Eisenhower, Intelligence and the U-2 Incident

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EISENHOWER, INTELLIGENCE

AND THE 1960 U-2 INCIDENT

University of Amsterdam Thomas van der Brugge

10262652

Master’s Thesis MA American Studies Prof. dr. R.V.A. Janssens

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Abstract

Eisenhower and the intelligence community were interwoven in his presidency. During his

military career, Eisenhower became familiar with intelligence during World War II, as the

United Kingdom provided him information through their ULTRA program. When

Eisenhower became president, he wanted to diminish the influence of the Cold War on the

United States economy in the long run. Eisenhower used various forms of intelligence,

because it was more inexpensive than conventional warfare. The Central Intelligence

Agency overthrew governments in Iran (1953) and Guatemala (1954). These coup d’états

were perceived to be successful in the short run and therefore these covert operations

formed the basis for later clandestine missions. During the late 1950s, the need for

intelligence from the Soviet Union increased, as the bomber gap and the missile gap made

Congress and public wary about a possible Soviet technological advantage. Therefore, the

Central Intelligence Agency started flying Lockheed U-2 spy planes over the Soviet Union,

photographing Soviet military bases. On one of those missions, the U-2 of Francis Gary

Powers was shot down. The incident led to a deterioration of the American-Soviet

relationship. While Eisenhower wanted to incorporate intelligence to make the Cold War

less of a financial burden for the United States, his short term look on the use of

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Introduction

In the early morning of May 1, 1960, a Lockheed U-2C spy plane took off from the Central

Intelligence Agency’s Camp Badaber, near the city of Peshawar, Pakistan. Its mission,

designated as “Operation GRAND SLAM,” was to photograph the alleged Soviet SS-6

Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBMs) launch sites in the East Soviet Union. It would

have been the first intelligence mission in which an American spy plane fully overflew the

Soviet Union, as it would have landed in Bodø, Norway. The pilot of the aircraft was

Francis Gary Powers, an Air Force veteran who performed intelligence gathering flights for

the Central Intelligence Agency. After takeoff, he steered the aircraft towards the Soviet

border. However, even before he had entered Soviet airspace, the plane was already

being tracked by their radar. More than 1600 miles in to the Soviet Union, near the city of

Yekaterinburg, the aircraft was subsequently shot down by a SA-2 missile.1

The intelligence gathering mission had been initially planned to take place on April

28 and was postponed twice because of bad weather on the route. The first of May was

the last date the mission could have taken place, because President Dwight D.

Eisenhower did not want the mission to interfere with the Four Powers Summit, which

would take place in Paris on May 16. During this conference, the Americans, the Soviets,

the Brits and the French were supposed to talk about the rapprochement of East and

West. In the late 1950s, the relationship between President Eisenhower and Soviet Prime

Minister Nikita Khrushchev had been relatively calm, with both leaders using a less

hardline approach than their predecessors President Truman and Prime Minister Stalin.

During the summit, the countries’ leaders would address major Cold War issues such as

disarmament and a nuclear test ban, which was needed to reduce further escalation.2

Gregory Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach. The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead

1

Reconnaissance: The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974, (Washington D.C., Central Intelligence

Agency, 1992). 170-175.

New York Times, “Spy Summit: The Leaders of East and West and the dramatic Case that beclouds the

2

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Since the Lockheed U-2 was shot down above Soviet territory, Khrushchev had

physical proof of the overflights, which Eisenhower could not deny. Moreover the, Soviet

Prime Minister presented the incident in a striking way, releasing information in batches,

which made the Eisenhower administration’s plausible deniability impossible. What started

as an incident on the May 1, turned in to an affair. Two weeks later, during the summit,

Eisenhower was absent. Khrushchev had made clear that he wanted to negotiate about

the situation in Berlin and East-West trade if Eisenhower apologized for the overflights.

President Eisenhower did not comply to Khrushchev’s demands and the talks were

terminated even before they had started. The failure of this conference was not the only

failure that was a consequence of the Central Intelligence Agency’s fatal overflight. The

incident caused a deadlock in the American-Soviet relationship and would herald in a

relatively tense period in the Cold War, with events such as the Berlin crisis and the Cuban

Missile Crisis.

Previous scholarship on Eisenhower’s presidency has focused mostly on the legacy

of the Eisenhower presidency. When his presidency ended, the public blamed him for his

lack of leadership. They saw him as a man who would play golf all day long, and delegated

his tasks to experienced government officials such as Secretary of State John Foster

Dulles. When the archives opened in the 1970s, this image of Eisenhower turned out to be

inaccurate. The debate changed and got a more appreciative approach to Ike’s

presidency, as he did make a lot of decisions regarding foreign policy. The role of the U-2

incident and intelligence in President Eisenhower’s administration has also been

discussed by scholars. In this debate, Eisenhower’s attitude towards the Soviet Union is

important. The President had an ambivalent approach, which is explained by political

scientist Fred I. Greenstein. In 1982, he published his book The Hidden Hand Presidency:

Eisenhower as Leader, in which he argues that President Eisenhower had multiple

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close and approachable. And in private, as decision maker, he aimed at making his own

decisions while delegating tasks to others. This approach made him both decisive while

retaining peace at the same time.3

Greenstein’s concept of Eisenhower’s hidden hand can also be applied to uncover

a different perspective. Eisenhower’s use of covert operations can be traced to this

“hidden hand,” as the Central Intelligence Agency effectively was Eisenhower’s hidden

hand in foreign affairs. This is made clearer by historian and Eisenhower biographer

Stephen E. Ambrose, who argues “Eisenhower was the first leader of the free world to

embrace espionage as a geopolitical tactic.” Furthermore, the President also 4

institutionalized the use of intelligence. His experiences with the British analysis of

intelligence during World War II had made him enthusiastic about the possibilities that

intelligence could offer. As a result, Eisenhower made extensive use of intelligence during

his presidency. Besides the aerial reconnaissance or espionage on Soviet targets,

Eisenhower also approved Central Intelligence Agency’s covert operations in Iran and

Guatemala, where the governments were overthrown. The Eisenhower administration was

so eager to use covert operations, that they did not fully consider the possibility of

unwanted repercussions or side effects, also known as blowback.

