A comparative case study into the
democratic transitions of
Ghana and Nigeria
With a focus on the role of civil society in the process of transitioning
Bachelor Thesis – Varieties of Democracy and Democratization Joana Lamptey 10536086 jnllamptey@gmail.com Bsc. Political Science, University of Amsterdam Thesis supervisor: Ph.D. S. Tanaka Second reader: Dr. S. Lim Submission date: June 25, 2018 Word count: 7680 words
ABSTRACT
This thesis focusses on the democratic transition of the two Sub-Saharan African countries,
Ghana and Nigeria. The main point of this thesis is two compare how civil society
organisations (CSOs) were able to play a role in both democratic transitions.
The two countries fall in what Huntington calls the Third wave of democracy. In this
period from 1974 going many sub-Saharan African countries start making the transition from
authoritarian rule to democratic rule. This is a transition in which Ghana has succeed, for
Western standards and Nigeria has not.
For a country to democratise I pose that, as literature suggests, a country’s rule should be
willing to make to move to democratisation from above, but this must be done in combination
with pressure from below to by CSOs.
I argue that due to the longstanding heavily militarised and repressive scene in
Nigerian CSOs were much less in the position to actually exert pressure and influence the
government into making an effective change. Little to no will from above doesn’t help create a political atmosphere to transition. On top of this Nigeria’s ethnic divide has long stood in the
way of reaching any effective unification in many factors in the country, including the stability
of CSOs.
In the case of Ghana military rule there was also repression, but less aggressive and
caused for less bloodshed. This enabled the CSOs to take their chance at pressuring form below
which was met with a will from above to move to democratisation. With this I also argue that
political opposition that were not allowed to officially organise themselves, individually joined
INDEX
2. THEORETICAL OVERVIEW AND METHODOLOGY ... 7
2.1
H
UNTINGTON’
S WAVES OF DEMOCRATISATION7
2.1.1
W
HAT IS DEMOCRACY?
... 92.2
W
HAT IS CIVIL SOCIETY?
10
2.2.1
T
HE ROLE OFCSO
S IN DEMOCRATISATION ... 112.3
R
ESEARCH METHODS13
3. THE CASE STUDIES ... 15
3.1
G
HANA16
3.1.1
T
HE POLITICAL HISTORY ... 163.1.2.
T
HE ROLE OFCSO
S ING
HANA’
S DEMOCRATISATION PROCESS ... 193.2
N
IGERIA22
3.2.1
T
HE POLITICAL HISTORY ... 223.2.2
T
HE ROLE OFCSO
S INN
IGERIA’
S DEMOCRATISATION PROCESS ... 244. ANALYSIS ... 25
5. DISCUSSION ... 27
6. CONCLUSION... 30
7. REFERENCES ... 32
8. APPENDIX ... 36
8.1
S
EMI-
STRUCTURED INTERVIEW GUIDE36
8.2
T
RANSCRIPTION INTERVIEW(1)
37
1. Introduction
From the 1990s onwards, many sub-Saharan countries started their official journeys to democracy. It was what Huntington (1993) described as the third wave of democracy. In terms of external factors only, this so-called wave was able to set in because of the ending of the Cold War. The Western world saw a chance to not let communism get an upper hand in world politics and therefore ‘espoused desirability of democracy in promoting development, and the benefits that developing countries stood to gain from political pluralism’ (Yayoh, 2006-2007)’. To strengthen this development, financial pressure was exercised (exerted) on the African countries by their Western donors (Gyimah-Boadi, 1996).
In current times we see that, having experienced widespread political problems such as civil wars because of misrule (Danso-Boafo, 2014), the process of democratisation for some African countries either failed to successfully happen, never happened or never happened at all by the doings of such autocratic (military) rulers. Some cases do however form an exception to the rule. In those cases, the process was able to set in successfully and today those countries are deemed democratic, if not full-fledged in light of Western concept of democracy.
One of those countries is Ghana. Starting its official path to democracy in the early 1990s, presently scores an 83 out of 100 on the Freedom House ranking (Freedom House, 2018a). Based on this it can be said that Ghana has developed a democracy that is deemed, by this institute and with it many others, free, including civil and political freedoms for its citizens.
A country where the process of democratisation so far has not been as successful is Nigeria, despite having certain similarities with Ghana. The country started making its official way to democracy in the late 1990s after long period of military rule. Today, Nigeria scores only a 50 out of 100 on the Freedom House ranking and is therefore considered ‘partly free’,
lacking many of the political and civil freedoms to be called a full-fledged democratic country (Freedom House, 2018b).
There is no doubt that these countries both developed differently after their periods of colonisation and therefore ended up with different outcomes. It is of interest to delve into what caused these different outcomes, when their paths have been similar. In this Bachelor of Arts thesis, I aim to discover the causes. In order to do this, I will revisit and research the specific period of the transition to democracy in the history of the two countries.
Both Ghana and Nigeria were faced with long periods of military rule before being able to make the step into multi-party democracy. Among other factors, I believe it is of great interest to research the way civil society was able to play a role in both transitions. In fact, the civil society factor is relatively under-examined in the democratization literature of African countries; which is interesting as the citizens of a country are the ones who must live in a system and the ones that can demand change in that same system if they deem it unsuitable.
According to existing literature, Ghana’s civil society played a big role in getting the Head of State at the time, Flight Lieutenant Jerry John Rawlings, to succumb to the wishes of the people and call for elections in 1992 (La Verle, 1994). In Nigeria too, there was a strong civil society that had a lot of presence (Olayode, 2007), but was however not able to exert as much power as Ghana’s civil society.
The research will indicate that even though the two countries had strong and active civil societies, the military rule in Ghana was less oppressive than in Nigeria and more willing to switch to democratic rule. I will also propose that another reason why civil society made more impact in Ghana’s transition is because political opposition, which was banned at the time, was able to act as civil society and equally exerted pressure on the sitting military government. What will also show is that Nigeria had a lot of internal factors such as profound ethnic and
regional cleavages that made it more difficult to create the much-needed internal civil coherence to strive towards democratic.
