The EU as a diplomatic actor in the global political order
MPA Thesis
Track: International and European Governance
Word count: 20.707
Claudia Meijer
S2676036
Dr. B.J. Carroll
List of Abbreviations 4
1. Introduction 5
1.2 Academic and societal relevance 7
1.3 Method of analysis and data collection 8
1.4 Outline of contents 8
2. Theoretical framework 10
2.1. Literature review 10
2.1.1. History of EU foreign policy 10
2.1.2. EU ‘actorness’ 11
2.1.3. Diplomacy 12
2.1.4. Perceptions of legitimacy 12
2.1.5. Historical institutionalism and path dependence 13
2.2. Theoretical framework 14
3. Research Design 17
3.1 Methodology 17
3.2 Data collection: Process tracing 17
3.3 Operationalisation 18
4. Empirical Findings 21
4.1. The road up to the EEAS: A timeline 21
4.1.1. Post- Cold War era 24
4.1.2. 1999 25
4.1.3. Foreign policy cooperation 26
4.1.3.1. External Action within the Commission 26
4.1.3.2. Commission versus Council 27
4.1.3.3. European Political Cooperation 28
4.1.3.4. The Policy Unit 29
4.1.4. Convention on the future of Europe: A Near Miss? 30
4.1.9. EU Presidency 32
4.1.10. Iraq war: A Failure of the CFSP? 34
4.1.11. Perceptions of legitimacy 35
Asia 35
United States of America 37
Other relevant countries 37
4.1.12. Theory 38
4.2.1 Legal basis EEAS 40
Legal framework of the Union 41
4.2.2. European Union Delegations 43
4.2.3 Challenges 43
4.2.4. Global financial crisis 45
4.3 Modern EU foreign policy, supported by the EEAS 48
4.3.1. Public Diplomacy 48
4.3.2. The EU as a normative power 49
4.3.3. Soft power 49
4.3.4. Smart power 50
4.3.5. Perceived legitimacy today 51
United States 53
4.3.6. Economic power 54
European perceptions 54
5. Conclusion 55
Limitations and further research 57
List of Abbreviations
ACP African, Caribbean and Pacific
AU African Union
CEOS Conditions of Employment of Officials of the European Communities
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy
DG Directorate-General
DG RELEX Directorate-General for External Action
EAC European Agency for Cooperation
EC European Communities
ECSC European Coal and Steel Community
EDC European Defence Community
EDF European Development Fund
EU European Union
EEAS European External Action Service
EEC European Economic Community
EPC European Political Cooperation
ENP European Neighbourhood Policy
HR High Representative
HRVP High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
IGC Intergovernmental Conference
IO International Organisation
IR International Relations
MEP Member of Parliament
MS Member State
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
SP Strategic Partnership
TEU Treaty on European Union
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
1. Introduction
Lisbon, Portugal, December 2007. EU Member States Heads of Government have gathered at the fifteenth century Jerónimos Monastery in the neighbourhood of Belém. The Portuguese
government, holding the presidency of the Council of the European Union under the leadership of prime minister José Sócrates, has arranged the reunion in light of the signing of the so-called Reform Treaty. After a duration of approximately six years, the 27 EU member states finally managed to come to an agreement on the internal reforms that are needed to “tackle today’s challenges and tomorrow’s” (European Commission, 2009). Sócrates describes it as a “victory for Europe”, stating that “with this agreement … we will be ready to tackle the world’s
challenges” (Goldirova, 2007).
The Lisbon Treaty has fundamentally changed the institutional and procedural framework of the EU in the realm of foreign policy, attempting to amend policy-making into a more efficient and democratic process by creating new policies and granting certain institutions novel competencies. The treaty has established, inter alia, the Office of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, extended the role of the European Council in the CFSP decision making process, and has led to the creation of the mutual defence clause and the solidarity clause (Ciascai, 2011). However, one of the most fundamental shifts to external relations developed by the Lisbon Treaty could have been the establishment of a diplomatic service for the EU - the European External Action Service (EEAS). The EEAS, formally instituted in 2011, has united expert staff in the field of foreign and security policy coming from the Commission, the Council, and the Member States (Galantino & Freire, 2015). As a diplomatic service, its core task consists of supporting the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy in his/her duty of securing “unity, consistency and effectiveness of action” in the EU’s CFSP (Galantino & Freire, 2015). Having the EEAS at the High Representative’s disposal should promote the advancement of a common external policy and provide consistency and unification to the European Union’s external action (Robert Schuman Foundation, 2007). Furthermore, Lisbon’s reforms were formulated so as to legitimise the ‘EU’s international persona’ (Ferreira-Pereira & Vieira, 2016). The Union’s
international influence was to be enhanced in order to “increase the role it plays in the international arena and to promote its values and interests” (Robert Schuman Foundation, 2007, p. 1).
Upon becoming operational in December 2010, the EEAS headquarters were established in Brussels some time later, and the Commission Delegations that were already in place, were
transformed into EU Delegations. These delegations are located in third countries, but also within international organisations such as the United Nations (UN) and the World Health Organisation (WHO).This broad network of diplomatic missions have an important public diplomatic role, which will be analysed later.
Hitherto, the EEAS has been perceived as both successful and ineffective, depending on the circumstances of EU action. By way of illustration, the EU crisis management mission in Kosovo with regard to rule of law, was perceived to be inefficient by the European Court of Auditors in 2012. The Special Report stated that there were “significant areas where better management by the EEAS and the Commission could have made EU assistance more effective” (European Court of Auditors, 2012). More recently, the diplomatic service was negatively portrayed in the media after being accused of bowing to China’s pressure (Barigazzi, 2020). According to Politico Europe, “EU countries are going their own way on foreign policy; more EU institutions want in on the action; and the organisation itself suffers from management problems” (Barigazzi, 2020). Moreover,
Politico also noted that “while the EEAS is meant to be focused on external affairs, it has significant internal troubles” (Barigazzi, 2020). However, the news article also stressed, in the EEAS’ defence, that the service is still rather young, and can therefore not be measured against “more structured foreign services like [the French] Quai d’Orsay” (Barigazzi, 2020). Former Executive Secretary of the EEAS, Pierre Vimont, also noted that progress has certainly been made, yet “we are still far from the kind of outcome everyone is looking for” (Barigazzi, 2020).
On the other hand, the External Service has also been praised for some of its approaches. As a case in point, the EU’s response to the nuclear deal with Iran was praised by Politico Europe as “one of its great diplomatic successes - even after U.S. President Donal Trump withdrew from the
pact” (Barigazzi, 2020). Notably when the deal was first signed, the first High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs & Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, was a crucial actor in the
negotiations, and was commonly applauded for her role (Dreazen, 2013). Conversely, American news publication Foreign Policy also published an article in which the EU’s response to Iran was criticised. According to Iran expert at the European Council on Foreign Relations, Ellie
Geranmayeh, the collapse of the nuclear deal “has been one of the defining moments of the limits of European freedom of navigation in terms of foreign policy. … If the [nuclear deal] goes down and Europe can’t salvage it, it carries a message for every country - not just Iran - about the relevance that Europeans can play as a global actor” (Gramer & Johnson, 2019).
