Commons and democracy : a qualitative meta-analysis

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U n i v e r s i t y o f A m s t e r d a m

March 2016

COMMONS AND DEMOCRACY

A Qualitative Meta-Analysis

By Iris Leijendekker

MA Thesis Political Science: International Relations

Primary supervisor: Dhr. Dr. Luc Fransen

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4.1 What are commons? ... Error! Bookmark not defined. 4.1.1 The Commons: Sociality or Resources? ... Error! Bookmark not defined. 4.1.2. Common Resources: Rights, Regimes or Outcomes? ... Error! Bookmark not defined. 4.1.1. Commons as Resource Regimes ... Error! Bookmark not defined. 4.2 What is democracy? ... - 34 -

4.1 Political Philosophies in the Commons Literature ... Error! Bookmark not defined. 4.2. The Political Process ... Error! Bookmark not defined. 4.3. Political Visions for Socio-Economic and Strategies: On the Relation between Citizen, Commons and State... Error! Bookmark not defined. Synthesis ... Error! Bookmark not defined. 4.2 What is democracy? ... Error! Bookmark not defined. 3.3. External Conditions, Mediators, and Moderators ... Error! Bookmark not defined. 3.3.1 Technological Developments ... Error! Bookmark not defined. 3.3.2. The Role of the State: Enforcement, Legislation and Regulation ... Error! Bookmark not defined. 3.3.3. Capitalism: Stranger, Friend, or Big Bad Bully? ... Error! Bookmark not defined. Conclusion ... - 46 -

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“There can be no more important aspect of scholarship than that of concept and language. If scholars use the same words or terms to describe fundamentally different fact situations, ideas, or phenomena,

then progress in understanding is impeded rather than advanced” – Bromley (1990, p.1) ---

1. I

NTRODUCTION

Capitalism is in crisis. Although the capitalist system has arguably greatly improved the material standard of living in the Western hemisphere since the Industrial Revolution (Berend, 2012) and was by many considered “the only game in town” after the Cold War (Desai, 2002), it has attracted growing critique. Capitalist ideology essentially assumes that individuals are self-interested and will work, innovate, and invest if they are rewarded through the accumulation of capital, making the system directly dependent on private property, money, and individual competitive freedom (Chang, 2010). The cumulative total of unrestricted individual transactions is supposed to lead to a society that is both fair and in line with the values of individual members, as the laws of supply and demand dictate the distribution of wealth (Rose, 1986, p. 711). However, capitalism has been associated with ongoing environmental degradation (Greenhalgh, 2005), recurring economic depressions and recessions (Easterling, 2013), growing economic inequalities (Greenhalgh, 2005), continuous commodification processes (Boyle, 2003), alienated work forces (Rothman & Lichter, 1982; Aylin, 2010), “meaningless” consumer life styles (Carolan, 2005; Lipovestki, Porter, and Sennet, 1994), the erosion of social fabric (Bauman, 2010); and even the corruption of moral character (Wittel, 2013). Moreover, some scholars question capitalism’s successes in terms of enhanced productivity and, instead, argue that Western wealth is predominantly a result of the appropriation of resources from developing countries (see e.g. Strongman, 1996).

This discontent has sparked a widespread but dispersed interest in the commons, i.e. goods which are collectively accessed and/or owned and which may also be collectively governed and/or produced. Several social movements relate to these ideals, including the Solidarity Economy, the Transition Town Movement, Water Activism, the Landless Workers Movement, Free Software/Open Source Software, the Creative Commons, Wikipedians, Open Access Publishing, the Open Education Resources Movement, Pirate Parties, and the Occupy Movement (Bailey & Mattei, 2013). Some politicians also have jumped on the bandwagon:

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The European Parliament has created an intergroup1 on “common goods and public services” (Bloemen, 2015), and Ecuador is in the process of a large-scale transformation of the state and public policy in order to facilitate a transition towards an economy that is driven by commonly-owned knowledge production (Bollier, 2014, May 14).

This renewed interest in collectivity comes at a time in which several socio-technological developments appear to be enhancing the opportunities to collectively produce, govern, or own goods. First, the Internet has enabled networked communication amongst dispersed actors, without the need to consider time and place and without the need for an agent that coordinates this communication (Benkler, 2006) – thereby enhancing the possibilities for the collective production and governance of immaterial goods (e.g. culture, ideas, knowledge, and designs). Second, the Internet has made possible unlimited digital duplication at trivial costs, thereby creating the theoretical opportunity to grant collective use

rights to digitally transferrable immaterial goods through universal digital access (Bauwens,

2014, p. 17). Third, production technologies for both material and immaterial goods are becoming cheaper and more widely accessible (e.g. the computer, media, solar panels, and the 3D printer) (Rifkin, 2014). This “miniaturization of technologies” (ibid), albeit still a relatively new trend in the case of material goods, reduces the fixed costs of production, granting ordinary (groups of) individuals the opportunity to become producers of immaterial and material goods.

Together, these developments enable a new vision of economic collectivity that is fundamentally different from its usual associations with state-planned communism or subsistence communities. Bauwens, for example, envisions a society in which goods are predominantly produced collaboratively through the distribution of tasks rather than the division of labor, in which individuals work by assigning themselves to tasks rather than acquiring a set of tasks by virtue of their function; in which the goal of production and the assessment of quality is steered collectively rather than by a managerial top; and in which the value of goods is measured by its use value (i.e. how useful it is) rather than its exchange value (i.e. how much it is worth on the market) (Bauwens, 2005; Good, 2006; and Bauwens, 2014). This vision, the argument goes, does justice to both the freedom of the individual that is promulgated by capitalism and to the moral concern for the collective that is propagated by

1_{An intergroup is a social forum for the informal exchange of views. It does not have any legislative or}

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communism, by combining the power, creativity and dignity of the individual with the well-being of the collective. Apparently, they make possible “a third way” of governance (Kelly, 2009, p. 2) that goes “beyond market and state” (e.g. Euler, 2015, p. 1).

