The Netherlands: UN peacekeeping decision-making. Insights from Mali

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THE NETHERLANDS: UN

PEACEKEEPING DECISION-MAKING

Insights from Mali

MSc Crisis and Security Management

Leiden University

Student: Naomi Bieckmann Student number: S2467089 Supervisor: Joachim Koops

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Chapter 1. Introduction

On May 1st, 2019, the Dutch deployment in the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) ended. In 2014 the Netherlands became involved in the United Nations peacekeeping mission, under the mandate of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), with the goal to contribute to peace and stabilization in Mali (UNSC, 2013). Critics state that the situation in Mali has worsened over the years (Human Rights Watch, 2018; Sommer & van der Heide, 2018; Van de Lijn, 2019). The peacekeeping mission that started as a success, is now being described as ‘the deadliest peacekeeping mission in the world’, due to the 208 deceased UN peacekeepers (NOS, 2019; NRC; 2019; Sommer, 2018; Van der Heide & Sommer, 2018, UN, 2020).

After years of absence in UN Peacekeeping, the Dutch contribution to MINUSMA mission is as seen as a return to UN peacekeeping (Willigen, 2016). The Netherlands started their contribution to MINUSMA in June 2014 and contributed over 1200 personnel until May 2019. After five years of participating, the Dutch redeployed most of their troops and only 5 staff members remained active in MINUSMA. In June 2018 the Algemene Rekenkamer1_{issued a critical review on the contribution of}

the Dutch army in the United Nations mission in Mali. The report concluded that the peacekeeping mission put a major strain on the Dutch army and that the employability of the Dutch must be taken more into account in the decision on whether to participate in peacekeeping missions (Algemene Rekenkamer, 2018). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that these findings are explicitly included in the decision to end the Dutch deployment in MINUSMA, as of May 1st, 2019 (Kamerstuk 29531, NR 368). Subsequently, Dutch ministers have stated that the Netherlands will nonetheless contribute to the modernization and improvement of the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping missions and in this light debates and summits were organized (Kamerstuk 29521, NR 368). In its review the Algemene Rekenkamer assessed the challenges and improvement possibilities of Dutch involvement in peacekeeping missions, which can be considered when deciding on the involvement of the Netherlands on a future UN peacekeeping mission.

Besides the success of the mission, which retrospectively seemed to be doomed to fail, the question emerges why the Netherlands initially decided to contribute and invest in MINUSMA after years of absence in UN peacekeeping. Besides attention for the degree of success rate of the peacekeeping mission, there seems little attention to the mission and the Dutch contribution to it in its wider context. Deceased in the field and information on progress get little attention in the Dutch news, and the public debates scarcely takes place (Sommer, 2018; Sommer & van der Heide, 2018).

Up to now, the Dutch grounds for contributing to MINUSMA as formally stated in the Parliamentary Papers seem ambiguously presented with limited explanatory or informative embedding

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and offer therefore non-exhaustive and non-comprehensive motives for contribution. Experts state that the decision process on the Dutch contribution is non-transparent (Brouwers, 2019). Moreover, there are speculations that the Netherlands has motives others than those that are presented in official documents. Experts argue that the Dutch motives to contribute to MINUSMA are generally more politically embedded than is formally acknowledged (Brouwers, 2019; NOS, 2019; Willigen, 2016)

The vaguely presented grounds for contributing to MINUSMA and speculations for different motives, in the light of the Dutch return to UN Peacekeeping, show the need for insight into decisive factors in the Dutch decision-making process to contribute to MINUSMA. Therefore, to be able to achieve this objective, an exploratory research design will be applied. Exploratory research is a method that can be used to gain further insight in a topic where at that stage is not much information available on. It is therefore a research design that provides general perspective to be able to gain a better understanding of the phenomenon, so that insights can be provided. The research question that will be addressed is the following:

What key motives can be identified for the Dutch contribution to the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali?

To be able to address this question the following sub questions will be answered:

o What are general existing theories to explain a country’s decision to contribute to peacekeeping missions? (Chapter 2)

o What is the (Dutch) historical background in UN peacekeeping and in relation to MINUSMA? (Chapter 3)

o What methodological design is adopted to gain insight in the Dutch key motives for contribution? (Chapter 4)

o What motives become clear in interviews with stakeholders and how can these be analyzed? (Chapter 5)

In this research the concept ‘motive’, ‘factor’ and the concept ‘grounds’ will be interchangeably used to facilitate the reading. They will be aligned, as ‘grounds’ is a term often used in Dutch Policy and Parliamentary Papers which are sources often used for this research. The concept motive is explained by ‘a reason for doing something’ (Cambridge dictionary, 2019).

First, a theoretical framework on general motives for states to contribute to peacekeeping missions will be provided. Subsequently, the Dutch formal motives, as they are officially declared in Parliamentary Papers, will be described. After that, the data gathering starts by identifying remaining factors; other motives that have facilitated the Dutch decision to contribute. This is done by a mix of

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the field of Mali as well as experts on policy making, governmental officials, and Dutch military deployed in Mali.

1.1 Societal relevance

This research analyses the Dutch grounds for contributing to the UN peacekeeping mission MINUSMA. The societal relevance of this research is twofold. First, it is important for the Netherlands to obtain insight in the distinction between different motives involving the decision for contributing. Secondly, the findings on the motivation of a state for contribution, are of value for the continuance of UN peacekeeping.

As will be clarified in the following chapter, the Dutch role in UN peacekeeping has greatly evolved over the years. Moreover, Willigen (2016) argues that the Dutch contribution to MINUSMA can be regarded as a ‘return to UN peacekeeping’. Therefore, it is important to identify what were the motives of the Netherlands to participate to MINUSMA, and why it was decided to contribute their share to this extent. It is important to identify what motivates a state to contribute to a UN peacekeeping mission and if so, what determines whether they solely provide a token contribution or more than their fair share.

The UN and their peacekeeping missions are cornerstones of the international liberal order. Gaining insight in the elements that explain support of European countries to UN peacekeeping therefore also provides motives for supporting an important element of this liberal order.

Furthermore, research of Kathman & Melin (2017) shows that the UN encounters problems mobilizing contributors for their peacekeeping missions. This stresses the urge for the UN to gain insight in what motivates states to participate or not, so that these insights can be considered in future peacekeeping missions and will assist them in gathering participants. Besides the general grounds that contribute to the decision-making process prior to participating, specific knowledge on the motives of a country provides the UN knowledge to specifically target a country on their motives to convince them to cooperate.

