Make your own future: Coups by non-commissioned officers

Pieter Verstappen (1543598)

Bachelor project 9

Dr. Kevin Koehler

Words count: 7884

Make Your Own Future:

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Index

1. Introduction ... - 3 - 2. Definitions ... - 5 - 3. Theorical Framework ... - 6 - 3.1 Hypotheses ... - 7 - 3.2 Research Design ... - 9 - 3.3 Context setting ... - 10 - 4. Case Analysis ... - 12 - 4.1 Hypothesis 1 ... - 12 -

4.1.1 Problems in the Surinamese military ... - 12 -

4.1.2 Three causes for success ... - 13 -

4.1.3 Surinamese military compared to N. Singh ... - 14 -

4.1.3 Sergeants coup and coups from below ... - 15 -

4.2 Hypothesis 2 ... - 16 -

4.2.1 The start of Surinamese self-government ... - 16 -

4.2.2 Suriname as an independent country ... - 17 -

4.2.3 Comparing Suriname to African cases ... - 18 -

5. Research question ... - 20 -

5.1 The Surinamese military ... - 20 -

5.2 Surinamese political conditions ... - 21 -

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1. Introduction

Als wij de leiding van de SKM naar huis sturen dan is het ook eerlijk om de andere leiding te laten gaan (If we send the management of the SKM home, then it is also fair to let the other

management go). – Bouterse (2009)

Desi Bouterse and fifteen comrades staged a coup in 1980 that seized power over the military and Suriname to Bouterse (Dew, 1994). Bouterse and his comrades were non-commissioned officers with no future within the military. Non-commissioned officers are officers that do not hold important leadership positions and will never be promoted to top-ranking functions. They are also ignored in the decision-making within the military. So for them, a coup from below was the only way to get a better future. To guarantee a higher position and influence in the decision-making, non-commissioned officers can plot a coup from below. This is not without risks, because most coups from below are not successful. The coup of 1980 in Suriname is an exception. This thesis will investigate this exception by answering the research question:

Under what circumstances can coups like the coup of 1980 in Suriname, staged by non-commissioned officers, be successful when the odds are against the plotters?

Professionalism is expected from the military (Huntington, 1981). This means that the government is in charge of the military and that the military must follow orders of the government. The military, however, is in charge of the hard power in a country. This makes them powerful and a threat for the sitting executive. When the military feels the need to intervene in politics, they can stage a coup (Alagappa, 2001; Gates, 1995). A coup has the intention to seize the power in a country. It is not easy for one part of the military to stage a successful coup. A divide can lead to friction within the military, which in the worst-case scenario leads to a civil war (Pion-Berlin & Esparza & Grisham, 2012). Followers are important for the coup plotters to stage a successful coup. According to Singh (2011), to acquire followers it is important to manipulate expectations. People are more likely to join the coup plotters’ side if they think it is the winning side. Top-ranking officers are generally more successful in acquiring large numbers of followers. According to the literature, successful coups are staged mostly by top-ranking officers (Thompson, 1976; Singh, 2011). Singh (2011) concludes that this is because top-ranking officers have more organisational resources. In addition, Singh

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concludes that lower-ranking officers are used to following orders of top-ranking officers, so that every decision of top-ranking officers is supported by the whole military. These findings assume that the military is a homogenous institution. This does not always ring true. Lower-ranking officers and soldiers can revolt against the top-Lower-ranking officers and the government. This can lead to coups from below. These are generally not as successful as coups from the top, but there are successful coups from below that differ from the general theory. In this thesis will be investigated what the circumstances are of a successful coup from lower-ranking officers. This thesis will be a single-case study. This thesis will look for the reasons that the case could deviate from the general theory. The case that is investigated is the coup in Suriname of 1980. This coup is called the Sergeants coup, because it was staged by sixteen non-commissioned officers (C. Singh, 2008). After the coup, Bouterse kept political power in Suriname for eleven years. This thesis will examine how non-commissioned officers can stage a successful coup, like Bouterse and his comrades did in Suriname. In Suriname, it seems that the non-commissioned officers were mistreated by the sitting executive and the top-ranking officers. This, and the malfunctioning political elite are seen as the main reasons for the successful coup in Suriname and will be the main focus of this thesis (Dew, 1994).

The thesis will first explain some definitions. Afterwards, the general theory on coups by lower-ranking officers will be reviewed and hypotheses formulated. These hypotheses will be examined by analysing the case of Suriname, by looking at the military of Suriname and the political history. Finally, the conclusion will offer an answer to the research question.

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2. Definitions

First, we need to define the important concepts in this thesis. The first concept that needs to be defined is that of the non-commissioned officer. Non-commissioned officers are low-ranking officers who rose through the enlisted ranks. In contrast, commissioned officers hold higher ranks and might be commissioned directly without passing through the lower enlisted ranks. While non-commissioned officers are considered the backbone of military organisations, they do not hold important leadership positions and do not have influence on decision-making within the military. Non-commissioned officers may also never have higher functions within the military. However, they still have an influence because they lead groups within the military. Because they are closer to soldiers than top-ranking officers, they are important both in coups from the top as in ones from below (Kandeh, 2004).