When looking at the social relevance of this theme, it is noticeable that many African states are still not (fully) democratised. The people of such undemocratic states may however be striving towards a (multi-party) democracy and the findings of this research might aid into understanding the circumstances under which the citizens can come together and thrive in their efforts to get a democratic system in their respective countries; which can be a gain, as more democratisation may also result in domestic peace internally and internationally (Hegre et all 2001; Olayode 2007).
Considering the scientific relevance of this research, I believe this can be found in the lack of comparative research done in this region in the specific role of civil society in the democratisation process. This mostly may come forth from the idea that civil society only thrives in already established democracies. Therefore the leading research question of this thesis shall be: Why was civil society able to play a much bigger role in the acceleration of democratisation in Ghana than in Nigeria?
This thesis is built up to first look at the theoretical and methodological side of the research, continuing with the political histories of both countries and how civil societies took part in the transition, followed up with an analysis, discussion and finally the conclusion.
2. Theoretical overview and Methodology
In this part there shall be a brief explanation of the most important concepts in this research: democracy (as well as democratisation) and civil society. The main objective is to conceptualize civil society as well as possible given the many views in the literature on the best definition of the concept.
There will also be insight into which research methods will be applied in this thesis.
2.1 Huntington’s waves of democratisation
As has been mentioned before, the mass democratisation on the African continent set in around the 1990s. Diamond (1999) notes this as ‘the third wave of democratisation finally reaching the African continent.’ These waves of democratisation are a (preliminary) framework of the development of democratisation in the world. Huntington (1993) uses his framework to explain when democratisation came to certain places and why. For this thesis I deem this a basis that can help to understand which external circumstances potentially played a role in the development of democracies in Ghana and Nigeria.
Huntington (1993) describes his idea of wave of democratisation as “a group of transitions from non-democratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specified period of time and that significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite direction during that period;” with the Third and most relevant wave for this research starting in 1974.
In his book, Huntington (1993) describes different patterns in which countries democratize (in the Third wave). The most relevant for Ghana and Nigeria is what he calls the decolonization pattern. This is a pattern that applies especially to former British colonies. It is
the pattern in which democratic countries impose democratic institutions on its colonies. The colony then goes on to become independent and (is supposed to) maintain its democratic institutions.
He also makes mention of five global changes that played a role in igniting this third wave. In short these are:
1) Deepening legitimacy problems for authoritarian systems as the world widely accepts democratic values;
2) The unprecedented global economic growth of the 1960s which raised living standards, increased education and expanded urban middle classes in many countries;
3) The transformation of churches from defenders of the status quo to opponents of authoritarianism and proponents of social, economic and political reform; 4) Changes in the policies of external actors (EU in terms of expanding, US
promoting human rights and democracy in other countries and SU trying to maintain the empire);
5) ‘Snowballing’ of demonstration effects of first transitions to democracy in the third wave in stimulating and providing models for subsequent efforts at regime change in other countries (Huntington, 1993).
It must be mentioned that there have been quite some critiques to Huntington’s work. Such as by Doorenspleet (2000), for instance, who doubts how much can be really said with these waves as she deems the data too incomplete and Huntington’s work being largely conceptual. I acknowledge this critique, yet do not deem it problematic to the extent that Huntington’s theory of the democratic waves and its accompanying patterns cannot be compatible with my work. What is of importance is that his waves acknowledge democratisation as the move from authoritarian systems to democratic ones. The patterns and the five global changes described help explain what ignited the Third wave which laid the grounds for many African countries,
including Ghana and Nigeria and are of great importance in identifying (external) influences for democratisation.
2.1.1 What is democracy?
It is of great importance to conceptualize democracy before going further into what the role of civil society can be in the process of getting here. It is a term that is most and loosely used in many cases nowadays. In general sense, most people might just capture it as a way of life in which the people have political and civil freedoms with a government that is chosen by an electorate at regular intervals.
The term democracy is derived from the Greek word ‘demokratia’: ‘demos’ meaning people and ‘kratos’ translates to power or rule. Democracy therefore refers to governing, and thus power, by the people. The state and government are to adhere to the popular will in order to execute its mandate (Mbacu, 1994).
Larry Diamond (1996) describes the description above as merely ‘minimalist and intermediate conceptions of democracy’. He chooses to add a few elements which a state should meet to be a liberal democracy. So, Diamond (1996) says,
‘in addition to regular, free, and fair electoral competition and universal suffrage, it (democracy, red.) requires the absence of “reserved domains” of power for the military or other social and political forces that are not either directly or indirectly accountable to the electorate. Secondly, in addition to the “vertical” accountability of rulers to the ruled (which is secured most reliably through regular, free, and fair elections), it requires “horizontal” accountability of officeholders to one another; this constrains executive power and so helps protect constitutionalism, the rule of law, and the deliberative process. Thirdly, it encompasses extensive provisions for political and civic pluralism, as well as for individual and group freedoms.’
In short; in the process of democratisation, it is a liberal democracy that is being strived towards.
2.2 What is civil society?
In the past and in current times many have argued the need for a civil society in the process of democratisation as well as in existing democracies. A clear definition of civil society however, seems to be absent partly because it encompasses a lot of different organisational types. Because of this lack of clarity, it is of importance to understand what we speak of when referring to civil society. Therefore, it is much needed to conceptualize it.
‘Civil society is the realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self-generating, (largely) self-supporting, autonomous from the state and bound by legal order or set of shared rules’ (Diamond, 1997). Its goal is to ‘express themselves and advance their interest’ (Stepan, 1988: Olayode, 2007).
Sesay (1994) distinguishes two types of civil society: weak and strong. A strong civil society can be characterised by ‘the existence of well organised, highly elaborate, autonomous and self-conscious institutions and associational activities. These may be trade unions, class, religious or professional associations and so on’ (Sesay, 1994). He also describes a weak civil society. This type is not as organised or autonomous, nor can it provide a vanguard for the anti-one-party system and therefore campaign for a multi-party system (Sesay, 1994).
