Libya and Syria: Just War and Just Abstinence?

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MSc Crisis and Security Management (CSM) Master Thesis

Libya and Syria: Just War

and Just Abstinence?

A comparative analysis of NATO’s humanitarian intervention in Libya in 2011 and the absence of such an intervention in Syria in the same year, in light of Just War Theory.

Supervisor: I.L. Elias Carrillo MSc Second Reader: S. Boeke LL.M.

Student: M.C.F. van der Klugt MSc Student number: s0951277

Word count: 32,933 The Hague, June 8, 2017

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Acknowledgements

I would like extend my sincere gratitude to everyone who has helped and supported me during the conduction and the writing of this research. First of all, thank you to my supervisor Leticia Elias Carrillo MSc for her comprehensive feedback and valuable suggestions, both in writing and during our meetings, and for her patience, as I did not always stick to the approved plan during this process. Secondly, I would like to thank Anne van Hasselt MA, who has checked this thesis thoroughly for linguistical errors, for her corrections and input. Finally, thanks to my fellow students, for all the moral support during the countless coffee breaks at the University Campus in the previous months.

Matthijs van der Klugt MSc The Hague, June 2017

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Abstract

This research revolves around the military intervention for human protection purposes in Libya in 2011 and the absence of such an intervention in Syria in the same year. These two cases will be addressed from the perspective of Just War Theory (JWT) – the criteria of which determine whether a war can be considered morally justifiable and which provide the basis for the current existing framework for interventions with humanitarian protection purposes – in order to examine whether this doctrine can explain why an intervention was authorised in Libya and not in Syria. As such, this research intends to find out whether the intervention in Libya and the lack thereof in Syria were justifiable from a JWT perspective, and, this way, it aims to provide new insights regarding the feasibility and durability of the current existing international framework for humanitarian interventions. It will be argued that the intervention in Libya can be considered just to a very large extent and that the JWT criteria would legitimise an intervention in Syria in the same year as well. Consequently, it will be argued that JWT cannot explain the different outcomes in the Libyan and Syrian cases: an intervention would have been justified in both countries because in both cases the just cause criterion was present and an intervention was – or would have been – a last resort with a reasonable hope of success. Hence, it will be concluded that the current framework for interventions with human protection purposes is showing serious flaws: if an examination of the preconditions – in this case the JWT criteria – show that similar cases are entitled to a similar course of action, but get treated differently instead, the framework in which the decisions are made is insufficient and unreliable and therefore seriously malfunctioning.

Key words: Just War Theory (JWT), Libya, Syria, Humanitarian Intervention, Responsibility

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List of Images and Tables

Front Page: Image of women wrapped in a Libyan and Syrian flag, posted to Twitter by @okbahmushaweh, published by The Telegraph……….. 1

Table 1: Four Scholars on the jus ad bellum Criteria……… 20

Table 2: Four Scholars on the jus in bello Criteria……… 25

Table 3: JWT Criteria Distinguished for This Research……… 28

Table 4: The JWT Criteria Defined and Operationalised……….. 42

Table 5: The JWT Criteria Applied to the Intervention in Libya……….. 72

Table 6: The JWT Criteria Applied to the Situation in Syria in 2011………... 79

Table 7: The Applied JWT Criteria Compared………... 82

Table 8: Presence of the Indicators in the Case of Libya……….. 105

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List of Abbreviations

ACLED Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project

AFP Agence France-Presse

AU African Union

BBC British Broadcasting Corporation

BC Before Christ

BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa CSM Crisis and Security Management

EU European Union

FIDH International Federation for Human Rights HRC Human Rights Council

HRW Human Rights Watch

ICC International Criminal Court

ICISS International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty IDP(s) Internally Displaced Person(s)

IS Islamic State

ISI Islamic State of Iraq

JWT Just War Theory

LAS League of Arab States

LCCS Local Coordination Committees of Syria LLHR Libyan Federation for Human Rights NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NGO(s) Non-Governmental Organisation(s) NTC National Transitional Council

OHCHR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights POW(s) Prisoner(s) of War

R2P Responsibility to Protect

SNHR Syrian Network for Human Rights SOHR Syrian Observatory for Human Rights SRGC Syrian Revolution General Commission

St. Saint

UAE United Arab Emirates

UCDP Uppsala Conflict Data Program

UK United Kingdom

UN United Nations

UNGA United Nations General Assembly UNSC United Nations Security Council UNSG United Nations Secretary-General

UNSMIL United Nations Support Mission in Libya

US United States

VDC Violations Documentation Center in Syria WMD(s) Weapon(s) of Mass Destruction

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1. Introduction

1.1Topic and Problem Statement

With the adoption of Resolution 1973 – on the situation in Libya – on March 17, 2011, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) authorised the use of force for human protection purposes, for the first time against the wishes of a functioning state (Bellamy and Williams, 2011: 825). Until then, previous authorisations in the same context had always been in either the absence of a central government, or in consent with a(n) (interim) government (Ibid.). Therefore, the subsequent military intervention in Libya could mark a turning point in the debate on the plight of internally displace persons (IDPs) and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Several days after authorisation by the UNSC, members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) initiated the intervention, which included the establishment of a no-fly zone and the launches of aerial attacks on government forces of the then incumbent Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi (Kuperman, 2013: 105).

The reason for this intervention was the severe and indiscriminate use of violence by Qaddafi’s military forces against the Libyan population, in response to the eruption of protests in demand for dignity, human rights, elections, democracy, and good governance, in February 2011 (e.g. Payandeh, 2012: 372; Roy, 2012: 5; Saxon and Pratt, 2015: 152). Over the course of just several weeks, both the demonstrations and the violence in the country escalated completely. According to multiple accounts, Qaddafi’s forces indiscriminately bombed civilian targets in urban areas and sometimes even executed unarmed civilians (e.g. Kirkpatrick, 2011b; Berti, 2013: 27).

Almost simultaneously – as part of the same wave of rebellion that swept across Northern Africa and the Middle East in 2011 – people in Syria launched protests against the regime of President Bashar al-Assad, in regard to general human rights violations, a lack of democracy, poverty, and inequality (e.g. Zifcak, 2012: 73; Saxon and Pratt, 2015: 161). As was – allegedly – the case in Libya, government forces indiscriminately cracked down on protesters and mass gatherings and the situation eventually escalated into a civil war during subsequent months and years (MacHugo, 2014). Despite several important similarities between these two cases, the UNSC has never authorised an intervention for civilian protection purposes in Syria, as it did in Libya.

