From 'impartiality' to 'non-membership in a military alliance': The impact of nato-Finland interaction on the evolution of the Finnish neutrality identity

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FROM ‘IMPARTIALITY’ TO ‘NON-MEMBERSHIP IN A

MILITARY ALLIANCE’: THE IMPACT OF

NATO-FINLAND INTERACTION ON THE EVOLUTION OF

THE FINNISH NEUTRALITY IDENTITY

MSc Political Sciences (International Organisation) MSc Thesis: International Institutions and Security Governance

Supervisor: Dr. Hilde van Meegdenburg Second reader: Rebekah Tromble

Saara Rissanen s2256991 Word count: 9,999

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ABSTRACT

This thesis seeks to theorise how a state’s foreign policy identity of neutrality can evolve through interaction with other international actors with perceived security identities. Building on the constructivist theories of International Relations and using the Finnish interaction with NATO in the post-Cold War era as a case study, I argue that the Finnish identity of neutrality has changed when (1) there has been a critical juncture, providing as a permissive condition for change, and (2) NATO has appealed to Finland through what Alexander Wendt (1992, 1999) calls ‘altercasting’, which functions as a productive condition for change. The case study reveals three different patterns. First, the Finnish identity and policy of neutrality seem to be mutually constitutive. That is, whenever the identity of neutrality changes, the policy of neutrality follows. Second, the changes in the Finnish identity of neutrality have indeed occurred in the aftermath of critical junctures, when the policy change has been institutionalised in the form of a White Paper. Finally, NATO altercasting has functioned as a push-and-pull force for identity change, encouraging or discouraging change, depending on how it is perceived in Finland. Whenever the altercasting attempts positively resonate in the Finnish audience, identity change follows.

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1. INTRODUCTION

In his 1961 speech at the United Nations headquarters in New York, former president Urho Kekkonen epitomised the Finnish identity of neutrality as “a physician rather than a judge”, seeking not to “condemn” but to “diagnose” and “cure” (Kekkonen, 1961). Nearly 60 years later, this peace-potential still remains at the core of the Finnish neutrality identity. Two decades after the end of the Cold War great power struggles that Finland traditionally stayed neutral from, abstaining from military alliances is still regarded as the best means to encourage international stability and to prevent conflicts. However, the desire to integrate security and defence policies internationally has simultaneously increased in the post-Cold War era. Self-reliantly guarding the Finnish independence as “warriors” and “descendants of miracle men” (Virtanen in Eduskunta, 1995: 715) is no longer considered sufficient or desirable in the changing security environment. As a manifestation of this, the cooperation with NATO has constantly intensified and currently extends to all other Alliance activities except collective defence. Therefore, while the Finnish neutrality identity is still viewed through its peace-potential, its realisation and practice have significantly changed. This thesis seeks to theorise this evolution of the Finnish neutrality identity through interaction with other international actors. Building on the constructivist theories of International Relations, the research question stands as follows: how has the interaction with NATO in the post-Cold War era changed the Finnish identity of neutrality?

This thesis contributes to two research fields. First, it makes a theoretical contribution to the existing literature on neutrality by exploring the mechanisms – namely, interaction at the international level – causing change in a state’s neutrality identity. As neutrality has not been studied from this perspective before, I hope to demonstrate the continued academic relevance of neutrality norm in International Relations. Second, this research empirically contributes to the literature on the evolution of the Finnish identity of neutrality through focusing on the interaction

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with NATO in the post-Cold War era – a perspective that has not been adopted before. In light of the foregoing, this thesis argues that the Finnish identity of neutrality has changed when (1) there has been a critical juncture, opening room for identity change, and (2) NATO has appealed to Finland through what Alexander Wendt (1992, 1999) calls altercasting.

1.1 Literature Review

However, before delving into the theoretical framework and the case study, let us explore the existing literature on neutrality. The overall focus of this has been on the nature of the concept, and its role in the post-Cold War world. Regrettably, the changing nature of neutrality has been under-theorised, despite the acknowledged redefinition of the concept. This thesis takes on this explanatory task and seeks to explain how the identity of neutrality can evolve.

The existing literature on neutrality has primarily focused on explaining how neutrality emerges as a foreign policy. Historically, neutrality is considered as a policy of small states with vulnerable geopolitical and material positions (Agius and Devine, 2011: 272; Karsh, 1988; Palosaari, 2013). Despite this common understanding, there has been scholarly debate on the meaning of neutrality. Those building on realist literature highlight the weakness of the neutral states, seeing neutrality as a means to detach from great power politics (Karsh, 1986; Mouritzen, 1991). To this end, neutrality is a rational policy that serves the purpose of ensuring state survival. In contrast to this realist approach, constructivists take a more positive stance on neutrality as a foreign policy. For them, neutrality has become an identity that represents political symbolism domestically (Aunesluoma and Rainio-Niemi, 2016; Joenniemi, 1989; Goetschel, 1999) and active internationalism (Agius, 2006; 2011). Thus, neutrals “are not merely preoccupied with their own security and survival” (Joenniemi, 1988: 54), contra the realist position.

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While these two readings offer different pictures of the neutrals’ perception of international politics – one highlighting survival, and the other identity – they are, in fact, complimentary to one another. The policy of neutrality may emerge as a foreign policy doctrine out of what is considered a rational choice, as was the case with Finland during the Cold War (see Agius and Devine, 2011: 268), and can evolve into a full-fledged identity among both the decision-makers and the public. As demonstrated by Aunesluoma and Rainio-Niemi (2016), “neutrality – although never completely undisputed – grew close, even dear, to the Finnish people and elites and was therefore constitutive of Finland’s self-perception during the Cold War” (60). Following this, neutrality as a foreign policy can become deeply associated with national identity (Cottey, 2013: 447) even when the conditions, in which it emerged, have passed. However, as Lödén (2012) puts it, “identities, even if stable, are not unchangeable” (277). It is precisely this process of change in neutrality identity that this thesis is interested in. Presently, this remains under-theorised in literature.

