What significance did the Serbian and Hutu paramilitaries have in the 1992-95
Bosnian ethnic cleansing and 1994 Rwandan genocide?
Sarah Hilton
Student Number: 11105208
Supervisor: Dr Kjell Anderson
MA History: Holocaust and Genocide Studies
University of Amsterdam
Acknowledgements
I would firstly like to thank my supervisor Dr Kjell Anderson for all of his help and guidance throughout this thesis process, from helping me develop my ideas to all the feedback provided on my work. I would also like to thank my family and friends who have been there throughout the course of my master’s programme and have supported me greatly throughout the year.
Abstract
The phenomenon of paramilitarism can be found in conflicts throughout the twentieth century. However, none arguably more so than in cases such as the Bosnian war of 1992-95, and the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Here, multiple groups can be seen to have been greatly involved the violence that took place. As the Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi were the only Hutu paramilitaries in Rwanda, two groups were examined in the case of Serbia, the Tigers and the Chetniks. With these groups being involved to such a great extent, the question of what specific importance they had was raised. Through an examination into multiple aspects of paramilitary involvement in both cases, similarities and differences are revealed, both illustrating a pattern in paramilitary violence and showing how the role these groups played in ethnic cleansing and genocide was significant.
From establishing how significance could be found from when these groups were formed, their significance is uncovered and tracked throughout their initial beginnings, to the acts of violence they committed during the period of conflict, up to an exploration into their relationship with the government. Consequently, their importance within both cases was found to have manifested a variety of different areas. Survivor testimony alongside various documents from the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council highlight the behaviour of paramilitaries in each case and how these groups were responsible for committing serious atrocities whilst providing their respective governments with plausible deniability.
Table of Contents
Acknowledgements 1
Abstract 2
Introduction 4
Chapter 1: How does the formation, purpose, and evolution of Serbian and Hutu paramilitaries illustrate their significance before ethnic cleansing and genocide? 8
1.1 – How were these groups formed? 9
1.2 – What was their purpose? 15
1.3 – How did they evolve? 19
Chapter 2: What was the function of these paramilitary groups and what acts of violence did they
commit? 23
2.1 – How did the groups function in society? 24
2.2 – What acts of violence did they commit and how? 27
Chapter 3: To what extent can paramilitary significance be identified in their relationship to the Army
and Government? 42
3.1 – What significance did they have in comparison to the Army? 42 3.2 – How was their relationship with the Government, and what was their attitude towards
paramilitaries? 48
Conclusion 58
Introduction
The United Nations defined the Serbian-based paramilitary groups as “special forces”, a definition that can be extended to incorporate Hutu groups as both had similar functions.1 As stated in the Security Council’s ‘Final Report of the Commission of Experts’ from 1994, Section 121 is devoted to provide an explanation as to how these groups can be identified; they:
…usually operate under the command of a named individual and apparently with substantial autonomy, except when they are integrated into the regular army’s plan of action. The special forces are supplied and often trained by the respective governments that they serve. Many special forces answer only to senior political officials in the respective governments. Such a relationship is frequently based on political allegiance and is not always publicly known. However, in time, information about the political sponsorship and support of these groups will become available. As these units usually operate independently and outside the apparent chain of command, their order of battle is not known. Notwithstanding the strong links between these units and the respective armies, the regular army failed to restrain them from the commission of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law….2
This section further goes on to state that the most notorious of these aforementioned groups are Arkan’s Tigers and Šešelj’s Chetniks. However, although the above definition is linked to paramilitary groups present in the former Yugoslavia, this definition can also be used for the Rwandan Hutu groups, the Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi. Both Hutu paramilitary units were armed and trained on the orders of the Rwandan government and were unrestrained by the Hutu regular army.
When examining paramilitarism in general, it has been stated that ‘Paramilitaries are actors within a system of organizations called parainstitutionalism.’3 These ‘parainstitutions’ are located in between state agents such as the army, upholding sovereignty, and rebel factions, wanting to ‘subvert’ and ‘seize’ it, sharing attributes from each side.4 Ariel Ahram has detailed these groups as being ‘…loosely and semi-covertly affiliated with the state, often created, licensed, and dependent on state organs, though they are distinct from them.’5 Furthermore, Ahram describes that commonly, paramilitaries will undertake the actions, such as intimidation and extermination, which the
1 United Nations, Security Council, Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security
Council Resolution 780 (1992), S/1994/674 (27 May 1994), 31. Accessed from
http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/OTP/un_commission_of_experts_report1994_en.pdf
2 Ibid.
3 Ahram, A. I., ‘Why States Choose Paramilitarism’, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Vol.7 No.1 (Winter/Spring 2006), 66.
4 Ibid. 5 Ibid.
government does not want to be directly associated with.6 It has been documented that paramilitaries have been used by both democratic and authoritarian states around the world.7 What these paramilitary groups are responsible for poses the question as to whether they were the most significant aspect in carrying out both the Serbian policy of ethnic cleansing, and the Hutu genocide of the Tutsi.
In order to more deeply examine the paramilitary units from both Serbia and Rwanda, the overall question of what significance did they have in ethnic cleansing during the 1992-1995 Bosnian war, and the 1994 Rwandan genocide shall be posed. To fully gauge this significance, several sub-questions will be further be analysed. These include looking at who was recruited, or joined, and why; if these groups evolved during their respective conflicts; what was their function and what acts of violence were these units responsible for committing; were they significant in comparison to each country’s regular army; what relationship was held between paramilitaries and their government; and finally, what was the governmental attitude towards these groups.
The relevance in exploring these paramilitary units and their significance in ethnic cleaning and genocide, is that both the events of Serbia and Rwanda occurred during the same period whereby international attention was focused on human rights norms. The increased significance of states using irregular groups to perform tasks that the international community would not approve of was the result of a greater interest in human rights and its abuses. Ahram has explained the importance of this rising awareness of human rights, writing that ‘The dissemination of human rights norms may have prevented some of the most flagrant atrocities, but it also created incentives for states to employ parainstitutions to do their dirty work.’8 It is important to note that the reason for using both Serbian and Rwandan paramilitary groups for this examination into their significance was that both had a large paramilitary presence connected to the state and to the atrocities committed. Furthermore, their different contexts created both similarities and differences between both cases that shall be explored throughout.
In order to answer the main, and sub, questions a variety of both primary and secondary sources will be utilised to provide evidence. Primary sources include books containing interviews from both victims and perpetrators. These testimonies are utilised to illustrate the actions taken by paramilitary groups and their encounters with such groups. Such publications include Jean Hatzfeld’s
Machete Season, They Would Never Hurt a Fly by Slavenka Drakulić, and Philip Gourevitch’s We Wish
6 Ibid. 7 Ibid. 8Ibid, 68-69.
to Inform you that Tomorrow we will be Killed with our Families. The report compiled by Helsinki
Watch, in 1992, is further useful in conveying the interpretations of the international community as the events were unfolding. The use of documents from the United Nations, such as General Assembly and Security Council reports, are important as they contain established facts and information collated from a variety of different references. Nevertheless, although there are many strengths associated with the use of these primary sources, their limitations also have to be discussed. As with the use of testimonies, there is a reliance upon the memory of the witness, either victim or perpetrator, in interviews that may have been conducted after a significant period of time has passed. Furthermore, there is a possibility that, in the case of perpetrator testimony, the individual would try and portray their own actions in a more positive light compared to what might have really happened.
