The European Union and the Belt and Road Initiative: A Research Towards EU Actorness

The European Union and the Belt and Road Initiative

A Research Towards EU Actorness

Supervisors: Dr. I.L. Elias Carrillo Prof. dr. J.A. Koops

Second Reader: Prof. dr. A.L. Dimitrova Student: J.S.B. Hartman BSc

Word count: 22,687 (excl. prologue, abstract and references) Januari 19, 2020

Leiden University

Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs (FGGA) MSc Crisis and Security Management (CSM) Master Thesis

Prologue

Front cover impression Belt and Road Initiative by author

L.S.

Considering my academic background, studying Crisis and Security Management may not seem like a logical step. Although, I have been interested in history, war, peace, politics and societal movements from an early age, I decided to focus on my other interest in natural sciences and technique in general. However, my interest in international politics, history and societal movements remained and during my bachelor Architecture and the Build Environment at TU Delft, I spend a minor in Ghent, following courses on political sciences and history. Last year, I started the master Urbanism at the same faculty, because in this study, technique and society come together in the most clear and comprehensive way. Yet, I still wanted to broaden my view besides the technical perspective. Therefore, I also applied to the master Crisis and Security Management a year later, where I was admitted!

The final project of my first year studying Urbanism was about the Harbor of Rotterdam. The project group I was part of, was asked to make a vision and a design for this harbor, incorporating current and future trends. A highly complex but very interesting assignment, considering that our furthest ‘deep dive’ into the future went as far as 2080! It was during this project, that I read about the Belt and Road Initiative for the first time. This thesis gave me the opportunity to delve deeper into this topic.

In the course of writing this thesis, the Corona virus struck and normal live came to a halt. In the first week of the ‘intelligent lockdown’, Kevin Hoffman and I started the initiative ‘Studenten tegen Corona’. This initiative linked interdisciplinary groups of students with organizations (both private and public) that needed ‘brainpower’ to overcome their problems during this crisis. Around 250 students joined the initiative. A very useful and interesting experience in a turbulent time, since the lessons of Crisis Management could be implemented in a life case.

However, this initiative and other consequences of the Corona virus made writing this thesis an extra challenge. Nevertheless, I managed to finalize this thesis, thanks to the thorough feedback of Leticia Elias Carrillo and Joachim Koops, my supervisors, and the extra time I was granted. Finally, this master has been a great opportunity for me and I would like to thank everyone who made it possible.

Yours sincerely, Samuel Hartman

Abstract

In 2013, President Xi Jinping of China launched the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This initiative of unprecedented scale aims to connect China with its western hinterland, eventually reaching Europe and the African east coast, through massive infrastructural investments. Although, the potential consequences of this initiative can be enormous, the EU has hitherto shown limited (re)action towards the BRI. This led Misiągiewicz & Misiągiewicz (2016, p. 39) to state that “the European Union has to date been slow and reluctant in

responding to the ‘One Belt, One Road’ idea”. This reveals what some would call a low degree of EU-‘actorness’, with ‘actorness’ being understood as the extent to which an actor can deliberately operate among and with other actors within the international system (Sjösted, 1977). This leads to the research question of this thesis, namely: “What factors can explain

the low degree of actorness of the European Union regarding the Belt and Road Initiative?”.

Following on a literature review towards actorness, three factors that influence actorness are identified. These three factors are context, capability and coherence. The first factor, context, is about external elements that influence actorness (Brattberg & Rhinard, 2012; Bretherton & Vogler, 2013; Da Conceição-Heldt & Meunier, 2014; Jupille & Caporaso, 1998). The factor of capability is about the different ‘tools’ an actor has and whether it is able to use those tools (Brattberg & Rhinard, 2012; Bretherton & Vogler, 2006; 2013). The third and last factor this thesis will study is coherence. This factor is about how coherent an actor and its institutions are among themselves (Bretherton & Vogler, 2013; Da Conceição-Heldt & Meunier, 2014; Nilsson et al., 2012). These factors are elaborated upon and analyzed in this thesis to determine whether they can explain the low degree of EU actorness regarding the BRI. To analyze the factors of context and capability, qualitative content analyses are conducted towards primary sources, consisting of EU documents and two EU webpages. To study the factor of coherence, a quantitative content analysis will be conducted towards primary sources, consisting of EU documents that represent the external message of the EU. Following from these analyses, it can be concluded that the factors context and coherence resulted in the low degree of EU actorness regarding the BRI. The factor of context constrains EU actorness regarding the BRI, because the EU is not completely recognized as a relevant party by other international actors with regard to themes that are relevant in the context of the EU and the BRI, for example concerning FDI laws. The factor of coherence constrains EU actorness regarding the BRI, because the external ‘message’ of the EU is not coherent in three ways. First of all, EU documents often contradict themselves. Secondly, EU documents that

are published in the same year are not coherent with one another. Last, the EU’s message is also not coherent with itself over time.

Key words: actorness, European Union (EU), Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China, context,

Content

Prologue

Abstract

1 | Introduction

1.1 Topic and Research Puzzle

1.2 Research Question and Framework 1.3 Relevance of this Thesis

1.4 Structure of this Thesis

2 | The BRI and the EU: Context and Background

2.3 The BRI in Europe and the EU Reaction 2.3.1 China and the BRI in Europe

2.3.2 Materialization and Consequences of the BRI

3 | Theoretical Framework

3.1 Introduction to Actorness

3.1.1 Conceptual History of Actorness

3.1.2 Actorness Studies and the Literature Gap Regarding the BRI 3.2 Factors that Enable or Constrain EU Actorness

3.2.1 Three Main Factors

3.2.2 Context

3.2.2.1 Recognition

3.2.2.2 Opportunity

3.2.3 Capability

3.2.4 Coherence

3.2.4.1 Coherence Concerning the External Message of an Actor

3.2.4.2 Coherence Over Time

3.3 Review of the Main Factors of Context and Capability in Relation to the EU and the BRI

3.3.1 The Main Factor of Context in Relation to the EU and the BRI

3.3.1.1 Recognition

3.3.1.2 Opportunity

3.3.2 The Main Factor of Capability in Relation to the EU and the BRI

4 | Methodology

4.1 Research Methodology of the Main Factor Context

4.1.1 Recognition 4.1.1.1 Data Collection 4.1.1.2 Operationalization 4.1.2 Opportunity 4.1.2.1 Data Collection

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4.1.2.2 Operationalization

4.2 Research Methodology of the Main Factor Capability 4.2.1 Data Collection

4.2.2 Operationalization

4.3 Research Methodology of the Main Factor Coherence 4.3.1 Data Collection

4.3.2 Operationalization

4.3.2.1 Constructing the Codebook

4.3.2.2 Unit of Analysis

4.3.2.3 Steps of the Analysis

4.3.3 Reliability Test

5 | Explaining the Low Degree of EU Actorness

5.1.1 Recognition | The EU Not Completely Recognized 5.1.1.1 Results of the Content Analysis

5.1.1.2 Conclusion

5.1.2 Opportunity | Room for the EU to Operate 5.1.2.1 Results of the Content Analysis

5.1.2.2 Conclusion

5.1.3 Conclusion Regarding the Main Factor of Context 5.2 Capability | Enabling EU Actorness Regarding the BRI

5.2.1 Results of the Content Analysis

5.2.2 Conclusion Regarding the Main Factor of Capability 5.3 Coherence | Constraining EU Actorness Regarding the BRI

5.3.1 Results Applied to Coherence of the External Message

5.3.1.1 Coherence of the External Message in the Years 2013 and 2015 5.3.1.2 Coherence of the External Message in the Year 2016