The U-2 incident was an example of such an intelligence failure. After the incident,

the American overflight of the Soviet Union was subsequently halted. Intelligence

historians Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach argue that the Central

Intelligence Agency’s endeavor in the world of overhead reconnaissance was nonetheless

successful. The CIA and the U-2 Program, a study written for and published by the CIA’s

Fred I. Greenstein, The Hidden Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader, (New York: Basic Books, 1982),

3

5-9.

Stephen E. Ambrose, Ike’s Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment, (Jackson: University

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Press of Mississippi, 1999), ix. While Ambrose offers a comprehensive history of Eisenhower’s experience with the intelligence community. In recent years, Ambrose has been criticized for plagiarism of other scholars and alleged fabrication of interviews with Eisenhower. Nonetheless, Ambrose’s products are useful because they provide a good view of what kind of person Eisenhower was.

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Center for the Study of Intelligence, draws its information from many interviews and secret

documents which other academics did not have access to. Welzenbach, a CIA veteran,

and Pedlow, a scholar and former Army intelligence officer, construct the narrative of a

successful intelligence program. They argue that the U-2 project signaled a greater

involvement of the Central Intelligence Agency in overhead reconnaissance during peace

and war. However, was this influence really positive?5

While there are many scholars who stress that Eisenhower had the final decision,

there is evidence to believe that people within the Central Intelligence Agency had a

certain influence on the President’s decisions. This was particularly the case in the

approval of the overflights. Political scientist Raymond L. Garthoff adds to this that

Eisenhower did not believe in the missile gap. Then why did the President approve the

overflights? And what was the impact of the U-2 incident?

In recent years, post-revisionist scholars such as Tor E. Førland and Mary S.

McAuliffe have argued that the debate of the Eisenhower presidency should concentrate

itself on the effects of the policy that Eisenhower made, as it is now clear that the

President himself had the last word on the United States foreign policy. In her commentary

on Eisenhower’s presidency, Mary S. McAuliffe notes that it is the time for post-revisionist

historians to conclude how Eisenhower’s views worked out in the long run. Questions she

poses are predominantly about his vision and tone. What kind of vision did the President

have, and was it sustainable in the long run? Was he looking for peace or was he a

warmonger? In this thesis, these questions are combined with Eisenhower’s extensive 6

use of intelligence. Was Eisenhower’s extensive use of intelligence effective in the long

run? In order to answer this question, we need to evaluate different sub questions about

Pedlow and Welzenbach, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance, 322.

5

Tor Egil Førland, “Selling Firearms to the Indians: Eisenhower’s Export Control Policy, 1953-1954,”

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Diplomatic History Vol 15 (1991), 223n6. And: Mary S. McAuliffe, “Eisenhower, The President,” The Journal of American History, Vol. 68, No. 3 (1981), 631-632.

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Eisenhower’s approach of the Cold War and how he incorporated intelligence and dealt

with its consequences. How familiar Eisenhower was familiar with intelligence and how did

he use it during his Presidency? As the U-2 incident is a striking example of how

Eisenhower used his intelligence, the last question which will be investigated is about the

U-2 Program and the incident. What was the effect of the U-2 incident on intelligence?

In chapter one, Eisenhower’s foreign policy will be sketched. This is important,

because his need for restructuring the defense budget is key to his intelligence policy.

Eisenhower wanted to reduce the strain of government spending on the economy. He

understood that, if the American government wanted to win the Cold War in the long run, it

needed to have more financial stamina. The economy would play a key role in this

objective. With the help of relatively new tools such as nuclear weapons and intelligence,

Eisenhower was able to obtain his goal of diminishing the costs and make the Cold War

sustainable in the long run.

The second chapter revolves around Eisenhower’s experience with the intelligence

community. During World War II, Eisenhower had gained a lot of knowledge concerning

intelligence from the British intelligence services. It had enabled him to approach the war

more efficiently, since the United Kingdom had provided him with intelligence from

deciphered German messages. As President, Eisenhower used this experience to support

his foreign policy in various ways. During the 1950s, the Central Intelligence Agency was

used to overthrow allegedly Communist regimes in Iran and Guatemala. These operations

were deemed successful, and they were in the short run. However, in the long run, they

would provide insecurity to the United States, because of the blowback that occurred.

In the third and final chapter, the U-2 Affair itself will be covered. This incident, near

the end of Eisenhower’s Presidential term, can be seen as the epitome of Eisenhower’s

ventures in the world of intelligence and covert operations. It was one of the first American

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under Eisenhower’s guidance. Pedlow and Welzenbach argue that the U-2 Program was

successful despite its failure to fully overfly the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, Eisenhower

and Allen Dulles gave permission for the U-2 overflights. Why was this the case? On the

other hand, the U-2 project served as the foundation for more, even rigorous

reconnaissance and covert operations during later presidencies. Examples of this include

the 1961 invasion of Cuba and the various intelligence failures during the Vietnam War.

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Chapter One: Eisenhower’s Cold War Approach

On April 16, 1953, President Eisenhower delivered a speech for the American Society of

Newspaper Editors (ASNE). Former Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin had died one month

before the “Chance for Peace” address, and Eisenhower used the opportunity to reflect on

the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union after World War II. The

new President argued that after the mutually coordinated victory over Nazi Germany, both

countries had grown apart, with the Soviet Union finding security in picking up arms. To

arm themselves against Soviet aggression, free nations such as the United States also

had to increase armaments, which resulted in multibillion dollar defense budgets.

Eisenhower now called for disarmament and the limitation of atomic weapons.

Furthermore, the President hoped to build on a better relationship with Stalin’s successor.

At first sight, Eisenhower’s plan seems to be straightforward and simple. By improving the

relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, the need for further

mobilization decreased. In turn, this meant that the United States economy was less

restrained by large amounts of government spending that were needed to keep the

country secure from Soviet threats. However, Eisenhower’s plan was more complex.

Under the surface, his approach was not solely about creating a peaceful relationship with

the Soviet Union. It was just one tactic, part of a broader strategy.