An array of secondary sources including books and journal articles have been utilised throughout. Articles have been taken from many different journals, including the Journal of Genocide
Research, Human Rights Quarterly, and The British Journal of Criminology alongside others. The
information from this range of sources corroborates what has been discovered within the primary sources, thereby validating the facts. Some of the key secondary sources include, for Serbian actions in Bosnia, Edina Bećirević’s Genocide on the Drina River, Frontiers and Ghettos by James Ron, and also an article titled ‘Militias and Genocide’ by Alex Alvarez. This article by Alvarez was additionally a key source for Rwandan paramilitary activity. Other important sources for Rwanda are The Order of
Genocide by Scott Straus, Lee Ann Fujii’s Killing Neighbors, and finally When Victims Become Killers
written by Mahmood Mamdani.
In the first chapter, the question of what the formation, purpose, and evolution of these paramilitary groups can convey about their significance will be analysed. After an explanation of which paramilitary units will be the subject of focus, the formation of each group will be examined, answering the question of who was recruited into, or joined, these units and the reasons why. From this, the purpose of why these paramilitary groups were formed will then be explored, focusing on if their initial purpose was for violence. The last section of this chapter will explain how, and in what ways, these groups evolved. To assess this, the social aspects of these groups will be investigated and the impact that paramilitary actions had on other aspects of society.
The second chapter shall then focus on the question of what was the function of these units in society during the period of violence, and furthermore, an exploration into the acts of violence that were committed by the groups. Prior to answering this, the context of when each case of ethnic violence began will be provided to establish the conditions in which their violence occurred. To begin with, their function within society will be analysed to illustrate if their significance was present in a
societal regard and to examine how they acted, and behaved, within the boundaries of organisation, culture, and rules. An examination into the acts of violence that these groups committed will then be the subject of focus. To fully gauge their significance here, it will be ascertained if these groups were utilised as force multipliers, if their actions were the result of planned, improvised or contingency planning, and to see if civilian involvement was important in paramilitary actions.
Lastly, the third chapter will pose the question of to what extent can their significance be identified in their relationships to both the regular army and their government. Paramilitary significance in comparison to the regular army will be the first point to be evaluated. This shall be done in order to assess if any other group could be argued to have possessed a greater significance than paramilitary groups. To establish this, the actions of the army will be examined, followed by an insight into the relationship between them and paramilitaries, and lastly, if they approved of paramilitary actions in ethnic cleansing and genocide. Following this, the governmental relationship with the paramilitary groups, and their subsequent attitude towards them, will be focused upon. In order to fully examine this, their paramilitary relationship to the government will looked at first and if this evolved over time. Then, the attitude of the government towards these groups will be the focal point to illustrate their view of paramilitary actions, if the use of these groups were necessary. Moreover, an insight into both military and state self-perceptions before finally analysing the reasons as to why paramilitary groups were utilised for each conflict.
Chapter 1: How does the formation, purpose, and evolution of Serbian and Hutu paramilitaries illustrate their significance before ethnic cleansing and genocide?
The context in which paramilitary groups were established and developed can be useful in examining whether or not their significance, if any, in genocide or ethnic cleansing was present from the very beginning. Paramilitarism has been an important presence in genocide even before the creation of the term ‘paramilitary’ in the 1930s, noted by Robert Gerwarth and John Horne, ‘…to designate the emergence of armed political formations organized on military lines in fascist states….’1 This significance in their role can be traced back as far as the Napoleonic wars.2 First, the groups that will be focused on shall be discussed.
One Serbian-based paramilitary unit that shall be focused on are Arkan’s Tigers. Formally known as the Srpska Dobrovoljačka Garda (Serbian Volunteer Guard), they were led by Željko Ražnatović who went by the name of Arkan.3 Alongside reports of close connections to Yugoslav intelligence services, Serbian state security, and even Serbian President Slobodan Milošević, Arkan was antithetical to other paramilitary leaders who believed themselves to rival the President.4 The other paramilitary group that shall be focused upon are known most commonly as the Chetniks, led by Vojislav Šešelj. However, unlike Arkan and his Tigers, a report commissioned by the United Nations Security Council in 1994 highlighted that ‘Šešelj’s group follows the pre-Second-World-War group called the “Chetniks” who were known for their ultra-right wing monarchical politics.’5 To display this connection to the previous Chetnik force, Šešelj’s men wore the same double-headed eagle emblem and referred to themselves as Chetniks.6
Contrary to the Bosnian war, the Rwandan genocide of 1994 involved considerably less paramilitary groups. Aside from civilian input and armies such as the Hutu Forces Armées de Rwanda (FAR) and Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), there were only two Hutu paramilitary groups that participated in the genocide. These were the Interahamwe, whose meaning in Kinyarwanda is ‘those who stand together’ (or those who fight together), and the Impuzamugambi,
1 Gerwarth, R., and Horne, J., ‘Vectors of Violence: Paramilitarism in Europe after the Great War, 1917-1923’,
The Journal of Modern History, Vol.83 No.3 (September 2011), 490.
2 Ibid.
3 Schlichte, K., ‘With the State against the State? The Formation of Armed Groups’, Contemporary Security
Policy, Vol.30 No.2 (2009), 256.
4 Ron, J., Frontiers and Ghettos: State Violence in Serbia and Israel (Los Angeles, 2003), 47.
5 United Nations, Security Council, Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security
Council Resolution 780 (1992), S/1994/674 (27 May 1994), 76. Accessed from
http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/OTP/un_commission_of_experts_report1994_en.pdf 6 Ibid.
meaning ‘those with a single purpose’.7 Despite both groups being involved in the genocide the Interahamwe will be the main focus throughout, due to their close collaboration meaning that some individuals were members of both groups.8 Alison Des Forges summarised this lack of group distinction, writing that ‘Once the genocide began, there was virtually no distinction between Impuzamugambi and Interahamwe in the field, although members of each might still wear the distinctive garb or colors belonging to their parties.’9
1.1 – How were these groups formed?
By exploring the process that resulted in the formation of these paramilitary groups, it can be observed if these groups had any significance in the process of ethnic cleansing or genocide before the violence took place.