5.3.1.3 Coherence of the External Message in the Year 2019 5.3.2 Results Applied to Coherence Over Time

5.3.3 Conclusion Regarding the Main Factor of Coherence

5.3.4 Reliability Test

5.4 Conclusion of the Results

6 | Conclusion

6.1 Conclusion and Limitations 6.2 Recommendations

References

Appendices:

Annex I Used Documents of the Analysis Towards the Main Factor of Context

Annex II Used Documents of the Analysis Towards the Main Factor of Capability

Annex III Quotes from the Analyzed Documents Regarding the Main Factors of Context and Capability

Annex IV Coded Documents of the Analysis Towards the Main Factor of Coherence

Annex V Coding Sheets of the Analysis Towards the Main Factor of Coherence (Excel-file)

Annex VI Numerical Outcomes of the Analysis Towards the Main Factor of Coherence

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Introduction

Chapter 1

1.1 Topic and Research Puzzle

In 2013, President Xi Jinping of China launched the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), officially aiming to foster trade and create people to people bonds (Nordin & Weissmann, 2018; Wang, 2016). The initiative, launched to connect China with its western hinterland, consists of two parts, the ‘Belt’ and the ‘Road’ part (Baltensperger & Dadush, 2019; Chaisse & Matsushita, 2018; Churchill et al., 2019; Chen, Gamassa, and Kany, 2017; Meijnders & Van der Putten, 2015; Nordin & Weissmann, 2018; Pan, Wang, and Yang, 2018). The ‘Belt’ part stands for a modern revival of the classic Silk-road, running between China and Europe through Central Asia and Russia in the form of roads, railways and pipelines (Baltensperger & Dadush, 2019; Chaisse & Matsushita, 2018; Churchill et al., 2019; Meijnders & Van der Putten, 2015; Nordin & Weissmann, 2018). The ‘Road’-part encompasses maritime routes between China, Europe and the east coast of Africa, running through the Chinese Sea, the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean. To support these routes, China invests in a network of ports and coastal infrastructures (Baltensperger & Dadush, 2019; Chaisse & Matsushita, 2018; Churchill et al., 2019; Chen, Gamassa, and Kany, 2017; Meijnders & Van der Putten, 2015; Nordin & Weissmann, 2018; Pan, Wang, and Yang, 2018). The reactions to this initiative are mixed. Some countries welcome the investments and point to potential economic growth, while other countries are more reluctant in participating in the BRI due to fear of Chinese involvement in domestic policies and dependency on China (Grieger, 2018).

Within Europe, China has taken an active role promoting and establishing bilateral relations with multiple countries regarding the BRI, including both members and non-members of the European Union (EU) (BRI.cn, 2019; Skala-Kuhmann, 2019). According to Skala-Kuhmann (2019), almost half of the member-states of the European Union (EU) already signed bilateral trade agreements with China regarding the BRI. The EU itself, however, is not involved by China in these negotiations (Baark, 2019). According to Baark (2019), this is the result of the Chinese perception of Europe as a continent which is weakened by internal political divisions and a succession of wars (e.g. French-German War, First and Second World War, Cold War and more local conflicts such as the Yugoslav Wars) revealing historical tensions among member states in which the EU is not believed to be capable to overcome these historical differences. Therefore, China does not perceive the EU as a credible actor to conduct its

Introduction

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE A research towards EU actorness

2 Introduction ₃

an actor is not recognized in a certain aspect by other actors is no reason on itself for reduced international activity. As an example, he poses that the movements of Hamas and Hezbollah are not internationally recognized either, while they are both internationally active.

This is a rather notable situation, since the BRI is what some even call the “the largest and most ambitious global connectivity initiative of present times” (Skala-Kuhmann, 2019, p. 144). Several scholars and strategists share the opinion that the EU should play a decisive role in relation with China regarding the BRI (Chang & Pieke, 2017; Farooki, 2018; Grieger, 2019; Misiągiewicz & Misiągiewicz, 2016). Misiągiewicz & Misiągiewicz (2016, p. 40), for example, state, based on the fact that China is the second most important trade-partner of the EU, that “This trade interdependence should be a major incentive for the EU to pay close attention to and engage in the OBOR project.”. Next to this, Chang & Pieke (2017) and Farooki (2018), underscore that a direct response of the EU towards the BRI instead of a fragmented EU where every member-state has its own relations with China, would reduce the chance on Chinese soft power exertion and economic disadvantage regarding EU member-states with regard to this initiative. Besides, a fragmented relation with China regarding the BRI could, in turn, lead to a weaker EU with less global influence due to a loss of credibility (Chang & Pieke, 2017). Even though other scholars such as Meunier (2014) and Garlick (2019) are more moderate in their assessment of these issues, most scientific sources agree that a “successful politicaleconomic China strategy [regarding the BRI] will require a decisive and united EU capable of effectively holding its trading partners – including China – to their responsibilities and obligations” (Chang & Pieke, 2017, p. 4). Also the European Commission (EC) agrees that the EU should play a more active role regarding key aspects of the BRI. For example regarding Foreign Direct Investments (FDI’s) in strategically important fields (e.g. harbors and energy infrastructures), the President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, stated during his State of the Union in 2017: “Let me say once and for all: we are not naïve free traders. Europe must always defend its strategic interests. This is why today we are proposing a new EU framework for investment screening. If a foreign, state-owned, company wants to purchase a European harbour, part of our energy infrastructure or a defence technology firm, this should only happen in transparency, with scrutiny and debate. It is a political responsibility to know what is going on in our own backyard so that we can protect our collective security if needed.” (Baark, 2019, p. 89-90). Although China or the BRI is not mentioned specifically, Baark (2019) poses that this statement was indeed directed to China.

business with, constraining EU action with regard to the BRI (Baark, 2019). Next to this, Skala-Kuhmann (2019, p. 144) states that even “In the sixth year of its existence, BRI has still not seen a unified approach from geographical Europe or, for that matter, from the European Union or even EU member states.”. Misiągiewicz & Misiągiewicz (2016, p. 39) add that “the European Union has to date been slow and reluctant in responding to the ‘One Belt, One Road’ idea” (One Belt, One Road (OBOR) is another name for the BRI). Blockhuis & Hu (2019) continue by stating that the EU currently responds to the BRI merely through existing legislation, such as legislation on free market competition, state aid and public procurements. However, the fact that the EU legislation on state aid does not incorporate state aid from outside the EU, may be seen as an indicator that the EU was (and still is) not prepared for something like the BRI interfering in its ‘backyard’ (Blockhuis & Hu, 2019). According to Grieger (2018), the EU, next to these regulatory tools, launched ‘the Berlin Process’ in 2014 through which the ‘Connectivity Agenda’ was created. This ‘Connectivity Agenda’ is part of the broader Western Balkans Investment Framework and plans and regulates infrastructural investments in the Western Balkans by the EU (European Commission [EC], 2018). This agenda could be perceived as a sort of ‘counterbalancing’ regarding the BRI. One could, however also regard this as acting ‘around’ the BRI instead of reacting directly to the BRI itself. These aspects of the current situation show that next to being excluded by China from BRI-related negotiations, the EU itself, apparently, undertakes little or no action regarding the BRI either.

