optional Protocol in 1999, the Convention has often been criticized for not being on equal foot with other human rights treaties and has even been called a second-class instrument.101 The Convention is not unique in its enforcement issues it faces, however, it used to have significantly less enforcement options in comparison to for example the ICCPR and the CAT.102 With the adoption of the Optional Protocol, two new enforcement mechanisms were provided for thereby strengthening CEDAW by placing the Convention on equal footing with other human rights instruments.103
Before the adoption of the Optional Protocol, the Convention provided for two procedures to monitor states compliance; the interstate procedure and the reporting procedure.104 CEDAW requires states to submit an initial report within one year after the entry into force of the Convention for the state concerned. Thereafter, every periodic report showed that the legislative, judicial, administrative or other measures which they have adopted to give effect to CEDAW’s provisions and on the progress, made in this respect.105
This process is seen by Committee Members as a constructive dialogue, in which they pose
97 Idem, p 60. 98 Idem, p.62. 99 Pauw, p. 61. 100 Ibidem.
101 Theodor Meron, 'Enhancing The Effectiveness Of The Prohibition Of Discrimination Against Women' (1990)
84 The American Journal of International Law, p. 213.
102 Catherine O'Rourke, ‘Bridging the Enforcement Gap - Evaluating the Inquiry Procedure of the Cedaw
Optional Protocol’ (2018) 27:1 Am UJ Gender Soc Pol'y & L 1. , p. 9.
103 Ibidem.
104 CEDAW, supra note 15, art. 18 & 29. 105 Idem, art. 18.
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questions to governments on their accomplishments and discuss areas that might need further efforts.106 Under general recommendation No. 19, these reports must also contain information on the prevalence of domestic violence and the measures taken to protect women from such violence.107 After that, the Committee presents its concluding comments, in which its present recommendations for the State concerned to improve their performance.108 These recommendations are published and can thereby put political pressure on states to improve CEDAW’s implementation by shaming them, however, if a state refuses to reply, the Committee faces struggles to enforcement the recommendation since it cannot impose sanction.109 Other issues the reporting procedure faces is the high number in overdue reports110, superficial reports and the high backlog the Committee faces.111
The interstate procedure allows states to complain about the failure to comply with the obligation of CEDAW by another state. A case can be referred to arbitration or the International Court of Justice on request of a state party.112 However, this enforcement
mechanism can be opted-out with paragraph 2 of article 29 by a reservations when ratifying the convention.113 This procedure is politically very sensitive and has therefore up to date never been used.114 A complaint procedure more relied on, is the individual complaint procedure. This procedure has been introduced with the adoption of the Optional Protocol in 1999. Claims of violations of her rights set forth in the convention may be submitted by an individual or on her behalf,115 after all available domestic legal remedies have been exhausted.116 If the communication is admissible, the Committee will decide on the merits. According to article 7.3 of the Optional Protocol, ‘the Committee shall transmit its views on the communication, together with its recommendations to the parties concerned.’117 The state
concerned must give ‘due considerations to the views of the Committee, together with its
106 Sally Engle Merry, 'Gender Justice And CEDAW: The Convention On The Elimination Of All Forms Of
Discrimination Against Women' (2011) 9 Hawwa, p. 51.
107 Idem, p. 52. 108 Ibidem.
109 Ronagh J.A. McQuigg, 'The Responses Of States To The Comments Of The CEDAW Committee On
Domestic Violence' (2007) 11 The International Journal of Human Rights, p. 474.
110 Secretariat of the UN, 'Compliance Of State Parties With Their Reporting Obligations To International
Human Rights Treaty Bodies' (2017)
<https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/TB/AnnualMeeting/29Meeting/ComplianceStatesParties.docx.> accessed 21 July 2019.
111 Sally Engle Merry, supra note 106, p. 52. 112 CEDAW, supra note 18, art. 29
113 Ibidem.
114 Daniel Moeckli, supra note 5, p. 381.
115 UN General Assembly, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against
Women (1999) , A/RES/54/4, art 2.
116 Idem, art. 4. 117 Idem, art. 7(3).
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recommendations.’118 States are required to submit a written report within six months
responding to these views and recommendations in which it elaborates on any action taken following the Committee’s decision.119 If deemed necessary the Committee may request the
state party to submit further information on the taken measure in its next period report.120 However, the views are non-binding and, similar to the reporting procedure, there are no enforcement mechanisms available for the Committee to pose sanctions or penalties on the violating state. Therefore, to increase the impact of its decisions, the Committee has started a follow-up procedure, in which specifically appointed members follow-up the decisions with the government in a particular case.121 Nevertheless, states consistently fail to implement the Committee’s view and recommendations. A revolutionary ruling of the Spanish Supreme Court in 2018 in the Angela Gonzales case might change this practice. In the Supreme Court reached the decision that the Spanish government is bound by the recommendations of the Committee and ordered Spain to pay Angela the compensation sum ordered by the Committee.122 It must be noted that this decision only regards economic compensation and no reference was made to legal enforceability of law and policy recommendations.123 Nonetheless, this increases the legal weight of the individual communications procedure, which could lead to a greater use of the mechanism.124 Furthermore, the impact of adopted views by the Committee may have a positive impact on national and regional levels. International bodies contribute to defining human rights standards at the global level, which will influence judicial decisions at the national and regional level.125
However, not everyone has the opportunity to bring a case in front of the Committee since article 3 of the Optional Protocol expressly provides that ‘no communications shall be received by the Committee if it concern a State Party to the Convention that is not a party to this Protocol.’126 Currently 112 countries have ratified the Optional Protocol,127 which means
118 Idem, art. 7(4). 119 Ibidem. 120 Idem, art. 7(5). 121
'Mechanisms For Advancing Women’S Human Rights: A Guide To Using The Optional Protocol To CEDAW And Other International Complaint Mechanisms | Australian Human Rights Commission' (Humanrights.gov.au, 2019)
<https://www.humanrights.gov.au/our-work/sex-discrimination/publications/mechanisms-advancing-womens-human-rights-guide-using> accessed 21 July 2019.