In October 1990, Arkan had founded the Tigers who were then comprised of supporters of the Belgrade soccer team, Red Star.10 In an explanation by Michael Mann, it has been said that he was recommended to the government ‘…as someone who could discipline football hooligans,’ and as a result ‘…he organized them into an ethnonationalist pro-Milosevic militia.’11 Eventually, the Tiger’s expanded to an estimated 1,000 members.12 For Šešelj, however, his group did not begin at the behest of the Yugoslav government and the Chetnik movement had a considerably more complex beginning in comparison. Within Šešelj’s indictment from the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) it states that he had founded the “Serbian Renewal Party” in June 1990, later renamed as the “Serbian Chetnik Movement.”13 This group was banned by the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) after the December elections in 1990.14
Nevertheless, on 23 February 1991, Šešelj was appointed President of the new “Serbian Radical Party” (SRS).15 Tim Judah explains that Šešelj’s extreme nationalism had begun to attract more
support thereby bringing him to the attention of Milošević who saw the opportunity to utilise Šešelj
7 Alvarez, A., ‘Militias and Genocide’, War Crimes, Genocide, and Crimes Against Humanity, Vol.2 (2006), 12-13. 8 Møller, B., ‘The Role of Militias and Other Paramilitaries in African (un)Civil Wars’, Danish Institute for
International Studies (DIIS) Working Papers, Issue 23 (2006), 23.
9 Des Forges, A., “Leave None to Tell the Story”: Genocide in Rwanda (United States, 1999), 327. Accessed from
https://www.hrw.org/reports/pdfs/r/rwanda/rwanda993.pdf 10 Ron, J., ‘Frontiers and Ghettos’, Op Cit, 47.
11 Mann, M., The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing (Cambridge, 2005), 404.
12 Horncastle, J., ‘Unfamiliar Connections: Special Forces and Paramilitaries in the Former Yugoslavia’, Special
Operations Journal, Vol.2 No.1 (2016), 16.
13 ‘Vojislav Seselj Indicted by the ICTY for Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes’, ICTY, accessed 19 July 2016, http://www.icty.org/en/press/vojislav-seselj-indicted-icty-crimes-against-humanity-and-war-crimes 14 Ibid.
in order to obtain the ‘hardline nationalist vote’.16 To achieve this, the government fast-tracked him into parliament through the June 1991 elections in Rakovica, a suburb of Belgrade.17 Following these events, the re-labelled Chetnik Movement, the “Serbian Radical Party”, were given mass television coverage that brought Šešelj into the public eye.18 In return for this boost in publicity, Šešelj gave his support to Milošević.19 It was during this time that Šešelj was rallying and campaigning for Serb unity alongside war against their “historic enemies”; ethnic Croats, Muslims, and Albanians.20 This, thereby,
shows that the Yugoslav government in Serbia did have some modicum of interest in paramilitary groups from the beginning of the 1990’s. Such an interest can potentially indicate a significance of these groups to the government before ethnic cleansing became a solution in response to Bosnian independence. However, the type of men these groups appealed to also need to be examined to assess if they were truly significant in the process of ethnic cleansing.
Arkan’s Tigers recruited those from all ages and levels of education, not just ‘…socially deprived youths’.21 Erella Grassiani and Eyal Ben-Ari have summarised Maria Vivod who has shown ‘…how the Serbian paramilitary force was comprised of weekend warriors (or freelance workers) who held a steady job but added ‘employment’ in violence activities to garner further resources.’22 This illustrates how opportunists were one class of individuals that were attracted to paramilitary groups in order to make monetary gains. Other individuals recruited into the Tigers and Chetniks, as listed by John Mueller, include ‘…criminals, adventurers, mercenary opportunists, and, in the case of the Tigers, soccer hooligans.’23 Nevertheless, Ron has found a commonality in that most of these Serbian paramilitary groups were drawn to leaders who were ‘…charismatic individuals associated with extreme Belgrade nationalists.’24 It could be argued that this was due to many eventual paramilitary leaders starting their careers as dissidents in the anti-communist Serbian national movement in the 1980s.25 This conveys that individuals seeking to gain from paramilitary activities, alongside those from a criminal background, were both recruited into the Tigers and Chetniks.
16 Judah, T., The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia (Padstow, 2009), 187. 17 Ibid.
18 Ibid. 19 Ibid.
20 ‘Vojislav Seselj Indicted by the ICTY’, Op Cit. 21 Schlichte, K., Op Cit, 257.
22 Grassiani, E., and Ben-Ari, E., ‘Introduction: Violence Operators: Between State and Non-State Actors’,
Etnofoor, Vol.23 No.2, State/Violence (2011), 12.
23 Mueller, J., ‘The Banality of “Ethnic War”: Yugoslavia and Rwanda’, for the 2000 Annual Meeting of the
American Political Science Association (July 26, 2000), 9.
24 Ron, J., ‘Frontiers and Ghettos’, Op Cit, 46.
25 Ron, J., ‘Territoriality and Plausible Deniability: Serbian Paramilitaries in the Bosnian War’, in Bruce B. Campbell and Arthur D. Brenner (ed.), Death Squads in Global Perspectives: Murder with Deniability (New York, 2002), 293.
It should be noted that complications can arise when identifying which individuals belonged to what group. For Serbian paramilitaries in Bosnia, one identifier of a group could be found in discipline, to which Judah has commented that ‘Unlike Arkan’s disciplined, clean-shaven ‘kill ‘n’ loot’ shock troops, Šešelj’s men were often drunk and shabby.’26 However, it can be argued that this may not be applicable to all situations. The confusion surrounding the identification of who belonged to what paramilitary group was focused upon by Helsinki Watch, a division of Human Rights Watch. Their report from the first months of the Bosnian war illustrated how easy it was for individuals to identify as being a member of any paramilitary group as distinguishing factors became blurred, explaining that ‘…combatants who wear insignia belonging to the White Eagles will identify themselves as members of Vojislav Šešelj’s or Dragoslav Borkan’s forces.’27 Similar issues arise with the names that the groups were referred to and was further noted by Helsinki Watch, reporting that ‘Similarly the term Četnik, originally used to identify Šešelj’s forces, now is widely used to refer to paramilitaries belonging to Jović’s, Borkan’s and, to a lesser extent, Arkan’s and Dragan’s forces.’28 The confusion created because due to this degree of ambiguity, though not intentional, illustrates the fluidity of these paramilitary groups. Individuals identified with more than one group and the general terms, and names, of paramilitaries became interchangeable.
A visible difference in formation, compared to Serbia, can be found when analysing Hutu paramilitaries. Nevertheless, there is one main similarity in that both governments were involved in the creation of these paramilitary groups. It was during the early months of 1992 that the Interahamwe was created.29 A report from May 1992 by the opposition party, Mouvement Démocratique Républicain (MDR), disclosed that the Interahamwe was the idea of Charles Nyandwi and Mathieu Ngirumpatse and had been approved by nearly all members of the MRND national committee.30 Mahmood Mamdani explained that it was the liberalisation of political activity during this time, with President Habyarimana making it legal to establish oppositional parties, that ‘…drew two volatile constituencies into the political arena: the unemployed youth and those displaced by the civil war.’31 Due to these changes, Mamdani states, ‘Starting with the ruling party, one by one, political parties began reaching out to this constituency, incorporating it into its youth wing.’32 Regarding the
26 Judah, T., Op Cit, 188.
27 Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina (United States, 1992), 37. 28 Ibid.