The existing research on the changing nature of neutrality has primarily focused on the move from ‘neutrality’ to ‘post-neutrality’ (Agius, 2011; Forsberg and Vaahtoranta, 2001), neglecting the mechanisms causing this change. These accounts have successfully demonstrated how neutrality has been reconceptualised to suit the new political environment. With the focus on the European Union integration, Agius (2011) demonstrates how neutrality has been redefined as ‘military non-alignment’, indicating a new conceptualisation of neutrality as non-involvement in conflicts. Similarly, Forsberg and Vaahtoranta (2001) argue that Finland and Sweden today remain neutral only in terms of rejecting collective defence. However, these papers seem to stick to redefining neutrality in light of available evidence, and neglect the theoretical side of this evolution. While they find evidence for this in increased international cooperation, neither of them looks into how this new form of interaction has resulted in the changed identity of neutrality, presenting a theoretical gap in the literature.

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Simultaneously, the existing literature on Finnish neutrality has overlooked the effect of NATO cooperation on the Finnish identity of neutrality. Instead, the focus has been on Russia and the EU. In relation to Russia, the policy of military non-alignment – in contrast to NATO membership – has been explained in strategic terms, conceived as a means to avoid destabilisation and “the potential harm that NATO enlargement might do to Russian domestic development and foreign policy” (Forsberg and Vaahtoranta, 2001: 75). In contrast, the policy of neutrality has been questioned in relation to EU membership. As put forth by Aunesluoma and Rainio-Niemi (2016), “Finland’s EU membership, as well as the security it provided, was seen as a welcomed substitute for the country’s policy of neutrality” (52). However, it is striking how (1) in these accounts, neutrality is primarily defined in policy terms, as opposed to identity, and (2) very little attention has been given to cooperation with NATO – an organisation that is traditionally antagonistic to neutrality. This thesis takes on the task to fill these gaps and looks at the Finnish neutrality specifically from the perspective of identity in relation to NATO.

Overall, the existing literature has primarily focused on the debate on the nature of neutrality. It has neglected the question of how neutrality changes through social interaction. When it has focused on change, it has primarily made observations instead of theorising them. This thesis takes on this explanatory task and seeks to explain how the interaction with other international actors can change the identity of neutrality. By using Finland as a case study, it makes an empirical contribution to the literature by studying specifically the Finnish identity of neutrality in relation to interaction with NATO.

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2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

As identified in the literature review, there is no universal approach to neutrality. The legal definition of neutrality as the right to territorial integrity and abstinence from war, following the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 (Raymond, 1997: 125), has invoked a wide range of interpretations of the term. The essence is the same – impartiality in a conflict – but the means to realise it differ. Fundamentally, “neutrality is what states make of it” (Agius, 2006: 32). This fluidity of the term allows for reinterpretation of neutrality, making the identity of neutrality prone to change. It is this process of change that I seek to explain in this section. I argue that the interaction with NATO may have changed the Finnish identity of neutrality in situations in which (1) there has been a critical event, opening room for redefinition of state identity, and (2) NATO has appealed to Finland through altercasting.

For the purpose of this thesis, Wendt’s (1992) definition of identity as “relatively stable, role-specific understandings and expectations of self” (397) is adopted. That is, it is a subjective interpretation of what one is, which creates expectations for behaviour – that is, policy – based on the role given to ‘self’ vis-à-vis other actors (Jepperson et al., 1996: 54). Identities are formed and maintained through repeated interaction with others by giving meaning to their behaviour and by reciprocating action. Neutrality is one such identity: by identifying as ‘neutral’, a state limits its operational freedom to the types of policies deemed suitable for this role. Identities evolve when there is a disequilibrium, in which behaviour is no longer reciprocated, changing a state’s interpretation of what ‘self’ represents in relation to the ‘other’ (Wendt, 1992). Consequently, both the identity and policy of neutrality evolve when there is a change in the pre-existing interaction pattern. When the policy changes through this interaction and no longer adheres to the neutrality identity’s expectations for behaviour, the identity also evolves to take on a new meaning. Similarly, when the identity changes through interaction, the expectations for behaviour are also changing.

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Therefore, the policy and the identity of neutrality mutually constitute each other and cannot be studied independently from one another.

The identity of neutrality, thus, evolves through changes in interaction patterns. Two mechanisms for change in this pattern can be identified: the process of what Wendt (1992, 1999) calls ‘altercasting’, and the emergence of critical junctures. Borrowing the concepts of Soifer (2012), critical junctures provide permissive conditions that create room for change, while altercasting presents a productive condition that produces identity change. Let us consider each of these in turn.

The underlying logic of critical junctures is that an external event can change the perception of the social world so drastically that it permits reflection on one’s identity. In the words of Capoccia (2015), critical junctures are “moments in which uncertainty as to the future of an institutional arrangement allows for political agency and choice to play a decisive causal role in setting an institution on a certain path of development”, creating room for new courses of action (148). Similar logic can be applied to state identities. An event is critical when it is perceived so by the state. The uncertainty caused by an event opens room for potential redefinition of self-identification vis-à-vis ‘others’. However, a presence of a critical juncture does not automatically result in a policy or identity change. As demonstrated by Capoccia and Kelemen (2007), a critical event may result in re-equilibration instead of change (352). Once internalised, identities tend to be fairly sticky and emerge as social truth for future generations (Berger, 1996: 327), resisting fundamental change. While critical junctures provide permissive conditions for identity change, it is crucial to identify any productive conditions – that is, altercasting – that cause the change.

According to Wendt (1992), altercasting is “a technique of interactor control in which ego [‘other’] uses tactics of self-presentation and stage management in an attempt to frame alter’s [‘self’]

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definitions of social situations in ways that create the role which ego desires alter to play” (421). It specifically aims at changing the “identities and interests of the others that help sustain [the existing] systems of interaction” (Wendt, 1992: 421). For altercasting to produce change, the ‘other’ must alter its behaviour or redefine its identity to reflect the new understanding of the situation. The ‘self’ then gives meaning to this action, redefines the situation and adjusts behaviour. While stage management occurs when the ‘other’ treats the ‘self’ as if ‘self’s’ identity has already changed (Wendt, 1992: 421), self-presentation refers to the ‘other’s’ attempt to portray itself in a light that is appealing to the ‘self’. If the change in the ‘other’ resonates in the ‘self’, identity is redefined in new terms. In contrast, if the change is perceived negatively, the existing identity is reinforced. Therefore, altercasting can be either attractive and encourage change or repelling and discourage change. Therefore, the hypothesis stands as follows: the Finnish identity of neutrality may change through interaction with NATO in situations in which (1) has been a critical juncture, opening room for redefinition of identity, and (2) NATO appeals to Finland through altercasting.

