How deliberative governance can enhance policy
durability in the gas markets of the EU: A comparative
Q-study of the Netherlands and Sweden
Alexander J. O. Verkerk
s1461206
Leiden University
Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs
MSc. Public Administration (Economics & Governance)
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Science in Public Administration
First reader: Vasilis Karakasis
Second reader: Maarja Beerkens
Abstract
Despite that the role of natural gas within Europe’s future energy mix is uncertain, markets within the European Union are integrating and decarbonising with the policy goal to realise an internal energy market that is more secure, sustainable and competitive. However, knowing that many policies fail to live up to their goal over longer periods of time and are as a result revoked or significantly altered, this study embarks on the question of how policy durability in the gas markets within the EU can be enhanced. A literature review on policy durability found, among other ingredients, that it is vital that gas market participants are satisfied with the policy and its regulations and public consultations, for example regarding the latest one to harmonise the setting of transmission tariffs (NC-TAR), because it cultivates compliance as well as mobilisation to preserve a policy goal.
Using Q-methodology, this study first compiles the viewpoints and reasonings of gas market participants in the Netherlands and Sweden regarding the deliberative character of market consultations and subsequent implementation decisions and implementation, after which this complexity is boiled down to three dominant heterogenous perspectives for each case. The resulting insights may stimulate ‘deliberative learning’ among consultation facilitators and regulatory decision-makers within both cases. A comparison provides support for the presence of controversies in other national gas markets in the EU with a strong deliberative and elite character regarding transparency, regulatory flexibility, inclusiveness as well as the division of costs and benefits. The similarities between both countries furthermore provide support for several hypotheses regarding how policy durability can be fostered in these markets, among which, when consultations are organised at regular intervals and consistently by the same entity, and when all possible stakeholders are actively engaged and free to participate individually and through associations as long as they have a clear stake and sufficient expertise.
Key words: internal energy market, natural gas, policy durability, deliberative governance, market consultation, Q-methodology.
Plagiarism declaration
I certify that this thesis is my own work, based on my personal research and insights, and that I have acknowledged all sources used in its preparation in accordance with APA citation requirements.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank everyone in the Netherlands and Sweden who took the time to participate in my study by filling out the questionnaire and answering countless follow-up questions. I am also grateful to my supervisor at Leiden University, Mr. Karakasis, for his guidance as well as second reader, Ms. Beerkens, for her support during the initial exploration of potential thesis topics.
Content
I. INTRODUCTION ... 1
II. LITERATURE REVIEW ... 6
2.1. Policy durability within the policy cycle ... 7
2.1.1. Agenda-setting ... 7
2.1.2. Policy formulation ... 8
2.1.3. Decision-making ... 9
2.1.4. Implementation ... 11
2.2. Conclusion ... 13
III. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK ... 14
3.1. Deliberative governance ... 15 3.2. Q-methodology ... 18 3.3. Deliberative learning ... 18 IV. METHODOLOGY ... 20 4.1. Case selection ... 21 4.2. Data collection ... 23 4.3. Analysis ... 29 4.4. Interpretation of output ... 31 4.5. Threats to inference ... 34 V. THE NETHERLANDS ... 35
5.1. The Dutch gas market and NC-TAR ... 35
5.2. Perspective NL1 – The progressive, cagey, associational egalitarian ... 37
5.3. Perspective NL2 – The conservative, transparent xenophile ... 38
5.4. Perspective NL3 – The progressive, protectionist, transparent preferentialist ... 39
5.5. Comparison of consensus and compromise points ... 40
5.6. Conclusion ... 45
VI. SWEDEN ... 47
6.1. The Swedish gas market and NC-TAR ... 48
6.2. Perspective SE1 – The progressive, transparent altruist ... 49
6.3. Perspective SE2 – The inclusive, transparent, egalitarian utilitarianist... 50
6.4. Perspective SE3 – The conservative, protectionist, semi-egalitarian egoist ... 51
6.5. Comparison of consensus and compromise points ... 52
6.6. Conclusion ... 57
VII. COMPARISON ... 60
7.1. Representation ... 61
7.3. Decision-making ... 65 7.4. Implementation ... 67 7.5. Conclusion ... 71 VIII. CONCLUSION ... 74 IX. BIBLIOGRAPHY ... 78 X. ANNEXES ... 84
Annex A: Q-sample statements ... 84
Annex B: Factor Matrix for the Netherlands and Sweden with an X indicating a defining sort ... 86
Annex C: Eigenvalues of all factors in the Netherlands and Sweden ... 87
Annex D: Correlations between factor scores in the Netherlands and Sweden ... 87
Annex E: Standard errors for differences in factor Z-scores in the Netherlands and Sweden ... 88
Annex F: Z-scores and Q-sort values of perspectives in the Netherlands for each statement ... 88
Annex G: Z-scores and Q-sort values of perspectives in Sweden for each statement ... 90
Annex H: Z-scores for the perspectives in the Netherlands and Sweden along the deliberative dimensions ... 92
Tables and figures
Table 1: Gill and Frankel’s matrix on cost-benefit distribution and likelihood of durability ... 10Table 2: deliberative learning in the context of this study ... 20
Table 3: Distinguishing statements for factor NL1 ... 38
Table 4: Distinguishing statements for factor NL2 ... 39
Table 5: Distinguishing statements for factor NL3 ... 40
Table 6: Profound consensus and compromise points in the Netherlands ... 40
Table 7: Distinguishing statements for factor SE1 ... 50
Table 8: Distinguishing statements for factor SE2 ... 51
Table 9: Distinguishing statements for factor SE3 ... 51
Table 10: Profound consensus and compromise points in Sweden ... 52
Table 11: similarly and dissimilarly ranked statements in the Netherlands and Sweden ... 61
Figure 1: Q-sorting distribution matrix ... 28
Abbreviations
ACER Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators
ACM Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets (Autoriteit Consument en Markt) Ei Swedish Energy Markets Inspectorate (Energimarknadsinspektionen)
EU European Union LNG Liquefied Natural Gas
NC-TAR EU regulation establishing a network code on harmonised transmission tariff structures for gas
NL The Netherlands, or part of the label for perspectives in the Netherlands like NL1 NRA National Regulatory Agency (Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets in NL;
Swedish Energy Markets Inspectorate in SE)
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development PCA Principal Components Analysis
SE Sweden, or part of the label for perspectives in Sweden like SE1
TSO Transmission System Operator (Gasunie Transport Services in NL; Swedegas in SE) TTF Dutch Title Transfer Facility
I. INTRODUCTION
1.1. The research puzzle and context
Energy markets within the European Union (EU) are integrating and decarbonising with the policy goal to transform into an internal energy market that is more secure, sustainable and competitive. National governments have delegated legislative power to the EU to harmonise the rules that regulate these markets, among which, the cross-border markets for natural gas. The EU Commission has introduced a number of sequential regulations over the years to remove barriers in the way of increased interconnection of gas networks, including the ones on interoperability and data exchange, gas balancing, capacity allocation mechanisms, congestion management, and most recently, transmission tariff structures (EU Commission, n.d.). The latter regulation sought to harmonise national approaches to setting tariffs for gas transmission services because the multiplicity of heterogenous approaches makes it complex and inefficient for internationally-oriented actors in the gas markets to trade gas and develop infrastructure, which entails that Member States will soon be required to operate within a framework of common parameters for the tariff-setting process and publication requirements (ACER, n.d.).