Groups that are to be excluded from civil society are ‘organisations that seek to monopolize a sphere of collective life or to envelope totally the lives of their members, but also the private dimensions of individual and family life, inward looking activities of parochial groups, profitmaking enterprises of individual business firms and political efforts to take control of the state’ (Diamond, 1997).
Furthermore Diamond (1997) notes certain distinctive characteristics that can be attributed to strong civil society organisations (CSOs): they are concerned with public ends and mediate between state and society in this light. Most importantly, no CSO aims to represent the whole of a person’s or community’s interest: different groups represent different interests. These descriptions help to conclude the following: for a CSO to be strong and effectively help bring about a democracy it needs to be organised and autonomous from the state, it must also represent particular interests and mediate between state and society.
2.2.1 The role of CSOs in democratisation
CSOs are deemed to have had a large and strategic role in the development of the Third Wave of democratisation as described by Huntington (1993). In many of the countries, extensive mobilisation from below was instrumental in pressure for democratic change (Diamond, 1997).
Many Western (financial) organisations which were to be instrumental in the democratisation of African countries saw the importance of the existence of civil society for the transition to democracy. Civil society began to take its form as that which would offer solution to the incapacities of the state when ‘the failure of the centralised states in the development project’ started to manifest itself (Olowu, 1990).
In this way an active civil society becomes extremely important for the political democracy and ‘nurturing of civil society is widely perceived as the most effective means of controlling repeated abuses of state power, holding rulers accountable to their citizens, and establishing democratic governance’ (Kasfir, 1998; Olayode, 2007).
However, CSOs are not to be seen as a holy grail of the liberal democracy per se. They, too, have gotten their share of critique as to whether they really make the difference in a country’s attempt to democratise or even if they really help with democratising. Olayode (2007), notes that the emergence of civil society does not guarantee the development of a
democracy, though there is the thought that it is not very likely for a viable democracy to survive without an existing civil society.
So, if critique such as stated above exists why then do scholars, Western donors and many more believe that the existence of civil society in the process of democratization is of actual importance? The main reason that liberal theory supports the existence of civil societies lies mainly in the fact that it sees civil society as an element of remoulding authoritarianism towards the liberal democracy: this means that donors will support civil society because a liberal democracy creates the environment for economic liberalism which on its own is seen as a way to escape poverty (Olayode, 2007).
Escaping poverty through democratisation is the reason Western donors give CSOs financial aid. It is believed and hoped that by supporting civil society, it will ignite pressure from ‘below’. Eventually it is the combination of this so-called pressure from ‘below’ and the will to democratise from ‘above’ by formal powers what will equate to democratisation in a country (Matelski, 2013). As will be exemplified in the history and analysis chapters, Ghana’s formal powers had the desire to democratise earlier than Nigeria. The combination with the strong CSOs led to democratisation in Ghana.
The literature mainly offers us insights as to how best civil society can be an aid in the process of democratisation. However, what I believe is crucially missing in the existing literature is the role of ethnic diversity, especially in African countries, can potentially play in the way a country does or does not democratise. For this purpose, it is useful to examine why Ghana democratizes, while Nigeria remains non-democratic despite the existence of strong civil society and ethnic diversity in both countries.
2.3 Research methods
The findings of this research come forth from a comparative case study compiled of information found in primary and secondary sources. Primary sources are from five semi-structured interviews conducted. Secondary sources are review of literature as well as the use of the internet. As I am carrying out a case study on two countries on a topic which does not lend itself for quantitative study, I am carrying out a combined qualitative study instead. By taking a close look at existing literature, I expect to find and compile the necessary information on the role of CSOs in both democratic transitions and find a conclusion accordingly. This shall be complimented with the above-mentioned semi-structured interviews carried out with people who were part of CSOs during the time of only Ghana’s democratic transition.
These interviews are semi-structured as there are set questions ahead of the interviews. These questions can be found in the interview guide (see section 8.1 of the appendix). These questions could be asked in no particular order and with this there is chance to ask questions based on the respondent’s answer which are not in the interview guide.
In these semi-structured interviews, I expect to find the following: that CSOs played a great role in the process of democratisation, that CSOs were probably funded by Western donors and mostly that there was a symbiosis between government and civil society to make the process of democratisation come to pass.
Should it be the case that I do not receive answers from the respondents which are in line with what I pose above, it should acknowledge that perhaps my argument may have been wrong and that it was in fact not the symbioses that set off the democratisation process after all. These responses could vary from a respondent indicating that there was no or close to no genuine movement of the then incumbent government to move towards democracy or potentially downplaying the part of the civil society organisation in question.
I have made the deliberate choice to only focus on interviewing (ex-) members of Ghanaian CSOs, mainly because of limited means and time. With this being said, I do see the potential of not shedding enough light on personal experiences of (former) Nigerian CSO participants. This is a rather unfortunate shortcoming of my research. Another shortcoming may be the general critique of qualitative studies; the findings of these type of studies cannot be generalised.
Yet still, while acknowledging the possible shortcomings, I believe carrying out a qualitative study has benefits that, in my opinion, will make up for the abovementioned weaknesses. In this case one may think of: perspective is from the one being studied, generates contextual understanding, provides rich and deep data and concerned with social reality (Bryman, 2012).
3. The case studies
To further research the role CSOs played in the sub-Saharan African democratic transition, I have chosen to compare Ghana and Nigeria for a few different reasons. Mainly the fact that both countries have a long track record in the participation by civil society organisation before, during and after democratisation. Looking at the factors that ended up altering the democratic transitions and progress following it therefore becomes more interesting.
Aside from the different outcomes, the two countries have a lot in common in terms of starting points after independence (see table 1.1). Also, both countries are former British colonies. There have been studies to prove that former British colonies have better chances of establishing stable democracies (Elgie, 2011), as compared to former French colonies. This partly lies in the fact that the British, during colonisation, allowed for civil society and local representation more than other colonisers (Elgie, 2011).
In terms of ethnicity and religion, the two countries are also quite heterogeneous. From table 1.1 it can be noticed that the countries have the same religions that are being practiced. It also shows that both countries have significant ethnic diversity, which I shall further argue had more impact on Nigeria’s democratic transition than Ghana’s.