Three main similarities can be distinguished between the cases of Libya and Syria. First, mass protests against the respective regimes started in 2011 around the same time: in

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9 Libya in February (e.g. Cerone, 2012: 532; Payandeh, 2012: 372; Saxon and Pratt, 2015: 152) and in Syria in March (e.g. Zifcak, 2012: 73; Saxon and Pratt, 2015: 161). Secondly, the regimes of the two countries responded with similar forms of indiscriminate violence against demonstrators. Both in Libya (e.g. HRW, 2011a; Payandeh, 2012: 372; Saxon and Pratt, 2015: 15) and in Syria (e.g. HRC, 2011c: 28; HRC, 2012b; Zifcak, 2012: 73), multiple occasions of severe and destructive military force against civilians have been reported, including – but not limited to – torture, arbitrary arrests and detention, abuse of children’s rights, sexual violence, and violations of economic and social rights. Finally, both countries eventually resorted into civil war, although in Libya this happened after the ousting of Colonel Qaddafi, whereas President Assad is still the incumbent President of Syria.

Hence, in 2011, protests against the regime erupted both in Libya and Syria and both regimes, arguably, responded with violence and oppression (Morris, 2013). Yet, in the case of Libya, an intervention was authorised, whereas a possible intervention in Syria has been vetoed within the UNSC ever since, despite the currently still ongoing civil war, the occurrence of large-scale loss of life, and a large amount of IDPs. Considering the many similarities between the two cases, it remains unclear why the international community – represented by the UNSC as the legitimate authority in such cases – decided to mandate an intervention Libya and not in Syria. If it is truly a concern of the international community to defend innocent people against wrongful attacks and to prevent human suffering and the violation of human rights – as is implied by the endorsement of the principles of R2P by all United Nations (UN) members in 2005 (CQ Researcher, 2011: 11) – it seems logical to assume that similar measures should be taken in similar cases.

1.2Research Question and Framework

This thesis aims to address the cases of Libya and Syria in light of the just war doctrine, or Just War Theory (JWT). JWT consists of two sets of criteria, which address the right to go to war and the right conduct in war (Childress, 1978: 428). Taken all together, these criteria can determine whether a war is morally justifiable (Ibid.). From this perspective, this study will revolve around the central research question to what extent can JWT explain why an intervention took place in Libya in 2011 and not in Syria in the same year. Three narrower sub research questions, which will help answering the central research question, have been established. First, to what extent can the intervention in Libya in 2011 be deemed just? Secondly, to what extent would an intervention in Syria have been justifiable? Thirdly, what

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10 are the implications of the answers to these first two questions for future military interventions for human protection purposes?

As such, it will be investigated to what extent JWT can explain the legitimacy of a military intervention for human protection purposes in Libya, and the lack of such an intervention in Syria. To be more specific, it will be examined to what extent the Libyan intervention can be deemed just by applying the different criteria of contemporary JWT to the intervention in the country in 2011. Additionally, the same criteria will be applied to the situation in Syria in the same year, in order to examine whether an intervention there would have been justifiable.

The JWT framework is suitable for such a research because of the extensive overlap between its criteria and the core principles of R2P. The latter are captured in a report, titled

The Responsibility to Protect by the International Commission on Intervention and State

Sovereignty (ICISS). This report can be regarded as the legal basis for the intervention in Libya, since it specifies the conditions under which international military interventions might be justified in cases of humanitarian crises (ICISS, 2001; Biersteker, 2013). However, from a scientific perspective, JWT can be regarded as an academic doctrine, whereas R2P is more of a legalised policy concept. The JWT criteria seem to provide an academic theoretical basis for the (policy) concept of R2P, in the sense that R2P has become an embodiment of JWT (Saxon and Pratt, 2015: 135). This embodiment is the reason why JWT remains an existential guiding standard for investigating and judging the application of R2P in practice (Ibid.). By applying the criteria of JWT to (potential) interventions that are legally grounded in R2P, one can investigate whether these interventions were morally justifiable or not according to the academic doctrine that underpins their legal foundation. Hence, by examining the Libyan and Syrian cases in the light on JWT, one can compare both cases to a set of similar criteria in order to determine the justifiability of an intervention in one case and the lack thereof in the other. Additionally, this kind of research can provide new insights regarding the feasibility and durability of the current existing international framework for humanitarian interventions. If the results of such a research point out that an intervention had been justified – or not justified, for that matter – in both cases, while an intervention occurred in (just) one of these cases, it can be argued that this framework is deficient and unreliable.

1.3Relevance and Purpose

The intervention in Libya and the civil war in Syria have reignited both the academic and societal debates on the framework and the validity of humanitarian interventions, especially

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11 those based on the R2P principle. A consensus has not been reached, neither within nor outside the academic realm, which makes additional research desirable. Considering the link between JWT and R2P, and examining the legitimacy and justifiability of the Libyan intervention and the lack of an intervention in Syria, this research can provide new insights in regard to the feasibility and durability of the current existing international framework for humanitarian interventions.

As such, this research aims to contribute to the academic, political, and public debates surrounding humanitarian interventions: is there a future for this kind of intervention and is the current underlying framework sufficient? This research does not aim to investigate and question the divergent motives different individual actors may have had in regard to mandating an intervention in Libya and preventing one in Syria. Rather, it aims to find out whether the intervention in Libya and the lack thereof in Syria were justifiable from a JWT perspective, and, this way, whether there is a future for the current framework of interventions for humanitarian protection purposes, considering the link between JWT and R2P as explained in the previous section.

1.4Content and Structure

In this research, it will be argued that NATO’s intervention in Libya can be deemed just to a very large extent. Additionally, it will be stated that the JWT criteria would have allowed for an intervention in Syria in the same year as well. Consequently, it will be argued that it cannot be explained from a JWT perspective why an intervention took place in Libya in 2011 and not in Syria in the same year: in light of JWT, an intervention would have been justified in both countries. Therefore, it will be concluded that the current framework for interventions with human protection purposes is insufficient: if similar cases demand a similar response, but get opposing outcomes instead, the framework in which these decisions are made, is insufficient, unreliable and showing serious weaknesses.