An important element in Eisenhower’s approach towards the Soviet Union was the

United States government defense budget. The Presidents financial planning was related

with an improved relationship with the Soviet Union. In the same address, Eisenhower

explained his vision:

Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed. This world in arms is not spending money alone. It is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children. The cost of one modern heavy bomber is this: a modern brick school in more than 30 cities. It is two electric power plants, each serving a town of 60,000 population. It is two fine, fully equipped

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hospitals. It is some fifty miles of concrete pavement. We pay for a single fighter with a half-million bushels of wheat. We pay for a single destroyer with new homes that could have housed more than 8,000 people. This is not a way of life at all, in any true sense. Under the cloud of threatening war, it is humanity hanging from a cross of iron.7

In his speech, Eisenhower laid down what would be the blueprint for the policy of his

presidency. The newly elected President had come to the conclusion that spending too

much money on defense was not efficient. Instead of fighting a war with the Soviets, he

wanted to focus on the “war on poverty and need.” Eisenhower believed that conventional

war was not beneficial to most people, that most people wanted peace, and that many of

them lived in poor conditions. This change of battleground needed to be accomplished

through the stimulation of global trade and the creation of infrastructure that served the

needs of the ill-fated, such as hospitals and schools. After having spent more than

thirty-five years in the military, Eisenhower had come to the conclusion that military power was

not the way to solve the ongoing issues in the world.

Picking up arms would not be beneficial for the United States, as the President

believed that the increasing deficit of the government would eventually be fatal to national

security as well. Eisenhower had foreseen that the Cold War would not end in the near

future. He predicted that this war would have been very costly if the Truman

administration’s course would have been followed throughout his presidency.

Eisenhower’s policy was therefore aimed at keeping the nation secure with minimal costs,

but with the most effective outcome. Improving the relationship with the Soviet Union thus

was not the end goal, it was merely one of the methods to ensure that the United States

would be safe from Communist threats in the long run. Eisenhower’s goal was to minimize

the financial stress on the United States economy.

Another element that played a defining role in Eisenhower’s presidency was the

intelligence community. The overflights of the Lockheed U-2 spy plane over the Soviet

Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Address Before the American Society of Newspaper Editors” (speech, Washington,

7

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Union also need to be seen in the light of Eisenhower’s long term vision. Eisenhower

approved the flights, because they provided an excellent insight in the capabilities and

intentions of the Soviet Union. In turn, the Central Intelligence Agency helped reducing the

budget, because the United States buildup of arms could be tailored to the capabilities of

the Soviets. This helped reducing the defense budget from being a heavy burden to the

treasury and ensured that the American covert actions were kept under the radar of both

the Soviets and the American general public.

President Eisenhower’s long term vision is also stressed by historians Robert R.

Bowie and Richard H. Immerman in their book Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped

an Enduring Cold War Strategy. The authors argue that the main reason of Eisenhower’s

Presidential candidacy was his discontent with President Truman’s view of the Cold War,

who made excessive use of containment politics to limit the spread of Communism.

Truman’s Cold War approach led to massive government deficits through the creation of

NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and the Korean War. Thus, Eisenhower

believed that Truman’s policy was not sustainable in the long run, as it was not a cost

effective solution. Fighting wars and armament was not only not beneficial for national

security, it also cost a lot of capital maintain an army and keep the war going. Because of

Eisenhower’s ability to alter Truman’s foreign policy in a sustainable plan, Bowie and

Immerman also credit him for being the President whom matured the Cold War policies

laid out by Truman.8

In contrast to what earlier historians have argued about Eisenhower’s Cold War

master plan, Bowie and Immerman describe Eisenhower as someone with a clear vision,

who successfully altered Truman’s Cold War strategy from a reactionary to a proactive

one. They repudiate the earlier image of a President who cared more about playing golf

than foreign policy and left the most important decisions to his experienced staff. After his

Robert R. Bowie, Richard H. Immerman, Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War

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presidency ended, this image of Eisenhower had prevailed for more than 20 years. 9

Nonetheless, Eisenhower had more influence on his foreign policy than many Americans

during his presidency thought. To fully understand this negative sentiment that has

surrounded the Eisenhower Presidency we need to have a look at how Eisenhower

approached the Cold War. The low intensity conflict differed from a normal war in both

style and length. Therefore, the President used different measures. In his government, he

organized discussions to straighten foreign policy and made strategic investments in the

economy to counter the Communist threat. To fully understand his approach, we will look

at his previous experiences as general, his Presidential predecessors, his personal

experiences, and most important: how these influences shaped foreign policy. What were

his ideas? And what was the result of his vision?

1.1 NSC-162/2

During World War II, the Soviet Union had conquered many countries in Eastern Europe.

Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania became incorporated in the Soviet Union, and many other

Eastern European countries became satellite states. Communist governments were

installed in all those countries. In the Middle East — Iran and Turkey, Communism got

support from an increasingly part of the population. For the United States, it was evident

that the Soviet Union was pursuing a world in which Communism would be the only

economic system, philosophy and social order. For the post-war American government,

this imminent threat meant that a plan to secure the freedoms of the United States was

needed. The first American experience with containment politics was in 1947. Under the

“Truman Doctrine,” aid was given to both Greece and Turkey, which was needed to bring a

halt to the Soviet sphere of influence in the region.10

Bowie and Immerman, Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy, 11.

9

Ibid. 12.

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One of the more solid governmental plans against Soviet hegemony was made in

1947, in the form of NSC-20/4. In this document, the containment policy is officially

adopted “to reduce the power and influence of the USSR to limits which no longer

constitute a threat to the peace, national dependence and stability of the world family of

nations.” Initially, the defense budget was not very high, but in the subsequent years the 11

American reliance on nuclear weapons made the creation of a strong air force necessary,

which in turn led to an increase of defense expenses. A military component was created

for this purpose: The Strategic Air Command (SAC), which was founded in 1946 and its

primary task was to protect the United States and allied states from a Soviet attack.12

On the 23rd of September 1949, President Truman announced that the Soviets had

successfully performed a nuclear test. In his statement, Truman did not seem to be

impressed. He stressed that it was inevitable that the Soviets would eventually be able to

produce nuclear warheads and called for “enforceable international control of atomic

energy.” While Truman’s statement was sedate, the test had a profound effect on the 13

defense policy of the administration. In the wake of the nuclear test, the President

envisioned that if the United States was not the only country to have nuclear weapons,

they might as well be the best. Following the nuclear test, Truman ordered the Department

of Defense to develop the fusion bomb.14

Another measure that was taken was the production of a new National Security

Policy. President Truman approved NSC-68 in April 1950, in which the Cold War strategy

of the United States was established. The strategy of the Truman administration was

National Security Council, NSC-20/4: Report by the National Security Council on U.S. Objectives With

11

Respect to the USSR To Counter Soviet Threats to U.S. Security (Washington, D.C: November 23, 1948),

18.

