S2371146
Post-democratisation mass violence: Evaluating theories of mass violence using the Rohingya Crisis as a case study.
Research question: What caused the government of Myanmar to use mass violence indiscriminately against the Rohingya people in 2016 and 2017?
Total word count: 15,349
Word count of thesis not including bibliography: 13,813
Edward Ives S2371146 International Relations Leiden University e.r.d.ives@umail.leidenuniv.nl
S2371146
Table of Contents
1. Introduction ...3
2. Existing theories for mass violence...5
2.1. Counter-insurgency mass violence theory ...5
2.2. Genocidal Consolidation theory ...6
2.3. Ethnic Hatred theory ...9
2.4. Leader ideology theory ... 11
3. Research design and methodology ... 12
4. Case analysis ... 15
4.1. Counter-insurgency strategy theory ... 15
4.2. Genocidal Consolidation theory ... 22
4.3. Ethnic Hatred theory ... 29
4.4. Leader ideology theory ... 34
4.5. Theory evaluation ... 37
5. Conclusion ... 39
1. Introduction
“Some people were beheaded, and many were cut. We were in the house hiding when they were beheading people. When we saw that, we just ran out the back of the house. Rakhine people were doing it. The military shot people, and the Rakhine were cutting heads. Some of the people were shot by the military first and, when they were lying down, the Rakhine came and cut their necks. Some were not yet shot, and the Rakhine came and cut their life away.” Sultan Ahmed, 27, a Rohingya eyewitness of the Chut Pyin massacre on August 27th, 2017 (Fortify Rights, 2018, p. 55).
This research provides a critical analysis and comparison of explanatory theories for the causes of mass violence. This investigation aims to further understanding of the mass
violence in a new democracy, where the former regime is still a significant stakeholder. This case has been selected because Myanmar is an understudied and complex country, and there are many different explanations for why mass violence was being committed. The theories for mass violence will be applied and evaluated using the case study of the violence against the Rohingya people in Myanmar in 2016 and 2017, analysing the observable implications of each theory.
Before 2016 there was a growing acceptance of Myanmar1 in western media because it had seemingly transitioned from a dictatorship to a partial democratic system under the
stewardship of the National League for Democracy (NLD) government, led by Nobel Prize winner Aung San Su Kyi. This democratic transition has been following the 2003 Road Map of establishing a “disciplined flourishing democracy” guided by the Tatmadaw (van Klinken and Aung, 2017, p. 354).2 The Tatmadaw is the military force of Myanmar, and has
controlled the country with military dictatorships since 1962. A new constitution was
1The name Myanmar will be used throughout this research and holds no political
connotations. While the country is officially named the Republic of the Union of Myanmar in 2008, some journalists and academics still refer to the country as Burma. Aung San Su Kyi in an interview in 2016 was questioned about the official name for the country, she stated her preference for the colonial term Burma but that Myanmar is also acceptable (Selth, 2018, p. 5).
2 Tatmadaw (Royal Force) is the term used to describe Myanmar's tri-service (Army, Navy, and Air Force). The term Tatmadaw is often used to describe just the Army as it is the largest of the military branches (Selth, 2018, p.5). The Tatmadaw is the most influential branch of government, and its budget in 2017 exceeded the budgets for health, welfare and education
introduced in 2008 and elections were held in 2010 and 2015, with a by-election in 2012. Growing international optimism was demonstrated in November 2012, when US President Barrack Obama became the first sitting US President to visit Myanmar.
However, after the 2015 election of the NLD, in 2016 and 2017 the violence committed against the Rohingya was so severe the UN High Commissioner has called the situation in Rakhine state “a textbook example of ethnic cleansing” (Freedom House, 2018). Others have argued that the crimes committed are consistent with genocide (Selth, 2018, p. 11). Today, journalists are struggling to understand how Aung San Su Kyi - the once venerated human rights and democracy advocate - could defend the same military that once imprisoned her from accusations of genocide (Bowcott, 2019).
The Rohingya have endured considerable persecution from the government of Myanmar. The Rohingya are the largest Muslim population in Rakhine state. The origins of where the Rohingya come from are unclear and contested. Rohingya leaders claim the people have lived within Rakhine State for centuries and there is archaeological evidence to support this. The government, however, claims they are recent illegal migrants from Bangladesh
(International Crisis Group, 2013, p. 3).
Despite overwhelming evidence, the government of Myanmar has denied that the atrocities have taken place, or have attempted to blame the violence on the Rohingya people by claiming that they are burning their own homes and vehicles (South China Morning Post, 2017). The government has also made claims that it is fighting a counter-insurgency campaign against a foreign backed, Islamic terrorist group (Bowcott, 2019). However, on closer inspection, there is little rebel presence in the region compared to other areas in Myanmar.
Why would a government that is opening up to international investment and political liberalization take part in mass violence against its people? Why are the Rohingya people being targeted? Why did it escalate in 2016 and 2017? To answer these salient questions, and to obtain further understanding of mass violence, this investigation will attempt to answer the following research question:
What caused the government of Myanmar to commit mass violence indiscriminately against the Rohingya people in 2016 and 2017?
Ultimately, this research contributes to the literature surrounding mass violence by answering the much broader question of "why do governments commit mass violence after democratic transition?" It also seeks to understand how authoritarian leaders can defend their positions within a democratic transition. It should be noted that despite the appearance of
democratisation, much of the government apparatus is still controlled by officers from the previous military regime.
2. Existing theories for mass violence
This research will be using the definition of Mass Indiscriminate Violence from Eelco van der Maat’s research (Van der Maat, forthcoming). Mass indiscriminate violence is defined by four specific characteristics: A) intentionally targeting large numbers of non-combatants (Valentino, 2004); B) the victims are part of an out-group, separated from the ruling group by class, religion or ethnicity; C) violence is committed against the victims regardless of their behaviour; D) it is not for the purpose of political control (Kalyvas, 2011; Van der Maat, forthcoming).
By analysing news reports and reviewing academic research, the four main theories that are relevant to explain why the government of Myanmar used mass violence against the
Rohingya people in 2016 and 2017 are: 1) Counter-insurgency mass violence; 2) Genocidal Consolidation; 3) Ethnic Hatred; 4) Leader Ideology.
The first two theories argue that mass violence was used as a strategic decision, describing the use of violence as either part of a deliberate counter-insurgency strategy, or as a way of dealing with high levels of elite rivalry within the ruling group. The last two theories attribute the violence to non-strategic ideological explanations, claiming that the violence is the result of ethnic hatred or the ideological goal of the leader.
2.1. Counter-insurgency mass violence theory
The Counter-insurgency mass violence theory argues that mass violence is a strategic
used by states as a mechanism to break the support networks between civilian groups and the guerrilla opposition. To prevent defeat, and to avoid making political concessions, mass killing is used against their opposition’s civilian support base as a strategy to defeat guerrilla groups (Valentino, Huth and Bach-Lindsay, 2004, p. 403). It is used to destroy insurgent infrastructure and supplies, clear territory, or simply ‘drain the sea’ around the insurgents (Valentino, Huth & Balch-Lindsay, 2004).