29 Mamdani, M., When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda (Princeton, 2002), 204.
30 Melvern, L., Conspiracy to Murder: The Rwandan Genocide (London, 2006), 118. 31 Mamdani, M., Op Cit, 204.
Impuzamugambi, formed in 1992, it was only once the Coalition pour le Défense de la République (CDR) had established itself as a political party that this group came to fruition as a youth wing.33
It has been estimated that around 1700 people were “professional interahamwe”, receiving both training and uniforms, continuing to increase after the genocide had started.34 Others, such as Mueller, have estimated that number to be as many as 50,000 Interahamwe.35 Despite this, Luke Fletcher noted how they had the best structure ‘…with a sophisticated system for organizing recruits from each area into sectors.’36 This superior structure can be illustrated when looking at who was responsible for, and in charge of, these groups. With the Interahamwe being a youth militia for the ruling party, Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement party (MRND), this may account for why implementing an effective structure was possible;
The militia was directed by a national committee that included Jerry Robert Kajuga, president (himself the son of a Tutsi father and Hutu mother), Phénéas Ruhumuriza, first vice-president, George Rutaganda, second vice president, Eugene Mbarushimana, secretary-general, Dieudonné Niyitegeka, treasurer and, as councilors, Bernard Maniragaba, Joseph Serugendo, Ephrem Nkezabera, Jean-Marie Vianney Mudahinyuka, and Alphonse Kanimba.37
With such a rigid administrative structure that contains many different roles, recruitment was efficient across the country. This is at great contrast to the structure of the Impuzamugambi, whose only leaders were those from the CDR, most notably Barayagwiza.38
Although little is known about each member’s socio-economic background, it has been generalised that the poor and unemployed were predominantly targeted for recruitment.39 To this, Philip Gourevitch provides the context in which this recruitment occurred, stating that ‘The economic collapse of the late 1980s had left tens of thousands of young men without any prospect of a job, wasting in idleness and its attendant resentments, and ripe for recruitment.’40 These events further
33 Ibid.
34 Mueller, J., Op Cit, 22. 35 Ibid.
36 Fletcher, L., ‘Turning interahamwe: Individual and Community Choices in the Rwandan Genocide’, Journal of
Genocide Research, Vol.9 No.1 (2007), 34.
37 Des Forges, A., Op Cit, 327. 38 Ibid.
39 Smeulers, A., and Hoex, L., ‘Studying the Microdynamics of the Rwandan Genocide’, The British Journal of
Criminology, Vol.50 No.3 (May 2010), 441.
40 Gourevitch, P., We Wish to Inform you that Tomorrow we will be Killed with our Families: Stories from
caused these men to feel alienated and angry, resulting in their convergence to government sponsored soccer fan clubs.41
Similarities between Serbia and Rwanda yet again emerge as both governments targeted the types of men that joined soccer fan clubs. Nevertheless, due to economic instability, these paramilitary groups became attractive and provided the young men with some degree of security and a better quality of life. In order to appeal to this specific part of the population, before the genocide, rallies were held, described by Gourevitch as such;
Hutu Power youth leaders, jetting around on motorbikes and sporting pop hairstyles, dark glasses, and flamboyantly colored pajama suits and robes, preached ethnic solidarity and civil defense to increasingly packed rallies, where alcohol usually flowed freely, giant banners splashed with hagiographic portraits of Habyarimana flapped in the breeze, and paramilitary drills were conducted like the latest hot dance moves.42
As the Interahamwe and the government were closely connected, President Habyarimana and his wife occasionally attended these rallies.43 Gourevitch, however, explains that whilst these rallies were taking place, ‘…in private the members of the interahamwe were organized into small neighborhood bands, drew up lists of Tutsis, and went on retreats to practice burning houses, tossing grenades, and hacking dummies up with machetes.’44 The Hutu Power mentioned in the description of the rallies pertains to the movement of the same name that was prevalent during this time. As an extremist ideology, its defining beliefs were that the Hutu and Tutsi were ‘racially different groups’, and that Tutsi were not to be trusted and were the cause of all problems in Rwanda.45
Prior to April 1994 young Hutu men were drawn into wanting to join, compared to recruitment during the genocide. After the 6th April 1994 vulnerability was still prevalent with many unable to find food. The need for safety from paramilitary violence arose, resulting in individuals wanting to join for reasons of personal protection. In an interview conducted by Alette Smeulers and Lotte Hoex, one prisoner explained his reasons for joining the Interahamwe:
I went with the Interahamwe because with them I could sleep and eat and I could not do that without them. The man who brought me in was a friend from primary school. It was not difficult
41 Alvarez, A., Op Cit, 14. 42 Gourevitch, P., Op Cit, 93. 43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
to convince me because I was already convinced by the fact that I would have food and would be protected in the group. The guy who brought me in taught me how to shoot. (Prisoner F)46 Therefore, unlike the conditions before the genocide started, violence caused by these paramilitary groups led some to believe there was more safety being part of the group than being outside of it. Such thinking is further enforced when Gérard Prunier mentioned that some would become part-time Interahamwe, either for opportunistic reasons or to be a part of that group in order to protect themselves and their homes.47
Additionally, it has been documented that many Hutus joined groups such as the Interahamwe in order to avoid punishment from other Hutus for refusing to participate in the violence.48 An example of this can be seen in Ngali, a province of Kigali. One chief lieutenant of Jude, the conseiller, would target family members for recruitment into the Interahamwe, or for killing.49 Having killed his own sisters Tutsi children, he forcibly recruited his nephew into the paramilitary group.50 During an interview conducted by Lee Ann Fujii with a friend of the nephew, it is explained how the boy, a child at the time, was threatened with death if he did not join;
Q. How did [the uncle] force your friend to join the interahamwe? [The uncle] was the head of
Pawa. He was powerful and he told [my friend] to join the Interahamwe and if he did not join them, they were going to hurt him. Q. If your friend refused to join the Interahamwe, would he
[the uncle] have killed him? He would have killed him. [201, #7/8]51
This conveys the violent nature of recruitment after the physical violence had begun as opposed to the previous attempts to attract Hutu men by appealing to the things that they wanted.
Nonetheless, it was not only Hutu men who joined the Interahamwe for survival. In another case noted by Fujii, who used pseudonym’s to protect identities, a Tutsi man, Eugène, also from Ngali, was able to utilise his friendship with a Hutu, named Paul, in order to obtain documents allowing him free movement.52 Rather than fleeing, he used them to join the Interahamwe where he would be amongst friends, in safety, and able to survive.53 Despite his reason to join being one of survival, Fujii
46 Smeulers, A., and Hoex, L., Op Cit, 448.
47 Prunier, G., The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide (London, 2014), 243.
48 Straus, S., The Order of Genocide: Race, Power, and War in Rwanda (New York, 2006), 96. 49 Fujii, L. A., Killing Neighbors: Webs of Violence in Rwanda (New York, 2011), 135.