In order to arrive at the abovementioned conclusion, a literature review in support of the necessity of this research, a historical overview of JWT, a delineation of contemporary JWT’s criteria, and an explanation of JWT’s link with R2P will be outlined in the second chapter. Subsequently, the methodology used for the conduction of this research, the operationalisation of the JWT criteria, and an explanation of how these criteria are measured will be presented in the third chapter. In the fourth chapter, the situations in Libya – including NATO’s intervention – and Syria in 2011 will be discussed, preceded by a short outline of the so-called ‘Arab Spring’, in order to put the cases in the right context. After that, the

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12 intervention in Libya and the situation in Syria will be analysed in light of the operationalised JWT criteria, in order to provide answers to the three sub research questions and eventually to the main research question. Finally, the conclusions of this research will be presented in the sixth chapter.

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2. The Just War Doctrine

This chapter, which contains the theoretical framework of this research, consists of four sections. In order to put this research in context and to underline its added value to the academic debate, the first section will contain an overview of the contributions of various scholars who have already addressed NATO’s intervention in Libya, with and without making a comparison to the situation in Syria. Subsequently, the focus will turn to the doctrine that will provide the theoretical framework of analysis for this research: Just War Theory, or JWT. Over the course of more than two millennia, multiple contemporary versions of the concept of just war have evolved from a broad historic tradition (Casey, 2005: 186). In the second part of this chapter, a short historical overview of JWT and its development will be presented. Thirdly, the different criteria characterising contemporary JWT will be delineated in three different subsections. Finally, the relation of the concept of R2P with JWT will be discussed in the fourth section of this chapter.

2.1Literature Review

The protests that erupted in Libya in the spring of 2011, the allegedly violent response of the Libyan authorities to these protests, and the subsequent NATO-led intervention have been subject to extensive academic debate. Some scholars gauge the legitimacy of the (authorisation of) the intervention, some use the Libyan case to evaluate the (future of) interventions with humanitarian protection purposes, whereas others make the comparison with Syria and aim to explain the different outcomes in both cases from different angles. Sometimes only one of these topics is addressed, while in other cases a combination of two or even all three of these streams is made. In this section, an overview of these academic contributions will be delineated. This overview will show that the academic literature on the cases of Libya and Syria is abundant, but that there seems to be a knowledge gap in the literature on both cases in the light of JWT. As such, it will be argued that additional research into the Libyan and Syrian cases from a JWT perspective is useful and desirable.

A comparison of the Libyan and Syrian cases in light of JWT and R2P has been investigated by Saxon and Pratt (2015). From a legal perspective, these scholars present an examination of the relationship between JWT and R2P. They advance the argument that R2P should be seen as a contemporary embodiment of the historical JWT principles, rather than considering it to be a modern principle of international law (Ibid.: 135). With examples from

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14 the cases in Libya and Syria, they state that the JWT criteria of just cause and proportionality – which will be discussed in the next section – will continue to be existential guiding standards for judging the application of R2P in practice (Ibid.). As such, they conclude that R2P remains a principle in development and that interventions with human protection purposes are still left without a clear legal justification, considering the absence of clear state practice in this area (Ibid.: 171). Moreover, a military intervention under the auspices of R2P will remain contentious in cases of the absence of authorisation by the UNSC (Ibid.).

Zifcak (2012) also compares the Libyan and Syrian cases and he aims to determine why the response of the international community was different in both cases. However, he ignores JWT as the foundation of R2P and solely focuses on the question what the different outcomes can tell about the practice of R2P. According to him, the intervention in Libya can be deemed a successful application of R2P because many Libyan civilians were protected from certain humanitarian suffering due to the intervention (Zifcak, 2012: 71). For Syria, in contrast to the Libyan case, there was no consensus within the UNSC that the situation constituted a threat to international peace and security (Ibid.: 74). Especially the Russian delegation argued that an intervention might provoke considerable regional instability.

Kuperman (2013) reassesses NATO’s Libya intervention in light of the broader R2P debate, and like Zifcak he does not mention R2P’s link with JWT. He focuses on the fundamental question “…whether intervention can achieve its explicit humanitarian objective…”, but also takes into account the impact of the intervention on other interests, such as the spread of democracy and the security and prosperity of intervening states (Kuperman, 2013: 107). He concludes that future potential interveners should beware of misinformation and disinformation, as his analysis offers reasons to assume that NATO misperceived the situation in Libya prior to the intervention (Ibid.: 133-134). According to him, if the West had accurately perceived the situation in Libya, “…NATO would have been much less likely to launch an intervention that gravely exacerbated humanitarian suffering and security threats in Libya and its neighbors” (Ibid.: 134).

Additionally, Kuperman states that interventions may backfire by escalating rebellion, because sub-state groups could be encouraged to violently provoke state retaliation if they believe it will attract an intervention that could help them to achieve their political objectives, such as regime change (Ibid.). Subsequently, this may prolong violence and hence invoke more humanitarian suffering, which is the opposite of what interventions aim to achieve. The desire for regime change could also be a potential pitfall for interveners: when interveners attempt to justify their actions, they tend to demonise the ruling regime of the targeted country

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15 (Ibid.: 135). As a result, the intervention is “…prone to expanding its objective to include regime change”, which in return may encourage the regime to continue fighting until the very end, resulting again in prolonged and escalated violence and humanitarian suffering (Ibid.).

His findings are to a certain extent supported by Morris, who states that “…Libya has served less as a showcase for the potential of R2P and more as a warning of its dangers” (Morris, 2013: 1280). Actually, Morris claims that R2P was rarely cited by UNSC members as an argument for intervention in Libya, but that the way in which NATO has implemented its UN mandate in the country has been used by Russia and China to discredit R2P in UNSC debates over potential action in Syria (Ibid.). As such, actors with a general sceptical attitude towards R2P, or those who do not deem it to be in their interests, have used the Libya intervention to delegitimise the concept of R2P in general. As a result, and in light of the cases of Libya and Syria, Morris argues that “…the prospects for future invocations of R2P as a basis for intervention by force are now significantly diminished…” and that “…R2P’s international standing can best be preserved through the excision of its most coercive elements…” (Ibid.: 1266). This means that future R2P missions should focus on guidance and support, whereas coercive military action should be considered outside its framework.