For a generally accepted definition of a coup, we need to look at Powell and Thyne (2011). According to them, a coup has three criteria. The first criterion is that the target is always the sitting executive with the intention of changing the regime. The second criterion is that the perpetrators of a coup should be part of the elite. The last criterion is that coups are illegal. For this thesis the second criterion is an interesting one. This is because according to Powell and Thyne (2011), coups not staged by an elite group are not considered coups. However, the case of the 1980 coup in Suriname shows that this definition has shortcomings. For this thesis, a coup will be defined as: an illegal act to oust a sitting executive and change a regime. A coup is successful when it seizes the power in a country. Widespread support within the military is a necessity in a successful coup (Singh, 2011).

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3. Theorical Framework

In this chapter, the literature about the general theory will be mentioned and explained. From the general theory the research question will be formed. Besides the literature about the general theory, the theory about the circumstances of successful coups from below will be mentioned as well. From this theory the hypothesis will be formed.

Singh (2011) argues that coup plotters are dependent on organisational resources. Therefore he suggests that coups by top-ranking officers are more likely to succeed. Top-ranking officers can use their resources to manipulate how people think about the outcomes. According to this argument, people are more likely to join the coup plotters if they think that the coup will be successful. Because it is easier for top-ranking officers to manipulate expectations, their coups are more likely to succeed. Coups by top-ranking officers are also less violent than coups by lower-ranking officers: violence creates problems with the image of the coup plotters, making it less likely to succeed.

The only way coups from below can succeed is if the coup plotters can make people believe that their coup will succeed. Widespread support is an important matter for lower-ranking officer to have a successful coup. Thompson (1976) did a quantitative research about successful coups and their plotters. Thompson concluded that of the coups staged by top-ranking officers, 91 per cent was successful. Only 27 per cent of the coups staged by lower-ranking officers were successful. In this research, there was one case of a coup of only non-commissioned officers and one case of non-commissioned officers and junior officers. Both of them did not succeed. The research of Thompson confirms the conclusions of N. Singh and Powell and Thyne. In general, a coup is more likely to succeed if it is staged by top-ranking officers. They have access to organisational resources and lower-ranking officers and soldiers are used to following orders by top-ranking officers (C. Singh, 2007). From the articles above, a general theory can be formed about why coups staged by top-raking officers are more likely to be successful. Nevertheless, there are examples of coups staged by lower-ranking officers that are, against the odds, successful. An example of a successful coup staged by non-commissioned officers is the 1980 coup in Suriname. This is the case analysed in this thesis. This thesis will examine which factors make a coup by non-commissioned officers successful. The research question therefore is:

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Under what circumstances can coups like the coup of 1980 in Suriname, staged by non-commissioned officers, be successful when the odds are against the plotters?

In short:

Under what circumstances can coups by non-commissioned officers be successful?

3.1 Hypotheses

Kandeh (2004) and Dwyer (2018) have both studied military behaviour in Africa. They both looked at behaviour of lower-ranking officers and soldiers when they rebel. Kandeh (2004) looked at coups from below in five countries in West-Africa. He finds three different similarities among all five cases. The first one is that coups from below are always more violent and more destabilising compared to coups from top-ranking officers. The second similarity is that coups from below bring more political violence after the coup. This affects all people in a country. The last similarity will be investigated in this thesis: all coups were staged against a divided political elite that failed to legitimise political power, curb corruption and promote socio-economic development (Kandeh, 2004). This political elite evoked resistance especially among the lower class. This resistance can lead to a coup from below. Due to the already existing resistance, it is easier to get followers for the coup.

Dwyer (2018) argues that some coup-proofing measures can lead to revolts of soldiers and lower-ranking officers. In some countries the sitting executive tries to prevent a coup by improving the economic position of top-ranking officers. The sitting executive tries to buy the loyalty of the top-ranking officers because they see the military as a homogeneous institution. In doing so, the improvements for the top-ranking officers can cause a divide within the military. These improvements cause a more unequal division of resources within the military. This can cause lower-ranking officers and soldiers to revolt against the sitting executive. The assumptions of Dwyer are supported by Albrecht and Eibl (2018). They looked at the motives of staging a coup or supporting one. They concluded that there was a difference between the motives of top-ranking officers and lower-ranking officers. If there is a high military budget, top-ranking officers are less likely to stage a coup. This explains why sitting executives sometimes improve the economic position of top-ranking officers, which Dwyer also argued. If political liberalisation and social spending are bad in a country, this increases

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the likelihood of a coup by lower-ranking officers, according to Albrecht and Eibl (2018). Dwyer (2018) gives an explanation; soldiers and lower-ranking officers are closer to lower class in a society. Therefore, the most important reason that soldiers and lower-ranking officers are more affected by political liberalisation and social spending is their proximity to the lower-class.