The aim of this work is to analyse if the establishment of the EEAS has had any influence on the perceptions of relevant actors on the EU’s legitimacy as a global actor. Accordingly, the research question that follows is: Has the creation of the European External Action Service, established by the Lisbon Treaty, led to any significant changes in the perception of legitimacy of the European Union as a global actor?
In order to answer this question, this work will present a political analysis of the history of EU foreign policy, eventually leading to the establishment of a European diplomatic service. The perceptions of both internal and external political actors will be taken into account, though the emphasis lies on external actors. Through the method of process tracing, the empirical study
examines perceptions of the EU as a legitimate global actor before and after the Lisbon Treaty came into effect.
1.2 Academic and societal relevance
The value of this research lies in its analysis of the perceptions of legitimacy by prominent actors in global politics. It is important for the EU, and more specifically the EEAS, to know whether the objectives for establishing the EEAS have indeed been fruitful. After all, if third countries do not perceive the EU as a legitimate actor, it is difficult to forward EU interests to these nations.
Although the focus lies on perceptions by third countries, the opinions of internal actors will also be present. By comparing different points in time, one can observe whether the EU has made any progress as a foreign policy actor. This knowledge can be of high relevance in future EU decision-making on foreign and security policy. Therefore, it could also potentially guide scholars and policymakers in their pursuit of writing recommendations on how to conduct foreign policy. Our current climate is one of increasing global complexity and interdependence; the EU’s position as a global political power is often threatened by surging powers such as China, and by an increasing rivalry between China and the US. As a result, the EU is forced to rethink its strategic landscape. This work will contribute to our understanding of how exactly the EU is conducting this
challenging task. By analysing the EEAS so extensively, this work also provides thorough information on the general institutional structures of the European Union, and the motives for setting up new bodies that serve important functions. Moreover, this work can be differentiated from previous literature by avoiding to operate on a normative basis. While the data that is used for this research is normative in nature, this work seeks to remain solely positive.
One’s understanding of how the EU has conducted its foreign policy in the past and in the present, and why the Lisbon Treaty has been so significant, is of societal relevance. Although one might argue that the average EU citizen is not so much affected by the EU’s foreign policy, the security and safety of the EU’s internal space is in fact of relevance to all EU citizens. As previously mentioned, this work is of specific relevance to policymakers as it could guide them in the process of producing new policy recommendations and/or proposals. Furthermore, it can be beneficial to national and EU diplomats in navigating their daily activities and it can guide them in obtaining a better understanding of how their collective actions are being perceived. Lastly, this work can be significant for students with an interest in EU foreign and security policy, and international relations more generally. It can be of assistance in deciding whether pursuing a career or a traineeship at the EEAS or the European Commission, truly aligns with their interests.
1.3 Method of analysis and data collection
The method of analysis and data collection are of utmost importance to any research project and have to be justified. The research question will be answered by means of process tracing, a
qualitative analysis methodology. By taking different points in history, the perceived legitimacy of the EU can be analysed over time. The third chapter of this thesis will elaborate deeper upon this matter.
1.4 Outline of contents
This first chapter has presented an introduction to the establishment of the European External Action Service by the Treaty of Lisbon and concludes with the presentation of the research question. The academic and societal relevance have been discussed, and the methods of analysis and data collection have briefly been mentioned. In the second chapter, the literature will be reviewed, providing an overview of the academic literature that has been relevant for this study. This literature review is structured into different paragraphs representing different topics related to the research area. The next section will then begin by presenting the hypotheses, considering the findings of the selected literature. This section will also discuss and justify the theoretical
framework. The third chapter is about the research design; it commences with the justification of the methodology that best fits this research. Subsequently, the explanatory and outcome variable will be operationalised. The fourth chapter will report the empirical findings that were monitored, and apply these findings to the theoretical framework so as to test the hypotheses. The main
hypothesis will either be confirmed or refuted. Finally, the sixth chapter will summarise the findings and deliver an answer to the research question. A reflection will also be present, in which the
2. Theoretical framework
This chapter starts with a review of literature and then proceeds to explain the theoretical framework of this thesis.
2.1. Literature review
This work assembles various courses of literature. This section will elaborate on the major courses of work that have been examined in order to conduct this thesis. The topic of the European Union’s position in global affairs in academic literature has been ascending over the past decade, as the EU has been expanding its engagement in different parts of the world. This engagement has exceeded the sphere of economic integration. As dictatorial governments have increasingly gained power in crucial areas, the position of the EU in external relations has obtained the interest of scholars
specialised in IR and European Studies. This chapter will introduce some of the main themes within this field of research. In compliance with these distinct themes, this section will be divided into five different paragraphs, discussing the following topics: EU foreign policy, EU actorness, diplomacy, (perceived) legitimacy, and historical institutionalism.
This academic literature was obtained through Leiden University’s catalogue.
2.1.1. History of EU foreign policy
The literature of EU foreign policy illustrates that its history is rich and lengthy, and shows how the European countries have engaged in some type of common foreign policy ever since the beginning of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). Morgenstern-Pomorski (2018) has provided a great historical framework that is useful for this research as it puts EU foreign policy in perspective. This historical framework is important for gaining understanding as to how and why policymakers have eventually concluded that it was necessary for the European Union to acquire its own
diplomatic service, independent but cooperative with the diplomatic missions of the individual member states. It becomes clear that the “institutional development of EU external action appears to include distinct decision-making phases” (Morgenstern-Pomorski, 2018, p. 40). Moreover, the perennial debate between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism in decision-making in EU foreign policy becomes apparent (Morgenstern-Pomorski, 2018), which symbolises a more general issue that the EU has been faced with ever since its existence. Ohrgaard (1997) argued that
European Political Cooperation was more intergovernmental in nature, while at the same time being more intense than that.
Vanhoonacker et al. (2011) focused their research on the role of the Presidency of the Council within EU external relations, which was in charge of coordinating the political sphere of foreign relations. Although they noted that the mechanism enjoyed legitimacy, a major issue was that third countries did not know who to contact, as the face of Europe was changing every six months. They found that most member states would give priority to certain their countries with whom they had geographical and historical ties. According to Vanhoonacker et al. (2011), the mechanism lacked continuity, leadership and coherence. Lisbon’s reforms sought to improve this.
2.1.2. EU ‘actorness’
This work adopts a so-called ‘European Union-as-actor’ approach, meaning that the focus lays on influence of Europe on world politics, as it was specified by Brian White (2018, p. 45). Within the analysis, the European Union is the core ‘actor’.