Bowie and Immerman, Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy, 14-15.

12

Department Of State, Atomic Explosion Occurs in the U.S.S.R: Statement by the President, Department of

13

State Bulletin Vol. XXI, No 535 (1949), 487.

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based on the idea that the Soviets would have the possibility to use nuclear and hydrogen

bombs in the near future. In the case of a surprise attack, the United States not only

needed to be able to withstand a nuclear bomb, but also needed the military means to

retaliate against the Soviets. However, there were uncertainties about the Soviet nuclear

program. The United States intelligence community knew that their reports were not

providing a full image of the nuclear capabilities of the Soviets, which could lead to

problems with estimating the probable timing of a Soviet attack. The result of this 15

inaccurate intelligence was that the Truman administration needed to be careful with their

approach of the Soviets. Underestimating their nuclear progress could lead to deception,

which the administration wanted to avoid.

The National Security Council also advised the President to increase the defense

budget, as previous programs against the Soviets had proven to be inadequate for

protection of the free world. An example of a program that was not very effective was 16

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), of which Eisenhower had been appointed as

the first Supreme Allied Commander in December 1950. Eisenhower allegedly complained

that he would refuse any “paper plans,” as he needed to deal with many financial and

political difficulties in his position as Supreme Commander. Eisenhower believed that the

objectives of the NATO and its financial position did not match. However, historian David T.

Fautua argues that NSC-68 alone was not able to persuade politicians to support the

higher defense budget. He contends that the main reason why NSC-68 was successful in

allocating resources for arms was the Korean War. When the North Koreans invaded

National Security Council, NSC68: A Report to the National Security Council by Executive Assistant on

15

United States Objectives and Programs for National Security (Washington, D.C: April 14, 1950), 19-20.

https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/documents/pdf/10-1.pdf

National Security Council, NSC68, 63.

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South Korea in June 1950, the budget for the Department of Defense rose to 48 billion

dollars, almost quadrupling earlier estimates.17

In his first year as President, Eisenhower wanted to create a uniform national

security policy. Eisenhower and his Secretary of State John Foster Dulles agreed that

NSC-68 needed to be revisioned because Truman’s containment policy would eventually

be disastrous for the United States. Not because the United States did not have the

military power to cope with the Soviets. They thought that it would be disastrous for the

economy in the long run, which in turn would harm national security. Despite the shared

belief in repudiation of NSC-68, Dulles and Eisenhower disagreed on what the future

should look like. Dulles wanted to pursue a rollback strategy, as he predicted the Soviets

to be more aggressive in the near future. The Secretary of State believed that a hardline

attitude was the only way Western Civilization could survive Communism. While

Eisenhower had also stressed the need for rollback in his campaign, as a President he

advocated a milder strategy. To make everyone in his administration work in unison,

Eisenhower made a plan. This became Project Solarium, which was named after the “Sun

Room” on the top floor of the White House, where Dulles and Eisenhower had an informal

meeting and had once spoken about the trajectory of American national security.18

In the project, all officers were divided in three Task Forces. Task Force A’s

instruction was to develop a new iteration of the containment policy, which would focus on

military and economic strength while using vulnerabilities to destabilize the Soviet Union.

Task Force B used the aggressive containment policy: drawing a firm line around the

Soviet Union propagate that crossing this line would result in massive retaliation. The last

group, Task Force C, investigated the use of “rollback” of Communism. This was the most

offensive scenario, which used multiple techniques such as economic, psychological

David T. Fautua, “The ‘Long Pull’ Army: NSC 68, the Korean War, and the Creation of the Cold War U.S.

17

Army,” The Journal of Military History, Vol. 61, No. 1 (1997), 94-95.

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warfare and covert action. In the end, each team had to present the figures and estimates

they had made to the President.19

George F. Kennan, who was heading Task Force A during Project Solarium, pointed

out that Eisenhower carefully weighed the outcome of the three Task Forces, while paying

particular interest to the American economic prospectus for each plan. Also important to

Eisenhower were the risk of a general war between the United States and the USSR and

plans that could have impact on support from United States allies. Eisenhower’s focus on 20

the economy is confirmed by a view shared by Bowie and Immerman, who think that

Eisenhower’s preconceptions about the American approach towards the USSR played a

major role in the establishment of NSC-162/2. During World War II, when Eisenhower was

the United States General in Europe, he had learned that the economic budget was

essential to the military objectives that politicians had made. In his role as NATO’s

Supreme Allied Commander, he had dealt with many objectives but little budget. As a

President, Eisenhower therefore sought to balance the objectives with the available

resources. This was his primary goal, as he believed that the exorbitant military expenses

during the Truman administration were harming the United States economic growth.

Dulles critique on Project Solarium was mainly about the limitations of the

evaluation. Task Forces B and C shared many features as they were both directed more

aggressive forms, respectively containment and rollback. Task Force A, in his view, was

radically different from B and C and therefore it was easier to pick this strategy. This

critique of the Secretary of State was valid, because the President had indeed steered

towards the ideas that were emphasized by Task Force A. Despite this criticism, the

exercise was still useful. While the Task Forces themselves focused on the differences,

Eisenhower pointed out there were many similarities. The President knew that he could

Bowie and Immerman, Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy, 12-15.

19

George F. Kennan, Memoirs: 1950-1963 (New York: Little Brown and Company 1972), 186.

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not satisfy all participants of Project Solarium. Eisenhower chose his own direction, but the

project had been set up to give the members of his administration the feeling that they

were a valuable contribution to the future basic national security policy. The members of

the Solarium exercise provided answers within their respective frameworks and The

President handpicked the ideas that could fit his views.

The outcome of Project Solarium was subsequently distilled in to a new report,

which was further discussed by the National Security Council and eventually was turned

into NSC-162/2. The document provided the “Basic National Security Policy” for the

majority of the Cold War. It rested on the American perception that the Soviets would be a

long term threat to United States interests abroad, particularly in Western Europe.