50 Ibid. 51 Ibid. 52 Ibid, 141. 53 Ibid.
has explored how this decision to join actually made him a “willing” participant in the genocide.54 By not fleeing, as other Tutsis with similar documents had done, Fujii describes how this made him ‘…both a “forced” and “willing” participant.’55 Such confusion only serves to highlight how complex the decision to join had become once the genocide started as opposed to the nature of recruitment prior to April 1994.
Altogether, the formation of the both the Serbian and Hutu paramilitary groups has shown that in both Serbia and Rwanda, a pattern of government involvement and interest could be found. Simultaneously it can be argued that during the period before ethnic cleansing and genocide was an option, paramilitary groups were not utilised for the purpose of committing these kinds of violence actions. However, with the Interahamwe, it can be asserted that they held more significance during this period due to the altered political context that resulted in an increasing amount of oppositional groups. One final pattern that emerged was that in both Serbia and Rwanda, recruits were taken from football clubs comprised of vulnerable men seeking stability. However, once violence had started, the decision to join had become one of survival, as many feared the consequences of refusal.
1.2 – What was their purpose?
Through an examination into the purpose of Serbian and Hutu paramilitaries, it can aid in discovering whether or not their initial purpose, and significance, was to commit genocide or ethnic cleansing and if it ever changed. This can be seen through investigating their importance to the government, if they were created for violent purposes to begin with, or if there was genocidal intent.
One purpose of Serbian paramilitaries can be found when looking at how the government, specifically Milošević, used these groups. It has been stated by Ron that ‘…Serbian state security officials originally asked Arkan to create the Tigers to monitor the other Serbian paramilitaries,’56 thereby conveying that they were created for the purpose to observe other active paramilitary groups during the early 1990’s, a task that the government would have been unable to do themselves as the groups were primarily autonomous. Furthermore, the government had encouraged Arkan’s leadership of the Red Star fan club, known as Delije, for the purpose of wanting to, as Alex Alvarez summarises, ‘…harness the energy, nationalism, and violence of the young men who made up the club.’57 Although it can be seen that the government wanted to utilise these qualities, another purpose of these
54 Ibid. 55 Ibid.
56 Ron, J., ‘Frontiers and Ghettos’, Op Cit, 47. 57 Alvarez, A., Op Cit, 9.
paramilitaries has additionally been uncovered. Explained again by Alvarez, government interest in paramilitaries was motivated ‘…by a desire to counteract the influence of Vojislav Šešelj, a prominent dissident who was later to become a rabid nationalist and leader of a rival Serbian militia group.’58 As a consequence of this, Arkan became leader of the Delije whilst simultaneously secretly forming the Serbian Volunteer Guard.59 When Arkan then created the Tigers, it can be illustrated how the group’s purpose from the start was to be used in violent activities. The influence of military-style discipline and appearance was, as Alvarez argued, ‘…the first step in transforming these soccer fans into a military style organization.’60 Nonetheless, even though the underlying purpose of the group can be seen to be one of committing future violence, it is difficult to establish whether or not their use at this stage was to be one of ethnic cleansing.
It has been argued that the Yugoslav government had an ulterior motive and more important purpose for these paramilitary groups than just using them to observe other units and counteract Šešelj’s influence. To explore this motive, the political context of this period needs to be discussed. The political atmosphere at the time was one of increasing nationalism alongside ideology that involved the creation of what was known as “Greater Serbia”. Todd Salzman has summarised this form of nationalism;
Serbian political and military leaders systematically planned and strategically executed this policy of ethnic cleansing or genocide with the support of the Serbian and Bosnian Serb armies and paramilitary groups to create a “Greater Serbia”: a religiously, culturally, and linguistically homogenous Serbian nation.61
Therefore, with Bosnia seeking independence at the same time this ideology was rising in Serbia, the only way to acquire the land sought after by the Serbs would be through force. On an international level, the Bosnian war took place during a period where global human rights norms and, as noted by Ariel Ahram, ‘…the ability of international and domestic civil society to punish states for violations have spurred the prevalence and visibility of state-sponsored militias as states look for ways to both assert control and abide by international law.’62 As a result of this, the term ‘paramilitary’ was used to convince those outside of Serbia that the government was not in control of them.63 Although this
58 Ibid. 59 Ibid. 60 Ibid.
61 Salzman, T. A., ‘Rape Camps as a Means of Ethnic Cleansing: Religious, Cultural, and Ethical Responses to Rape Victims in the Former Yugoslavia’, Human Rights Quarterly, Vol.20 No.2 (May 1998), 349.
62 Ahram, A. I., ‘Why States Choose Paramilitarism’, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Vol.7 No.1 (Winter/Spring 2006), 68.
meant that such groups could be used for the purposes of murder and expulsion, the connection between the groups and the government had to remain hidden and orders were verbally communicated, leaving no paper trail.64 Thus, the purpose of Serbian paramilitaries can be seen to have shifted once Bosnian Independence had occurred, with groups then acting as state proxies for the purpose of murder and ethnic cleansing.
The purpose of paramilitary groups in Rwanda, however, indicate that they were formed in order to defend. The relationship between the two paramilitary groups and violence can be identified early on in their formation in 1992. In these years prior to the genocide, the two groups were given military training and supplied with weapons, indicating that their main purpose was to commit violence on the orders of the government. One other prisoner from the interviews conducted by Smeulers and Hoex stated that ‘The Interahamwe already prepared before the genocide started; they had meetings and training sessions together and so they knew each other before the genocide. During the genocide they went along house-by-house to do the killings. (Prisoner B).’65 Such preparation can be traced back to when the Arusha peace accords were in the process of being signed. It has been documented that the French military played an important role in training these militiamen. During the signing of the Arusha agreement, Prunier commented how ‘France had discreetly been backing the CDR in various ways,’ bringing in reinforcements of around 150 men before negotiations had started.66 As Prunier has summarised, ‘This was seen by the French military mission in Rwanda as contingency planning ‘just in case something bad happened’.’67 Nevertheless, due to careless screening, and without realising, candidates accepted for military training, notably at the Bigogwe commando camp, included men from both groups.68
Although the training given to these paramilitary groups by the French military were not done with purpose or intent, the Rwandan Hutu military, FAR, did purposefully provide training for these groups. Such training by the military can be verified by an account given by Lieutenant General Roméo Dallaire. In this account, Dallaire recalls Luc Marchal’s encounter with their informant, code-named Jean-Pierre, in the early months of 1994.69 It was during their encounter that the informant, a previous officer in the commandos and Presidential Guard, explained how he left the army to become the ‘chief trainer for the Interahamwe’.70 Importantly, Jean-Pierre described that in 1993 he had begun drilling
64 Ibid.
65 Smeulers, A., and Hoex, L., Op Cit, 441. 66 Prunier, G., Op Cit, 164.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid, 164-165.