Table 1.1 Key indicators Ghana and Nigeria:
GHANA NIGERIA
SOCIAL & ECONOMIC INDICATORS
Area (sq. km) 239,540 923,768
Population (2018)*** 28,200,000 186,500,000
Population below poverty line (%) (2010) **
24.2 46
GDP per capita (2018) *** $1,361 $363
Life expectancy in years (2016) ** 62.7 53.4
Major ethnic groups Akan, Ga-Adangbe, Ewe and Mole-Dagbani
Hausa-Fulani, Igbo & Yoruba
Most practiced religions Christianity, Islam Traditional/indigenous
Christianity, Islam Traditional/indigenous
POLITICAL INDICATORS
Year of independence (from) 1957 (Great-Britain) 1960 (Great-Britain)
Military coups since independence 4 7
Freedom House classification (1999) *** Free Partly Free
Civil liberties - Freedom House Index (1999) ***
3 3
Freedom House classification (2018) *** Free Partly Free
Civil liberties - Freedom House Index (2018) *** 2 5 Control of corruption (2000) **** 55 7 Control of corruption (2016) **** 51 13 Rule of law (2000) **** 57 15 Rule of law (2016) **** 55 14
Voice and accountability (2000) **** 53 33
Voice and accountability (2016) **** 67 36
Note: See the Appendix for details of data. Freedom House Index 7-point scale (1 = high and 7 = low). The WGI
(World bank Governance Indicators by Kaufmann et all, 2010) rank each country on 0–100 point scales where higher = better governance ratings.
Sources: * http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/economies/Africa/Ghana.html http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/economies/Africa/Nigeria.html - ** https://data.worldbank.org - *** https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world - **** http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#reports
3.1 Ghana
3.1.1 The political history
As has been mentioned earlier, Ghana’s political history after independence is marked with many military governments (see table 1.2 in the appendix for an overview). Each new attempt at a civil rule was graced with the name republic and sequenced as such. ‘With the exception of the First Republic under Nkrumah (1960-1966), the interludes of civilian governments under the Second (1969-72) and Third (1979-81) Republics have been short-lived, unable to survive for up to three years without being overthrown in a coup d‘état’ (Abdulai, 2009).
First Republic under Nkrumah (1960-66)
On March 6th, 1957, Ghana was the first sub-Saharan country that became an independent state. It was headed by Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, who in the years before, had been one of the biggest advocates for independence (Meredith, 2013). When after 1960 the official representation of Ghana by Great-Britain also ended, the country became an official republic (La Verle, 1994).
It was the country’s first attempt at democracy. Nkrumah’s Convention People’s Party (CPP) had overwhelmingly won the elections, organized by the British under Ghanaian political pressure, prior to independence with a majority of nearly 70% of the votes (Buah, 2007). It did not take very long, however, for Nkrumah’s rule to turn into an authoritarian one-party rule. This led to the country’s first coup d’état in 1966 (van Tiem, 2007).
Second Republic under Busia (1969-72)
‘In October 1969, liberal political institutions reappeared, this time to be squashed by the reintervention of the armed forces early in 1972’ (Baynham, 1985). In this short period of the Second Republic of Ghana, Dr. Kofi A. Busia headed the nation with his Progress Party (PP) (Buah, 2007). Following corruption scandals, he too was relieved of his function by a military government, which was this time headed by Colonel I. Acheampong. They took it upon themselves to ‘correct the evils which they considered beset the nation’ (Buah, 2007). Acheampong ended up running a regime so corrupt the army replaced him with another general (Meredith, 2013).
Third Republic under Limann (1979-81)
Before the army could call for new elections, the military regime of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), led by Flight-Lieutenant Jerry J. Rawlings, took over power
and carried out what they called a ‘house-cleaning exercise’ on the 4th of June 1979. This consisted of the execution of 8 senior officers (including three former heads of states) and an impromptu People’s Court to deal with army officers and businessmen accused of malpractice and corruption (Meredith, 2013). Many human rights were not respected in this short period.
On the 24 September 1979 the power of Ghana’s Third Republic was inherited by Dr. Hilla Limann with his People's National Party (PNP) from AFRC (Hutchful, 1997). This government started with a great amount of economic and political problems inherited from the previous (military) governments. It was thus not for long, before Rawlings and his AFRC came again to seize power and fought the mismanagement of state.
On the 31st December of 1981 he took over and announced three days later that the country would henceforth be led by the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) (Danso-Boafo, 2007). In this period of power, the PNDC would implement Economic Recovery Programme (ERP), which would lead to a Structural Development Programme (SAP) to strengthen the economy and help development. The funding of the ERP would come from the World Bank (Danso-Boafo, 2014). Eventually ‘in the late 1980s, after nearly one decade of quasi–military rule under the PNDC, strong internal and external pressures on the government led to the promulgation of a liberal constitution in 1992 and the inauguration of a multiparty party democracy in 1993, ushering in Ghana into its Fourth Republic’ (Abdulai, 2009).
Fourth Republic under Rawlings 1993
The realisation of this Republic was Ghana’s return to democratic rule and is still in existence today. It was Jerry J. Rawlings who led the country for 2 consecutive terms after winning the first elections that he called out in 1992 when still in power with PNDC. Taking from Yayoh (2006-2007) it becomes clear that the change to democratic rule under Rawlings was done
Bank, who were investing in the democratisation of the country, and internal pressures from individuals and organizations who had long wished for the return to civilian rule. Table 1.1 also indicates that this Republic succeeded in transforming the country as by 1999 it was deemed ‘free’ by the rulings of Freedom House indicators.
3.1.2. The role of CSOs in Ghana’s democratisation process
Civil society organisations have since long played a big role in Ghana’s road to democracy. Before independence, there were nationalist movements such as the Fante Confederation, who were in favour of removing foreign domination at time (Buah, 2007). It was however in the time of Rawlings’ second coming (see table 1.2) that civilians really grew tired of all the military governments, the pressure it came with and mostly the lack of civil freedom. Civil society organisations that once existed mostly to protect and fight the rights of their own now turned into pro-democracy movements.