1.2 Academic relevance

General theoretical approaches are generated on why states contribute or not contribute to (UN) peacekeeping. Moreover, factors that make contribution to a peacekeeping mission more or less attractive are identified (Neack, 1995; Boborow & Boyer, 1997; Bellamy and Williams; 2013, Sandler, 2013; Kathman & Melin, 2017). However, there is still a relative absence of theories in peacekeeping research. Recent research on providing for peacekeeping of Bellamy & Williams (2013) attempt to explain troop contributions. Nonetheless their research shows that different states have different motives for contributing to a peacekeeping mission, and that these theories and factors are not applicable

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general factors that make contributing to a peacekeeping mission attractive. This case study directly contributes to the literature on peacekeeping by identifying and analyzing specific motives for the Netherlands out of general theories.

As the Dutch contribution to MINUSMA can be regarded as a reversal in the Dutch peacekeeping patterns, it is important to determine driving motives behind this decision. This research provides therefore supplemental insights to the literature on grounds for contribution to UN peacekeeping, as it specifically delves into the Dutch motives for participating to MINUSMA and therefore contributes to the body of knowledge on the Dutch decision-making process and motives for participating in UN peacekeeping. Because in the analysis results are distinguished in different subcategories, it allows the reader to gain more exact and detailed insight in the gathered information.

Furthermore, this research distinguishes itself from existing literature, because interviews have been conducted with different stakeholders that were involved in or around the Dutch decision-making process in 2013 or are scholars or (experience) experts. Due to the in-depth interviews with these closely involved stakeholders, new insights can be provided that up to now as far as I am aware, previous research has not yet revealed. Furthermore, as some respondents are governmental officials, due to the fact that this research is taking place a few years after the events, the stakeholders look at it retrospectively, often have different functions and therefore might feel more freely to speak than previously.

1.3 Structure of the thesis

The following chapter provides a theoretical framework on theory on providing peacekeepers. the third chapter is the case study into the Dutch contribution into MINUSMA, and provides a historical overview of UN peacekeeping in general, the Netherlands, and MINSUMA. Chapter 4 will discuss the research methods. Chapter 5 is the results section. Chapter 6 will provide the data analysis. In chapter 7 a conclusion of the research and a discussion is provided. The references can be found in the final chapter.

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Chapter 2. Theoretical framework and Core Concepts

This chapter provides a theoretical background and core concepts. Subsequently, theory on peacekeeping missions in general is provided. Four main theories that explain reasons for contribution will be discussed. Thereafter, an overview of different perspectives on why states contribute to a peacekeeping mission is provided. The chapter continues with a closer look at the Netherlands and its involvement with UN missions like MINUSMA. The history of the Dutch contributions to UN peacekeeping missions over time is discussed. This chapter concludes with an overview of the Dutch grounds, for contributing to MINUSMA, as they are presented in Governmental papers.

2.1 General grounds for contributing

Bellamy and Williams (2013) are two scholars that have attempted to provide theoretical insights on the question of why and under which conditions countries contribute to peacekeeping. They evaluate the contemporary environment and changing practices and politics in which peacekeepers operate and what challenges they face. By analyzing twenty-five case studies they explain the national politics of UN peacekeeping contributions. Bellamy and Williams both assist in the Providing for Peacekeeping Project (PPP) from the International Peace Institute (IPI). This is an independent research project that analyzes factors that encourage or discourage states in their decision to participate in UN peacekeeping missions. The PPP generates and analyzes up to date information on troops and police contributing states with the aim to improve the quality of the contributions and fill the key capability gaps (IPI, 2020).

In Bellamy’s & Williams’ (2013) book Providing Peacekeepers they already provide closely related theory on peacekeeping and factors that facilitate and inhibit states from participating. They however argue that the decisions of a state to participate is not a simple binary decision. According to Bellamy and William there are choices related to peacekeeping, choices such as whom, where and what a state can contribute to.

First, states must decide with whom they want to contribute. Certain European states have institutional preferences for working through EU and NATO alliances over UN or the other way around. The institutional preferences and choices of a state therefore play a role in the decision-making process (Bellamy and Williams, 2013). Subsequently, a state needs to decide where to contribute. Geographic affiliation or regional proximity can hereby be a contributing factor that stimulates or inhibits from participating. However, this can also counteract and constrain states from contributing to a peacekeeping mission when the country is located in peaceful regions (Bellamy and Williams, 2013). Finally, a state must decide what they want to contribute. This can be the contribution the UN asks for, a specialized or niche contribution, solely a token contribution, or the state can decide not to contribute at all (Bellamy and Williams, 2013).

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Subsequently theoretical approaches that assist in explaining a state’s contribution to UN peacekeeping are examined by Bellamy and Williams (2013). These approaches provide a framework that assists in a better understanding of grounds that contribute to the decision-making process regarding participating in a peacekeeping mission. These theories each provide types of structures and processes and explain general patterns and trends that can work facilitating or inhibiting in the decision whether to participate to a peacekeeping mission. However, Bellamy and Williams (2013) argue that the theories individually lack in in offering a comprehensive persuasive general theory.

The theories that are discussed are the realist-inspired approach, the liberal approach, the public goods theory and the bureaucratic disposition: a civil military relation.

2.1.1 Realist inspired approach

The first theory is the realist inspired approach which explains the contribution of states to UN peacekeeping by self-interest reasons. This self-interest can be expressed in two ways, according to Bellamy and Williams (2013). The first explanation is that UN peacekeeping is rarely understood as a charity action, but moreover as an exercise of a state’s foreign policy. When a state’s interest benefits from maintaining the prevailing situation the more likely they will contribute to peacekeeping missions (Bellamy and Williams, 2013). The second possibility is when states perceive peacekeeping to enhance their prestige with relatively low costs. Hence, ‘safe’ missions such as UNAVEM II in Angola and UNMIH in Haiti, were oversubscribed with willing contributors (Bellamy and Williams, 2013). Neack (1995) describes this as a ‘self-interested action to establish, preserve or increase [their] position and power base in the world’ (p. 188). Sierra Leone’s ambition for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, or India’s derived international status are explanations for participation in UN peacekeeping. Another explanation following from the realist inspired account is that states provide peacekeepers to be able to influence UN decision making.

The realist approach is also referred to as the ‘argument for the middle’. This argument implies that middle powers are not able to challenge international peace and order, but together are able to provide sufficient resources against aggressive states. Therefore, middle powers are the most likely states to participate in peacekeeping, because of their commitment to preserve international peace (Neack, 1995). Neack furthermore finds that most Western states dominate peacekeeping as a mean by which they exercise control over the international community.