This apparent inability or reluctance to take initiative and to act is also acknowledged by other authors such as Gabusi (2019), Chang & Pieke (2017) and Geeraerts (2019). They all arrive at this conclusion in the same way, namely by analyzing the EU’s response on BRI related projects in geographical Europe. Skala-Kuhmann (2019), for example, looked to projects, such as the 16+1 network (a network consisting of sixteen Central and Eastern European countries plus China that cooperate on a wide variety of themes) and Chinese funded infrastructural projects. This led her to conclude that “EU institutions, namely the European Commission, did not respond with a unified approach to China’s grand foreign policy design” (Skala-Kuhmann, 2019, p. 147). Gabusi (2019, p. 96), concludes the same after “analysing the official discourse in EU documents, and comparing them with the dynamics that the BRI has been generating, especially in Central Europe and in the Western Balkans”. So, this leads to a situation where at the one hand, China does not actively involve the EU, while on the other hand, the EU itself has also shown to be unable or unwilling to take initiative and to act regarding the BRI hitherto. Hereby it should be noted that although the EU’s exclusion by China from negotiations may sound as an explanation as to why the EU undertakes little action regarding the BRI, Thomas (2010; 2012) argues that the fact that

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one another and whether an actor is coherent with itself through time (Börzel & Van Hüllen, 2014; Da Conceição-Heldt & Meunier, 2014). Chapter 3, the Theoretical Framework, will further elaborate on these factors. Based on this information, the research question of this thesis is formulated as follows: “What factors can explain the low degree of actorness of the European Union regarding the Belt and Road Initiative?”.

Since there is a low degree of actorness in our case, there are probably one or more main factors that constrain EU actorness regarding the BRI from ‘taking place’. By studying all three main factors, one can explain the low degree of actorness of the EU regarding the BRI.

To study the main factors of context and capability, three qualitative content analyses will be conducted (also towards underlying criteria) towards primary sources (EU documents and two EU webpages) that treat relevant themes. Regarding the main factor of coherence, a quantitative content analysis will be conducted towards primary sources, consisting of EU documents that represent the external message of the EU regarding BRI related themes. Further elaboration on the analyses will be provided in Chapter 4, the Methodology.

Regarding the analysis, the focus wil be placed on the EU perspective, only using primary EU documents for the analysis in order to increase the comparability of the used sources. In the Theoretical Framework, a broader literature review is provided (subchapter 3.3) on the main factors of context and capability.

1.3 Relevance of this Thesis

Regarding several subjects, such as terrorism (Brattberg & Rhinard, 2012), climate policy and the environment (Groen & Niemann, 2013) and trade policies (Bretherton & Vogler, 2013), research has been conducted towards the actorness of the EU. However, regarding EU actorness concerning the BRI, there is a gap in the literature. Considering the scale of the initiative and the potential impact it might have on the EU and its member-states, this gap is remarkable. Through the endeavor of filling this knowledge gap, this thesis participates in an academic dialogue regarding EU actorness.

Next to this, since the BRI will have a substantial impact on states and people alike across Europe, and the EU could play a role in shaping it, it is, from a societal point of view, important to pinpoint why the EU is not taking this role. By studying this phenomenon, this research generates input for the public debate regarding the EU and the BRI.

Last, as discussed above and as will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 2, the literature mentions several ways in which China could increase its soft power capacity with regard to the EU and its member-states through the BRI. Examples are so-called debt trap

1.2 Research Question and Framework

This limited (re)action of the EU towards the BRI and the fact that EU member-states individually react on the BRI shows, what some would call a low degree of EU-‘actorness’. In this context, ‘actorness’ is understood as the extent to which an actor can deliberately operate among and with other actors within the international system (Sjösted, 1977). This definition of ‘actorness’ will also be used in this thesis. To measure the degree of actorness, Brattberg & Rhinard (2012) and Thomas (2010) determine whether an actor actually deliberately operates in the international system. Brattberg & Rhinard (2012, p. 574), for example, pose that EU actorness regarding international terrorism is not “complete”, because little actual policies have been made let alone have been implemented in a consistent manner. Groenleer & Van Schaik (2007) present EU actorness regarding the International Criminal Court and the Kyoto Protocol as an example of a case where the degree of EU actorness is considered high. They base this statement on the fact that the member-states of the EU coordinate their external policies regarding these topics. With regard to the EU and the BRI, the degree of EU actorness is deemed low based on the notions, as elaborated upon above, that the EU hardly operates at all among and with other actors in the international system regarding the BRI, that the member-states act individually regarding the BRI and that these member-states do not have a jointly coordinated policy in this regard.

This thesis aims to explain this low degree of EU actorness with regard to the BRI. Actorness can be enabled or constrained by several factors. In this thesis the main factors of context, capability and coherence will be used. In this framework, context is about contextual elements that influence actorness (Brattberg & Rhinard, 2012; Bretherton & Vogler, 2013; Da Conceição-Heldt & Meunier, 2014; Jupille & Caporaso, 1998). This factor bundles two external criteria, namely: recognition, about how an actor is seen by other actors, and opportunity, about the ‘climate’ in which an actor operates (for example whether contemporary paradigms enhance or constrain certain actions by the actor in question) (Brattberg & Rhinard, 2012; Bretherton & Vogler, 2013; Da Conceição-Heldt & Meunier, 2014; Jupille & Caporaso, 1998). The main factor of capability is about the different ‘tools’ an actor has and whether it is able to use those tools (Brattberg & Rhinard, 2012; Bretherton & Vogler, 2006; 2013). An example is the legal instruments (e.g. regulations, laws and EU power to negotiate) the EU has at its disposal to screen Foreign Direct Investments (FDI’s) within the EU and whether the EU is able to actually use these instruments. The third and last main factor this thesis will use is coherence. Coherence is about how coherent an actor and its institutions are among themselves (Bretherton & Vogler, 2013; Da Conceição-Heldt & Meunier, 2014; Nilsson et al., 2012). In this thesis, this is considered to be about whether the different values, preferences and goals of the policies an actor sets out are coherent with

The BRI and the EU: Context and Background ₇ THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE

A research towards EU actorness 6

diplomacy, where China uses the debts of a country to foster one’s own bargaining position and asymmetric use of agreements, in which case China, while benefitting itself from an agreement does not fulfill its own promises (Were, 2018; Kamo & Okano-Heijmans, 2019). These practices can coerce a country in a certain direction in ways that come close to hard-power policies, where countries or groups of people are forced to do something without being offering a choice (Arreguín-Toft & Mingst, 2017). In fact, some analysts even warn for a ‘Scramble for Europe’ where ‘divide and conquer’ tactics will be used by China to foster its position (Farooki, 2018; Godement, Parello-Plesner, & Richard, 2011). Obviously, the methods mentioned above can be a threat to countries and peoples that are involved in the BRI also within the EU. Therefore, research regarding the low degree of EU actorness in this respect, fits very well in the field of Crisis and Security Management (CSM).