De Baere and Wessel (2013) provide a more legal analysis of the position of the EEAS within the institutional structure of the EU as a whole. Such analysis clarifies to what extent the EEAS is able to act within the constraints of EU law. De Baere and Wessel (2013) conclude that the Lisbon Treaty has remained ambiguous with regards to the functioning of the EEAS, limiting its capacities to make the EU’s external action more coherent and effective. They also found that this ambiguity has been used by the member states in their favour, so as to not limit the amount of power ceded to the EEAS. Erkelens and Blockmans (2012) argue that a major difficulty was installing the EEAS within the EU’s institutional architecture, specifically considering the fact that it is not a formal EU institution, nor an agency with legal personality.
A study conducted by Edwards (2014) discusses the problems faced by the then newly established diplomatic service. These included technical issues, such as staffing and budgeting, but also the defective exchange of information, which hindered the EEAS in functioning effectively. This work also focuses on the position of member states vis-à-vis the diplomatic service, as he put an emphasis on the need for the member states to approve of the EEAS.
By taking a constitute approach, questions such as “What is an international actor” and, more importantly, “Do other states recognise the EU as an international actor?” should then be asked (Jorgensen, 2004, p. 43)
2.1.3.Diplomacy
Foreign policy has traditionally been linked to nation states. Foreign policy analysts have had to shift away from this view of foreign policy being associated merely to the state. This literature focuses on the Westphalian framework of diplomacy. However, the EU has emerged as a novel type of diplomatic actor, which has challenged traditional concepts of diplomacy.
In their work, Sandrin and Hoffmann (2018) analyse how public diplomacy is conducted by the EU as a unique foreign policy practice that is also applied for identity building. Through the act of soft power, the EU seeks to enhance its influence in third countries and to legitimise its action (Sandrin & Hoffmann, 2018). Rasmussen (2009) has linked public diplomacy to the act of enacting an identity for the Union as an actor, whereby it seeks to have a foreign impact on important European values like democracy and human rights. This corresponds with the persona of the EU as a
normative actor. This strategy is increasingly crucial to the Union, who seeks to establish itself as an important normative actor in the global sphere.
A study conducted by Cross (2011) combines the use of soft power and hard power in what she frames as ‘smart power’ - a strategic combination of the use of both. According to Cross (2011) merely looking at soft power is not enough to discuss the EU’s position as a global actor, albeit recognising that the Union relies mostly on soft power tools. In this regard, soft power is open to different perceptions. It also has to be noted that the Union could already seen as a normative power prior to the creation of the EEAS, but the inception of the diplomatic service has reinforced this notion of soft power. However, Cross (2011) also acknowledges the presence of hard power, in terms of military action through the CFSP. According to Cross (2011) the EU can acquire the desired perceptions of its legitimacy through smart power.
2.1.4. Perceptions of legitimacy
According to Tallberg and Zürn, perceived legitimacy can be defined as “actors’ perception of an institution’s authority as appropriately exercised” (p. 583), measuring it as an “individual’s confidence or trust in a political institution” (p. 586).
A study conducted by Schweiger (2016) argues that overdue and uncoordinated responses to foreign policy matters are threatening the EU’s legitimacy as a political actor. This work claims that the focus on interior questions leads to a shortcoming in dealing with international challenges. As a result, external action as conducted by the European Union is more often seen as incoherent and inefficient.According to Schweiger (2016), the 2015 migration crisis illustrates this finding.
Lehne (2017) argues that the overall functioning of EU foreign policy has indeed improved since the Lisbon Treaty came into effect, and that relations with third countries are conducted in a fairly effective manner. Nevertheless, when difficult situations arise and crucial decisions have to be made, the system is not as effective. As a result, Lehne concludes that the general international stated of the Union has diminished since the Lisbon Treaty.
To analyse the outcome variable, previous literature examining the external perceptions of the EU have been utilised, which are scarce. Fioramonti and Lucarelli (2010) have conducted a
comprehensive global examination of perceptions of the EU by third countries, which concerns the pre-EEAS time frame of this study. Prior to the creation of the EEAS, they had concluded that political elites around the world were hesitant about the “effectiveness and credibility of the EU as a ‘new type’ of global actor” (Fioramonti & Lucarelli, 2010, p. 218). For the post-EEAS time frame, Schweiger argues that the EU has often been unable to deal with international challenges, and has therefore often been discerned as incoherent and inefficient (Schweiger, 2016, p. 213).
2.1.5. Historical institutionalism and path dependence
This study builds on the theoretical framework of historical institutionalism, which supports the research. However, historical institutionalism should rather be seen as an approach to study phenomena within the realm of the social sciences (Steinmo, 2008). According to Steinmo (2008), the focus of historical institutionalism lays on empirical matters, viewed from a historical
perspective, thereby focusing on how political attitudes and outcomes are framed by institutions.
A study conducted by Capoccia and Kelemen (2006) focuses on the concepts of critical junctures and path dependency, both associated with historical institutionalism. They offer a definition of critical junctures as “relatively short periods of time during which there is a substantially heightened probability that agents’ choices will affect the outcome of interest” (Capoccia & Keleman, 2006, p. 348). The authors define path dependence as longer periods in time, during which institutional
stability is present. According two Capoccia and Kelemen (2006), path dependence is an important causal mechanism within the realm of historical institutionalism (Capoccia & Kelemen, 2006).
On the other hand, Thelen and Steinmo (1999) has provided for a more general framework of historical institutionalism. They argue that institutional choice and change is imperative in the field of political science, whereby moments of critical juncture guide us in comprehending political history. Moreover, Thelen and Steinmo present the idea that institutional decisions have the ability to frame people’s perceptions and attitudes. Accordingly, the theory of historical institutionalism is relevant for this work as it becomes clear that institutional decisions, such as the decision to establish an EU diplomatic service, can frame people’s perceptions and attitudes towards that institution (Thelen & Steinmo, 1999, p. 27).
2.2. Theoretical framework
Given what the literature has determined about this topic, this work relies on the theoretical framework of critical junctures, deriving from the theory of historical institutionalism. Having a theoretical framework guides in explaining, predicting and understanding certain circumstances.
I hypothesise that the establishment of the European External Action Service as the EU’s diplomatic service has contributed to higher levels of perceived legitimacy of the EU as a global actor. With this hypothesis, the establishment of the EEAS is regarded as a critical juncture in EU foreign policy. The alternative hypothesis states that the creation of the EEAS has not contributed to any changes in the perception of legitimacy of the EU as a global actor.
Path dependence is a pivotal causal mechanism within historical institutionalism and will therefore be central here (Capoccia & Keleman, 2006, p. 343). Thelen and Steinmo (1999) have implied that institutional analysis is relevant within the examination of comparative politics for two reasons. First, assessing the conflict that preceded the institutional change is relevant for our
understanding of political history (Thelen & Steinmo, 1999, p. 27). Secondly, they argue that institutional decisions can frame people’s perceptions and attitudes (Thelen & Steinmo, 1999, p. 27). In this respect, the establishment of a diplomatic service for the European Union could shape perceptions of the EU.
