Political attitudes toward the feasibility of deliberative democracy for citizen
engagement in EU affairs
Student: Laura Galante Candidate number: 10885986
Master’s thesis
Graduate School of Communication
Erasmus Mundus in Journalism, Media and Globalization Supervisor: Dr. Andreas R.T. Schuck
Date of completion: 3 June, 2019
Author’s note: As this is a qualitative analysis paper, its length has been agreed upon together with the supervisor.
Acknowledgements
In the completion of this thesis there are several people I would like to acknowledge. First of all I would like to thank all the MEPs who participated in this research and their assistants who facilitated communication. I would also like to thank my supervisor for providing me with valuable guidance and feedback throughout the process. And finally, my family and friends for their endless encouragement and support.
Abstract
This paper investigates the attitudes of Members of European Parliament (MEPs) toward the feasibility of deliberative democracy for better engagement of citizens in European Union (EU) affairs. Deliberative democracy is a democratic model that functions on the base of group discussions between citizens in order to create a more inclusive space for collective decision-making. This model has received a lot of attention in research for being a potential solution to the ongoing democratic deficit at EU level. 18 semi-structured interviews were conducted with MEPs from different member states and across party groups to understand their perspectives in adopting this model at EU level. Findings show that before adopting deliberative democracy in the EU it is necessary to improve the current representative system in terms of accountability and transparency across all institutional bodies, as well as reform internal communication channels. Views are mostly skeptical for adopting deliberative democracy due to lack of faith in improved engagement and the rigid European treaties. If it were, it should – in the view of the majority of MEPs – remain a supplement to the
representative system in the form of informative consultations.
Table of Contents
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ________________________________________________________________ II ABSTRACT ___________________________________________________________________________ III INTRODUCTION ________________________________________________________________________ 1 LITERATURE REVIEW __________________________________________________________________ 4
UNDERSTANDING DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY _________________________________________________ 4 THE CURRENT SYSTEM: REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT _______________ 6 PARTICIPATION GAPS IN EU REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY ______________________________________ 7 THE BENEFITS AND FEASIBILITY OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY ____________________________________ 9
METHOD ______________________________________________________________________________ 12 ANALYSIS _____________________________________________________________________________ 15 FINDINGS______________________________________________________________________________ 17
POSITIVE ATTITUDES TOWARD THE EU INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE _______________________________ 17 NEGATIVE ATTITUDES TOWARD THE EU INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE _______________________________ 18 POSITIVE ATTITUDES TOWARD DEMOCRATIC MODELS FOR ENGAGEMENT ____________________________ 22 NEGATIVE ATTITUDES TOWARD DEMOCRATIC MODELS FOR ENGAGEMENT ___________________________ 24
DISCUSSION ___________________________________________________________________________ 26 CONCLUSION __________________________________________________________________________ 31 FUNDING ______________________________________________________________________________ 32 REFERENCES __________________________________________________________________________ 32 APPENDIX A – EXPLANATION OF CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS FOR MEPS ______________ 37 APPENDIX B – INTERVIEW GUIDE ______________________________________________________ 39 APPENDIX C – CODE BOOK _____________________________________________________________ 41
Introduction
The 2019 European election turnout observed an average 8% increase since the last election in 2014 (“European Parliament 2019-2024”, 2019). However, even though this result is the highest in 20 years (51%), it is still quite low for a democratic election (Solijonov, 2016). The gap between citizens and their representatives has only become more evident, baring entry to nationalist euroskeptical parties and a decrease in loyalty to established center-left and center-right coalitions (“European Parliament 2019-2024”, 2019). Feelings of
cynicism, discontent and underrepresentation have all contributed to lack of trust in European institutions and disinterest in being involved with current political parties and policies
(Sonnicksen, 2010; Cengiz, 2018). This democratic deficit is particularly relevant for the European Union (EU) as a supranational institution representing 500 million people in 28 different states1. At the same time, lack of motivation from citizens to engage in European
politics has resulted in the increased presence of activist groups and lobby organizations to influence elite decision-making (Parvin, 2018). Furthermore, the EU’s communication strategy has not been solid enough to bridge a transparent dialogue with its constituency (Brüggemann, 2010).
While the EU’s promise of democracy is evident, there remains a lot of skepticism as to whether representation and citizen engagement are sufficient. In light of this, much
research has been undertaken on the concept of deliberative democracy to understand whether this model may bridge the information and representation gap between politicians and
citizens. Deliberative democracy is a process through which citizens influence decision-making by informing and potentially transforming their opinions in a fair exchange of perspectives (De Vries et al., 2010). Participation dynamics differ from representative democracy, a system relying mostly on representatives for decision-making with limited
direct input from the electorate. Deliberative democracy has reaped a lot of interest in political research for being considered a potential solution to the EU’s democratic deficit, or citizens’ perceived lack of representation and participation opportunities for decision-making (Cengiz, 2018; De Vries et al., 2010; Neijens & De Vreese, 2009; Sanders, 2012). First proposed by Habermas together with the idea of a public sphere (Strömbäck, 2005), the concept of deliberative democracy was later applied by academics such as Fishkin (2009) in experiments adopting deliberative polls. These deliberative polls randomly recruited EU citizens in focus groups, and they discussed specific EU policies with the aid of unbiased information provided by experts. This form of communication enabled the participants to come to more informed opinions and suggested solutions to these issues (Fishkin, 2009).
But can deliberative democracy live up to its expectations in a real-life setting such as the EU? After all, the EU encompasses a complex set of authoritative branches that differs significantly from an experimental setup. Thus, assessing the feasibility of the deliberative democratic model is important if it were to be adopted at EU level. In particular, attitudes of members of the European Parliament (MEPs) toward the feasibility of deliberative democracy could be valuable to evaluate this. Ultimately, they are the policymakers who understand the complex mechanisms of the EU institutions and the only ones directly elected by their citizens. In addition, while multiple experiments have been conducted in a controlled setting, the point of view of EU policy makers on this matter has not yet been explored in current deliberative democracy research. Citizens’ attitudes on the other hand have already been investigated in the experiments mentioned above, which showed positive results for citizens’ cognitive abilities and motivation to engage with complex issues (Offe, 2014).