These new rules of the game are the result of co-approval by the EU Council and Parliament that was preceded by numerous discussions and consultations with stakeholders to ensure coherence, ranging from the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) and the European Network of Transmission System Operators (TSOs) for Gas, to national regulatory authorities (NRAs), national governments of EU Member States as well as bordering countries (EU Commission, n.d.). However, before the regulation enters into force, each Member State needs to first consult stakeholders within their national gas market as well, among which TSOs, gas suppliers, traders and consumers, and then make a number of implementation decisions on matters such as the reference price methodology for tariff-setting as well as its input parameters.
Despite extensive integration and harmonisation efforts, the role of gas within Europe’s future energy mix is uncertain. Europe is the largest importer of natural gas worldwide with rising consumption levels and low reserves (Troncarelli, 2016). While the EU Commission foresees a vital role for natural gas in the energy transition to 2035, it is has not been clear about its role beyond this (Deign, 2018; Simon, 2019) besides mentioning that “the share of natural gas may be reduced” (EU Commission, 2018). In its ‘2050 Energy Strategy’, the EU Commission furthermore outlined its aim to gradually reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 80% through a number of activities, among which, the substitution of coal and oil with gas until 2035 (Deign, 2018). Knowing what happens after that is of vital importance to Europe’s energy community because investment decisions need to be made many years in advance
(Deign, 2018). What we do know, nevertheless, is that the EU Commission appears to be ambitious when it comes to tackling climate change, as illustrated by the fact that it did not sign a declaration on “sustainable and smart gas infrastructure” recently proposed by the Romanian Presidency because it did not mention the vision of achieving climate neutrality (Simon, 2019).
Environmentalists are clearer and do not foresee any role for gas beyond 2050 in order to avoid the most destructive impacts of climate change, considering it accounts for a growing 20% of emissions in the energy sector worldwide (Deign, 2018). The fact that renewables such as solar and wind power have become much cheaper puts further pressure on the future use of natural gas (Deign, 2018). However, others say, replacing oil and coal with renewables directly will take too long considering the infrastructure that needs to be build, and as a result entail excessive carbon dioxide emission. Replacing them with natural gas first, on the other hand, can have a timely and sizeable impact (Deign, 2018) without endangering the security of supply (De Buck, 2018, p. 16).
It is clear that the transition to an internal gas market combined with the transition to renewables in which the future role of gas is undecided, make that gas market participants in the EU experience considerable uncertainty. Many reforms fail to live up to their policy goal over longer periods of time and are as a result revoked or significantly altered. The United States’ policy goal to reduce carbon emissions through the use of clean renewable energy is, for example, being replaced by the aim to increase fossil fuel use and abandon multiple environmental regulations. The costs of non-durable policy are high, not only in terms of the administrative costs of producing new regulations, but also because regulatees regularly need to change their conduct, and because they cannot plan for the future nor make long-term investments given the uncertainty (Nixon, 2016, p. 2). Thus, for these transitions in the European gas sector to be successful, policies and their regulations need to maintain stability, coherence and integrity as time passes, achieving its basic goals amid the inevitable vicissitudes of politics (Patashnik, 2003, p. 207). As the National Research Council (2010) puts it, climate policy needs to be durable. But how can this be achieved? What is the recipe for durable policy? This study found that there are many ingredients and several of them are virtually always necessary to produce durable policy, among which, high degrees of stakeholder satisfaction (OECD, 2010, p. 17). Because when stakeholders are happy, they are more likely to comply, and support the preservation of the policy and its regulations.
However, having many satisfied stakeholders once does not mean that they will always remain satisfied. NRAs such as the Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM for short) as well as the Swedish Energy Markets Inspectorate (Ei for short) need to continually foster stakeholder satisfaction, and even more so when modifications towards the internal market in natural gas need to be made that will inevitably harm a number of stakeholders. Given such circumstances, regulators typically hold market consultations in which stakeholders can express their wishes and concerns. There are several
guidelines on how to conduct a consultation in a way that improves transparency, efficiency, fairness and accountability (Rodrigo & Amo, n.d.) but less attention is given to what extent such principles of democratic governance actually satisfy market stakeholders. To better satisfy stakeholders we need to enhance our understanding about what stakeholders in the soon-to-be internal energy market in natural gas find important during a consultation and the subsequent decision and implementation. To do so, the different attitudes among stakeholders in the EU’s gas markets need to be mapped and compared. This research goal naturally leads to the following research question:
• How can policy durability in the gas markets of the EU be enhanced through deliberative governance?
To answer this question, there are a number of sub-questions that need to be addressed, including: a. What are the attitudes towards the public consultation tool among stakeholders in the Dutch
gas market?
b. What are the major points of agreement and disagreement among perspectives in the Netherlands?
c. What are the attitudes towards the public consultation tool among stakeholders in the Swedish gas market?
d. What are the major points of agreement and disagreement among perspectives in Sweden? e. What are the shared similarities and shared differences between the attitudes towards the
public consultation tool among stakeholders in the Dutch and Swedish gas market?
1.2. Literature review
Despite that literature on policy durability is limited, there are a few definitions that commonly recognise that durability is a dynamic process where a policy needs to be adaptive to ensure that the policy objective remains intact throughout the vagaries within the policy cycle. Several indicators and good practices have been mapped that are vital to maintain and enhance (or undermine) durability, among which, quite crucially, the existence of broad satisfaction among stakeholders because when stakeholders are not satisfied, the policy cannot be fully institutionalised nor effective as stakeholders are more likely to offer resistance and demand policy change, says Nixon (2016, pp. 8-10). He continues by saying that each such ingredient needs to be studied in greater detail in order to generate more empirical data that can enhance our understanding about durability and how to influence it (ibid, p. 3). To realise and maintain stakeholder satisfaction, the literature underlines the necessity of fostering relational contracts among politicians, stakeholders and the bureaucracy in a way that promotes trust (Evans and Quigley, 2013, as cited in Nixon, 2016, p. 17) and the willingness to seek consensus and compromise (Nixon, 2016, p. ii). Jiao and Boons (2013) furthermore add that to do so it is of vital importance that the concerns and wishes of stakeholders are heard and taken into account (p. 13).