However, the question remains: how can one observe this process of change? As put forth by Finnemore and Sikkink (1988), “norms do not appear out of thin air; they are actively built by agents having strong notions about appropriate or desirable behaviour” (896). Similarly to norms, agents construct identities through predominantly discursive means (Milliken, 1999: 229). In his work on state identities, Erik Ringmar (1996) has convincingly argued that states construct identities through metaphors that form stories. In his words, “first we see something as some-thing […] and then we construct a narrative about this something. In this way narrative becomes the process through which human beings make sense of the unfolding of their lives” (Ringmar, 1996: 451). Building on his work, it is crucial to study Finnish discourse to understand how these stories on neutrality and NATO are constructed and evolve over time. It can, therefore, be expected that the

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change in the way neutrality is constructed – that is, in the way stories are told about neutrality – can be observed in official Finnish discourse on security and NATO.

Neutrality, therefore, emerges as an identity through social interaction. Building on Wendt’s work, the following hypothesis can be formulated: the interaction with NATO can transform the Finnish identity of neutrality in situations in which (1) there has been a critical event, providing a permissive condition for identity change, and (2) NATO appeals to Finland through ‘altercasting’, which functions as a productive condition. Building on Ringmar’s discourse theory, the change in the way neutrality is constructed is likely to manifest itself in the Finnish discourse on security and NATO.

3. METHODOLOGY

As stipulated earlier, the purpose of this research is twofold: (1) to explain how interaction with other international actors with perceived security identities can change a state’s identity of neutrality; and (2) to study the change in the Finnish identity of neutrality in relation to interaction with NATO. The theoretical framework specifically discussed the former. The next step is to apply this to the case of the Finnish interaction with NATO. However, before turning to this case study, let us look at the case selection and the methods of discourse and content analysis employed in the study.

3.1 Doing case studies and case selection

This thesis uses a single case study method to test the theoretical framework. This approach enables the testing of the hypothesis in a manner that allows for detailed focus on causal mechanisms behind X and Y variables, which permits drawing inferences about the hypothesis (Beach and Pedersen, 2013: 11). Simultaneously, it invites for application of the theory to other similar contexts in which X’s effect on Y can be studied (Halperin and Heath, 2017: 214). Hence, using a single

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case study method allows for testing of the theorised causal mechanisms behind social interaction at the international level (X) and the changes in the identity of neutrality (Y).

The case study chosen for this research, the Finnish interaction with NATO, was selected based on the criterion of having both X and Y variables present. The Finnish identity of neutrality has significantly evolved since the end of the Cold War (see Lödén, 2012; Aunesluoma and Rainio-Niemi, 2016; and Cottey, 2013), which allows for detailed examination of this process of change. Simultaneously, the Finnish interaction with NATO is frequent and institutionalised due to the NATO partnership programmes. Therefore, this specific criterion is met. Sweden, Austria, Switzerland, and Ireland present other suitable cases for study in relation to NATO. However, Finland was chosen, due to my affinity and familiarity with the Finnish culture and language. This allows for better understanding of the cultural and linguistic cues in the documents studied. Additionally, the Finnish cooperation with NATO provides an interesting case to study because, first, the relationship has evolved from having no official interaction during the Cold War to enhanced partnership, and, second, NATO membership is traditionally considered incompatible with neutrality. Through this example, I hope to demonstrate how the interaction with NATO has changed the Finnish identity of neutrality.

3.2 Combining discourse and qualitative content analysis

In order to analyse the change in the identity of neutrality, this research combines aspects of discourse and qualitative content analysis. While qualitative content analysis studies a text itself and seeks to uncover the cultural and social realities present in it (Bos and Tarnai, 1999: 660), discourse analysis “explores the ways in which discourses give legitimacy and meaning to social practices and institutions” (Halperin and Heath, 2017: 335). Qualitative content analysis exposes the phenomenon that discourse analysis helps to interpret through revealing “the meanings that the

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political world has for agents who participate in it and that give people reasons for acting” (Halperin and Heath, 2017: 336).

Considering the focus on interaction with NATO, the study of the Finnish identity of neutrality is best carried out by means of both qualitative content analysis and discourse analysis. Qualitative content analysis, on the one hand, effectively reveals how the Finnish identity and policy of neutrality are presented in relation to NATO over time. Discourse analysis, on the other hand, provides a means to study the process of how identities of ‘self’ and ‘other’ are constructed. This reveals the ways in which different meanings are given to neutrality. Qualitative content analysis, therefore, reveals the changed meaning of neutrality, while discourse analysis uncovers the mechanisms behind this evolution.

This thesis analyses official Finnish and NATO discourse in relation to three specific post-Cold War periods: 1991-1995, 2001-2004, and 2014-2016. These have one common factor: they follow a critical juncture or a cluster of critical junctures that prompted reconsideration of the Finnish foreign policy in the form of White Papers. Due to the permissive conditions caused by these critical junctures, the evolution of Finland-NATO bilateral interaction can be studied, enabling the test of the hypothesis. However, since these three periods present only a part of the whole process of change, this might have an impact on internal validity.

Following the two components of the hypothesis, four categories of interest in discourse can be identified. The first one is neutrality identity, that is, how Finland is portrayed as an international actor. The second one is neutrality policy, that is, the course of the Finnish policy and its continuity with or divergence from previous policies. The third category is that of critical junctures, that is, how international events are interpreted and viewed from the Finnish perspective. The final

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category is that of altercasting, that is, how NATO has altered its behaviour and the way this is perceived in Finland. With these categories of interest identified, let us turn to look at the exact documents studied.