Another argument explaining the realist approach is a financial reason. States that contribute troops get a financial compensation based on deployed personnel. In some cases, this financial compensation is similar to the troop’s costs. When the UN compensation rate is higher than a countries costs for peacekeeping deployment, the financial compensation might be a reason for contributing. However, in other instances the compensation rate does not cover incurred expenses, and can it inhibit states from participating (Khusrav, George, Sandler & Shimizu, 2015; Solomon, 2007). Beside a state’s

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financial reward, access to foreign currency can also function as a motivational factor for countries to participate to UN peacekeeping (Thakur, 1984).

Stojek and Tir (2015) continue the self-interest approach by arguing that whether an intrastate conflict receives a deployment of peacekeepers depends on factors such as trade ties between a Permanent member of the Security Council and the civil war state the peacekeeping mission might be deployed to. Stojek and Tir hereby make a distinction focusing on the characteristics of the civil war state on the one hand and the (self-interest) motivations of the deciding countries on the other hand. Stojek and Tir argue that when states that have big economies, powerful governments and armies or powers they are less likely to be the focus of peacekeeping (Forna, 2004; Gilligan and Stedman, 203; Mullenbach, 2005; Walter, 2009). Civil war states as such are less likely to let other states interfere in their affairs because they are more likely to resolve their civil matters through their domestic economy, resources and military. On the contrary, this theory suggest that peacekeeping missions are more likely to be sent to military and economically less advantaged states. Stojek and Tir furthermore find that ‘the most ‘attractive’ destinations for UN PKOs will be those states that, among other factors and upon cessation of major hostilities, engage in significant economic exchange with the p5.’ (Stojek and Tir, 2015, p.354).

2.1.2 Liberal perspective

The next prominent approach is the Liberal perspective. The liberal perspective explains peacekeeping contributions by focusing on the principled considerations. It departs from the perspective that states cooperate because of the mutual gain. Democratic states are more likely to participate than non-democratic states because it is insignificant whether the benefits and burdens are distributed, following from the liberal perspective. Pevehouse (2002) emphasizes the link between democratic states and their willingness to cooperate to peacekeeping missions by three reasons.

Pevehouse explains this by arguing that democracies derive their legitimacy from liberal principles. This becomes clear in the inalienable rights that need to be pursued and promoted worldwide. The second argument is that principles such as humanitarianism and democracy are not always separated from self- interest, but however easily spread. Third, democracies are more likely to cooperate with others and to join international organizations to achieve common goals, such as participating in a peacekeeping operation to establish justice and peace (Pevehouse, 2002).

Where the realist approach mainly offers an explanation to participate in peacekeeping driven by self-interest, the liberal perspective generally addresses the main driver by offering an explanation that does not deliver direct pay offs. It argues that states cooperate to create or maintain international peace and security. Associated terms to the liberal perspective are concepts such as ‘free-riding’, which illustrates that some states (choose to) benefit from collective revenues without contributing their share, and ‘bandwagoning’ whereby states follow the actions of states that are more powerful.

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After the changing nature in UN peacekeeping after the Cold War, which includes the shift from supporting ongoing conflict resolution efforts to more direct intervention in conflict zones, the UN experienced shortfalls in troops (Fortna & Howard, 2008; Diehl & Druckman, 2010; Hultman, Kathman & Shannon, 2014). As of 1990 the UN missions have resource shortfalls and an average monthly shortfall of 21.6% in total personnel (Passmore, Shannon & Hart, 2018). This shortfall of troops, military observers and civilians is according to Passmore et al. primarily a result of freeriding among UN member states. They show that free riding and thus shortfalls occur when the number of contributors to the mission is larger, and secondly when the private incentives for states such as economic gains are lower. On the other hand, are states less likely to freeride when they perceive a higher profit for the participating peacekeepers (Passmore, Shannon & Hart, 2018).

If peacekeeping is a self-evident public good, these concepts explain why some states contribute and others do not contribute at all, or solely a token contribution. However, the distinction between some states that contribute symbolically and others that provide a significant contribution remains unexplained by the liberal approach (Bellamy and Williams, 2013).

2.1.3 Public goods theory

The public goods theory is an approach that departs from the perspective that states produce collective goods, such as peacekeeping, by conducting self-interested behavior. Hereby the distinction is made between pure public goods and impure public goods, that assists in explaining state’s actions in their decision whether to participate to peacekeeping missions (Boborow & Boyer, 1997). Pure public goods are non-excludable and joint. A non-excludable public good means that everyone has access to the good. Jointness means that the use of a good does not reduce the amount of the good that is available for other actors. UN peacekeeping is subject to free riding because it produces the ‘pure’ public good of greater security, which is both non-rival and non-excludable to countries (Diehl, 1993; Khanna, Sandler & Shimizu, 1998). The collective action problem suggests that states either will not pursue the public good of peacekeeping or will under-produce the desired amount of peacekeeping (Bobobrow & Boyer, 1997: 726). Self-interests works against the interests of the collective, because they do not want to carry the burden. From this perspective, the pure public good theory offers an explanation not in favor but against states contributing to UN peacekeeping (Olsen, 1965; Boborow & Boyer, 1997; Bellamy & Williams, 2013).

An approach that offers an explanation that supports states contributing to peacekeeping, follows from the concept of impure public goods. States contribute to the production of public goods when it provides them private benefits. The impurity of the concept comes from the unequal distribution of the goods that are produced, such as economic or social benefits, stabilizing political relations,

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resolving conflicts that directly damage a state’s interest such as political relations, refugee flows or negatively influencing trading routes (Sandler, 1977, 2017; Boborow & Boyer, 1997).

Bellamy and Williams (2013) further argue that peace operations affect certain regions, because of their geographical deployment. This means that states closer to the regions deployed benefit more from the production of peace and stability. Research on peacekeeping shows furthermore that the regional proximity of a potential contributor increases its chances of contributing (Bove and Elia, 2011; Perkins and Neumayer, 2008). This leads to the assumption that ‘States will thus provide peacekeepers when the provision of a public good is likely to also produce private goods for the contributor’ (Bellamy and Williams, 2013, p.14).

2.1.4 Bureaucratic approach

The bureaucratic approach is a fourth theory explaining motives for contributing to UN peacekeeping missions by focusing on civil-military relations (Bellamy & Williams, 2013). Sotomayor (2010) states that military personnel is deployed to accomplish political and diplomatic objectives. To be able to achieve this goal, the armed forces of a state need to support the UN operation and back up the decision to deploy troops. Sotomayor argues that ‘where militaries are unwilling to participate, this serves as a powerful brake and forces political and civilian authorities to offer them enticements’ (p.192). He on the other hand states that it is more likely that the state will contribute when the military supports the peacekeeping mission. The extent to which a country’s military feels associated with foreign policy and is concerned with external oriented defense structures is a factor of influence. This approach of Sotomayor (2010) mainly stresses the connection between a state’s national and international structures and to what extent the military culture of a country influences decision concerning peacekeeping mission.