Ramesh Thakur (2013) states that the intervention in Libya was a perfect example for justifying R2P principles, but that the implementation showed “…the need for legitimacy criteria to guide decisions on authorizing and overseeing international military intervention” (Thakur, 2013: 61). He argues that NATO exceeded its mandate, for which the Syrian population paid the price, in the sense that this has caused the lack of an intervention there. According to Thakur, the R2P consensus that underpinned UNSC Resolution 1973, “…was damaged by gaps in expectation, communication, and accountability between those who mandated the operation and those who execute it” (Ibid.: 72). Hence, in his view the intervention in Libya was legitimate and the use of military force to prevent human suffering must always remain a last resort, but the international community should seek to improve the means of implementing these interventions.

With the exception of Zifcak (2012), the scholars discussed so far are sceptical and do not consider the intervention in Libya to be a success for the concepts of JWT and/or R2P, with Kuperman (2013: 133) even arguing that the intervention was “…a humanitarian disaster”, in the sense that arguably more lives were lost in the aftermath of the intervention than would have been the case without it, and that the intervention has exacerbated terrorist activity and other forms of violence in the region. Other scholars, however, argue that the intervention has opened the door to a better future for Libya, that it has prevented the deaths

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16 of thousands of innocent civilians, and that it can be seen as a success for NATO, Libya, and the Libyan people, despite the question mark that can be put over Libya’s transition afterwards (e.g. Chivvis, 2012; Daalder & Stavridis, 2012; Zifcak, 2012). Daalder and Stavridis (2012) even pose that the intervention can be regarded as a model and framework for future interventions.

Payandeh (2012) offers a comprehensive legal examination of Resolution 1973, contributing to the debates about the legality and legitimacy of the intervention in Libya. He focuses on the broad scope of the authorisation, which turned out to provide a legal basis for regime change in Libya (Ibid.: 355). When Payandeh writes his article in 2012 he concludes that the Libyan rebellion and NATO’s intervention can be deemed successful (Ibid.: 402). However, he also points out that the assertions of serious human rights violations and violations of humanitarian law on part of the Libyan protesters, together with the – at that time – still unclear circumstances surrounding the capture and killing of Qaddafi, could turn out to sincerely undermine the legitimacy of the intervention (Ibid.).

Another research from a legal point of view has been conducted by Garwood-Gowers (2013), who examines the implications of the Arab Spring – and the Libyan intervention in particular – for R2P and corresponding international law. In his essay, Garwood-Gowers argues that international law on the use of force has barely been influenced by the Libyan intervention because Resolution 1973 is consistent with previous UNSC resolutions authorising the use of force for human protection purposes (Ibid.: 595). Moreover, he argues that the adoption of Resolution 1973 and the subsequent intervention arose from a highly unusual junction of political and factual circumstances, rather than from an international commitment to combat humanitarian suffering (Ibid.). Pointing to Syria, he adds that – also after Libya – the international community remains deeply divided over when and how to respond to human rights violations committed by states (Ibid.: 615).

Although the previous paragraphs show that the academic literature on the intervention in Libya, the lack thereof in Syria, and comparisons of both cases, is abundant, there seems to be a gap in the literature on both cases in light of JWT. Most scholars tend to concentrate merely on the principle of R2P, approaching the concept in the form of a three-pillared mechanism – which will be explained in more detail in the fourth section of this chapter – rather than measuring criteria in order to determine the justifiability of (the absence of) an intervention. The research of Saxon and Pratt (2015) seems to be the exception; however, they do not measure the JWT criteria, but instead they focus on the legal foundations of R2P as an embodiment of JWT. Yet, this embodiment is the reason why JWT

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17 remains an existential guiding standard for judging the application of R2P in practice (Saxon and Pratt, 2015: 135). Moreover, from a scientific perspective, JWT can be regarded as an academic doctrine, whereas R2P is more of a legalised policy concept. By applying the JWT criteria to the cases of Libya and Syria, one can compare both cases by measuring a set of similar criteria, in order to determine whether the intervention conducted in Libya was legitimate and whether an intervention based on R2P would have been legitimate and justifiable in Syria as well. Additionally, such a research can provide new insights in regard to the feasibility and durability of the current existing international framework for humanitarian interventions. If the results of such a comparison indicate that an intervention would have been justified – or not justified, for that matter – in both cases, whereas an intervention did occur in (only) one of the cases, it can be argued that this framework is flawed and unreliable.

2.2Historical Overview of JWT

The JWT doctrine has a long history and seems to be as old as the conduction of war itself. In order to understand where the sets of criteria in contemporary JWT – which will be presented in the subsequent section – come from, a short historical overview of the development of JWT will be presented in this section. The origins of traditional JWT date back to the texts of Aristotle, Cicero, and St. Augustine of Hippo, but its development is mainly accredited to later scholars, such as Thomas Aquinas, Hugo de Groot (Grotius), and Francisco de Vitoria (Mooney, 2007: 204). Mainly due to this latter group of scholars, just war is regarded as one of three different perspectives from which Christians have historically assessed the moral justification of war, with pacifism and the crusade or holy war tradition being the other two (Casey, 2005: 186). In this sense, traditional JWT was an attempt to rationally ground “…the moral legitimacy of waging war between polities, states and nations” (Mooney, 2007: 205).

However, many centuries before the contributions of these Christian scholars were written, in the fourth century BC, Aristotle was the first to write on the different virtues of justice, as justice is not an easy virtue to define. Aristotle distinguishes three different senses in which the word ‘just’ is used in Book 5 of the Nicomachean Ethics (Fisher, 2013: 371). According to him, the first sense of justice is a “corrective or punitive justice”, which is the justice expected and practiced in courts (Aristotle, n.d.: 67) 1. Secondly, Aristotle identifies “distributive justice”, a sense of justice which can be explained as fairness and which is demanded in the distribution of resources (Ibid.: 71). Finally, Aristotle describes a general

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All references to Aristotle are from the translation and edition listed in the bibliography. This also applies to later quotations of Thomas Aquinas and Francisco de Vitoria.

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18 sense of justice, which is frankly defined as “what is morally right” and concerned with respecting the welfare of others (Fisher, 2013: 362). “…justice in this sense of the word is complete virtue”, Aristotle explains, “Thus righteousness or justice, so understood, is not a part but the whole of virtue.” (Aristotle, n.d.: 80). This sense of justice is the broadest of them all, since one can be considered to act justly as long as one takes the interests and welfare of other into account. Hence, the question that finally remains is which of these three senses of justice is the one required to make war morally justifiable.