69 Dallaire, R., Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda (London, 2004), 142. 70 Ibid.
cells of young men in different communes ‘…under the guise of preparing a civil-guard-style militia to fight the RPF if it resume the offensive.’71 As can be seen, it conveys how even in 1993 they were preparing for Tutsi attacks. Dallaire continues to recall how Jean-Pierre stated that his supervisor was Mathieu Ngirumpatse, president of the MRND party, who also gave him orders.72 The informant explained how ‘…that in the past few months, the real plan behind the training of the Interahamwe had begun to be articulated,’ and was ordered to get the cells to draw up lists of Tutsis.73 It was this order, Dallaire explains, that led Jean-Pierre to become suspicious that the lists would be used for the purpose of rounding up Tutsis for extermination.74 Dallaire recounts that Marchal had been told about the nature of Interahamwe training:
He described in detail how the Interahamwe were being trained at army bases and by army instructors in several locations around the country, and that on a weekly basis a number of young men would be collected and transported for a three-week weapons and paramilitary training course that placed special emphasis on killing techniques.75
Alongside this regimented training that was taking place across the country, it is further explained that the army were also arming the Interahamwe. Four large shipments of AK-47s with ammunition and grenades were given to the unit to be used alongside their traditional weapons, such as spears and machetes.76 This highlights how both groups were exposed to military influence and training since their formation, conveying that the purpose was to create groups that could be used in violent conflicts, such as genocide, against the Tutsi enemy.
The first use of the Interahamwe can be dated back to March 1992, in Bugasera, where they were used to slaughter Tutsis.77 Nevertheless, it can be seen that even though its purpose eventually became one of genocidal intent, their primary purpose when they were first created was to defend. This would include protecting party meetings alongside fostering a ‘youth movement’ to hold demonstrations and marches.78 It was during the period of the transitional government, with Habyarimana still remaining in the position of President, when the purpose of the Interahamwe changed. As written by Peter Langford, ‘Its initial, essentially defensive role to provide protection for MRNDD officials was now modified, and until August 1992, it was used to undermine the authority of 71 Ibid. 72 Ibid. 73 Ibid. 74 Ibid. 75 Ibid. 76 Ibid, 143.
77 Des Forges, A., Op Cit, 109. 78 Mann, M., Op Cit, 445.
the transitional government by blocking roads into the capital, Kigali.’79 Thus, it can be determined that a visible shift in purpose took place in accordance with the changing political context of the time. Such a notion has been identified by Alvarez, who has explained that ‘The reason for their creation relates to the political changes sweeping Rwanda in the early 1990’s.’80 To this, Alvarez describes how in 1990 the RPF invaded Rwanda with a force of 2500 Rwandan exiles, and even though this number was small, their superior training and discipline proved a ‘…formidable fighting force’.81 Therefore, a degree of uncertainty and perceived threat from a recurring attack by the RPF could have assisted in this change of paramilitary purpose, transitioning from a need for defence to the need for possible retaliation. Though the government were arguably aware that genocide could take place, it is important to note that many individuals who joined these paramilitary groups were unaware that this would occur.82
Overall, in both cases, paramilitaries went through some form of change in purpose. For Serbian groups, Bosnian independence shifted their purpose as the government’s goal of creating Greater Serbia was threatened. As a result, the state could not be seen in interfering thus increasing the significance of these groups to the state. The outcome of this was that the state could intervene militarily in Bosnia without the knowledge of the outside world, thereby maintaining a peaceful image. Hutu groups such as the Interahamwe endured a shift in purpose due to the changing political context such as the creation of the transitional government alongside an RPF invasion. With the government perceiving there to be a threat from Rwandan exiles, their mentality leaned towards being prepared for further attacks. Nonetheless, before these changes occurred in both Serbia and Rwanda, the significance of these groups was found in their purpose to engage in violent activities, offensive or defensive.
1.3 – How did they evolve?
For both the Serbian and Hutu paramilitaries, their evolution as a group is important to examine. Evolution of these groups can illustrate how they grew socially and linguistically throughout the period of their involvement. The features of evolution that will be focused upon include the social aspects of
79 Langford, P., ‘The Rwandan Path to Genocide: The Genesis of the Capacity of the Rwandan Post-Colonial State to Organise and Unleash a Project of Extermination’, Civil Wars, Vol.7 No.1 (2005), 14.
80 Alvarez, A., Op Cit, 13. 81 Ibid.
being involved in a paramilitary group, the notion of being a part of something greater, and finally the context in which the names of these paramilitary groups were used in and if this changed over time.
When the Serbian-based paramilitaries were initially created in 1991, the purpose of some of these larger groups were, as summarised by Ron, ‘…to fight alongside the Yugoslav Federal Army and local Serb militias in Croatia.’83 It can be argued that with their purpose initially being to fight and commit violent acts, evolution can be found to have manifested in the social aspect of being a part of these units. The Tigers and Chetniks arguably had an empowering effect on the men who were involved. To this, Alvarez has explained how militias gave young men a mission and a sense of purpose, summarising that ‘Mass movements are interchangeable and the energies that young men channel into sports clubs can easily be transferred to more violent outlets, ones that are possibly political and/or genocidal.’84 Therefore, the evolution that occurred before the conflict can be shown to have taken place in the targeted recruitment of a specific type of young man from soccer fan clubs rather than appealing to all men from Serbia. These men, as Alvarez further notes, who had previously felt powerless and angry, became intoxicated from the power obtained from being part of these paramilitary groups.85 Intoxication of power and finally having a purpose would have been greatly enforced during the Bosnian war, and further appealed to those in a similar vulnerable situation, when paramilitary groups became what Vivod has described as ‘symbolic capital’. This led these groups to become known as ‘‘…the carriers – as heroes – of the greater aim of the Serbian nation.’86 The appeal of going from an unknown individual disgruntled at their situation to being known as a hero of Serbia can arguably have enticed, or at least appealed to, many young Serbian men.