1.3. Conceptual framework
The literature review suggested that each durability ingredient needs to be studied in greater detail, that more specific cases need to be studied to gain a better understand of durability, and that stakeholder satisfaction is a vital ingredient for durability that can be attained trough considering the concerns and wishes of stakeholders. These are exactly the theoretical gaps that this study seeks to (partly) fill by approaching stakeholder satisfaction through the lens of deliberative governance within the context of a public consultation because it is precisely a tool for mapping the concerns and wishes of stakeholders before deciding how to implement or change certain aspects of a policy or regulation, be it about the future role of natural gas or the harmonisation of tariff structures for gas. Deliberative governance offers a useful perspective because it provides insights on how decisions can be reached that are based on new understandings, consensus and compromise (Meadowcroft, 2004). In other words, it suggests how such change (through decisions and implementation) can be facilitated in a way that maximises stakeholder satisfaction (through consensus and compromise).
My study seeks to generate more detailed insights about the satisfaction of stakeholders active within the Dutch and Swedish gas market within the (regulatory) decision-making and implementation phase. Specifically, it will examine what they find important during a consultation as well as regarding the subsequent decisions and implementation. It will zoom in at the national-level consultations preceding the implementation decisions within the Netherlands and Sweden on ‘EU Regulation 2017/460 (16 March 2017) establishing of a network code on harmonised transmission tariff structures for gas’, also known as NC-TAR. Sweden and the Netherlands are selected because they are democracies with a longstanding tradition of deliberative governance and public consultation. Moreover, taking Fishkin’s (2009) theoretical models of deliberative governance, the deliberative character within the regulatory space of their gas markets can be labelled as ‘elite’ because stakeholders cannot co-decide through voting, because the main participants are organisations and associations rather than individual citizens, and because the NRAs seem to try to make fair decisions based on consensus and compromise without imposing severe deprivations on certain stakeholders. This appears to be typical for national gas markets in the EU.
The consultation regarding NC-TAR as well as its participants are selected for this study because it is the latest EU regulation that seeks to further integrate national gas markets. This means that the stakeholders who participated are currently active and therefore representative players of their respective gas markets. Moreover, they are likely to have experienced consultations regarding preceding regulations and therefore are more likely to provide more reliable and meaningful insights.
1.4. Method
To uncover the perceptions among stakeholders in the Dutch and Swedish gas market that participated in this consultation, Q-methodology is used, which is a tool for studying human subjectivity. Stakeholders are asked how they feel about statements that fall within a matrix that is based, on the one axis, on Meadowcroft’s (2004) four dimensions that weigh the deliberative democratic content of participatory mechanisms, and on the other axis, on Jiao and Boons’ (2014) four policy elements which collective and relational assembling and reassembling over time determines whether a policy is durable. All 17 viewpoints within each case are then compiled and boiled down to three dominantly held ‘patterns of thought’ through factor analysis. These resulting perspectives within each case are then substantiated, interpreted and compared with the aid of comments provided by respondents. A cross-case comparison will finally uncover new insights regarding the shared similarities and shared differences in attitudes towards the public consultation tool and associated decisions and implementation among stakeholders in the Dutch and Swedish gas market, which will inspire some hypotheses about how policy durability in the EU’s gas markets can be enhanced through deliberative governance.
1.5. Societal relevance
Besides theoretical it also has practical relevance because it leads to something that I call ‘deliberative learning’, which refers to the change of conduct resulting from the enhancement of one’s understanding through deliberation. In this study it refers to consultation facilitators and regulatory decision-makers changing their conduct to increase stakeholder satisfaction and thereby policy durability, as a result of the enhancement of their understanding by way of noting and reflecting upon the different opinions and discussions among stakeholders during public consultation in the particular gas markets.
First of all, this study identifies dominantly held patterns of stakeholder preferences as well as shortcomings that greatly dissatisfy stakeholders which might have otherwise not become apparent, either because certain questions would not be asked or because stakeholders would be hesitant to answer them due to the possible absence of anonymity. Based on the generated insights and associated practical recommendations, consultation facilitators and decision-makers active in the Dutch and Swedish gas market can choose to alter their conduct and/or priorities to correct deficiencies and better satisfy stakeholders, and thereby strengthen the durability of their regulations and contribute to the successful transformation into an internal energy market. This is especially relevant for future consultations on NC-TAR which, according to Article 27(5), need to occur at least every five years, but also for future regulations within this domain. The findings of this study certainly warrant (experimental) adjustments. Facilitators and decision-makers in other EU countries with gas markets that have a strong deliberative and elite character might also be interested in the identified patterns of thought, insights and hypotheses because, although the precise distribution may vary, these are likely to exist in their respective contexts
as well. They can further their learning by testing the newly generated hypotheses in their own contexts in order to refine their conduct according to contemporary stakeholder preferences, which will in turn contribute to the identification of trends regarding the preferences among stakeholders in the EU’s upcoming internal energy market in natural gas as a whole.
1.6. Overview of chapters
This thesis starts with a literature review (2) that outlines definitions, indicators (especially stakeholder satisfaction), good practices, academic discussions and literature gaps surrounding policy durability along the stages of the policy cycle. It then moves on to a conceptual framework (3) that outlines which theoretical lens is employed, positions the contribution of this study within existing theory, and outlines the relevant concepts and theories as well as the relationships between them. A methodological chapter (4) will then address the methods used and choices made to answer the sub questions. A case study involving the Netherlands (5) will identify and compare stakeholder perceptions regarding the consultation tool and associated decisions and implementation, after which the same is done for Sweden (6). A comparative chapter (7) will identify and discuss the shared similarities and differences between both cases along the four deliberative dimensions, after which a conclusion (8) will outline the resulting new insights, hypotheses as well as implications, limitations and areas for further research.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
According to Nixon, there is no generalised theory or undisputed methodology that governs the analysis of policy and its durability (2016, p. 3). As such, this chapter provides an overview of literature on policy durability to identify its current state and gaps. Special attention is given to mapping concrete indicators and good practices that make it more likely for a policy to be durable because, ultimately, regulatory agencies are looking for a recipe that makes their work effective and everlasting. Works that discuss policymaking or regulatory governance in general, without explicitly addressing policy durability or related terms, are not reviewed because they are unlikely to offer insights tailored to the preservation of a policy goal.
The materials for review were found through Leiden University’s online catalogue, Lund University libraries’ catalogue, Google Scholar, Academia.edu and Research Gate. To locate literature, keyword combinations were used containing policy, regulation, governance, regulatory, durability, sustainability, sustainable, and durable. A snowballing technique was then used to find new material mentioned in found articles until reviewing papers did not yield any new information of interest to the literature review.
This chapter will first outline definitions of policy durability. Subsequently, the indicators, good practices and critiques of policy durability will be discussed according to which stage in the policy cycle they are applicable because this concretely depicts the development of a policy and highlights what policy actors could do to strengthen or weaken the durability of a policy during each phase throughout its lifespan, from its inception through its implementation in the form of regulations. As Andrews (2008) puts it, a policy (change) has different needs at different stages of the process (p. 6). This way of depiction furthermore allows for the depiction of where this study (and contribution) is positioned within this cycle. It should be noted that the evaluation stage does not receive any attention in policy durability literature, and as such is omitted. This is unsurprising because in this phase the success of a policy in the form of regulations’ implementation is assessed, which in turn determines whether a policy will remain in place, is changed or annulled. In other words, the evaluation determines whether durability indicators were sufficiently present during the preceding phases.