However, a lot analytical obscurity surrounds both the commons (Euler, 2015) and democracy (Cumbers, 2014) and, particularly, it remains unclear how political strategists should make use of these developments in order to facilitate a society of the commons (Wainwright, 2009). As the commons are gaining momentum as a political discursive tool and appear to be aligning social struggles in the global North and South (McCarthy, 2005; Bollier, 2014) for a more radical democracy based on the reclaiming of “space, labour and time” (Cumbers, 2014, p. 66), it is high time to critically evaluate the conceptual toolkit of this literature. As Bromley (1990) strikingly phrased it, “[t]here can be no more important aspect of scholarship than that of concept and language. If scholars use the same words or terms to describe fundamentally different fact situations, ideas, or phenomena, then progress in understanding is impeded rather than advanced” (p.1). Accordingly, this paper will ask: How does the literature understand the relationship between the commons and democracy? This question will be divided in the following sub-questions: What are commons? Which definition of commons is best suited to address the capitalist critique? What is democracy? What different dimensions of democracy can be distinguished and how do they interrelate? What kind of democratizing effects do commons have? How is this affected by the characteristics of the resource? What are the internal and external conditions under which the commons have democratizing effects? The purpose of these questions is to present a schematic overview of what claims are made, how they are interrelated, and how they have been studied, in order to take the first steps towards a theoretical model on the relation between the commons and democracy.

The analytical process is complicated by at least five factors. First, the concepts “democracy” and “democratization processes” are complex, multifaceted and tend to be ill-defined, but nonetheless carry heavy moral weight, and thus tend to be used and misused whilst discussing the implications of development X. The commons have been associated with at least the following effects that could be termed “democratizing”: the reduction of economic inequalities (Bollier & Conaty, 2014), more ethical and sustainable production goals (Bauwens, 2006; Andersson & Agrawal, 2011), a more attached work force (Fisher & Fuchs, 2015), the building of moral character (Benkler & Nissenbaum, 2006, p. 395), the

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politicization of the citizen (Castro, 2009), and the reclaiming of leisure time (Bauwens, 2014). This analytical confusion impedes comparison of findings.

Second, scholars may have different definitions of commons and may focus on different types of commons, thereby also convoluting the independent variable. Differences include a) the type of good that is made common (e.g. basic facilities, services, culture, knowledge, and so on), b) the aspect of the goods that is made common (i.e. access, ownership, production and/or governance), c) their internal operating structure (e.g. the coordination and decision-making processes), and d) the external legal, social, and political environment in which they operate (e.g. Kostakis & Drechsler, 2015; Gencer & Meyza, 2011; McGowan, Stephens, and Gruber, 2006). This cautions against generalizations, as it may mean that different types of commons have different effects on democracy in different types of situations.

Third, the commons literature consists of contributions from many different scholarly disciplines, including political science, sociology, psychology, economics, philosophy, technology studies, and law. This variety automatically resulted in the use of many different levels of analysis and theoretical assumptions – the scope of which ranges from case studies of individual actors and organizational structures (e.g. Iannicci, 2005) to class struggle and societal structures (e.g. Bauwens, 2009). The challenge here is to incorporate the general tendencies as well as the individual-level variations, without giving preference to any one theoretical perspective. Fourth, studies have differing knowledge claims: some studies are descriptions of empirical cases (e.g. Iannacci, 2005), others are theoretical, predictive explorations (e.g. Rigi, 2013), and others still are suggestions about the desirable social, political and legal innovations (e.g. Li & Lee, 2010; Bauwens & Kostakis, 2014f). While they all may make claims about the theoretical relationships between the commons and democracy, they do so with varying degrees of validity.

The scientific value of this paper is twofold: first, this paper assesses and refines the conceptual tool-box of the commons literature, which constitutes the building blocks of scholarly analyses on the commons; second, by giving a comprehensive overview of this body of scholarship, it hopes to highlight incongruences between scholars and potentially refocus scholarly engagement with the issue into new lines of inquiry. The social relevance of this paper is that it hopes to do justice to the democratic potential of the commons whilst at the same time giving an cautionary warning against uncritically supportive thinking on the

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relationship between commons and democracy. This is particularly important in light of the increasing number of political experiments and autonomous projects based on collective forms of ownership, production and governance of resources (FLOK Research Project, 2015). This paper will proceed as follows. First, it will justify its choice for a qualitative meta-analysis and provide a mission statement. Second, it will briefly discuss traditional political theories, so that the current commons literature is understood against a background of theoretical debates. Third, the analysis will be presented in three sections: How does the literature define commons and what are the analytical merits of each definition? How does the literature interpret democracy, how does it distinguish between different dimensions of democracy, and how they interrelate? How do conceptual differences and political dispositions affect the relative emphases on the conditions for a successful commons? Lastly, it will present its conclusions and discuss the implications of the findings, note the limitations of the study, and offer suggestions for future research.

2. M

ETHODOLOGY

This paper will conduct a qualitative meta-analysis. Although meta-analyses have become standard practice for quantitative research, scholars have only recently embraced the systematic integration of existing studies as a valid primary research activity for qualitative research – as evidenced by the recent profusion of umbrella terms that aim to capture this strand of research, such as “qualitative analysis” (Timulak, 2008), “qualitative meta-synthesis” (Thorne et al., 2004), “qualitative research integration” (Conway et al., 2013), and “qualitative evidence synthesis” (Booth, 2013). A wide range of methods from across the epistemological board claim to fall under this category, but they are united in their aim to engage in “conceptual innovation” by treating qualitative studies as data (Britten et al., 2002, p. 209). Unlike traditional literature reviews, “the result” is supposed to be “greater than the sum of its parts” (ibid). Their purpose may be to construct more abstract theories, describe theories in greater detail, or give a comprehensive overview of a field of enquiry (Timulak, 2009, p. 592), by either juxtaposing studies “to identify patterns and directions in the findings” or integrating them “to produce an overarching, new explanation or theory which attempts to account for the range of findings” (Booth, 2013, p. 43).

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Presently, the following methods have claimed to be qualitative analyses: meta-ethnography, framework synthesis, meta-interpretation, meta-study, meta-summary, narrative synthesis, realist synthesis, meta-narrative, critical interpretive synthesis, qualitative interpretive meta-synthesis, realist synthesis, thematic synthesis, and aggregative synthesis (Barnett-Page & Thomas, 2009, p. 59; Booth, 2013). Most of these methods have only been used a couple of times in syntheses2 and have yet to establish standard research procedures (Barnett-Page & Thomas, 2009, p. 61). Moreover, many studies have mislabeled their methods, complicating qualification (Booth, 2013, p. 43). Booth (2013) attempts to overcome the differences in QES methods by tracing their roots to a “dual heritage” of, one the one hand, the systematic review, which is more closely associated with positivist methodologies, and, on the other, primary qualitative research, which is more inclined towards interpretative methodologies. Instead of regarding the methods mentioned above as a finished catalogue of methods to choose from that offer set combinations of methodological options (like e.g. Barnett-Page & Thomas, 2009), Booth (2013) argues that we should acknowledge the relative merits and disadvantages of different sample sizes, selection procedures, and methods for different research purposes. He argues for the “flexible and context sensitive application” of “a more versatile and pragmatic toolkit” (p. 6).