It must be acknowledged that Rawlings’ PDNC government, when seizing power, claimed that it had only overthrown Limann’s government because of the scandals, corruption and such. In a broadcast on 5th January 1982, Rawlings said the following:
“(..) But it was not a military coup in the sense of another opportunity for some soldiers and their allies in trade and the bureaucracy to come to power for their own ends. It is rather to create by this action an opening for real
democracy, government of the people, by the people and for the people (Danso-Boafo, 2014).”
He went on to create a (military) government that seemed very heterogeneous with high and low-ranking officers and also people with different ethnic, religious and professional backgrounds. ‘Rawlings insisted throughout PNDC rule that the revolution's main and long-term goal was to create a more just society in which the interests of the majority were not repressed in favour of those of a tiny minority and in which the productivity of all Ghanaians
would increase. He saw participatory democracy as the best guarantee of such a society (La Verle, 1994)’.
In Ghana ‘among the politically active and influential organizations and interest groups were the Trade Union Congress (TUC), the Ghana Bar Association (GBA), the Ghana Journalists Association (GJA), the National Union of Ghanaian Students (NUGS) (La Verle, 1994)’. During the transition these organisations were heavily pro-democratic.
It were especially the GBA and NUGS that had an apparent style of getting their point across. They found themselves amongst the organisations that were most combative in their efforts to regain democratic rule and often provoked (La Verle, 1994). An explanation for this would be for the NUGS they raised in university cost that PNDC introduced and for the GBA the rising amount in unfair and illegal trails (Danso-Boafo, 2014). Religious and traditional organisations such as the Christian Council of Ghana (CCG) and the National House of Chiefs went in with less force and were moderate in their pleas for democratic transition. It must be mentioned that these regional and traditional organisations are to some extent civil society and at the same time are not. As described in the section what is civil society, it was stated that civil society doesn’t promote general needs, but specific interests of specific groups. These two groups however have a commitment to ‘promote common rather than special interests. They insist on negotiation and mediation in the management of national disputes, and they advocate policy alternatives that stress the long-term needs of society. In the past, they have taken bold initiatives to attain the abrogation of state measures and legislation that violate human rights or that threaten law and order (La Verle, 1994)’.
rule. They were one organisation that was given true limitations. By means of the ‘Criminal Libel and Sedition laws and the Newspaper Licensing Law under which the government had the right to favour newspapers they deemed friendly to their course and those papers who they perceived as being hostile were denied the license to operate (Interview transcription - Appendix 8.2, 2018)’. Private media that did not enjoy government support was used to get across messages and initiatives of pro-democracy civic groups and were used as a vehicle to get there (Interview respondent 1, Appendix 8.2, 2018).
The involvement of CSOs in Ghana’s transition also had another effect. It appears to ‘have led to an increasing atmosphere of tolerance and cooperation people from different ethnic backgrounds and political parties to collaborate for a common cause.’ In one CSO you would find people with different ethnic groups and opposing political backgrounds (Fobih, 2008).
It can be concluded that CSOs had in different ways and effective impacts and roles they played in getting the PNDC government to return to democratic rule. This also happened by those who were in the opposition parties and not able to actively participate and let their voice heard because they were banned at the time. I would argue that even though these people were not officially banned to organise themselves in parties and pressure the government to return to democratic rule (Danso-Boafo, 2014; Buah, 2007), they still managed to exert pressure.
What took place is that some opposition party members would integrate into existing CSOs and act as opposition while there. As Respondent I notes: ‘In fact, the current president, Nana Addo Akuffo-Addo, was also very active in civil society organisations in the restoration of democratic rule in Ghana (Interview transcription, Appendix 8.2, 2018).
3.2 Nigeria
3.2.1 The political history
‘During the period of rapidly expanding British rule, the country's administration was divided. The Northern, Western, and Eastern Regions had been taken over at various times by different men with different theories of how to govern, and when Nigeria was amalgamated each sought to have his own doctrines incorporated throughout the country ’Moore, 1984.
As the first on the continent, Nigeria is federalism that was started in 1954 (Adamolekun, 2005). When it started as a federal state, postcolonial Nigeria’s regions ‘were each dominated by one or two ethnic groups: Hausa-Fulani in the north, Yoruba in the west, and Igbos in the east (Heerten & Moses, 2014)’. The optimism of a good transition that had come with decolonisation started becoming less as everything was done along ethnic lines (Heerten & Moses, 2014).
The history of Nigeria as we know is tainted by coups, counter coups and most of them involving a lot of bloodshed of both civilians and the military (see table 1.3 in the appendix for an overview). Each new attempt at a civil rule was here too graced with the name republic and
sequenced as such. Just like Ghana, there have been four republics with the last one being as young as 19 years.
Biafran War (civil war) led by Ojukwu 1967-70)
The Igbos were of the three groups the smallest, but particularly successful in economic and academic terms. The other groups were slightly afraid of what would happen to their interest if this small group was to take, especially the Hausa-Fulani group in the North. After a failed federal election, Balewa was killed and anti-Igbo riots started up north. General Ojukwu was forced to lead the sucession so that Igbos would no longer feel like a marginalized group in
their own country (Heerten & Moses, 2014). On the 30th of May a one-sided succession was called out and the Republic of Biafra came to existence (Meredith, 2013).
Eventually the war was one of the bloodiest times in Nigeria’s history in which many Igbos were killed when trying to escape the rough times that Biafra was going through after sanctions by the government (Meredith, 2013).
If this war taught Nigerians one thing, it was that ethnic divide was extremely destructive for a nation. As a result, ‘ethnic conflict was suppressed and carefully controlled so that any outbreak or seriously publicized discrimination on ethnic grounds was considered a matter of national security. In the few outbreaks that occurred since the war, the federal government acted swiftly to gain control and stop the conflict (Chapin Metz, 1991). It must be understood that this suppression influences ‘participation by all groups of society. If these political elites did not represent different classes, neither did they reflect contending notions of democracy. It plays a great role in understanding the development of democracy in Nigeria (van Tiem, 2007)’.