The four theories as previously discussed, the realist, liberal, public good theory and the bureaucratic approach, do not cover all factors of why states contribute UN peacekeeping and therefore lack in providing a clear understanding of motives. This is a critical deficiency in providing a clear explanation, because a state’s decision to participate is not solely based on one or two factors but more over an interplay between a wide variety of elements. Regional security contexts and cultures, policies and relations, bureaucratic interests, broader global dimensions and domestic political structures are factors as such (Sotomayor, 2010; Bellamy and Williams, 2013). The theories therefore do not provide a comprehensive elaboration of motives of a state but moreover an insight in elements of motives that function as motives for contributing to peacekeeping.

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2.2 Rationales

Bellamy and Williams (2013) argue that the previous four theories lack a comprehensive explanation for motivations behind a states’ contribution to UN peacekeeping. Kathman and Melin (2017) argue that states receive security benefits that outweigh the costs of diverting their soldiers to peacekeeping missions. Kathman and Melin state that it is possible to identify general factors that make contributing attractive. However, much of the literature indicates that states are often motivated by narrower self-interests such as maintaining the international political status quo (Neack 1995), protecting former colonies or trade partners (Perkins and Neumayer, 2008; Khanna, Sandler, and Shimizu, 1999) maintaining alliance and security ties (Lebovic 2004), stemming refugee flows (Uzonyi 2015), and stabilizing proximate PKO host states (Perkins and Neumayer 2008).

To generate an overview Bellamy and Williams have developed five categories of rationales to categorize the motives of states to participate or not in peacekeeping missions. They argue that ‘the best way to proceed is to develop a framework that distinguishes the range of factors involved, posits suggestions about their relationship, but also includes empirical analysis of particular decision-making context’ (p18). These rationales are related to either political, economic, security, institutional and normative factors. These rationales can function either as facilitating or inhibiting factors. Table 1 provides an overview of factors that contribute to countries decision to participate to a UN peacekeeping operation. Subsequently each rationale is clarified.

Political rationale

The political rationale adheres to the motive that a state participates to a peacekeeping mission because it contributes to other political goals. Following from this perspective, the absence of a political rationale can work constraining for a state to contribute to a peacekeeping mission because it does not bring assist them in fulfilling their objective. Findlay (1996) states that the most leading political rationales are ‘pressure or persuasion by allies, great powers, or the UN secretary-general or Secretariat, and perceptions that peacekeeping contributions enhance the country’s ‘national prestige’ or might strengthen its bid to acquire a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council (or for some states, their bid for a permanent seat on a reformed Council)’ (p7-9).

Economic rationale

The following rationale explains a states’ contribution to UN peacekeeping missions on economic grounds. This economic ground is explained by financial incentives as a compensation for a state’s deployment. This financial compensation can be beneficial for several actors. National governments, of are mainly developing countries can benefit from contributing to a peacekeeping by using the payment of the UN to support their national budget or in their collection of foreign currency. Subsequently are national defense and security sectors, individuals (such as military and police officers)

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and private corporations able to profit by merits of services and goods such as (air) transportation and bottles water (Bellamy and Williams, 2013).

Security rationale

Bellamy and Williams (2013) describe the security rationale as the perceived threat a country has of a conflict affecting their country, as a motivational driver for contributing to UN peacekeeping. When a state believes that a peacekeeping mission is in its national security interest, it is more likely to participate to the peacekeeping mission. Regional proximity is hereby of importance in the extent of motivational influence.

Institutional rationale

The institutional rationale is described as a motivation related to military forces, bureaucratic dynamics and influences of the security sector. It stresses the relation between decisions on contributing to peacekeeping missions and a state civil-military context. Armies of certain states review contribution to peacekeeping missions as appealing because it allows them to provide their personal with overseas experience. While on the other hand, other militaries review the deployment of their personnel to peacekeeping missions as occupied on foreign territory rather than interfering in domestic matters (Findlay, 1996; Bellamy & Williams, 2013).

Normative rationale

The final rationale explains the motivation of UN peacekeepers by normative reasons. States that review themselves as ‘good international citizens’ or ‘good Samaritans’, participate to peacekeeping missions because they act out of solidarity with others because they sympathize and identify with their suffering. Another explanation follows from states principal commitment to peacekeeping because they perceive this as the most appropriate manner of dealing with international conflicts (Brysk, 2009).

Strategic and cultural influence

Finally, Bellamy and Williams (2013) state that a state’s cultural and strategic factors influence the decision on whether and what to contribute to a UN peacekeeping mission. They however state that these factors are influenced by demand-sided issues, policy standpoints and the current political context. Culture is hereby connected to the ‘good international citizenship’ and stated that a state deploys troops to a peacekeeping mission because they review this action as a promotion of what is in their perspective a collective good. Bellamy and Williams divide this in the elements of frames and the element of embedded practices that influence the decision. In this regard it is argued how deliberate actions of key policy entrepreneurs can function as a either facilitating or inhibiting factor in the decision to participate to a peacekeeping mission.

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Table 1-Summary of main factor influencing UN troops contributions (Koops, 2016) Core factors Facilitating factors

(Opportunities)

Constraining factors (Challenges)

Political rationales

 Greater voice/authority or prestige in int. politics  Pressure by allies or great powers

 Pressure by UN institutions  Election bid for UNSC

 Peacekeeping used for domestic political ends

 Domestic political opposition to UN peacekeeping

 Withdrawal by allies from operation

 Pressure to contribute to other entities (NATO/EU)

 Alternative political priorities  Not in line with national interest  Exceptionalism

Economic rationales

 UN reimbursements as economic incentives for individuals, governments, contractors

 Costs of peacekeeping and resources required  Financial austerity

Security rationales

 Contribution to particular UN mission linked to perceived national/regional security interests

 No security interest in particular region/country in which operation is deployed to

Institutional rationales

 Interests by military or by certain bureaucratic players in participating in peacekeeping

 Civil- military relations (particularly role of parliament)

 Scepticism by military or certain bureaucratic players/ ministries towards UN peacekeeping/C2  Preference by (some) institutions for alternative

fora (EU/NATO)

 Negative experiences from past UN operations  Preference for direct operational control

Normative rationales

 Variety of normative commitments to UN, peacekeeping and ‘good international citizenship’

 Normative reservation against Un militarization or robust peacekeeping.. etc.