1.4 Structure of this Thesis

The outline of this thesis will be as follows. After this introduction, Chapter 2 will present background information on the BRI itself, how the EU generally constructs its policies and the implementation of the BRI in Europe including reactions of the EU on the BRI so far. Next, Chapter 3, the Theoretical Framework, will elaborate on the theory regarding actorness and the factors that either enable or constrain actorness. Chapter 4, the Methodology,

will discuss how the research will take place and what methods will be used. In Chapter 5, the results of the analysis itself will be presented and reviewed. Last, Chapter 6, the Conclusion, will finalize the thesis by evaluating and recapitulating the study and by giving recommendations for further research.

Chapter 2

In this chapter, three topics will be elaborated upon to provide further information and context on the themes that will be handled during the analysis of the main factors. The first subchapter will handle the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) itself. In this subchapter, background information consisting of the BRI’s history, varying interpretations and its consequences, will create a better general understanding of the BRI as phenomenon. Next to this, themes that will be used for the various analyses, such as the official goals of the BRI and the different forms in which the BRI materializes, will be explained and placed into context. The second subchapter is about the organizational structure of the EU regarding the construction of its policies. This subchapter provides information on the different (policymaking-related) competences of the EU regarding different themes. Covering this topic gives insight into how the EU constructs its policies regarding these different themes, which also cover the different facets of the BRI. During the analyses, discussed in Chapter 5, insights about these competences and methods of policy construction will be used. The third and last subchapter is about the implementation of the BRI in Europe and its consequences. This subchapter treats the broader developments of the BRI in Europe and in relation with the EU, providing context and further background information for the research of this thesis.

2.1 History, Concept and Goals of the Belt and Road Initiative

During the rise of the Persian Empire in the 5th century BC, trade started to flourish in Central Asia (Brakman, Frankopan, Garretsen, and Van Marrewijk, 2019). In the following centuries, the Persian road network was extended and from the 2th century BC, the Chinese empire became connected (Chin, 2013). Among others, silk became an important trading good and the Silk-Road, as most historians call it, came into existence (Chin, 2013). In 2013, the Chinese President Xi Jinping launched the One Belt One Road Initiative (OBOR), later rephrased in English as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (Nordin & Weissmann, 2018). Within this name, ‘Belt’ stands for a modern revival of the classic Silk-road,

connecting China, Central Asia, Russia and Europe to one another through roads, railways and pipelines (Baltensperger & Dadush, 2019; Chaisse & Matsushita, 2018; Churchill et al., 2019; Meijnders & Van der Putten, 2015; Nordin & Weissmann, 2018). The ‘Road’-part encompasses the maritime ‘Silk-road’ which includes a network of ports and coastal infrastructures along the Chinese sea, the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean, connecting

The BRI and the EU:

Context and Background

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE _{The BRI and the EU: Context and Background}

8 ₉

China, Europe (via the Suez-canal) and the east coast of Africa (Baltensperger & Dadush, 2019; Chaisse & Matsushita, 2018; Churchill et al., 2019; Chen, Gamassa, and Kany, 2017; Meijnders & Van der Putten, 2015; Nordin & Weissmann, 2018; Pan, Wang, and Yang, 2018). Although the BRI appears to be a grand strategy, most documentation about it is relatively vague and sometimes even contradictive. This is also acknowledged by Gabusi (2019) and Baltensperger & Dadush (2019, p. 12) who state: “Lack of transparency is perhaps the defining trait of the BRI and the projects carried out under its umbrella”. The countries and infrastructural entities that are envisioned to take part, for example, seem to differ per source. This also applies for the potential routes the BRI will encompass and the amounts of money that are to be invested (Baltensperger & Dadush, 2019). This is best exemplified by Figures 2.1 and 2.2. Figure 2.1 shows how Kany, Chen, and Gamassa (2017, p. 142) pose that the route of the BRI runs through Russia and Kazakhstan. The map they use even shows multiple destinies of the BRI in this region. Figure 2.2 (Bottazzi, Hotez, Wang, Zhan, Zhu, and Zou, 2019, p. 5), on the other hand, depicts the BRI completely different. In this map, the economic belt of the BRI runs through Central Asia instead of Russia and Kazakhstan and Moscow is as only Russian destiny, included as a stopover. Besides, in this map the route ends at Rotterdam, while Kany, Chen, and Gamassa (2017) let the route continue all the way to Madrid in Spain. This example shows how two different authors have two very different perceptions of the BRI. It seems that the BRI can be better perceived as a broad framework within which countries can take part and investments can be made, with the final goal in mind of an economically connected Eurasia with China as centrepoint.

To construct the BRI, China invests great amounts of money - estimates range around 150 billion USD per year - in many different countries along the route (Farooki, 2018). However, also on this aspect, there is no unambiguous number and Baltensperger & Dadush (2019) show how this amount ranges between 1 trillion USD for an unspecified amount of time to 8 trillion USD to be invested within 20 years.

The BRI serves China to reach five official goals, these are: increased policy coordination, people-to-people bonds, unimpeded trade, connectivity facilitation and financial integration (Wang, 2016). However, several scholars and institutions pose that China also has other underlying goals it hopes to achieve through the BRI. Chang & Pieke (2017), for example, argue that, although China promotes the BRI and itself as the forefront of free trade, its main objectives are to increase its own access to resources, boost its own exports and relieve its industrial over-capacity. With this focus on its own economic growth, China would not shy away to harm other countries in its course (Chang & Pieke, 2017). Last, Gabusi (2019)

sees the BRI as a method for China to project its vision on global governance (a multipolar structure). Some authors even perceive the BRI in this context as a method of China to exert soft power in the involved countries (Chang & Pieke, 2017; Kamo & Okano-Heijmans, 2019; Were, 2018).