2.1. Policy durability within the policy cycle
According to Patashnik, policy durability refers to “the capacity of a policy to maintain stability, coherence and integrity as time passes, achieving its basic promised goals amid the inevitable vicissitudes of politics” (2003, p. 207). He explains that the long-term sustainability of any policy revolves around successfully reworking political institutions and creating positive policy feedback effects, for example through empowering interest groups that have a stake in the reform’s maintenance (ibid, p. 203). Nixon (2016) approaches the concept of policy durability as being dependent on politics, policy advising, implementation and how well they associate. He argues that it is only when these three components overlap that policy durability is achievable (p. i).
Similarly to Nixon, Jiao and Boons (2017) state that policy durability relates to persistent policy formation and implementation, which starts from the adoption of a certain policy idea that is then turned into decisions, programmes and actions. They explain that these components of a policy as well as their interrelation alter over time in response to changing circumstances with the aim of continuing to achieve the original policy targets (p. 13). They define policy durability as “the result of an active translation process during which four key elements of policy (actors, ideas, practices and objects) assemble and reassemble over time.” They add that the stability of this policy assemblage over time is an empirical phenomenon: it may (re)shape as time passes (ibid, pp. 12-6).
2.1.1. Agenda-setting
In the agenda-setting stage, policy ideas are generated by party platforms, advocacy organisations or administrative agencies and placed on the political agenda through awareness campaigns. Andrews, in his Reform Space Model, (2008) splits this stage into two: conceptualisation, which involves identifying and demarcating of a problem as well as probing solutions on paper, and initiation, which is involves introducing the ideas for change into the political arena (pp. 6-7). Andrews notes that there is usually a
high degree of acceptance at this stage because government actors are generally open to consider new ideas. However, the actual authority to and ability to realise new ideas lag behind because the current system of laws and procedures operate in accordance with current processes and mechanisms (ibid, p. 7).
According to Nixon, durability becomes relevant already when a policy idea enters the political agenda (2016). For a policy intent to turn into a durable policy, it needs to enter at the right window of opportunity, that is, when the topic in question has societal significance, speaks to public opinion and builds upon previous policy change efforts. He continues that there should furthermore be political attention, media coverage and interest group pressure (ibid, p. 7).
2.1.2. Policy formulation
In the policy formulation stage, the policy intent and different ways for accomplishment are debated. Andrews (2008) supplements this phase with what he calls ‘the transition phase’, which refers to the development of rules and implementation plans around the policy intent (p. 7).
He continues by saying that a policy proposal often strands at policy formulation because of a decrease in acceptance when moving from discussing an idea to discussing its implementation because it threatens existing structures and starts to require more time and money (ibid, p. 7). Nixon (2016) furthermore notes that most proposals fail to get enough support because there may not be sufficient need for change or the timing is off (pp. 9-10). As such, Andrews (2008) continues, it is crucial that once it is on the agenda it is crucial to get support from actors along the entire policy and regulatory cycle (p. 7). Realising broad support requires convincing, sometimes through training, that affected parties will still manage in a new system (ibid, p. 7). More importantly, Nixon (2016) adds, this can only happen when the problem in question and the proposed solution are both politically interesting and without risk, which means that the solution should not entail high economic costs nor burdens (pp. 5-10). At the same time, Nixon continues, politicians should not be given the chance to engage in short-term oriented political opportunism, as it would be at the expense of long-term durability (ibid, p. 12). Patashnik (2003) explains that opportunistic politicians may, for example, support the passage of a symbolic reform knowing that the reform can be sabotaged at the post-enactment stage (p. 210).
Moreover, Nixon (2016) recognises that institutional arrangements provide some degree of stability and continuity into the government system, which is good for the durability of existing policies but not as much for the instalment, let alone durability, of new policies (p. 15). Patashnik (2003) adds that stable legal rules, bureaucratic structures and administrative procedures are more likely to disable policymakers from taking new actions contrary to previous reform measures (p. 211).
When drafting implementation plans, Nixon (2016) furthermore advises that policymakers employ a systematic approach and follow a checklist of questions (p. ii). While Jiao and Boons (2017) suggest
that durability is more likely when policymaking takes local feasibility into account (p. 13), Pressman and Wildavsky (1984, as cited in Nixon, 2016) go as far as to say that policymaking and implementation should go hand in hand (p. 26). Special attention should be paid to feasibility when a regulation is the result of top-down policymaking (Nixon, 2016, p. 26) or when a regulation is applied to different contextual realities (Thorndike, 2012, pp. 348-9), as can for example be the case with EU regulations such as NC-TAR. The National Research Council (2010, p. 218) and Nixon (2016, p. 34) furthermore note that a policy is more likely to be durable when it is consistent with existing policies, political processes and objectives. The National Research Council adds that he instalment of complementary policies can also enhance stability (2010, p. 218).
Patashnik (2003) furthermore states that the inevitability of post-enactment adjustments and recalibrations must be recognised early on and contribute to the strength of regulations without becoming rigid (p. 226). He suggests that not a detailed plan of action but rather a set of basic policy goals and criteria are used when deciding what to do in case of unforeseen events (ibid, p. 226). Nixon (2016) furthermore underlines that such implementation plans should also account for technological requirements, for example a software programme to monitor technical aspects related to a regulation, because when a policy does not function it will not be durable (p. 23).
2.1.3. Decision-making
In the decision-making phase, elected or appointed decision-making bodies decide or vote in favour or against the new policy idea. Once policy idea is approved, it passes to administrators who are responsible for operationalising it and making it work. In his Reform Space Model, Andrews (2008) refers to institutionalisation which relates to the transformation of the policy idea into new formal and informal rules. In addition, he continues, at this stage there is a need for stakeholders and regulatees to be satisfied and accept the policy idea (p. 7).
Durable rules require broad acceptance and satisfaction, and not just from those making them but also from those that the rules apply to because if they ignore them then they cannot be fully institutionalised nor effective (OECD, 2010, p. 17; Nixon, 2016, pp. 8-10). This means that the concerns and wishes of stakeholders need to be heard and taken into account (Jiao & Boons, 2017, p. 13), especially when a regulatory change touch upon their core values or interests (Nixon, 2016, p. 12). In doing so, Patashnik (2003) points out, engaging ordinary voters can be difficult or unproductive when the subject matter is rather technical (p. 210). To gain and sustain support among stakeholders there should also be short and long-term benefits in place, and these need to be evident well in advance, especially when there are high investment costs involved (Nixon, 2016, pp. 11, 24), when the compliance burden for stakeholders in increased (Thorndike, 2012, p. 347), or when a notable change in organisational or industry conduct is required for the policy to the effective (Jiao & Boons, 2017, p. 13). Having short-term benefits is sometimes difficult to facilitate, as Jiao and Boons (2017) point out, because policy
implementation can be a long-term process, which implies that sometimes the economic fruits are only pickable in the long run (p. 13).