This is why it is relevant to assess the perceived feasibility of deliberative democracy as an instrument for improved citizen engagement through the eyes of MEPs. It allows to wager whether its benefits can be applied to an existing representative body. Also, it enables
to evaluate the current institutional strengths and weaknesses of the EU as an institution and its implications for the democratic deficit. Therefore, the research question that this paper poses is: What are MEPs’ attitudes toward the feasibility of deliberative democracy as a tool
for citizen engagement in EU affairs?
In answering this research question, an assessment is made about the current representative democratic model adopted at EU level in the perception of EU
parliamentarians. Whether the implementation of more deliberative forms of democracy is feasible also depends on the MEPs’ own assessments of representative democracy in engaging EU citizens in its affairs. This incurs understanding what its strengths and
weaknesses are, and how have they been addressed – if at all – or how they can be addressed. Therefore, the first sub-question in the current study is:
1. Is the current model of representative democracy effective enough in engaging EU citizens in its political activities?
After this has been established, an assessment needs to be made about whether deliberative democracy can – or cannot – improve the current democratic deficit, therefore to what extent its characteristics are beneficial to address any potential current problems brought about by representative democracy. The second sub-question therefore is:
2. How can deliberative democracy reduce the current EU democratic deficit?
Finally, the question that remains is the general feasibility of deliberative democracy. Even when deliberative democracy is – potentially – being seen as beneficial, the question remains: is it feasible at all to be implemented at EU level? Whether the benefits of deliberative
democracy can be adopted at EU level or not, largely depends on the institutional capabilities of the EU to sustain such a model. Therefore, it is important to understand whether this model
3. Can the EU as an institution adopt more deliberative forms of democracy for citizen engagement in its decision-making?
Answering the above questions, a general picture both of the perceived need and potential as well as the feasibility of deliberative democracy can be generated. The next few chapters review what has already been researched on deliberative democracy and the current representative democratic model at EU level and provide a theoretical framework for defining the different components of the concept of feasibility.
Literature Review Understanding deliberative democracy
Deliberative democracy functions on the base of group discussions between citizens in order to create a more inclusive space for collective decision-making (Parvin, 2015). As a potential decision-making tool, deliberative democracy asks participants to pay heed to the following values: Discussions should be conducted through “rationality, impartiality, intellectual honesty and equality among the participants” (Strömbäck, 2005, p. 336). In addition, these discussions should not only be an end to improve decision-making, but also a means to allow people to become more informed about a particular policy, for example climate change, which could lead to more informed choices. In normative terms, people should be interested and willing to partake in the discussion and be inclined to change their opinion when facts overrule judgment (Strömbäck, 2005, p. 336).
Existing research on deliberative democracy can be split into three stages (Kuyper, 2015); The first stage begins in the early 1960s with Jürgen Habermas’s first definition of the model and its characteristics (Gimmler, 2001). Here, the normative ideals of the concept were pinpointed. In the second stage, between the 1990s and 2010s, academics such as Fishkin (2009) focused on practically applying the concept into empirical experiments that tested
these norms for their efficacy. For example, the deliberative poll strove to incorporate
deliberative ideals by recruiting citizens into focus groups. A deliberative poll adopts random selection to recruit citizens in focus groups for political discussions. Before the discussion starts, participants are interviewed about their political views. Afterwards, they are given information by experts about issues discussed and are provided with solutions to those issues. After debating with their peers and experts about the best policies to address the issues, they are interviewed again to see whether political views change post-discussion (Offe, 2014).
Europe-wide experiments such as Europolis, which adopted this model, recruited 348 people from 27 EU states in May 2009 to come to Ireland for three days to discuss divisive topics such as climate change and immigration. The EU Commission contributed to 70% of the project’s budget (around 1.2 million Euros) (“Involving Citizens in the Political Process”, 2015). While the experiment’s purpose was only demonstrative, hence not providing a base for actual institutional implementation, it showed that people did indeed change their views on immigration toward becoming more tolerant, and adopted a ‘greener’ attitude on climate change (Cengiz, 2018; Offe, 2014; Universitá degli Studi di Siena, 2019). Similarly, the G1000 project in Brussels involved crowdfunded mini-publics coming together during a governmental crisis in 2011, where small groups of people discussed social security, wealth and immigration policies. It demonstrated that people were willing to participate in, and were supportive of, a deliberative effort to bring about informed decisions and inclusive decision-making despite diverse political orientations (Jacquet & Reuchamps, 2018). Other similar projects have been tried around the world at national level, such as the citizen parliament held in Australia in 2009 (O’Donoghue & Chaney, 2009), which also recruited 150 people to participate in a conversation about strengthening Australia’s democratic system. This experiment also demonstrated the ability of citizens from different backgrounds to discuss
ideas together civilly, adopt new perspectives on more democratic practices and learn more about the political system through complex discussions.
The third stage of deliberative democracy research, otherwise known as the ‘systemic turn’, investigates to what extent the practicalities of this model can be adopted in a real-life system (Kuyper, 2015; Parvin, 2015). In fact, while the experiments mentioned above demonstrate the success of deliberative discussions among citizens, none of them physically applied their real-life application at government level. Therefore, there is much to be said about the feasibility of their implementation in a real-life institution such as the EU.
How has the feasibility of deliberative democracy been discussed at EU level?
Research on deliberative democracy has not yet empirically investigated the systemic turn of this model, however, much literature assesses its implications normatively and not in practical terms. In order to understand deliberative democracy’s implications and possible contribution for public representation and engagement, it is necessary to take a look at the current system at EU level, a representative democracy, and more specifically, the way it is currently implemented in the European Parliament (EP).
The current system: representative democracy and the European Parliament
Representative democracy has been adopted by most democracies around the world and is a model that researchers often contrast deliberative democracy to (Linn, 2011; Sonnicksen, 2010). The main objective of a representative democracy is to generate a majority of preferences for political candidates through individual votes of a population (Sonnicksen, 2010). This process therefore gives legitimacy to the leaders of the constituency to make legislative decisions on their account with little to no citizen involvement if not for votes and occasionally referenda (Sonnicksen, 2010).