(Strategic) culture

 Influence of historical experience, identity and embedded practices on decision to contribute to Un peacekeeping

 Role of key policy entrepreneurs

 Influence of strategic culture on decision to contribute

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Chapter 3. Case study

3.1 UN peacekeeping - A historical overview

The UN was established in 1945 in the wake of the Second World War atrocities. During the Cold War, the main purpose of the UN was to establish and maintain national peace and security and to ‘save succeeding generations from the scourge of war’ (United Nations, 1945, p1). Originally, the UN charter of 1945 did not provide for peacekeeping missions. UN peacekeeping started as a series ad hoc involvement provided for specific disputes to eventually evolve to be the main tool to pursue this purpose (Koops, MacQueen, Tardy, Williams, 2015; United Nations, 2008, p.13).

The United Nations peacekeeping emerged in the late 1940s as a result of circumstance factors of that period. Peacekeeping missions were originally devised to stabilize countries, maintain ceasefires and support political efforts by peaceful means. The first two peacekeeping missions deployed by the United Nations were the peacekeeping mission in the Middle East (UNTSO, 1948) and the peacekeeping mission in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP, 1949). These missions had monitoring, reporting and confidence-building tasks and consisted solely of unarmed military observers and lightly armed troops. After these relatively modest peacekeeping deployments, in 1956 the first armed peacekeeping mission (UNEF I) was deployed to address the Suez crisis. The deployed troops consisted of over 6000 personnel provided by ten Member states. The Suez Crisis and the peacekeeping mission became internationally significant as it created a formula for future UN peacekeeping missions due to its success (Mah, 2017).

Although the aim of peacekeeping missions in its early period remained to control conflict and to only use military force in self-defence, the aims and principles of the peacekeeping missions evolved over time. During this initial period the purpose of UN peacekeeping focused on interim measure tasks to ‘help manage a conflict and create conditions in which the negotiation of a lasting settlement can proceed’ (UN, 2008, p21). This ‘traditional’ peacekeeping addressed interstate conflicts and was mainly military in character, so the conflict was resolved on the political level.

Since the end of the Cold War in 1988, the number of peacekeeping missions increased and a shift in focus took place. After the Cold War a transformation towards a more international environment took place, which led to a more ‘multidimensional’ approach in UN peacekeeping. The role of the UN evolved towards a civil conflict and intrastate focus (Mullenbach, 2005). Tasks significantly evolved from the aim to freeze a conflict and thereby observe and monitor the ceasefire, to the purpose to also ‘address the root causes of conflicts, including peacebuilding activities, including electoral assistance, promotion of human rights, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants, security sector reform, and other rule of law-related activities’ (Willmott & Sheeran, 2013, p519). These multidimensional peacekeeping missions play, in contrast to traditional UN peacekeeping, a role in political efforts to resolve the conflict (UN, 2008).

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During the Cold War the Netherlands contributed to nine UN peacekeeping missions, among which one large military contribution to the peacekeeping mission in Lebanon (UNIFIL, 1979-1985) with 9.084 troops (Ministry of Defense, 2008). The Netherlands also substantially contributed to the Korean War (1950-1953), however this was officially not a peacekeeping but an enforcement mission. Although the Netherlands was a co-founder of the UN, it has always adopted an instrumental approach towards contributing to UN peacekeeping (Willigen, 2016). This instrumental approach consisted of a decision-making process mainly based on national interest (Willigen, 2016). This instrumental approach becomes apparent in the Dutch grounds for contributing to UN peacekeeping as they are mainly political and economic embedded. Willigen explains this by stating that the Netherlands is a trading nation and therefore he stresses the Dutch need for international peace and stability. He furthermore states that ‘As a medium-sized European country the Dutch government needs multilateral institutions to advance its interests and values and the UN is an obvious forum to do so.’ (2016, p704).

After the Cold War ended, the Netherlands as also other European countries, increased its contribution to UN peacekeeping. The Netherlands significantly contributed to the peacekeeping missions in Bosnia (UNPROFOR, 1991-1994), Somalia (UNISOM, 1992-1993), and Rwanda (UNAMIR, 1994). In the 1990’s the Netherlands belonged to the top 30 financial contributors to UN peacekeeping (Pichat, 2004).

A series of UN peacekeeping disasters in the 1990’s contributed to significant changes in UN peacekeeping, as well as in the involvement of Western countries in UN peacekeeping. Peacekeeping missions in Bosnia, Somalia and Rwanda turned out to be dramatic failures. Lack of ‘appropriate mandates, information, political support, troops resources and guidance’ are important explanations identified for these peacekeeping failures (Bellamy and Williams, 2010, p119). As a result of these failed peacekeeping missions, a mass European withdrawal from UN peacekeeping emerged. Due to the failures European countries experienced a decreasing trust in the functioning of UN peacekeeping occurred (Willigen, 2016). Countries among which Denmark, Norway and Germany showed a decreased contribution in UN peacekeeping missions (Jakobsen, 2016; Karlsrud & Osland, 2016; Koops, 2016). Alongside this decrease of trust, alternative international security cooperation fora increasingly formed an alternative next to UN peacekeeping. European countries started diverting resources away from UN peacekeeping by investing in their own crisis management. Arrangements such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) became an alternative after several successful missions such as operations Deny Flight and Deliberate Force in Bosnia mid 1990’s (Willigen, 2016). Furthermore, the European Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) developed in 1999 which became another alternative for Western countries. The combination of the decrease of trust in UN peacekeeping and the emerged security alternatives are commonly identified as reasons for the European withdrawal in the 1990’s (Koops & Tercovich, 2016).

