Abstract
The rise to power of Konrad Adenauer was an unexpected one. At the ‘young’ age of seventy-two, the long-time mayor of Cologne won the first free democratic election in Germany since 1933, becoming the chancellor of the newly-founded Federal Republic. At that time little known outside the British sector, Adenauer was able to overcome considerable initial internal opposition and successfully built a Kanzlerdemokratie (Chancellor Democracy) that would last fourteen years. He is nowadays almost unanimously considered the founding father of ‘post-war Germany.’ His present-day popularity, however, tends to obscure his problematic first years in office. If known at all, Adenauer’s problems are regularly described as mere bumps in his farsighted path towards regaining sovereignty for the country. This thesis challenges this common view by highlighting domestic and international issues, arguing that his early position was much direr than is often anticipated.
Adenauer’s national challenges centered on his dealings with the Allied High Commissioners representing the victorious Western nations. The country’s lack of sovereignty was blatantly obvious as the Western powers not only maintained a veto right over any law passed by parliament, but excluded pivotal policy areas such as foreign and defense policy from the government’s remit. Criticized by the opposition as Erfüllungspolitik (compliance politics), Adenauer tenaciously worked on gradually shifting the relationship from the humble representative of a defeated country towards an ‘inferior partnership’ based on respect and cooperation. The Petersberg Accord in November 1949 brought some improvements in the occupation status, but all-in progress was frustratingly slow and indecisive. At the same time, the chancellor was under immense pressure from a restless population to quickly improve an abysmal and further deteriorating economic situation. An increasingly vocal opposition led by Kurt Schumacher exploited Adenauer’s precarious position, sensing a chance to topple the government.
The heightened tensions of the Cold War culminating in the outbreak of hostilities on the Korean peninsula ‘rescued’ Adenauer’s chancellorship. Under the forceful leadership of the U.S. State Department the Allies fundamentally changed their approach towards Germany. Within a very short timeframe the country ‘mutated’ from defeated foe to indispensable ally against any Soviet aggression in Europe, also triggering a change in attitude by the High Commissioners. Even more important for the survival of the chancellor, the worldwide economic boom caused by the Korean War greatly benefitted the German export industry, being widely considered as the starting point of the following Wirtschaftswunder (economic miracle). Now Adenauer’s policy of West integration bore tangible results, and with soaring approval ratings he could cement an almost unassailable position for years to come.
Adenauer’s international challenges were dominated by the contentious relationship with France. His overarching policy of West integration would only succeed if at its core a French/German rapprochement could be achieved. However, France’s thinking was ‘obsessed’ with security concerns against its old arch enemy, leading her to advocate an economically weak and virtually defenseless ‘parcelized’ Germany. Paris was perpetually concerned that a sustainable recovery of the German economy would again overpower the rest of Europe, building the fundament for yet another potentially aggressive policy. One way of taming such dangers was to ‘detach’ the Saar region with its highly valuable coal and steel resources. In the same vein, defining the Rhine line as the primary defense parameter against a Soviet expansionist policy was preferable to any rearmament of the long-term foe. The public outcry in Germany was livid and across the political spectrum. Adenauer faced immense pressure not to accede to any unilateral change of the 1937 borders prior to a formal peace treaty, and to refute any policy that would not grant the country the undeniable right of defending its territory.
The grass roots Ohne Mich (Without Me) movement formed a viable threat to the sustainability of the government.
Again, Adenauer was ‘rescued’ by external initiatives. France was acutely aware that its vastly diminished power relative to the United States made its position untenable. It devised two plans along identical lines to ‘Europeanize’ the issues, in order to preserve some influence over developments in Germany. The Schuman Plan called for joint oversight over the vital coal, iron and steel industry, thus alleviating concerns that Germany may divert resources for war preparations. But it also allowed Adenauer to subsume the Saar conflict under the overarching aim of French/German rapprochement and European integration. Similarly, the Pleven Plan proposed the creation of a joint West European army, securing a fair share contribution of Germany in defending its own soil whilst simultaneously preventing a nationalistically driven rearmament of the country that may potentially threaten France’s security. Adenauer endorsed the plan as it would secure the Western Allies’ defense support for the entire country, with the discriminatory elements of the plan being of secondary importance.
Despite being undoubtedly one of the ablest politicians Germany ever had, Adenauer’s chancellorship may not have survived its initial phase without the ‘help’ it received through the changing international environment. External events and initiatives provided the escape route for some of the most inextricable domestic issues. The Korean War was arguably the most important event as it fundamentally altered the United States’ approach towards Germany. Acknowledging the relative power structure after the Second World War, this then ‘induced’ France to launch its ‘Europeanization’ initiatives to ameliorate the French/German relationship. These developments were instrumental in securing Adenauer’s position, paving the way to make his name nowadays synonymous with Germany’s ascendency after 1945.
The Embattled Chancellor
Konrad Adenauer’s fight for political survival from 1949 to 1951
Tabea H. Wanninger
Thesis submitted for the Masters of Arts Degree
Universitaet Leiden, The Netherlands
Europaeum Programme: European History and Civilisation
(Leiden – Paris Sorbonne I – Oxford)
24
thJune 2016
Oxford Supervisor: Dr. Sebastian Gehrig (Wadham College)
Leiden Supervisor: Dr. Patrick Dassen
Table of Contents
Introduction……….……… 1-5
National challenges – the troubled relationship with the High
Commissioners………..……..6-19
a. The framework – Adenauer’s political pillars and the Occupation
Statute………...………....6-11
b. Demolition and the Petersberg Accord………....……...11-15
c. Economic difficulties………..………....15-17
d. Unexpected ‘salvation’ – the Korean War………..…17-19
International challenges – contention and rapprochement with
France….………...……20-36
a. Saar Conventions and European Council……….………..20-23
b. The Schuman Plan……….……….23-27
c. West Germany’s precarious defense position………....…….27-32
d. The rearmament debate and the Pleven Plan………..……32-36
Conclusion………...……….…….37-41
Bibliography……….…42-47
Appendices………48-52
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Introduction
1945 not only proved to be the annihilation of the Nazi regime but it appeared as if the long career of Konrad Adenauer had ended as well. The British sector leader dismissed the long-term, and just recently re-instituted mayor of Cologne in early 1946, placing him almost certainly in definite retirement at the ‘youthful’ age of sixty-nine. Yet like a phoenix Adenauer rose form his ‘political ashes.’ He out-maneuvered and pushed aside better known and more popular politicians like Jakob Kaiser, co-founder of the Christian Democratic Party (CDU) in the Soviet zone, or Karl Arnold, Minister President in populous North-Rhine Westphalia, to become the leader of this newly-founded center-right party. Against strong opposition even in his own party, he then succeeded to become the first Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), notably by a single vote – his own. From there on, Adenauer’s Chancellorship is regularly described as a continuum of consecutive successes, barely interrupted by a couple of minor bumps in the road. However, in the beginning this was not the case. In the first half of 1950 the Chancellor was just holding onto power by the ‘flesh of his teeth,’ and it was not until mid-1952 that this precarious situation had abated, and Adenauer had relatively secured his position in the party, the government, and with the public.