Following Booth’s (2013) footsteps, this paper will abstain from a methodological label altogether and will consider each aspect of the research process – the search strategy for papers to include, the procedure for their appraisal, and the synthesis process - as involving a choice between more realist, methodologically rigid procedures and more idealist, interpretative approaches. Any such choice naturally has its advantages and disadvantages and needs to be assessed in light of the paper’s analytical objective. The present objective is to provide a comprehensive overview of the way that commons scholars have studied the relationship between the commons and democracy. This is set in a context in which the concepts under review are multifaceted, tend to be ill-defined, and carry a lot of normative connotations; in which the relationship between the concepts is likely to be highly complex, complicated by a multitude of social, legal, economic, technological and political factors; and in which claims about their relation may be explicit or implicit, may be empirically or theoretically based, and are studied at different levels of analysis.

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The first methodological choice concerns the search strategy for the inclusion of papers, as this will naturally influence the sample and thus the research results (Booth, 2003, p. 25). Let us first note that a comprehensive search of the literature is not possible given the sheer number of papers on the commons and, as is increasingly acknowledged by QES researchers, is not necessary to ensure an appropriate sample (that is either representative or theoretically interesting) (p. 22). The challenge in this case is threefold: this paper needs to construct a comprehensive review of a phenomenon that is complicated by a multitude of variables of which only a fraction may be covered in any one paper; it needs to incorporate multiple levels of analyses and research foci; and it needs to remain politically neutral on a topic that is very sensitive to political views on human nature and justice. In the aptly phrased words of Brunton et al. (2002), this paper is “not concerned with piling up examples of the same finding, but in identifying studies that contain new conceptualizations of the phenomenon of interest” (cited in Booth, 2003, p. 25). Consequently, the search strategy should aim for a diversified sample and, accordingly, should not only cover a large sample size, but should also incorporate a diversity of political views and disciplinary backgrounds.

Specifically, this paper analyzes 67 papers and books on the commons, which span from 1968 to 2016, with an emphasis on the last two decades. The initial search strategy included the following search words to minimize political bias as a result of terminology: “commons”, “associationism”, “democracy”, “public interest”, “meritocracy”, “freedom”, “equality”, “state”, “justice”, “class”, and “welfare”. Upon realizing that the commons is often confused with other concepts, like “the sharing economy”, “peer production”, “digitally networked technologies”, “open design/ source communities”, and “property”, this paper adopted a more inclusive search strategy and also included studies that showed conceptual overlap with the commons even if they did not refer to the term directly. Moreover, after noting a predominance of positivist assumptions and liberalist philosophies, this paper used the snowball technique to account for more radical political discourse and power- and class-centric analyses. The final dataset comprises academic journals with conservative political affinities3 as well more radical-left philosophies4 and includes journals that specialize in

3

E.g. The University of Chicago Law Review, Administrative Culture, Federal Communications Law Journal

4 _E.g._{The International Socialist Review, Review of Radical Political Economics, the Post-Autistic}

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economics, political philosophy, communication, geography, technology, organizations, cultural studies, and law5.

The second methodological choice concerns the appraisal of the papers under review and the extent to which the validity of the research findings is assessed on the basis of the respective paper’s theoretical assumptions and methodology. This paper essentially aims to “reconstruct a construction of reality”, if you will, as it studies how commons scholars study the relation between the commons and democracy. It is more concerned with the presence or absence of analytical foci and theoretical perspectives and how they may influence incongruences between research findings than with the validity of the findings. Moreover, as Booth (2013) argues, methodologically poor papers may still present relevant insights (p. 7). Consequently, this paper will take the findings of the papers under review at face value and will not exclude papers on the basis of a quality assessment. This suits this paper’s analytical ambition well, since, by opting for a holistic understanding of an already complex phenomenon, it has committed itself to a large sample size and a time-consuming research process.

The last methodological choice concerns the analysis and synthesis itself. The challenge is to deconstruct the different conceptualizations of “democracy” and “commons” and to reconstruct them in a way that does justice to their multifaceted nature. This paper needs to distinguish between, on the one hand, the claims about ‘objective’ effects of the commons on things that are related to democracy, like classes, power, the public domain, systems of production, life styles, freedom, and equality, essentially constituting the empirically verifiable, descriptive relations between the commons and democracy; and, on the other hand, judgments about how they should be valued, essentially constituting the different interpretation of what democracy truly means. The literature under investigation is, in Murphy’s words, not “in a state of … ‘normal science’ where there is a high degree of consensus on the definition of problems and methods, where there are accepted means of defining these operationally which lead to a standard use of keywords and where the results

5 _{The Journal of Political Philosophy; Journal of Latin American Geography; Social & Cultural}

Geography; Land Economics; Science; Technology Analysis & Strategic Management; Emergence: Complexity & Organizations; European Journal of Operational Research; Information & Communication Technology Law; Journal of Business Ethics; Studies in Social Justice; Information, Communication & Society;

Ephemera Theory & Politics in Organization; The Fibreculture Journal.

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come in forms that can be treated as equivalent or converted into a common currency” and, accordingly, is best suited for interpretative methods (cited in Booth, 2003, p. 18).

Specifically, each paper will be scrutinized on the following questions. To uncover the normative affiliations of the papers under investigation, this paper will ask: What do they critique about the status quo? Which attributes of the commons do they praise? What ideas about justice do they uphold? What is their interpretation of freedom and equality? How do they envision the relation between citizen, the state, and the economy? Do they offer a democratic vision of a society of the commons and, if so, what does it look like? It hereby hopes to encompass explicit and implicit ideas about what constitutes a true democracy and to construct some sort of a check box of values to which the claimed effects of the commons can be assessed. To uncover the real-world effects of the commons on real-world phenomena that are closely related to democracy, this paper will ask: What is their definition of the commons? What is their unit of analysis? What type of goods are they concerned with? What aspect of the good is made common? What internal characteristics about the common do they mention? What environmental characteristics do they mention? What is the relationship between commons and capitalism? What is the effect of the commons on life style, classes, equality, freedom, and power? The answers to these questions will be coded and will be presented schematically.