In the EU, representative democracy is the fundamental system upon which decision-making is based to represent all 28 member states. The EU is an intergovernmental body, and
its EP among the institutions that function on this system, is sometimes compared to a domestic national parliament in a federal system rather than a chamber in an international institution (Rittberger, 2012). However, there are scholars who also claim that the EP’s representative system has nothing in common with a national one, nor does it fit democratic representations of a nation-state (Crum & Fossum, 2019; Quintas, 2015; Shackleton, 2017) as establishing its leadership and its legitimacy is more difficult. The EP, which is part of a geopolitical entity sui generis thus encompasses a mixed system of representation.
Regardless, the EP, on a similar level to the Commission and the Council of the EU (henceforward referred to as Council), has undergone a significant deal of empowerment since the Lisbon Treaty of 2009. The Lisbon Treaty further institutionalizes representative democracy by giving the EP co-equal legislative status with the Council (Rittberger, 2012). While the Council reflects the decisions of representatives of member states, in the case of the EP, decision-making should reflect the consent of the people of the EU. Moreover, the EP exercises significant influence over policy formation, as well as holding the rest of EU bureaucracy, such as the Commission to account (Rittberger, 2012). Therefore, the EP plays an important role in the leadership and character of representative democracy (Shackleton, 2017) especially since the introduction of European elections in 1979 activating open candidate competition and public scrutiny (Shackleton, 2017). The feasibility of adopting a deliberative system in the EU thus stems from the affordances of representative democracy in such an institution.
Participation Gaps in EU Representative Democracy
How is representative democracy perceived since the Lisbon Treaty of 2009? While the EP’s role became more legitimized through increased decisional power, citizens still perceive participation gaps at EU level (Hooge, 2003).
While the debate of European representation has been taking place for the past three decades (Hooghe, 2003), increasing citizen distrust since the 2008 financial crisis and further exemplified by the Brexit discussion, shows a Europe that needs to strengthen its relations with its citizens (Cengiz, 2018). The reform of a representative model for the EU
demonstrates a reallocation of institutional power more than strengthened citizen participation (Cengiz, 2018). Thus, the lack of perceived participation opportunities effectively brings about a legitimation crisis for the EU’s institutional bodies. This is because citizens are not provided with an official opportunity to partake in decision-making besides voting for a MEP, which may not be enough in democratizing the EU (Cengiz, 2018). Furthermore, the EP does not have right of initiative as the Commission does.
There are of course, non-binding decision-making channels such as the Petition tool and European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI), both introduced with the 2009 Lisbon Treaty (“European Citizens’ Initiative”, 2018), which suggest a more ‘direct’ democratic approach. ECI, while being another participation opportunity, consists of a bottom-up procedure in which citizens should gather at least 1 million signatures for an initiative before even being
considered for implementation by the Commission. Petitions can be submitted to the EP
individually or collectively if a citizen perceives a breach in EU law (“Petitions”, 2019). An example of a successful ECI was the Right2Water initiative, which asked to implement basic rights to clean water in all EU member states (European Parliament, 2015). While it gathered more than one million signatures, MEPs were critical that the Commission did not sufficiently meet the ECI’s demands, and the directive is still not fully adopted four years after its launch (Right2Water, 2019). Ultimately, citizens do not have the opportunity of selecting political programs that comprise the whole of the EU other than directly choosing MEPs (Müller, 2016). While this participation problem is also evident at national level, at EU level
politicians do not have as much visibility and do not function with a “government vs.
opposition-style political dynamic” that national governments have (Sonnicksen, 2010, p. 4), Above all, the EU has largely failed to implement more effective ways of
communicating with its constituency, leaving citizens uninformed and uninterested in the day-to-day activities in Brussels (Brüggemann, 2010). Such disinterest may be due to a lack of a proper communication strategy that fosters dialogue and brings people closer to their leaders (Brüggemann, 2010). This predominantly has to do with the lack of a European public sphere, or common arena for discussion for a European public, due to the fact that there are 24 official languages and the absence of a common media system (Brüggemann, 2010; Müller, 2016).
One can argue that the main issue with allowing all five hundred million constituents to partake in decision-making is the enlarged integration. It is the reason for the EU to work on a system of majority and why this is still more complex than a nation-state system (Sonnicksen, 2010). However, there may still be ample possibility for bridging the gap between the people and European leaders. Turnout at elections can be increased and citizens can be given agency in policy formation through more deliberative approaches.
The benefits and feasibility of deliberative democracy
A strengthened parliamentarization is already a step forward for enabling citizens to partake in greater democratization. However, with a multitude of nationalities and identities, it is not surprising that skepticism is plentiful when it comes to the EU’s legitimacy. So, can participation in the EU further be strengthened by deliberative democracy? Existing research offers both optimistic and pessimistic perspectives on this.
Sonnicksen (2010) argues that a deliberative system could foster the formation of a European public sphere through “inclusion as a true manifestation of political equality” (Sonnicksen, 2010, p. 6). Adding to this, Talisse (2008) asserts that deliberative democracy
outweighs the limitations that public ignorance may pose, claiming that citizens can still be interested in partaking in collective decision-making even when background knowledge is uneven. Additionally, the acceptance of a divided outcome may seem more likely once the individuals are involved in the process of decision-making, rather than not being listened to in the first place. This is considered by Talisse to be a legitimizing effect (Talisse, 2008). A third source of democratic legitimacy stems from the co-responsibility of policy makers and
citizens on the opinion formation process, as it is the “exchange and reformation, and not simply a majority-rule vote or election outcome that confers legitimacy upon the result” (Sonnicksen, 2010, p. 6). Strengthening the necessity for collective deliberation thus ensures that there can exist unanimity in the face of diversity even under circumstances of
disagreement, which can connect individuals to institutions (Parvin, 2015). Even in the face of mass ignorance and apathy, deliberation has an effect on people’s attitudes and information assimilation, which can be beneficial for both those who are already engaged in politics and those who tend to be less interested (Simmons, 2012).
Of course, the benefits and components of deliberative democracy pose important queries if they are to be integrated in an existing system, or even reform it. This is where scholars advance a more realist view. Parvin (2015) argues that the more weight is placed on the normative components of deliberative democracy, hence the more is asked of it, the less feasible it becomes on an institutional level. Parvin discusses that if social capital and citizen participation are already declining in a liberal system, then it would be even less feasible with one which demands even more from the average citizen (Parvin, 2015).