It must not be mistaken that the country did indeed attempt the manifestation of a democracy. After colonialism, Nigeria had been under the British system of rule with a Prime Minister and a President. This changed when they adapted an American presidential system which lasted four years under Shangari (see table 1.3 in appendix) before yet another coup (van Tiem, 2007). Under Shangari’s rule Nigeria turned into a police state in which military and civilians were allowed to keep the population under control with violence. His ruling also was tainted by a lot of corruption which caused the country to go into major debt even though the years before it has made a lot of financial gains due to the many natural resources the country has, especially oil (Kraus, 1982).
Before Olusegun Obasanjo of the PDP was elected and established the Fourth Republic in 1999, Nigeria faced a serious crisis with Babangida annulling election results of 12th June 1993 and standing in the way of democratisation once again in Nigeria’s history. It exposed the ethnic and regional cleavages deeply embedded in Nigerian politics. The cancellation brought to the surface the resentment and fear of political domination of the ruling Hausa-Fulani Northern elite (Olayode, 2007).
3.2.2 The role of CSOs in Nigeria’s democratisation process
By the 1980s Nigeria had a big uprising of pro-democracy groups and radical human rights organisations. These human rights organisations came forth out of the strong grip of the military on the political process since most of Nigeria’s many coups had not gone without bloodshed, harming both civilians and military.
Olayode furthermore notes that Przeworski (1991) sees that ‘a common feature of dictatorship is that they cannot tolerate independent organisations. They feel threatened not by ‘the breakdown of legitimacy, but by the organisation of counter hegemony: collective projects for an alternative future. Thus, authoritarian regimes either incorporate organisations under central control or repress them by force. Przeworski further argued that once repression lessens, the reaction is a flourishing of autonomy organisations of civil society. This was certainly the case in Nigeria’s democratisation experience following the death of the military dictator, Sani Abacha in 1998 (2016)’.
This means that in the previous times of major repression political organizations in Nigeria were not willing to listen to CSOs, let alone take up their cause. Not only CSOs were ignored, but also international human right organisations. This may be due to natural resources they had, knowing that not many countries would turn on them if they had something to lose.
organisations, including the Committee for the Defence of Human Rights (CDHR); Women in Nigeria (WIN) and the Nigeria Union of Journalist (NUJ). The objective was to terminate military rule and restore popular rule.
Once again ethnic diversity became a problem with Bangbida’s annulment. The public protest following the annulment were the biggest in Nigeria’s history. The intensity of these protest gave CD the power to keep going, but on the other hand as the concentration of the protests were in the South-West, critics (of other ethnic groups) deemed CD a Yoruba favouring organisation. By the ethnicization of the protest, the impact of CD was heavily limited (Olayode, 2007).
Concluding, we see that the main CSO that was put together to fight authoritarian rule failed in its job, because ultimately ethnic divide pulled its efforts apart. There was also an extremely hostile and repressive political environment in which Nigerian CSOs could not effectively pressure the government into change, nor was there much will from above to change the government system.
4. Analysis
Though both countries had very similar starting points after independence there were a few factors that affected one more than the other. If we try to analyse both countries we find the
Nigeria had a military rule which took in 2/3 of the time after independence till democratisation. The instability of the governments is largely to blame on the corruptness of the states and the ethnic cleavages that kept getting in the way of a nationwide interests. The coups were also very often bloody, costing a lot of civilian causalities. Nigeria was faced with a lot of international critique on its human rights policy, or rather the lack of it; something which it did not seem to be bothered by a lot. This very hostile and repressive military rule caused CSOs to not enjoy a lot of freedom to fight for their cause. Aside from freedom people became hesitant to join out of fear for repercussions.
Something crucial which I believe existing literature does not acknowledge enough is the possible impact of ethnic divide in a country. Nigeria has a troubled past in relation to this. It is yet another factor why unification in the country and in CSOs have not been as smooth. Looking at Ghana’s rule however, it was more moderate than that of Nigeria. This is mostly to blame on the financial aid the government was receiving to re-build the country. Under PDNC there were funds received from the World Bank and the IMF. These two parties were also funding CSOs. To keep receiving funds, the oppression could not escalate the level of bloodiness as was the case in Nigeria. Also, the will to democratise from above, whether voluntarily or not, was bigger than in Nigeria.
This aided an environment in which civil society was able to express their grievances and they too were financed by foreign donors to exert this pro-democracy pressure from ‘below’ on the sitting government to do exactly that. This goes hand in hand with the claims Rawlings often made that his main aim was to create a state for the people and by the people; will to democratise from above.
Furthermore, it is of importance to acknowledge how political opposition merged themselves in CSOs to further pressure government to turn to democratic rule. Together with
organisations such as the GJA and people who were ready to die for the cause, Ghana was able to make a much more convincing transition than Nigeria.
5. Discussion
If anything, the findings of this research prove the difficulty it can take for a democracy to really develop. Though it is a hard question to answer whether democracy really is for Africa, it is a rather normative question that I, too, have my doubts about. I believe there is such a thing as the paradox of African democratisation. On one hand you have the benefit that democratic space comes to live, and many people are given the chance to participate. On the other hand,
you are faced with too many different groups wanting to go in different directions which may benefit them as a group, but not the country as a whole. The system of democracy is then faced with a demand overload it cannot handle and may break down or be faced with violent conflicts (Ake, 1997). This is something we witness in, for instance, modern-day Nigeria where Boko Haram is terrorizing some parts of the country in order to have their vision for the country come to life. These differences manifest themselves in various ethnic groups, religious groups in some places and a reduced feeling of a common nationality.
Coming back to the question, is a democracy imposed by former rulers truly the system African countries should be striving towards? This is a question I, and unfortunately many scholars with me, have not been able to formulate a clear answer to this question and thus it remains to be seen.
With this comes another question: are CSOs truly as important as the much of the existing literature states and Western financial donors believe? It is general ‘knowledge’ that CSOs are of great worth in the process of democratisation because they promote it being a democratic system of their own. But CSOs also have a paradox to them. Because one could also claim that CSOs rather develop out of democracies as democracies teach citizens civic values. When we once again observe Nigeria, one could rightfully wonder why, with a strong CSO presence, still have not made their way to a free and democratic country. The political indicators of table 1.1 show that close to no improvement has been made in many of the core values of developing and maintaining a healthy (liberal) democracy.