3. D

EMOCRACY AND THE

C

OMMON

G

OOD IN

T

RADITIONAL

D

EMOCRATIC

T

HEORY

Before delving into the particulars of the renewed interest in the commons, it seems useful to locate this scholarship within the context of traditional democratic theories and how they relate “the common good” to other pertinent issues, like freedom and equality, the structure and scope of the state, and the relation between state, society, politics, economy, classes, and private life. This has a threefold purpose: it allows us to acknowledge the conceptual heritage of “the commons” so that we can distinguish its current use from its predecessors; it provides us with a common reference point to distinguish between models of democracy, so that we can better interpret the theoretical baggage of the normative claims in the current commons literature; and it gives us a broad understanding of the problems that need to be addressed by any democratic theory, so that we can better assess the current commons literature on the

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relation between the commons and democracy. Although a comprehensive review of these issues is beyond the scope of this paper, we may turn to Held (2003) for a useful categorization of the main democratic models. Note that the terms used below to signify schools of thought have been appropriated by many political theorists. Their characterizations should be understood as simplified typologies of the main models. Scholars may disagree about the usage of a particular label, but this does not seem to greatly affect our discussion, as the purpose is not to cast judgment about the superiority of any one school of thought, but to introduce the general debates surrounding the interpretation of value laden concepts, the social analysis of empirical concepts, and the appropriate form of government.

The term “democracy” literally translates to “rule by the people”, but democratic theories disagree widely on what this should mean in practice. As Held (2003) points out, the meaning of democracy inextricably links the normative and the empirical, as democratic theories set out to prescribe a particular system of decision-making on the basis of a combination of 1) normative judgments (e.g. on the common good, the meaning of freedom and equality, and the appropriate scope of the political); 2) analytical constructs that are based in a particular philosophy of social sciences (e.g. the nature of human beings, the relation between state, civil society, and economy, the relation between power and stability); and 3) a particular socio-historical context (e.g. the size of the citizenry, the complexity of the society, the level of political heterogeneity, the technological possibilities, and the dominant system of value creation) (p. 8, 15). As a result, the term “democracy” may alternately signify a particular political process (i.e. the structure of decision-making) or a particular outcome (i.e. a state of affairs pertaining to freedom, equality, and justice). For the purpose of clarity, this section will separate and simplify some of the intricacies. It will first discuss the two main blueprints for democratic decision-making; it will then discuss visions of the common good; and it will lastly discuss how modern democratic theories may alternately conceptualize freedom and equality and the relationship between state, economy, and civil society.

3.1. The Political Process: Direct and Representative Democracy

Held (2013) argues that democratic models “could reasonably be divided into two broad types: direct … democracy (a system of decision-making about public affairs in which citizens are directly involved) and … representative democracy (a system of rule embracing elected ‘officers’ who undertake to ‘represent’ the interests and/or views of citizens within the

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framework of ‘the rule of law’) (p. 6). Political models may, of course, also adopt mixtures of representative and direct democracy, by advocating different decision-making designs for particular stages of the decision-making process or particular types of decisions.

Direct democracies may include provisions for the collective decision-making by the entire body politic (Held, 2003, p. 19), by a representative sample of citizens (p. 141), by particularly affected citizens (ibid), or by the working class (p. 271); the rotation of political functions on the basis of lot (p. 41); strict limitations on the duration of office and on the number of times the same individual can run for office (p. 19); the continuous and unrestricted accountability of the state to the people (p. 105); and the “political integration” of the dominant interests in society by constituting power blocs with special access to policy making (p. 271). These theories have in common that they place a great trust in the ability of the citizen to articulate meaningful interests and choose intelligently amongst policy alternatives and, accordingly, place (some) decision-making authority in them. The main advantage of direct forms of democracy is that they establish a direct link between the rule and the people subject to the rule, thereby closely aligning if not equating state and society, and that they contain the power of any single individual as they distribute it amongst many individuals and over time. Disadvantages, however, include that direct democracy is only feasible as an exclusive form of governance in small groups (p. 33), that it often does not allow for the “continuity of … functionaries”, thereby impeding the accumulation of experience and expertise (p. 162), that it puts a high degree of obligations on citizens to participate in political life (p. 17), and that it may be susceptible to charismatic authority, oratory skills, and the excitement of the moment (p. 27).

In contrast, representative democracies create a distinction between government and citizens or between state and civil society, by vesting political decision-making power in the hands of elected officials. Rather than being a process of “ruling and being ruled in turn”, the democratic process becomes a matter of “choosing your rulers” (Held, 2003, p. 234) through electoral politics, party systems, and parliaments. Advocates argue that representation is a practical method for the stable, peaceful and effective governance of large territories (p. 119), that the fulfillment of political offices becomes a viable career choice, enabling the accumulation of expertise (p. 133), that there is likely to be more continuity in pursued ends (p. 110), and that there is no moral obligation on disinterested citizens to participate in political life (p. 141). Critics argue that the relationship between state and civil society becomes more confused, which raises questions about the need for additional mechanisms

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that balance power relations and ensure the correct representation of the interests of the people; that representative democracies need to rely on widespread surveillance to contain civil unrest, thereby infringing on the freedom of the individual (p. l31); and that they are inevitably accompanied by bureaucracies, which some associate with inflexible and rigid procedures that overlook individual circumstance (p. 166), with a propensity to expand the scope of its own operations (p. 105), and/or with the disciplining of citizens and bureaucrats alike as their private lives become increasingly dependent on the state apparatus (p. 106).

In addition to the design of the decision-making process, democratic blueprints also (implicitly or explicitly) set out to determine the scope of issues that should be considered political and can be subject to collective decision-making. Freedom of interference in particular issues – like the economy, accumulated wealth, or basic rights – might be deemed pre-conditional to a well-functioning democracy or for a citizen’s capacity to exercise freedom. Theorists may remove these issues from political control ideologically, by framing particular issues as private matters or by using analytical tools that discourage particular lines of investigation; or practically, by ensuring the preservation of particular individual rights through their constitution in the framework of “the rule of law”. Here theorists appears to make a trade-off between, on the one hand, ensuring that particular outcomes are impossible and that the potential for “tyranny of the majority” is contained, and, on the other hand, the risk of masking forms of oppression that are relinquished to the private domain and running counter the wishes of the people.