To study the policy of neutrality, the 1995, 2004 and 2016 White Papers on foreign, security and defence policies are examined. The opinions of Defence Committee and Foreign Affairs Committee, and the debates from the Finnish parliament, Eduskunta, on the White Papers are also consulted. These allow for studying how the Finnish foreign policy identity is viewed and constructed in discourse. Additionally, to reflect the interactionist aspect of identity and to study NATO altercasting, the Finnish views of NATO in these documents are studied. Unfortunately, due to the unavailability of the individual partnership reports on Finland to the public, NATO altercasting strategies are studied in reference to statements delivered at NATO summits. While this excludes the bilateral interaction with Finland, these statements sufficiently reveal the changes in the general NATO stage management and self-presentation.

In sum, the case study of Finland is used to trace the causal mechanisms behind the interaction at the international level (X) and the changed identity of neutrality (Y). To explain how the Finnish identity of neutrality has evolved through interaction with NATO, a combination of qualitative content analysis and discourse analysis is used. Through careful consultation of the Finnish White Papers, their parliamentary debates and committee reports, and NATO statements, I hope to unveil the ways in which the Finnish identity of neutrality has evolved through interaction with NATO.

4. TESTING THE THEORY: FINLAND AND NATO

Based on the theory presented earlier, three expectations for the evolution of the Finnish neutrality identity emerge: (1) the patterns of change in the policy of neutrality should be mirrored in the

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identity of neutrality; (2) these changes should then be institutionalised in the aftermath of a critical juncture, and (3) the variations in NATO stage management and self-presentation should explain these patterns of change. This section focuses on testing these expectations on the three aforementioned time periods – 1991-1995, 2001-2004, and 2014-2016 – that present a cluster of critical junctures resulting in White Papers on foreign, security and defence policies. Through studying the changes in the Finnish identity and policy of neutrality over time, it appears that NATO altercasting functions as a push-and-pull force for identity change, either encouraging or discouraging change depending on how it is perceived in Finland.

4.1 The Finnish neutrality during the Cold War

However, it is crucial to first briefly present the history of Finnish neutrality to understand the core tenets of the neutrality identity. Historically, it has two dominant aspects.

Firstly, it represents state survival in the midst of great power politics. While the policy of neutrality was initially imposed on Finland in the form of Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union in 1948 (Agius, 2011: 378), the policy itself was ultimately perceived as a policy of a small state, seeking to navigate in the turbulent international environment and to ensure its freedom of movement (Himanen, 2003: 19). Therefore, neutrality is closely associated with external power struggles and seen as a means of survival.

Secondly, it is associated with a stabilising and peace-promoting role in international politics. During the Cold War, neutrality grew to be seen as a part of the Finnish identity, viewed normatively through its peace-potential. In his 1961 speech, former president Kekkonen characterised Finland as “a physician rather than a judge”, not “accusing” or “condemning” but “diagnosing” and “curing” (Kekkonen, 1961). This gave rise to the Finnish identity as a

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‘peacekeeping superpower’ (Palosaari, 2013: 360). Therefore, the Finnish identity of neutrality is traditionally conceptualised through its peace-potential.

Thus, neutrality was not only seen as a policy of survival but was also a defining factor for the Finnish foreign policy identity. Due to this, the policy of neutrality was seen as a viable security policy choice despite the changes in the international system in 1991 (Prime Minister’s Office, 1992: 16), demonstrating the integral role of neutrality in the Finnish identity.

4.2 1991-1995: The end of the Cold War

The changes in the Finnish identity of neutrality in the early 1990s seem to follow the logic of the hypothesis. Reflecting the changes in the international system, there is continuity in the Finnish military neutrality, while political neutrality is departed from. Following the expectations of the hypothesis, NATO altercasting seems to have encouraged identity change in the political realm but discouraged it in the realm of defence.

The early 1990s provide support for the first part of the hypothesis, as the changes in the international system were considered critical to the Finnish policy. The two circumstances against which the Finnish policy of neutrality was constructed – the bipolar world order and the historic agreement with the Soviet Union – had come to an end, opening room for change in the identity and policy of neutrality. The uncertainty caused by these critical junctures is well described by Kimmo Kiljunen, a Social Democratic Member of Parliament (MP), in the parliamentary debate on the White Paper on Defence Policy: “The security environment has changed. The defence institutions […] have changed. Security systems, international institutions, have all changed in this respect. The entire concept of security with its created needs has changed” (Eduskunta, 1995: 733). What had come to be known as certain had shattered, providing a permissive condition for change in the Finnish neutrality identity.

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The White Paper reveals a changing nature of the neutrality policy, presenting clear divergence from political neutrality. The most evident sign of this is the replacement of ‘puolueettomuus’ (impartiality) with ‘liittoutumattomuus’ (non-alignment) in official rhetoric. Impartiality is seen incompatible with the Finnish aspirations of preventing and solving international problems through active engagement in international cooperation (Prime Minister’s Office, 1995: 39). This is also realised in practice, where the Finnish security policy is seen as “Europeanising”, particularly in reference to foreign policy (Foreign Affairs Committee, 1995: 9). Therefore, there is a clear departure from the Cold War political neutrality.

In contrast, the new policy of non-alignment reflects continuity in military neutrality. From the security political perspective, the perception is that “Finland best advances the stability of Northern Europe by abstaining from military alliances and maintaining credible independent defence” (Foreign Affairs Committee, 1995: 3) and, as put forward by Prime Minister Lipponen in the parliamentary debate, that “this is a natural approach for a small state that is in a geopolitically challenging position” (Eduskunta, 1995: 678). Therefore, it becomes evident that while politically the policy of neutrality changed drastically, this is not matched in the realm of defence.

From this, it can be expected that the Finnish identity of neutrality would have also changed in the political realm but that there would have been continuity in the Finnish identity of military neutrality. This seems to have been the case. The parliamentary debate reveals that while the rhetoric highlights unity with Europe, there is a sense of pride in maintaining the militarily neutral position. On the one hand, the post-Cold War identity construction seems to focus on associating Finland with the European value system. The Cold War identity is given a negative connotation through phrases, such as “walking a tightrope” (Hassi in Eduskunta, 1995: 700) and

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“inbetweenness” (Tarkka in Eduskunta, 1995: 707; Foreign Affairs Committee, 1995: 13), highlighting the trapped position of Finland. In contrast, the post-Cold War rhetoric emphasises the sense of belonging with Europe, as the European values and practices of democracy, fundamental human rights, minority rights, rule of law, and social justice are regarded integral to Finland’s Nordic identity (Prime Minister’s Office, 1995: 6). This demonstrates a break from the identity of political neutrality, as the sense of belonging with Europe is increasingly emphasised.