Gill and Frankel (2014, as cited in Nixon, 2016, p. 30) also point out that the division of costs and benefits is crucial to realise stakeholder satisfaction, and they developed the following framework for this:
High Concentration of Benefits Low Concentration of Benefits High Concentration of Costs Highest likelihood of review (e.g.
workplace safety)
High likelihood of review (e.g. leaky buildings)
Low Concentration of Costs Lowest likelihood of review (e.g. occupational regulation)
Low likelihood of review (e.g. weights and measures)
TABLE 1:GILL AND FRANKEL’S MATRIX ON COST-BENEFIT DISTRIBUTION AND LIKELIHOOD OF DURABILITY
Patashnik (2003) agrees with this framework and explains that when benefits of a given policy are concentrated and its costs are diffused, the beneficiary group will recognise that its interests are at stake and will be more inclined to mobilise itself for policy maintenance (pp. 203-4). For maintenance to hold, the policy should create financial dependence among beneficiaries (Miller, 2014, p. 950) and continue to produce productivity gains over time (Nixon, 2016, p. 4) while the beneficiary group comprises of the major players (National Research Council, 2010, p. 216) that are empowered by policy practitioners to actively support the policy’s maintenance (Patashnik, 2003, pp. 203-5). In contrast, when costs are diffused, groups that bear them either will be unaware of or indifferent to them (Patashnik, 2003, pp. 203-4). This means that they are unlikely to mobilise to demand policy change/reverse or punish politicians and regulators during re-election (Lodge & Wegrich, 2012, pp. 30-1).
In addition, people may have ethical reservations about disrupting inherent arrangements on which other specific groups have come to rely (Bardach, 1976, as cited in Patashnik, 2003, p. 204). Inspired by Schneider and Ingram's concept of the ‘social construction of target populations’, Campbell (2003) adds that this feeling is strengthened when the media portrays the positive impacts of a regulation on its beneficiaries (as cited in Chattopadhyay, 2015, p. 132). Another reason to opt for a high concentration of benefits and low concentration on costs is that monitoring costs are less for a smaller group of beneficiaries (Patashnik, 2003, p. 204).
However, when a reform or new policy is beneficial to a larger audience (a general-interest reform) and imposes costs on specific individuals and groups, Patashnik (2003) suggests that this will motivate action among the smaller group of payers and not among the large group of beneficiaries because the anticipation of a loss is more likely to motivate action than the expectation of a payoff of equal size (p. 204). Nevertheless, he continues, when a general-interest reform does occur at the expense of certain special interest groups this does not mean that that is the end of it, as interest groups are likely to continue to promote their cause and get other stakeholders on board even when the costs in effort are greater than
the potential benefits of winning. Politicians and regulators may be unable to withstand such pressures over time (ibid, pp. 204, 226). Lastly, he states, the division of costs and benefits may also shift when politicians change their mind about the political costs and benefits without being pressurised (for example through learning), or when they are replaced by people who think differently (ibid, p. 226). Contrary to Patashnik’s idea, Miller (2014) illustrates that policies can actually enjoy more durability when it reflects the interests of a broad group of stakeholders. In the case of Medicaid in the US, he argues, the fact that the programme was made accessible to the middle class also, made it receive notably more support than when the programme would benefit the poor exclusively (p. 950). These different perspectives hint at the fact that a high concentration of costs should be avoided at all times.
The possibility of unintended consequences furthermore enhances resistance (Nixon, 2016, p. 34). These can be difficult to foresee because policymakers do not always have accurate or complete information about the costs, benefits and effects of each policy option in advance due to bounded rationality and limited resources. Instead, they sometimes rely on best guesses, experience or a simple cost benefit analysis (Simon, 1957, as cited by Nixon, 2016, pp. 15-21).
Nixon (2016) notes that can be difficult to overcome resistance by those who benefit from current systems (pp. 9-10). Nevertheless, resistance and divides can be overcome when there is a strong coalition of interest between politicians, stakeholders and the bureaucracy that is willing to seek compromise and symbiosis (ibid, p. ii). Although it is a long-term endeavour (Gibbs, 2003, as cited in Jiao and Boons, 2017, p. 13), Evans and Quigley (2013) agree that fostering such ‘relational contracts’ for the development and change of rules builds trust and leads to more durable policy (as cited in Nixon, 2016, p. 17). Another way to mitigate resistance, mentioned by Nixon, is to do a ‘roadshow’ in which policy advocates explain the importance of the policy and listen to local responses (2016, p. 12). However, when in the next period the government reneges on its policy prescription more resistance and less trust can be expected (Mankiw, 2006, as cited in Nixon, 2016, p. 17). Jiao and Boons (2017) adds that it is of utmost importance to listen to the concerns and wishes of stakeholders (p. 13).
2.1.4. Implementation
Once implementation decisions are made and a regulation enters into force, it needs to be monitored, enforced and reviewed properly for it to be durable. For a regulation to remain durable during implementation, it is important that the regulator has a good reputation among politicians and regulatees because it provides for more confidence, cooperation and leeway. Agencies with less political capital, for example because of a poor past performance, might be more hesitant to take risks necessary to produce desirable and thus durable policy outcomes (Nixon, 2016, p. 24).
While Lazarus (2004, as cited in National Research Council, 2010, p. 217) and Moore (1995, as cited in Nixon, 2016, p. 18) point out that regulators should have enough resources to manage their caseload, Nixon (2016) adds that they should also make efficient use of them to sustain support for a regulation
(pp. 11-6). Because when resources are lacking, principle-agent problems may emerge (Lipsky, 1969, as cited in Nixon, 2016, p. 26). Patashnik (2003) continues by saying that regulatory agencies should be allowed to use their discretion to make policies work while simultaneously be constrained by politicians in their ability to shirk or stray from their original mandate (p. 208).
A durable policy will also include provisions about the division of regulatory tasks (Andrews, 2008) and information-gathering mechanisms to monitor progress towards policy goals (Lazarus, 2004, as cited in National Research Council, 2010, p. 217). Patashnik (2003) furthermore adds that information should be accessible to both regulatory watchdogs as well as consumer lobbies (p. 210). Nixon concludes that monitoring can have a major impact on the durability of a policy (2016, p. ii).