In terms of deliberative focus group participants, one of the biggest questions raised by academics regarding the implementation of deliberative democracy is who sets the
agenda? (Barbaros, 2015; Parvin, 2015). While some give priority to how decisions are made as opposed to who makes them (Barbaros, 2015), methodological issues still exist about how
exactly deliberative democracy should function at an institutional level, and suggestions abound in research. Adapting Fishkin’s deliberative polls used in the Europolis experiment (2009) or the G1000 experiment (Jacquet & Reuchamps, 2018) has been suggested due to their ability to facilitate information pooling among participants (Barbaros, 2015). Even if the direct objective were not for the sake of decision-making, insight can still be generated by communicating different perspectives in order to produce a plan of action that takes these views into account.
Ultimately, what does this mean for a greater deliberative participatory scope? There are concerns about the complexity of controlling deliberative discussions the more one moves high up in the societal scale (Gastil, 2018). No matter how well-structured a deliberative discussion might be, Gastil (2018) argues that it is impossible to grasp the ideal structure that embodies all the normative components of deliberation. This could mean that deliberative democracy could work better locally rather than nationally or supra-nationally. For example, the G1000 project was successful because it was motivated by citizens themselves, rather than starting at institutional level. This showcases that political participation is in fact tangible. However, it also raises the question of whether a deliberative system should be put in place by supranational institutions such as the EU or initiated by citizens themselves. On the other hand, the Europolis experiment and the Australian Citizen Parliament experiment
demonstrate the efficacy of involving national and supra-national institutions for deliberation. In line with what has discussed above, the current study assesses the feasibility of deliberative democracy, which is done following three parameters:
1. Attitudes toward representative democracy for engagement – the extent to which MEPs are satisfied with how the current system works, the strengths and weaknesses attributed to it for citizen engagement.
2. Attitudes toward deliberative democracy for engagement – how well deliberative democracy can engage citizens where representative democracy cannot, if at all. 3. Attitudes toward institutional capacity for adopting deliberative democracy – based
on the former two, how well set up the EU is for adopting a deliberative democratic model for citizen engagement.
The attitudes of MEPs on the matter may showcase how near or how far we are in adopting such a system at institutional level. Depending on the weight that a MEP places on each of these parameters, an assessment can be made about the feasibility of a deliberative democratic structure at EU level.
Method
MEPs were recruited2 by sending out 745 emails and calling the members whose
email was not available in order to reach out to the full MEP population (N = 751). 183 MEPs replied (24%), most of whom declined in light of busy agendas or because their chosen language for the interview was not spoken by the researcher. In the case of some British MEPs, by the time they were contacted it was not clear whether they would participate in European elections, therefore they felt that an interview would not be suitable because of ongoing Brexit negotiations affecting their future mandate. This, however, did not apply to all British MEPs. A second round of calls was carried out around a month after the email was sent to those who had not responded.
26 MEPs agreed to partake in the research. However, in order to achieve a sample that would be more or less representative of the current party group proportions in Parliament, four MEPs from the European People’s Party (EPP) and one from the Social Democrats (S+D) were omitted due to a surplus of politicians from those groups willing to partake in this
2 As the results were gathered before May 2019 EU elections, MEPs recruited reflect the political group
research project. Three more MEPs ultimately declined to participate in light of unforeseen circumstances. In the end, a total of 18 MEPs was recruited through a selected convenience sampling.
Data on attitudes toward the questions at stake was gathered following the grounded theory approach using semi-structured interviews. This method was selected because it is the most effective procedure for ensuring that qualitative findings can be conceptualized into reality, thereby making them more valid (Corbin & Strauss, 1990). The grounded theory approach translates into a systematic and consecutive procedure through which ideas can be captured at the time they are expressed and immediately recorded for best identifying their meaning and later be theorized. Semi-structured interviews were employed as they allow for easier comparison of responses across participants while at the same time giving a certain flexibility for expanding on given ideas.
Seven interviews were conducted face-to-face in Brussels, nine interviews were conducted through phone, and two participants provided responses through email. Convenience sampling may run the risk of basing sample selection on availability of participants alone. However, it is justifiable in this case as the sample universe is “imparted by a demographic commonality” (Robinson, 2014, p. 28), namely holding a political mandate in the EP. This therefore allows for generalization of responses for the entire population of MEPs (Robinson, 2014). The average mandate lasted five years, with some MEPs being in their second or even third term.
The interviews lasted 20 to 45 minutes (M = 34). Some were shorter because of limited time slots available while others took greater liberty with their time. In some cases, when the interview was interrupted because of incoming appointments or poor phone connection, it was reprised at a later time. Sixteen interviews were conducted in English and two in Italian. All participants agreed to be recorded by the researcher and were assured full
anonymity and confidentiality. Before the interview, in all communication channels, participants were briefed about the purpose and main concepts of the research, such as ‘deliberative democracy’ and ‘deliberative poll’ in order to bring them to a common understanding of the terms discussed (Appendix A). Real life examples such as Europolis were also discussed. The level of experience with, or recognition of the definitions of these concepts varied per participant.
After the definitions and purpose of the study were made clear, the interview guide was divided into five blocks following the research questions (Appendix B):
i) General questions about mandate duration and perceived role within own party and group.
ii) Attitudes toward representative democracy in the EU as the current status quo, iii) Attitudes toward deliberative democracy as a potential participatory model at EU
level
iv) The role of institutional capacity in the extent to which the EU could adopt deliberative democracy
v) Personal experiences in dealing with deliberative or similar projects.
In some cases, further probing questions were used to encourage the participant to provide more detailed responses. Additional elements about deliberative democratic scenarios were specified when the perceived definition was interpreted differently from the researcher’s premise3. At the end of the interview, MEPs were asked to sign an informed consent form that
certified their participation and anonymity throughout the research4.
3 In one case, a MEP understood the definition as ‘liberal’ democracy instead of ‘deliberative’ and had to be
briefed again.
The MEP sample distribution5 consists of members from 8 EP groups and 14 member states
(Table 1).
Although the biggest group at the EP is the EPP, the biggest majority in this sample is the S+D. Countries of origin range from early EU founders like Belgium and Italy, to
latecomers like Poland and Czechia in 2004.