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE

A research towards EU actorness The BRI and the EU: Context and Background

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This figure shows how the route of the BRI runs for a major part through Russia and Kazakhstan and includes several separate destinies in these regions. Besides, in this map the BRI continues all the way to Madrid in Spain. Source: Kany, Chen, and Gamassa, 2017, p. 142

This figure shows how the route of the BRI runs through Central Asia, enters Europe via Turkey and depicts Moskow as the only stopover in Russia. Next to this, the end of the BRI-route seems to be Rotterdam. Source: Bottazzi, Hotez, Wang, Zhan, Zhu, and Zou, 2019, p. 5

Figure 2.1

Figure 2.2

2.2 Competences and Policy Development of the EU

In 1992, after long preliminary deliberation, the Treaty of Maastricht was signed by all EU member-states (Wincott, 1996). With this Treaty, the so-called pillar-structure became implemented (Wincott, 1996). This structure consisted of three main pillars comprising different themes and governing structures. In this structure, also the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was included (CVCE, 2020c; Wincott, 1996). The goal of this policy was to foster the common values of all member-states and the interests of the EU (CVCE, 2020c). In the following years, the treaties of Amsterdam and Nice, which entered into force in respectively 1999 and 2003, made several adjustments to the Treaty of Maastricht (De Beare, 2008). The Treaty of Amsterdam made some amendments of which the formal addition of the Petersburg Tasks to the CFSP, which are about a wide range of tasks spanning from humanitarian and rescue missions to peacekeeping operations, are the most notable (Kriz & Chovancik, 2013; Quille, 2006). The Treaty of Nice, fostered closer cooperation among the member-states, further institutionalized the EU, granted it more decision power and added the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) (which was later, following on the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, rephrased as Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP)) to the CFSP (De Beare, 2008). With this, the treaty prepared the EU for further expansion eastward (De Beare, 2008).

After the Lisbon Treaty entered into force in 2009, the pillar-structure was abolished and several other adjustments were made to the governing structure of the EU. These adjustments intended to increase the decisiveness and power of the EU, including veto-power for the European Parliament and a mandate for the European Commission to represent the EU regarding union wide foreign affairs (Groen & Niemann, 2013). Next to this, a High Representative of Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (who was already installed, but called differently (namely: High Representative for CFSP), following on the Treaty of Amsterdam) represents the EU concerning matters that are included in the CFSP (Groen & Niemann, 2013). After the formal abolishment of the pillar-structure, a relatively similar structure was implemented consisting of three strands comprising different themes and methods of governing. The first strand is about issues where the EU has exclusive competence such as monetary policies and custom policies (EUR-Lex, 2016). This means that for these issues, the EU is the only actor that is authorized to make legislation and adopt binding decisions, except when it specifically authorizes a member-state to act (EUR-Lex, 2016). It is not specifically defined which institution(s) within the EU-organization (e.g. European Commission, the European Council) is then responsible for this, relevant legislation and summaries hereof refer to “the Union” (s. 3.1 and 3.4 Categories and Areas of Union Competence, Consolidated Versions of the Treaty On European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union) or the “EU” (EUR-Lex, 2016). However, based on the usual competences of the different institutions, it makes sense to assume that the

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European Commission takes on managerial and executive tasks and proposes legislation while the European Council defines priorities of the EU and its political direction (GOV, 2013). The second strand is about themes such as the internal market and environmental issues (EUR-Lex, 2016). Here, the EU shares its competences with the member-states and both the EU and its member-states may engage in binding acts (EUR-Lex, 2016). In practical terms this means that a member-state may act in areas where the EU decides not to act or is not capable to act (EUR-Lex, 2016). Regarding the third and last strand, the EU has a supporting role where it helps to coordinate or complement member-states in their actions (EUR-Lex, 2016). This third strand comprises themes such as culture, the industry and civil protection (EUR-Lex, 2016). The CFSP falls outside the three strands and is a so-called special competence (EUR-Lex, 2016). Here, decisions are made through the intergovernmental method. This method implies that the European Commission, like all member-states, can propose topics on which the Council of the European Union (consisting of the, for the topic in question, relevant ministers of the member-states) decide through a majority of voting (CVCE, 2020b; De Beare, 2008). In this process, the European Parliament may only give non-binding advice (European Convention, 2003). The judicial accountability is ensured by the European Court of Justice (De Beare, 2008). ‘Day to day’ issues regarding the CFSP, are managed by the High Representative and the President of the European Council (consisting of the heads of government of all member-states) (EUR-Lex, 2016; De Beare, 2008).

2.3 The BRI in Europe and the EU Reaction

Since its launch in 2013, the BRI managed to establish several footholds in Europe. According to the website of the BRI (BRI.cn, 2019), Italy and the members of the so-called “17+1 group” or the Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries (China-CEEC) have become partner countries within the BRI network. Especially the membership of Italy is usually presented as the most notable development because it is one of the founding members of the EU and the first member of the G7 to join (Fardella & Prodi, 2017; Gabusi, 2019; Kamo & Okano-Heijmans, 2019; Sárvári & Szeidovitz, 2016). However, the China-CEEC may be more interesting to elaborate on, since most BRI-investments within Europe are made in these countries and they include 17 European states (including EU and non-EU members) (Grieger, 2018). The China-CEEC was founded by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2012 and originally included the following countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and Slovenia (Grieger, 2018). In 2019, Greece was added to the group (fmprc.gov, 2019). According to Grieger (2018) the China-CEEC is meant to foster

cooperation and coordination between the members in a wide array of fields. Herein, most member-states focus on a specific theme. Slovenia, for example focusses on forestry, while Poland manages coordination on maritime issues (Grieger, 2018). The way China positions itself in the group resembles the way China treats other multilateral coordination platforms it sets up around the world, which mostly comes down on a ‘no strings attached’ approach within a multilateral structure that has as function to foster bilateral ties (Jakóbowski, 2018). This leads to the notion that EU and China have two very different perceptions on regionalism. Gabusi (2019, p. 100) states about this that “For China, regionalism is fundamentally about creating communities of practice” while the EU regionalism is usually about sovereignty transfers, shared values and an Europeanization of policies in a country, creating a much more normative discourse. Especially for non-EU (sometimes EU candidate-) states in Europe, the Chinese approach can be appealing, since the normative approach of the EU may require many governmental changes while the Chinese concept has nothing of all this and has direct financial benefits as result (Gabusi, 2019).

2.3.2 Materialization and Consequences of the BRI

The bilateral ties between China and other states within the frameworks of both the BRI and the China-CEEC are exemplified by the several treaties, Memoranda of Understanding and concrete investments. Next to the Italian memorandum, one of the most famous examples is the Greek harbor of Piraeus that was bought by a Chinese state-controlled company called China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO) in 2009 (Van der Putten, 2014). In the following years this port grew from being the 77th container port of the world in 2009 to being number 46th container port in 2012 making it the fastest growing container port worldwide (Van der Putten, 2014). Also on a smaller scale, investments are being made. Examples are investments worth of 900 million Euro in Montenegro and around 2.6 billion Euro of infrastructural investments in Serbia (Grieger, 2018). According to Grieger (2018), these investments, especially have a negative impact among countries that have a relatively unstable government without a solid structure adhering the rule of law. This is also acknowledged by Farooki (2018), Godement, Parello-Plesner, & Richard (2011), Kamo & Okano-Heijmans (2019) and Were (2018), who add that there is even a chance on so-called debt trap diplomacy. In such a case, the creditor uses the debt of a country to foster one’s own bargaining position (Were, 2018). Next to this, Kamo & Okano-Heijmans (2019) mention that there are signs of asymmetric use of agreements, for example in Poland where a memorandum of understanding had great symbolic value for China, but Chinese promises remained unfulfilled. Last, the assertive bilateral approaches of China make that some analysts warn for a ‘Scramble for Europe’ where divide and conquer tactics will be used by China to foster its position (Farooki, 2018; Godement, Parello-Plesner, & Richard, 2011).