My research does clearly not cover enough to suggest solutions for the paradoxes I pose above. It has a serious shortcoming in the sense that one interview can surely not say enough or a lot
on the lack of time and means. I also encountered problems in enthusing (old) CSO members to speak to me on the record. Why remains unknown to me as no clear reasons were stated. Another limiting factor was the little information on how Nigerian CSOs truly played a role in civil society. This leads to believe that their role was not as big as was thought beforehand.
Nonetheless, I strongly believe that these are questions I believe science should give more attention to. If we truly believe that democracy is a system that is a one-size-fits-all we should act accordingly and find out why some are not able to fit the mould and how this potentially can be solved.
6. Conclusion
The research question this BA thesis started with was:
Why was civil society able to play a much bigger role in the acceleration of democratisation
in Ghana than in Nigeria?
I believe that this thesis has tried to answer the question in the best way possible. Ghana’s political climate was more moderate and less repressive compared to Nigeria. The strong civil society therefore had room to move around exert pressure on the government. The ethnic divide in the country did not become a problem by the doings of traditional and religious organisations. I also argue that maybe equally as important for the transition was the opposition that submerged itself in CSOs in lead in the fight for democratic rule.
Nigeria experienced a more repressive and more violent regime in which civil society had less chances of exerting the same kind of power around the same time as Ghana. Nigeria was also more affected by the ethnic diversity in the country as it had played a role right from the beginning of the First Republic and never got the attention to solve the problem which led to the civil war. Due to making of the rulers this fragmentation was used to keep disorder in the country in an attempt to extend military rule. As a result, civil society which once was very strong grew more unorganized and fragmented and not to forget was also made illegal so this too cut down the chances of operating effectively.
Concluding it can be stated that it was a combination of elements that put Ghana in a much healthier environment to grow its CSOs and with that its power, something that could not be established in Nigeria, because the political environment was not fertile enough there.
research I would advise to look more into what long term effect possibly could be for the democratisation of Nigeria going the way it did. Will it be able to morph into a democracy that meets the Western standards? Could the lack of CSOs in the process potentially be a reason why Nigeria and maybe some other African countries still have not fully democratised? Though I may have my questions as to whether democracy should be the choice government form for the African content, reality has it that majority of the world seems to think otherwise and subscribes to the idea that it is. However, I do believe the answers to the questions posed above should be further researched to benefit science and potentially these countries still in the process of democratisation.
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8. Appendix:
8.1 Semi-structured interview guide
PERSONAL:
- Where in Ghana are you originally from? (Region) - Which ethnic group do you identify with?
- What is your background in terms of education? - What is your job history?
- Would you consider yourself politically active? (Member of a party + actively participating in party)
CSO INVOLVEMENT + DESCRIPTION:
- When did you get involved with this organisation? (Year) - How did you get involved with this organisation?
- Describe main reasons of existence of organisation - Is the organisation affiliated with any political party? - What are the sources of income for the organisation?
CSO ROLE IN DEMOCRATISATION:
- How would you describe political atmosphere at the time?
- Were there any attempts by the then government of moving to civilian rule? - Did it influence the way [NAME OF CSO IN QUESTION] operated? - Could democratisation in Ghana have set in without this organization?
- Do you think democracy would have set in at all without the collective of civil society organisations?
8.2 Transcription interview (1)
Respondent: current executive member of Ghana Journalist Association (GJA). - Short introduction of research to respondent –
Q: Are you currently still part of the Ghana Journalist Association? A: Yes, I am the current president of the Ghana Journalist Association
Q: That is great, thank you. I will start with a few personal questions, before moving on to more research related questions. Where in Ghana exactly are you from?
A: I am in Accra right now.
Q: Were you born and raised there? A: Yes, in Accra.
Q: What ethnic group would you say you identify with? A: I am a Fante, so an Akan.
Q: Could you give a short summary of your educational track? A: I went to basic school in the Central Region.
Q: And after that?
A: After that I went to Aggrey Memorial in the Central Region.
Q: Did you stop there or continue your education?
A: I studied journalism at the Ghana Institute of Journalism. I also did another course in journalism at the International Organisation of Journalism in Prague, Czech Republic.
Q: Was that a scholarship?
A: Yes, indeed it was. After that I did a graduate program at the University of Ghana in Legon, Ghana.
Q: What was the focus of your dissertation?
A: The impact f the radio on the community in Accra.
Q: What you consider yourself political active?
A: Well the nature of my job requires me to engage with political parties, but at no point was or am I associated to one particular party.
Q: Could you tell me at which point (or in which year exactly you got involved with the GJA? A: That was in 2004.
Q: How did you get involved?
A: Well, I stood for elections and was chosen.
Q: Does that mean you were a member prior to 2004?
A: Yes, I was already a member. I became a member in 1980. That is when I started journalism. I started as a broadcaster for the GBA and every media person becomes an automatic member of the GJA when they start. My interest in the board then came when I was invited by the then head of the organisation to join her executives. That is how I stood for election, was chosen and joined her team and the beginning of my leadership role in the organisation.
Q: What would you say is the main objective of the GJA? What do you do for your members? A: We champion their rights (to receive information, protect their interest, train them, champion better conditions of service for them. GJA is registered as trade union, so their salaries and working conditions are our main concern. We insist on a certain level of professionalism and ethical responsibility through our code of ethics which serves as a guide in discipline. Depending on our financial health we also mentor journalist.
As an organisation we were also instrumental in Ghana’s return to democratic rule in 1992. When I joined we (Ghana, red.) were then under a dictatorship. Our executive members played an instrumental role in the fighting to expand the freedom for expression for media. We also succeed in getting the then government to repeal the Criminal Libel and Sedition laws and the Newspaper Licensing Law under which the government had the right to favour newspapers they deemed friendly to their cause and those papers who they perceived as being hostile were denied the license to operate. So the GJA occupies a special place in Ghana’s history for helping secure the basic freedoms not only for the media, but also for generality of Ghanaians. Q: Where does the GJA currently get its funds from?