Analysis
The interviews were manually transcribed verbatim and analyzed through qualitative research software ATLAS.Ti, which facilitated code generation and pattern identification. Responses were cleaned when the participant repeated certain words or expressions and internal filters such as “you know”, or, in the case of non-native English speakers, adjusted
5 Political leaning labels based on information of official party group web-sites. Individual party affiliations may
for grammatical structure while staying as close to the meaning conveyed as possible.
Following Charmaz’s approach (2006) the first phase of coding involved open coding line by line. This open phase allowed for approaching the data with an open mind without prior judgment or expectations and constructed the base for selective coding. Around 300 codes were generated during the first phase. Selective coding then involved combining overlapping code meanings into broader categories (e.g., ‘problem with election system’ and ‘power to smaller parties’ into ‘power imbalances at EU level) to identify the most frequently-occurring ones. Relationships between codes were then identified through axial coding in order to generate underlying themes and maintaining coherence. While validity is hard to establish in qualitative research (Charmaz 2006), memos were written to account for irregularities in the analysis and codes that did not fit a general theme.
Codes were distributed into categories following the sub-research questions and keeping in mind the diversity of responses that took place (see Appendix C for the code book). Categories are distributed between negative and positive attitudes toward
representative and deliberative democracy with sub-categories that hold implications for engagement and for institutional structure (see Figure 1 below).
As MEPs come from a variety of different parties and nationalities, many differences in attitude ensued. The model shows that main patterns emerged which tied attitudes toward
representative and deliberative democratic models to both positive and negative implications for both engagement and EU institutional structure. It thus demonstrates how positive and negative attitudes toward representative democracy are closely linked with attitudes toward deliberative democracy. The findings that follow explain this relationship.
Findings
MEPs held contrasting – and oftentimes contradicting – attitudes toward the current representative system adopted at EU level. Skepticism varied for citizen engagement and consequences for the EU as an institution. Surprisingly, equally skeptical were the attitudes toward deliberative democracy. However, most MEPs stressed a variety of flaws pertaining to the representative structure, while at the same time it was emphasized as a mostly crucial model to maintain and foster within the EU infrastructure. More negative attitudes ensued toward the EU institutional structure and engagement than positive ones. Attitudes toward citizen engagement and institutional structure do not seem to vary significantly across party orientations and nationalities, with issues raised and benefits cited coming from all party groups for both engagement and institutions.
Positive Attitudes Toward the EU Institutional Structure
Representative system balanced and fair. Two MEPs from the ALDE and the
Greens respectively believe that politicians can be held accountable with representative democracy because of the transparency of the EP and the advantages of the proportional
system for the election of more parties. In addition, a Finnish member of the EPP believes that
the present representative system “brings balance to the Council”, attributing more influence to the EP for enabling the Council to make compromises. The same MEP believes that the solidarity system works well, contrasting many other MEPs who believe that the EU is diverging from the principles of solidarity adopted in the treaties.
Deliberative democracy as a supplement. Some MEPs believe that a deliberative
structure could stem from the EP while its function has to remain purely supplementary. For example, it could be initiated by the Petitions Committee, which, while not deliberative in itself, currently facilitates the opportunity for citizens to petition for a variety of issues in a more direct way. At the same time, there are also views that Parliament is unsuitable for adopting this as its powers lie predominantly as a “legislation partner of the European Commission and Council” (EPP MEP). Therefore, according to the treaties, the Commission should be the one initiating the proposal for more deliberation at EU level, as this process could enable citizens to reach out to the Commission more easily than with current more direct procedures such as ECI.
Negative attitudes toward the EU institutional structure
Power imbalance. The most cited issue toward representative democracy for EU
institutions as a whole is the power imbalance that exists at EU level between different countries as well as institutions such as the Council and the Commission. MEPs stressed in particular the uneven influences that individual nations have on decision-making depending on country and party size and number of Parliamentarians per country.
In particular, the proportional system adopted to elect MEPs is both criticized and praised. Two MEPs from the EPP and ECR respectively would rather see a first-past-the-post system in order to stay more accountable to their electors, as opposed to being elected from a party list. While the proportional system used at EP is more democratic, they argue, it allows the smaller parties to withhold more power and make decisions for a majority. At the same time, a British member of the ENF specifies a preference for proportionality for the reason that it is more democratic in his view. This view is also tied to how much authority certain members want the EU to have as an institution, whether holding more federal power and keeping the rest of the other countries equal, or delegate more authority to the individual
nations. A MEP stresses wanting the same amount of influence in Parliament regardless of party or nation size:
“That is the meaning of federation, you increase the power of the smaller states. Let’s give people the feeling that we are somehow the same. In the Parliament we are six Cypriots and there are 80 Germans.” (Cypriot, GUE)
Therefore, as it stands, the power imbalance between representatives of each country is perceived differently depending on the priorities and aspects that are emphasized from each MEP. This can then already pose an issue for ensuring balance and trust in the adoption of a deliberative system.
Accountability problem. The power imbalance is not only tied to Parliamentary
influence, but some MEPs also perceive that the lawmaking system adopted within the Commission is unfair. In the Commission, officials are approved by the EP, and officially appointed by the Council, without the citizens having a say. Some think that Commission officials are difficult to be held accountable because of the blurry democratic process involved in initiating legislation and often cannot be replaced. Others believe that they
prioritize more powerful lobbyists such as NGOs over citizens who propose the adoption of
certain legislations. For example, a MEP from the GUE cited an online public consultation initiated by the Commission over investment protection in TTIP which received 150 thousand responses by citizens vehemently opposed to TTIP in general. She then believes that the Commission “pretends to listen and just in practice they don’t care” about the inputs generated by citizens on this policy as the Commission did not incorporate all of their suggestions eventually and TTIP was not rejected. In the same way, a member of the ENF comments that the Commission keeps caving to the demands of the green lobby more than farmer owners themselves.
This is why in their view deliberative democracy could be difficult to integrate at institutional level. Problems are tied to the fear that lobbyists would be prioritized in decision-making using this model and the decision-decision-making process would remain ambiguous.