Whilst committing mass violence has the potential to produce a backlash (Kalyvas, 2011), it is used for short term gains because it scares the population into compliance and
demonstrates the government’s ability to punish rebellion (Valentino, Huth & Balch-Lindsay, 2004). This strategy is often adopted by authoritarian governments when they do not have the necessary information to target insurgents selectively (Kalyvas, 2011). Kalyvas argues that indiscriminate violence is counterproductive because it communicates to the local population that cooperation with the state will not spare them from violence (Kalyvas, 2011).
This theory is relevant in this case because the government of Myanmar has stated it is fighting a guerrilla threat in Rakhine State. Myanmar's long-running conflicts in the ethnic border states have been a persistent problem for peace, stability and growth. Conflict affects more than one third of the country's townships (Burke, 2017, p. 9). Unlike wars in other Asian countries, Myanmar's internal conflicts are not limited to just one geographic area but occur in many of the border regions (Burke, 2017, p. 9). Many of the internal conflicts are amongst the world's longest enduring civil wars, with some areas having been controlled by rebel groups since Burmese independence in 1948.
2.2. Genocidal Consolidation theory
An alternative strategic theory, the Genocidal Consolidation theory, argues that mass violence against out-groupcivilians is part of a strategy to deal with high levels of elite rivalry in the regime (Van der Maat, 2014, forthcoming). This theory builds upon past research on the connection between authoritarian politics and political violence (Goemans, 2008; Roessler, 2011; Van der Maat, 2014). Van der Maat explains that mass violence
against out-group civilians is a tool used by elites to resolve high levels of elite rivalry within the regime, to consolidate power and side line elite opposition. This strategy forces rival
elites to either take part in the violence, or risk putting themselves in danger, in other words, "keep their heads on by keeping them down" (Van der Maat, 2014, p. 15).
Authoritarian regimes are ruled by elites who support the dictator in exchange for rents from their senior position in the regime (Svolik, 2009). It has been established that power in authoritarian governments primarily stems from control over the military and security
services (Herbst, 2014). To combat risks to their personal safety, authoritarian dictators build a coalition of political elites with support bases made up of formal and informal networks capable of defending the regime with violence (Dittmer, 1978; Svolik, 2009).
Authoritarian leaders do not benefit from the same protection mechanisms that democratic leaders receive. Internal threats are more dangerous to a dictator than external threats because they are harder to anticipate; the support base of the dictator is also the dictator’s greatest threat. The elites in an authoritarian regime are stuck within a zero-sum game: if they lose their position, it can end in prison or result in their death (Svolik, 2009; Goemans, 2008; Roessler, 2011; Van der Maat, 2014). Rivalry between these elites, therefore, is a significant element of authoritarian politics.
Despite the international optimism in the NLD government in 2015 and the belief that the military dictatorship that had controlled for over half a century was going to be disbanded, the Tatmadaw have managed to defend their positions within the government. Whilst elite rivalry is often researched singularly, there are two elements to the elite rivalry in Myanmar. First is the rivalry within the Military between key generals and between units. The second element of the elite rivalry is between the senior members of the military and the
democratically elected, civilian government - the National League for Democracy. While there is possibly a correlation between the two rivalries in Myanmar, it is possible for there to be low levels of rivalry within the military at the same time as high levels between the NLD civilian government and the military.
There is also debate over the specific relationship between the democratisation process and the occurrence of mass violence. Some academics have argued that introducing democracy has a stabilising affect and reduces the level of violence and conflict (Birnir, 2007; Lindberg, 2009; Rummel, 1995). Other academics have shown that during the democratic transition,
country is either fully democratic or fully authoritarian (Fein, 1995). Cederman et al. (2012) have argued that under specific circumstances, democratisation increases the likelihood of ethnic civil war and violence. Weeks maintains that there is a considerable variation of conflict initiation between military and civilian run authoritarian governments (Weeks, 2012).
Significant levels of violence have occurred during the democratic transitions of other states, including South Africa and Kenya (Klopp and Zuern, 2007, p.127). Mansfield and Snyder (2007) contend that democratisation can lead to war. In weak states, post-democratisation, elites adopt conflict as a method of building a nationalist coalition to unite broad and often incompatible viewpoints.
This thesis puts forward two mechanisms for how mass violence is being used to address elite rivalry between the civilian government and the military. Within Myanmar, the military could be committing mass violence whilst the NLD government is in power, to tarnish the reputations of the NLD and appeal to Buddhist nationalists across the country. Ben Rhodes former deputy national security advisor to the Obama administration, has noted that “It is possible that the military wanted to embarrass and undermine Su Kyi, who did not have the formal power to stop the attacks” (Rhodes, 2019).
Members of the Tatmadaw are concerned that if full democratisation and reform take place, they are in danger of being prosecuted in tribunals, therefore by committing mass violence whilst the NLD government is in power, the NLD will equally be tarnished by the violence. Due to the constitutional restriction of Aung Sung Su Kyi’s role to comment on the Rohingya crisis, or the affairs of the military, the military is able to use the crisis to undermine the credibility of the civilian government.
Another mechanism for the use of mass violence is international realignment. Mass violence damages western relations for the NLD, and realigns Myanmar closer with China. China has built long-term relations with the Tatmadaw and the military’s political party, the Union Solidarity Development Party. China also remains the largest supplier of military hardware for the Tatmadaw (Tourangbam and Amin, 2019).
Politically, China has helped the government facilitate the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) in October 2015 with eight different ethnic armed groups (Tourangbam and Amin, 2019). Important economic relations have been established as part of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), which is a part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and several key Tatmadaw owned corporations are working with Chinese businesses to connect Yunnan province with the Bay of Bengal (Tourangbam and Amin, 2019).
In 2013, in response to the 2012 by-election, the European Union, United States, Canada and Australia all removed their sanctions placed on Myanmar (Pritchard, 2016). Members of the Chinese government were concerned that Aung San Su Kyi’s pro-democracy beliefs would realign Myanmar internationally with western governments (Sun, 2015). By the Tatmadaw committing violence openly, it hinders potential relations for the NLD being able to apply for aid from western governments, making Chinese investments more critical for the
government. This naturally enhances Chinese influence and is of benefit to the pro-Chinese factions within the Tatmadaw.
2.3. Ethnic Hatred theory
Ethnic Hatred theorists argue that mass violence is not a strategic decision, but the result of structural changes such as state collapse, or state encouragement, which produce an
opportunity to “settle old scores” through violent acts (Peterson, 2002, p. 64). As Claire Armon-Jones argues, hatred is a psychological tool that allows individuals to dehumanise others and justify immoral treatment (Peterson, 2002, p. 67). Within this theory, Ethnic Hatred is part of a culture and committing violence against a specific group becomes a ritual (Peterson, 2002, p. 63). The culture of ethnic hatred is based upon a supposed belief in the innate and unchanging negative characteristics of a group, which are remembered indefinitely and used to justify violence. The Ethnic Hatred theory argument has been applied to explain racial violence in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda (Kaplan, 1993; Peterson, 2002).