NSC-162/2 furthermore estimated that the USSR would continue to seek opportunities to

broaden its influence, but at the same time it would be hesitant to attack the United States

and start a war. A nuclear attack was assessed as a possibility, as the Soviets “would soon

have the capability of dealing a crippling blow to our industrial base and our continued

ability to prosecute a war.” However, an effective defense could reduce the effects and

such likelyhood of such an attack. The NSC’s solution against the Soviet aggression was 21

mainly based on retaining a strong defense, with American and Allied forces working

closely together to counter a possible attack. The United States military needed to be

mobilized in such a way, that a victory over the Soviet Union was ensured in the case of a

sudden attack. Except for differences in estimating how long Soviet aggression would

hold, the assessment of the intentions and capabilities of the USSR does not differ that

much from the evaluation of the Truman administration in NSC-68/4.

Another key element in countering the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence was the

creation of a strong economy. Thus, the second important objective for national security

was the “Maintenance of a sound, strong and growing economy.” In NSC-162/2 this

National Security Council, NSC162/2: Note by the Executive Secretary to the National Security Council on

21

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economic focus needed to provide support for a long term Cold War or rapid mobilization

in the event of war.” By using the economy as a second objective to counter the Soviets, 22

the NSC stressed the importance of the American economy not only because it was

needed for budgetary reasons. It also made clear that the communist ideology was a

threat to free enterprise, a faith deeply rooted in American society.

A third element which needed to be countered by the administration’s practices was

the “maintenance of morale and free institutions and the willingness of the American

people to support the measures necessary for national security.” This objective was 23

interrelated with the former NSC objectives of maintaining a superior army and economy.

While a strong military was needed to outweigh Soviet actions in a possible attack, the

public support for a new Korean War would be limited. Furthermore, a robust and thriving

economy would ensure people that they were benefitting from the American freedoms. For

the Eisenhower administration it would be easier to sell the Cold War expenses to the

public if there was economic growth with additional benefits for the individual.

The longevity of Soviet aggression caused the NSC to form new supportive

measures. One of those measures was the development of a new intelligence system,

which needed to be capable of ensuring that both the United States military and economy

could run in the most effective manner possible. The National Security Council stated in

NSC-162/2 that the intelligence community needed to be able to “Accurately [evaluate] the

capabilities of foreign countries (…) to undertake military, political, economic and

subversive courses of action affecting United States security.” For Eisenhower and his 24

administration, intelligence was important, as it affected both the military as well as the

economy. First and foremost, intelligence gained insight about the intentions of the

National Security Council, NSC162/2, 6.

22

Ibid. 6.

23

Ibid. 6.

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Soviets, which in turn could be used as a tactical advantage for the military. Secondly, it

was beneficial to the long term strategic goals of the administration. By rightly assessing

the intentions of the Soviet Union, the long term strategy could be adapted. The adaptation

of the military and strategic goals to intelligence was in turn positive for economic growth.

1.2 “New Look”

The Korean War was the first conflict in which Eisenhower could put his ideas into

practice. During the Presidential elections, Eisenhower had proclaimed in his “I Shall Go

To Korea” speech that the Korean War “was never inevitable, it was never inescapable,” as

he believed that it was the fault of the Truman administration to get involved in the war. 25

Eisenhower stressed that there would come no end to war if the United States would

continue to conduct its current foreign policy.

The President had made a promise to end the war, or at least end the American

involvement in the Korean War, as he believed that it had been the result of irrational

decision making of the Truman administration.

Military historian Allan R. Millet argues that the Korean War did not have much

influence on Eisenhower’s national security policy, because the Ike’s “New Look” had been

formed during his earlier experiences and NSC-162/2 was still in early stages of

development during the Korean War. While it is true that Eisenhower had a lot of 26

experience as General of the Army, being in the Oval Office and shaping foreign policy is

different from executing the same policy. The Korean question was Eisenhower’s first

experience with war in his presidency and therefore it is conceivable that it had a profound

effect on his foreign policy. Nonetheless, Millet also admits that the Korean War could have

Dwight D. Eisenhower, “I Shall Go to Korea” (speech, Detroit, October 25, 1952), Eisenhower Presidential

25

Library.

Alan R. Millet, “Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Korean War: Cautionary Tale and Hopeful Precedent,”

26

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provoked an unwillingness to get involved in later conflicts, which undermines his own

argument. Therefore, there is reason to believe that Eisenhower continued to approach

conflicts with the Soviet Union in a similar way. He did not want to get involved in fighting a

war.

While Eisenhower’s “I Shall Go To Korea” speech might be full of campaign rhetoric,

the address showed a glimpse of how Eisenhower wanted to approach the Soviet Union.

First, he stressed the importance of intelligence through saying that the American

government had “failed to read and to outwit the totalitarian mind.” Eisenhower stated that

many members of Congress had been misinformed about the situation in Korea and

capabilities of the Soviet Union. He underlines this with various Republican

representatives in Congress, who were convinced that an American retreat from the

Korean peninsula would not lead to war. However, there also was intelligence available

that could have persuaded Congress to halt the retreat of American soldiers. The House

Foreign Affairs Committee had already reported that there was information that a joint

Soviet-Korean attack was imminent. And only one Republican Congressman, Lodge, had

his doubts about the retreat, saying that the “the presence of our troops there is a

tremendous deterrent to the Russians.”27

Despite his pledge to end the war, Millet shows that President Eisenhower first

considered various options to end the war. Surprisingly, one of the options was ending the

war with a victory. One of the options Eisenhower considered was increasing the number

of South Korean and UN troops by letting friendly nations pay for it. Another possibility the

administration considered was the reinforcement of the American troops with more

personnel and the use of nuclear weapons. Eisenhower was approaching the war

Dwight D. Eisenhower, “I Shall Go to Korea” (speech, Detroit, October 25, 1952), Eisenhower Presidential

27

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differently than Truman did. The new President looked for the easiest way to resolve the 28

issue, or at least prevent the United States from getting dragged in a never ending conflict.