Today’s popular conception of Adenauer’s chancellorship is the impression of him as a continuous ascending star, evidenced in polls regularly showing him as the most influential German in history, with a margin of up to fifty percent over the second placed, Otto von Bismarck. The initial struggles of Adenauer are almost completely forgotten. Similarly, historians have approached the Adenauer era from a more teleological perspective downplaying the early difficulties. There is little recent literature been added to the immense library of books on the chancellor, with the effect that the historiography is almost entirely based on the dichotomy of the East-West struggle in which the logic of Adenauer’s ‘policy of strength’
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appears convincing and rational. Against this background, this thesis attempts to present a ‘twist’ to the common picture by highlighting the various difficulties he had to overcome in the first years in office. It would have been very possible that he would have just become a prominent footnote of the post-World War Two history instead of being considered one of the great statesmen of his time, being mentioned in one breath with de Gaulle and Eisenhower, or the founding fathers of European integration, Jean Monnet, Alcide de Gasperi and Paul-Henri Spaak. Therefore, this thesis argues that the multiple problems faced by Adenauer in its initial phase in office may well have cost him the chancellorship. Notwithstanding his undisputed political and tactical capabilities in influencing domestic developments, it were the politican and economic consequences of external factors like the outbreak of the Korean War or firen initiatives like the Schuman Plan and the Pleven Plan that ultimately determined Adenauer’s fate as much as his domestic policies.
Adenauer’s historical image is still shaped by the writings of Hans-Peter Schwarz. The political scientist was in the privileged position of being able to conduct personal background interviews with Adenauer and being granted access to at the time unpublished material not accessible to other historians. He not only published multiple books analyzing every aspect of Adenauer’s thinking, but also wrote the two volumes dealing with the Adenauer era of the authoritative history of the Federal Republic of Germany.1 Schwarz generally paints the picture of a wise, far-sighted and all-encompassing Chancellor who in the end was always proven right, whereas other politicians often took longer to realize the benefits of, and ultimately adopt to Adenauer’s policies. Whilst at times acknowledging the accommodative character of this policy
1 Books used by him are the following: H.-P. Schwarz, Die Ära Adenauer: Gründerjahre Der Republik
1949-1957, Vol. 2., (Stuttgart, 1981); H.-P. Schwarz, Adenauer Der Aufstieg: 1876-1952, (Stuttgart, 1986); H.-P.
Schwarz, Vom Reich zur Bundesrepublik: Deutschland im Widerstreit der außenpolitischen Konzeptionen in den
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towards the Allies, even calling Adenauer the ‘Chancellor of the Americans,’ he is quick to dismiss counter-viewpoints of political opponents as petty, irrelevant or short-sighted. This essay differs inasmuch as particularly in the period analyzed it was not primarily Adenauer’s conscious policy but external factors that provided solutions to inextricable domestic problems.
Josef Foschepoth presented a more critical view in his book of the Chancellor and the ‘German Question.’2 He argues that Adenauer never truly sought a policy of reunification but, rather, only pretended so in order to appease and mollify the public.3 However, Foschepoth also considers the early problems faced by Adenauer as mere bumps in the road that only slightly hampered his unrelenting progress, a view challenged by this thesis. Hermann-Josef Rupieper strongly disagrees with the view postulated by Schumacher that Adenauer was the ‘Chancellor of the Allies,’4 somewhat contradicting his own statement that the “options available to the German politicians in the early fifties was limited by the relationship of the anti-Hitler alliance amongst themselves.”5 Again, this essay argues that Adenauer was foremost not ‘master of his own destiny’ but was significantly pre-determined in his policies by the international framework.
Adenauer’s rise took place against the backdrop of the return of the so-called ‘German Question’ after 1945. Dating as far back as the ascend of Prussia under Frederick the Great, during the nineteenth century Germany increasingly challenged and eventually surpassed Great Britain as the European economic powerhouse, and in military terms humiliated the traditional land power France. The creation of the German Empire in 1872 under Otto von Bismarck shook the foundations of the European power balance. Thus, the ‘German Question’ was essentially
2 J. Foschepoth, Adenauer Und Die Deutsche Frage, (Göttingen, 1988).
3 Stated in J. Weber, Die Republik der fünfziger Jahre: Adenauer’s Deutschlandpolitik auf dem Prüfstand, (München, 1989).
4 H.-F. Rupieper, Der deutschlandpolitische Handlungsspielraum der Bundesregierung 1949-1955, in J. Weber,
Die Republik der fünfziger Jahre: Adenauer’s Deutschlandpolitik auf dem Prüfstand, (München, 1989), p. 77.
5 “Allerdings wurden die Optionen deutscher Politik in den frühen fünfziger Jahren vornehmlich von den
Beziehungen der ehemaligen Alliierten der Anti-Hitler-Koalition untereinander, weniger von der Stellung der Bundesrepublik zu diesen Mächten, bestimmt […].“ Ibid., p. 71.
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the relationship of the newly emerged power in the middle of Europe towards the traditional powers of France, Great Britain and Russia (and a declining Austria-Hungary).
Gerhard Ritter, one of the core authorities on the ‘German Question’ focused on its pre-1945 developments.6 He strongly attacks the thesis of the historian Fritz Fischer who stipulated that during their ascendency Germans developed a ‘natural’ tendency towards authoritarian regimes, causing the outbreak of the First World War and the rise of the Nazi regime. According to Ritter, singling out Germany is misleading since other countries have supported totalitarian regimes as well. J. K. Snowden analyzed the ‘German Question’ specifically in the context of the Cold War ideological conflict past 1945.7 With the emergence of the Iron Curtain Germany was split into two parts, losing territories in the East, and causing the issues of regaining sovereignty versus promoting reunification to become permanent topics in German politics. Similarly, Alfred Jütter describes the German Question as the “quest to politically determine and shape central Europe.”8 He considers the control of central Europe a long-standing theme throughout European history, where domestic and international interests clashed.9 The difficulties of finding answers to these overarching pillars go a long way of explaining Adenauer’s first troubled years in office. He was constantly forced into balancing acts to accommodate domestic public opinion whilst simultaneously acknowledging the supreme power of the Allies over a defeated Germany.
The thesis is divided into two broad chapters. The first one focusses on Adenauer’s contentious relationship with the Allied High Commissioners and the quest for sovereignty. The German government had to constantly find the delicate balance between assertively
6 G. Ritter, Das Deutsche Problem. Grundfragen deutschen Staatslebens gestern und heute, (München, 1962). 7 J. K. Snowden, The German Question 1945-1973. Continuity in Change, (London, 1975); the same view is shared by W.R. Smyser, From Yalta to Berlin: the Cold War struggle over Germany, (New York, 1999). 8 Es geht um die politische Gestaltung und Ausgestaltung der europäischen Mitte. In A. Jütter, Die deutsche
Frage. Eine Bestandsaufnahme, (Köln, 1971), p. 2.
9 A similar stance is taken by D. Calleo, The German Problem Reconsidered. Germany and the World Order,
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demanding more room for manoeuvre and acknowledging its inferior position as defeated nation. Whilst initial progress was frustratingly slow, the outbreak of the Korean War substantially altered the Allied powers’ approach towards Germany - the country ‘mutated’ from punishable foe to indispensable ally. In its wake the all-important issue of the population’s economic situation massively improved, marking the starting point of the famous Wirtschaftswunder. The second chapter highlights the challenges that characterized the relationship with France. Rapprochement between the two arch enemies was at the core of Adenauer’s overarching policy of West integration. It was a fractious process of accommodating France’ deep-seated ‘obsession’ with security whilst simultaneously preserving the integrity of the German borders and granting the country the undeniable sovereign right of defending its soil. The solution in either case was the ‘Europeanization’ of the issues through the French initiatives of the Schuman and the Pleven Plan respectively.