In other quoted cases of Ethnic Hatred driving mass violence, research has indicated there were also considerable political motivations behind the violence. Despite press attention at the time attributing the Rwandan genocide to ethnic hatreds, academic researchers have argued against this explanation (Straus, 2006). Researchers assert that the 1994 Rwandan Genocide was not the product of violent hatreds being released due to state collapse but the
product of regime change, as the violence on close inspection was being carried out by organised agents of the state who were intent on changing the structure of the society (bin Talal and Schwarz, 2013, p. 5). Straus (2006) argues that Hutu leaders committed mass violence to gain an advantage in the oncoming civil war.
Similarly, many researchers have pointed directly towards the role of ethnic competition, and score settling, to explain ethnic mass violence during the Bosnian conflict. Other researchers have pointed towards the deliberate strategies of military leaders to create homogenous territorial entities as part of a political strategy and not driven purely out of primordial hatreds (Weidmann, 2011, p.1180).
The Ethnic Hatred theory is relevant to understanding this case because Myanmar is an ethnically divided country, with the majority Buddhist Bamar group in control of the government and military. There is a racial element to the periphery conflicts in Myanmar. The periphery states around the borders are populated mostly by ethnic minority groups. The Tatmadaw demonises ethnic rebel groups. Combat units are deployed to areas where their members have no family ties or shared language (Selth, 2018, p. 32). The Tatmadaw considers ethnic groups, such as the Chin, Kachin and Karen people to be savage, jungle-dwelling people who abuse prisoners (Selth, 2018, p. 31).
Derrek Mitchell, the United States Ambassador to Myanmar and several journalists have contested that racial tensions are crucial to understanding violence in Rakhine State (Calamur, 2017; Leider, 2014; Wade, 2017). There are considerable tensions between the Bamar people and the Rohingya people. This is evident in state owned media outlets such as the newspaper Global New Light of Myanmar, which have compared the Rohingya people to “detestable human fleas” - demonstrating how widespread and visceral these accepted racist views are regarding the Rohingya people (Selth, 2018, p.31).
There is an additional complication when studying ethnic violence in Rakhine state because the violence was committed by both the Tatmadaw, who are mostly ethnically Bamar, and by local Rakhine civilians. The two largest ethnic groups in Rakhine state are the Rohingya people and the Rakhine people. There has been a long history of conflict between these two groups. Within the ethnic tensions in Rakhine state, the Rakhine people are stuck in a double security dilemma, struggling against the Bamar majority and Muslim groups such as the
Rohingya on the other side (Leider, 2014; Wade, 2017). Due to perceiving that the Rohingya people have powerful international allies from violent jihadist groups, the Rakhine people feel their very existence as a group is at risk (Wade, 2017).
2.4. Leader ideology theory
The second non-strategic theory used to explain the occurrence of indiscriminate violence states that authoritarian leaders can use mass violence to force the populace to show adherence to the leadership (Valentino, 2014). It is argued that personal security for those living in the regime can best be gained by showing ideological conformity. That is to say, people are likely to adapt their behaviour accordingly and take part in the violence to secure their own safety. The leading proponent of this theory, Valentino (2014), argues that
communist ideologies - imposed by the leadership of communist states - directly led to mass killing. A problem with this theory is that elites within the same ideological background can be motivated to carry out violent acts for very different actions and it does not explain variation in the violence either (Van der Maat, forthcoming).
In Myanmar, there are two influential figures within society who promote ideological
violence against the Rohingya. The first is Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, the Commander in Chief of Myanmar's armed forces, who is the leading public figure promoting the ideology of the Tatmadaw. The military perceives Rohingya nationalism as a threat to the stability of the Union of Myanmar, on which all economic and political progress depends.
The second ideological figure examined here is Ashin Wirathu (U Wirathu), a Buddhist monk, who is the most senior figure within the anti-Muslimism movement in Myanmar, the Ba Ma Tha (the Burmese name for The Buddha Dhamma Charity Foundation, which was previously called the Association for Protection of Race and Religion). These Buddhist extremist organisations argue that Islam is a violent religion and a threat to Buddhism in Myanmar - citing examples such as the Taliban’s destruction of ancient Buddha statues in Afghanistan or the September 11th attacks in New York (Wade, 2017, p. 159).
Many researchers point to the political influence of Buddhist nationalism in driving violence against the Rohingya people (Hodal, 2013; Wade, 2017; Wong, 2019; Ibrahim, 2016). The Buddhist nationalist groups, The 969 Movement, have made claims that their way of life was
under threat by the Muslim Rohingya people. In 2012, there were ethnic riots across Rakhine state between these two groups, in which Buddhist Nationalists took part in the violence. There have also been several news articles claiming Facebook was being used by radical Buddhist groups as a platform used to spread anti-Rohingya racist propaganda (Wong, 2019).
Ibrahim (2016) argues that Buddhist nationalism is incredibly influential in Myanmar, which is why the NLD is reluctant to comment on anti-Rohingya violence. There are fears within Myanmar that Islam will expand and erase local Buddhist culture. Local Buddhist people have equated Islamic devotion with extremism and cite violent acts of Islamic State as justification for the fears of Islam (Schissler, Walton and Thi, 2017). One argument within sociological academic circles explains the occurrence of mass violence claims that in many instances the perpetrators fear future humiliation based on past experiences humiliation and habitual submission (Lindner, 2009).
3. Research design and methodology
This research will examine the assumptions made by each of these theories against the events that have occurred in Myanmar. Theories, when used independently, can become an obstacle to understanding a case. By critically assessing the merits of four different theories, this research will demonstrate that there are many different contributory factors in the Tatmadaw’s use of mass violence.
This research will be process tracing using qualitative data (Punton and Welle, 2015) as well as case analysis of Myanmar’s counter insurgencies, using quantitative data on the use of violence provided by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). Qualitative data in this study will include reports made from NGOs, academics and journalists on the violence in Myanmar.
The Counter-insurgency theory argues that the defeat of a guerrilla group is the objective of the violence. Genocidal Consolidation theory states that the removal of other elites, or the change in the elite power structure, is the objective. Ethnic hatred theory concludes that the violence is driven by long term ethnic tensions that have recently been able to be released in the form of mass indiscriminate violence. Leader ideology theory proposes that mass
violence is the ideological goal of the leadership, and civilians take part to show adherence to the ideology.
This research will test the assumptions made by each theory through analysis of events in Myanmar, to evaluate the strengths and limitations of each theory using the case study of mass violence being used against the Rohingya by the government of Myanmar in 2016 and 2017. These conditions this research considers necessary for each theory to provide a valid explanation for the occurrence of mass violence. Within the case analysis each of the observable implications will be explained and used as a framework to evaluate theory using violence against the Rohingya as a case study. A limitation of conducting a theory test is that it is plausible that mass violence, in this case, is overdetermined and multiple theories equally offer a sufficient explanation for why mass violence occurred against the Rohingya in 2016 and 2017.