The general theory of this thesis is that a coup by lower-ranking officers, like non-commissioned officers, is less likely to succeed compared to a coup by top-ranking officers. A coup from below is less likely to be successful because it is harder for the plotters to get widespread support, due to lack of organizational resources. There are, however, conditions and reasons for soldiers and lower-ranking officers to join the coup plotters’ side. The first reason for lower-ranking officers and soldiers to join a coup is disaffection about their treatment compared to more senior officers. As already stated, non-commissioned officers and soldiers are overlooked in the decision-making process. In a well-functioning military, the top-ranking officers will listen to problems of lower-ranking officers and soldiers and make decisions in their favour. Nevertheless, disaffection can arise when the top-ranking officers and the sitting executive do not listen to the problems addressed by the lower-ranking officers and soldiers. This disaffection can cause lower-ranking officers to join a coup. This mistreatment can also be seen in the different coup-proofing strategies. A coup from below is less likely to happen when the sitting executive increases the social spending in a country (Albrecht & Eibl, 2018). Political liberalisation in a country will also proof a coup from below. These are two coup-proofing strategies that are less common. A coup-coup-proofing strategy that is more often used is increasing the military budget. This is a coup-proofing strategy that prevents a coup from above. The sitting executive tries to buy the loyalty of the top-ranking officers. The sitting executive thinks that the military is a homogenous institution, which means they think if the top-ranking officers are on their side, a coup will not happen. Improving the economic position of top-ranking officers, however, can lead to more disaffection among lower-top-ranking officers and soldiers. This coup-proofing strategy and the fact that the top-ranking officers and the sitting executive are only interacting with each other and overlook the problems of non-commissioned officers and soldiers, can lead to a coup from below. From this theory the hypothesis can be formed:

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Hypothesis 1: When the sitting executive only interacts with the top-ranking officers and both

the sitting executive and the top-ranking officers do not listen to problems of non-commissioned officers, this will lead to a successful coup by non-commissioned officers.

Widespread support within the military is important for a successful military coup (Singh, 2011). A reason for a successful coup can be a malfunctioning political elite. This can cause resistance of civilians, soldiers, and lower-ranking officers. Kandeh (2004) concluded that coups from below are always staged against a failing non-hegemonic political elite. This political elite is also associated with corruption and clientelism among other things. The political elite causes political instability in a country. This political instability causes resistance among civilians and lower-ranking officers and soldiers. Kandeh (2004) gives the example of Liberia, a coup in the same year as the coup in Suriname. In Liberia the human rights of the civilians were violated by the political elite. The civilians revolted and the government repressed this resistance. This was the reason for lower-ranking officers to stage a coup and seize the power. The malfunctioning political elite often coincides with low social spending and limited political liberalisation. According to Albrecht and Eibl (2018), these are important factors for coups staged by lower-ranking officers to happen. These factors are important in understanding why lower-ranking officers stage coups or why lower-ranking officers and soldiers support coups. Based on these considerations, the following hypothesis can be formed:

Hypothesis 2: Non-commissioned officers can successfully stage a coup when it is against a

malfunctioning political elite.

3.2 Research Design

The purpose of a deviant single case study is to explain exceptional and untypical cases (Lijphart, 1975; Hague & Harrop, 2013). There is a general theory or a norm and the case that is investigated deviates from the general theory or norm. A deviant single case study provides a contrast of the norm which can improve our knowledge of the norm itself. In summary, a deviant single case study investigates the exception to the rule.

In this thesis the general theory is that coups are less likely to be successful when staged by lower-ranking officers. The deviant case that will be discussed is the coup of 1980 in Suriname. This case was a successful coup staged by sixteen non-commissioned officers (Dew, 1994). The non-commissioned officers seized power over Suriname for eleven years. This is longer

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than the average military regime (Geddes, 1999). This coup was staged by non-commissioned officers (C. Singh, 2007). Still, this coup was successful, which deviates from the general theory. This makes the case of the coup of 1980 in Suriname a good case for this thesis. Against the odds, the coup was successful and transferred the power to Bouterse and his comrades. Under what circumstances could this happen? Answering this question contributes to the theory and gives factors for a successful coup by lower-ranking officers. The thesis will look for factors that can explain the success of a coup of non-commissioned officers. The next chapter will start looking at the historical context with the focus on Suriname after the independence of the country. It will explain the conditions within the military that led to a revolt of the military. The thesis will focus on the behaviour and mistreatment of non-commissioned officers and soldiers and their motives to stage the coup and join the coup plotters side. Besides that, it will look at the political conditions in Suriname that allowed the coup to happen. The thesis will investigate how in Suriname a malfunctioning political elite could rise. The mistreatment and the malfunctioning elite will be the two focus points to answer the research question.