The concepts of critical junctures and institutional development have a rich history in the social sciences (Capoccia & Keleman, 2006, p. 344). Quite recently, ideas from the field of
economics have been embraced and added, which has “provided a rich new analytic toolkit for social scientists to analyse how early choices and historical circumstances could generate enduring, path-dependent effects” (Capoccia & Keleman, 2006, p. 345). Capoccia and Keleman (2006) have noted that previous literature has predominantly focused on the institutionally stable period of path dependence (p. 346). The relationship between path dependency and critical junctures is crucial. Mahoney (2000) described that “once a particular option is selected [during a critical juncture], it becomes progressively more difficult to return to the initial point when multiple alternatives were still available” (p. 113). Simply stated, critical junctures are “brief phases of institutional flux, during which more dramatic change is possible” (Capoccia & Keleman, 2006, p. 341). A more elaborated definition explains critical junctures as “relatively short periods of time during which there is a substantially heightened probability that agents’ choices will affect the outcome of interest” (Capoccia & Keleman, 2006, p. 348). Hereby the concepts of “relatively short” and “substantially heightened probability” remain rather obscure. Therefore, “relatively short period of time” means that, according to Capoccia and Keleman (2006), it should be short with respect to the duration of the path-dependent process that it provokes (p. 348).Moreover, the “substantially heightened probability” implies that, when comparing before and after, the chances of the decisions made by the relevant actors to influence the outcome of interest should be higher (Capoccia & Keleman, 2006, p. 348).
In their work, Capoccia and Keleman (2006) seek to address some of the conceptual flaws that had not been tackled by preceding literature. They identified these shortcomings in the domains of units of analysis power asymmetries, time horizons, and near misses (Capoccia & Keleman, 2006, p. 347-248).
With regards to units of analysis, it is important to clearly identify a particular unit of analysis, as a critical juncture can drastically change one institution, while it leaves other
institutions untouched (Capoccia & Keleman, 2006, p. 349). Secondly, changes that were acquired by longer time horizons might not be considered as critical junctures, as “causal accounts that involve cumulative causes suggest that the probability of a particular outcome increases steadily over time” (Capoccia & Keleman, 2006, p. 351). Meanwhile, if the causes are more short-term, they “are far stronger candidates for the application of the critical juncture framework” (Capoccia & Keleman, 2006, p. 351). Thirdly, Capoccia and Keleman (2006) suggest that change is not a critical component of critical junctures. Indeed it is often a result, but could still eventually be rejected (p. 352). Therefore, they emphasise that in some cases, “re-equilibration of an institution” is the result (Capoccia and Keleman, 2006, p. 352). It leads to ‘near misses’ being overlooked, while they can
actually provide interesting and relevant information. Lastly, their work emphasises the importance of decisions made by powerful actors/ political elites (Capoccia and Keleman, 2006, p. 354).
3. Research Design
This chapter seeks to provide an overview of the methods and procedures that were used during the process of collecting, analysing and processing data. The research has to be designed in a way that supports the research question and the relevant theoretical framework.
3.1 Methodology
This research will be conducted as a small-N comparative analysis, which should confine the intricacy of causal identification strategies (Toshkov, p. 259). Though the focus lays on a single case, namely EU foreign policy, it will be measured over different points in time.
The research is qualitative in nature, meaning that it provides “depth and detail through direct quotation and careful description of situations, events, interactions and observed
behaviours” (Labuschagne, 2003, p. 100). This signifies a focus on “processes and meanings”, rather than a focus measurement in the form of quantity or frequency (Labuschagne, 2003, p. 100). In this regard, the qualitative data offers insights that can assist in answering the research question. The "depth and richness” it provides is indeed the largest benefit of this research method (Research Optimus, 2013). Moreover, such comprehensive analysis is able to enhance the validity and
reliability within the processes of measurement and operationalisation (Toshkov, 2016, p. 261). However, its major drawback comes from its susceptibility to bias and individual subjectivity (Research Optimus, 2013).
3.2 Data collection: Process tracing
The method of analysis that best suits this research is process tracing. The objective of process tracing is to determine whether a possible cause has had an influence on a particular change or set of changes (INTRAC, 2017). According to Bennett and Checkel, process tracing can be defined as “the use of evidence from within a case to make inferences about causal explanations of that case” (2015, p. 4). Several scholars have written about the method of process tracing. Toshkov (2016) emphasises the focus on causal mechanisms within process tracing (p. 298). Waldner (2012) claims that “the core idea of process tracing is concatenation” (p. 68), which comes down to the idea that “the researcher uncovers a tight sequence of events that are linked together as if in a chain … To be causally relevant, the sequence of events must be held together by one or more causal mechanisms that strongly imply the links between the individual events” (Toshkov, 2016, p. 298).
These links must be clearly mentioned by the researcher, and the information regarding these causal mechanisms must be obtained from existing scholarship (Toshkov, 2016, p. 298). Process tracing seeks to utilise and merge the previously established core elements of causal explanations to justify particular cases (Toshkov, 2016, p. 298). Based on the causal mechanisms, the events that have been narrated through process tracing can turn into evidence either backing or disproving the hypotheses (Toshkov, 2016, p. 299).
The data collection of process tracing is intensive and the research conducted is often
concerned with actors’ motivations and information (Toshkov, 2016, p. 299). A common way to do so is by analysing written sources such as speeches and minutes from conferences (Toshkov, 2016, p. 300). Toshkov also noted that another common manner to conduct process tracing is “recovering in as much detail as possible the institutional context and reconstructing the chronology of events leading to an outcome of interest” (Toshkov, 2016, p. 300). Thus, data will be collected from speeches and interviews, news articles, policy documents and reports, and academic literature.
To summarise, “process tracing incorporates individual events and general facts, mediates between structure and agency, and shifts between the abstract and the concrete” (Toshkov, 2016, p. 300).
3.3 Operationalisation
By operationalising the variables, it becomes clear how one can measure them. Providing
comprehensible definitions of both the independent and dependent variable assists in enhancing the quality of the results (Shuttleworth, 2008). Moreover, a clear definition of the variables can assure an exact reproduction of this research (Shuttleworth, 2008).
In this work, the independent variable consists of ‘the non-existence or existence of the EEAS.’ Thus, this variable is binary as it can only take two values (Toshkov, 2016, p. 114). Operationalising this variable is relatively straightforward. There is a period prior to the Lisbon Treaty during which the European Union did not have a common diplomatic service. During this time, the concept of foreign policy is important, which is defined as “directed at the external environment with the objective of influencing that environment and the behaviour of other actors within it, in order to pursue interests, values and goals” (Directorate-General for Research and Innovation, 2014, p. 21). Two different stages of foreign policy can be differentiated; policymaking and policy implementation (Directorate-General for Research and Innovation, 2014, p. 21). The
sphere of diplomacy falls within the scope of policy implementation. Accordingly, one could argue that it was only sensible for EU foreign policy to be equipped with its own diplomatic service.