Lack of transparency. In a similar manner, MEPs cite the Council as
unrepresentative for adopting the law of unanimity when member state officials vote on a particular proposal. Unlike the proportional system in the EP, Council officials all hold veto power regardless of the country size, which means that even when just one member opposes a law, in some circumstances it cannot be adopted unless every member agrees to it (“Voting System – Consilium”, 2018). This is further tied to a lack of transparency due to the absence of knowledge outside the premises of the Council as to voting procedures taking place there. This uncertainty in turn implies difficulties adopting new legislations, unfocused
representation and a lack of accountability to the citizen. Thus, even MEPs who may be favorable toward the adoption of a deliberative democratic system perceive the obstacle of bypassing Commission power and the transparency issue of the Council.
Rigidity of the European treaties and decisional power. Some MEPs comment on
the rigidity of the European treaties ingrained in this representative democratic system, which complicates the possibility of adopting new laws that could potentially implement a more deliberative democratic approach to decision-making within their regulation. The same MEPs would also like to see more reforms to the representative system laid down in the European treaties, but a member of the EPP stresses that “representative legislature was powered in the hands of the representatives. They are not going to be ready to give up that power.” Hence, delegating power for more participatory initiatives might be too complicated in their view, especially when the party line could be too strict and there exists too much fragmentation in the EU as to what priorities are considered most important to deal with.
For MEPs, treaty rigidity is also the greatest issue with the adoption of deliberative democracy at institutional level. This attitude further depends on whether the MEP views decisions taken through democratic polls as purely consultative or potentially binding, in which case an alteration to the EU treaties would be necessary. Most MEPs would not like to see deliberative democracy being adopted as an integral part of the European institutional structure, as exemplified in this quote:
“Deliberative polls could be put in place at the European level, but they would only be purely informative since they would require a treaty change to be given more impact.” (Italian SD MEP)
Another Finnish MEP from the EPP thinks it would complicate decision-making at European level if opinions from deliberative polls were to be binding, or taken mandatorily into account, while a Belgian MEP from the ALDE would be “open to discuss [opinions]” rather than adopting any outcomes in a binding way.
A time-sensitive issue. For five MEPs, including those who would be more in favor of
adopting a deliberative system, another problem is the time taken to adopt this model in the workings of the EU. They fear that it could take years before it gets properly integrated in the day-to-day structure of EU institutions especially when political decision-making has short deadlines.
Ultimately for some MEPs, deliberative democracy should not even hold a place in the institutional structure of the EU, as they believe it needs to come from an external neutral
body. The reason for this is that they believe that existing participatory initiatives such as the
ECI are neglected by citizens, and therefore might not increase credibility as much as an unaffiliated organization. However, another main reason is to avoid conflicts of interest and biased tendencies to manipulate the deliberative procedure for personal gain.
Positive attitudes toward democratic models for engagement
Representative system best for engaging and representation. Whereas positive
implications of representative democracy for the EU as an institution are very little, for
engagement there are more. Nearly all MEPs believe that representative democracy is the best
system for engaging citizens and that citizens should without question be represented by officials. A British MEP from the ECR claims it is “the best we’ve ever come up with,” and
an Italian S+D member said it is “the more effective and creating less tensions and difficulties”. A Finnish EPP member believes that people are well enough represented in Parliament because of the possibility to vote in the European elections, thus solidifying this representation and believing that it is good enough as it is. Another Belgian MEP is in favor public debates, but that the role of officials remains as final decision-making:
“I am in favor of informing citizens and have them participate in public debate. That part I totally support, but democratic elected persons do the final political decision-making” (Belgian, ALDE).
Enough opportunities for participating already. Almost all MEPs believe in
engaging with their constituency on a regular basis, whether through meetings with their
citizens, visits to the EP, town hall events or school visits. For them, opportunities for citizens to hold direct contact with them abound, but more in informal channels rather than laid out procedures. While they were also disappointed that there is not enough turnout, they expressed not being surprised that not all citizens feel encouraged to participate in European politics. They further agree that the Commission’s consulting groups and ECIs are already directly democratic as they are and that efforts to meet citizen interests are clearly visible. When it comes to what MEPs could do better to engage citizens in European affairs in the current system, another Luxemburgish MEP from the ALDE believes that it starts with national politicians before MEPs, and that their work responsibilities are all clearly laid down in the treaties. Ultimately, positive
attitudes for engagement view citizen participation as important, but that the
representative system already provides enough opportunities to engage and contribute to political discussions if citizens take initiative to do so. The same MEP mentions that there already exists the possibility to engage in consultations through the Commission:
“The Commission has through its offices in the member states taken the initiative to consult the citizens in order to know how they see the future institutions etc…So as you see, there are many opportunities for people willing to be involved in politics to do so at EU level.” (Luxembourgish, ALDE)
A consultative poll for simple matters. Of those who are relatively more
inclined toward a deliberative model, they would rather see it as a consultative poll for spreading information rather than allowing citizens to contribute to decision-making. If such is the case, then topics discussed should not be too technical. A MEP from the S+D who works on monetary affairs especially emphasizes that “the legislative proposals that I negotiate here are completely not understandable for my constituency. Sometimes they are not understandable for me” (Spanish, S+D). This is also the reason why most MEPs still believe that the greatest part of decision-making should be left to the representatives with little accountability on citizens’ side if not for voting for their delegates.
Importance of citizen participation for decision-making. A few MEPs see
greater benefit of deliberative democracy for citizen engagement. They definitely perceive a need for more input from citizens in order to enhance decision-making. Citizen voices could help in balancing out the bigger voices of the institutions and well-established lobbyists such as NGOs and corporations. At the same time, some MEPs also believe that deliberative polls could be a good way to engage in dialogue as an
majority of the population, some MEPs would also be willing to implement opinions generated through deliberative democracy as well:
“An opinion that we have partly taken into account probably is interesting…if they deliberate we have to implement some aspect of what they decide, otherwise you create envy to participate and probably they will be more deluded after.” (Belgian, SD)
In this sense, MEPs here recognize the value of citizen input for decision-making, also stressing that there are topics that a vast majority of the population can comprehend in order to take part in discussions, as well as the fact that if there are bigger voices in a discussion that does not cause imbalances when they are moderated. An Italian MEP from the EFDD further believes that from personal experience people are willing to listen to facts that did not match their own point of view and at least question their own opinion, even though most other MEPs do not believe this is always the case.