Dividing the thesis into domestic and international aspects is somewhat artificial. None of the issues happened in isolation or can be allocated to either of the spheres only. Similarly, there was no singular causality between problem and solution. For example, the Korean War not only affected the relationship with the High Commissioners but also had a major impact on the rearmament debate. Notwithstanding, the approach was chosen as all issues had one dominating aspect. Similarly, while the economic problems may have been caused by international developments, they first and foremost played out in the national debate and standing of the government. Likewise, whereas the Schuman Plan also affected the ‘domestic’ issue of demolition it was foremost geared towards finding a solution in the contentious French/German relationship. Therefore, while it is recognized that challenges and solutions were intertwined and feeding on each other, the division helps to highlight the principal link between cause and effect.
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National challenges – the troubled relationship
with the High Commissioners
The framework – Adenauer’s political pillars and the Occupation Statute
The general elections to the German Bundestag (Parliament) in 1949 – the first democratic federal elections since the Nazi takeover in 1933 – was foremost a fierce contest between the Christian Democratic Party (CDU), led by Konrad Adenauer, and the Social Democratic Party (SPD) under the leadership of Kurt Schumacher. The campaigns primarily centered on the different economic policies and the SPD was generally perceived as having an edge over its opponent.1 However, much to the consternation of Schumacher the predicted landslide victory of the center-left spectrum did not occur (the other heavy casualty was the Communist Party Germany (KPD) under the leadership of Max Reimann with only 5.7 percent of the popular vote).2 For Adenauer, as important as the triumph itself, was that the election result created the mathematical possibility to form a center-right, conservative-led Kleine Koalition (small coalition), in contrast to the ‘Grand Coalition’ of the CDU and the SPD as envisioned and actively supported by leading politicians in both parties.3 Inviting chief figures from the conservative political party spectrum to his private house – the famous Rhöndorfer Konferenz - Adenauer set out to promote, and achieve, a center-right government.4
1 A. C. Storbeck, Die Regierungen des Bundes und der Länder seit 1945, (München, 1970), p. 39. 2 Ibid.
3 Schwarz, Die Ära Adenauer, (Stuttgart, 1981), p. 30; internationally, a coalition was also deemed as the most probable outcome of the election. See The New York Times, "Western Germany will vote today; coalition likely," (14 August 1949) by Drew Middleton; R. Hiscocks, The Adenauer Era, (Philadelphia, 1966).
4 These political parties were the following, besides the CDU: the Christian Socialist Union (CSU), the Bavarian Party (BP), the Free Democratic Party (FDP), and the German Party (DP); Williams described Adenauer’s programme as 'heroic' for going "against the political tide of the time." In C. Williams, Adenauer: The Father of
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One of the main obstacles for Adenauer was the so-called Brückentheorie (bridge theory) prominently postulated by Jakob Kaiser from his own party.5 Based on the premise of a quick reunification, the theory argued that the Federal Republic should remain neutral in the American-Soviet divide. Only this neutrality would ensure that the existing split of the country would not become perpetual, and that Germany would not again be devastated in case the Cold War turned hot. Instead, the country should try to build a ‘bridge’ as a credible arbiter between the two superpowers. The theory was outright rejected by Adenauer.6 In contrast, he forcefully formulated his policy of Westbindung (Western integration) whereas the Federal Republic had to irrevocably integrate and bind itself to the Western societies – that part of the world where it ‘rightfully’ belonged to.7 In his conviction, neutrality was tantamount to accepting Soviet supremacy over Europe. Only through the integration into the U.S.-led Western world could Germany hope to regain its sovereignty and economic prosperity.
Adenauer had a very unlikely but invaluable ‘helper’ in the person of Schumacher himself.8 Having paid a heavy personal price with years in concentration camps for his resistance against the Nazi regime, he saw the Social Democrats as the ‘true and genuine’ resistance against Hitler already at a time when the Allies still pursued a policy of appeasement towards the Führer.9 The election result had shocked and embittered him, exacerbating his cynicism and uncompromising stance towards the High Commission. Rather than fostering the simmering sentiments for a Grand Coalition, Schumacher perceived compromises with political opponents as a ‘betrayal’ of reconstructing Germany according to true Socialist ideas.
5 A. Hillgruber, Deutsche Geschichte 1945-1982: die "deutsche Frage" in der Weltpolitik, (Stuttgart, 1983), pp. 32-33; for a detailed description of the history of the theory see Schwarz, Vom Reich zur Bundesrepublik, pp. 299-392.
6 Not only did Adenauer reject Kaiser’s international relations conceptions but also his propagated 'Christian Socialism.' See S. Creuzberger Kampf für die Einheit: das gesamtdeutsche Ministerium und die politische Kultur
des Kalten Krieges 1949-1969, (Düsseldorf, 2008), p. 42.
7 Hillgruber, Deutsche Geschichte, p. 37; Schwarz, Vom Reich zur Bundesrepublik, p. 291, 393-452. 8 P. Merseburger, Der schwierige Deutsche. Kurt Schumacher: eine Biographie, (Stuttgart, 1995), p. 382. 9 Hillgruber, Deutsche Geschichte, p. 34; similarly, the public saw him as the more adequate politician to lead the nation. In A. Baring, Aussenpolitik in Adenauers Kanzlerdemokratie, (München, 1969), p. 2.
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Therefore, despite widespread backing by the Länder (federal states) and the population the option for a non-conservative government eventually fell through.10 Therefore, left without a genuine alternative, Adenauer’s ideas formulated at the Rhöndorfer Konferenz succeeded, and he was inaugurated as the first chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany on 20 September 1949.
In his first speech in front of the Bundestag, Adenauer tried to counter the view held by a substantial part of the German population that the very formation of a West German government was the institutionalization of a permanent divide. “Without the disappearance of the division of Germany, Europe will never find peace,” he said, tying peace and the cause for the country’s split directly to the tensions between the two superpowers.11 Only when these tensions decrease and eventually disappear will Germany have a chance to be reunited. In contrast, the historian Theodor Eschenburg criticized the lack of political will to pursue a Grundgesetz (Basic Law) encompassing all of Germany rather than the separatist sentiment as already evidenced in 1948 with the Parlamentarische Rat.12 The law was perceived as being heavily influenced by the Allied military governors who had exercised their veto right on a number of occasions. Therefore, Adenauer not only had to dispel the notion that he was not fighting for the reunification of Germany but, even more damaging, that his chancellorship was directy to be blamed for the perpetuation of the country’s split. In the following months and years the ‘German Question’ in its revised form under the East-West conflict constantly
10 Die Zeit, "Koalition des Wiederaufbaus," (25 August 1949), by Ztlcanung-Pietar.
11 Wenn ich vom Frieden in der Welt und in Europa spreche, dann, meine Damen und Herren, muß ich auf die
Teilung Deutschlands zurückkommen. Die Teilung Deutschlands wird eines Tages - das ist unsere feste Überzeugung - wieder verschwinden. Ich fürchte, daß, wenn sie nicht verschwindet, in Europa keine Ruhe eintreten wird. Diese Teilung Deutschlands ist durch Spannungen herbeigeführt worden, die zwischen den Siegermächten entstanden sind. Auch diese Spannungen werden vorübergehen. Wir hoffen, daß dann der Wiedervereinigung mit unseren Brüdern und Schwestern in der Ostzone und in Berlin nichts mehr im Wege steht. InStenographische Berichte des Deutschen Bundestages, Sitzung Nr. 5 (20 September 1949), p. 30.