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Of the series of UN peacekeeping disasters, especially the Srebrenica disaster in Bosnia, where over 8000 civilians were killed, had a big and lasting impact on the Dutch perspective on UN peacekeeping and military interventions (ICTY, 2002; Willigen, 2016). As a result of this the Netherlands revised its decision-making process for participating in UN peacekeeping missions. One of the faults during the deployment of UNPROFOR, was the lack of previous assessment on the military feasibility. A second problem in Bosnia was the lack of political and military back up. As a response to the disaster and to deal with the problems, the Netherlands adopted a more instrumental approach. This consisted of a revision in the Dutch approach to UN peacekeeping that led to the introduction of the Article 100 procedure. This procedure refers to Article 100 of the Dutch Constitution and the establishment of the Toetsingskader (Assessment Framework) in 1995 (Willigen, 2016). The Toetsingskader was developed after Srebrenica (1995) when the Dutch Parliament decided that the decision-making process had to be improved. The Toetsingskader is a framework that assesses the decisions and the intentions of the Government when it is deciding upon military deployment in a peacekeeping mission (Van der Lijn, 2014). Article 100 of the Dutch Constitution obliges the Government to inform the Parliament prior to a peacekeeping operation. This results in the need of announcement of intervention to the Parliament prior to the involvement of a peacekeeping mission. In contrary to the previous Article 96 (Declarement of War), this new procedure does not contain the official approval of the Parliament. The Toetsingskader attempts to improve the quality of decision making on military interventions, by supplying several criteria against which the decision to participate needs to be made. The Toetsingskader consists of 14 grounds (see table 1), five grounds are related to the political desirability and nine grounds are related to the military feasibility of the operation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018). By implementing this Toetsingskader the Netherlands started reviewing their contribution to the peacekeeping missions on a case-by-case analysis. However, van der Lijn argues that since the Toetsingskader came into effect, the Article 100 letters (which elaborate on the Toetsingskader) have become ‘increasingly vague, compromise documents and procedures have become more blurred’ (Van der Lijn, 2014).

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Table 2- Toetsingskader (Assessment Framework)

1. Deployment takes place on the basis of Dutch interests, including the protection of international peace and security and / or the promotion of the international legal order.

2. Deployment must be in accordance with international law and preferably on the basis of a clear mandate from the United Nations.

3. Factors such as solidarity, credibility and the distribution of responsibilities play a role. 4. A multinational approach is preferable.

5. Deployment is not automatic. The Dutch government decides on a case-by-case basis. Barring exceptions, a decision is only implemented after parliament has been informed. There must be sufficient support in society for deployment.

6. There must be a concrete military assignment.

7. The government must assess whether the alleged political and military objectives of the mission are reasonably achievable.

8. The burden of international operations must be prevented from being borne by a small group of countries. Agreements on repayment and financing are desirable.

9. Units must be available.

10. There must be a clear chain of command.

11. The risks for the personnel to be deployed must be assessed as accurately as possible. 12. There must be good international agreements on the mission and the tasks must be feasible. 13. Financing must be guaranteed.

14. Broadcasting must be subject to a time limit. Participation will be terminated afterwards. In continuation is a new decision required.

After the withdrawal to UN peacekeeping by Western countries in the 1990’s, as a result of the series of peacekeeping disasters and evolving international defense structures, the Netherlands has been continuously restructuring and downscaling its contribution to UN peacekeeping. Where in 1990 almost 105,000 Dutch armed troops were deployed, this was less than 40,000 troops in 2014 (van der Lijn, 2014). Until MINUSMA, the latest big Dutch contributions to peacekeeping missions were in Liberia (UNMIL, 2003) and Lebanon (UNIFIL, 2008) but consisted solely of maritime contributions. The only last larger scale troop contribution was the deployment in Afghanistan, (ISAF, 2010). In this light the Dutch contribution to the Mali mission in 2014 can be regarded as a ‘return to UN peacekeeping’ (Willigen, 2016, p.703).

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Willigen however argues that although a return was made, this contribution is not a ‘structural change in policy making, but depended on a particular domestic political configuration’ (p703) and that the decision to participate is mainly based on national interests and domestic factors. He furthermore states that during the Cold War national interests determined the decision to participate, while since the 1990s domestic politics and foreign policy making by coalition governments became more important in considering the Dutch contribution to UN peacekeeping.

The following chapter will delve into the Dutch grounds for participating to UN peacekeeping missions is discussed. The chapter concludes with an overview of the Dutch grounds for contributing to the MINUSMA peacekeeping mission.

3.2 The Netherlands and UN peacekeeping

Besides the evolved perspective of the Netherlands towards UN peacekeeping mission, which led to the introduction of Article 100 and the Toetsingskader, the Dutch cabinet stated that they want to continue to commit and invest in the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping missions. The Netherlands furthermore urges the necessity of peacekeeping missions, due to increasing pressure on the international legal order and instability in regions bordering Europe. It is furthermore stated that the deployment of Dutch troops primarily focuses on UN peacekeeping mission that direct or indirectly contribute to the Dutch safety (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018).

3.3 Conflict Mali

The following paragraph provides information on the situation in Mali and the crisis situation. Mali covers over 1,2 million kilometers and is closed off from the sea. Where the northern part of Mali is desert, the south has a tropical climate, which allows agriculture to be the main economic income of Malian civilians. The conflict is mainly about the divide between the Tuaregs in the north and other ethnical and pastoral tribes in the south (Homan, 2013). In 1960, Mali gained independence from former colonial ruler France. The government had to proclaim its authority on a large territory, which was challenged by the Tuareg and Arab population. The divide between Northern and Southern communities came to be more present as the Malian state officials showed resentment towards northern communities by marginalizing the areas. The southern communities continued to focus their economic policies on the south of Mali (Chauzal & Van Damme, 2015). Animosity and division between the scarcely populated northern and economic dominant southern Mali lead to regular food shortages and even famines. In 2012 the situation in Mali destabilized, from January to April the fourth Tuareg uprising after Mali’s independence, an Islamic takeover of the Northern Malian cities and a military coup occurred (Chauzal & van Damme, 2015).

Over the years the situation in Mali has developed to a crisis with political, security, humanitarian, socio-economic issues. Factors such as ‘weak state institutions, ineffective governance; fragile social cohesion; deep-seated feelings among communities in the north of being neglected,

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marginalized and unfairly treated by the central Government (…)’ are being described as conditions for the armed conflict in Mali (UN, 2019). ‘To provide coordinated and coherent support to the ongoing political and security processes in the country’, with the goal to strengthen Mali’s security forces and defense the African Led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) was established. As the situation in Mali further escalated in January 2013, the establishment of an UN peacekeeping mission was reviewed. On July 2013 AFISMA would transfer its authority to MINUSMA (UN, 2019). Operation Serval, the French Military operation in Mali that was launched in December 2012 operated alongside AFISMA. The operation ended on July 2014 and was replaced with similar mission, Berkhane (UN, 2019).

3.4 MINUSMA

By adopting Resolution 2100, MINUSMA became effective from July 1st, 2013. Hereby the UNSC approved a peacekeeping mission in Mali consisting of 12600 personnel. MINUSMA supports political processes and performs security related stability tasks. It is a mixed civil-military mission. This means that the military have the main purpose to create stability and safety, while the civil elements focus among others on the protection of civilians, monitoring human rights, humanitarian assistance and the return of the displaced persons (Homan, 2013). To set priorities, the UN developed a strategic plan in the Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) whereby the focus of MINUSMA was established on four tasks, namely the political processes, safety and stabilization, protection of civilians and human rights and the reconstruction of the North of Mali (Parliamentary Paper 29521, nr. 243; Resolution 2100).