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Chapter 3

This chapter will elaborate on three main topics. In the first part, the concept of actorness will be introduced. In this subchapter, the concept of actorness in general, a brief description of its history and its application regarding a wide variety of topics will be discussed. This will result, among others, in the definition of a literature gap regarding EU actorness in the context of the BRI. In the second part of this chapter, factors put forward by the literature that explain actorness will be discussed. This will lead to a framework of factors and underlying criteria that will be used to explain the low degree of EU actorness regarding the BRI. In the third and last part, a literature review will be conducted towards the main factors of context and capability in relation to the EU and the BRI. This will create a better understanding of the topics and themes that are identified and discussed in the section 3.2 and that structure the analysis of these factors in Chapter 5.

3.1 Introduction to Actorness

Actorness is by most authors understood as the degree to which an actor can deliberately operate among and with other actors within the international system, or in the words of Sjösted (1977, p. 16): “the capacity to behave actively and deliberately in relation to other actors in the international system”. Throughout the years, the body of knowledge around this concept grew, bringing forward factors and frameworks that explain actorness. Since the goal of this thesis is to explain the low level of EU actorness regarding the BRI, these theories and frameworks will help to give this research a starting and focus point.

3.1.1 Conceptual History of Actorness

The concept of actorness was used for the first time by Cosgrove & Twitchett (1970) to explain the increasing influence of collectives such as the European Economic Community (EEC) and the United Nations (UN) in the realm of international politics, traditionally a field reserved for states. In this context, Cosgrove & Twitchett (1970), came up with three requirements for an intergovernmental organization to gain global influence as an actor alongside states. These factors are about the extent to which independent decisions can be made, the impact an organization can make in international relations and last, the importance that is attached to it by the members of the organization (Cosgrove & Twitchett, 1970).

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Sjösted (1977) built further on these notions, but put the emphasis on two different factors. According to him, especially internal cohesion and independence from external actors are important to enable actorness. During the 1990’s, the concept gained renewed attention; the EU performed less than expected, creating renewed interest in theories explaining this phenomenon (Drieskens, 2017). In the same period, two different frameworks explaining the working of actorness originated (Drieskens, 2017). The first framework was developed by Bretherton & Vogler (2006 (2nd ed.); 2013) in 1999. This framework contains three pillars or factors that explain actorness: capability, opportunity and presence. Among these factors, most emphasis is put on presence, which entails three subfactors: how an actor is perceived, the quality of the setting in which it operates and its appearance (Allen & Smith, 1990; Bretherton & Vogler, 2013). The second factor, capability, is about the capacity of an actor to make its own policy and to make use of its instruments to promote and foster these policies (Bretherton & Vogler, 2013). The third and last factor, opportunity, is about external factors, such as trends or ideas that enable or restrict action (Bretherton & Vogler, 2013). The other framework, which was constructed by Jupille & Caporaso (1998), contains four factors explaining actorness: recognition, cohesion, authority and autonomy. In this framework, recognition is about to what extend an actor is recognized as a legitimate party by other actors, cohesion is about whether an actor can internally come to an agreement regarding, for example, policy proposals and other decisions about external actions, authority is about the fields in which an actor has a legal say, and last, autonomy is about the degree to which an actor can make independent decisions (Groen & Niemann, 2013; Jupille & Caporaso, 1998).

One could argue that the factors described by Jupille & Caporaso (1998) and Bretherton & Vogler (2006) have some overlap. The concept of the factor capability, for example, covers parts of the factors autonomy and cohesion. These are, the capacity of an actor to make independent decisions and to have all internal members on the same page to efficiently make and pursue these decisions. On the other hand, there are some fundamental differences as well. Besides having both a strong focus on the internal factors that enable actorness, Bretherton & Vogler (2006) emphasize on external factors (opportunity and presence) as well. Next to this, Bretherton & Vogler (2006) created their framework with the EU in mind while Jupille & Caporaso (1998) tried to create a broader and more generalizable framework. Drieskens (2017) acknowledges this and continues by stating that besides these two main differences, it is not uncommon for studies about actorness to make variations and combinations of factors based on their specific need of the concept.

Despite these differences and variations, the concept of actorness and the frameworks that evolved around it, enable one to take both internal and external factors into account, making

that specific attributes of an actor (for example the EU) can be studied next to the context in which this actor operates. This makes that the potential influence of an actor in the field of international politics can be predicted next to explaining ongoing developments (Drieskens, 2017).

3.1.2 Actorness Studies and the Literature Gap Regarding the BRI

According to Drieskens (2017), most actorness research so far, is about the EU. These studies encompass a wide variety of subjects. Taking into account the three strands which reflect the competences of the EU regarding different themes, as elaborated upon in subchapter 2.2, it strikes that most of these themes have been covered. Some studies are relatively broad and with regard to ‘common’ topics such as safety and security policies and trade. Other studies are about specific niche topics such as EU actorness regarding space governance. Other types of actorness research are more about comparing the actorness of different international organizations.

Usually this is about comparing an organization or a country with the EU. Wunderlich (2012), for instance, compared the actorness of the EU with that of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). However, this kind of research is different than the type of study that will be conducted in this thesis. Therefore, this is less relevant to discuss.

An example of a relative broad study towards EU actorness is the research conducted by Bretherton & Vogler (2013). They conducted research towards global actorness of the EU by studying EU policies concerning developmental aid, foreign relations and security issues, climate and trade. In this study Bretherton & Vogler (2013) stuck to the factors they presented in the framework they published in 1999, by using the factors of presence, opportunity and capability to study the policies mentioned above. After analyzing these factors, they found that especially the factor of opportunity constrained global EU actorness.

Examples of research aimed on a more specific field, are specific studies towards EU actorness concerning security and defense policies and environmental policies. Brattberg & Rhinard (2012), for instance, conducted research towards EU actorness regarding terrorism. To discuss EU actorness in this regard, Brattberg & Rhinard (2012) used a framework of four main factors and several subfactors. The main factors they used are context, capability, coherence and consistency. The outcome of their research was that the EU has no complete actorness regarding terrorism, because the EU sends an inconsistent message over time and does not have the capability to ‘follow through’ on their policies (Brattberg & Rhinard, 2012). Another example of actorness research towards a relative specific field is the research conducted by Groen & Niemann (2013). They studied EU actorness regarding environmental policies, more specifically, EU actorness during the Copenhagen climate negotiations in 2009. After studying

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the factors of coherence, autonomy and the effects of the external context the EU operated in, they found that EU actorness was limited due to limited coherence and a constraining external context (Groen & Niemann, 2013). Groenleer & Van Schaik (2007), also conducted (a part of) their research towards environmental policies, namely EU actorness in the context of the Kyoto Protocol. They had a different outcome. They found, after studying the four factors of the framework of Jupille & Caporaso (1998) (recognition, cohesion, authority and autonomy), that the EU showed a high degree of actorness in the context of the Kyoto Protocol due to the fact that none of the four factors constrained EU actorness in this regard. An example of an actorness study towards a less common topic is the research conducted by Pieper, Winter, Wirtz, and Dijkstra (2011) to EU actorness in the Arctic region. They used the framework of Jupille & Caporaso (1998) (recognition, cohesion, authority and autonomy), with regards to different subtopics in relation to the EU and its interests in the Arctic region. According to them, EU actorness in this regard varies but is generally limited by the factors of recognition, cohesion and autonomy.