For most Christian (medieval) JWT scholars, the sense of justice required in war was the corrective or punitive one (Fisher, 2013: 362). The thirteenth-century philosopher and theologian Thomas Aquinas, basing his views on what St. Augustine of Hippo wrote approximately one thousand years before him, states in his work Summa Theologiae:

We usually describe a just war as one that avenges wrong, that is when a nation or state has to be punished either for refusing to make amends for outrages done by its subjects, or to restore what it has seized injuriously (Aquinas, 1265-1274: 82).

As such, Aquinas makes it clear that in his views, war can only be just if it attempts to correct wrongdoings, which are referred to as wrongfully (and violently) taking something and harming people. Moreover, Aquinas argues that “…rulers have the right to safeguard the public order against external enemies, by using the sword of war” (Ibid.). In this sense, the justice in war is corrective justice, as it should be used as a punishment for committed atrocities.

This understanding of a just war as a war that avenges wrongfully inflicted harm is mirrored by Francisco de Vitoria, who wrote the following in the sixteenth century:

…he [a ruler] may not draw the sword against his own subjects unless they have done some wrong: therefore, he cannot do so against foreigners except in the same circumstances (Vitoria, n.d.: 303; emphasis mine).

Although Vitoria condemns violence, he explicitly makes an exception for the correction of wrongdoings, both in the cases of internal and external threats. Hence, he also regards war as morally justified if it is used to punish actors who wrongfully inflicted harm upon others.

During later centuries, JWT scholars moved away from the understanding that the justice required in war should be of a corrective or punitive nature (Mooney, 2007: 205). Instead, they have shifted their focus to a more defensive perception of justice, one that is grounded in justifications based on international agreements and international law (Ibid.).

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19 According to Fischer (2013: 363), there is an obvious reason for this transition. In medieval Christian Europe it may not have been considered problematic for a ruler of one state to exercise the power to judge, sentence, and punish the people of another state, but it certainly became precarious after the Peace of Westphalia gave rise to horizontally organised sovereign states in 1648. In the former situation, authority for action could be sought further up the hierarchy – all the way to the Pope if necessary – whereas in the latter situation, states themselves became the highest authority in the system, with sovereignty over their respective territories as a crucial condition for their mutual survival. As a logical consequence, (modern) states became more reluctant to wage war with the objective of punishing other states’ citizens (Ibid.).

2.3Contemporary JWT

The shift from a punitive to a more defensive understanding of justice has resulted in the establishment of contemporary JWT (Mooney, 2007: 205). This consists of a set of criteria or principles, which together can determine whether a war is morally justifiable (Childress, 1978: 428). As such, JWT is considered to be more of a doctrine or a tradition, rather than one single academic theory (Johnson, 1976: 41). Although most – if not all – JWT scholars acknowledge that war is atrocious, they argue that it is not always the worst possible option: the undesirability of certain outcomes, the importance of some responsibilities, and the possibility of preventing mass atrocities may justify resorting to war, but only if multiple criteria have been met (Guthrie & Quinlan, 2007: 15).

These criteria can be divided into two different categories: the jus ad bellum criteria, which determine whether one has the right to go to war, and the jus in bello criteria, which are concerned with the right conduct in war (Childress, 1978: 428) 2. There is no consensus among scholars regarding the criteria falling into the just ad bellum and jus in bello categories, although a considerable overlap exists. In the next subsections, the explanations of the criteria identified by four leading JWT scholars will be delineated, starting with the jus ad bellum criteria in first one and followed by the jus in bello criteria in the second one. In the third subsection the JWT criteria for use in this research will be presented.

2_{Some scholars, such as Mooney (2007: 205), also include a third category, the jus post bellum. The criteria falling into this}

category are concerned with actions to be taken in regard to ending hostilities at the end of war (Ibid.). However, the civil war that erupted in Libya following the ousting of Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi lasted until 2012 and the civil war in Syria still rages on at the time of writing this research (2017), whereas the timeframe for the analysis of this research will be the year 2011. As such, no useful comparison can be made for this category between the cases of Libya and Syria in 2011. For this reason, this category will neither be included in the theoretical framework of this research, nor in the analysis.

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2.3.1 The Right to Go to War: jus ad bellum

Childress (1978), Hurka (2005), Johnson (1999), and Orend (2005) have all addressed JWT and provided criteria that they believe to be part of the doctrine. As mentioned, there is an extensive overlap between their contributions, but some notable differences exist as well: Childress and Johnson both identify seven jus ad bellum criteria, whereas Hurka and Orend each describe six. All criteria distinguished by these scholars – which will be discussed in this subsection – are summarised in Table 1 at the bottom of this page.

The first jus ad bellum criterion mentioned by all four scholars – except for Childress, who ranks it second – is the just cause. Johnson (1999: 28-31) distinguishes between a classic and a modern interpretation of this criterion. According to him, the classical meaning of just cause was threefold: the defence of innocent people against an armed and wrongful attack, retaking something (either people, property, or other values) wrongly taken, or the punishment of evil. This classical meaning resembles the meaning of just war provided by Aquinas. In the contemporary world, these three meanings have evolved to self-defence – both national and regional – against an armed attack, retaliation for an armed attack, and an international response to threats to international peace and security (Ibid.). A similar definition is handled by Childress, who states that the reason to resort to war needs to be a “serious and weighty one”, including the protection of innocent civilians from unjust attacks, the restoration of wrongfully denied rights, and the reestablishment of a just order (Childress, 1978: 436). Childress argues that such significant and weighty reasons should be deemed necessary

Table 1: Four Scholars on the jus ad bellum Criteria

J.F. Childress T. Hurka J.T. Johnson B. Orend

Legitimate or competent authority Just cause Right intention Announcement of intention Last resort Reasonable hope of success Proportionality Just cause Legitimate authority Right intention Reasonable hope of success Last resort Proportionality Just cause Right intention Right authority Proportionality of ends Last resort Reasonable hope of success Aim of peace Just cause Right intention Proper authority and public declaration Last resort

Probability of success Proportionality

Sources: Childress (1978: 428) and Toner (2010: 82-83) 3

3

Both this table and Table 2 on page 25 are to a large extent derived from Toner (2010: 82-83), who himself based the criteria and their ordering on Johnson (1999: 28-29), Hurka (2005: 35-36), and Orend (2005, Sections 2.1 and 2.2). For these tables, Toner’s data are complemented with the criteria presented by Childress (1978: 428).

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21 necessary, because war inherently conflicts with the important moral objection not to kill or injure other people (Ibid.).