3.5 Grounds Dutch contribution MINUSMA

The MINUSMA peacekeeping mission was established on July 2013, the Netherlands started contributing as of June 2014 (Parliamentary Paper 29521, nr 213). The decision to contribute to MINUSMA was made as part of a case-by-case analysis (Parliamentary Paper 29521, nr 213). This means that the Dutch cabinet reviewed its decision whether to contribute to MINUSMA by using the Toetsingskader, and by determining the political desirability and the military feasibility of the peacekeeping mission (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018). The Dutch government often goes at length in explaining in detail its consideration of whether to deploy troops to a peacekeeping (Den Ridder, Dekker, and van Houweling, 2011).

On the 1st of November 2013, the cabinet informed the Dutch Parliament on the decision that the Netherlands will contribute to MINUSMA, in accordance with Article 100 of the Constitution. In this Parliamentary paper (29521, nr. 213) the essence of the contribution and the grounds for participating are elaborated. Subsequently both will be discussed.

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3.6 Essence of contribution

As a response to the request by the UN, the Netherlands decided to contribute to the peacekeeping mission MINUSMA. Hereby the Netherlands determined to contribute the following:

 220 Military staff for the intelligence gathering component of the UN mission, among which 70 analysts, 90 special forces unit and a detachment of 60 soldiers with four Apache fight helicopters;  128 Soldiers supporting detachment;

 Extra soldiers at the deployment and redeployment phase;  30 Officials of the police component;

 Civil experts in the fields of protection of civilians, constitutional development and security sector reforming.

(Parliamentary Paper, 29521, nr. 213)

This is a contribution of in total 368 Dutch soldiers contributing to MINUSMA. The Parliamentary Paper states that the Dutch contribution is focused on the military niche that the Netherlands will focus on during the mission. The niche that the Netherlands contribute to consists of mainly intelligence and exploration tasks. It is argued that the Dutch contribution increases the efficacy of MINUSMA which leads to a significant increase of the success rate of the peacekeeping mission. The Parliamentary Paper subsequently stresses the necessity for a country such as the Netherlands, to be involved in international collaboration and that the Netherlands therefore needs to share responsibility in international context (Parliamentary Paper, 29521, nr. 213).

Subsequently it is mentioned that the Netherlands endeavor to contribute will have a substantial impact on the success rate of the mission. The size of the contribution is also dependent on the aim to let the deployed soldiers perform their tasks and guarantee their safety autonomously, without having to depend on others. It is stated that the Netherlands will not carry out area responsibility in Mali. Hereby they refer to contrary earlier missions such as Srebrenica and Uruzgan, where this turned out to be problematic (Parliamentary Paper, 29521 nr. 213).

The Dutch contribution was initially planned to deploy until the end of 2015, whereby mid 2015 the cabinet would conduct an intermediate evaluation. This evaluation would a role in whether the Netherlands extend its contribution. The Dutch deployment eventually got extended until May 2019.

3.7 Grounds for participating

The second part of Parliamentary Paper (29521, nr. 213) elaborates on the grounds for the Dutch contribution to MINUSMA. In Parliamentary Questions 29521, nr. 215, question 25, becomes clear that the grounds for contributing are in its entirety depicted in Parliamentary Paper 29521, nr. 213 as it is stated that ‘Contribution to this peacekeeping mission is based on the interests and grounds as

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articulated in Parliamentary Paper 295231, nr. 213’. Therefore, solely this source will be used to depict the formal grounds for the Dutch contribution to MINUSMA. These grounds for contributing to MINUSMA are threefold, and touch upon a political, economic and normative argument.

The first argument for contributing to MINUSMA is that participating in MINUSMA serves several Dutch interests. Hereby is referred to the Internationale Veiligheidsstrategie (IVS, International security strategy), in which the Netherlands depicts its strategic objectives. These objectives focus on preserving international security, stability and a well-functioning rule of law. The Parliamentary paper (29521, nr. 213) shows that the cabinet seeks to realize its objectives by focusing on unstable regions adjacent to Europe. Subsequently, the Sahel region and Mali specifically are characterized as such.

A second ground mentioned in the Parliamentary Paper is an economic argument. The North and West of Africa are important commodities trading partners of the Netherlands. Therefore, the Dutch cabinet states that it is of importance for the Dutch economy to maintain access to raw materials and energy sources in the area to be able to continue the industry and trading (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Parliamentary Paper 29 521, nr. 213).

The third and final ground that is mentioned as an important consideration for deployment, is the Dutch solidarity with the Malian civil society. Hereby is referred to the caused instability, insecurity and human right violations as a result of the ongoing crisis in Mali, which led to 350.000 internally displaced and 170.000 refugees. As an embedding of this solidarity, Article 90 of the Dutch constitution is brought forward. This article states that the pursuit of human rights forms an explicit role in the Dutch Governments fostering of the international legal order (Parliamentary Paper, 29 521, nr. 213).

This chapter provided an outline of the motives and facts as they have been presented in official documents. To discover whether there are other factors that have facilitated the Dutch decision to contribute to MINUSMA, this research will continue by looking into more detail into the Dutch motives. The following chapter will first outline the methodology that is used to gather the data.

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Chapter 4. Methodology

In order to identify the Dutch grounds for contributing to the MINUSMA peacekeeping mission, a qualitative research design was chosen (Bryman, 2012). This qualitative method suits the aim of this research, namely, to identify and analyze motives for contribution to a peacekeeping mission. A qualitative research design provides the possibility to identify facilitating factors in a detailed way. The scope of this research is limited, due to the time frame of this master thesis. Therefore a large N-study is not doable, hence is chosen to perform in depth interviews with key decision makers as a more suitable method. This research collects primary and secondary sources and conducts interviews that will subsequently be analyzed. To analyze the collected data a theoretical framework on motives for contribution to peacekeeping will be used. To be able to achieve this objective an exploratory research design will be applied. This is a research method that can be used when there is not much information available on the research topic and that allows qualitative research more flexibility due to the possibility of in-depth questions (Bryman, 2012).