While it cannot be ascertained that MEPs believe deliberative democracy should be fully adopted in all its characteristics, those who tend toward more participatory practices definitely see the benefit of keeping citizens informed and would want to see consultative polls enabled. In addition, they would like to see existing direct democratic structures like the ECI and the Petition tool have more binding weight in Commission and Parliament instead of being purely advice-giving.
Negative attitudes toward democratic models for engagement
Suboptimal citizen participation. Nearly all MEPs seem to agree that citizens’
political engagement is not optimal. Those who do participate are largely already politically active and interested in the technicalities of political topics, which is a small percentage of the population. This is why some MEPs are more cynical of the potential for citizen participation in a deliberative system because they think that no matter how much participation is
encouraged it is not going to improve the current scenario. In addition, some MEPs are skeptical that citizens retain their ideas regardless and polarize depending on what their
convictions and ideologies are. Another MEP from the S+D believes that no matter how much information citizens receive it is not going to change the way they perceive a particular issue. Perceptions are then that MEPs in political parties leverage on this to gain votes instead of giving an unbiased picture of the issues that need solving.
This is why even though perceptions are that there are little or no deliberative opportunities in the EU, for some MEPs in more conservative groups like ECR and ENF it does not mean that there should be more. For others in more socialist groups such as GUE and S+D – and even some in EFDD, usually considered euro-skeptical (“Our Charter”, 2019) – it is a call to integrate more participation or otherwise use it as a supplement, but not a complete replacement.
Distance between electorate and representatives. In the same way that some MEPs
are cynical of greater political participation taking place, they also agree that there is a significant distance between citizens and their representatives both at national and EU level because of citizens’ perceived lack of transparency and accountability and the EU’s failure to inform citizens properly about the institutions’ workings. The loss of trust that citizens have fostered for the EU results in little initiative to contact MEPs to discuss European policy, as they perceive it to be too remote to affect them in any way. Some MEPs also feel that the EU is not addressing citizen interest, especially in outlets such as the ECI. Very few ECIs are deemed successful, and even if there are, the Commission is not obliged to act. Therefore, in the current representative system, many MEPs feel that participation is not properly being addressed while others do not have faith in citizen engagement anyway. This therefore in their eyes creates further complications in the adoption of a deliberative democratic model.
Who sets the agenda? At least eight MEPs do not think that deliberative democracy
could improve or be useful for citizen engagement in the EU. Issues include who sets the
population in the first place, which in their view elevates the status of who partakes in these deliberative discussions over others. In addition, in the same way that some MEPs see lobbyists as too influential currently already, they are afraid that in a deliberative model they might highjack decision-making when partaking in a deliberative poll because of their established reputation.
One MEP from the Social Democrats is skeptical that deliberative polls would indeed represent the general interest at all, especially when it comes to very technical issues that need a long time to be explained and understood. Therefore, the issue is also time spent to bring citizens on the same page when it comes to explaining a complex issue, whom might again only be the politically interested ones. In the view of a British MEP from ENF, “the people, the real workers, don’t get involved in the focus groups. It tends to be the political village,” in which case deliberative polls may result unrepresentative for the whole population, according to a Greek unattached member and a Belgian ALDE member.
Differing national systems and cultures. The unlikelihood of adopting a deliberative
system for some MEPs stems predominantly from a national problem instead of a EU problem. Because of different legal and political systems adopted at national level – such as proportional versus first-past-the-post, more or less direct democratic systems such as for example the Swiss democratic model, it would be difficult to solidify this not just at EU level but in the nations. This is also tied to how long a country has been part of the EU and how much it would feel part of a European public sphere.
Discussion
The current study aimed to understand what MEPs’ attitudes are toward the feasibility of deliberative democracy as a tool for citizen engagement in EU affairs. It did so by first looking at the attitudes toward representative democracy for citizen engagement and
institutional structure, and then analyzing what this meant for the adoption of a deliberative democratic model at EU level.
First of all, attitudes toward representative democracy vary significantly among MEPs, and sometimes are even contradictory. For example, some praised a proportional system for its democratic appeal and others disregarded it completely due to it favoring smaller parties. Contradictory attitudes even extended to one Greek non-attached member, who – while very euroskeptical – still considers representative democracy the most appropriate system for representation and engagement. However, there is no underlying attitude pattern across different party groups and nationalities. The most significant pattern is that the representative system is by all considered crucial for engagement and decision-making6, while the adoption of deliberative democracy is still seen by most as risky and
sometimes too idealistic. However, although all MEPs tend to appreciate the current
representative system at EU level, they express a lot of criticisms toward its structure. They emphasize how it should be made more transparent and accountable, as well as stressing the need for it to better reflect the wishes of their constituency.
How does this tie in with deliberative democracy and engagement? Despite this criticism, they all mostly believe representative democracy is the best system both for
engagement and representing their electorate. Skepticism toward the feasibility of deliberative democracy, which abounded, comes as a result of doubts over whether it can be integrated in the representative system, as well as whether it could really engage people in politics more than now. Most MEPs were still positive toward more citizen involvement in general, and if there had to be a way to integrate that better, then they mostly favored strengthening current initiatives such as ECI and the Petition tool in order to make them more accessible and
6 It is worthwhile to note that one unattached Polish member did not believe in democracy at all and in the
binding. This point was especially raised by a member of the Petitions committee. MEPs thus placed a lot of weight on the EU’s institutional limitations for adopting deliberative
democracy.
Other aspects raised about deliberative democracy complement existing theories. MEPs’ concerns about lobbyists’ influence over citizens in deliberative democracy are also raised by Parvin (2018). However, he sees the benefit of deliberative polls for countering this influence, while MEPs do not believe it would be reduced. This ties with the issue of who sets the agenda for focus groups. Barbaros (2015) advances the issue of who should be included in deliberative discussions as a fundamental aspect for the legitimacy of the model, an issue that a few MEPs mention as well. They also do not think it can necessarily be facilitated in a deliberative system compared to a representative one. However, Sonnicksen (2010) counters this by asserting that citizens would still have more control over the agenda. Perceptions of deliberative feasibility thus also depend on how much trust is placed in participation.