12 The Parlamentarische Rat refers to the conference-style meeting in 1948 between leading politicians and prime ministers of the Länder. Although an invitation was send to politicians in the Soviet zone, many did not attend due to fear of not being able to return. Schwarz, Die Ära Adenauer, p. 2; A similar view is presented by the historian Manfred Overesch. See M. Overesch, Einheit oder Teilung? Westdeutsche Entscheidungsträger vor
der gesamtdeutschen Frage 1945-1947, in J. Foschepoth, Kalter Krieg und Deutsche Frage: Deutschland im Widerstreit der Mächte, 1945-1952, (Göttingen, 1985), p. 273, 279-280.
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required delicate balancing acts between nationalistic expectations and the harsh reality of a defeated non-sovereign nation.
The ‘Occupation Statute’ was formally proclaimed one day after the swearing in of Adenauer as chancellor and was set up to “act in lieu of a peace treaty between the Western occupying powers and the new Federal Republic of Germany.”13 Although The New York Times wrote that the dominance of the Allied powers had been replaced by ‘civil occupation’ there remained a vast number of rights reserved for the Western powers, including all aspects of foreign policy and international trade, or denying any military build-up.14 Effectively Germany was placed into the status of a protectorate, with the Allied powers maintaining a veto right against any laws passed by the German Bundestag. André François-Poncet regularly reminded Adenauer of his inferior position - in his first meeting with the High Commissioners, he was pointedly asked by the French representative whether “he was aware of the rights of the High Commissioners.”15 As headquarters the High Commission had consciously chosen the same hotel in Petersberg that the English Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain stayed in during the 1938 Sudetenland Crisis, seen synonymous to the detested appeasement policy.16 But now the roles were reversed. Adenauer and his ministers had to climb the small road up to the Hotel, a perceived humiliation deeply resented by Adenauer who not only felt superior in age but inasmuch as being a publicly elected government head instead of a ‘mere’ representative.17 Thus, the place of residence of the High Commissioners unambiguously demonstrated who held the true authority in West Germany.18
13
Text of Occupation Statute promulgated on the 12th May 1949 by the Military Governors and Commanders in Chief of the Western Zones, [http://www.cvce.eu/obj/text_of_the_occupation_statute_of_germany_bonn
_12_may_1949-en-6750efd3-4b34-4fec-9a4a-df0ff125d302.html], (accessed 3 June 2016). Appendix A 14 The New York Times, "Civil Occupation formally begun in West Germany," (22 September 1949), by Jack Raymond.
15 H.-P. Schwarz and R. Pommerin (eds.), Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland.
Adenauer und die Hohen Kommissare, Band 1 – 1949-1951, (München, 1989). Nr. 1 (29 September 1949), p. 1.
16 Schwarz, Die Ära Adenauer, p. 42. 17 Schwarz, Adenauer. Der Aufstieg, p. 673. 18 Schwarz, Die Ära Adenauer, p. 42 .
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Besides his contentious dealings with the High Commissioners, Adenauer faced immense pressure to deliver on the election promise of substantial economic improvements. The Soziale Marktwirtschaft (social market economy) personified in the Economics Minister Ludwig Erhard had been a key cornerstone in the electoral success of the CDU and the population was impatient in experiencing swift improvements in its living standard, particularly regarding food, employment and housing. Given the utter destruction during the war and the unprecedented refugee stream from the former Eastern provinces, there was an almost insurmountable gap between expectations and reality, causing frustration with the government. In addition, a broad-based opposition movement formed around the SPD which relentlessly attacked Adenauer in not pursuing forcefully enough the reunification process. Shortly after the creation of the Federal Republic the Soviet Union institutionalized in its zone the German Democratic Republic (GDR) which was seen as prove that Adenauer’s uncompromising Western integration policy was cementing the German divide indefinitely. Carlo Schmid from the SPD vividly attacked in the Bundestag the chancellor’s allegedly too accommodative policy towards the Allied powers. As the division of Germany was mainly caused by the Cold War the government needed to actively hold the Western Allies accountable for their responsibility for the unification process.19 In this fundamental question for the German people there was no room for compromises or concessions towards the Allies.20
Adenauer was stuck between ‘a rock and a hard place.’ On the one hand, he needed to demonstrate strength and resilience in representing the interests of the German people. But on the other hand, he had to realistically acknowledge the lack of sovereignty as a defeated country, with the necessary subordination towards the High Commissioners. The chancellor had to
19 Stenographische Berichte des Bundestages, Sitzung Nr. 10 (29 September 1949), p. 184.
20 The German weekly newspaper Die Zeit described this as 'destructive politics' by the Social Democrats with nationalistic tendencies. However, the German population was open to these arguments. See Die Zeit,
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constantly walk a small tightrope, a delicate balancing act where any misstep could have disastrous consequences.
Demolition and the Petersberg Accord
Since 1945 the Western powers had continuously increased their armed forces and civilian personnel in their respective zones to secure public order and cope with the immense administrative challenge of managing a destroyed and demoralized country. Consequently, the Besatzungskosten (occupation costs) were skyrocketing, threatening to cripple the government in its infancy. As an example, in 1950 the occupation costs reached an astounding 4.5 Billion Deutsche Mark, equivalent to a staggering thirty-six percent of the total budget.21 Adenauer repeated complaints towards the High Commissioners about this massive burden fell on deaf ears. They claimed it being sanctioned by “international law and recognized in the Hague Convention of 1907,”22 apart from the fact that the full costs were never really paid.23 Consequently, the topic never ceased its importance during the first term of Adenauer’s chancellorship and flared up in domestic policies on a regular basis. For Adenauer there seemed to be only one way out of this situation: to decrease and eventually end the occupation statute.
The tensions in economic relationship with the Allies were dramatically aggravated by the intended demolition of German industries. In accordance with the decisions at the Potsdam Conference, the Western powers saw the demolition as a legitimate reparation policy to cover part of the costs to rebuild Europe after the destruction caused by the Nazi regime.24 Initial plans in 1946 called for a dramatic reduction of German industrial production capacity to half
21 Schwarz, Die Ära Adenauer, p. 44.
22 J. J. McCloy, Report on Germany: Sept. 21, 1949 – July 31, 1952, Office of the U. S. High Commissioner for Germany, (Cologne, 1952), p. 56.
23 Ibid. 24 Ibid., p. 122.
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of its 1938 level. However, this was deeply resented by the general public who saw the policy to be motivated by funding the reconstruction of the French and British economies at the expense of the German people. 25 The affected workers retaliated with repeated strikes and disruptions of the demolition process which in turn triggered harsh punishment by the Allied military governors.26 The Internationale Ruhrbehörde (International Ruhr Authority) founded in December 1948 to place vital resources like coal, iron, and steel under direct European control added to the bitterness of the confrontation.27 It was interpreted as a cynic tool to eventually “bring all German key industries under long-term Allied control.”28
A Bundestag resolution initiated by the opposition SPD “demanding immediate cessation of the dismantling program” was adopted with widespread support from all political parties.29 It was a constant topic in the government’s Kabinettssitzungen (Cabinet meetings), and Adenauer time and again appealed to the High Commissioners “for some concession on the issue of dismantling.”30 The High Commissioners maintained their stance by emphasizing that the demolition of industrial plants was closely tied to the security question in Europe. Adenauer acknowledged this but in turn highlighted it demoralizing effect, undermining the overall process of integrating Germany back into Europe.31 However, according to Werner Abelshauser the “German public measured the significance of the demolition process based on
25 In particular France followed a policy of binding its occupied zone closely to its economy. See Schwarz,
Adenauer. Der Aufstieg, p. 554; H. Elzer, Konrad Adenauer, Jakob Kaiser, und die >>kleine
Wiedervereinigung<<: die Bundesministerien im aussenpolitischen Ringen um die Saar 1949 bis 1955, (Röhrig,
2008), pp. 54-58.