On the other hand, this does not seem to extent to the realm of defence. In fact, military neutrality and what it represents are viewed with pride, embodying the Finnish core values: sisu (rough translation: perseverance), stamina and independence. As “warriors” and “descendants of miracle men” the Finns are capable of self-reliantly fighting for their independence and sovereignty during difficult times (Virtanen in Eduskunta, 1995: 715), as history shows. Hence, in the words of Prime Minister Lipponen, Finns can “look back on history with pride. The Finnish experiences and activities in international cooperation during the Cold War and particularly in maintaining neighbourly relations are useful assets now and in the future” (Eduskunta, 1995: 678). The history that shaped the Finnish character, thus, justifies military neutrality.

Following this discussion, it appears that the policy change is indeed associated with identity change. The departure from political neutrality was corresponded with more openly European identity. Conversely, the continuity in military neutrality was closely associated with historic heroism. Consequently, two expectations can be made for the NATO altercasting activities: (1) NATO adjusted its behaviour in a way that encouraged the departure from political neutrality, while (2) discouraging change in the realm of defence.

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Regarding the first expectations, NATO altercasting could have contributed towards the Finnish identity change. Using self-presentation techniques, NATO sought to refashion its identity in the post-Cold War world as a European unifier, as the Alliance “continue[d] to serve the main forum where the West [could] formulate and coordinate common political decisions” (NATO, 1994a). Being viewed as a desire to avoid future European divisions in Finland (Foreign Affairs Committee, 1995: 10), this represents perceived NATO dissociation from power politics, which Finland traditionally remained neutral from. Furthermore, through stage management, NATO encouraged increased engagement of Finland in its politics. By offering means of engagement through Partnership for Peace (PfP), NATO created new avenues for cooperation that were compatible with the Finnish identity, while giving Finland the identity of a ‘partner’ as opposed to a third country. With the programme’s focus on “[increasing] stability, [diminishing] threats to peace, and [building] strengthened relationships by promoting the spirit of practical cooperation and commitment to democratic principles” (NATO, 1994b), NATO managed to appeal to the Finnish identity as a ‘peacekeeping superpower’, encouraging increased cooperation. These two altercasting strategies can provide some explanation for the appeal of NATO cooperation and the preference to depart from political neutrality.

Regarding the second expectation, the continued emphasis on collective defence in NATO self-presentation may have reinforced the Finnish identity of military neutrality. In NATO rhetoric, collective defence was portrayed as the main appeal for new members (NATO, 1994a). With the newly established PfP-program, it was specifically the benefit of common defence that characterised the NATO membership: “no single Ally is forced to rely upon its own national efforts alone in dealing with basic security challenges” (NATO, 1995). Therefore, by reaffirming its identity as a collective defence alliance, NATO reinforced the Finnish identity of military neutrality in contrast to alignment with NATO. Furthermore, with the NATO focus on “democratic states to

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our East” (NATO, 1994c), NATO stage management seems to have primarily targeted former Soviet countries. The perception in Finland was that “NATO’s current interest in enlargement is applicable only to Central European countries,” excluding Finland (Tarkka in Eduskunta, 1995: 708-9). Therefore, it appears that NATO self-presentation in this field was perceived as discouraging and, hence, did not produce identity change.

Overall, the changes in the Finnish identity of neutrality through interaction with NATO in the early 1990s follow the logic of the hypothesis. Critical junctures appear to have functioned as a permissive condition for change. In the areas that NATO altercasting was encouraging change, this seems to have functioned as a productive condition, as expected by the theory. In contrast, where NATO reinforced its historical identity, there is continuity in the identity of neutrality.

4.3 2001-2004: Europe in change

The changes in the Finnish neutrality identity in the early 2000s mostly provide support for the hypothesis. In this period the Finnish policy of neutrality came to be increasingly questioned and was described in narrower terms than before, which was then reflected in the decreased dominance of neutrality identity. The push-and-pull force of NATO altercasting can largely explain these changes, though some aspects can also be explained, for example, by interaction at the EU level.

Again, there is support for the first part of the hypothesis, as the events of the early 2000s were regarded critical to the Finnish foreign policy. As stated in the 2004 White Paper on Security and Defence Policy, “the major changes of the recent years are accentuated in the operating environment of the Finnish security and defence policy” (Prime Minister’s Office, 2004: 17). In the light of NATO and EU enlargement to the Baltic States, the terrorist attacks of the 9/11 and the Iraq war, the policies of the 1990s aimed at achieving stability in Europe were regarded unsuitable for the changing environment (Prime Minister’s Office, 2004: 17). Due to this need for reconsideration

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of policy, there was a window of opportunity for redefinition of identity. Therefore, the critical junctures that invoked the 2004 White Paper provided a permissive condition for change.

The 2004 White Paper demonstrates a line of continuity in the policy of military neutrality. However, in contrast to 1995, the White Paper pushes the boundaries of the concept’s definition. Military non-alignment in reference to Finland is only mentioned three times, in contrast to six times in 1995, and is confined to defence: as a “militarily non-aligned country”, Finland “maintains” and “develops” its “defence capabilities”, while closely monitoring the “changes in the security environment” (Prime Minister’s Office, 2004: 8, 87, 97). Moreover, the line between political and military alignment is becoming increasingly blurry, as more and more security-related policies are justified under ‘political alignment’. This is particularly the case in reference to the EU integration in the realm of security and defence, as it is seen that Finland has committed to the “development” and “realisation” of the EU security and defence policies through EU membership (Defence Committee, 2004: 19) and is, thus, willing to limit its conception of military non-alignment in light of the integration process. This implies that what is conceived acceptable under political alignment is expanding and pushing the boundaries of the definition of military neutrality.

Additionally, the 2004 White Paper introduces the possibility of military alignment for the first time with its specific references to the changing security environment. By tying the policy of military non-alignment to the prevailing circumstances, the White Paper suggests that, in case of changing security environment, military alignment is a possibility. The Foreign Affairs Committee (2004) report goes even further by claiming that “NATO membership must be a real security policy option in the future” (15). These references imply that Finland may have chosen to break away from military non-alignment, if it wanted to. Therefore, while there is continuity in the policy of military

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neutrality, as non-alignment is still seen as the most suitable defence arrangement, it is increasingly questioned.