3.3 Context setting

As already mentioned, the general theory of this thesis is that coups staged by lower-ranking officers, like non-commissioned officers, are less likely to succeed. This thesis will study a single-case study which deviates from the general theory, the coup of 1980 in Suriname (Dew, 1994). Suriname became independent of the Netherlands in 1975. Before independence, Suriname had a history of weak governmental institutions. The Surinamese parliament and government were dominated by ethnic political parties. These political parties did not differ in views on the main positions. Because of these similarities, the political parties mostly focused on gaining votes of their own ethnic groups (C. Singh, 2007). To get these votes they tried to get money from the Netherlands spent in areas where people of these ethnic groups lived. The Surinamese government made a mistake in not seeing the military as a potential threat. Non-commissioned officers especially were overlooked by the sitting executive and top-ranking officers. The non-commissioned officers tried to change a lot within the military but did not get support from the government and the top of the military. One of the problems was the salary of soldiers and non-commissioned officers (C. Singh, 2008). The commissioned officers earned a lot more than the non-commissioned officers and soldiers. There was also a

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difference in soldiers who were trained in the Netherlands and Suriname: soldiers that were trained in the Netherlands earned a lot more than those who were trained in Suriname.

This was one of the reasons that the non-commissioned officers wanted a union within the military. Roy Horb was the initiator of the union and appointed Desi Bouterse as chairman of the union. The government and top-ranking officers responded to the union by saying that they would not listen to what the union decides. The union however did not back down, because the government and the top-ranking officers did not listen to them. They kept holding meetings and in January 1980 they announced a strike against the Surinamese government. This strike was repressed by the police and some non-commissioned officers, who were union members, were arrested. This humiliation was the reason that Horb and Bouterse together with 14 non-commissioned officers, staged a coup which transferred the power within the military and the whole of Suriname to Bouterse. Bouterse remained in power until 1991 which makes the coup of 1980 a successful one (Dew, 1994).

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4. Case Analysis

The case will be analysed by looking at both the hypotheses. The first hypothesis will analysed by looking at the military of Suriname after the independence. This will also be compared to the theories from Kandeh (2004) and Dwyer (2018) and the general theory of N. Singh (2011) The second hypothesis will be investigated by looking at the historical context of Suriname. Especially, the political conditions before the independence and between the independence and the coup.

4.1 Hypothesis 1

To answer H1, first we will look at the problems non-commissioned officers had with the sitting executive and top-ranking officers. Secondly, interesting observations that can be made will be discussed. After that, the military of Suriname will be compared to the theory of N. Singh (2011). At last, the military of Suriname will be compared to the literature of coups from below.

4.1.1 Problems in the Surinamese military

To stage a successful coup, it is important to have many followers (N. Singh, 2011). According to N. Singh, to get followers, you need to manipulate the way people think about the outcome. For coups by non-commissioned officers to succeed, they must convince their peers. In Suriname this was not very difficult because non-commissioned officers and soldiers had a lot of problems with top-ranking officers (C, Singh, 2007). The first problem was with the payments within the military. Some non-commissioned and commissioned officers were trained in the Netherlands. They were payed much higher salaries than soldiers and non-commissioned officers trained in Suriname. Besides this, there was a big difference between the salaries of commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers.

Another problem were the fines that could be imposed on soldiers. The Suriname Armed Forces (SKM) was a small military without major threats. This made the military more of a parade force. Top-ranking officers insisted that their soldiers always needed to look perfect. For the smallest inconsistency, soldiers could be heavily fined. This caused discontent among the soldiers, which pushed them closer to the discontent non-commissioned officers.

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The last problem was with the commander of the SKM, Colonel Henck Elstak. Elstak was appointed by the Dutch, which gave people the idea that he was still working for the Netherlands (Dew, 1994). Some non-commissioned officers called him ‘de-Surinamesed Surinamer’. Elstak, on the other hand, did not like the non-commissioned officers. He called them ‘lamebrained boy scouts’, which illustrates the bad relationship between Elstak and the non-commissioned officers. The difference in payments, the heavy fines, and Henck Elstak, led to discontent between non-commissioned officers and soldiers. One thing the non-commissioned officers had learned from the Dutch is the importance of having a union (Dew, 1994). Due to all the problems, the non-commissioned officers started a union, Bond van Militair Kader (BOMIKA). Unfortunately, Elstak and the Surinamese government resisted against the BOMIKA. This did not stop the BOMIKA, who kept having meetings and recruiting members. In January 1980, the BOMIKA declared themselves on strike against the top-ranking officers and the government. The government used the civil police and the military police to end the uprising of the BOMIKA. The police arrested three leaders of the BOMIKA. This was seen by the non-commissioned officers as a humiliation by the government. This was the immediate cause for the coup.

On February 25, sixteen commissioned officers attacked the Memre Boekoe Kazerne, a munitions bunker and the marine base (C. Singh, 2008). Within hours, Prime Mister Arron ordered the defence to end their resistance. Bouterse immediately replaced top-ranking officers with his comrades and increased his numbers. He also appointed himself as commander-in-chief, closed the parliament, and fired the government.