Counter-insurgency Mass violence
Genocidal Consolidation Ethnic Hatred Leader Ideology
• Reactive mass violence. • Credible Guerrilla threat. • Indiscriminate violence in rebel areas. • Consistent strategy. Intra- military Civilian- military • Consistent targeting with same justification • Low state involvement. • Shift in political control. Tatmadaw ideology Buddhist extremism • Increase in elite rivalry tensions shown by o Coup attempts. o Purges o Reform • Increase in elite rivalry tensions shown by o Coup attempts o Purges o Reform • Clear message • Different from previous rhetoric • Clear message • Different from previous rhetoric
There are limitations with the methodology chosen to analyse the Counter-insurgency mass violence theory. In order to compare counter insurgencies within Myanmar’s border states, this research is using data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) who categorise violence into State-Based3, Non-state Based4, and One-Sided violence.5 In this database, all three of these categories have exclusive and non-overlapping data points - i.e. the same death is not counted multiple times.
The State-based violence deaths are from battlefield deaths, where one force involved is the state, with at least 25 casualties in a year - i.e. casualties on either side as the result of conflict between a state and a guerrilla force. The Non-State violence are deaths from conflict
between two groups, where neither group is part of the state, with at least 25 casualties - i.e. inter-communal rioting. One-sided violence is the use of force by an official state group against civilians, in which at least 25 casualties occurred in one year.
The UCDP calculate the best estimate of casualties based on an average of three figures from global newswire reporting, translations of local news reports by the BBC, and secondary sources such as field reports, NGOs and local media. When analysing counter-guerrilla violence, the line between State-based violence and One-Sided violence can become blurred due to civilian casualties occurring in all three separate categories. While the UCDP shows higher levels of State-based violence than One-sided violence in Rakhine State, this is misleading. For instance, the data shows a massacre carried out by the Tatmadaw and Rakhine militia against Rohingya civilians in which 750 are recorded to have been killed at Tula Toli but is classed as State-based violence. This research is using this data to
demonstrate the severity of the conflict taking place, so the differences between State-based and One-sided violence are not relevant.
3 State-Based violence is “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year” (UCDP, 2019).
4 Non-State violence is “the use of armed force between two organised armed groups, neither of which is the government of a state, which results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year” (UCDP, 2019).
5 One-Sided violence is "The use of armed force by the government of a state or by a formally organised group against civilians which results in at least 25 deaths. Extrajudicial killings in custody are excluded" (UCDP, 2019).
There are other limitations with this study, as it was not possible to conduct field research for this thesis. The availability of primary material was limited for this research due to the sensitive nature of the internal politics of Myanmar and also due to language constraints. As there are many humanitarian agencies assisting with the Rohingya crisis, this research has made significant use of secondary literature published by NGOs which include interviews with many of the perpetrators and victims of the violence. While the authors of the reports will have their own objectives, they provide useful details and perspective on the events taking place. There is sufficient available information in these sources to verify the existence of a causal mechanism for the violence within this case, which is why the methodology of a theory test has been chosen over other approaches.
4. Case analysis
As mentioned, within this case analysis there are four theories of mass violence that will be analysed in this order: 1) Counter-insurgency mass violence; 2) Genocidal Consolidation; 3) Ethnic Hatred 4) Leader ideology. Each of the necessary observable implications will be outlined before using these implications as a framework for analysing the case study of violence being committed against the Rohingya. In the evaluation, each theory will be compared with the other theories and critically appraised. The findings of this section show that within this specific case, the civilian-military rivalry provides the most coherent explanation for mass violence being used against the Rohingya though other explanations have likely to have had some impact.
4.1. Counter-insurgency strategy theory
4.1.1. Observable implications
The Counter-Insurgency Theory of mass violence argues that violence is a deliberate strategy of using force against local civilians, in areas where rebel groups are present, to weaken a guerrilla army’s support base. There are four necessary observable implications of this theory.
Firstly, this theory argues that mass violence is being used reactively, which requires a specific chronology of events. If this theory is correct in its explanation of the violence, the counter-guerrilla strategy would only begin to be implemented after a significant guerrilla
threat has appeared. States forces, in this explanation, use mass violence as a reactionary means of defeating the guerrillas.
Secondly, it is likely that the violence committed would not be selective in the areas where the guerrilla force is present. The regime would be utilising violence in regions where it has sufficient knowledge to target its opposition selectively, so they would be targeting villages in the areas where there is a guerrilla presence. The aim of the violence is to cause as much damage to the support base of the guerrillas as possible, so significant destruction to local villages and towns is also likely.
The third condition of this theory is there is a guerrilla group that is significant enough to require the use of extreme measures, such as mass violence, to be defeated. Unless there is evidence of a change in doctrine, the levels of civilian casualties should be proportionate to the threat posed by specific rebel groups.
Lastly, this counter guerrilla operation will broadly show similar levels of violence to other regions of Myanmar. This pattern would be observed because the killing of civilians would be part of a strategy to damage the rebel support base, so there would be no deeper
motivation to disproportionally cause harm to the Rohingya people within this conflict compared to the Karen or Shan people in other states.
Counter-insurgency mass violence • Reactive mass violence. • Credible Guerrilla threat.
• Indiscriminate violence in rebel areas. • Consistent strategy.
Table 2: Counter-insurgency Mass violence observable implications. 4.1.2. Country analysis
Analysing this case study produces mixed results - demonstrating that this theory alone does not provide an adequate explanation. Considerable violence was committed against the Rohingya people prior to the main attacks by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA).
The most significant ARSA attacks took place in August 2017 but before these attacks the Tatmadaw took part in various pre-emptive measures that undermine the counter-insurgency narrative.
Prior to the 2017 wave of violence, the Tatmadaw systematically confiscated sharp or blunt objects that could be used as weapons from Rohingya homes, tore down fences and other structures in Rohingya to provide a greater line of sight for the military, and built up an unnecessarily large military presence in the region (Fortify Rights, 2018). The Tatmadaw also trained and armed Rakhine Buddhist militia, deprived Rohingya of food aid, and enforced discriminatory curfews on the Rohingya people (Fortify Rights, 2018, p. 41). The Fortify Rights Group argue that these actions fit within the UN’s Framework for Analysis of Atrocity Crimes as “preparatory actions” for genocide and crimes against humanity (Fortify Rights, 2018, p. 41). This evidence clearly shows that the violence and contributory acts committed by the Tatmadaw was not purely reactive to a guerrilla threat.
However, for counter-guerrilla mass violence to take place, there needs to be a credible guerrilla presence in the region. In Rakhine state, the rebel group that are being targeted is the ARSA, who was previously known as Harakah al-Yaqin. The ARSA is a small rebel group, recently formed in 2016. Reports suggest that the ARSA is a small band of poorly armed and ill-trained exiles and local supporters, who were driven to act by long term persecution (Selth, 2018, p.15). Experts estimate that ARSA has only 200-600 members (Bhaumik, 2017). The Tatmadaw has made claims that they are part of an international jihadist network. However, the International Crisis Group argues it is likely that the ARSA has no
transnational jihadist agenda (Selth, 2018, p. 14).
The ARSA operates from within villages and uses cells of villagers armed with bladed weapons and basic improvised explosive devices to launch mass mob attacks on military outposts that are coordinated through WhatsApp (International Crisis Group, 2017). Due to their size and capability, their victory against the Tatmadaw seems unlikely. A cynical interpretation of these attacks is that they were deliberately trying to provoke an excessive backlash by the security forces to gain international attention and support for the Rohingya cause (Selth, 2018, p.15). Nonetheless, it is unlikely that the ARSA pose any significant threat to the Tatmadaw.