Most modern democratic theories assume that some form of political representation is inevitable, since existing citizenries are too large for collective decision-making, citizen bodies are too heterogeneous for consensus, and existing political problems are so complex that they require a certain level of expertise (Marx is the exception). This implies that there is some kind of separation between state and civil society (p. 87), raising questions about whether and how electoral politics should be supplemented by additional mechanisms that link them together.

3.2. Visions of the Common Good: An Individualist Focus

The argument for a particular democratic blueprint is, first of all, intimately related with a particular vision of “the common good”, as the former is supposed to produce the latter. Berndt Rasmussen (2013) distinguishes between aggregative common goods, where the

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common good is understood as the sum of the well-being of the individual members of society, and teleological ones, where it goes beyond that and is aligned with some “goal, end, or function which the group is taken to serve” (p. 35), like military conquest, social harmony, or the fulfillment of human capacity. In any case, democratic theorists need to justify why they think that their blueprint for democratic decision-making accomplishes that version of the common good. In doing so, they need to account how the democratic process should strike a bargain between competing interests between citizens or between citizens and the whole.

Grounded in a common disdain for any centralized moral authority, modern democratic theorists are inclined towards aggregative interpretations of the common good. Placing individual needs and wants at the center of normative arguments, they are united in their ideal of the individual as the “master of his destiny” (p. 73), although they strongly disagree on the conditions that constitute this freedom.

3.3. The State, the Economy, and Civil Society

To understand how arguments for a particular democratic blueprint are related to a sociological understanding of the relationship between the state, civil society, the economy, classes, and private life, and to a philosophical understanding of (the relation between) equality and freedom, we should take a closer look at some of Held’s (2003) models.

3.3.1. The liberal perspective

Some theories – in particular liberal democracy and deliberative democracy – uphold a strict analytical division between state and civil society and maintain that the state can be a neutral administrator of the people’s interests (Held, 2003, p. 119). They tend to argue that elections, possibly accompanied by mechanisms of accountability through parliament (liberal democracies) or through a lively public sphere (deliberative democracies), are a sufficient means to ensure that policies are compatible with the people’s interests. Moreover, they tend to regard economic transactions as private matters that have little political significance (p. 141). In line with capitalist ideology, they maintain that the freely chosen interactions of competitive and equal individuals will, as through an “invisible hand”, lead to a distribution of wealth that is both just (as it rewards good ideas and hard work) and in line with the values of individual members (as it is determined by the equilibrium of supply and demand). This

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assertion is premised on the view that society is no more than the sum of individual actions, which derive, in principle, from free choice. Non-participation in political affairs is, for example, seen as a reflection of apathy or an acknowledgment that one’s interests are already provided for (p. 160). Similarly, engagement in economic transactions is conceived as an exercise of free choice (p. 145).

Firmly grounded in the individual as the sole legitimate unit of moral worth, these theories conceptualize freedom as an individual’s ability to pursue self-chosen ends (Held, 2003, p. 148). Crucial to this conceptualization: 1) an understanding of equality as absolute equality, embodied in equal treatment before the law (p. 144), 2) the unlimited pursuit of wealth and, by extension, the institution of private property (p. 148), and 3) the free competition of political values and leaders and, by extension, freedom of speech, press, and assembly (p. 157).

3.3.2. A Weberian compromise

Other scholars problematize the presumed neutral character of the liberal state by highlighting how the state becomes an institution that operates as an independent actor with its own interests (Held, 2003, p. 141). Due to the complexity and scale of modern societies, modern nation-states tend to be accompanied by bureaucracies, i.e. large-scale organizational forms that operate on the basis of hierarchies and strict protocol (p. 156). For Hegel this represents an important achievement that fosters quality of governance and impartiality, because “all particular interests are subordinated to a system of hierarchy, specialization, expertise, and coordination on the one hand, and internal and external pressures for competence and impartiality on the other” (p. 133). However, other scholars are more critical of centralized state power. Weber, although praising bureaucracy’s capacity to deal with technical matters and to administer impartially (which he believes to be a necessary condition in large, rationalized societies), laments the loss of individuality and freedom that he associates with its rigid procedures (p. 143). Moreover, he and Mill argue that bureaucracies have the tendency to expand the scope of their operation and, consequently, to become increasingly pervasive in everyday life (p. 139). This becomes a vicious cycle, as more and more people become dependent on the state and will therefore act in its interests: “The ‘bondage’ of all to the state bureaucracy … would even extend to the members of the bureaucracy themselves, “[f]or the

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governors are as much the slaves of their organization and discipline as the governed are of the governors” (p. 106). Accordingly, Weber argued that the pervasive tendencies of centralized political power should be contained and that the free reign of the economy is the only way to do this. However, his argument leaves unexamined how the free market may also create bureaucratic economic organizations and how state interests may themselves be dependent on or intertwined with capitalist interests.

3.3.2. A Marxist Critique and a Radical Alternative

In contrast, another set of theorists refutes the idea of the liberal state as a neutral state and emphasizes the ways in which it is linked to civil society through complex webs of power, interlocked interests, and by the very understanding of what constitutes the political, thereby producing partial effects. This assertion is premised on the view that citizens are not isolated individuals, but that “individuals only exist in interaction with and in relation to others” and that their life choices, their interests, and their capacity for political influence are greatly affected by their social position (Held, 2003, p. 121-122). In other words, these perspectives give analytical precedence to socially structured patterns of behavior to make sense of reality. Marx emphasized how economic relations of production underlie politics and civil society (Held, 2003, p. 150). First of all, he problematized the liberal assumption that the economy consists of the free and equal interaction of individuals and, by extension, the presumption that economic activity belongs to the private sphere. He argues that “economic freedom” in fact implies that “the pressures of capitalist investment” determine “the circumstances of people’s lives” and create a situation where those who do not have access to the means of production need to sell their labor to the capitalist class and “are estranged from the products of their labour, the process of their work, their fellow human beings and their fundamental capacities” (p. 137). In other words, by placing the economy outside the scope of the political, liberalism effectuates the structural exploitation of large segments of society, without giving them a political means to change it (p. 130).