Maintaining the support and commitment of politicians and policymakers is vital not only during the policy formulation phase but also throughout implementation (Persson and Tabellini, 1999, as cited in Nixon, 2016, p. 11; Patashnik, 2003, p. 208), knowing that government can always change their (regulatory) course and agreements can always be revisited or even cancelled (Stiglits, 1998, as cited in Patashnik, 2003, p. 208). Others add to this argument that commitment is more likely to remain when government is undivided (Jiao & Boons, 2017, p. 13), when the dominant political composition and their policy preferences remain stable (Nixon, 2016, p. 17), when relevant policymakers are updated regularly on progress, and when there are no crises that redirect everyone’s attention (National Research Council, 2010, p. 220). The support of political actors for a regulation also depends on the support of the public, because when it becomes more negative of the regulation, politicians could also change their stance to avoid electoral backlash or even engage in short-term political opportunism (Patashnik, 2003, p. 206; Persson and Tabellini, 1999, as cited in Nixon, 2016, p. 11). Nevertheless, the fact remains that public scrutiny is mostly a good thing because it can motivate policymakers to stay involved with the policy and motivate effective enforcement that is in line with a policy goal (National Research Council, 2010, p. 220).
A number of unforeseen events that require a response or change in regulation were outlined earlier. Patashnik (2003) actually argues that a true durable policy is adaptable to all kinds of changes, including changes in technology, international trends and even government composition (p. 211). Nixon (2016) adds that a durable policy should also be able to withstand changes in societal views (p. 4) and argues that such changes should not threaten durability as long as they do not undermine the original policy intent (p. 17). To recite Patashnik, it is important that a set of basic policy goals and criteria are used when deciding what to do in case of unforeseen events because adjustment and recalibrations are inevitable (2003, p. 226). The National Research Council (2010) furthermore notes that it can be challenging to balance the inherent tension between the goal of policy adaptability and durability. To navigate this challenge, the importance of having access to information about policy effectiveness and
technological developments that is relevant, centralised and manageable is once again underlined (pp. 215, 220).
Another durable response to change is policy layering. This is a process of policy change that preserves as much as possible of the original policy while incrementally adding amendments so that rules from the past can be updated according to current normative, social and political thinking (Daugbjerg & Swinbank, 2016, p. 5). This, in turn, facilitates policy learning because layering requires constant negotiation and adjustment as stakeholders also change their preferences in response to the adaptive nature of a regulation (Nixon, 2016, p. 16). Lindblom (1959, 1979) agrees that gradual change can result in more durability when it focuses on mitigating the negative aspects of a regulation (as cited in Nixon, 2016, p. 16). While layering has had considerable success, for example in areas such as social policy, critics of the approach point out that it has limited applicability because only known policy options are introduced and because layering is not used for goal-oriented purposes (Nixon, 2016, p. 16). Additionally, Streeck and Thelen (2005, p. 24) suggest that layering does not always lead to durable policy reform as it may eventually crowd out the original policy goal (as cited in Daugbjerg and Swinbank, 2016, p. 24), for example when policymakers lose control over the process (ibid, p. 6).
2.2. Conclusion
The review identified several durability ingredients that are at play at different stages throughout the life trajectory of a policy. The review also demonstrated that the recipe for policy durability is a complex one with several ‘ifs’ and ‘buts’ dispersed along economic, political, practical and social themes throughout the policy cycle. At the same policy durability is fragile. Policy practitioners need to remain highly attentive of such ingredients at all times for a policy intent to not only pass the agenda-setting, policy formulation and decision-making phase, but also remain intact during the course of implementation within a perpetually changing context. A misstep is easily made and can haunt the viability of a policy or regulation throughout its existence. Even when the recipe is followed meticulously, external factors, such as a change in government composition, can sometimes reverse even the most durable policies, but only if institutional arrangements allow it.
Existing definitions recognise that policy durability is a dynamic process where a policy needs to be adaptive to ensure that the policy objective remains intact throughout the vagaries within the policy cycle. However, there are subtle differences in focus. Whereas Nixon typifies this process in terms of the policymaking process (politics, policy advising and implementation), Patashnik refers to the output of the policymaking process (decisions, programmes and actions). Jiao and Boons, on the other hand, refer to the underlying factors that shape this process (ideas, actors, objects and practices). Each approach appears to be meaningful because the policy process as well as its underlying dynamics and empirical output consist of the various ingredients outlined earlier that can either enhance or undermine the durability of a policy.
While the body of literature on the policy process in general is vast and addresses good practices and considerations in each phase, it is surprising that policy durability is rarely mentioned explicitly. Is it obvious that following a checklist for each phase, for example the indicators of regulatory policy and governance by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), equals bolstering policy durability? To a considerable degree, this definitely appears to be the case, as this body of literature overlaps with that focusing on durability specifically. The difference between the two appears to be that the literature on durability emphasises the need for a policy goal to remain intact during the post-enactment phase whereas literature on governance in general is more concerned with the democratic character of governance rather such as the specific result.
As Nixon (2016) mentioned, there is still no undisputed methodology that governs the analysis of policy and its durability (p. 3). While each policy situation is unique, he says that it might be beneficial to decompose the policy cycle and study each phase and durability ingredient in greater detail in order to generate more detailed insights; policies are fragile so details matter. Furthermore, he continues, for each phase, more specific cases need to be studied because empirical data on policy durability is very limited. Only then can trends emerge that allow the durability of policy to be better studied and influenced.
It is noteworthy that the decision-making phase receives the most attention, which hints that the ingredients in this phase are perhaps the most decisive and/or fragile steppingstones to durability. Most of them boil down to stakeholders being satisfied with decisions regarding a policy or regulation: if there are no short and long-term benefits in place, stakeholders are less likely to be satisfied; if the costs are concentrated and benefits spread, specific stakeholders are less likely to be satisfied; and if unintended consequences negatively affect stakeholders, they are less likely to be satisfied. When stakeholders are not satisfied, the policy cannot be fully institutionalised nor effective in addition to the fact that they are more likely to offer resistance and demand policy change (Nixon, 2016, pp. 8-10). To realise and maintain stakeholder satisfaction, the literature underlines the necessity of fostering relational contracts among politicians, stakeholders and the bureaucracy in a way that promotes trust (Evans and Quigley, 2013, as cited in Nixon, 2016, p. 17) and the willingness to seek consensus and compromise (Nixon, 2016, p. ii). Jiao and Boons (2013) add that to do so it is of vital importance that the concerns and wishes of stakeholders are heard and taken into account (p. 13).
III. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
The literature review suggested that each durability ingredient needs to be studied in greater detail, that more specific cases need to be studied to gain a better understand of durability, and that stakeholder satisfaction is a vital ingredient for durability that can be attained trough considering the concerns and
wishes of stakeholders. These are exactly the theoretical gaps that this study seeks to (partly) fill by approaching stakeholder satisfaction through the lens of deliberative governance, and specifically within the context of public consultation.
Public consultation is a popular tool that can be used by policymakers and regulators during several moments in the policy cycle precisely to map the concerns and wishes of stakeholders before deciding how to implement or change certain aspects of a policy or regulation, for example concerning the gas market. Deliberative governance tailored to the consultation context offers a useful perspective because it provides insights on how decisions can be reached that are based on consensus and compromise. In other words, it suggests how change (through decisions) can be facilitated in a way that maximises stakeholder satisfaction (through consensus and compromise).