While the ARSA is an active guerrilla group, compared with other guerrilla groups that are in conflict with the Tatmadaw in other states in Myanmar, the ARSA are a low priority because they are comparatively unprofessional, lack numbers, weaponry and funding. The largest and most effective of the ethnic insurgent groups that are in conflict with the state is arguably the United Wa State Army in Northern Shan State, who have between twenty to twenty-five thousand members, modern and sophisticated Chinese made weaponry, and substantial funds gained from cross border narcotics trafficking (Lintner, 2019 A, p. 3). The United Wa State Army signed a ceasefire agreement with the government in 2015 and is arguably a core component of any lasting peace in the country.
The United Wa State Army is not the only insurgent group who pose a threat to the state. There are many other organisations who pose a significant threat, and have their own pro-independence political party. In Shan State, the ethnic rebel groups consist of large
organisations such as Shan State Army South. There is also a conglomeration of rebel groups, referred to as the Northern Alliance, which consists of the rebel groups the Arakan Army, the Kachin Independence Army, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army. The conflict in Shan State is between various Shan ethnic insurgent groups and the central government. These rebel groups are far larger than the ARSA.
The type of violence present in Rakhine State in 2016 and 2017, however, is consistent with the Counter-insurgency strategy theory. Many NGO reports, including Fortify Rights, have shown systematic and indiscriminate killing of Rohingya civilians as well as the confiscation and destruction of property, which is consistent with the observable implications of the Counter-insurgency theory (Fortify Rights, 2018).
Consistent with the Counter-insurgency mass violence theory, mass violence has been used widely in Myanmar, and this evidence suggests that it is part of a centralised strategy. Christina Fink argues that Tatmadaw brutality has increased post-1988 due to a dangerous culture of unquestioning loyalty, unrealistic goals and inadequate resources (Selth, 2018, p.32). Officers know that mistreatment of soldiers and civilians, while carrying out orders, will go unpunished.
Due to a lowering of entry standards during the 1990s, many of the lower ranking soldiers are uneducated. They have been fed information stating that dissidents are enemies of the state and the people (Selth, 2018, p.32). There is documentation of this strategy, using food and land acquisitions, killings, torture, beatings, forced labour, forced relocation, rapes,
destruction of villages and the placement of landmines to prevent civilians returning to destroyed villages (DLA Piper report, 2005, pp.14-18).
The Tatmadaw counter-insurgency strategy was officially formulated into the Four Cut Strategy in 1968. The Four Cut Strategy aims to cut off supplies of food, funds, intelligence and recruits, from local villages to insurgent groups (DLA Piper report, 2005, p.14). The
zones (contested between the Tatmadaw and the rebel groups), and white zones (Tatmadaw controlled) (Gyo, 2018). In the black and brown zones, the Four Cuts Strategy is
implemented in tandem with an unofficial self-sufficiency policy of units living off the local ethnic villagers’ supplies and labour. The Tatmadaw seeks to divide opposition groups by offering ceasefires and economic opportunities for rebel groups to be co-opted into the Border Guard Force (Gyo, 2018). Research has shown that there is a correlation between internal purges of the Tatmadaw and ceasefire offers with local rebel groups (Eck, 2015).
A key piece of evidence that undermines the Counter-insurgency theory is the lack of
proportionality of the violence and resultant casualties compared with the threat posed by the ARSA. Data from the UCDP shows the Tatmadaw uses the strategy of mass violence to defeat rebel groups in Kayah, Kachin, Kayin and Shan States. The UCDP data for Rakhine State shows there have been mostly low levels of State-based violence, apart from in 2017 where significant amounts of both one-sided and State-based violence took place. This had far higher rates of casualties than any other state, apart from Shan State which has a far higher rebel presence.
Table 3: Graphs of UCDP data for Regions in Myanmar.
The levels of casualties from state based violence in Rakhine State after 2015 (see graph ‘Casualties in Rakhine State’), seems to be a clear outlier because they are so high, and yet the level of guerrilla threat posed by the ARSA is very low. If the Tatmadaw's use of mass indiscriminate violence was their primary method of fighting counter-insurgencies, then the levels of indiscriminate violence would mainly be similar between the different ethnic conflicts, or would broadly reflect the level of threat posed by the opposition. The evidence of the severity of violence used against the Rohingya indicates that there are deeper
motivations behind the violence being used, other than defeating a small, poorly equipped insurgent group.
From this analysis of the Counter-insurgency theory, there is evidence of long term and widespread use of indiscriminate violence in counter-guerrilla operations against ethnic armed groups. Importantly, the chronology of events suggests that actions were taken against the Rohingya people, prior to the ARSA posing much of a significant threat to the
government, which shows that the violence being committed was not purely reactive. The threat posed by the ARSA was small when compared to other active armed insurgent groups within the country, so targeting this group within Rakhine state should have been a low priority. Whilst there is evidence that mass violence is used as a strategy by the Tatmadaw, from comparing the levels of civilian casualties between the conflicts in Kayah, Kachin, Kayin and the Shan States, the level of violence in Rakhine State appears to be massively disproportionate.
4.2. Genocidal Consolidation theory
4.2.1. Observable implications
Genocidal Consolidation is built upon three mechanism: 1) Elites who lose power face a high risk of harm or imprisonment, and mass violence can resolve this rivalry because it facilitates coalition building and can divide and undermine rivals; 2) Due to the lack of protection mechanisms for authoritarian elites after they leave power, non-democratic leaders would be more likely to use mass violence when their positions are threatened; 3) The violence will be used to reduce the threat to their positions (Van der Maat, forthcoming).
In order to establish if elites’ positions are under threat, this research will focus on the levels of elite rivalry within the military by analysing both the actions of the leadership and the actions of their potential rivals in order to establish whether there is evidence of: military coup attempts; purges or arrests of key military figures; or attempts to reform or change the country’s security structure. The pressures of elite rivalry are so connected to the survival of elites, that unimaginable policies, like the mass killing of civilians, can become a realistic option (Van der Maat, forthcoming).
The definition of elite purges this study will be using is “reducing the number of essential supporters, concentrating political power in the remaining (smaller) group of supporters…. often entails the execution, imprisonment, or exile of those purged” (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2015, p. 5). Exact numbers of purges, or coup attempts, are often kept secret within
authoritarian regimes to project the image of stability, so this research will be limited to what has been made public. Due to the secretive nature of elite rivalry, this analysis will determine if these events were present at the time of mass violence.
The presence of the civilian-military rivalry will be conducted by examining the changes in the balance of power in this relationship. Before democratisation, the military held complete political control of the state, so as Myanmar theoretically becomes more democratic, the tensions in the civilian-military relationship increase. The observable implications of the civilian-military rivalry are arrests of civilian politicians, critical political statements made by the civilian government or military against each other, key jobs and responsibilities
transitioning from the military to the civilian government, and election results demonstrating that the balance of power is transitioning away from the military, or political reforms that change the balance of control.