4.1.2 Three causes for success

According to C. Singh (2008), there are three interesting observations. These observations are of importance for this thesis, to answer hypothesis 1 (H1). The first observation is that one reason that non-commissioned officers could stage a coup, is the way in which the military was divided. The SKM was a small army: after the independence, the SKM had 8 commissioned officers, 100 non-commissioned officers and 500 soldiers. There was a paucity of mid-level commissioned officers. The non-commissioned officers were the middle-management between top-ranking officers and the soldiers. The top-ranking officers and the Arron government did not see the importance of this middle-management. Through the lack of mid-level commissioned officers, the aggrieved non-commissioned officers and soldiers could bond about

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their discontent concerning the top-ranking officers. This led to a lot of support of ordinary soldiers for the coup.

The second observation is on the capriciousness of Elstak and Arron. They both never listened to the problems the BOMIKA addressed. Bouterse responded after the coup:

‘We tried repeatedly to talk with the military leaders. But they had no understanding of the actual situation. It wasn’t long before three-quarters of the army lost all interest in their duties. Morale sunk rapidly’ (Dew, 1994, p. 41).

This illustrates how the coup could have been prevented if Elstak and Arron had just listened to the issues the BOMIKA had addressed.

The third observation is that the coup was feasible. Due to the discontent of non-commissioned officers about the top-ranking officers and the sitting executive, some officers were already planning a coup for a couple of years before it actually happened. Furthermore, the Memre Boekoe Kazerne was an easy barrack to overtake. The location of the barrack was a poor one, a fact that was generally known. Because the government did not see anyone plotting a coup did not want to spend money to fix this. It was this indifference about the barrack and the growing discontent that lead people to planning a coup, that made the coup feasible.

These three observations are essential in explaining how the coup of 1980 in Suriname could be a success. Every observation can be seen as a failing of the sitting executive or top-ranking officers. This observations in addition to mentioned problems are the main causes for the successful coup.

4.1.3 Surinamese military compared to N. Singh

When comparing the case of 1980 in Suriname with the theory of N. Singh (2011), we can see differences and similarities. The first difference is an important one for this thesis. Coups from below are the least likely to succeed; the coup of 1980 was an exception to this theory. Another difference between the theory and the Sergeants coup, is the way the coup was plotted. According to N. Singh (2011), it is hard to plot a coup. This happens at social events, like birthdays. In Suriname, the coup did not have to be plotted on these social events. Because of the lack of mid-level commissioned officers, the coup could be planned at regular meetings. Also, the BOMIKA meetings could be used because the top-ranking officers and government

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did not look at these meetings. Another difference between N. Singh (2011) and the coup of 1980, is the number of plotters. For a successful coup from below, the plotters should be a big group, making it easier to get a lot of followers. In Suriname there were only sixteen coup plotters. It was only the discontent among all the soldiers about the top-ranking officers that made them join the coup. This made it easier for the sixteen plotters to get loyal followers. There are also some similarities between Singh’s theory and the Sergeants coup. The first one has already been mentioned, which is that coups from below are violent. This was also the case with the coup of 1980. The civil police and military police defended the barracks vigorously, which caused a lot of causalities (Dew, 1994). The second similarity is the motive of the coup plotters. Coup plotters from below often have more personal motives. In Suriname this was the treatment by top-ranking officers and the government. A last similarity is the minor role of the civilians. The Surinamese people did not play a major role in the coup. N. Singh explains this by the gap between civilians and military. This can be explained in Suriname because of the motives of the coup plotters. Later, when the coup was successful, the government was fired, and the parliament was closed, they got the support from the public.

In summary, there are some similarities between N. Singh (2011) and the coup of 1980 in Suriname. The coup deviates from the general theory. This might be the reason why the coup was successful. The differences, however, are not the main reasons that the coup was successful. It was the striking conditions that caused much support from soldiers and lower-ranking officers for the coup.

4.1.3 Sergeants coup and coups from below

Dwyer (2018) stated that lower-ranking officers, like non-commissioned officers, can revolt when the political regime only focuses on the top-ranking military positions. A frequently made mistake by leaders is seeing the military as a homogenous institution. They often try to buy the loyalty of these top-ranking officers by increasing their economic position. According to Albrecht and Eibl (2018), improving the military budget could prevent a coup by top-ranking officers.

On the down side, this can also create a bigger divide within the military. This bigger divide and what Dwyer (2018) concluded, is something we saw in Suriname (Dew, 1994). The top-ranking officers earned a lot more than the lower-top-ranking officers within the military. This was

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one of the biggest problems that led to the start of the BOMIKA, which eventually led to the coup. One of the main reasons that there was discontent among the non-commissioned officers concerned the salaries. Besides that, the government also never listened to, or discussed with the BOMIKA. The government only talked with top-ranking officers, like Colonel Elstak. The non-commissioned officers were overlooked by the government and they would not listen to the problems of the non-commissioned officers. This behaviour of the government was the main trigger for the non-commissioned officers to stage a coup. It was a coup that gained followers within the military, due to the same behaviour of top-ranking officers and the government. These factors made the coup by non-commissioned officers a success.