A slightly broader perception of the just cause condition is described by Hurka (2005: 35). Hurka, who states that the just cause is the most important ad bellum criterion, includes in his definition resistance against aggression, an armed attack on one’s own or an allied state, and state sponsoring of or support for deadly attacks on another state’s citizens without entering on the latter state’s territory (Ibid.). Not only is this definition very broad – “resistance against aggression” can be framed in such ways that defends numerous different cases – but Hurka also seems to label terrorism as a just cause for war, considering the third example, which, as he points out, has been the trigger for the 2001 Afghanistan war. Lastly, and important for this research, Hurka indicates that many contemporary JWT scholars include humanitarian interventions as a just cause, in which the civilian population of another state is protected from right-violations by their own authorities (Ibid.).

Finally, also Orend (2005, Section 2.1) claims that the just cause criterion is the most important of all, because it “…sets the tone for everything which follows”. According to him, self-defence of one’s own state or an allied state against an external armed attack, the protection of innocent civilians from aggressive and ruthless regimes, and punishment for uncorrected grievous wrongdoings are all morally justifiable reasons to resort to war. Moreover, Orend explicitly states that a humanitarian intervention can be deemed a just cause, if armed forces are used to violate the basic rights of innocent civilians. In this sense, the just cause for resorting to war is always related to resistance against a form of aggression and a received wrongdoing.

In contrast to the four other scholars, Childress (1978: 435) considers a different criterion to be the most important one instead of the just cause. He argues that the first criterion to determine whether a war is just, is the right or legitimate authority, since this functions as a presupposition and a precondition for the other criteria; this criterion basically determines who gets the responsibility to judge whether the other criteria will be met (Ibid.). However, besides this description, Childress does not provide a definition of the right authority, except for the general remark that “wherever there is sovereignty, there is right authority” (Ibid.). Hence, one could deduce from this remark that in his views the right to warrant an intervention should be in the hand of states, as the sole sovereign actors in the international political system.

Whereas Hurka (2005: 35) mentions the right authority as an ad bellum criterion, he does not elaborate on it. Johnson (1999: 28), however, in line with Childress’ general remark,

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22 states that the right authority for authorisation of the use of force lies with (an authorised representative of) a “sovereign political entity”. As such, he also implies that the only actors allowed to initiate a just war are states. However, Johnson also correctly points out that the right to authorise force has been given to the UNSC to a certain degree as well, even though this body lacks sovereignty in the traditional sense (Ibid.: 30). This resonates well with the ICISS report The Responsibility to Protect, in which it is argued that there is no better or more appropriate body for the authorisation of an international military intervention in case of a humanitarian intervention than the UNSC (ICISS, 2001: xii). Finally, Orend (2005, Section 2.1) links the proper authority to public declaration, which means that the decision to go to war has to be made public to one’s own citizens and to enemy states through the proper process. Orend also indicates that the appropriate authority is often specified in a state’s constitution (Ibid.).

A third criterion mentioned by all four scholars is the criterion of the right intention. Childress (1978: 436) poses that this means that the intention should be in line with the earlier determined just cause and he adds that a formal announcement or declaration of intention is also required. Although this does not necessarily have to be a formal declaration of war, Childress explains that failure to announce one’s intention of and one’s reasons for resorting to war is also “…a failure to exercise the responsibility of explaining and justifying exceptional action to those involved, including the citizens of one’s own country, the enemy, and third parties who have to decide how to respond” (Ibid.: 436-37).

Johnson (1999: 28) indicates that the right intention should be in concordance with the just cause too, whereas it should not include coercion, intimidation, and territorial aggrandisement. As such, it means that bad intentions and motivations should be avoided, while simultaneously “…serving the good of proper political life...” (Ibid.: 32-33). Orend (2005, Section 2.1) uses similar terminology, arguing that the previously determined just cause should be the only intention of the war: the actual motivation behind the right reason should also be morally justifiable. At the same time, one may not pursue a hidden agenda, which means that ulterior motives are ruled out, since they often lead to moral corruption (Ibid.).

Additionally, all scholars briefly mention that war should always be the last resort, which is the fourth ad bellum criterion. This means that one must have explored and/or tried every other possible solution, without any success resulting from it or without any reasonable expectation of success in the future (Childress, 1978: 436). Therefore, only if the aims cannot

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23 be achieved through non-violent means as diplomacy, one may resort to war (Hurka, 2005: 35). Orend provides the most extensive definition of the last resort criterion:

A state may resort to war only if it has exhausted all plausible, peaceful alternatives to resolving the conflict in question, in particular diplomatic negotiation. One wants to make sure something as momentous and serious as war is declared only when it seems the last practical and reasonable shot at effectively resisting aggression (Orend, 2005: Section 2.1).

Clearly, one must always first attempt to construct a dialogue with the opposing actor in order to open negotiations for a peaceful resolution. Only when one is convinced that war is the only viable option left, one may resort to it. It also becomes evident that diplomatic negotiations are regarded as the highest form of non-violent means to resolve a conflict. Johnson (1999: 28) is the only one to note that the last resort interacts with other ad bellum criteria in order to determine “level, type, and duration of force employed”.

Furthermore, there should always be a reasonable hope of success, or, as Orend puts it, the probability of success. Although the definition of ‘reasonable’ may depend on different situations, this criterion implies that “totally useless, pointless, or self-indigent warfare which reasonable people cannot expect to achieve goals or to express values” should be discarded as justifiable warfare (Childress, 1978: 437). Hurka (2005: 35) adds that the consequences of war will be to no purpose if there is no probability of achieving the predetermined just cause, whereas Johnson (1999: 29) points out that this criterion – as was the case with the last resort – helps to determine the amount, the type, and the duration of the employed forces. However, Childress, Hurka, and Johnson neither elaborate on how this probability can be measured, nor do they specify to whom the responsibility to measure it should be given.

Orend (2005: Section 2.1) states about this criterion that “a state may not resort to war if it can foresee that doing so will have no measurable impact on the situation”. Hence, the purpose of this criterion is to prevent violence that will turn out to be futile in hindsight. From this description one can deduce that the authority to determine whether there will be a reasonable chance of success is the state itself, which resonates with Orend’s view on the aforementioned criterion of the right authority. As such, it can be argued that the right or legitimate authority to wage war, is also the one who determines whether the chances of success are reasonable, which is on concordance with Childress’ remark that the right or legitimate authority basically determines who gets the responsibility to judge whether the other criteria will be met (Childress, 1978: 435).