A training camp was established in Erdut, East Slavonia, by the Serbian Ministry of the Interior that aided the evolution of groups such as the Tigers.87 It was in these camps that the Tigers were equipped with arms, light artillery, trucks and tanks.88 According to Klaus Schlichte, an estimated 10,000 men were trained in Erdut with the average length of participation in violence being only a couple of months.89 Providing proper training and equipment enforced the notion that these young men had a significant purpose and a mission to complete, further empowering them and continuing the group’s evolution. In the case of the Chetniks, however, evolution can be argued to have come from the increased presence of Šešelj on the television. Due to the increased frequency of his
83 Ron, J., ‘Frontiers and Ghettos’, Op Cit, 47. 84 Alvarez, A., Op Cit, 27.
85 Ibid.
86 Grassiani, E., and Ben-Ari, E., Op Cit, 12. 87 Schlichte, K., Op Cit, 257.
88 Ibid. 89 Ibid.
appearance, and the support of Milošević, Judah argued that this allowed the party to grow powerful.90
Evolution of Hutu paramilitary groups can be found to have occurred before the genocide. To illustrate this evolution, Mamdani has summarised the transformation of the Interahamwe in the pre-genocide years, arguing that it was the context of war that led to these changes. He states that it transitioned ‘…from a youth organization at its founding in 1990 to a vigilante group in 1991-92, and ultimately into a death squad whose members led the house-to-house search for identifying and killing Tutsi in 1994.’91 Evolution of the Interahamwe, and Impuzamugambi, was even later commented on by Barayagwiza, leader of the CDR, who commented that ‘…the militia became real paramilitary forces once the “interethnic massacres” began.’ 92
Arguably the most noticeable evolution of Hutu paramilitaries can be found in the different meanings and changing use of the term ‘Interahamwe’. Before 1994, the term ‘Interahamwe’ was specifically associated with the MRND militia recruited and trained in Kigali.93 It was this group that was utilised by the government during the genocide, as explained by Fujii, to ‘…jumpstart killings in regions where local residents were reluctant to kill or where Tutsis (and Hutu) had put up resistance.’94 Fujii furthermore explains how ‘Interahamwe’ did not always carry this same definition as time went on. Using the example of Ngali, he states that ‘…people used the term to refer to bands of local killers’ but that many Rwandans used the term ambiguously to mean either local or professional killers, or sometimes both.95
Ambiguity such as this has also been acknowledged by Fletcher who concludes that ‘In many cases the evidence suggests that make-up of the interahamwe included large numbers of ordinary citizens or villagers from local or surrounding communes who had come down from neighbouring hills to take part in the massacre.’96 From its initial, precise, definition of one group, Fletcher notes that a linguistic change took place and evolved during the genocide, utilising survivor testimony to observe the change in meaning.97 One testimony explained how ‘On Saturday, we saw a lot of young men, carrying weapons. There were a few trained interahamwe from Kigali. But for the most part, these were villagers turned interahamwe.’98 From these testimonies, Fletcher further noted the emergence
90 Judah, T., Op Cit, 188. 91 Mamdani, M., Op Cit, 212. 92 Des Forges, A., Op Cit, 329. 93 Fujii, L., Op Cit, 87. 94 Ibid. 95 Ibid. 96 Fletcher, L., Op Cit, 39-40. 97 Ibid, 40. 98 Ibid.
of the phrase ‘turn Interahamwe’ in Rwandan lexicon. This phrase surfaced when survivors who gave their testimonies ‘…were not surprised when people they knew to be extremists began to attack them’ but that ‘It was the betrayal by the non-extremists who joined in that most shocked and upset them.’99 Thus, those who were unsuspecting that had decided to participate were the ones that ‘turned Interahamwe’.100 Evolution, therefore, can be identified in the linguistic sense due to this change in definition.
In conclusion, both Serbian and Hutu paramilitary groups experienced the same pattern of evolution before and during each conflict. Apart from this, paramilitary groups were found to have evolved in different aspects. Serbian-based groups were found to have evolved socially, with the government appealing to a vulnerable demography, enticed by the prospect of empowerment and being seen as a hero of Serbia. This was arguably enforced through military training and the distribution of weapons and artillery. For Hutu paramilitaries, however, these groups evolved most evidently through a change in lexicon that can be identified when comparing the term ‘Interahamwe’ from before and during the genocide. From first being used as a term to define the MRND youth group before the genocide, this term evolved to become an ambiguous mixture of either local killers or professionally trained militia from Kigali. These changes can be shown to have aided the creation of the term ‘turning Interahamwe’ to define those who voluntarily opted to join in the killing to the surprise of the survivors.
99 Ibid. 100 Ibid.
Chapter 2: What was the function of these paramilitary groups in society and what acts of violence did they commit?
After examining the pre-conflict period for both Serbia and Rwanda, it is important to explore how these paramilitary groups functioned within society and ultimately their behaviour during ethnic cleansing and genocide, focusing on the acts of violence they committed and how they carried it out. However, before this can be done, the context at the time violence broke out in Bosnia and Rwanda needs to be briefly explored. This will illustrate the conditions these groups were acting in and assist in investigating what significance they had during ethnic cleansing and genocide.
Bosnian independence from Yugoslavia was internationally recognised by the West in April 1992, turning an internal boundary into a sovereign, international border that had to be acknowledged as such by Serbia.1 The referendum for independence had taken place earlier that year and was a process plagued by violence, eventually escalating into war when international recognition was obtained.2 Helsinki Watch reported that on June 20, 1992, the Bosnian government declared they were in a state of war, summarising that the intention of Serbian-based paramilitary actions in Bosnia in response to this were done ‘…in the hope of preventing all or parts of the republic from seceding.’3 Nevertheless, despite their efforts in trying to achieve this, the main overriding aim of the Serbs was, as stated by Andrew Bell-Fialkoff, ‘…to create a more secure, ethnically homogenous state….’4
In regards to Rwanda, it was arguably the assassination of President Habyarimana that ushered in a wave of genocidal violence when his plane was shot down on April 6, 1994. The argument for this being the main causal factor for the genocide is due to the speed at which massacres had started after the assassination.5 Although the people responsible for the assassination have never been found, a case for the blame to be placed onto the Akazu has been made. The Akazu, meaning ‘Little House’, was an inner circle of the President’s government who were Hutu extremists, including the President’s wife, political and military leaders.6 It was these Akazu leaders that also bankrolled and supervised the Interahamwe.7 The individuals in this group were against the power sharing
1 Ron, J., Frontiers and Ghettos: State Violence in Serbia and Israel (Los Angeles, 2003), 17. 2 Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina (United States, 1992), 8.
3 Ibid, 30.
4 Bell-Fialkoff, A., ‘A Brief History of Ethnic Cleansing’, Foreign Affairs, Vol.72 No.3 (1993), 110. 5 Prunier, G., The Rwandan Crisis: History of a Genocide (London, 2014), 223.
6 Alvarez, A., ‘Militias and Genocide’, War Crimes, Genocide, and Crimes Against Humanity, Vol.2 (2006), 13. 7 Gourevitch, P., We Wish to Inform you that Tomorrow we will be Killed with our Families: Stories from
agreements made with the Tutsi in 1991 by Habyarimana, allowing the creation of oppositional parties in politics that led to the formation of more defensive youth wings.8
2.1 – How did the groups function in society?
Through an examination into how Serbian and Hutu paramilitaries functioned within their respective societies, it can show if they were significant in a societal aspect. By investigating how they operated in terms of organisation within society, their cultures and, importantly, rules it can help to assess what function these paramilitary groups had within Serbian and Rwandan society.