Also regarding topics that are more relevant for studying EU actorness concerning the BRI, studies have been conducted. Examples are research conducted towards EU actorness regarding the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) (Börzel & Van Hüllen, 2014) the EU’s global actorness in the form of foreign policy (Bretherton & Vogler, 2013) and trade (Wessel & Takács, 2017). Yet, the outcomes and used factors of these studies vary to a great extent. In the context of EU actorness in relation to the ENP, for example, Börzel & Van Hüllen (2014) put the focus on the factors of coherence and consistency. According to them, a lack of consistency regarding the goals of the ENP constrains EU actorness. However, as discussed above, the research conducted by Bretherton & Vogler (2013) towards global EU actorness, found that opportunity constrained EU actorness. Wessel & Takács (2017), in turn, present again a different outcome. They argue, after studying EU actorness regarding its trade and investment policies, that the factor capability not only enabled but even further fostered EU actorness.

Next to revealing the usage of a wide variety of factors to explain actorness in different contexts and the fact that the results vary per study and subject, this concise literature review also demonstrates that regarding EU actorness concerning the BRI itself, no research has taken place so far. This makes that this subject represents a gap in the literature.

3.2 Factors that Enable or Constrain EU Actorness

In this subchapter, factors that either enable or constrain EU actorness and that will be used in this thesis to explain the low degree of EU actorness regarding the BRI will be presented and discussed. To do this, the framework of Brattberg & Rhinard (2012) will be used as starting point. Of this framework, which consists of four main factors, three main factors will be included in this thesis to study the low degree of EU actorness regarding the BRI (see Table 3.1). In the following section (section 3.2.1), these factors and the reasoning behind this choice will be briefly discussed. In the sections 3.2.2 till 3.2.4, a literature review will be conducted to elaborate on each of the three main factors, leading to a combination of the input of several authors. This will create insights on the main factors regarding their underlying criteria (if applicable), characteristics and demarcation.

3.2.1 Three Main Factors

Brattberg & Rhinard (2012) used four main factors and several underlying subfactors for their research towards EU actorness in the field of terrorism. Three of these main factors will be used in the study conducted in this thesis. These are, context, capability and coherence and comprise both internal and external factors (Brattberg & Rhinard, 2012). Brattberg & Rhinard (2012) also mention a fourth main factor, which is not included in this thesis, namely: consistency. This factor is about the ‘faithfulness’ of internal actors (Brattbert & Rhinard, 2012). An example concerning the EU is, whether its member-states, over time, keep supporting the policies they agreed to and whether they keep supporting these policies when the actor in question tries to implement them (Brattberg & Rhinard, 2012). Although Brattberg & Rhinard (2012) pose that consistency is an important, yet often forgotten factor regarding actorness, this study will not include this factor because this research focusses on the actions and possibilities of the EU, including influences of its direct context, that enable or constrain actorness, not those of the individual member-states. In this way, the research is demarcated to the EU itself, enhancing the feasibility of this study.

The main factors of context and coherence are subdivided in two underlying criteria that make that these factors either enable or constrain EU actorness (see Table 3.1). Regarding the main factor of context, these criteria are recognition and opportunity. The main factor of coherence, contains the two criteria of coherence concerning the external message and coherence over time. The main factor of capability does not contain any underlying criteria (see Table 3.1). All three main factors that are included in this thesis, either enable EU actorness or constrain it (Brattberg & Rhinard, 2012). Therefore, for ‘complete’ actorness to ‘happen’, all factors and their underlying criteria have to be met (Brattberg & Rhinard, 2012). In the following sections starting with 3.2.2, the three main factors and their underlying criteria will be discussed.

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3.2.2 Context

The first of the three main factors this thesis will use to explain the low degree of EU actorness regarding the BRI is context. Context entails the external or contextual elements in the international field that enable or constrain an actors capacity to deliberately act in relation to other actors in the international system, in other words, its actorness (Brattberg & Rhinard, 2012; Bretherton & Vogler, 2013; Da Conceição-Heldt & Meunier, 2014; Jupille & Caporaso, 1998). The main factor of context bundles two of the three external criteria that were brought forward by Bretherton & Vogler (2013) and Jupille & Caporaso (1998), namely: recognition and opportunity. The criterion of presence is not included here, because recognition can be perceived as a reaction to presence. After all, presence, as elaborated upon by Allen & Smith (1990) (and as discussed above) is about whether and how an actor is recognized by other actors. Therefore, measuring recognition, makes the inclusion of presence as a separate criterion unnecessary. Even the definition of presence by Bretherton & Vogler (2013, p. 376), namely “Presence conceptualises the ability of an actor, by virtue of its existence, to exert influence beyond its borders [underlining added by author]” leads to the same conclusion since a ‘virtue of being’ only constitutes any effect if another actor ‘feels’ this presence and thereby recognizes it. This is also acknowledged by Brattberg & Rhinard (2012, p. 561) who state that “Jupille and Caporaso’s depiction of ‘recognition’ fits into this category [the category of structural presence as discussed by Allen & Smith (1990)]”. Besides, recognition as a criterion is better measurable because it constitutes a(n) (re)action of one or more actors instead of just ‘being’. Next to presence, the criterion of authority is not included in this study either. This criterion is not included because, as stated by Börzel & Van Hüllen (2014), authority is about the legal leeway an actor has, which will be covered by the main factor of capability. The main factor of capability, after all, is about the tools, including legal instruments, an actor has and how it uses them (Brattberg & Rhinard, 2012; Bretherton & Vogler, 2006; 2013). So, to conclude, the main factor of context is divided in two criteria:

Factors and Criteria

Context

Capability Coherence

Opportunity

Encouraging conditions

Possessing the tools and using them Agreement and alignment

Definition

‘Faithfulness’ to own message over time Recognition

Coherence concerning the external message Coherence over time

Coherence within an actors message Recognition as legitimate actor ‘Climate’ an actor is operating in

The definitions of the three main factors and their underlying criteria Table 3.1

recognition and opportunity. These will be discussed in the following two sections. 3.2.2.1 Recognition

The criterion of recognition is about the extent to which an actor is recognized as a legitimate party in the field it operates (Da Conceição-Heldt & Meunier, 2014; Jupille & Caporaso, 1998). In their research towards EU actorness in the field of global counterterrorism,