Therefore, following the theory, it can be expected that, while still present, the identity of neutrality would also be less dominant than before. The parliamentary debate on the White Paper provides support for this. Firstly, while the general consensus is that Finland’s foreign policy identity is tied to military neutrality, some representatives of the opposition National Coalition Party openly question this. As argued by the leader of the party, Katainen, “Finland is not, in the traditional sense that we are accustomed to thinking, militarily non-aligned” (Eduskunta, 2004: 33). This signifies that the Finnish foreign policy identity of neutrality is losing its dominance over other identities. Secondly, in contrast to the rhetoric in 1995, only the opposition representatives of the radical right party, the True Finns, continue to highlight the heroism of historic military neutrality (Halme in Eduskunta, 2004: 25). Instead, the prominent view, in the words of a Social Democrat MP, is that “security policy must reflect the real challenges, not the challenges of the past” (Jaakonsaari in Eduskunta, 2004: 7). This signifies diminished dominance of neutrality identity and increased importance of practicality. Overall, while the neutrality identity has a diminishing role in rhetoric, military neutrality remains an appropriate policy for the Finnish character and a suitable way to describe the Finnish foreign policy identity.

Again, there seems to be support for the argument that the policy and identity of neutrality are mutually constitutive. As military neutrality was defined in more constricted terms and the policy of neutrality was increasingly questioned, the identity of neutrality also diminished in dominance. Therefore, it can be expected that NATO’s altercasting efforts would have contributed towards increasingly amenable view of military alignment in Finland, and would have pushed the boundaries of the definition of military neutrality.

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Regards to the self-presentation strategies of NATO, the continued redefinition of NATO functions and role can explain the more amenable view towards military alignment. The reconstruction of NATO identity is evident in the declaration of the 1999 Washington Summit: “we have paid tribute to the achievements of the past and we have shaped a new Alliance to meet the challenges of the future” (NATO, 1999a). With the added emphasis on conflict prevention and crisis management, the NATO identity was framed in terms of not only collective defence but also other security-related functions. The parliamentary debate on the White Paper reveals that this new self-presentation resonated in the Finnish audience. As recognised by a government Central Party MP, Vihriälä: “one has to openly admit that the NATO that some of us remember from the 50s and 60s no longer exists” (Eduskunta, 2004: 116) – NATO had evolved into a crisis management organisation (Prime Minister’s Office, 2004: 58). With the self-identification as a ‘peacekeeping superpower’ and reaffirmation to continued importance of conflict prevention and crisis management in Finnish foreign policy, the new self-presentation of NATO was more compatible with the Finnish values and policies. This seems to have contributed towards more amenable view of NATO.

On the other hand, the NATO stage management seems to have reinforced the Finnish identity of neutrality. Invoking the Article 5 of common defence in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks reaffirmed the Finnish desire to remain outside the military alliance. Clashing with its post-Cold War reformulated image, the NATO operation in Iraq was primarily seen as a breach of international law that brought instability to the world system (Laakso in Eduskunta, 2004: 18). The NATO was, above all, seen as struggling with an internal crisis with some member states forced to a war they did not want (Elo in Eduskunta, 2004: 96). This did not only stand against the Finnish values but also demonstrated the fear of being pulled into other countries’ conflicts through NATO

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membership. This seems to have reaffirmed the identity and policy of neutrality, as NATO actions reinforced the Cold War identities of both Finland and NATO.

The extent to which NATO altercasting caused the reconceptualisation of military neutrality in increasingly limited terms, however, is difficult to disentangle. On the one hand, NATO self-presentation encouraged increased cooperation through the renewal of the PfP-programme with an increased focus on dialogue, cooperation, reform, and enlargement (NATO, 2004), and the full use of partnership in conflict prevention and crisis management operations (NATO, 1999b). This extension of military-related cooperation, combined with the Finnish commitment to develop the cooperation with NATO further through active participation in the PfP -programme (Prime Minister’s Office, 2004: 80), could have contributed towards reconceptualisation of military neutrality. On the other hand, this trend can equally be explained by the EU stage management. As mentioned earlier, the EU integration in the realm of the common security and defence policy likely contributed towards the conceptualisation of political alignment beyond its original remits, defining military neutrality in increasingly restricted terms and Finland as more and more militarily aligned. Therefore, while the extension of NATO cooperation to new security-related realms may have been an encouraging factor, the reconceptualisation of military neutrality in the Finnish politics is best described by a combination of NATO and EU altercasting.

Overall, it appears that the increased doubt over the Finnish identity of neutrality can be at least partly explained by NATO altercasting. As NATO redefined its role in international politics, the Finnish view on military alignment became more amenable. Conversely, as NATO actions endorsed the Alliance’s Cold War identity, the Finnish identity of neutrality was reinforced.

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4.4 2014-2016: the Russian invasion of Crimea

The evolution of the Finnish identity of neutrality between 2014 and 2016 provides partial support for the hypothesis. While it is evident that the war in Ukraine and the Russian invasion of Crimea created a permissive condition for change, the changes in the Finnish neutrality identity cannot fully be explained by NATO altercasting specifically. During this period, military neutrality practically disappeared from the official rhetoric, while the practice of the policy and the core of the Finnish identity followed the traditional neutrality norms. While NATO altercasting can explain the continued presence of these norms, it cannot explain the departure from it in rhetoric.

Like the previous two White Papers, the 2016 White Paper on Foreign and Security Policy emerged as a reaction to the changes in the security environment that were regarded critical to the Finnish foreign policy, providing support for the first part of the hypothesis. Unlike previous critical junctures, the war in Ukraine and the Russian annexation of Crimea were seen to directly “challenge the foundations of the European security system and create instability in the Finnish operating environment” (Prime Minister’s Office, 2016: 13), materialising a risk of an armed conflict. The Finnish view on these events is well described by Ilkka Kanerva, a government National Coalition Party MP, “once again we need to perceive the world with new eyes. Insecurity, confrontation and power politics are the reality. Geopolitics has returned.” (Eduskunta, 2016: 7). This demonstrates a permissive condition for change, as the uncertainty caused by the critical junctures created room for redefinition of identity.