During the Korean War, Eisenhower became impressed by the impact of nuclear

weapons. After having had an argument with the South Korean President Syngman Rhee

about their view on the course of the Korean War, Eisenhower decided to move nuclear

warheads to the Air Force base on Guam. The armistice between North Korea and South

Korea was signed shortly after. Millet beliefs that Eisenhower and Dulles were impressed

by the effect of their actions. The administration believed that the positioning of their

nuclear weapons was the last push for the armistice to be signed.29

This nuclear lesson Eisenhower learned from the Korean War was part of his Grand

Cold War strategy. The President knew that the Soviet Union had been developing nuclear

weaponry and that they would soon have the ability to deploy these bombs. A year in the

Eisenhower presidency, and half a year after the Korean War ceasefire had been signed,

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles gave a speech in which he outlined the American

Cold War strategy. In this speech, Dulles announced that the Eisenhower administration

had chosen a long term strategic policy, which would make an end to Truman’s reactionary

policy. The Secretary of State talked about the use of “massive retaliatory power,” by which

he hinted at the utilization of nuclear weapons in order to deter the Soviet threat. While the

weapon itself was effective, it was more about dissuasion the enemy than utilization of

nuclear weapons.30

For Eisenhower, the use of nuclear weapons brought to major advantages. On the

one hand, the policy of nuclear deterrence encompassed a reduction of the military forces

that previously served abroad, which ultimately resulted in a reduction of costs. On the

Millet, “Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Korean War,” 155-174.

28

Ibid. 171.

29

John Foster Dulles, “The Evolution of Foreign Policy,” (speech, New York, January 12, 1954). Department

30

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other hand, the local defense of the United States was improved, as nuclear missiles were

more powerful than conventional weapons. Investments were made in army bases and

existing air defense objects were improved. One of the major implications of this policy

was the creation of the Dwight D. Eisenhower National System of Interstate and Defense

Highways. The 34th President used these strategic investments in the economy to ensure

national security. Eisenhower approved the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956. The main

purpose of creating the Interstate System was to ensure that, in the case of a Soviet

attack, military logistics could be conducted as planned. Therefore, the system linked 31

major military bases together. It also provided road access to many ordinary Americans, in

a period when owning a car became more common. Furthermore, it provided work for a

significant workforce for an extended period of time. Thus, it was not only beneficial to

national security, but the economy and the American people also benefitted from the

creation of the highways.

Nuclear deterrence, diminishing costs and making strategic investments were not

the only policies which the Eisenhower administration relied on. They were part of a series

of measures that were directed at winning the Cold War in the long run. Making and

retaining alliances with other countries was also important. While defensive alliances such

as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization created a bulwark against Communism, Dulles

argued that they also diminished costs and would be more effective than multiple

operations. However, there also was a geographical factor which played a role. From 32

several European, Middle Eastern and Asian countries, intelligence missions would be

commenced. The United States is too far away too coordinate and start covert operations

from.

United States Congress, Public Law 84-627: Federal Aid-Highway Act of 1956, 374. https://www.gpo.gov/

31

fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-70/pdf/STATUTE-70-Pg374.pdf

John Foster Dulles, “The Evolution of Foreign Policy,” (speech, New York, January 12, 1954). Department

32

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During the Eisenhower administration, countries such as Taiwan, Pakistan, Turkey

and Norway facilitated multiple covert operations over Soviet and Communist Chinese

territory. These covert operations were supplemental to Eisenhower’s “New Look” policy,

and provided the administration with information about the capabilities and intentions of

the enemy. In response to the gathered intelligence, the Americans could tailor their

defense investments to the exact threat and did not need a too large or too small, thus

inefficient army. This meant that the administration could reduce costs while maintaining or

improving the level of national security, which made Eisenhower’s Cold War policy viable

for the Cold War in the long run.

1.3 Conclusion

While Eisenhower initially seemed to approach the Soviet Union in a more friendly way,

seeking rapprochement after Stalin had died, improving the relationship with the Soviet

Union was not his primary objective. It was merely a tool through which the President

could obtain his goal of diminishing costs. Eisenhower believed that United States national

security was linked to the cost of war, because he estimated that the Cold War would drag

on for a long time. Therefore, he thought the American Cold War approach towards the

Soviet Union needed to change.

His predecessor, Harry S. Truman, had invested millions in the containment of

Communism. Eisenhower did not believe that this policy was working effectively. Not in the

short run, and certainly not in the long run. Therefore, he wanted to end the American

involvement in the Korean War. Among many of his government officials, this was not a

very popular point of view. Therefore, Eisenhower invented the Solarium exercise to be

sure that everyone in his administration had the same approach towards the problem by

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Eisenhower often sought the path of least resistance to achieve his goals, but this

did not mean that he was evading conflicts. For every dispute or obstacle, the

administration waged every solution and used the solution which had the most effect, with

the least costs or public interference. Most of the techniques the administration used were

not visible to the public, which is why Eisenhower for a long time was seen as the

President who preferred playing golf, instead of contemplating the Cold War future.

Through various covert or less overt actions, for instance the creation of a national

highway system or the Solarium exercise, he tried to increase national security while

keeping an eye on efficiency and the budget of the government at the same time.

To accomplish his vision as outlined in NSC-162/2, Eisenhower made use of

various tools, which were never the objective but were used as a means to reach this

objective. Through these tools, Eisenhower tried to reach his objective of minimizing the

impact of war on American society. The monetary problem of up keeping a strong army

was solved by using nuclear weapons instead of maintaining a large field army, which the

Soviets had. Eisenhower believed that the United States needed to decide what the world

should look such as, and how the army was arranged. According to the Allen Dulles, the

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Chapter Two: Eisenhower and Intelligence

Under supervision of Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Allen Dulles, a new intelligence

campus was opened near Langley, Virginia in 1960. After considering a few sites, Langley

had been chosen because of its security and privacy, as the site was surrounded by parks

and had few residential areas in its surroundings. The location was also future proof, as

there was enough room for expansion of the new complex. It was the first permanent

home of the Central Intelligence Agency. Previously, the agency had operated from various

buildings in downtown Washington DC, which had been difficult to secure and

uncomfortable for its workforce. Most of these buildings had been in use since World War

II, when the wartime intelligence agency Office Of Strategic Services (OSS) had its offices

there until it was dissolved in 1945. The Central Intelligence Agency had significantly

grown since its creation in 1947. Thus, the need for a new unified headquarter had been

high.33

On November 3, 1959, President Dwight D. Eisenhower laid down the cornerstone

for the Central Intelligence Agency’s main building. In a speech directed at the agency’s

employees, the President stressed that intelligence had utmost importance in both war and

peace:

In war, nothing is more important to a commander than the facts concerning the strength, dispositions, and intentions of his opponent, and the proper interpretation of those facts. In peacetime the necessary facts are of a different nature. They deal with conditions, resources, requirements, and attitudes prevailing in the world. They and their correct interpretation are essential to the development of policy to further our long-term national security and best interests. To provide information of this kind is the task of the organization of which you are a part. No task could be more important.34

“The CIA Campus: The Story of Original Headquarters Building,” Central Intelligence Agency, accessed

33

May 10, 2017. https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/2008-featured-story-archive/ original-headquarters-building.html

Dwight D. Eisenhower, “The Cornerstone Ceremony” (speech, Langley, Virigina, November 3, 1959,

34

Central Intelligence Agency. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP75-00149R000200540044-6.pdf

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Eisenhower explained that the intelligence produced by Central Intelligence Agency was

key to the development of American policies. The President lauded the organization and

its employees because of their diligent work, wherein they could not celebrate successes

with or explain mistakes to the public. By mentioning both war- and peacetime implications

of intelligence, Eisenhower emphasized the dynamics of the Cold War. Eisenhower knew

that the Cold War was going to be a long process, in which the threat perception of the

Soviet Union would shift back and forth. The CIA therefore needed to use intelligence in

multiple ways. The agency not only needed to provide intelligence for long term policies,

but also intelligence about imminent threats. Eisenhower’s speech accentuates how he

saw the role of the intelligence community. The President believed that intelligence could

support his foreign policy by providing the right information about security threats, but also

by removing specific threats.

Nonetheless, Eisenhower was relatively new to intelligence. Historian Stephen E.

Ambrose has written about Eisenhower’s first experiences with intelligence. Ambrose

contends that Eisenhower did not know anything about intelligence before the United

States got involved in World War II. The main reason for this was that the United States

Army did not give any priority to intelligence gathering. This radically changed when the

Americans became involved in World War II. His experiences during the war made

Eisenhower very knowledgeable about intelligence and its uses. The British intelligence

services had provided Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, with the

necessary information to counter the German army. In the early beginnings of the war, the

British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) had progressed much further than the Americans

had. The United Kingdom had actively developed their intelligence program and were able

to intercept and decrypt German messages.

The experiences during World War II also shaped Eisenhower’s political career. As

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during the Second World War. Various intelligence gathering missions were secretly

conducted over or in foreign territory. On the one hand, the President made excellent use

of his experience with intelligence he obtained during World War II. In 1954, Eisenhower

had given the CIA permission to develop an aircraft capable of making clandestine flights

over hostile territory, which ultimately became the Lockheed U-2 spy plane. In 1955 the

CIA started wiretapping Soviet cables under East Berlin. And after the successful launch of

the Soviet Sputnik satellite, Eisenhower made effort to kick start the Corona program, from

which a series of reconnaissance satellites evolved. On the other hand, the Eisenhower

administration did not only make use of intelligence agencies to assess the enemy’s

intentions, but also approved covert operations that had more impact on foreign nations.

The administration attempted multiple regime changes in countries such as Iran (1953),

Guatemala (1954), Indonesia (1957) and Congo (1961) when the government in these

countries did not aim for Western economic or political interests. Eisenhower subsequently

also planned the Bay Of Pigs invasion in 1960, but this operation was executed after his

presidency had ended. The result of Eisenhower’s incorporation of intelligence is therefore

mixed. While both the use of intelligence gathering missions with the Lockheed U-2 over

foreign nations and the coup d’états in Iran and Guatemala are invasive to sovereign

states, the latter is more destructive and the outcome could be more disastrous for the

United States, as the effect of the American actions would only become noticeable years

later.

2.1 World War II

Intelligence did not play a large role in the United States Army before World War II.

Eisenhower did not receive any training on the use of intelligence during his education at

the United States Military Academy. In the multiple positions he held during his military

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intelligence, but preferred to focus on operations instead. Command historian Michael E.

Bigelow argues “While [inter-war Army schools] gave some instruction in tactical

reconnaissance, they overlooked the broader fields of collecting and using intelligence.” 35

Eisenhower did not have any personal experience and intelligence was not deemed to be

important within the United States Army. Nonetheless, intelligence would dominate the

general’s mind during World War II.

During the war, Eisenhower became intrigued by intelligence. In 1942, the general

was introduced to the “wizard war” by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Winston

Churchill. Ambrose contends that Churchill had a lot of respect for the American general,

and wanted him to be the Supreme Commander of the Allied forces in Europe. Therefore,

the Prime Minister updated Eisenhower on the latest British secrets of war. The British had

more experience with intelligence than the Americans. Before the Americans got involved

in World War II, the British intelligence agencies already had multiple successes. Under

the Double Cross System, many German spies whom were active in the United Kingdom

had been identified by the British intelligence agencies. The information these spies sent

to Germany was subsequently altered by the British intelligence agency, through which the

British tried to mislead the Germans. However, the largest British success came in the

form of ULTRA, which was the codename for an operation in which German diplomatic

and military messages were intercepted and deciphered. After the German Enigma coding

machines had been obtained and British cryptologists spent months trying to crack the

code, the decoded messages provided the United Kingdom with valuable information

about movements and actions of the German army.36

Ambrose stated that most of the American army generals were reluctant to

incorporate intelligence in their warfare. One example is general George S. Patton, who

Michael E. Bigelow, “Eisenhower and Intelligence,” Military Intelligence Vol 17 No 1 (1991), 19.

35

Stephen E. Ambrose, Ike’s Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment, 4.

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was not impressed by the achievements of the British intelligence agencies. He said he

“just liked fighting,” intelligence was not his interest. Furthermore, many American military

officials were selected for the Intelligence division, also known as G-2, based on how long

they had served their country, and not based on their ability. General Eisenhower, in 37

contrast to other members of staff, was susceptible to this new type of warfare and would

later incorporate it in his strategy to win the war. Based on the accounts of Sir Kenneth

Strong, a British intelligence officer, Ambrose also argues that Eisenhower had the ability

to comprehend intelligence. Eisenhower, as Army leader was open to “new ideas, new

techniques, new approaches to old problems.” His embrace of the intelligence, did not 38

only broaden his views of war but would also shorten it.