4.2 Hypothesis 2

To answer hypothesis 2 (H2), we need to look at the political conditions of Suriname before the coup of 1980. First, the political system of Suriname, before the coup will be explained. Secondly, the bad political conditions between 1975 and 1980 will be outlined. At last, the case of Suriname will compared to the African cases from the literature about coups from below.

4.2.1 The start of Surinamese self-government

Suriname is an ethnically plural society. The biggest ethnic groups were respectively the Hindustanis, who accounted for 37 per cent of the population in 1970, and the Creoles/Blacks, 31.35 per cent of the population (Dew, 1994). This ethnic plurality did not only dominate society but also politics (C. Singh, 2008).

In 1948, the Dutch started an experiment in self-government (Dew, 1994). For this experiment political parties were needed. Political parties were founded based on the support of a specific ethnic group. The biggest Hindustani party was Verenigde Hindostaanse Partij (VHP). The largest ethnically based Creole party was the Nationale Partij Suriname (NPS). These two parties have dominated politics in Suriname from 1958 until the coup of 1980. The VHP and NPS were always the biggest parties but never won a majority, which is why they always needed coalition partners. Because this was between ethnical divided parties, Suriname can be called a consociational democracy (Lijphart, 1969; Dew, 1994). Consociationalism means that when a society is divided and lives apart, the leaders of the society still work together to govern the country. On a national political level, the ethnic groups worked together. In 1958 the VHP and

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NPS started a big coalition called the verbroedering (brotherhood). Suriname was an ethnical differentiated country, but the coalition between VHP and NPS caused political stability. There were also other factors that caused political stability in the heterogenous country such as, a good relationship with the Netherlands and a good economy due to large resources of bauxite (Dew, 1994).

Although the verbroedering caused political stability, there were negative consequences as well. Due to the big majority, it was easy for these parties to abuse their power. This led to patronage, clientelism and corruption among the supporters of the coalition (C. Singh, 2008). In 1966 the verbroedering ended and interethnic tensions between the VHP and NPS rose, which made cooperation impossible. It was not the end of consociationalism, however, since both parties turned to other coalition parties. The next governments were all governments in which the VHP or NPS participated. The dominance of the VHP and the NPS was seen by the population as evidence for an elite cartel. Due to the dominance of these two political parties, did the legislation and the political institutions among other things not change.

4.2.2 Suriname as an independent country

It all worsened after the independence in 1975. The VHP was against the independence but saw that they could not stop it from happening. The NPS was nationalistic, so they celebrated the independence. The independence changed a lot for politics in Suriname. Not only because the government suddenly had all the power in the country, but also because Suriname received 1.92 billion US dollars from the Netherlands, to become an independent country (C. Singh, 2008). How to spend this amount was a big concern in the parliament in Suriname. The VHP wanted elections within six months after the independence, because a lot had changed since the last elections in 1973 (Dew, 1994). NPS Prime Minster Arron, however, did not want elections, because this would have caused more chaos.

Arron’s main focus was the remigration of Surinamese, especially Creoles, from the Netherlands. Before the independence, a lot of Surinamese people migrated to the Netherlands. Arron’s main focus was getting young, highly educated people back to Suriname. This was criticised by the opposition, who said that there were no jobs for these people. Arron wanted to create these jobs by investing in West Suriname (Dew, 1994). In West Suriname there was a lot of bauxite, which was the most important resource for Suriname. The West Suriname project of Arron received large amounts of criticism of the opposition. According to the opposition,

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Arron had a hidden agenda because Creoles would profit from the West Suriname project the most. Despite of this criticism, Arron still won the 1977 elections and stayed on as Prime Minister. This gave a lot of people in Suriname the feeling that the elite cartel would never change. The trust in the government of Arron was at its lowest point when a sick member of parliament was replaced without following the constitutional procedure. This was one of the reasons that the parliament of Suriname got the nickname ‘circus stupido’. The support for the political parties was still only based on ethnic motives. Due to the consociationalism the elite who had to work together stayed an elite. They did not change because they kept getting votes through the ethnical plurality in the country. This also caused patronage and corruption by the elite.

4.2.3 Comparing Suriname to African cases

When comparing the case of Suriname with the cases of Kandeh (2004) and Dwyer (2018), we can see that the coup is also staged against a malfunctioning political elite. The difference with most of the cases in Africa, is that Suriname can be seen as a competitive democracy. In Africa coups were staged against a malfunctioning oligarchy. Nevertheless, democracy did not mean that there was no elitism in Suriname. The ethnic pluralism in the country made Suriname a consociational democracy (Dew, 1994). A lot of people thought that the malfunctioning political elite would never change. Therefore, some people encouraged the coup when it happened. One of the first things Bouterse did when he seized the power was closing the parliament. The newspaper ‘De Vrije Stem’ had the headline ‘Eindelijk’ (Finally), the day after the coup. The elite cartel was no more.