A: Our revenue sources constitutes from our members, the civil society supports us, also the German NGO Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) helped us with our code of ethics, educating journalist, especially when we were changing to democratic rule, to sharpen their skills for democratic constitution. We also received support from donors like the World Bank, UNDP,
Q: Was this is recent times or rather the time of democratisation?
A: Yes, in times of democracy and FES was very instrumental in the time of democratisation. After rejecting bullets and embracing the ballot box as a means to elect our government, it became necessary to deepen the charter of democracy and the media was used as a vehicle to do that. FES and other institution helped us achieve that. If Ghana today is ranked as the first in terms of free media in Africa and 23rd in the world, then we are so grateful to these donor organisations who were our support in those difficult times.
Q: How would you describe the political atmosphere around the time of the shift to democratic rule?
A: It was repressive and oppressive because the government reluctantly caved into the pressure to return the country to democratic rule. The media constituted a very sharp opposition and became enemy number one of the government. As a result, prominent and outspoken media participants were incarcerated and some even paid the supreme price for speaking out and daring to be bold to speak out against authoritarian rule and advocate for democratic manifestation.
Q: What exactly do you mean with the supreme price? Did they pay with their life? A: Exactly, yes. They paid with their lives.
Q: Did this oppression rule heavily affect the way the GJA operated? With this I mean did you feel inclined to make yourselves less heard or was the authoritarian rule rather an ignition for making yourselves more heard?
A: Certainly, we knew we had a common enemy at the time. Therefore we were cautious in our media practice. However, we also felt like we carried the cross for the media to create the space and latitude to be able to give their best and get freedom. Our main goal was to secure the right environment for media practice and we did know the consequences but at the time we were so determined to do what was right and what we were called to do. We saw it as a divine call to execute that agenda of returning the country to civilian rule, that was the larger agenda. The GJA formed the voice of the voiceless and when some of our people were arrested and detained, we gave them the moral support and visited them in prisons. We did also receive support from friendly embassies like Britain, America and Germany. They gave us the support to do what we did and eventually this paid off.
Q: Would democracy have set off in Ghana without this organisation or do you deem that impossible?
A: We certainly played an immeasurable role as in we were the voice of the voiceless. If the government at the time succeed in repression of some civil society groups, not the GJA. We had been called at that time to fight a high level of democracy, free speech and freedom of the media.
Q: And without the collective civil society efforts?
A: Well, that would have delayed the process, because the media and the civil society organisations served as a catalyst to prepare Ghana for its present democratic destination. The global pressure and turn may have gotten Ghana there too, but it certainly would not achieve the momentum it did when the media gave it all the push.
Q: Alright, well my final question then. Opposition parties that were at the time not allowed to exist also operated as civil society organisations. What would be your view on that?
A: Yes, yes. In fact, the current president, Nana Addo Akuffo-Addo, was also very active in civil society organisations in the restauration of democratic rule in Ghana. We see them as an ally and worked with them constantly. No wonder we were branded as enemy of the state, but we were not shackled of any branding of ill words. We tasted democratic rule and free media practice. We felt that the two had a symbiotic relationship. So, when we were sent back to the dark days, we felt that there was a missing link, so we needed to fight for the restauration of democratic normalcy, which we did with every atom of our energy and every moment of our time.
Q: Alright and if we go back to those (non-existent) political parties. Did they to act as civil society
A: Yes, as I said the current president was even part of such a group. They very much existed and formed actual pressure groups which later morphed into political parties.
- Thanks followed by explanation of what will happen to the data -
8.3 Tables
Table 1.2: Historic overview of political events in Ghana post-independence
Year Event Ruler (+ Party) in power Left office
(1st July)
1960
Official (First) Republic
Kwame Nkrumah (CPP) 1966 – overthrown
1966 First Coup d’état Lit.-Gen Joseph J. Ankrah (till
02/1969) and Brig. Akwasi Afrifa (till 09/1969) (National Liberation
Council)
Ban on political parties removed – parliamentary
elections organised
1969 Second Republic Dr. Kofi A. Busia (PP) 1972 – overthrown
1972 Second Coup d’état Col. Ignatius Acheampong 1979 - overthrown
1979 Third Coup d’état Ft.-Lit. Jerry J. Rawlings (AFRC) Handover to Dr. Limann
1979 Third Republic Dr. Hilla Limann (PNP) 1981 – overthrown
1981 Revolution – Fourth
Coup d’état Ft.-Lit. Jerry J. Rawlings (PNDC) (Second coming)
1993 – calls for democratic elections
1993 Fourth Republic Ft.-Lit. Jerry J. Rawlings (National
Democratic Congress - NDC)
2001 – serves two terms
2001 Fourth Republic John Kufuor (New Patriotic Party -
NPP)
2009 – serves two terms
2009 Fourth Republic John Atta Mills (NDC) 2012 – dies in office
2012 Fourth Republic John D. Mahama (NDC) 2017 – takes over after
death Atta Mills and serves a consecutive term
2017 Fourth Republic Nana A. Akufo-Addo (NPP) Incumbent
Table 1.3 Historic overview of political events in Nigeria post-independence
Year Event (Ruler + Party in power) Left office
(1st October)
1960
Independence Nnamdi Azikiwe as president (National Council of Nigeria and
the Cameroons – NCNC)
Sir Abubakar T. Balewa as Prime Minister (Northern People’s
Congress - NPC) and represented
by the Queen of England
-
1963 Official (First)
Republic
Nnamdi Azikiwe as president (NCNC)
Tafawa Balewa as Prime Minister (NPC)
1966 – Balewa killed in coup
January
1966
Coup d’etat Gen. Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi 1966 – overthrown and killed
July 1966 (Counter) coup d’état Major Gen. Yakuba Gowon 1975
1967 CIVIL WAR (BIAFRA)
led by Lt. Col. Emeka Ojukwu
1970
1975 Coup d’état Gen. Murtala Muhammed 1976 – killed
1976 Coup d’état Lit. Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo 1979 – organised