Genocidal Consolidation
Intra- military Civilian- military
• Increase in elite rivalry tensions shown by
o Coup attempts. o Purges
o Reform
• Increase in elite rivalry tensions shown by
o Coup attempts o Purges
o Reform
Table 4: Genocidal Consolidation observable implications
4.2.2. Country analysis
From the analysis of intra-military rivalries, it is not clear that there was a significant escalation in elite tensions during the violence taking place against the Rohingya people. Therefore, it is unlikely that intra-military rivalry fully explains this case. To establish if there has been an escalation of these tensions, this section will examine evidence of coup attempts, purges, and reform of the security apparatus to determine if there is a correlation between these events and mass violence perpetrated against the Rohingya.
Understanding the internal politics of the Tatmadaw is challenging and insider information on the Tatmadaw is considered to be an informational black hole for both academics and foreign intelligence agencies (Selth, 2018, p.20). Officers in the Tatmadaw are loyal to the unit of their original posting. Within these units, they develop a student-teacher relationship with more senior officers, who they usually stay with throughout their career. There have been bitter rivalries between Infantry Units and Intelligence Units, as well as between the periphery outposts and the central command (Min, 2008, p.1021). At various points in Myanmar's history, these rivalries have been manifest in mass purges of the military, or purges of senior officers and their entourage.
The most obvious sign of high levels of elite rivalry, within a regime, is coup attempts. During other periods of Myanmar’s history, coups and coup attempts have occurred but from examining the literature it is unclear whether there have been any coup attempts in Myanmar between the years of 2016 and 2017. Whilst coups are secretive by nature, if a coup attempt fails in other cases, mass purges of the coup plotters often occur.
Whilst there have been several high-level purges within the military prior to 2016, it does not appear that these events are closely related to anti-Rohingya violence. Arguably, by the beginning of the Rohingya crisis, the main rivalry within the military between the intelligence and infantry branches had been resolved through mass purges. The military Intelligence and the infantry units have had a bitter rivalry throughout Myanmar’s history. In 1983, the dictator Ne Win, who was a former member of the 4th Burma Rifles, launched a significant purge of Myanmar’s military intelligence branches, damaging the ability of the security services. This purge was carried out because Ne Win believed that Brigadier General Tin Oo was a threat to his leadership (Selth, 2019, p. 619; Min, 2008, p. 1023). The
intelligence branches were rebuilt under the command of Khin Nyunt (Selth, 2019, p. 619).
Another major purge of the intelligence branch was conducted by Lieutenant General Soe Win and General Shwe Mann by carrying out mass arrests and restructuring of the
intelligence services in 2004 and 2005. The purge started on October 19th 2004 and it was announced on Myanmar's national television channel, MRTV, that former general and prime minister Khin Nyunt was ‘permitted to retire for health reasons’ (Selth, 2019, p. 620). Statements were made that the government had discovered a significant corruption ring of military intelligence officers on the Myanmar-China border. It was subsequently claimed that
General Khin Nyunt had known about these corruption rings, refused to act against them, and had ordered information to be gathered on other generals in the military (Selth, 2019, p. 620).
After General Khin Nyunt’s arrest in 2004, a significant purge was launched against the intelligence branch of the military. Estimates vary in terms of arrests but at least 300 senior intelligence officers were arrested, and the number of people purged range from 3,000 to 30,000 (Selth, 2019, p. 624). The purge extended to imprisoning Khin Nyunt’s sons and investigated the charities run by Khin Nyunt’s wife (Selth, 2019, p. 624). It was alleged by local sources that the purge extended to “not just to the roots, but to the soil attached to the roots” (Selth, 2019, p. 624). Since then, Myanmar's army intelligence corps has been disbanded and the command of field units have been given to regional commanders (Selth, 2019, p. 625).
In 2015 there was another high-profile purge, the removal of Thura Shwe Mann, the leader of the military’s Union Solidarity and Development Party and the speaker in Pyithu Hluttaw (the lower house in the parliament). Thura Shwe Mann was arguably one of the front runners for the Presidency in 2015. Due to an alleged rivalry between Thura Shwe Mann and Thein Sein, Shwe Mann was removed from his position of power three months before the 2015 election. Police raided the USDP party headquarters and arrested Thura Shwe Mann. The USDP later issued a statement saying Thura Shwe Mann was “too busy” to perform his duties (Kurlantzick, 2015). In 2016, Thura Shwe Mann formally left the party. Aung Min, Thura Shwe Mann’s chief negotiator with ethnic rebel groups and Soe Thein, a former minister for Industry, were both forced to leave the party and stand as independents in the parliament (Kurlantzick, 2015).
Ultimately, the Tatmadaw instigated the transition to civilian government in 2011 from a position of strength and the decision was made within the Tatmadaw, rather than by outside influences. This change can be seen as a strategy to release tensions that were brewing within Myanmar and open the country up to foreign investment (Selth, 2018, A, p. 3). It is likely that there were some underlying tensions within the military due to senior Tatmadaw officials becoming civilians and the USDP’s poor electoral performance.
Tatmadaw will become a modern “standard army” capable of fighting conventional,
multidimensional wars in complex environments (Selth, 2018, p.22). This has meant a reform of the command structures of the police, Tatmadaw and other security branches (Selth, 2018). Whilst the impetus for this restructure remains unclear, it can be seen as a means to separate potential rivals from their support bases, move them into administrative positions, or exile them to periphery units.
Whilst elite rivalry is a standard component of authoritarian governments, it is unclear from the available information if there was a distinct increase in elite rivalry within the military during this period. A possible explanation for a lack visible elite rivalry within the military is a deliberate effort to unite against the threat posed by the civilian government. It is possible that more information on elite tensions within the military will later become public and vindicate this hypothesis.
The second part of the elite rivalry in Myanmar is the rivalry between the NLD civilian-government and the military, and that violence being perpetrated against the Rohingya is a deliberate strategy being used by senior members of the military to deal with high levels of elite rivalry. As stated by the French political philosopher Alexis de Tocqueville in 1856 “The most dangerous moment for a bad government is when it begins to reform” (Selth, 2018, A, p. 8). The reason why reform is significant to understanding the civilian-military rivalry is because the prospect of full democratisation and full civilian government control haunts the military as it could lead to constitutional reform - allowing civilians to instigate an international tribunal for past abuses conducted by the military (Selth, 2018, p. 8).
There are several key and present indicators of rivalry between the civilian government and the military. Despite political liberalisation, there have still been purges of prominent civilian government figures which suggests some level of ongoing rivalry. The murder of Ko Ni, a pro-reformist NLD lawyer, created rumours that elements of the armed forces were prepared to take violent action to prevent any credible chance of reform (Selth, 2018, A, p. 14).
Another key indicator of civilian-military rivalry is evidence that a coup attempt is likely. There is some debate over the possibility that coup tensions are building. Whilst certain academics, such as Andrew Selth and Mary Callahan, believe that a coup is now unlikely, journalists such as Larry Jagan disagree over this issue (Selth, 2018, A, p. 15).
Other academics believe that a coup remains a realistic possibility and a clear underlying tension. Several key developments have created coup rumours. In 2015 during a meeting with the French Ambassador, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing stated that if Suu Kyi were to win and push for reforms, the military would instigate a coup (Zin, 2016, p.124). It was predicted that Min Aung Hlaing was in line to succeed the USDP president Thein Sein (from 2011 to 2016) to become president but this plan was thwarted by the 2015 election (Paddock, 2017). Min Aung Hlaing was a protégé of Than Shwe, the military head of state (from 1992 to 2011), who was retiring and needed a loyalist in power to protect him.