The political elite made a series of mistakes. In relationship to the coup the most important mistake was to think that the non-commissioned officers held no potential threat (C. Singh, 2008). According to Bouterse, it would have been easy to prevent the coup if the political elite and the top-ranking officers had listened to the non-commissioned officers. Due to the failure of the political elite, the coup got public support from the Surinamese population.

The coup, however, was not staged because of the way Suriname was governed. In other cases, the non-commissioned officers staged a successful coup because of mass uprisings. This is the case in Liberia in the same year as the Sergeants coup (Kandeh, 2004, pp. 97 - 118). In Liberia there were a lot of mass uprisings, which were repressed by the government. The

non-- 19 non--

commissioned officers in Liberia, saw the coup as a necessary means to save the Liberian people.

In Suriname, on the other hand, the main reason was the way the political elite and the top-ranking officers were treating the non-commissioned officers (C. Singh, 2008). The political elite created a climate were the chance of a revolt was increasing. This climate caused the public support for the coup, even though Bouterse and his comrades did not try to save the people of Suriname. Later, Bouterse called his coup a revolution. This was only an attempt to legitimatise seizing the power over Suriname. When looking at H2, we can say that the bad relationship between the political elite and the non-commissioned officers has caused the coup.

To summarize, the governing of the political elite and the failing consociationalism were not the main causes of the coup. It might have caused more support for the coup among the population and the soldiers, but it was not the most important reason that this coup was a success. Still, Bouterse and his comrades did see this as a chance to change the malfunctioning regime in Suriname.

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5. Research question

The research question of this thesis is: Under what circumstances can coups by non-commissioned officers be successful? This thesis looked at the two main circumstances for a successful coup by non-commissioned officers. In this chapter will the research question be answered with the findings from the case analysis.

5.1 The Surinamese military

The first circumstance is the treatment of non-commissioned officers by the military. This was the most important factor for the coup to be successful. There was widespread discontent among soldiers and lower-ranking officers. There were a lot of problems with the difference in payments, heavy fines for minor offenses and weak top-ranking officers under Henck Elstak’s leadership (Dew, 1994). This mistreatment led to the formation of a union with the aim of talking about the problems with the top-ranking officers and the government. Unfortunately, the top-ranking officers and the government did not deem talking with the union necessary (C. Singh, 2008). This was a mistake of the government and top-ranking officers because the non-commissioned officers were the middle management of the military. This made it easy for them to get their peers and the soldiers they are in charge of to join their side. The top-ranking officers had no knowledge of this, because they did not have mid-level commissioned officers and did not listen to the issues the union raised. Had they seen them as potential threat, they could have easily resolved several issues to raise the morale among soldiers and non-commissioned officers. This was the most important circumstance for a successful coup by non-commissioned officers in Suriname. Another circumstance is that the coup was doable. The barrack was easy to overtake, which made the coup achievable. This was because the government and the top-ranking officers did not see the importance of improving the facilities.

From this thesis, we can conclude that if the government only interacts with the top-ranking officers and does not pay attention to the lower-ranking officers, like non-commissioned officers, these officers can rise as potential actors to stage a coup. This can cause discontent among soldiers and non-commissioned officers when they cannot raise issues with the top-ranking officers. Especially, for non-commissioned officers this can be a problem, because their position within the military is low.

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5.2 Surinamese political conditions

The other circumstance that was investigated was the political elite in Suriname. According to the literature, coups from below are always against malfunctioning political elite (Kandeh, 2004). Multi-ethnic politics and failing consociationalism in Suriname led to a malfunctioning elite. With this political elite it was not strange that a coup was staged. However, how the political elite was governing the country was not the most important reason for the coup to be a success. Of course, civilians were discontent with the way the political elite worked and the fact that this did not change. The ‘circus stupido’ simply did not function as a proper parliament. This was the reason that the civilians did not revolt when the coup happened and that some soldiers joined the coup side. But the coup was not a way to save the Surinamese people. Although Bouterse did say that the coup was a revolution, he only did this because he wanted to legitimatise that he took the power over Suriname. Especially, to keep the financial support from the Netherlands.

But for Bouterse and his fifteen comrades it was not the main issue that they wanted to stage a coup. In relationship with the coup, the main issue with political elite was that they did not see the non-commissioned officers as an important factor. Had they listened to the problems the BOMIKA addressed, they could have easily prevented the coup from happening. Of course, if the coup was staged against a political elite that was widely supported, the coup would have gotten more resistance. The corruption and clientelism were not the most important reasons for the widespread support. A malfunctioning political elite makes it easier for a coup from commissioned officers to be successful. In conclusion, it was to change the way non-commissioned officers were treated, not directly to change the politics in the country.