In terms of policy titles, there is a clear break from the policy of military non-alignment. While the 2004 White Paper clearly described Finland as a “militarily non-aligned country” (Prime Minister’s Office, 2004: 8, 87, 97), there is no reference to this in the 2016 White Paper. Instead, it claims that “Finland does not belong to a military alliance” and that “Finland actively and extensively

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strengthens its international networking”, while “[maintaining] the possibility of seeking membership in a military alliance” (Prime Minister’s Office, 2016: 19). This implies that (1) the policy of military neutrality practically has ceased to exist as such, and (2) the NATO non-membership does not in itself make Finland a militarily neutral country. This presents a clear break from the previous policy.

However, despite deserting the title of military non-alignment, there is continuity in terms of policy practice. This is particularly clear in the resumption of active policy of stability, aiming at preventing conflicts and releasing tension in the vicinity through independent credible defence forces and extensive international cooperation (Prime Minister’s Office, 2016: 19). This is remarkable in two different ways. First, it demonstrates a practical return to the Cold War policy. Similarly to the Cold War neutrality, the active policy of stability is perceived as the best means to assure continued independence – that is, to avoid being thrown around like driftwood in the great power politics (Kääriäinen in Eduskunta, 2016: 70). Second, the active policy of stability is, in fact, considered the main alternative for military alignment. The party political positions presented in the parliamentary debate demonstrate how the political parties are divided between the NATO membership supporters and those in favour of active policy of stability1. This implies that by adopting the active policy of stability, the option of military alignment was rejected. Thus, while military non-alignment has disappeared from the official policy rhetoric, it is assured in practice.

Similarly to the policy rhetoric, the terms in which the Finnish identity is described have changed. As the policy title has changed, the references to military neutrality as the defining feature of the Finnish identity have decreased. The parliamentary debate on the White Paper includes the total of

1_{The political parties standing on the right of the political spectrum, namely the National Coalition}

Party, the Swedish People’s Party and partly the True Finns, seem to be in favour of NATO

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12 references to military non-alignment of which six argue for continued military non-alignment and only one vaguely associates military neutrality with the Finnish identity2. This implies that military neutrality is decreasingly associated with the Finnish identity. On the other hand, the references to Finnish identity as a stability producer have increased. Unlike previously when this was attributed to military non-alignment, the prevalent view is that “despite the small size, Finland has always been active internationally and has been there to create common international rules of the game” (Mikkonen in Eduskunta, 2016: 10) and that “it is important that with an active foreign and security policy we are contributing towards building a more stable, more secure and fairer world” (PM Sipilä in Eduskunta, 2016: 19). Evidently, the Finnish identity is built content-wise on the same tenets as before: small size, active internationalism and stabilisation. The main difference is that these are no longer associated with neutrality. Therefore, a similar pattern of change can be identified in the Finnish identity of neutrality as on the Finnish policy. Military neutrality has practically disappeared from the official vocabulary, while the practices of the policy and the realisation of the identity follow the traditional neutrality norms.

Consequently, the same pattern appears here as in the two previous time periods: the changes in the identity of neutrality reflect the changes in the policy of neutrality. Therefore, based on the theory presented earlier, it would be expected that the while NATO altercasting altered the Finnish policy rhetoric, it was not successful in producing a behavioural change.

There is no support for the claim that NATO altercasting caused the change in the Finnish policy rhetoric. While the Finnish cooperation with NATO is extensive in the realm of defence, this cooperation is purely voluntary and specifically rules out collective defence. In contrast, through the

2_{This is in reference to the emphasis on rearmament and preparedness for an armed attack in the}

White Paper (Tuomioja in Eduskunta, 2016: 9). It portrays military non-alignment more as a social fact than as foreign policy identity that Finland seeks to portray.

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EU membership, Finland is committed to the EU decisions on defence and security matters. Close examination of the White Paper reveals that the EU was increasingly perceived in terms of military alignment. The perception was that the EU’s solidarity clause and the mutual assistance clause “hold security policy significance, both in principle as well as in practice,” providing concrete expectations for assistance (Prime Minister’s Office, 2016: 22). This in itself can be interpreted as a form of military alignment, as, upon request, the Member States are required to give assistance “by all the means in their power, including military resources” (Prime Minister’s Office, 2016: 22). Paired with the fact that participation in the NATO cooperation is purely voluntary, it seems more likely that the rhetoric was changed to reflect the EU’s changing security-political identity than as a result of increasing cooperation with NATO.

However, NATO self-presentation may explain why active policy of stability was preferred over NATO membership. Just like the active policy of stability resembled the Cold War policy of neutrality, NATO was increasingly seen in the Cold War terms. By highlighting how “Russia’s aggressive actions against Ukraine have fundamentally challenged our vision of a Europe whole, free, and at peace” (NATO, 2014), NATO assumed a position of defence against an arbitrator that challenged not only European security but also the whole value system. Through rhetorical means, NATO recreated its power political position of the past. This is reflected on the Finnish perception of the world order: “we live in a phase, in which the Cold War set up has partly returned, the relations between Russia and the West are fragile”, and the best means to face this is through stabilising (Korhonen in Eduskunta, 2016: 62). Thus, as NATO portrayed itself increasingly as a defence alliance against Russia and this was mirrored in the Finnish conception of NATO, the Finnish neutrality identity was reinforced.

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Overall, it becomes evident that NATO altercasting can partly explain the diminishing role of Finnish neutrality identity. While NATO altercasting seems to have contributed towards the reinforcement of the neutrality practice in policy and in identity, it does not provide full explanation for the disappearance of military neutrality in identity rhetoric.

4.5 Discussion

Examining the three periods of time reveals that the Finnish identity of neutrality has significantly decreased in importance in the post-Cold War years. It has evolved from encompassing both political and military aspects to officially including neither. According to the theory presented in this thesis, this should be explained by a combination of (1) critical junctures that have created room for redefinition of identity and (2) NATO altercasting that has produced the identity change. The three time periods studied reveal that (1) redefinition of neutrality identity has indeed occurred after critical junctures, and (2) NATO altercasting can explain the emerging pattern in most cases, albeit with some exceptions. Altercasting seems to function as a push-and-pull force for change, encouraging change when it positively resonates in the Finnish audience and discouraging change when it is viewed negatively.