My study seeks to generate more detailed insights about the satisfaction of stakeholders active within the Dutch and Swedish gas market within the (regulatory) decision-making and implementation phase. Specifically, it will examine what they find important during a consultation as well as the subsequent decisions and implementation. The decision and implementation process are also addressed because of the fact that policy durability is not only concerned with making it through the decision-making phase but also staying intact throughout implementation.
3.1. Deliberative governance
As indicated earlier, deliberative experiences of stakeholders matter because they determine whether they are satisfied, which in turn influences the durability of a regulation. Deliberative governance theory is used as a framework to map and analyse the preferences of stakeholders regarding a consultation and beyond. So, what is deliberative governance? Meadowcroft (2004) describes it in the following way:
Deliberative democracy typically is defined in contradistinction to "aggregative" visions of the democratic process, which emphasise voting as a mechanism for counting preferences and selecting preferred outcomes. This contrast can be understood in two ways. First, deliberative democrats argue that it is not the act of casting a ballot that represents the core of democratic decision-making, but the reasoned argument and public reflection that should precede voting. Second, deliberative democrats insist that the public interest cannot emerge merely by summing pre-existing preferences, but only can come to the fore through a deliberative process, which generates new insights and transforms initial perspectives. (p. 3)
In other words, deliberative governance promotes group-based public participation involving a wide variety of stakeholders from government, business and civil society to address specific questions in a structured manner with the goal to reach new understandings that shape the way for the future of existing and new priorities and policies (ibid, p. 2).
3.1.1. The four deliberative dimensions of a public consultation
Since the 90s, deliberative democracy has become increasingly embraced in democratic governance as a means to mitigate societal tension and create consensus-based policy solutions to specific societal problems, says Meadowcroft, and continues by saying that such consensus-seeking deliberation can be organised through various instruments, among which, the widely-used public consultation (Meadowcroft, 2004, pp. 11-2). A consultation process typically starts with information meetings in which the consultation facilitator presents a draft proposal to stakeholders, which is then possibly followed by a ‘questions and answers’ session and/or moderated discussion. When they are familiar with the proposal and different regulatory scenarios, they are welcomed to submit written opinion statements outlining their wishes and concerns. This information is then used by the regulator to improve its regulations. However, Meadowcroft adds, the regulatory decision-maker reserves the right to decide how to act on the opinions (ibid, p. 12). This instrument has been employed widely in deliberative democracies such as the Netherlands and Sweden at various stages of regulatory development, for example before the initiation of a new regulation or during the evaluation of an existing one (Rodrigo & Amo, n.d., p. 1).
Meadowcroft (2004) provides a framework to weigh the deliberative democratic content of a public consultation and uses the dimensions of representation, deliberation, decision-making and implementation. Each dimension will be briefly introduced and include some associated common consultation practices established by the OECD, CEER and EU Commission.
First, representation concerns the representation of affected interests. It considers questions such as whether any interested party is allowed to voice its opinion; whether they get equal chances to participate and influence the decision-maker; whether all possible stakeholders are actively engaged; and whether the process open to scrutiny by those who cannot take part directly (Meadowcroft, 2004, p. 10). Some guidelines include (1) announcing the launch of a planned consultation well in advance (EU Commission, n.d., p. 81); (2) adopting an inclusive approach by consulting as widely, yet balanced, as possible (EU Commission, n.d., pp. 69, 77; OECD, 2012, p. 24; CEER, 2018, p. 3); (3) Identifying and engaging target groups that run the risk of being excluded (for example due to having limited resources) (OECD, 2012, p. 24; EU Commission, n.d., p. 77); (4) making consultation proposals widely known and available through all appropriate means but most particularly, on the internet (CEER, 2018, p. 3)at a "single access point” (EU Commission, n.d., pp. 69-70); and (5) allowing for digital means of participation (CEER, 2018, p. 4).
Second, deliberation concerns the quality of deliberation. It considers questions such as whether the consultation is structured to facilitate reasoned analysis; whether careful and equal attention is given to all participants; whether the consultation is facilitated by the proper entity; whether stakeholders can exert influence through multiple channels; and whether parties are given ample time to formulate an
opinion (Meadowcroft, 2004, p. 11). Some guidelines include (1) having a timeline on the consultation procedure (CEER, 2018, p. 4); (2) having a consultation document that is clear and concise, and includes all necessary information to welcome responses rather than questions (EU Commission, n.d., p. 69); (3) providing sufficient time for contributions (EU Commission, n.d., p. 70), which means within a range of eight weeks to four months (CEER, 2018, p. 4; OECD, 2010, p. 93); (4) using additional tools if necessary, such as public hearings and information meetings (CEER, 2018, p. 4); and (5) allowing for confidential responses while explaining why they are not disclosed (CEER, 2018, pp. 4-5).
Third, decision-making concerns the decisional character of a consultation. It considers questions such as whose opinions are prioritised and used to inform decisions; which stakeholders win and lose from the decision; and whether the decision benefits society at large (Meadowcroft, 2004, p. 11). Some guidelines include (1) incorporating the principles of openness, transparency, consistency and accountability (CEER, 2018, p. 3); (2) outlining the available policy options and their impacts (CEER, 2018, p. 4; EU Commission, n.d., p. 75); (3) allowing both foreign and domestic interests to provide input (OECD, 2012, p. 19); (4) publicising a report outlining a summary of all consultation responses (EU Commission, n.d., pp. 67, 83); (5) distinguishing between information (data/facts) and subjective opinions (EU Commission, n.d., p. 85); (6) emphasising expert input (CEER, 2018, p. 3); (7) prioritising those with the highest degree of interests or influence over the proposal (EU Commission, n.d., p. 76); and (8) substantiating decisions and explaining what input has been taken into account and why (CEER, 2018, p. 3; EU Commission, n.d., pp. 69-70).
Fourth, implementation concerns the collective implementation, monitoring and review. It considers questions such as to what extent stakeholders are involved the implementation of a decision; whether there are opportunities to monitor progress or revisit the regulation in the future; and whether the consultation is a one-time thing or an ongoing process (Meadowcroft, 2004, p. 11). Some guidelines include (1) allowing stakeholders to provide input at multiple times within the policy cycle (EU Commission, n.d., p. 67) and timely so that stakeholder views can still make a difference (CEER, 2018, p. 4; EU Commission, n.d., p. 69); and (2) conducting an end-of-process survey addressed to all consulted parties to gauge the depth of stakeholder satisfaction with the process, as well as with the final outputs and outcomes (EU Commission, n.d., p. 87).
These dimensions thus culminate into a framework in which consultation facilitators and regulatory decision-makers active within the gas market can identify and mediate stakeholder positions, come to new understandings and make deliberate decisions. However, this framework and ‘good practices’ are mostly concerned with the democratic character of governance rather than stakeholder satisfaction per se. To see if there is overlap such practices are included in the search to verify and identify the preferences of stakeholders.