26 Schwarz, Die Ära Adenauer, p. 44, 62.
27 Office of the Historian, Draft Agreement for the Establishment of an International Authority for the Ruhr. [https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1948v02/d371], (accessed 5 May 2016).
28 Die Wirtschaftskontrolle durch das Militärische Sicherheitsamt und durch die Ruhrbehörde, so war zu
befürchten, würde weitere Schlüsselbereiche der deutschen Wirtschaft westalliierter Steuerung überantworten.
In Schwarz, Die Ära Adenauer, p. 64; See also Schwarz, Adenauer. Der Aufstieg, p. 554.
29 The New York Times, "Germans open Parliament; Demand end to Dismantling," (08 September 1949), by Jack Raymond.
30 The New York Times, "Adenauer asks for some curb on Dismantling," (13 September 1949).
31 The Allied High Commissioners stance was voiced in a letter by the British representative Robertson. See U. Enders (ed.), Die Kabinettsprotokolle der Bundesregierung. Band 1– 1949, (Boppard am Rhein, 1984), Sitzung Nr. 17 (2 November 1949), p. 165.
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its original scope and its strong psycho-political impact.”32 In reality, the economic consequences were exaggerated and put out of proportion.33 It was even used as a tool by Adenauer to ‘test the waters’ of any sentiment change with the High Commissioners, but to no avail. On the contrary, they demanded from Adenauer to ‘detox’ the environment with regards to the demolition and de-escalate the public resentment.34
Eventually, Adenauer relented and pushed for a reversal of policy. In October 1949 the Bundeskabinett acknowledged that a participation in the various European organizations was in the interest of the country and preferable to the uncompromising confrontation as demanded by the SPD. It was now prepared to send representatives to the International Ruhr Authority, though initially as observers only.35 In justifying the reversal Adenauer strongly argued that the Federal Republic had to recognize its inferiority towards the Allies due to the defeat in the war, and was thus obliged to take the first steps towards compromises.36 The move substantially dented Adenauer’s standing with the general public but simultaneously much improved the relationship with the Western powers. Again, the chancellor’s stance was helped by Schumacher’s cynical attitude and consistent charges against the High Commissioners who perceived Adenauer as the ‘lesser evil of the two’.37 His shift in opinion was ultimately to recognize the fact that the Allies repeatedly made the joining of the Ruhrbehörde a prerequisite for any concessions on their behalf.38
32 Die deutsche Öffentlichkeit maß die Bedeutung der Demontagen damals wie heute an ihrem ursprünglich
geplanten Umfang und an der erheblichen psycho-politischen Wirkung […]. In W. Abelshauser, Wirtschaftsgeschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1949-1980. (Frankfurt am Main,1983), p. 25.
33 Ibid.
34 Schwarz, Die Hohen Kommissare, 1949-1951, Nr. 3 (17 November 1949), p. 25. 35 Enders, Kabinettsprotokolle – 1949, Sitzung Nr. 9 (4 Oktober 1949), pp. 102-103. 36 Schwarz, Die Ära Adenauer, pp. 64-65.
37 See Schwarz, Die Hohen Kommissare, 1949-1950, Nr. 3 (17 November 1949), p. 19 for an example of Adenauer denouncing Schumacher in front of the High Commissioners.
38 H. Vogt, Wächter der Bonner Republik: Die Alliierten Hohen Kommissare 1949-1955, (Paderborn, 2004), p. 18.
14
The Occupation Statute provided for a review and potential revision within twelve to eighteen months, a provision that made it a ‘workable agreement’ for Adenauer.39 In fact, the revision came much earlier than expected as it was replaced in November 1949 by the Petersberger Abkommen (Petersberg Accord).40 Hailed internationally as a move seeking to “avoid the mistakes made by the victorious nations after the First World War” it was also a personal triumph for the chancellor.41 Articles I-III acknowledged the Federal Republic as part of the Western community, one of the most important pillars of Adenauer’s policy.42 The demolition list was substantially reduced, citing as arguments the rise of unemployment and the related dissatisfaction and unrest amongst the German population.43 As such, Germany’s consent to join the International Ruhr Authority was reciprocated with rather wide-ranging concessions by the High Commissioners.
But Adenauer was not rewarded accordingly. Whilst the Bundeskabinett was by now firmly supporting the policy shift, the public outcry was deafening. In December 1949 the approval rating of the chancellor had fallen to an unprecedented low thirty-three percent.44 The SPD decried it as a selling out of German interests to the Allies and as an intrusion into the fundamental rights of any government.45 The tumultuous Bundestag session on 24th/25th November was inundated with allegations and personal insults between the combatting parties, culmination in the infamous exclamation by Schumacher that Adenauer was the Bundeskanzler der Alliierten (chancellor of the Allies).46 Ultimately the government succeeded in getting the
39 Vogt, Wächter der Bonner Republik, p. 18.
40
Protocol of the Agreements reached between the Allied High Commissioners and the Chancellor of the German Federal Republic at the Petersberg (November 22, 1949),
[http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/pdf/eng/Founding%208%20ENG.pdf], (accessed 3 June 2016). See Appendix B for the treaty.
41 See The New York Times, "West’s Agreement with Bonn signed," (24 November 1949), by Jack Raymond. 42 See Appendix B for all articles of the treaty.
43 An earlier inquiry into haltering the process was rebutted by the High Commissioners on 1st November for the impossibility of restarting it. Moreover, a number of important industries remained on the demolition list. See Schwarz, Die Hohen Kommissare, 1949-1950, Nr. 2 (15 November 1949).
44 E. Noelle, Statistics on Adenauer: Portrait of a Statesman, (Bonn, 1961), p. 37.
45 W. Benz, Opposition gegen Adenauers Deutschlandpolitik, In J. Weber, Die Republik der fünfziger Jahre:
Adenauer’s Deutschlandpolitik auf dem Prüfstand, (München, 1989). pp. 48-49.
46 Stenographische Berichte des Bundestages, Sitzung Nr. 18 (24/25 November 1949), p. 525. Schumacher was severely reprimanded for this statement by being excluded from the following twenty sessions.
15
Petersberg Accord approved. Historians have regularly portrayed the Accord as the first step in Adenauer’s endeavor to attain sovereignty for the Federal Republic. However, he paid a heavy price in his popularity, and in the following months his chancellorship was on a razor thin edge.
Economic difficulties
The Währungsreform (currency reform) in August 1948is widely seen as a prerequisite of the latter German Wirtschaftswunder (economic miracle).47 While Abelshauser considers this connection a ‘myth,’ the replacement of the then ‘worthless’ Reichsmark with the new Deutsche Mark almost overnight filled hitherto empty shops with consumer goods that had been horded in anticipation of the reform.48 This was considered tantamount to a miracle by a population that witnessed near-starvation in the 1946/47 winter. In conjunction, industrial production also increased by “a phenomenal fifty percent.”49 Consequently, the electoral success of the CDU in September 1949 was as much credited to Ludwig Erhard, the Economics Minister and affectionately nicknamed Der Dicke (The Chubby), as to Adenauer himself. However, the reform’s impact was short-lived with industrial production again declining noticeably by end-1949. From the very beginning the Adenauer government had to fight economic troubles on various fronts.