In this research a single case study approach was used. A case study is a methodology that provides the tools to gain in-depth and detailed knowledge of a phenomenon and to understand the phenomenon in its wider context. Gummesson (1988, in Meyer, 2001: p. 330) describes it as ‘The detailed observations entailed in the case study method enable us to study many different aspects, examine them in relation to each other, view the process within its total environment and also use the researchers’ capacity for ‘verstehen’. A case study is a method that can be applied in situations where the researcher has little control over the events (Eisenhardt, 1989; Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2000; Yin, 1998). Due to the characteristics of the topic, namely that the research focuses on a process that has already taken place, namely the decision making process prior to the deployment, it can be argued that this proposes a situation where the researcher has little control over the unfolding events and that a case study design is applicable. Due to the detailed and exploratory design of a single case study, the strategy often provides insights that might have not been achieved with other methods and is useful in early stages of a research on a topic (Rowley, 2002).

This research will conduct a within-case analysis with a holistic approach, to be able to analyze all the factors where after a complete overview of the findings will be presented. A within case study is used to develop a description and identify elements of the phenomenon, examine them in relation to each other and view processes in their total environment, which enables the researcher to identify a pattern within the case (Mills, Durepos & Wiebe, 2010).

Due to the detailed and in-depth nature of a single case study, a high internal validity is guaranteed. However, a downside of a single case study is the external validity or generalizability. The detailed character of the analysis diminishes the generalizability, because the more details are offered, the more difficult it is to find other cases with corresponding characteristics. For this reason, is a single

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a solution for this, by applying the evaluations of the case study to other concrete situations. This is done by extracting a more abstract level of ideas, ‘(…) ideas that nevertheless can pertain to newer situations other than the case(s) in the original case study.’ (Yin, 2013, p325). By applying this method, the findings and analysis resulting from this research can be generalized and therefore contribute to future UN peacekeeping missions.

4.1 Case selection

To be able to determine what case(s) had to be selected, first was decided what kind of case analysis had to be performed. As stated above I will perform a single case study. So only one case is needed to be selected. Often, this is a case that attracts the attention due to its focus, diversity, extremeness or influence for instance (Seawright & Gerring, 2008). In this case is chosen to research MINUSMA, because it is and has been a topic of attention due to its actuality, critiques and reversal Dutch approach towards UN peacekeeping.

4.2 Data collection

To perform the single case study research, in -depth knowledge needs to be conducted. To be able to do this desk research will be performed. To formulate a clear theoretical overview on motives for contribution to peacekeeping missions in general, and the Dutch grounds for contribution to MINUSMA in specific, a literature review will be conducted. Scientific articles will be used to construct the theoretical framework. Mainly primary sources will be used to outline the Dutch grounds for contribution, as these are uninterpreted and therefore provide the most objective information. Primary sources as such are among others reports, Parliamentary, - and Policy Papers.

Besides a literature review, additionally interviews will be conducted. The previously gathered and reviewed documents will serve as input for these interviews. The Dutch grounds for contributing to MINUSMA, as comes forward from the Parliamentary Papers forms the basis and the direction of the interviews. Concepts as appointed in these documents will be operationalized in the following paragraph and function as a guideline.

The interviews are semi-structured (Bryman, 2012). The interviews will be conducted with experts, governmental officials, as also military personal. This diverging range of backgrounds hopefully attributes to an extensive and comprehensive overview of insights.

In the data gathering process it is important to use different methods and sources. This is called ‘triangulation’. As stated above this research will gather by both literature research where different types of both primary and secondary sources will be used, as well as interviews will be conducted. This is a concrete and justified form of triangulation which will guarantee the authenticity of the data. The triangulation of methods and sources and methods improves the validity of the research (Yin, 2013).

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4.3 Respondents group and selection and research process

To be able to provide a comprehensive representation respondents with different backgrounds and perspectives are being interviewed. To be able to achieve this governmental officials, experts, and the people who were actively involved in MINUSMA were interviewed. Due to the scope of this research, the goal is to interview at least one person of each group. Respondents will be selected by adopting a purposive sampling method, which means that respondents are selected based on their relevance for the research (Bryman, 2012). If the scope of the research allows it more interviews will be conducted. The purposive sampling method will be then extended by snowball sampling (Bryman, 2012).

In total 8 respondents were interviewed. The list of respondents can be found in the appendix. Most of the interviews were conducted at a place where the respondent felt comfortable, often at the office or house of the respondent. One interview was conducted per telephone due to practical reasons. Each interview took between 1and 2 hours. At the start of each interview, confidentially was guaranteed and discussed whether the respondent wanted animosity, which was the case for 2 respondents. If quote’s are used in the presentation of the results, these were previously presented to the respondent for its approval.

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Chapter 5. Results section and analysis

The following chapter provides an overview of the results and analysis. The data was collected through interviews. The results are structured in hierarchy, based on their importance in facilitating the Dutch decision to contribute to MINUSMA. This hierarchy results from the number of times that the motives are mentioned by the respondents. Subsequently, a short overview of each motive is provided. Thereafter, each factor will be elaborated and analyzed. The terms ‘motive’ and ‘factor’ and ‘ground’ mean the same in this overview, they are used interchangeably. The wording of the motives and subcategories are based on concepts that have been used by respondents to explained the motives. The main motive is the factor of international politics, as it is mentioned by six respondents. The facilitating role of international politics on the Dutch decision to participate to MINUSMA is threefold and explained by the objective to exert international influence, the pressure by international allies and the influence of strategic interest.

A next motive is mentioned by five respondents and argues that the perceived international responsibility of the Netherlands was an important facilitating factor. It is argued that the Netherlands perceived a sense of responsibility towards France, the UN and Mali.

A third factor that seems to have played a facilitating factor was the Dutch ambition to obtain a seat in the UNSC. According to four respondents this objective played a facilitating role in the Dutch decision.

The next motive is the factor of the individual. It is stated that the fact that Bert Koenders, a Dutch former Labour Party (PvdA) minister, was Head of Mission of MINUSMA, was not directly influencing the Dutch decision to participate. However, it is stated that indirectly it facilitated the communication process.

This is followed by the fifth ground that is depicted in the Parliamentary Paper, 29521, nr. 213, and states the pursuit of international security, stability and a well-functioning rule of law. These are motives that facilitated the decision of the Netherlands to contribute.

Subsequently, it is continued by the sixth motive that follows from the same documents, that states the Dutch solidarity towards the Malinese civil society. This motives was mentioned by four respondents to have played a facilitating role in the decision to participate.

Another important motive, which is mentioned by three respondents, is the military factor. This motive stresses the need of the Dutch Ministry of Defense to deploy its troops in a peacekeeping mission in general and in MINUSMA specifically.

The bilateral relationship between the Netherlands and Mali, is factor number 8, which is mentioned by three respondents as a motive in the Dutch decision to participate to MINUSMA. This

The Netherlands: UN peacekeeping decision-making. Insights from Mali