Regards to the first part of the hypothesis, in all three cases critical junctures seem to have prompted reconsideration of the Finnish security and defence policies in light of the changing environment. This demonstrates the logic of critical junctures: the uncertainty caused by an event created permissive conditions for change. Additionally, the cases provide support for the mutually constitutive nature of identity and policy. A policy change seems to mirror a similar change in identity. In 1995, the departure from political neutrality mirrored the departure from the identity of political neutrality. In 2004, the identity of neutrality diminished in dominance as military neutrality was defined in narrower terms and the policy of neutrality was questioned. Finally, in 2016, military neutrality disappeared from both policy and identity rhetoric. Therefore, due to this

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mutually constitutive nature of policy and identity, the cases provide support for the first part of the hypothesis. The uncertainty caused by a critical juncture permitted reconsideration of existing policies that mirrored similar changes in the state identity.

Regarding altercasting, NATO self-presentation and stage management seem to partly explain the emerging changes in the cases. NATO altercasting has both positive and negative tendencies: it can either encourage identity change or reinforce old identities, depending on how it is perceived in Finland. For example, by redefining its purposes and priorities in 1994 and 1999 respectively, NATO portrayed itself in a manner more in line with the Finnish identity and values and, thus, encouraged increased interaction and identity change. This act of self-presentation was then reciprocated with a more amenable view of NATO, which, in turn, was reflected on the policy towards the Alliance. In contrast, by invoking the Article 5 of collective defence after the 9/11 NATO strengthened its traditional identity as a defence organisation. This, in turn, appeared to reaffirm the Finnish identity of neutrality, as NATO stage management was viewed negatively. Considering the fact that the Finnish identity of neutrality was formed in relation to the Cold War power struggle, it appears that whenever NATO portrayed itself as primarily a defence organisation, the Finnish identity of neutrality was reinforced. Therefore, a pattern emerges: when NATO altercasting is viewed positively, the identity of neutrality diminishes in importance. In contrast, when NATO altercasting is viewed negatively, the identity of neutrality is reinforced. Therefore, there seems to be support for the second hypothesis that expects an identity change as a response to appealing altercasting attempts.

However, NATO altercasting cannot explain all the changes in the Finnish identity of neutrality. Specifically the reconceptualisation of military neutrality in increasingly constricted terms in 2004 and the rhetorical departure from military non-alignment in 2016 are more readily explained by the

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Finnish interaction at the EU level. However, instead of providing counterevidence for the hypothesis, this reveals that identities are multi-dimensional. Examining the White Papers reveals multitude of actors that determine the course of the Finnish foreign policy: NATO, the EU, Russia, and Sweden to name a few. Each of these actors can influence the Finnish identity through bilateral interaction, as predicted by the theory presented in this thesis. Some trends can be better explained by interaction with other actors, such as the reconceptualisation of military neutrality and the rhetorical departure form military non-alignment. Most trends are likely caused by a combination of interaction with multiple actors that shape identities. While it may be difficult to distinguish which bilateral interaction causes which effect, this does not disprove the hypothesis – it demonstrates that multiple factors influence identity change.

Overall, the case study provides supportive evidence for the hypothesis. The critical junctures seem to have created a permissive condition for policy and identity change. The patterns in NATO altercasting seem to closely mirror the patterns in the Finnish identity change, demonstrating that altercasting can function both as an encouraging force for change and as a reinforcing factor for neutrality identity. Therefore, depending on the form it takes – positive or negative – it can function as a productive force for change or assure continuity.

5. CONCLUSION

The existing literature on neutrality as a foreign policy has left two specific gaps in literature that this thesis has sought to address. Firstly, it has left the mechanisms causing change in the neutrality identity under-theorised. While scholars have observed that neutrality has been reconceptualised in the post-Cold War era in policy practice, no systematic accounts for how and why this change has occurred have been offered. This thesis has offered one theoretical explanation for this, highlighting the role of interaction with other international actors. Through this, this thesis has sought to

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demonstrate the continued academic relevance of neutrality norm, as neutrality still continues to evolve and adopt new meanings. Secondly, the literature on Finnish neutrality has put emphasis on policies towards Russia and the European Union, neglecting the effect that the interaction with NATO has had on the Finnish identity of neutrality. This thesis has isolated this bilateral relationship and has demonstrated how the changes in the Finnish neutrality identity have mirrored the changes in the Finland-NATO interaction patterns. The following research question arose from these gaps in the literature: how has the interaction with NATO in the post-Cold War era changed the Finnish identity of neutrality?

Building on constructivist literature on International Relations, I have argued that the Finnish identity of neutrality has changed in situations in which (1) there has been a critical juncture, providing a permissive condition for change, and (2) NATO has appealed to Finland through altercasting, which functions as a productive condition. Using a combination of qualitative content analysis and discourse analysis in a single case study has enabled examining the changed meaning of neutrality and mechanisms behind this change in the case of Finland. Looking at the evolution of the Finnish identity of neutrality through three time periods (1991-1995, 2001-2004 and 2014-2016) reveals that (1) critical junctures have indeed prompted reconsideration of the Finnish security and defence policies, providing permissive conditions for change; (2) the changes in the Finnish policy of neutrality are mirrored in the Finnish identity of neutrality, demonstrating the mutual constitution of identity and policy; and (3) NATO altercasting has indeed functioned as a push-and-pull force for change in the Finnish identity of neutrality in majority of the cases. When this has not been the case, the change can be explained by the Finnish interaction with other international actors, demonstrating identity’s multidimensional character. The case study, thus, provides overall support for the hypothesis.

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While I have specifically sought to explain the change in the identity of neutrality, the presented theoretical framework invites for its application to identity change in general. Focusing on the permissive and productive conditions for change, the general logic of the theory is not limited to neutrality identity. This research, thus, also contributes to the academic literature on identity change, and invites for future application of the theorised causal mechanisms between interaction at the international level and identity change to different types of cases.

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From 'impartiality' to 'non-membership in a military alliance': The impact of nato-Finland interaction on the evolution of the Finnish neutrality identity