The dependent variable is the ‘perceived legitimacy of the EU as a global actor’. In this regard, the definition of perceived legitimacy follows Tallberg and Zürn’s (2014) definition, namely “actors’ perception of an institution’s authority as appropriately exercised” (p. 583).
To use the term ‘legitimacy’, defined as “an institution’s exercise of authority as rightful and worthy recognition based on its conformance to principles such as justice, public interest, and
democracy” (Tallberg and Zürn, 2014, p. 583), would make it a normative research. However, as this work seeks to remain solely positive and it does not seek to present a value-based research, the latter definition will not be applied. Consequently, the approach taken in this work makes use of the term ‘legitimacy’ not to provide any information on the actual correctness and righteousness of an authority, the EU in this case, but instead it seeks to tell us something about whether a certain action or policy is perceived as right and/or correct. This is measured through the empirical analysis of the relevant audiences. Tallberg and Zürn (2019, p. 586) have related to legitimacy as a “relational property” in the sense that it is measured by “the beliefs and perceptions of audiences about the exercise of authority” (p. 586). In this study, these audiences include officials such as civil servants, diplomats and politicians, also known as the political elite. The political elites studied here come from both EU as well as non-EU countries. However, the external perceptions of the EU’s legitimacy are slightly more relevant from its global position, so the focus will lay on this. Moreover, important actors include the media and scholars.
According to Tallberg and Zürn (2019), perceptions of legitimacy can be measured in terms of “an individual’s confidence or trust in a political institution” (p. 586). However, it is important to note that this work will not include the general public opinion. Naturally, perceptions of legitimacy are not fixed, which means that it can differ throughout different audiences and over various time frames. This is why I have opted for a comparative analysis, which will seek to measure the perceived legitimacy of the EU as a global political power over time.
For the measurement of the both variables, three time frames will be analysed. As previously mentioned, the before and after of the establishment of the EEAS will be analysed. However, the time frame of inception will also be taken into account. For this second time frame, it is important to decide upon the time lag of the establishment of the EEAS, that is, the time it takes for its result to become detectable (Toshkov, 2016, p. 229). The Lisbon Treaty was signed in 2007, became
effective in 2009, the EEAS was formally established in 2010, and its headquarters in Brussels were inaugurated a year later. The inception time frame will therefore approximately consist of the period from 2007 till 2011.
4. Empirical Findings
This chapter will provide the empirical findings of this research. The nature of this work implies that measurements have to occur during three different moments in time, respectively. Accordingly, this chapter will be dividid into three sections. The first time frame concerns the period prior to the establishment of the EEAS; this section provides a thorough historical analysis of EU foreign policy. Roughly, this time frame starts around the early as the 1980’s, when perpetual debates on the Union’s institutional structure were at full blast. This time frame is relatively large, so that a
contextual examination of EU foreign policy can be provided. Thereafter, the second section of this chapter discusses the inception of the EEAS, that is, the period during which the Lisbon reforms were implemented. The final section considers the phase of consolidation; the EEAS is now functioning properly and Commission Delegations have turned into EU Delegations.
4.1. The road up to the EEAS: A timeline
The debate on how to include foreign policy and external relations into the institutional structures of the Union has been present for a long time. By examining the organisational landscape of the EU prior to the establishment of the EEAS, it becomes clear how actors eventually came to an agreement to establish the diplomatic service. This procedure was not self-evident nor simple, which makes a thorough analysis all the more necessary. This section therefore presents the background on which the EEAS was created.
The start of external representation and foreign policy on a European level can be traced back to a period as early as 1954, when the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) opened an information office in Washington (European Commission, 2004). The office was led by the High Authority of the ECSC, the forerunner of the European Commission (European Commission, 2004). However, the first diplomatic delegation that was fully recognised as such was opened in 1956 in London, as well as a ‘liaison office’ in Santiago de Chile (European Commission, 2004). The first diplomat to represent a European institution abroad, namely the Euratom in Washington, was sent away in 1959 (European Commission, 2004). By then, the European Commission was already set up by the Treaty of Rome to replace the ECSC High Authority. The Commission soon recognised that there was the need for the Community to be represented globally. Jean Monnet, nowadays considered as one of the founding father of the Union, recognised that it was necessary for Europe “to create an identity for itself overseas” (European Commission, 2004, p. 11).
This started with a strong demand to improve the European presence in former European colonies during the 1960s. The European Agency for Cooperation (EAC) was established as a “semi-autonomous non-profit organisation/agency”, which was set out to organise the recruitment and management of those operating in the Commission offices (European Commission, 2004, p. 15). In essence, the personnel operated on a technical basis and was predominantly concerned with development cooperation (European Commission, 2004). Therefore, they did not enjoy diplomatic status. The Commission later branded the EAC as “something of a strange hybrid in political and administrative terms” (European Commission, 2004, p. 15).
The European Development Fund (EDF) was also created in the context of development cooperation, serving a purpose to grant financial aid for Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP countries) and the Overseas Countries and Territories (European Commission, 2004). In order to implement the EDF, offices were installed in these countries (European Commission, 2004).In the early 70s,delegations were also opened in Geneva and Paris, and the ‘information office’ in
Washington was formally transformed into a delegation (European Commission, 2004). During this time, around 150 Commission staff members were residing abroad to carry out their tasks in
approximately 30 missions around the world. However, they did not yet have any diplomatic capacities.
Not long afterwards, the Lomé Convention was signed between the European Economic Community (EEC) and 46 ACP states. This convention went beyond the scope its predecessor, the Yaounde Convention, by not merely covering development cooperation, but by also dealing with matters regarding trade, regional integration and cultural cooperation. Furthermore, the Lomé Convention was more political in nature (European Commission, 2004). The convention text also assigned Commission delegates to serve as heads of mission; they would “represent the
Commission in the ACP States for the purpose of implementing the Convention” (European Commission, 2004). As a result of this convention, the amount of missions in ACP countries doubled within a period of three years - from 1975 till 1978 (European Commission, 2004). Simultaneously, the Community had embarked on a journey of advanced relations with eight southern and eastern Mediterranean states by concluding agreements with them between 1975 and 1977. Accordingly, delegations were soon established within countries (European Commission, 2004). Likewise, the delegation network was expanded to the cities of Bangkok, Delhi and Caracas, Tokyo and New York. For the latter, a “more classically diplomatic approach” (European
Commission, 2004, p. 24) was adopted. Depending on the main role of the particular delegation, the majority fell under the authority of the Directorate-General Trade or the Directorate-General
Development, departments of the European Commission, as the Directorate-General for External Relations was only established in 1999 (Austermann, 2016, p. 80).