3.2. Q-methodology
Q-methodology is the method used to identify how stakeholders think with regard to the consultation and subsequent decisions and implementation because it can boil down the complexity of multiple viewpoints to a simpler picture of a few dominant patterns of thought. First, a large collection of opinions, practices and statements regarding the proper execution of a consultation and subsequent decision is extracted from literature on deliberative and decisional aspects of policy durability as well as deliberative governance, including Meadowcroft’s paper, ‘good practices’ outlined above as well as documents regarding the consultation on NC-TAR in the Netherlands and Sweden. A matrix that is based on the four dimensions of participatory mechanisms within deliberative governance a well as the four assembling and reassembling elements that determine a policy’s durability is used to reduce the concourse to a volume of 32 statements.
Stakeholders, as defined by Sabatier in his Advocacy Coalition Framework as businesses, independent experts, interest groups, journalists, governmental administrators and politicians (1988, p. 131), are then asked to rank these statements in a forced choice distribution according to how much they agree or disagree with them. The resulting filled distributions are Q-sorts. Through factor analysis, all Q-sorts are compiled and then boiled down to a smaller number of perspectives that represent the most dominant opinion patterns among all opinions. This shows precisely how stakeholders in both cases think about how a consultation and the associated decision should be executed. Written comments from respondents are used to uncover the rationale behind each ranking. These individual cases can then be compared and learned from.
3.3. Deliberative learning
The new insights that are generated through the application of Q-method can lead to something I call ‘deliberative learning’, which refers to the change of conduct resulting from the enhancement of one’s understanding through deliberation. In this study it refers to consultation facilitators and regulatory decision-makers changing their conduct to increase stakeholder satisfaction and thereby policy durability, as a result of the enhancement of their understanding by way noting the different opinions and discussions among stakeholders during public consultation. The term and theory behind ‘deliberative learning’ is adapted from, and can be seen as a sub-category of, ‘policy learning’.
3.3.1. Micro-level learning
Deliberative learning can occur at different levels. First of all, the mere fact that this study highlights the importance of realising stakeholder satisfaction to increase the chances for policy durability can lead to micro-level learning among consultation facilitators and regulatory decision-makers in the Netherlands and Sweden because now that they are aware of it and/or reminded they might feel encouraged to prioritise it more. Insights and associated recommendations about the preferences of
stakeholders regarding the consultation and the associated decisions along the dimensions of representation, deliberation, decision-making and implementation can lead to deeper micro-level learning among consultation facilitators and regulatory decision-makers in both countries because they detect shortcomings that greatly dissatisfy stakeholders they might not have been (fully) aware of, for example due to bounded rationality (Moyson, Scholten, & Weible, 2017, p. 164).
In turn, they can use these lessons to alter their conduct and/or priorities to correct these deficiencies (Argyris and Schön, 1996, as cited in Moyson et al., 2017, p. 163), and thereby better satisfy stakeholders and strengthen the durability of their regulations. As Cyert and March (1963, as cited in Moyson et al., 2017, p. 163) as well as Montpetit and Lachapelle (2017, p. 197) explain, learning allows learners to adapt to their environment and change future interactions with stakeholders accordingly. A conclusion that the decisional character of a consultation is more important to stakeholders than the collective implementation, monitoring and review of a regulation might, for example, inspire consultation facilitators and makers to reallocate resources from implementation activities to making activities. Likewise, a conclusion that stakeholders are considerably unpleased when decision-makers take independent experts more seriously than them allows for learning which in turn might inspire decision-makers to start attaching less significance to the opinions independent experts, again, in order to enhance satisfaction and strengthen policy durability.
3.3.2. Meso and macro-level learning
For meso-level learning to occur, that is learning at an organisational level, the individual learners directly involved with the consultation and subsequent decision are to spread the gained knowledge across their organisation through their network structure and the various rules governing the exchange of information and decision-making (Witting & Moyson, 2015, as cited in Moyson et al., 2017, p. 165). A comparison of the Dutch and Swedish case identifies two lessons that can lead to learning at the macro-level. First, the identified perspectives and their characteristics are likely to exist in other EU’s gas markets with a strong deliberative and elite character as well, although the number of stakeholders that make up each perspective may vary. These perspectives highlight the important themes, for example transparency or the distribution of costs and benefits, which they can take into account during future consultations. Second, the shared similarities hint at hypotheses regarding how stakeholder satisfaction (and durability) can be enhanced through deliberative governance. These hypotheses may be tested in other such contexts in order to refine their conduct according to contemporary stakeholder preferences, which will in turn contribute to the identification of trends regarding the preferences among stakeholders in the EU’s upcoming internal energy market in natural gas as a whole.
3.3.3. Types of learning
Kemp and Weehuizen (2005) classify such learning as ‘instrumental learning’, which they explain, concerns learning about how instruments (such as a consultation) may be improved to achieve set goals
(such as policy durability). This type of learning thus emphasises the means rather than ends (p. 8). Slightly adapting Bennett and Howlett’s (1992) framework about learning and policy change by inserting questions asked several others (Howlett and Cashore, 2009; Dunlop and Radaelli, 2013, as cited in Moyson et al., 2017, p. 166), the following summary can be established in table 2 that explains the learning context within this study:
Who learns? What do they learn? How do they learn?
what
What is the effect of this learning?
Consultation facilitators and decision-makers in the Netherlands and Sweden, and possibly, other deliberative democracies in the EU with gas markets that are strongly deliberative and elite.
How to adjust the execution of a consultation and their associated decisions and implementation.
Through lesson-drawing. Adjustments to the execution of a consultation and subsequent decision as well as increased stakeholder satisfaction and policy durability.
TABLE 2: DELIBERATIVE LEARNING IN THE CONTEXT OF THIS STUDY
For learning to occur effectively, however, consultation facilitators and decision-makers should not have rigid beliefs, says Moyson (2016, as cited in Moyson, Scholten and Weible, 2017, p. 165), nor psychological biases that make them give preference to their own existing beliefs rather than accept information that challenges those beliefs, add Leach et al. (2014, as cited in Moyson, Scholten and Weible, 2017, p. 165). Moreover, macro-level learning might only occur (or not at all) after micro and meso-level learning has successfully taken place in the Netherlands and Sweden.
IV. METHODOLOGY
I chose to employ Q-methodology to help answer sub-questions a to e because it can identify underlying patterns of multiple viewpoints and boil down this complexity to a few viewpoints. Based on how these ‘factors’ feel about certain statements, narratives for social perspectives can be composed. Q-method functions well with complex and controversial topics (Webler, Danielson, & Tuler, 2009, pp. 10, 25) and has been widely applied to environmental questions. Whereas virtually all studies very much focus on the content of the discussion within environmental questions, this study uniquely addresses the framework through which such discussion can take place, namely the consultation instrument, in the gas market. These is a unique methodological contribution.
To complement within-case findings of both countries, I use a comparative case study, which is another methodological contribution. The fact that two cases are selected appears highly uncommon since I did not come across any study that applies a singular methodological Q-design to two similar cases, let alone