Brattberg & Rhinard (2012) measured this factor by looking to the legal position of an actor among the other actors. Brattberg & Rhinard (2012) do this, by studying if and, if yes, in what way an actor (in their case the EU) is involved in relevant international organizations or diplomatic relations. This follows from the so-called ‘co-operation’ theory on which Gehring, Mühleck, and Oberthür (2013, p. 860) elaborate. They state that recognition takes place when an intergovernmental organization such as the EU is able to act and contribute to international processes separately from its members. Together with this, Gehring, Mühleck, and Oberthür (2013) also state that the admittance of an intergovernmental organization to become member of an international organization is not self-evident, because an extra party at the Table usually means more costs and longer negotiations (Gehring, Mühleck, and Oberthür, 2013). They continue that membership of an organization such as the EU is usually only allowed if it can foster cooperation among its members, enhancing the goal of the international organization it wants to become member of (Gehring, Mühleck, and Oberthür, 2013). This means that in practice, membership is permitted in exchange for efficiency gains by the prospective member, or in other words, the recognition of an actors capacity to create these efficiency gains and thus be a relevant actor (Gehring, Mühleck, and Oberthür, 2013). So, since membership of an organization is a form of recognition of an actor, mapping the legal possibilities of the EU and its subsequent memberships to international organizations and frameworks regarding a certain theme, makes it possible to determine whether actorness regarding the topic in question is either enabled or constrained (Brattberg & Rhinard, 2012; Gehring, Mühleck, and Oberthür, 2013).

With regard to this criterion in the context of the EU and the BRI, it becomes clear when reading literature about this, that three main topics are relevant. The first topic is trade. Since, according to Wang (2016), the BRI is first and foremost about unimpeded trade, the criterion of recognition in this respect is about recognition of the EU as legitimate trade power by other international actors, primarily China. To reach the goal of unimpeded trade, access by non-EU partners of the BRI, primarily China, to the internal market and the customs union of the EU is key (Farnell & Crookes, 2016). With regard to the internal market and the customs union, which are methods of the EU to control its trade market, Bretherton & Vogler (2013) mention that, based on the ‘co-operation’ theory, EU membership of the World Trade

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Organization (WTO) can demonstrate whether the EU is recognized as legitimate actor. The second topic is about regulatory power of the EU regarding Foreign Direct Investments (FDI’s). Recognition of the EU in this regard is relevant because the BRI up till now is mostly materialized through (Chinese) FDI’s (see also subchapter 2.1) (Farnell & Crookes, 2016). Next to this, a major part of unimpeded trade is about FDI’s (Farnell & Crookes, 2016). The third and last main topic is about the EU’s capacity to formulate foreign policy. Recognition of the EU regarding its capacity to formulate foreign policy is relevant because the five official goals of the BRI, which include people to people bonds, policy coordination and unimpeded trade, are pursued among others through international politics in the form of Chinese foreign policy, creating interaction with the EU’s foreign policy (Amighini, 2018). Next to this, the BRI currently interferes in projects that fall under the EU’s foreign policy. An example hereof is the, by China initiated, “17+1 group” (see subchapter 2.3) of which several members also participate in the European Neighborhood Program (ENP), which is set up by the EU (Yu, 2018). In this context, partnerships following from the legal possibilities of the EU regarding its capacity to formulate foreign policy can demonstrate recognition (Farnell & Crookes, 2016).

3.2.2.2 Opportunity

Opportunity, is, as discussed above, about the ‘climate’ in which the actor operates. This ‘climate’ can foster or counteract certain actions, therefore influencing actorness. Themes such as the broader historical political and systemic context in which an actor operates influence this ‘climate’ (Brattberg & Rhinard, 2012; Bretherton & Vogler, 2013). Bretherton & Vogler (2013) approach this factor by describing the situation and explaining why it increases or decreases actorness. Their framework also presents four main themes that are generally relevant with regard to the criterion of opportunity, because they can either create or eliminate opportunities that enable EU actorness. The first are historical developments, such as the fall of the Soviet Union, that changed the general operating field of the EU (Bretherton & Vogler, 2013). Secondly, changing dynamics in applicable international organizations, such as the WTO, are relevant (Bretherton & Vogler, 2013). Thirdly, the changing relative international market position of the EU, which Bretherton & Vogler (2013), describe by comparing GDP levels (Gross Domestic Product) can create or diminish opportunities for EU actorness. Fourth and last, the changing self-positioning and doctrines of other relevant international actors, for instance China, and the consequences hereof can influence opportunity (Bretherton & Vogler, 2013). This theme may also have an effect on broader tendencies and ideology clashes, such as tensions between the EU, US and China regarding the liberal world order.

3.2.3 Capability

Capability is the second main factor in the framework of Brattberg & Rhinard (2012). As described above, capability is about the policy instruments an actor has at its disposal to make and pursue its own policies and whether it can utilize these instruments without any constraint (Brattberg & Rhinard, 2012; Bretherton & Vogler, 2006; 2013). This factor is not further subdivided in criteria. By knowing what policy instruments are available to an actor, one can predict or explain the degree of actorness (Brattberg & Rhinard, 2012). In this study, the legal leeway of an actor to make decisions and act accordingly will be included under capability as well. This will reveal whether and in what domains an actor is able to act independently and on behalf of its members. In the case of the EU, for example, whether its member-states agree with the EU representing them on certain issues (Da Conceição-Heldt & Meunier, 2014). Next to this, including legal instruments under the factor of capability, will provide insights with regard to the construction of policies.

Within the field of international politics, there are traditionally three main methods a state-like actor can use to exert influence on a third country, these are political, military and economic instruments (Bretherton & Vogler, 2013). In this context, political means are usually understood to be about diplomacy and negotiation with third parties which can be complemented with military and economical means, such as economic incentives or sanctions (Arreguín-Toft & Mingst, 2017; Bretherton & Vogler, 2013). These tools can be used through the foreign policy of the actor in question, in this thesis, the EU. This means that to exert influence on the BRI, the EU has to construct and enforce a foreign policy. Therefore, with regard to EU actorness regarding the BRI, the main factor of capability will be about how the EU constructs its foreign policy and what instruments it has to pursue this policy. As is elaborated upon in subchapter 2.2, this depends on the topic (EUR-Lex, 2016; Groen & Niemann, 2013). Since the main factor of capability can either enable or constrain actorness, EU actorness is thus influenced by the topic in question (Brattberg & Rhinard, 2012;

Bretherton & Vogler, 2013).

In the context of the EU and the BRI, there are four relevant themes regarding capability, based on the frameworks of Bretherton & Vogler (2013), Brattberg & Rhinard (2012) and insights brought forward by Farnell & Crookes (2016). These themes are: the EU’s policy instruments regarding the regulation of its internal market, the EU institutions and organizations and their function with regard to the EU’s foreign and trade policy, such as the European External Action Service (EEAS), the decision-making process regarding foreign policy (in order to understand which parties have a say in this process and in what way) and the instruments the EU possesses to pursue or enforce its policies and the decisions it takes.