122 'Supreme Court Of Spain: UN Treaty Body Individual Decisions Are Legally Binding - Universal Rights
Group' (Universal Rights Group, 2019) <https://www.universal-rights.org/blog/supreme-court-of-spain-un-treaty-body-individual-decisions-are-legally-binding/> accessed 21 July 2019.
123 Ibidem. 124 Ibidem.
125 Malcolm Langford, César A Rodríguez Garavito and Julieta Rossi, Social Rights Judgments And The Politics
Of Compliance (Cambridge University Press 2018) p. 424.
26
many women are still excluded from having their claim heard by the Committee. The final enforcement mechanism also introduced with the Optional Protocol, which established an inquiry procedure that allows the Committee to initiate a confidential investigation when it receives information of grave or systematic violations by a state party.128 The ‘opt-out clause’ of article 10 allows states to declare upon ratification of the Optional Protocol that they do not accept the procedure,129 which undermines the effectiveness of the provision. However, only very few states that have ratified the Optional Protocol have opted-out of the inquiry procedure. The fact that only five inquiries have been concluded till today makes the efficacy of the procedure questionable. However, three out of the five concluded inquiries address violence against women and thereby contribute to further clarifying state obligations to end this violence.130 There are also other aspects of the procedure that
contribute to its promising concept. First of all, there is no requirement of the exhaustion of domestic remedies, which could lead to a more timely response compared to the communications procedure.131 Unfortunately, the procedure has proven to be lengthy and it can take almost up till 10 years for the Committee to present a report. Secondly, when it does conclude an inquiry it brings international attention to the issue, pressuring states to implement its recommendations. There has been an increase in inquiries lately, but nevertheless, the procedure has been used rarely.132 Considering the heavy workload of the Committee is it questionable whether it would be realistic to expect a raise in concluded inquiries on the short term.133
In this chapter, we have seen that the adoption of the Optional Protocol has provided for 2 more enforcement mechanisms, and thereby placing CEDAW on equal foot with other human right treaties. Still, the Convention faces enforcement difficulties. It does not contribute to pose sanctions or penalties on state that refuse to comply with recommendations of the concluding observations of the reporting procedure and the individual communications procedure. Furthermore, the interstate procedure has never been used, and has the full potential of the inquiry procedure not been unlocked yet. Finally, the high amount of 127 'UNTC' (Treaties.un.org, 2019)
<https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-8-b&chapter=4&lang=en> accessed 21 July 2019.
128 Optional Protocol, supra note 115, art. 8. 129 Idem, art. 10.
130 'Treaty Bodies Search' (UN Treaty Body Database, 2019)
<https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/TBSearch.aspx?Lang=en&TreatyID=3&DocTypeC ategoryID=7> accessed 23 July 2019.
131 Catherine O'Rourke, supra note 102, p. 25. 132Ibidem.
27
reservations, which are incompatible with the object, and purpose of the Convention are problematic for the effectiveness of the Convention.
28
Chapter 5
How to improve protection of women from domestic violence?
The previous chapters have shown the content and the development of the norm prohibiting domestic violence and the state obligation to prevent, protect, prosecute and provide remedies. Also, the different CEDAW enforcement mechanisms have been discussed. This chapter will dive into several suggestions that have been made to 1) further clarify the legal norm and 2) to strengthen the enforcement mechanisms.
5.1 Treaty on violence against women
Supported by others134, former SRVAW Manjoo has expressed her concern of the soft law nature of the legal norm on violence against women and has repeatedly called for a new treaty on this topic.135 Her successor on the other hand, has stated that the Convention, combined with the Committee’s general recommendations and jurisprudence, provides for a clear and legally binding framework.136 However, she has also expressed her concerns on the fragmentation of the work of the UN and regional mechanisms and calls for stronger cooperation. She has highlighted that there exists a lack of full acceptance and incorporation of international standards on violence against women on the domestic level and that in addition specific measure are needed to address this normative gap.137 In order to formulate what these specific measures should look like, she questioned stakeholders, including global and regional human rights mechanism and civil society, whether they would support the adoption of a separate treaty on violence against women with its own monitoring body.138
While most of the existing global and regional mechanism did not see the need for a new international treaty, the majority of civil society submissions did support a new international instrument, either in the form of a complete new treaty or as an optional protocol under CEDAW.139 An optional protocol under CEDAW does have some advantages. For
example, it could incorporate and consolidate the provisions of CEDAW and the jurisprudence of the Committee. Also, an additional protocol could be less costly than the
134 Ronagh J.A. McQuigg, supra note 14, p. 8. 135 Rashida Manjoo, supra note 48, chapter 7.
136 Dubravka Simonvic, supra note 130, par. 12. Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women,
its causes and consequences for the Commission on Human Rights by Dubravka Simonvic (72nd session 2017)
UN doc. A/72/134, par. 12.
137 Ibidem. 138 Idem, par 14. 139 Idem, par. 24