In November 2016, Ming Aung Hlaing made references, in speeches, regarding the
constitution covering states of emergency, which many interpreted as a sign of an impending coup (Seth, 2018, A, p. 13). Min Aung Hlaing also made similar ominous statements
internationally, at a gathering of senior European military officers at a National Defence College, stating that the armed forces would always have a role in Myanmar’s national political life (Selth, 2018, A, p.14). Whilst there is some debate over when and under what circumstances the military would instigate a coup, it remains a constant threat that if the country reforms too quickly, or power is taken away from the military, the coup will be enacted.
Despite elections, the military has slowed liberalisation in several key areas to inhibit progress. To maintain control of key institutions within the bureaucracy of Myanmar, the Tatmadaw have instigated the disruptive strategies of stacking, rigging and circumventing (Slater, 2003, p. 82).
Despite control officially transferring to the civilian government, the Tatmadaw has “stacked” departments in the government with military personnel, due to much of the civil service having remained under its purview. 80 per cent of senior civil service positions are occupied by former military personnel (Selth, 2018, A, p. 10). Whilst the minutiae of government control have transferred to the NLD civilian government, the military has retained control of important areas of government. The Ministries of Defence, Home Affairs and Border Affairs were retained under the control of military generals. The Tatmadaw also holds the majority of positions with the National Defence and Security Council (Selth, 2018,
A, p. 5). The depth of military influence within the government creates structurally embedded reluctance for reform and change.
As per the constitution, the Tatmadaw have ensured that the military would hold 25% of seats in the parliament, bending the rules of elections in their favour. As Myanmar has officially transferred to a “disciplined democracy”, elections are beginning to have an influence on the ruling of the country which suggests that, within this area, the military is losing influence.
There is some debate over whether Myanmar is truly democratising; authors such as Stefano Ruzza, Giuseppe Gabusi and Davide Pellegrino (2019) argue that this is not true
democratisation but a form of authoritarian resilience. After refusing to take part in the 2010 election, the NLD made significant gains in both in the 2012 by-election and the 2015 election. Whilst it is clear that the Tatmadaw were aware that the NLD would win the election, it is unclear if they were aware of the extent of the support that the NLD would receive. Part of Aung Sung Su Kyi’s support during the 2015 election was from ethnic groups who had previously only supported their regional ethnic parties.
The 2008 constitution of Myanmar was created to maintain the Tatmadaw’s influence within domestic politics as well as to protect members of the military. The Tatmadaw have
consistently stated that change will only be allowed once democracy in Myanmar has “matured” (Selth, 2018, A, p. 8). The 2008 constitution placed the judiciary under the control of both the parliament and the president preventing any checks and balances on the government through the separation of power (Pritchard, 2016, p.10). Section 445 of the constitution grants amnesty to all members of the military and government for crimes
committed whilst carrying out their official duties. Whilst any trials and court martials of the Tatmadaw are all exclusively managed by the Commander in Chief of the Tatmadaw
(Pritchard, 2016, p.10).
The military has created legislation which ensures that the judiciary remains under their control, and undermines any meaningful reform - demonstrating yet another tension between the civilian government and the military. Many studies have shown widespread and
systematic corruption within the legal system of Myanmar (Pritchard, 2016, p.14).
Investigation commissions, formed of parliamentarians, echo the government’s position. An important example of this was the investigation into the 2014 Du Chee Yar Tan massacre in
Rakhine state. The investigation, set up by the President in 2014, found no evidence of violence being committed or state involvement despite UN and MSF reports stating that at least 48 people were killed (Pritchard, 2016, p.16).
The conflict between the military and the NLD is also present within their approaches towards negotiating with the ethnic armed groups in the border regions of Myanmar. One of the NLD’s highest priorities is the “21st Century Panglong” peace process, which aims to create a comprehensive settlement with approximately twenty different ethnic armed groups (Selth, 2018, A, p.11). However, this agreement is contingent on the actions of the military, who have consistently taken a more hard-line approach within these negotiations on issues surrounding disarmament, demobilizations and reintegration (Selth, 2018, A, p. 11).
Despite measures taken by the military to secure their control, the civilian government has managed to defy the military in several ways. First is the creation of the role of State
Chancellor which is above the position of President. This occurred despite strong opposition from the Tatmadaw bloc within the parliament (Selth, 2018, A, p. 9). This can also be seen by Aung San Su Kyi’s appointment of Thaung Tun, a former diplomat, as National Security Advisor (Selth, 2018, A, p. 9).
From analysing the observable implications, there is sufficient evidence to support the view that elite rivalry between the civilian government and the military is likely to have had some impact on the mass violence in Rakhine State. Through committing mass violence, which is widely viewed as excessive, the military is able to undermine the civilian government of the NLD. From close analysis of the actions of Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, it appears that he is softening his image to begin campaigning for the 2020 elections. If Senior General Min Aung Hlaing became president, in theory, he would regain the power to dismiss the
government and the parliament in the name of security and return the country to direct military rule (Lintner, 2019, B).
4.3. Ethnic Hatred theory
The Ethnic Hatred theory, despite being a non-strategic, irrational theory, will have a number of clear observable implications. Measuring something as individual and subjective as hatred is problematic, but the Ethnic Hatred theory is based on several testable assumptions.
The first critical implication of the Ethnic Hatred theory is that the target of ethnic violence will be the group that has frequently been attacked before, over a significant length of time, with similar justification (Peterson, 2002, p.62). If the targeting of the ethnic group is not long standing, or if the targeted group is attacked with a completely new justification for the violence each time, then this does not support the theory.
The second implication is that violence against the targeted group would be mostly
indiscriminate. Due to the violence being committed out of hatred, it is unlikely that it would be coordinated or systematic. Whilst it is possible for security services to take part out of hatreds, it is unlikely for the violence that takes places to be a centrally controlled strategy.
Thirdly, another observable implication of this theory, is a shift in political control that allows mass violence to take place. This shift in power could come in the form of state collapse, significantly changes, or a belief that the state has decided to endorse the violence. This shift reawakens a contest in the territory that was suppressed by the state, and allowed for violent competition and score-settling to take place.
Ethnic Hatred
• Consistent targeting with same justification • State involvement.
• Shift in political control.
Table 5: Ethnic Hatred observable implications
4.3.2. Country analysis
By using this case study these four implications of this theory can be tested. The structure of this section will first examine the different periods of anti-Rohingya violence that occurred during the twentieth century, the levels of state involvement in the violence then analyse if
there was evidence of a shift in power that allowed ethnic violence to be committed against the Rohingya.
The ethnic hatred argument is reliant on the targeting of an ethnic group frequently, over a significant length of time, with similar justification (Peterson, 2002, p.62). From conducting a close examination of the different periods of anti-Rohingya violence, it is difficult to argue that there is one coherent reasoning behind the targeting of the Rohingya people. It appears that the episodes of violence are due to a long history of post-colonial political tensions, that are part of a broader pattern of ethnic independence movements in Myanmar.