As the network of delegations was quickly enlarging, there was a need for the Commission to acquire “high-level access and diplomatic protection” (European Commission, 2004, p 25). Thus, the Commission decided to establish special agreements with these states, based on the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 (European Commission, 2004, p. 25). Consequently, the head of mission and the foreign personnel would be granted full diplomatic status (European Commission, 2004). When the 1980s came around, there were fifty Commission delegations globally. Although the ‘External Service’ was clearly still being navigated, the delegations already had a substantial impact on the Community’s international persona and its global aspirations (European Commission, 2004, p. 25).
However, the system was faced with structural challenges within the management. A former senior official of the Commission, Adrian Fortescue, was mandated to conduct a study on how the joint external service could best be operated. His report became the foundation for the Commission in further developing EU foreign policy (European Commission, 2004, p. 37).
It noted, inter alia, that the management of personnel was a deficit in the External Service’s structure at the time. The management issues resulted largely from the fact that those working for delegations in associated countries under the EAC, did not enjoy diplomatic immunity, which often restricted them in taking adequate action. Considering that around 75% of the totality of the
Commission’s External Service personnel was employed by the EAC in APC missions, one can understand why this was problematic. It then became clear that if the Commission delegations were to be completely recognised and perceived as legitimate by the diplomatic services of the member states and third countries, it was necessary to present a permissible functional framework for the service (European Commission, 2004, p. 37). Moreover, the staff working overseas at the delegations lacked information, tools, financial and material assistance, and career perspective (European Commission, 2004, p. 38).
In the meanwhile, the Commission delegation were rapidly expanding, with a focus on launching delegations in the Mediterranean, Asia, and Latin America. From 1988 onwards, the Commission’s service was to be managed by common statutory rules, for which an exclusive Directorate-General IX was instituted (European Commission, 2004, p. 33). The reforms included a change in the position of EAC contract personnel; they would now be granted the status of
‘Commission official’ (European Commission, 2004, p. 34). Moreover, by the end of the 1980s, most delegations had required diplomatic status (European Commission, 2004, p. 36). The
diplomatic missions obtained a more significant role in the process of implementing the
Community’s policies in the host countries. The reforms had generally been successful, and by the end of the 1980s, “the External Service was well and truly on the map” (European Commission, 2004, p. 36).
In 1993, the Treaty of Maastricht established the European Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which fundamentally reformed EU foreign policy. Any mention of an External Service appeared for the first time in Article 20 of the Maastricht Treaty stating that:
“The diplomatic and consular missions of the Member States and the Commission Delegations in third countries and international conferences, and their representations to international
organisations, shall cooperate to ensure that the common positions and joint actions adopted by the [European] Council are complied with and implemented” (European Commission, 2004).
In practice, this signified a more dynamic political role for the delegations. 1993 was also the year that the Commission, under the administration of Jacques Delors, established a new Directorate-General - DG IA - with the purpose of making external relations ‘more effective and coherent’ (European Commission, 2004, p. 44). As the External Service was now being seen as ‘unified', innovations were again necessary to maintain and improve this. These innovations comprised matters of personnel management, but also material means (European Commission, 2004). Diplomat Yves Gazzo wrote that while security facilities had improved substantially, “we often remain under-equipped compared to Member States’ embassies, this situation being partly explained by limited budget resources” (European Commission, 2004, p. 45).
4.1.1. Post- Cold War era
During the 1990s, the European continent was faced with major challenges after the communist regimes in Europe and the former Soviet Union collapsed. This drastically changed the political context in which not only the Union, but the whole word was operating. Novel challenges and opportunities came into being, which made it necessary to reconsider tools and policies in order to be able to make decisions and operate in a changing environment (Galantino & Freire, 2015).
Therefore, the EU reinforced a foreign policy tool, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), to include some of these eastern and southern neighbours in their policy. With the Russian Federation, the EU embarked on a journey of ‘strategic partnership’, which was different from the ENP and gave EU-Russia relations new dynamic (Galantino & Freire, 2015). The countries of former Yugoslavia were also dealt with outside of the ENP framework, as they fell within the
‘enlargement package’ (Galantino & Freire, 2015, p. 2). Although the strategies were formally different, the principal tools that were employed, informally they were similar. Moreover, the objective of “providing the necessary political tools for engaging with these states in a cooperative manner that might foster security and stability throughout Europe” (Galantino & Freire, 2015, p. 2) was identical across the entire area, aligning with the EU’s comprehensive approach in its
international policy discourse (Faria, 2014). Moreover, the Community was active in its response to these events and rapidly created two novel programmes: PHARE for Central and Eastern Europe, and TACIS for the Russia and the now independent states (European Commission, 2004, p. 40). The large scale of these projects demanded close monitoring, and it was evident that there was a strong demand for the Community to strengthen its political status in this region (European Commission, 2004, p. 40). Therefore it was necessary to expand the Commission’s external service by opening new delegations here. However, it was impossible for some delegations to become full diplomatic missions (European Commission, 2004, p. 40). When the process of EU enlargement began soon afterwards, the delegations acquired an imperative role. They were crucial in the process of guiding the host countries,mainly by administrating the assistance programmes, guiding the harmonisation and implementation of the EU acquis and offering information on the workings of the EU
(European Commission, 2004, p. 40).
4.1.2. 1999
In 1999, Romano Prodi became president of the Commission. His goal was to make the
Commission’s central services more efficient. The DG for External Relations and the Development DG were strengthened and a new Directorate-General, the EuropeAid Cooperation Office, was established with the purpose of managing international development cooperation of the Union (European Commission, 2004, p. 51). Moreover, 1999 saw the fortification of the CFSP with the introduction of a High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy in the Treaty of Amsterdam. The Commission delegations were often involved in CFSP missions to sensitive areas, assisting the High Representative with its duties.
Within the operations of the Commission external service, the Parliament also played an active role. In fact, the Parliament made a proposal in 2000, known as the Galeote report, suggesting the creation of a joint European diplomacy, comprising a College of European
diplomacy (European Commission, 2004, p. 51). The special college was meant as a learning space for personnel deriving from EU institutions as well as the member states, in order to receive training on all EU and diplomacy related matters (European Commission, 2004, p. 51). Christopher Patten,
then Commissioner for External Relations, embraced the report in a speech in September 2000, stating that there is perseverance to “give a firm lead to the External Service, and to provide it with the career structure and leadership that it deserves and needs” (Patten, 2000, p. 2). Moreover, he emphasised the fact that despite officially being delegations of the Commission, they also have the obligation to support the other EU institutions and the member states wherever needed (Patten, 2000).
After 2000, the median size of the Commission delegations saw a significant increase. Danièle Smadja, who then served as the Head of Delegation to Canada, observed that “the move from Commission delegations to Union delegations will simply acknowledge what is already a fact in the host countries” (European Commission, 2004, p. 50).