Shortly thereafter, the devaluation of the Pound Sterling by 30.5 percent in September 1949 had send shockwaves through the global economy. To counter the effects on Germany the government proposed a corresponding devaluation of the Deutsche Mark by about twenty-five percent.50 However, the High Commissioners not only dismissed this a too aggressive but
47 Different reasons are listed by economic historians for kick-starting the Wirtschaftswunder. Focusing on the currency reform, economics such as Herbert Griesch and Holger Schiedling have seen the 1948 reform as vital for latter developments. Werner Abelshauser is the most prominent economist countering that approach. 48 Abelshauser, Wirtschaftsgeschichte der Bundesrepublik, pp. 40-41, 50.
49 McCloy, Report on Germany, p. 35.
16
demanded exemptions for the vital coal industry.51 The subsequent outcry across the political spectrum denounced the plans particularly pushed by François-Poncet as deliberately promoting the French economy’s competitiveness at the expense of Germany. Adenauer publicly attacked the ruling as stalling an already decelerating industrial production, depriving the country of much needed foreign currency reserves and leading to price hikes of more than twenty-five percent for domestic consumers.52 But all complaints were to no avail as the High Commissioners prevailed with their ruling, and the first months of 1950 saw a further stagnation in economic activity.
Correspondingly, unemployment continued to rise exacerbated by the endless stream of refugees from the former Eastern provinces and Germans leaving the Soviet zone via West Berlin.53 In September 1949 the unemployment rate had reached a disquieting 8.8 percent, increasing to an alarming 13.5 percent in February 1950.54 The dismantling of industries only heightened the tense situation in the Federal Republic. Furthermore, the devastating bombings of civil projects during the last years of the Second World War had led to a depressing lack of adequate housing. And adding to the catastrophic situation, financial constraints not least due to the sky-high Besatzungskosten prolonged the dire situation.55 Improvements came only gradually and frustratingly slow, with over 3 million Germans still residing in shelters by September 1950.56
The precarious state of affairs was further aggravated by the country’s dependence on imports of raw materials and agrarian products, far exceeding the export capabilities of the destroyed country. By the end of 1950 the foreign exchange reserves were nearly exhausted,
51 Stenographische Berichte des Bundestages, Sitzung Nr. 9 (28 September 1949), p. 157-158. 52 Ibid., p. 158.
53 McCloy, Report on Germany, p. 226-227. There were even talks within the Cabinet of curtailing the inflow of Berlin refugees due to the negative impact economically and on the society. A submitted request was refused by the High Commissioners. See Enders, Kabinettsprotokolle – 1949, Sitzung Nr. 23 (18 November 1949), p. 206. 54 Enders, Kabinettsprotokolle – 1949, p. 33; Schwarz, Die Ära Adenauer, p. 77.
55 Abelshauser, Wirtschaftsgeschichte der Bundesrepublik, p. 21. 56 Enders, Kabinettsprotokolle – 1949, p. 34.
17
the capital markets were still foreclosed, and the government predicted a shortage of basic food supply during the winter months.57 Adenauer urged Erhard to impose import restrictions and other measures contrary to the Marktwirtschaft doctrine which the latter refused. As a consequence, the chancellor seriously contemplated to replace his Economics Minister with a more compliant politician.58
The economic predicaments were particularly dangerous for Adenauer’s political future. People destitute of sheer subsistence were vulnerable to false prophecies of quick remedies, or in fact any political party promising an improvement of living conditions in the near future. The chancellor’s popularity sank dramatically – in the spring of 1951 a full thirty-nine percent of the population was dissatisfied with the current political trend. It was hard to see which domestic policies and activities could swiftly and decisively turn the economic situation.
Unexpected ‘salvation’ – the Korean War
The ‘salvation’ to Adenauer’s troubles came from unexpected quarters and far away. Half around the world, in June 1950 North Korean soldiers had crossed the thirty-eight parallel to invade South Korea. Suddenly the Cold War had turned into a hot one and fear of a Soviet attack in Europe were real fears voiced in the Western world.59 Paradoxically, for the chancellor these events in a very distant region had two indirect beneficial consequences: politically and, with some delay, economically.
The outbreak of the Korean War substantially altered the relationship between the High Commissioners and the German government.60 Until then Adenauer’s repeated warnings of a
57 Schwarz, Die Ära Adenauer, p. 126. 58 Ibid., p. 127.
59 Since the North Korean attack as seen as a Soviet-influenced maneuver, anxiety spikes were registered across the continent also due to the inadequacy of western military capacity. See G. Wettig, Entmilitarisierung und
Wiederbewaffnung in Deutschland, 1943-1955, (Frankfurt am Main, 1967), pp. 306-308.
18
potential invasion of the garrisoned East German Volkspolizei (peoples police), possibly supported by the Soviet army, were dismissed as scaremongering in order to extract further concessions from the Allies. Now the perception changed as the grossly inferior Western defense capabilities became very apparent. Whilst thus far Germany was primarily seen as the defeated enemy that needed to be treated accordingly, it almost overnight turned into an indispensable ally in building a defensible front in Europe against the Soviet bloc. Particularly Washington started to press for a German integration into the Western world.61 As a consequence, the tone of Adenauer’s dealings with the High Commissioners became less confrontational, the demonstrative superior attitude and sharp rebuttals were a thing of the past.62
The discussions in the Bundestag further fortified Adenauer’s position. True to their political convictions the SPD railed against the ‘mishandling’ of the situation by both the German government and the Western powers. Using the Korean War as an argument to incorporate a federal police force tantamount to the Volkspolizei was declared as distracting from the precarious situation of Berlin “much closer to home.”63 Schumacher and the Social Democrats saw the defense of Germany as a responsibility of the Allied powers as long as the country was treated as a protectorate, meaning that there was no German defense support without full sovereignty.64 Despite the drastic escalation in the East-West conflict the SPD continued in their relentless critic of the High Commissioners. However, notwithstanding the widespread war fears, the party did not succeed to rally the general public behind such
61 On 18th September the Allied powers agreed to instruct the High Commissioners to relax the "occupation controls." Further 'study groups' were set up with the intention to revise the Petersberg Accord. See Decision of
the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France with Regard to Germany,
[https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v03/d589], (accessed 15 June 2016); Wettig,
Entmilitarisierung und Wiederbewaffnung, pp. 315-318.
62 As an example, see Schwarz, die Hohen Kommissare, 1949-1951, Nr. 14 (29 Juni 1950). 63 Stenographische Berichte des Bundestages, Sitzung Nr. 97 (07 November 1950), p. 3540. 64 Wettig, Entmilitarisierung und Wiederbewaffnung, pp. 323-324.
19
uncompromising demands in a crisis situation. And the High Commissioners were almost relieved that they ‘only’ had to deal with the stubborn tricky old man from Rhöndorf.