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Moreover, understanding politics as the embodiment of clashes between class interests, Marx criticizes the presumed distinction between civil society and politics by highlighting the ways in which economic power is able to influence political policy (p. 135). Capitalists are not only able to influence policy directly through their close ties to other powerful institutions, like the media, universities, and the military, but also indirectly through the inherent bias of liberal democracies towards capitalist interests. First, individuals that exercise political functions often have exercised or will exercise managerial functions, and their “special interests (a smooth career path) and their ideological disposition (wholly accepting of the capitalist context in which they operate)” makes them inclined to support the institution of private property (p. 220-221). Second, political rulers are held accountable for the wellbeing of the economy and they are therefore unlikely to dismantle the institution of private property, as this would likely cause economic chaos, at least in the short turn (p. 232). Lastly, the widespread belief in the institution of private property delegitimizes political questions about the distribution of the (privately owned) means of production (p. 130).

It remains unclear from his writings whether he believed that the state is a direct reflection of class interests or whether it retains a degree of autonomy. This is important as it has far-reaching implications for appropriate political strategies. Some scholars argue that the state enjoys a degree of autonomy when the interests of (domestic or international) capitalist classes collide (Held, 2003, p. 287). Others, argue that it always enjoys a degree of autonomy as governments, being legitimized by popular vote, are under constant pressure between the need to appease commercial interests and the need (to appear to) appease the masses (p. 288); in addition to these ‘reactionary’ views of the state, others still argue that it retains a degree of autonomy that is independent of any class conflict as it can itself be an agent of political strategy. The less class independence that a theorist grants to the state, the less likely he is to propose a political strategy of reform in and through the state.

Marx believed that capitalism’s tendency towards greater productivity would eventually spark an “era of abundance” (p. 358), thereby removing the material basis of conflict and creating a classless society. In this scenario, the state, he argued, will no longer be necessary and any required coordination can be exercised as a managerial function (ibid). However, this position negates the possibility of non-economic sources of political conflict, which would make some form of politics an inevitable fact of social life.

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In any case, Marx understood freedom as the absence of exploitation and as the capacity for human flourishing. He strongly believed in the self-actualization of humans, which he thought to be dependent on the capacity to engage in meaningful social relations and in creative production (p. 219). Moreover, he argued that, as long as goods are scarce, equal access to the means of production as well as equal access to political influence are preconditions to freedom (p. 233). Finally, he adopts a relative vision of equality, in which each person contributes to society “according to his ability” and takes “according to his needs”. This vision recognizes equal worth under unequal circumstances.

3.3.3. Participatory Democracy and Political Participation

Like Marxism, participatory democracy argues that the representative state tends to produce biased political results, but, unlike Marxism, locates the reason in (perceived) skewed political influence (p. 377). It argues that ordinary citizens should enjoy more opportunities for political participation and emphasize their direct engagement (ibid). One branch of participatory democracy argues that the state should open up different stages of the policy-making process for particular political issues to (particularly affected) citizens. This creates a direct link with the people’s interests. Another branch – aptly nicknamed “workplace democracy” - argues more spheres of life should be opened up for democratic control (p. 387). Based on the assumption that you learn to participate through participation (p. 386), they argue that the immediate environment of ordinary individuals – and particularly the workplace – should be opened up for democratically controlled. Unclear is, however, who should be included in this decision-making process, how these decisions relate to national politics, and how this interferes with the standard economic premise that expertise and tough leadership can be economically fruitful (p. 399).

Participatory democracy tends to emphasize a vision of freedom and equality in which citizens have an equal opportunity to shape the conditions to which they are subject, either directly or through their intermediaries. Accordingly, political participation appears to be the condition for freedom and equality is predominantly understood in a numerical sense as an equal share in governance.

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3.4. Democratic Theories: A Case of Many Tales

In short, this section showed that democratic blueprints link a particular structure and scope of decision-making to particular interpretations of the common good, of freedom and equality, and of the relation between the state, civil society, the economy, classes and private life. It highlighted the following debates. First, the decision-making design appears to make a trade-off between, on the one hand, the efficiency, expertise, and aptitude to deal with complex problems that is associated with representative democracies and bureaucracies, and, on the other hand, the close relation to the people’s interests of direct democracies. Second, it is based on a conceptualization of the state as an impartial entity, as autonomous agent engaged in political strategy, or as a mirror of power clashes within society. Third, it relies on a vision of the common good as the aggregative of individual interests or as something that goes beyond it. Fourth, it conceptualizes freedom as the ability to pursue one’s own ends, having the opportunity to develop one’s capacities as human beings, having the capacity to influence your environment, or being free from exploitation. While some see economic equality as a precondition to political freedom, others maintain that any interference with economic interaction is antithetical to freedom. Finally, democratic theories set out the appropriate scope of political decision-making. Here they appear to make a trade-off between, on the one hand, the preservation of particular values that are deemed pre-conditional to democracy and thus should not be deliberated on, and, on the other, the risk of masking forms of oppression that are relinquished to the private domain.

4. A

NALYSIS

The analysis shows that the commons literature comprises very different understandings of the relationship between commons and democracy. It further shows that scholarly disagreement on the matter is not only fueled by disagreements on the definition of commons and on the interpretation of democracy, as was expected, but is also informed by at least six other factors. More precisely, scholars (should) base their argument about the appropriate structure of the commons on the following. First, they (should) base their argument on 1) the characteristics of the good that is made common and 2) the perceived effects of technological developments on the available options to collective produce, govern, and own goods (which together shape the boundaries of what is possible per type of good). Second, they (should) base their argument on 3) what they believe should be the appropriate scope of

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commons-- 20 commons--

based production and distribution, 4) how they understand the interaction between commons and capitalism, 5) how they understand the role of the state, and 6) what political strategy is appropriate (which together shape their vision of ‘what should be’ and how this is best achieved). Moreover, it shows that conceptual ambiguity significantly obstructs scholarly investigation on the relationship between commons and democracy, as conceptual looseness obscures differences of opinion on these six factors.

A straightforward rehearsal of the existing scholarly disagreements is impeded because of two reasons. First, most studies included in the analysis have not been explicit about their views on all of these factors, may disregard some of them completely, and may not only disagree with one another but at times may also adopt contradictory uses of a particular term in the same paper. This impedes the process of identifying and comparing the different levels of disagreement. Second and more problematically, a scholar’s position on any of these factors tends to be connected with its position on (some of) the other factors, so that they occur in clusters. For example, scholars that study abundant goods are more likely to uphold definitions of the commons in which the good is accessed universally rather than by a delineated community. Similarly, socialist scholars are more likely to be concerned with the ability of commons to transcend capitalism and are thus more likely to include characteristics of the production process in their definition of the commons. This “clustering” is most apparent in the division in the commons literature between material and immaterial resources. Of the 67 papers included in the analysis, only four attempt to bridge the gap between the two strands of commons literature (Euler, 2014, p. 3; Wainwright, 2009, p. 47; FLOK Research Project, 2014; Kostakis, 2015). This makes it more difficult to discuss each level of disagreement separately, as each is interwoven with others.