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24 Finally, the last ad bellum criterion is proportionality, which is closely related to the reasonable hope of success criterion, as Childress explains. According to him, this criterion implies that the possible negative consequences of a war must also be taken into consideration and they may never be greater than the positive consequences of achieving the just cause (Ibid.: 438). This take on proportionality is endorsed by Hurka (2005: 35), who argues that “the destructiveness of war must not be out of proportion to the relevant good the war will do”. If the damage caused by a war is excessive, the ware cannot be considered just, not even if there was a just cause which could not be achieved by other means than war (Ibid.).

It is emphasised by Orend (2005, Section 2.1) that the weighed expected goods and the weighed expected wrongs should be universal goods and universal wrongs, since states tend to tally merely their own expected profits and their own costs once they have entered a war, thereby significantly downplaying the costs and benefits of the enemy and innocent third parties. So, only if the universal benefits are proportional to the universal costs, war may proceed and deemed just. This definition is affirmed by Johnson (1999: 28), who distinguishes between proportionality of ends in the ad bellum criteria and proportionality of means in the in bello criteria. The latter criterion will be delineated in the next section, but the proportionality of ends means that the “overall good achieved by the use of force must be greater than the harm done (…) the level and means of using force must be appropriate to the just ends sought” (Ibid.). Again, this criterion is closely linked to the previous two criteria of last resort and probability of success, as the proportionality depends to a large extent on the amount and type of forces the legitimate authority decides to employ for a certain period.

2.3.2 The Right Conduct in War: jus in bello

The second set of criteria are concerned with jus in bello, or the right conduct in war. In contrast to the ad bellum criteria, there is less overlap between the definitions of the authors for these criteria. Childress (1978) and Hurka (2005) both distinguish three of them, Johnson (1999) identifies only two, whereas Orend (2005) describes the most with six criteria. An overview of the in bello criteria provided by the scholars is displayed in Table 2 on page 25.

Childress (1978: 428) is the only author who extends the criterion of right intention from the jus ad bellum to the jus in bello criteria. According to him, the right intention does not only apply to the initial decision to go to war, but also to specific battles – and even specific acts – within the war (Childress, 1982: 145). Hence, even after the decision to go to war has been taken, it remains necessary to ceaselessly measure and scale the true intentions of

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Table 2: Four Scholars on the jus in bello Criteria

J.F. Childress T. Hurka J.T. Johnson B. Orend

Just conduct Intention Proportionality Discrimination Necessity Proportionality Proportionality of means Non-combatant immunity

Obey all international laws on weapons Discrimination Proportionality Benevolent quarantine for POWs No means mala in se No reprisals

Sources: Childress (1978: 428) and Toner (2010: 82-83)

of the combatants. In his view, the right intention is not merely something upon which can be decided at the beginning of a war.

A second in bello criterion is mentioned by all four scholars, although they label it differently. Childress (1978: 440) poses that the just conduct, the choice of weaponry and fighting methods, should be directly affected by the aim only to injure or kill targeted combatants. He explicitly states that attacks on non-combatants should be deemed illegitimate. This definition is mirrored by the discrimination criterion described by Hurka (2005: 36), which “distinguishes between those people who are and those who are not legitimate targets of military force”. Combatants are then classified in the former category, whereas non-combatants – hence, civilians – fall into the latter group. This does not mean, however, that civilian casualties are unacceptable at all: civilians may not be targeted deliberately, but sometimes they can occur as so-called collateral damage (Ibid.). The restrictions for this are embedded in two other criteria, necessity and proportionality, which will be described further on in this section.

This discrimination criterion is also described by Orend (2005, Section 2.2), who states that the military forces deployed by the legitimate authority “must discriminate between the civilian population (…) and those legitimate military, political and industrial targets involved in rights-violating harm”. Hence, only combatants inflicting the wrongs for which the just cause has been determined may be targeted, the civilian population is “morally immune from direct and intentional attack” (Ibid.). However, also Orend indicates that some collateral damage among civilians is permissible, as long as they have not been targeted deliberately. Calculated targeting of civilians, however, can never be excused (Ibid.). Finally, Johnson (1999: 29) calls this the non-combatant immunity criterion, but its meaning is similar

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26 to the ones described above: direct and intentional harm to non-combatants should be avoided and efforts should be taken to protect them.

There is one other in bello criterion that is mentioned by all four scholars and closely related to an ad bellum criterion with the same name: proportionality. Johnson distinguishes between proportionality of ends (ad bellum) and proportionality of means (in bello). Whereas the former was defined as the overall benefits of the war outweighing the overall costs, the latter is concerned with the avoidance of means causing unnecessary harm and the prevention of torture (Ibid.). Orend (2005, Section 2.2) points out that the amount of force used should be “that amount appropriate to achieving their aim or target”, meaning that it should be proportional to the end or just cause which is being sought. As such, weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) are basically ruled out, since they are usually considered to be out of proportion to any legitimate military goal (Ibid.).

Childress (1978: 440) writes about proportionality that soldiers in war have the obligation not to inflict unnecessary suffering. This is defined as cruelty – inflicting harm for the sake of harm – and “wanton destruction” – demolishing property without any urgent reason. Hurka (2005: 36) links the proportionality criterion to the discrimination criterion, as he states that it is concerned with the prevention of excessive force: “collateral killing of civilians is forbidden if the resulting civilian deaths are out of proportion to the relevant good one’s act will do”.

As mentioned before, Hurka also links another criterion to discrimination, which is necessity. He states that this criterion, which is linked to the ad bellum condition of last resort, entails that all killing is forbidden if no military purpose is served with it (Ibid.). This applies to the killing of soldiers, but especially to the (collateral) killing of civilians. As such, it serves as an extra guideline for inflicting collateral damage: harm may also not be inflicted upon soldiers if it serves no direct advantage for achieving the just cause and if the suffering of others transcends the achieved benefits. Childress (1978: 440) adds that this means that the use of certain weapons, such as inflammable projectiles of dum-dum bullets, is prohibited because they are expected to cause unnecessary suffering.

Finally, Orend includes some extra in bello criteria, of which some are already (partly) included in the other criteria. Orend himself already excluded WMDs from justifiable warfare in the proportionality criterion, but he includes another specific criterion which includes the obedience of all international laws on weapons prohibition (Orend, 2005: Section 2.2). The main effect of this criterion is the exclusion of biological, chemical, and – obviously – nuclear weapons. As such, this criterion overlaps to a large extent with the proportionality criterion.