4.1.3. Foreign policy cooperation
This section will analyse some of the mechanisms that have previously guided the EU in
implementing its foreign policy. Whereas the previous section has provided a comprehensive and more general historical analysis of EU external action, this section dives deeper into the
mechanisms that were set up within the EU institutions with the purpose of creating and supervising foreign policy. Some of the most crucial entities will be elaborated, starting with the Directorate-General for External Relations,followed by an institutional analysis of the Commission and the Council within the foreign policy field. The phenomenon of European Political Cooperation will be discussed afterwards, succeeded by an investigation of the Policy Unit.
4.1.3.1. External Action within the Commission
The Directorate-General for External Relations, during that time known as ‘DG I’, was established in 1958 to assist the Commissioner for External Relations in its mandate of developing effective and coherent external policy for the EU (External Relations Directorate-General, 2006). The objective was to allow the Union to affirm its identity on the global scene (External Relations Directorate-General, 2006). Therefore, the DG for External Action was in charge of the
Commission delegations, maintaining relations with third countries and international organisations, and for upholding the involvement of the Commission within the CFSP (External Relations
Directorate-General, 2006). From 2004 onwards, when the Barroso Commission was installed, the European Neighbourhood Policy was also included in its responsibilities.
In many ways, the DG for External Relations, which later also came to be known as DG RELEX, can be seen as the predecessor of the EEAS. In fact, most of the officials employed at the DG RELEX were transferred to the EEAS upon its establishment (Bouris & Schumacher, 2017, p. 127). However, a major difference is that not all Commission delegations fell under the
responsibility of the DG RELEX.External relations, development, trade, and aid implementation were all administratively differentiated areas within foreign policy, meaning that different
delegations fell under different DG’s. Jointly these Directorate-Generals were also referred to as the ‘famille RELEX’ (Morgenstern-Pomorski, 2018, p. 23).
As mentioned before, the DG RELEX was essentially created in order to support the Commissioner for External Relations in his/her mandate. After the position of High Representative for CFSP was established, they shared the authority over foreign affairs and the European
Neighbourhood Policy. The Commissioner for External Relations was responsible for the coordination of foreign policy activities within the more supranational Commission, while the position of High Representative for CFSP was created within a separate intergovernmental pillar. But what is the difference?
4.1.3.2. Commission versus Council
This section analyses the Commission and the Council as two separate entities that have both carried, and continue to carry, great responsibility for European foreign affairs. It is relevant to examine these institutions since the EEAS has essentially emerged from them.
The Commission was a pioneer in the organisation of external representation, although its first delegations abroad, back in the 1950s, were considered to be more like ‘information
offices’ (Morgenstern-Pomorski, 2018, p. 20). They were not real diplomatic missions as we know them today in the sense that they, inter alia, were not headed by a seconded European diplomat. At that point in time, there was not yet a genuine wish or an intentional strategy from the ECSC to build a strong diplomatic network globally (Morgenstern-Pomorski, 2018, p. 20). Moreover, many delegations were initially managed by the Directorate-General for External Economic Relations, as trade was central in the Community’s external relations; and the DG for Development, as the Community had a strong presence in member states’ former colonies (Morgernstern-Pomorski, 2018, p. 20).
4.1.3.3. European Political Cooperation
Outside of the Community framework, the then twelve member states began to cooperate on an intergovernmental basis within the European Political Cooperation (EPC). With the Luxembourg Report in 1970, the basic procedures for the EPC were established, though not based on a legally binding commitment (Gainar, 2012). Nevertheless, the implementation of the EPC celebrated an important moment in the process of European development.
Three year later, the Copenhagen Report reinforced the member states’ commitment to European political cooperation. Indeed, the political cooperation between the foreign ministries gradually unified national administrations and therefore the EPC’s importance also augmented (Gainar, 2012).
Although the eagerness of the ten member states to “adopt a coherent and concerted approach to international and security issues” (CVCE, 2016, p. 2) was reaffirmed in 1981 with the London Report, Bernhard Zepter, who was later transferred to the position of Head of Delegation in Tokyo, wrote a critical evaluation of the EPC system. Therein he noted that the way in which the system was organised “had no future and that decision-making was too cumbersome and
inefficient” (European Commission, 2004, p. 52). He also advocated for a transfer for the EPC Secretariat to Brussels, and stated that there was a firm need for an integrated approach “if the EC really wanted to become a political actor to match its economic clout” (European Commission, 2004, p. 52).
Although the EPC evolved to be included in a treaty and secured a general secretariat with the Single European Act in 1987, the decisions taken within this framework were not legally binding. The EPC had always been encircled by the supranational-intergovernmental dichotomy that is central to European integration, that is, the institutional structure of EU (Ohrgaard, 1997). According to Ohrgaard (1997), EPC was “less than supranational, but more than
intergovernmental” (p. 1). It showed no supranational characteristics as it did not establish any independent institutions, nor did any supranational Community institution receive formal
competencies within the EPC framework (Ohrgaard, 1997, p. 10-11). Nonetheless, Ohrgaard argued that EPC was undoubtedly more than solely intergovernmental cooperation between member states. The Commission was “fully associated with EPC” and was “represented at all EPC
meetings” (Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1988, p. 7). The EPC Secretariat, representing the foreign ministries of the twelve member states, together with the
Commission, were connected through the Telex Network of European Correspondents, ‘COREU’ (Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, p. 7).
The EPC held four political cooperation meetings a year. When the meeting took place in December 1973, the ‘Declaration on European Identity’ was the result, a document in which the Heads of State or Government confirmed their perseverance to include the notion of a European identity in the common foreign policy. They argued that it would permit “them to achieve a better definition of their relations with other countries and of their responsibilities and the place which they occupy in world affairs” (Declaration on European Identity, 1973, p. 2).
A year later, in December 1974, the European Council was set up, as a “hybrid coordination and decision-making body,” comprising the Heads of State or Government (CVCE, 2016, p. 2). Although the European Council was to work independently from the EPC, its creation greatly affected the course of action of EPC, as political cooperation was given greater visibility and credibility by the existence of the European Council (Gainar, 2016). The nine European Council member states intended to establish a diplomatic strategy for all matters of international policy that would influence the interests of the Community. Throughout the course of time, the EPC started to address more matters that related to an increasing amount of regions (Gainar, 2016).
4.1.3.4. The Policy Unit
In 1993, EPC was replaced by the CFSP and therewith incorporated into the Community structure. The CFSP formed the second pillar of the Union’s pillar structure, which functioned by means of consensus in its decision-making, thereby contrasting the more traditional Community method of majority voting (Publications Office, 2001). With the Treaty of Amsterdam, the High
Representative for the CFSP was introduced, a post that provided EU foreign policy with a
figurehead. The appointment of a High Representative “proved an administrative turning point for the Council Secretariat” (Morgenstern-Pomorski, 2018, p. 29).