The consequences of the Korean War were even more important in economic terms.65 The boom caused by the outbreak of hostilities fully benefitted the German export industry in two ways. Firstly, very quickly there was a significant scarcity in capital goods, the traditional strength of the German industry.66 And secondly, as an increasing share of the Western Allies economies was occupied to produce war material – an area explicitly forbidden for German companies – it could fully focus in regaining markets lost during the Second World War.67 Therefore, probably more that any domestic policy at that time, the war in the Far East became the trigger point for the ensuing and much admired Wirtschaftswunder in Germany.68
All in, Adenauer was one of the great beneficiaries of the Korean War, albeit not immediately.69 It greatly solidified his grasp of power, thereafter being the undisputed leader of his party and government. Within the escalating Cold War the Western Allies increasingly treated Germany as an indispensable ally rather than the defeated foe, with a corresponding change in mood with relation to the High Commissioners. And with the consecutive massive improvement in living conditions and decreasing unemployment, Adenauer’s standing and poll rating continuously improved until he became virtually unassailable for years to come.70
65 H. C. Wallich, Treibkräfte des deutschen Wiederaufstiegs, (Frankfurt am Main, 1955), p. 4; Schwarz, Die Ära
Adenauer, pp. 104-105.
66 M. Schmitt, Außenwirtschaftsprobleme der Bundesrepublik während der Korea-Krise, in L.-E.-Stiftung (ed.),
Die Korea-Krise als ordnungspolitische Herausforderung der deutschen Wirtschaftspolitik. Texte und Dokumente, (Stuttgart/New York, 1986), p. 58.
67 For actual numbers of the developments in imports and exports, see Statistisches Bundesamt, Außenhandel:
Gesamtentwicklung des deutschen Außenhandels ab 1950,
[https://www.destatis.de/DE/ZahlenFakten/GesamtwirtschaftUmwelt/Aussenhandel/Gesamtentwicklung/Tabelle n/GesamtentwicklungAussenhandel.pdf?__blob=publicationFile], (accessed 22 June 2016).
68 Albeit, the economic situation was dire well until 1951. While the industry saw a stabilization of resource prices by October 1950, important consumer products experienced price increases until 1951. In March, the Cabinet came together for a special session discussing the price developments for agricultural products like milk. See U. Hüllbüsch (ed.), Die Kabinettsprotokolle der Bundesregierung. Band 4 – 1951, (Boppard am Rhein, 1988), Sondersitzung (6 März 1951), pp. 205-208; Schwarz, Die Ära Adenauer, p. 105, 126-127.
69 Baring, Aussenpolitik in Adenauers, pp. 81-90. 70 Noelle, Statistics on Adenauer, pp. 40-41.
20
International challenges – contention and
rapprochement with France
Saar Conventions and European Council
Integration into the Western world was the hallmark against which all policies of Adenauer needs to be measured. For the concept to succeed, reconciling the dysfunctional relationship between the Federal Republic and France was a prerequisite. When France was included into the Allied command structure of the occupied Germany it was based on the Anglo-Saxon understanding that the country would share similar positions as to the policies to be applied. However, it turned out that France’s thinking was dominated by an almost paranoid quest of never again be threatened by its arch enemy. After the Morgenthau plan of degrading Germany to a country confined to agricultural production without meaningful industrial capacity was abandoned, France became the principal proponent of a weak fragmented Germany, regularly being at odds with the other two Allied powers.1
The Saar region, which was part of the French zone, formed an integral part of the important German coal, iron and steel industry.2 By the same token it also suited well in rebuilding the French economy.3 As early as 1946 France pursued a policy of integrating the region by withdrawing if from the control of the military governors, despite repeated concerns voiced by the United States and Great Britain.4 After creation of the Federal Republic Paris forcefully intensified its efforts to establish a fait accompli before the Adenauer government would become strong enough to intervene.5
1 Elzer, Die >>kleine Wiedervereinigung<<, p. 50. 2 Ibid., p. 56.
3 Abelshauser, Wirtschaftsgeschichte der Bundesrepublik, p. 32, 38.
4 Elzer, Die >>kleine Wiedervereinigung<<, pp. 52-58; R. Flentey, Modern German History, (London/New York, 1959), p. 422; Schwarz, Die Ära Adenauer‘s, p. 89; McCloy, Report on Germany, p. 25.
21
From the onset the Saar policy of France met strong objections from the entire political spectrum in Germany,6 decrying the relapse into nationalistic policies contrary to the sentiment of European integration.7 Furthermore, it was in violation of the Potsdam Agreement where the victorious powers had agreed that any revision of the 1937 boundaries of Germany was subject to a final peace treaty.8 Jakob Kaiser at the Bundesministerium für Gesamtdeusche Fragen (Ministry of Interior German Relations) saw in it a dangerous precedent with regards to the former Eastern territories of the German Reich.9 The crisis exacerbated when in June 1949 France proposed to invite the Saar region as an independent member into the Europarat (European Council).10 François-Poncet during the Petersberg Accord discussions dropped the ‘bombshell’ that the Saar would enter the European Council simultaneously with the Federal Republic.11 The public uproar was unison, making any notion of quickly joining the Europarat obsolete, and gave credibility to Schumacher’s argument that France’s ultimate goal was to fully annex the Saar region.12
The all-time low came in March 1950 when Paris and Saarbrücken announced the signing of the so-called Saar Konventionen (Saar Conventions). Just the day before Adenauer was casually informed by François-Poncet about the ceremony, and he must have felt shocked by the cynical statement that he should be ‘grateful’ that the Conventions would be reviewed in case of a formal peace treaty with Germany.13 Adenauer felt betrayed in his quest to reconcile
6 Baring, Aussenpolitik in Adenauers, p. 65.
7 Stenographische Bericht des Bundestages, Sitzung Nr. 10 (29 September 1949), p. 184.
8 John McCloy described the non-intervention of the Americans based on the fact that the final decision was to be done through a peace agreement, meaning that nothing truly changed in his opinion. See McCloy, Report on
Germany, p. 25.
9 Elzer, Die >>kleine Wiedervereinigung<<, p. 98. 10 Ibid., p. 91.
11 Schwarz, Die Ära Adenauer, p. 91.
12 Elzer, Die >>kleine Wiedervereinigung<<, p. 92; Schwarz, Die Ära Adenauer, p. 91.
13 U. Enders, Die Kabinettsprotokolle der Bundesregierung. Band 2 – 1950, (Boppard am Rhein, 1984), Sitzung Nr. 50 (3 März 1950), p. 240; Adenauer formally appealed to the Allied High Commissioners, detailing that these developments would prematurely decide the situation of the Saar. Hence, the provision of awaiting
formalization via a later peace treaty was ‘cosmetic’ and unreal. In his final report, the U.S. High Commissioners John McCloy detailed the difficulties betweenFrance and Germany, showcasing the little American involvement in the issue. See McCloy, Report on Germany, pp. 25-27.
22
the relationship with France, and disappointed by the mute reaction of the USA and Great Britain. He publicly called it “a blow to European unity,” with the Saar region being treated like a “colony.”14
The Saar problem and membership in the European Council had now become inextricably intertwined. Adenauer was fully aware that any resolution to join the Council would not pass the Bundestag as even the Cabinet would not support it. Yet he continued his ‘secret diplomacy’ with the High Commissioners hoping to find a compromise in private talks.15 In the heated debate in Parliament he declared that “under no circumstances must the Saar question contaminate the relationship between France and Germany and thus disrupt the creation of a (unified) Western Europe”.16 Such a conciliatory statement astounded his fellow party members, especially after the harsh words against France just a few days earlier. They started questioning the chancellor’s authority – as Elzer writes, the “CDU/CSU party appeared to be more concerned over the chancellor’s changed attitude … rather than the content of the Conventions themselves.”17
Adenauer sounded increasingly desperate. He granted an interview to the hardly known US journalist Kingsbury-Smith in which he outlined the utopian proposal of complete union of France and Germany with one common Parliament.18 Paris sounded perplexed by both the content of, and the chosen channel for such a groundbreaking idea. The response from the Quai
14 The New York Times, "France, Saar sign 50-year mine pact, subject to treaty: coal lease and other fiscal links to Paris need approval of Big 4 at peace table," (04 March 1950), p. 1; Schwarz, Die Ära Adenauer‘s, p. 93. 15 Adenauer’s characteristic tactic was to first reject outrightly and, with the time won, seek to arrange an agreement in secret. Finally, he would adjust his initial harsh stance due to more 'beneficial development,' which he claimed as a victory for his initial stance. In Schwarz, Adenauer. Der Aufstieg, p. 694.