Consequently, it seems most fruitful to treat the commons literature as consisting of several lines of argument which all address – to different degrees – the factors mentioned at the start of this section. The analysis will proceed as follows. The first discuss the relevant technological developments that have renewed the scholarly interests in the commons and how they affect the possibilities for collective ownership, production, and governance of goods. The second section will outline the various definitions of the commons and discuss their relative merits. The third section will discuss the interpretations of democracy, which encompasses normative elements as well as tools for social analysis. These include 1) the common good, 2) the role of the state, 3) the relationship between capitalism and commons, and 4) the desired scope of commons-based production.

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4.1. Technological Developments

The most cited set of factors that shapes visions of the commons is technological developments. The commons, representing a form of collective ownership, production, and/or governance of goods, is dependent on technologies to define the possible shapes and forms of economic collectivity. The literature especially focuses on a series of socio-technological developments, which 1) enable networked communication and thereby enhance the possibilities for the collaborative production of goods, 2) make goods theoretically abundant and therefore potentially universal, or 3) make the means of production more widely accessible and therefore more likely to be conducive to non-commercial production. These developments include advances in the fields of information and communication technologies, industrial production technologies, energy production technologies, and logistics.

Let us start with networked communication. An increasing number of people and things can communicate through networks of computers. The most obvious example is the Internet as we know it, which connects any end user with any other end user, across time zones and geographical locations, without the need for an agent that actively coordinates this communication (Benkler, 2006). This is a sharp contrast to the one-to-one communication (through telephones) or the one-to-many communication (through television, radio, and print) that were possible in the mass media landscape (ibid). This form of communication, the argument goes, enhances the opportunities for the collective governance and production of (digital) goods, as it offers a framework through which different nodes in the network can contribute to a common goal in a cumulative and non-conflictual manner (ibid).

Moreover, just as the Internet connects people in networks of communication, more and more often “things” are connected to the Internet, creating an “Internet of Things”. In this scenario, things - which can be manufactured goods, machines, plants, appliances, buildings, animals, soil, and bodily functions – become themselves, like personal computers are in the “normal Internet”, nodes in the network: they establish pathways of communication between people and things and between things and other things. The idea is that each thing can collect information about its immediate surroundings through sensors, can analyze it through algorithms, and can communicate with other devices that are connected to the Internet (Rifkin, 2014). The simplest connection is a bi-directional one between a person’s smart phone and a person’s smart device, in which the device communicates the relevant

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information through the Internet to a person’s smart phone and the smart phone may communicate commands to the device. As more and more (related) devices are connected to one another, more data is available for analysis, which arguably improves its function (Wang & Zhang, 2012). Proponents mention two possible virtues of an Internet of Things. First, like the Internet of people enables geographically dispersed collaborative production of immaterial goods, the Internet of Things creates opportunities for “open and distributed manufacturing” (FLOK Project, p. 57). Second, some enthusiasts highlight the scientific and social potential of combining the perpetually growing body of data that is stored online as more things are connected to the Internet. As more spheres of life can be monitored, analyzed, and managed, society can better coordinate social interaction and prevent social ills (Rifkin, 2014).

The other two socio-technological developments that are emphasized in the commons literature concern declining production costs. These arguments are premised on the assertion that the production of any good consists of a variety of inputs – including machinery, knowledge, labor, energy, raw material, and/or logistics – and that a proportion of these costs is fixed, as it is required to start up the operation, and a proportion of these costs is variable, as it dependents on the quantity of output. The first argument posits that the fixed costs of production in certain industries are reducing dramatically, as production technologies become increasingly miniaturized, cheap, and accessible (Rifkin, 2014). Information and communication technologies, such as the mobile phone, the computer, and recording devices, are already commonplace and enable anyone that owns them and has the proper skills to produce text, sound, images, videos, games, and software (Benkler & Nissenbaum, 2006). A similar tendency seems to be materializing in the field of industrial products, energy, and logistics. In the case of industrial products, developments in 3D printing, laser cutting, 3D scanning, and milling machines are making the means to produce industrial goods cheaper and more accessible. The 3D printer is currently the most advanced of these technologies and, although it still has its limitation, “the prediction” is that “3D printing will continue to grow in capability, improve its efficiency and accuracy, being able to use a wider range of material,” eventually being able to “make anything” (Kostakis, 2013, p. 181-182). In the case of energy production, Germany and Denmark are leading the way towards a distributed system of energy production, in which micro power plants use solar panels, wind mills, geo thermos pumps and bio converters to create energy from naturally occurring processes or from waste; and use batteries, flywheels, capacitors, and hydrogen to store the surplus (Rifkin, 2014). This trend appears to decrease asymmetries in power relations, as ordinary individuals can become

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producers (for personal consumption or commercial goals) as the fixed costs of production no longer require the investment of a lot of capital.

The second argument posits that we are at the verge of an “era of post-scarcity” (Rifkin, 2014), at least for particular goods. Echoing Marx’s prediction, these scholars argue that marginal production costs are steadily decreasing to near zero and that they will continue to do so as several socio-technological developments converge. They argue that, if the marginal or variable costs of production become zero and there are no other constraints on the total output of goods, goods become theoretically abundant (ibid). This development appears to be materializing in a variety of industries, creating an accelerating cycle, as theoretically abundant goods are also used as inputs in other production processes, which in turn decreases their marginal costs.