Moreover, the Amsterdam Treaty had also established the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit, which was later known as the Policy Unit, under the High Representative for the CFSP (Publications Office, 2001). In the period after the appointment of the HR, the administrative structures of the EU foreign policy had advanced considerably. According to Morgenstern-Pomorski (2018), the establishment of the Policy Unit epitomised this shift (p. 31).
The rationale behind the Policy Unit was that, in order for the EU to generate effective responses to international developments and gain more legitimacy as a global actor, the Policy Unit
would analyse international issues and their consequences, in addition to pooling of information (Publications Office, 2001). Consequently, the Unit consisted of professionals deriving from the General Secretariat of the Council, the member states, the Commission and the Western European Union (Publications Office, 2001). Its duties included, inter alia, auditing and evaluating
developments on matters relevant to the CFSP, offering assessments of the Union’s interests in the field of foreign and security policy, and providing up-to-date evaluations and fast warnings of events, political crises and circumstances that could potentially have significant consequences on the CFSP (Publications Office, 2001). Morgenstern-Pomorski (2018) branded the Policy Unit as an “interesting organisational experiment” (p. 31). A Clingendael report described the Unit as HR Javier Solana’s “personal think thank” (Hemmer & Smits, 2010).
4.1.4. Convention on the future of Europe: A Near Miss?
During the 1990s, the idea of establishing a “tri-partite body made up of Member States, the
Council and the Commission” became more frequent amongst the political elite (Reflection Group, 1995, p. 29). At the time, treaties could only be amended via Intergovernmental Conferences (IGC) (Consilium, 2020). The Treaty of Maastricht, signed in 1992, foresaw the gathering of an IGC in 1996 with Article N(2) (General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, 1995). Later, the Treaty of Nice, signed in 2001 and taking effect in 2003, intended to strengthen the Union for its upcoming enlargement by seeking to generate more effective and legitimate institutions (European Parliament, 2019). The Laeken European Council of 2001, consistent with Declaration No 23, an appendix to the Nice Treaty, invoked a Convention in the interest of the future of the Union (European Parliament, 2019).
The Convention on the Future of Europe, more commonly known as simply the European Convention, sought to, inter alia, provide more clarity on the EU’s institutional structure. As enlargement would soon take place, the need to reform the entire institutional architecture of the Union emerged (Dobbes & Follesdal, 2004). As a novel means to EU reform, the Declaration swiftly became a centralised topic amongst academia and the political elite (Reh, 2008, p 782). The actors involved in the Convention included representatives of the member states, representatives of the candidate countries, members of national parliaments, members of the European Parliament, and representatives of the Commission (Morgenstern-Pomorski, 2018, p. 81). The debates included a variety of relevant institutional matters, but the relationship between the High Representative for CFSP and the Commissioner for External Relations formed a major topic of discussion
(Morgenstern-Pomodorski, 2018, p. 85). Although notions differed, all actors agreed that foreign policy had to be designed in a way that would ensure more global political influence for the European Union (Morgenstern-Pomodorski, 2018, p. 86). Many participating actors agreed that decision-making on foreign policy was incoherent, as implementation derived from different institutional units. As a result, some MEPs proposed the idea to consolidate the three entities into one administration that could serve as an ‘effective diplomatic service’, whereas others suggested a diplomatic service within the European Commission (Morgernstern-Pomorski, 2018, p. 86-87). Another proposal included the fortification of the Council’s Policy Unit, which could then serve both the Council and the Commission (Morgenstern-Pomorski, 2018, p. 88). Many of such institutionally different proposals were put forward.
Within the Convention, Working Group VII on External Action was appointed the responsibility for all matters related to foreign policy (Morgenstern-Pomorski, 2018, p. 87). Important questions that arose concerned coherence in the different international policy fields, the EU’s interests in foreign affairs and how to secure that these interests were represented, and how to enhance perceptions of the EU globally (Morgenstern-Pomorski, 2018, p. 87). During these
discussions, the concept of a European External Action Service emerged. This would entail a merger of the positions of the High Representative for CFSP and the Commissioner for External Relations and their respective offices.
Initially, these more ‘integrationist’ proposals did not gain considerable support. As an example, Javier Solana, then High Representative for CFSP, expressed that “merging these functions would, in my view, create more confusion that synergy” (Solana, 2002).
Those actors with more intergovernmental preferences were apprehensive about turning the Commission delegations into EU embassies; one of the goals of those supporting a more
supranational approach to EU foreign policy (Morgenstern-Pomorski, 2018, p. 89). The latter were of the opinion that such a merger could enhance the durability of foreign policy. For instance, the then representative of the Polish government Danuta Huebner exclaimed that: "I would also like to stress that the double-hatting exercise will do away with the discrepancy between the two services – DG Relex and Secretariat General of the Council – creating an opportunity for establishing a
Foreign Policy Commission. A single diplomatic service drawing heavily on seconded officials from the member-states as well as services of the Commission will not only allow to optimise the available resources but will also create the basis for greater unity of ideas and
Evidently, it was not a simple task to reconcile all the various views on the future of European diplomacy. Nonetheless, the positions that were more integrationists in nature were favoured by the majority, though this was not sufficient to come to a settlement on institutional change immediately, as there was still doubt regarding a single administration to sustain it
(Morgenstern-Pomorski, 2018, p. 90). Thus, the second revision of the draft final report included, a more unambiguous suggestion, that is, a single ‘European External Representative’ leading the foreign representation of the Union, assisted by the establishment of ‘one joint service’, consisting of officials from the DG of External Relations, the Council Secretariat and national diplomatic offices (Morgernstern-Pomorski, 2018, p. 91). Following this first referral to the service, it was to be a standard element in the discussion regarding the Union’s organisational structure, but some member states, such as the UK, Sweden and France, still opposed a ‘double-hatted
post’ (Morgenstern-Pomorski, 2018, p. 91). As a result, the basic aspects of the institutional reforms in the field of external relations were still not agreed upon by the end of 2002.
Nonetheless, the second draft constitution included the European External Action Service by means of a subsection, but the concept of a diplomatic service still remained rather vague
(Morgenstern-Pomorski, 2018, p. 97). The Treaty also anticipated a reform for the position of High Representative, renaming the position to ‘Union Minister of Foreign Affairs’ (European Union, 2004).
In 2003, the Convention presented the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe to discuss at the IGC of 2004. The Treaty was supposed to be concluded before 1 May 2004, prior to the accession of ten new member states (Broughton, 2003). Although the Constitutional Treaty was signed by all member states, France and the Netherlands eventually decided against ratifying it. Still in need of institutional reforms, the member states quickly commenced working on the Treaty of Lisbon (European Parliament, n.d.).
Near misses like these are important to identify as ignoring them could lead to selection bias and less accurate findings (Capoccia & Theleman, 2007, p. 352).
4.1.9. EU Presidency
The rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union was instituted during the period of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1958. The system was based on a mechanism in which a different country would be responsible for directing the gatherings of the Council, changing every six months. Prior to the Lisbon Treaty, the member state holding the EU presidency was, in