In December 1943, General Eisenhower was appointed Supreme Allied

Commander for the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF). In this

position, he could make a lot of use of intelligence that had been intercepted and analyzed

through the British ULTRA program. While the British interception of German messages

had a huge impact on the Allied approach of the Germans, the ULTRA program was not

always successful. Eisenhower also had to deal with setbacks. An example of deception is

what Bigelow calls the “Lesson of Kasserine Pass.” In February 1943, the Allied forces

fought against Erwin Rommel’s Afrika Korps in Tunisia. The British G-2 intelligence staff

reported to Eisenhower that the Germans would launch an attack through the northern

Fondouk Pass. However, the Germans would attack from the southern Faid Pass. This

intelligence failure resulted in a minor victory by Rommel’s army. Bigelow argues that

British intelligence had only focused on ULTRA interceptions, and ignored other sources of

intelligence such as patrolling the area. From this point onwards, Eisenhower knew that he

could not rely on a single source of intelligence. Therefore, he replaced the G-2 officer and

Stephen E. Ambrose, “Eisenhower and the Intelligence Community in World War II,” Journal of

37

Contemporary History Vol. 16 No. 1 (1981), 154.

Stephen E. Ambrose, Ike’s Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment, 13.

(31)

demanded a more thorough approach, combining multiple sources, from his successor. 39

Bigelow thinks the failure of Kasserine Pass was one of the greatest intelligence lessons

that could be learned from World War II. The intelligence officer had to present a full

overview of the enemy to the commander.40

On July 12, 1945, at the end of the Second World War in Europe, Eisenhower wrote

a letter to the head of the British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), Sir Stewart Menzies. In

his personal message, Eisenhower lauded the achievements of the cryptanalysists at

Bletchley Park, where the members of the ULTRA program had operated from.

Furthermore, the general also emphasized the constructive collaboration between the

United Kingdom and the United States:

The intelligence which has emanated from you before and during this campaign has been of priceless value to me. It has simplified my task as a commander enormously. It has saved thousands of British and American lives and, in no small way, contributed to the speed with which the enemy was routed and eventually forced to surrender.41

Eisenhower, through a series of different events, learned to appreciate the value of

intelligence for his work as Supreme Allied Commander. Furthermore, he was able to

efficiently work with intelligence and the intelligence community because of the high quality

British intelligence. The intelligence that was presented to Eisenhower was generally

broad, and the general was able to incorporate this in his view of the battlefield. It was the

synergy between the British intelligence and the American operational leadership that was

key to the success of Eisenhower and intelligence. However, World War II was not won

by intelligence alone. In the end, only sheer manpower played a decisive role in winning

the war. The actions of, mainly the British, intelligence agencies supported the armed

forces on the battlefield by supplying generals such as Eisenhower with information about

Bigelow, “Eisenhower and Intelligence,” 190.

39

Ibid. 195.

40

Dwight D. Eisenhower, Letter to Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service, Sir Stewart Graham Menzies,

41

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the enemy. Eisenhower, as Supreme Allied Commander, was one of the military men that

embraced the intelligence, through which the war eventually was shortened. A large part 42

of Eisenhower’s success with intelligence was the synergy between British intelligence and

American manpower. Eisenhower drew from British intelligence and combined this with his

experience on the battlefield. This is not stressed enough by either Ambrose or Bigelow, as

they focus on the implications of intelligence on Eisenhower’s battlefield.

A few years after World War II had ended, Eisenhower became President of the

United States. The experience with intelligence he had obtained during World War II

proved to be highly beneficial to his presidency. During his term, more intelligence would

be gathered and more covert operations would be held than any other previous President.

2.2 Eisenhower’s Presidency

In the period between the end of World War II and Eisenhower’s presidency, the American

dependency on British intelligence had decreased. It took some time for the United States

government to re-evaluate the need for intelligence. Between 1942 and 1945, the Office of

Strategic Services (OSS) had operated from Washington and was modeled after its British

counterpart, MI6. After the war, the agency had been dissolved and some of its tasks had

been delegated to various departments within the Department of War. The increasing

Soviet threat, however, pressed the need for a new agency that was able to coordinate the

gathering and analysis of intelligence in a simpler way. Therefore, the Central Intelligence

Agency was created with the signing of the National Security Act of 1947 by President

Truman.

Another governmental body that was created by the National Security Act of 1947

was the National Security Council. The National Security Council was created to advise

the President regarding national security. National defense specialist Richard A. Best

Ambrose, “Eisenhower and the Intelligence Community in World War II,” 164.

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explains that under Truman, it consisted of several statutory members: the President; the

Secretaries of State, Defense, Army, Navy, and Air Force; and the Chairman of the

National Security Resources Board. “Since the creation of the National Security Council,

every administration has had a different approach towards the council. Truman, for

instance, was not present during most of the board’s meetings. By doing so, he underlined

the advisory role of the board. Setting policy or coordination of policy, he believed, was not

a task of the National Security Council. While the board of advisors had become more

important during the Korean War, with more meetings and more attendance from the

President, Truman held on to his belief that the role of the council was an advisory one.43

Eisenhower attended the majority — 329 of out of the 366 meetings of the council.

While the council also had an advisory role, Eisenhower used the board more to debate,

formulate and coordinate future policies like Truman, the President did not take decisions

in the National Security Council. With help from his Secretaries of State and Defense, this

process took place in private. To facilitate the new role of the National Security Council, a

few changes were made. First, the position of Special Assistant for National Security

Affairs was created, which essentially was an advisor to the President. Initially this was

Robert Cutler, a former banker who had also served in the military. Secondly, two boards

were created, a Planning Board and an Operations Coordinating Board. The former board

focused on the planning of questions and drafting policies. The latter board was

responsible for the integration and implementation of the council’s policy in to the

executive branch. Thus, the National Security Council under Eisenhower evolved in to a 44

governmental body that was better able to cope with the increased threats and additional

paperwork of the Cold War era. Eisenhower knew that the various departments that were

represented in the National Security Council needed to efficiently work together and

Richard A. Best Jr, The National Security Council: An Organizational Assessment, (Washington D.C:

43

Congressional Research Service, 2011), 6.

Best Jr, The National Security Council, 7-9.

Eisenhower, Intelligence and the U-2 Incident