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6. Conclusion

In this thesis, a case that deviates from the general theory is examined. This single-case study of the coup of 1980 in Suriname, investigates under what circumstances a case can differ from the general theory. The general theory is that coups staged by non-commissioned officers are less likely to succeed, compared to coups staged by top-ranking officers. This theory is based on the article from N. Singh (2011), that concluded that top-ranking officers have more organisational resources to manipulate the beliefs and expectations of people. It is harder to get followers for lower-ranking officers, according to Singh (2011). This widespread support is of importance for a coup to be successful. Powell and Thyne (2011) agreed with N. Singh. Powell and Thyne defined a coup as an illegal and overt attempt by the military or other elites within the state apparatus to unseat the sitting executive. They assume that coup are always staged by elite within the military or outside the military. The Sergeants coup differs from the assumptions of Powell and Thyne.

Nevertheless, there are cases that differ from the general theory. Several of these cases are found in Africa. Dwyer (2018) and Kandeh (2004) did research on coups and mutinies from below in Africa. Dwyer concluded that the military was always seen by the sitting executive as a homogenous institution. Therefore, a coup-proofing strategy that is often used is improving the economic position of top-ranking officers. This will prevent a coup from top-ranking officers (Albrecht & Eibl, 2018). However, this will also lead to a divide within the military, as lower-ranking officers and soldiers will not profit from this measure. The only interactions with the military that happen, due to this coup-proofing strategy, leads to discontent under lower-ranking officers and soldiers. This can lead to a coup with many followers. Another reason people join a coup is because it is facing a malfunctioning political elite. Kandeh (2004) concluded that in all cases a coup was staged against a failing political elite, it could be associated with corruption and clientelism among other things. This discontent with the political elite can lead to uprisings by civilians, lower-ranking officers, and soldiers. This can eventually lead to coups from below that successfully oust the sitting executive. The way that the government interacts, and the malfunctioning political elite, are the main points of focus within this thesis.

The coup of 1980 in Suriname, this coup was staged by sixteen non-commissioned officers (C. Singh, 2008). According to the general theory, their coup is less likely to be successful. Nevertheless, their coup was a success. The main instigator for this success was the treatment

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of the non-commissioned officers and soldiers. The focus of the government was only on the top-ranking officers (Dew, 1994). The government and the top-ranking officers did not listen to the problems of the non-commissioned officers. There were a lot of problems with the payment of non-commissioned officers (C. Singh, 2007). Their salary differed a lot from that of commissioned officers. Soldiers also had a problem with the heavy fines they received for the smallest imperfections. This discontent pushed the non-commissioned officers and soldiers together in a union. This was an important factor in the success of the coup. In these union meetings the non-commissioned officers could get people to join their coup. This was especially so because the government and top-ranking officers did not listen to the union. For many discontented non-commissioned officers and soldiers the coup was the only way for improvement. The capriciousness of the government and top-ranking officers was the most important factor for the success of the coup. Another factor for the success of the sixteen coup plotters, was the paucity of mid-level commissioned officers. This enabled the mid-level non-commissioned officers to easily talk with soldiers about their problems and convince them to join their side. For the soldiers there were no commissioned officers to talk to. Thus, the non-commissioned officers could easily manipulate the information that the soldiers received. This is an important factor for success of a coup (N. Singh, 2011). Besides the unconsciousness of the government and top-ranking officers, the last factor was that the coup was doable (C. Singh, 2007). The barrack was easy to overtake, which gave the coup stagers a lot of power. These three factors, all of them mistakes of the top-ranking officers and government, were easy to prevent. The government and the top-ranking officers did simply not see non-commissioned officers as a threat. Also, the government only interacted with the top-ranking officers and never listened to the problems of non-commissioned officers. These mistakes by the political elite gave rise to a successful coup by non-commissioned officers.

The political elite in Suriname was not loved by the people in Suriname (Dew, 1994). The main problem was that the political elite never changed. Because of the plurality in Suriname, people generally voted on parties based on their ethnicity. Which concludes in political domination by two parties in Suriname. This failing consociationalism led to corruption, clientelism and profit for the respective ethnicity of the party in concern. Which caused discontent among civilians in Suriname, which according to Dwyer (2018) can lead to a successful coup from below. However, in Suriname this was not the most how important circumstance that led to a successful coup. Some soldiers might have joined because of this reason civilians did not revolt against

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the coup. But this was not the factor that led to a successful coup from non-commissioned officers.

When looking at the research question of this thesis: Under what circumstances can coups like the coup of 1980 in Suriname, staged by non-commissioned officers, be successful when the odds are against the plotters? We can conclude that in Suriname the circumstance around the treatment of non-commissioned officers and soldiers was the main reason for the coup to be successful. When both the government and the top-ranking officers did not deal with the problems of non-commissioned officers and only interacted with each other, this will lead to a successful coup by non-commissioned officers. In other cases, the malfunctioning political elite and how this governs a country might have a bigger role, but in Suriname this only caused eased conditions for the coup to be successful.

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