Sometimes, MEPs even proposed different solutions other than deliberative democracy. For example, a Dutch S+D MEP was in favor of adopting local initiatives to strengthen community building in her country, which she also interpreted as ‘deliberative’. Otherwise, adopting more consultation groups was mentioned as another solution, but only for improving the current communication structure, namely by informing and discussing with citizens rather than for decision-making. Based on a preference for the representative system, the feasibility of deliberative democracy was therefore perceived as unrealistic. Although some MEPs thought its more participatory structure could fill engagement gaps there where representative democracy could not, they had doubts about whether it could be adopted at EU level due to its scale, integration difficulties and historically low participation rates, which made MEPs think of existing participatory options. These attitudes complement what Parvin (2018) argues about systemically adopting the norms of deliberative democracy in an
institution: the more deliberative democracy is made central for a democratic system, the more unrealistic its criteria become.
Proposing alternative solutions to a full deliberative democratic model raises an important point for the interpretation of the concept of deliberative democracy; while the researcher’s explanations of the concept’s norms were all explicit and backed up by examples, MEPs often interpreted deliberative democracy in different ways; some attributed to it a more informative objective rather than an opportunity to allow citizens to engage in decision-making. Others looked to the equivalent of the Swiss democratic model, being it more
directly democratic. A few believed that ECI, the Petition tool and referenda came as close to deliberation as the concept itself. And others still even looked at social media engagement and informal citizen meetings as a deliberative effort. While these interpretations may be
considered a limitation of the research, they also illustrate how deliberative democracy still remains an academic topic, and although it has been tested in some governmental settings (O’Donoghue & Chaney, 2009), it is still far from being observed at EU level. This is
surprising especially in light of the Commission sponsoring Europolis in 2009, an experiment which even many MEPs did not know about. The discrepancies I observed between some MEPs who thought Parliament should adopt a deliberative model and others believing that the Commission should have the responsibility to adopt it also highlight how the perceptions of these two institutions’ authority vary within the EU. This further calls for communication channels and transparency to be better adopted internally as well. MEPs’ views are in line with Brüggeman’s research on EU communication channels, which finds that transparency and dialogue are still not optimal for citizens despite a Commission reform to enhance them (Brüggeman, 2010). However, most MEPs conclude that some of the inner workings of the EU institution are not transparent even for them.
Negative attitudes toward feasibility of a deliberative democratic system may also be influenced by perceptions toward national belonging before European belonging. Most MEPs tended to emphasize a national public sphere over a European public sphere. They were then also more skeptical of European authority and preferred to see their country as independent from Europe as an overarching entity. They therefore also suggested that deliberative
democracy could work better at national or local level. This is why MEPs also referred to the issue of differing representative cultures and legal systems in different countries; differing affiliations with the EU were seen as harmful for engagement as people would continue to hold the same kind of interest in the first place. Sometimes MEPs disregarded having to improve engagement altogether in the EU because they did not want to be part of it in the first place: “Also, you’re talking to someone who doesn’t even want to be in the EU” (British, EFDD).
Of course, a few EU supporters made their stance clear over wanting to represent the entire European population before calling themselves national politicians, but most MEPs tended to highlight problems and worries that people had back home. For Greece, for example, the MEP emphasized how the EU is not doing enough to listen to the country’s requests to ease the immigration crisis. The Italian MEP further discussed the lack of stimulating discussions between government and citizens in Italy. For example, Italians did not know about the reform on abolishing daylight savings in Europe until it was time to vote on it. This is why a few MEPs further suggested that deliberative democracy should be adopted locally in a smaller public sphere before being integrated fully at European level. Emphasizing this, the MEP from Luxembourg was generally satisfied with the representative system due to the fact that the country is quite small and so individual queries can be taken into account better. The local issue was also raised by Gastil (2018) when he argued that the normative components of deliberative democracy could get lost the greater its scope becomes.
This is further reflected in the Treaty of Lisbon 2009 being cited as the main obstacle to a deliberative democratic reform. Although it was signed to improve the EU’s democratic approaches, such as through the ECI, many MEPs fear the impossibility of reopening its clauses and would rather remain in line with its established boundaries.
Ultimately, all these attitudes toward the adoption of deliberative democracy may also depend on the kind of perception MEPs hold toward their mandate depending on specific role orientations. They could have varying outlooks on citizen engagement and institutional infrastructure depending on whether they come from a party-based system or a candidate-based system (Farrell & Scully, 2010), which could explain how much trust they put into the current representative system and in the ability, if at all, to improve it.
Conclusion
Based on the collective picture of MEP attitudes, the feasibility of adopting
deliberative democracy at EU level for better engagement is idealistic at best. Not only this, but the priority should first be on improving the representative system. While the current representative system in the EU remains essential, several things need to be implemented if a deliberative system were to be adopted in the future. These include better accountability and transparency in the Commission and Council, and better communication between institutions, as well as with citizens. Perceptions are that there exist some effective tools for citizen
engagement already, such as ECI, the petition tool and consultative polls, and those should be improved for accessibility and greater decisional power. Nonetheless, politicians should still keep on deciding for citizens what is best for them. Deliberative democracy can decrease the democratic deficit only when the current system is improved, and even then, be regarded purely as a supplement, or otherwise be initiated from outside the institution from the bottom up. The EU’s democratic structure is still too ingrained in the representative system to adopt a
deliberative approach, but citizen engagement is still acknowledged as important input for decision-making.
This research did not come without its limitations. Although MEP attitudes offer great insight into the first-hand experiences of EU structure and citizen engagement, they are not enough in determining whether deliberative democracy could technically function at EU level. More feedback could come from the Commission as a legislative initiator and from citizens as the potential participants. In addition, MEPs’ interviews conducted across different channels could have affected the quality of the responses given, e.g., shorter answers from the written interviews or misunderstandings from phone calls. Lastly, validity of the results is difficult to determine because of the establishment of new grounds for qualitative research.
These limitations notwithstanding, the current study is the first to investigate the feasibility of adopting deliberative democracy at EU level through the attitudes of MEPs. It shows that although this model holds potential, the process of its adoption is more complex than the normative suggestions reported in academia. Suggestions for future research include consulting citizens to understand their motivation for participating in deliberative practices at EU level, as well as tapping into other EU legislative and executive powers to understand the overall predisposition of adopting deliberative practices.
Funding
This research has been co-funded by the Erasmus Mundus Consortium by means of a travel grant to make it possible for the researcher to conduct face-to-face interviews with MEPs in Brussels.
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