Despite the violence that Serbian-based paramilitaries were committing in Bosnia, an important phenomenon was occurring within the borders of Serbia proper that is telling about how these groups operated in terms of the rules directed to them by the government. Unlike the ethnic cleansing they perpetrated towards Bosnian Muslims in Bosnia, within Serbia this same segment of the Bosnian population were subjected to less lethal actions of ethnic harassment, not death. James Ron explained that ‘Although the Belgrade government supported Serbian paramilitary violence in Bosnia during 1992-1993, it prevented those same forces from attacking Muslims in Serbia proper,’9 thereby illustrating how these groups followed government rules within their own home territory. One clear example of where this behaviour took place was in the Sandžak region, near the Bosnian border, where over 200,000 Muslims lived and also where many paramilitaries were based.10 Ron has shown that there was a reluctance to kill Muslims living in Serbia, and even though ‘despotic violence’ was used in Bosnia, such methods were not brought back across the border.11 Therefore, in terms of functioning in society, Serbian-based paramilitaries, including the Tigers and the Chetniks, can be seen to adhere to the rules enforced by the government.
Whilst their main enemy were Bosnian Muslims, Serbs have been found to have turned against each other. These actions provide an insight into how they functioned within their own society and culture. Stathis Kalyvas explains the circumstances this occurred in, stating that partisan and ethnic gangs can be ‘…color-blind and extort everyone equally.’12 Using an example that took place in Zvornik, Bosnia, with another Serbian paramilitary group, the “Yellow Wasps”, it was found that they
8 Ibid, 13.
9 Ron, J., ‘Boundaries and Violence: Repertoires of State Action along the Bosnia/Yugoslavia Divide’, Theory
and Society, Vol.29 No.5 (October 2000), 639.
10 Ibid.
11 Ron, J., Frontiers and Ghettos’, Op Cit, 2-3.
had extorted well-off Serbs in this area.13 Aside from extortion, Tim Judah further highlighted that the reports from the UN Commission of Experts briefly mention that Serbs have murdered other Serbs for refusing to participate in killings or other acts of violence.14 Thus, it can be argued that although Serbian paramilitaries restricted their violence towards Muslims in Serbia, other forms of ethnic harassment did take place, as did violence towards each other for failing to take part.
When examining how the Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi functioned within society, many differences in comparison to Serbia are revealed. Nevertheless, one similarity between both cases exists as each were found to have turned against their own. In Rwanda, an estimated 10,000 Hutus were killed during the genocide, and not all were killed by their Tutsi enemy.15 Both Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi, alongside help from enthusiastic civilians, were found to have punished Hutu men that would not participate in committing atrocities. Evidence for this was found by Scott Straus who discovered that ‘…in rural communities those committed to the genocide punished and beat Hutus who refused to participate in the violence.’16 Straus has additionally provided a testimony taken from an individual who lived in Gisenyi, Western Rwanda, detailing how the Interahamwe would believe those not joining in to be siding with the Tutsi, ‘…In the period of the Interahamwe, if you refused the orders of the authorities, they would consider you to be an accomplice…’17 The details of this testimony can be corroborated with another testimony from an interview conducted by Alette Smeulers and Lotte Hoex. Noting the presence of the Interahamwe in both testimonies, ‘Prisoner C’ explains how ‘There was always someone from the Interahamwe around ... They came and said ‘you have to kill or you will be killed’. Many people were killed because they resisted or hesitated.’18 This shows that one way the Interahamwe functioned within society during the genocide was by coercing unwilling Hutus to participate in the widespread violence.
The act of murdering disobedient Hutus and attempting to eradicate all Tutsi from Rwanda reveals another way in which these paramilitaries functioned within society. In order to incentivise the unemployed and discontented young Hutu men to participate, the government promoted the Interahamwe, and subsequent violence, as being a form of ‘work’.19 Caroline Williamson explained how ‘…Hutu men were enticed into participating in the genocide through the emphasis on ‘work’ and
13 Ibid.
14 Judah, T., The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia (Padstow, 2009), 237. 15 Straus, S., The Order of Genocide: Race, Power, and War in Rwanda (New York, 2006), 51. 16 Ibid.
17 Ibid, 221.
18 Smeulers, A., and Hoex, L., ‘Studying the Microdynamics of the Rwandan Genocide’, The British Journal of
Criminology, Vol.50 No.3 (May 2010), 442.
19 Williamson, C., ‘Genocide, Masculinity and Posttraumatic Growth in Rwanda: Reconstructing Male Identity through Ndi Umunyarwanda’, Journal of Genocide Research, Vol.18 No.1 (2016), 42.
other euphemisms…,’ and that, for some, it was used as ‘…means to ‘diminish individual responsibility for perpetrating evil’.’20 This illustrates that another function of the Interahamwe in society, aside from coercion, was by attempting to appeal to the vulnerable section of the population in need of employment.
How the Interhamwe functioned within society can best be illustrated when examining their group culture and what Lee Ann Fujii has termed as ‘Interahamwe identity’. This type of identity, Fujii has remarked, conveys the importance of being in a group environment, writing that ‘In group contexts, Joiners engaged in specific acts of killing…these acts constituted the group as a particular kind of social actor with a particular identity, what I call an Interahamwe identity.’21 This specific Interahamwe identity was constructed through a combination of both participation and observation.22 Even if Interahamwe members were not killing, the act of watching ‘…enhanced the performance of genocide and, thus, its expressive power as a form of complete domination over victims….’23 Importantly, Fujii mentions that Interahamwe identity could only occur in a group context, not when the members were by themselves, as ‘The maintenance of the identity thus depended on both context and activity.’24 Therefore, being in a group and carrying out violent activities would maintain the Interahamwe identity. However, being in a group but choosing to save a Tutsi would result in severe punishment as it ‘…threatened the very groupness of the group….’25
Furthermore, Fujii explains that as the group context of the Interahamwe meant that their identity was created and maintained by carrying out violent acts, it would lead to a situation whereby ‘…the group identity takes precedence over individual identities, including ethnic identities.’26 Consequently, this explains why Tutsis were able to join the Interahamwe and not killed immediately.27 This identity only manifested when group activities were being carried out and explains why some Interahamwe members acted differently outside the group, for example saving a Tutsi rather than murdering them.28 Moreover, it was the ‘powerful group dynamics’ that drew people in to commit violent acts and remain a participant in the genocide.29 With these unique group dynamics, those in the group gained new identities and power, and, as Fujii has summarised, ‘The constitutive power of killing in groups turned loose collections of friends and neighbors into tightly bound, social
20 Ibid, 49.
21 Fujii, L. A., Killing Neighbors: Webs of Violence in Rwanda (New York, 2011), 175. 22 Ibid, 175. 23 Ibid. 24 Ibid. 25 Ibid. 26 Ibid, 176. 27 Ibid, 176-177. 28 Ibid, 177. 29Ibid, 178.