From a close examination of discrimination and violence in Rakhine state, the causes of the ethnic tensions are more complex than simply a homogenous Buddhist majority victimising a Muslim minority, but a multifaceted system of conflicts that have been brought to the
forefront during the democratisation. Rohingya have also been the target of violence by local ethnic Rakhine people, who despite being a majority Buddhist group, have many differences with the Bamar majority. Rakhine Nationalist groups are also seeking their own
independence, and increased local powers separate from the Rohingya. It is not clear why, at specific points, there is obvious state involvement in perpetrating the violence and not at other times.
A significant cause of tensions between the Rakhine and Rohingya communities derives from the Second World War (International Crisis Group, 2013). During the Japanese occupation in 1942, ethnic Rakhine Buddhist groups supported the Japanese whilst Rohingya groups supported Britain. Members of both communities joined armed militias. Members of the Rohingya community left Japanese held territory, and Rakhine Buddhists mostly left British held territory.
These tensions continued after the Second World War, and armed rebellion continued after Burma gained independence from Britain in 1948. Rohingya Mujahedeen rebelled against the Buddhist officials that ruled after the British. Armed Rohingya rebels took over large areas of Rakhine state. The rebellion was short-lived, and eventually defeated by the Tatmadaw. In 1961, the government created a military-run administration in Rakhine state, led by
In 1962, under the military dictatorship of Ne Win, state-backed repression of the Rohingya people increased. Discriminatory legislation was introduced that denied citizenship rights to the majority of Rohingya people. In 1978, the Burmese Socialist Program Party, under Ne Win, started Operation Nagamin (Dragon King). Its original purpose was to gain
demographic data of citizens in northern Rakhine state, and expel Bangladeshi migrants who were escaping violence in their own country. Operation Nagamin was carried out violently and pushed hundreds of thousands of people back into Bangladesh (van Klinken and Aung, 2017, p. 357).
After the 1988 Coup, the State Peace and Development Council junta sought to punish
groups who had taken part in the 1988 anti-government mass protests. The government began by removing all citizenship papers of Rohingya people, then forced between 210,000 and 280,000 into refugee camps in Bangladesh (van Klinken and Aung, 2017, p. 358).
In June 2012, a period of inter-communal rioting broke out across Rakhine state between local Rakhine Buddhist people and Rohingya. On May 28th, a Rakhine Buddhist woman was gang-raped and murdered, and Burmese state media reported that Muslims were responsible. Riots broke out across the city, killing 98 people, and displacing 75,000 mostly Rohingya people. In October 2012, another wave of violence broke out between Rakhine Buddhists and the Rohingya people raising the death toll to 192 (van Klinken and Aung, 2017).
There is evidence that suggests that the violence was carried out by local people for religious reasons. A statement was made by a Rakhine man who took part in the 2012 ethnic riots in Rakhine state: "if the Buddhist cultures vanish, Yangon will become like Saudi and Mecca. Then there wouldn't be the influence of peace and truth. There will be more discrimination and violence . . . It can be the fall of Yangon. It can also be the fall of Buddhism. And our race will be eliminated." (Wade, 2017, pp. 5-6). Importantly, researchers have also found that in towns and cities where riots took place, it was often people from outside the region that instigated the violence, or national media circulating claims that their community was going to be attacked, that have sparked tensions and created the communal riots (Hein, 2018).
There is a considerable amount of animosity in the Tatmadaw towards the Rohingya community. Prior to the 2016 and 2017 waves of mass violence, there was evidence of
soldiers sharing anti-Rohingya propaganda on Facebook (Hein, 2018). A statement was made by a junior soldier stating: “the lower ranks, most of them are illiterate and uneducated...and they’re brainwashed into thinking that all dissidents are enemies of the army, of the state, of the people.” (Selth, 2018, p. 32).
From assessing these different incidents of anti-Rohingya violence during Myanmar’s
history, it appears that there were numerous social, political and economic factors driving the issue. Past episodes of anti-Rohingya violence across Myanmar have been driven by a
multitude of different intentions, primarily due to historical political differences and competing for independence movements. At specific points the violence can be seen as communal and religiously motivated, and at other times there has been considerable state involvement, and the repression has been carried out by the security apparatus of the state.
From analysing the levels of casualties in the UCDP data on violence committed in Rakhine State in 2016 and 2017, we can see a high level of state involvement in the violence, which does not suggest that the violence was driven by grassroots-level score settling, but a directed strategy by the military, which does not support the ethnic hatred theory.
To this end, it is worth noting a shift in politics that allows for the ethnic hatred-based violence to take place. It appears that there was an acceptance of violence being committed against the Rohingya around the 2012 riots, as well as in 2016 and 2017. In October 2012, there is evidence of state security forces taking part and allowing the violence to take place (Hein, 2018). During the June riots in 2012, the newspaper the Weekly Eleven, based in Yangon, ran stories that Rakhine citizens were killed by Rohingya terrorist attacks and there was a risk of the Rohingya committing ethnic cleansing or genocide against the Rakhine (Wade, 2017, p.152). At no point did the government intervene to stop news stories circulating that the Rohingya were dangerous (Wade, 2017, p.152).
In 2015, major legislation was passed that discriminated against the Rohingya. Four laws were introduced by Than Shwe’s government that directly related to race and religion: the Buddhist Women’s Special Marriage Act; the Population Control Law; the Monogamy Law; and the Religious Conversion Law (Hein, 2018, p. 375). These laws prevented interfaith marriage, enacted population control measures, and criminalised conversions.
On August 9th 2017, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing met with the leadership of the Arakan National Party, expressing concerns about the security situation in Rakhine state and to request the forming of local Rakhine Buddhist militia (International Crisis Group, 2017, p. 5). It is evident that these actions demonstrated a change in state control, by showing local people an endorsement of violence being used against the Rohingya people.
While the ethnic hatred theory has some merit in explaining episodes of mass violence, it does not offer a complete explanation for the violence in 2016 and 2017. Throughout
Myanmar's history, there have been many episodes of anti-Rohingya violence, but these have been carried out by different groups, sometimes taking the form of communal violence and at other times, under the guise of a government counter-insurgency strategy. The introduction of anti-Rohingya legislation, and evidence that the state does not hold people accountable for attacking Rohingya people, are not significant enough to explain the severity of violence against the Rohingya people in this case.
There is also evidence to suggest that violence has been committed against the Rohingya community for a considerable amount of time with impunity, meaning that it is unclear why mass violence occurred in 2016 and 2017 with such severity. On the whole, whilst there is considerable evidence of racial prejudice against the Rohingya, this theory alone does not provide a complete narrative for the use of mass violence against the Rohingya in 2016 and 2017.
4.4. Leader ideology theory
4.4.1. Observable implications
The Leader ideology theory argues that people take part in mass violence to show adherence to the ideology of the leadership, to protect their safety and positions within society. This research will be covering two ideologies: one of the Tatmadaw and the other of radical Buddhism.
For this theory to explain this case, there would need to be a clear ideology from Senior General Min Aung Hlaing or Ashin Wirathu, promoting violence against the Rohingya people. Evidence of this would be in the form of political speeches, new legislation or the