16 Unter keinen Umständen darf die Saarfrage zu einer Störung der Beziehungen zwischen Frankreich und
Deutschland und damit zu einer Erschwerung des Aufbaus von Westeuropa führen. In Stenographische Bericht des Bundestages, Sitzung Nr. 46 (10 März 1950), p. 1560. See also Elzer, Die >>kleine Wiedervereinigung<<,
p. 122.
17 Die CDU/CSU-Fraktion schien am 3. März 1950 mehr über ein Umschwenken des Kanzlers besorgt als über
den Inhalt der Konventionen. In Elzer, Die >>kleine Wiedervereinigung<<, p. 122.
18 Interview Kingsbury-Smith [http://www.konrad-adenauer.de/dokumente/interviews/interview-kingsbury-smith], (accessed on 8 June, 2016). Der Spiegel co-founder Rudolf Augstein, writing under his pseudonym Jens Daniel, saw Adenauer’s interview as an example of his "nebulous historical understanding." In J. Daniel,
23
d’Orsay came swift and was an outright refusal.19 At this point Adenauer’s overarching political mantra of West integration built around a rapprochement with France appeared to be in tatters.20 There seemed to be no solution possible that would cut through the ‘Gordian knot’ of keeping his policy on track whilst simultaneously preventing the effective recognition of the Saar region as a sovereign country, thus setting a dangerous precedent for the former Eastern provinces. But he was ‘rescued’ out of the cul-de-sac by a French initiative, and it came in a rather dramatic fashion.
The Schuman Plan
Robert Schuman was the foreign minister of the French government who from very early on supported a European plan of integration, in order to prevent the renewed splitting of the continent.21 He was convinced that only a unified Europe could position itself as a strong and recognized global power which would regain an importance similar to the one before the Second World War. Simultaneously, this eminent political figure was clearly aware of, and strongly influenced by the dangers of the Cold War. Therefore, unifying Europe loomed large in Schuman’s thinking, re-invoking ideas from leading statesmen of the 1920 like Gustav Stresemann and Aristide Briand.22
The first meeting between Schuman and Adenauer in January 1950 had been an unqualified disaster. Initially refusing to meet the chancellor, Schuman brushed aside all arguments presented by Adenauer as to the Saar Conventions violating the Postdam Accord.23 He stretched reality by maintaining that the Saar region was independent of any direct French
19 Elzer, Die >>kleine Wiedervereinigung<<, p. 124. 20 Baring, Aussenpolitik in Adenauers, pp. 67-68.
21 M. Lingen, Konrad Adenauer: Schuman, Robert, [http://www.konrad-adenauer.de/wegbegleiter/s/schuman-robert/], (accessed 27 March 2016).
22 Ibid.
24
influence and, therefore, entitled to its own policy towards the European Council.24 The meeting ended inconclusively with Schuman rather brusquely stating that he did not come to Bonn to negotiate.25
But the icy atmosphere significantly thawed over the coming weeks and months as both politicians came under intense domestic pressure. Similar to Adenauer, Schuman was faced with an untenable position. Within the context of the worsening Cold War situation Dean Acheson, the American Secretary of State, aggressively pressed for a revamp of the relationship with Germany. With Great Britain hesitantly in tow, the USA advocated a swift re-building of the German industry which over time would drastically change the power balance in Europe and challenge France’s influence over the Ruhr and Saar regions. If France did not want to be sidelined by the Anglo-Saxon more accommodative stance it needed to present a program on its own. And Paris acted decisively by developing a plan that would enable them to continue exercising some control over Germany.
The so-called Schuman Plan was essentially the work of Jean Monnet, a highly experienced and influential eminence grise in Paris, described by the British Central Bank Governor Montagu Norman as “not a banker but a magician.”26 The core of the plan was to put the French/German coal and steel production under a joint authority. It was an ingenious stroke benefitting both sides. France gained access to German coal and coke resources and thus secured a lasting supply for its massively expanded steel industry, providing a more level playing field with the old rival. Secondly, an economic union between the two countries would foster cooperation instead of an ‘economic arms race’ as had been the standard over the past decades. Through this initiative France would indirectly attain the security guarantees against its arch enemy that so dominated its thinking, by maintaining joint oversight over the vital
24 Schwarz, Akten des Auswärtigen Amtes, 1949-1950, Nr. 25 (15 Januar 1950), pp. 57-62. 25
Ibid., p. 61.
25
sources of coal and steel.27 And lastly, it took the sting out of the Anglo-Saxon new approach by putting the country at the vanguard of the French/German rapprochement. 28
But the Adenauer government was arguably the biggest beneficiary. Germany needed to officially formulate its position towards the Saar Conventions and the European Council for the scheduled Spring Conference of the Allied powers on 11 May 1950 in London, with all the aforesaid domestic complications. The Cabinet was already in session on 9th May when the Schuman plan was publicly announced in Paris. And all of a sudden the ‘squaring of the circle’ was possible. France had proclaimed a massive commitment to work together with Germany in building a stable and lasting foundation for peaceful co-existence. Membership in the Europarat could now be presented as one of many important pieces in the overall integration process of the Western societies. This was the overarching goal against which all other aspects, including the contentious Saar Conventions, needed to be judged and subsumed. At long last, Adenauer was finally able to present tangible results for his mantra of Western integration.
Adenauer now acted with astounding speed.29 On the very day of the announcement of the Schuman plan the perplexed Cabinet approved the resolution of applying for membership in the European Council and pushed it through the Bundestag just days thereafter. Even the obstacle of the Saar becoming a separate Council member was not perceived as being insurmountable anymore. The government assumed the notion that the region was in a ‘quasi-colonial status’ that would not prohibit the ‘free’ Federal Republic to join.30 The previously rejected argument that this was an ‘interim’ solution subject to a peace treaty was now deemed
27 R. Steininger, Deutsche Geschichte: Darstellung und Dokumente, Band 2: 1948-1955, (Frankfurt am Main, 2002), pp. 127-128; it would allow joint control over Western Europe historically strenuous vital resources. In McCloy, Report on Germany, pp. 167-168.
28 A favorable 'side-effect' for France was that Britain opted out of the plan. The continuous fixation of the United Kingdom towards the Commonwealth made the Labour government unwilling to integrate and thus loose partial sovereignty over their coal and steel industry. As a consequence, the country’s influence over the Ruhr region became drastically diminished.
29 John McCloy described the Schuman Plan period as giving "place to a sense of wonder that so revolutionary a conception in such a complex area could have been developed." In McCloy, Report on Germany, p. 167. 30 Elzer, Die >>kleine Wiedervereinigung<<, p. 147-148.