This has already materialized in the case of immaterial goods. The Internet, the computer, and the mobile phone have enabled the unlimited duplication of digital goods (Benkler, 2006). Although the original production of digital goods still requires labor, energy and access to ICTs (Pasquinelli, 2010), the subsequent reproduction and consumption of the good only requires energy and access to a computer that is connected to the Internet. Second, some scholars argue that energy may soon become theoretically abundant, if enough power plants are made so that the total output of renewable energy exceeds the total level of energy consumption (Rifkin, 2014). Again, in this scenario the fixed production costs would include the installation of the production technologies (e.g. solar panels and wind mills) and access to a distributed energy grid, but the variable costs would only include access to the network and storage technologies, as natural processes “do the work” (ibid). Third, some scholars argue that, if the Internet of Things will materialize and “smart things” will be able to communicate directly with one another, many production processes can become automated (ibid). This tends to reduce marginal costs dramatically, as labor is often a significant component of marginal costs, given that the costs per unit of labor cannot fall below a minimum threshold of subsistence. Finally, if energy, information goods, and logistics processes become theoretically abundant, goods that predominantly rely on these inputs follow suit (Rifkin, 2014). A cautionary note is in order, though. The argument of a zero marginal costs society is predominantly based on possibilities. As we will see in the subsequent section, theoretical abundance does not impede regulations and property laws to create artificial scarcity (e.g. Bauwens, 2006; Odwyer, 2013).

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These three socio-technological developments appear to provide ‘the soil’ for commons enthusiasts and form the conditions for the re-imagining of a new society based on the commons. This is particularly true for the more radical visions of the commons.

4.2. What are commons?

The concept “commons” is surrounded with a lot of analytical obscurity. The term appears to have become some sort of a chant that is uttered indiscriminately and may apply to any number of things, to the extent that there is no longer any common denominator unifying the different definitions. The definitions can be (a bit uneasily) divided into three broad strands: those who focus on theoretical rights, those who focus on actually existing resources, and those who focus on sociality. Accordingly, the term is used to refer to entirely different categories of referents, which may partly overlap but are categorically different. Complicating matters further, any one scholar may (implicitly) invoke aspects of each of these definitions and may switch between contrasting definitions in the same paper. Moreover, within each of these categories, scholars of course disagree on which types of rights, which types of resources, and which types of sociality should be called commons. This section will give an overview of the different types of definitions and will discuss their relative merits and how they tend to cluster in the literature.

4.2.1. Commons as Rights

Commons-as-rights definitions have in common that they base their definition on a normative element which appears to invoke a particular relation between humans and particular resources. Amongst rights-based definitions, the main incongruence is between definitions that define commons as categories of resources to which humans supposedly have a

theoretical right (McMurtry 2011), as a legal tool to convey the moral inappropriability of

particular resources (Bollier, 2007, p. 7), and as any human invention that fosters access to certain categories of resources (Sumner, 2011, p. 66).

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4.2.1.1 Individual rights

The first of these definitions posits that individuals have an a priori right to certain resources. They call “commons” those goods that scholars believe should be collectively accessible, regardless of whether this is in fact the case. Distinctions between commons and non-commons are made on the basis of a supposed inherent quality of the good as it relates to human beings - often because they are seen as a precondition to some other value, like democracy, autonomy, human dignity, or life itself (McMurtry, 2011). Emphasis lies on the assertion that people need particular goods for their survival or for a qualitatively good life, and that collective humanity, having enough resources at its disposal to produce these goods, has an obligation to do so. The most frequent examples are clean air, fresh water, land, and (nutritious) food (McMurtry, 2011; Sumner, 2011), but some scholars also argue that knowledge and ideas should be common goods (Benkler, 2000). Note that, if taken to its logical extreme, the assertion that an individual has a particular right to a resource, also establishes a moral obligation on others to provide it.

4.2.1.2 Legal tools

Closely related, some scholars use the term “commons” to invoke the “public trust doctrine”, which “declares that certain resources are inherently public in nature, and may not be owned by either private individuals or government” (Bollier, 2007, p. 7). Here, again, focus is on the normative trait of a particular resource, but it differs from the first definition in that it does not establish an individual right of a person to a good (i.e. everyone should have (a minimum) access to good x), but an inherent inalienability of a good (i.e. no one should have exclusive access to good x) (ibid). In other words, it posits that the current balance between private and collective property is illegitimate. The argument comes down to this: particular resources that are currently privately owned are either produced in common or are gifts of nature, and the owners of those properties therefore do not have more of a legitimate right to it than other people (Bollier, 2007). This appears to establish a negative obligation (i.e. do not appropriate good x) rather than a positive obligation (i.e. ensure that everyone has access to good x).

4.2.1.3 Social constructs

Lastly, some scholars build on these discourses by taking the should-be-universal-goods as a social goal and using the term commons to refer to any social construct that fosters this goal.

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For example, McMurtry defines the “civil commons” as “any and all social constructs which enable universal access to human life goods without which people’s capacities are always reduced or destroyed” (p. 66). By including any social construct that has the desired effect, this definition may apply to any social institution (e.g. laws, social services, public facilities, development agencies or accreditation schemes), that operates on any geographical scope (e.g. local water activism and global food systems), in accordance with any political philosophy (capitalist, communist, socialist or anarchist arrangements), and is initiated by any social actor (e.g. civil society, market actors, and governmental bodies). Although this definition theoretically does refer to actually existing practices, they still invoke a normative element, as social structures are only called commons if they foster access to particular goods. Moreover, by attempting to include everything, it loses all practical significance, as it appears to encompass (mutually incompatible) policies that have different perspectives on whether particular social constructs inhibit or foster access to life goods.

4.2.1.4 Rights-Based Definitions and their Relative Merits

Rights-based definitions of the commons are a very powerful tool of political mobilization, as they establish a sense of a priori entitlement to particular resources and thereby pose a serious discursive threat to the legitimacy of (unrestricted) private property. This is often discursively invoked with terms like “dispossession”, “appropriation”, “enclosure”, and “reclaiming the commons” (Moore, 2005; McCarthy, 2006; Bollier, 2007); as well as metaphorically through comparisons with a series of changes in agricultural policy after the industrial revolution, in which collectively farms were sold to private actors (McCann, 2006). Moreover, they raise important questions about how a dedication to democracy constitutes obligations to (domestic and foreign) individuals and might legitimize interference in the economy. However, this category of definitions is condemned to the realm of the normative, as they debate which resources should become rights (e.g. Baruchello & Johnstone, 2010; McMurtry, 2011). Euler (2014), for example, provocatively asks: “Why should we have a right to water, but not to soil? Not to crops? Not to culture? Not to computers?” (p. 5). In fact, Rose (1968) argues that what we deem as inherently public and private property is historically rooted in what we perceive to be “the glue of society”: in Roman times they believed religion to be inherently public, whilst now emphasis may lie on, for example, free speech (p. 714).

Commons and democracy : a qualitative meta-analysis

U n i v e r s i t y o f A m s t e r d a m

March 2016