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27 Closely related to this condition is the criterion of ‘no means mala in se’, which entails the prohibition of the use of weapons and means that are “…evil in themselves” (Ibid.). Examples of these include genocide, ethnic cleansing, mass rape campaigns, and treachery. However, it seems that these examples are already covered by the discrimination, proportionality, and necessity criteria, since no examples can be given of circumstances in which these means may have served a just cause or could not be labelled as unnecessary suffering or excessive force.

Additionally, Orend presents the criterion of benevolent quarantine for prisoners of war (POWs) (Ibid.). This criterion says that enemy soldiers who have surrendered and who became captives may not be killed and should be treated in concordance with all human rights. Although it may be good to stress this rule, the content of this criterion completely overlaps with the necessity criterion, which states that all killing (and torturing, etc.) is forbidden if no military purpose is served with it. Lastly, Orend lists a separate criterion of no reprisals, which entails that a violation of the in bello criteria by one’s belligerent may never be an excuse for oneself to violate the criteria as well.

2.3.3 JWT Criteria for This Research

In conclusion of this section it is important to distinguish the criteria that will be used to analyse the cases of Libya and Syria later on in this research. The criteria for this research will be based on the overlap that exists in the JWT criteria described by the four authors, as they have been delineated in the previous two subsections. As a result, six ad bellum criteria and four in bello criteria can be distinguished for use in the analysis of this research. An overview of these ten criteria can be found in Table 3 at the top of page 28.

The ad bellum criteria that will be applied to both cases are just cause, legitimate authority, right intention, last resort, reasonable hope of success, and proportionality of ends. All six of these criteria are mentioned by all four of the authors, although in some cases slightly different names have been handled for them. The in bello criteria that will be used are right intention, proportionality of means, necessity, and discrimination. Although this means that some of the criteria added by Orend (2005) will be excluded in this research as separate criteria, their content will still be covered by the four criteria that will be used in this research. Extensive working definitions of these criteria will be developed in the next chapter, together with their corresponding indicators that will be used in order to measure them.

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Table 3: JWT Criteria Distinguished for This Research

Jus ad bellum Jus in bello

Just cause

Legitimate authority Right intention Last resort

Reasonable hope of success Proportionality of ends Right intention Proportionality of means Necessity Discrimination 2.4JWT and R2P

As argued in the literature review in the first section of this chapter, the academic contributions on the cases of Libya and Syria largely ignored JWT and mainly focussed on R2P instead. However, it is interesting to have a closer examination of the two concepts together, as they seem to be closely linked to one another. With the publication of their book

The Forsaken People: Case Studies of the Internally Displaced at the end of the twentieth

century, Cohen and Deng (1998) sparked the debate on the plight of IDPs and R2P. According to the two authors, the legal norms and the institutional framework for providing protection of and assistance to IDPs showed significant weaknesses at the time. They argued that it was the international community’s duty to provide aid to IDPs in life-threatening circumstances, with or without the approval of the state concerned. Moreover, they stated that sovereign states failing to provide such aid themselves and refusing to receive it from others “should expect calibrated actions that range from diplomatic demarches to political pressures, sanction, or, as a last resort, military intervention” (Ibid.: 7).

Whereas these statements already show some resemblance with the JWT criteria outlined in the previous two sections, the debate that followed eventually reached its climax with the publication of a report by the ICISS, titled The Responsibility to Protect (ICISS, 2001; Biersteker, 2013: 255). In this report, it is specified under what conditions an international military intervention in case of a humanitarian crisis might be justified (Ibid.). As such, this report captures the core principles and basic foundations of R2P. This R2P framework delineated in the report shows some very significant similarities with the jus ad

bellum and the jus in bello criteria of JWT.

According to the ICISS report, R2P entails three specific responsibilities: the responsibility to prevent, the responsibility to react, and the responsibility to rebuild (ICISS, 2001: xi). Each of these three responsibilities is linked to a different phase of a conflict or

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29 crisis. The responsibility to prevent is concerned with the avoidance of any humanitarian suffering at all, as it is aimed at addressing the root and direct causes of man-made internal conflicts and other crises that put civilian populations at risk (Ibid.). Secondly, the responsibility to react means that the international community has the obligation “to respond to situations of compelling human need with appropriate measures” (Ibid.). These measures may be of coercive nature, which means that sanctions, international prosecution, and, ultimately, military intervention may be options. Finally, the responsibility to rebuild is concerned with the situation after a conflict or crisis – especially after a military intervention has taken place – and it includes the provision of “full assistance with recovery, reconstruction and reconciliation, addressing the causes of harm the intervention was designed to halt or avert” (Ibid.).

In the report, military intervention is considered to be an exceptional measure, so in order for such an intervention to be warranted, several criteria must be met (Ibid.: xii). It is because of these criteria that R2P seems to be an applied version of JWT. First, there is the just cause threshold, which is defined as actual or apprehended large-scale loss of life – with or without genocidal intent – and/or large-scale ethnic cleansing must occur or must be likely to occur (Ibid.). This definition appears to be a narrower interpretation of the just cause criterion in JWT: preventing large-scale loss of life or ethnic cleansing is definitely an example of defending innocent civilians against a (wrongful) attack and it is an understatement to point out that (genocidal) murder and ethnic cleansing are forms of aggression that violate civilian’s basic rights.

All of the four subsequent criteria, which are called the precautionary principles, seem to be derived from JWT criteria: right intention, last resort, proportional means, and reasonable prospects (ibid.). Similar to JWT, right intention means that the main goal of the intervention should be in concordance with the just cause, and hence to avoid or terminate human suffering. Also, in the definition of last resort, it is implied that military action is only justifiable when all other non-military options for peaceful resolutions have been explored and exhausted (Ibid.). Proportional means mirrors the meaning of the JWT criterion of proportionality (of means): it is indicated that the “scale, duration and intensity of the planned military intervention should be the minimum necessary to secure the defined human protection objective”, which resembles the argument that the amount of force should be appropriate to achieve the just cause (Ibid.). Additionally, the criterion of reasonable prospects states that there has to be a reasonable chance of success to actually avoid or terminate human suffering.

Libya and Syria: Just War and Just Abstinence?