Representing (OR Engaging) Dissonance within
the European Capitals of Culture: Jewish
Heritage in Kaunas 2022
Tsjalling Wierdsma
Tsjalling Wierdsma 10523480 Master Heritage & Memory Studies Universiteit van Amsterdam
Supervisor: Dr. Chiara de Cesari Second Reader: Dr. Tamara van Kessel
Abstract:
Building on a methodology of critical discourse analysis; semi-structured interviews; and site analysis, this Ma thesis focusses on the ways in which the Kaunas 2022 ECOC – and its practitioners – engage with and represent dissonant Jewish heritage, and how – in terms of the representation of (and engagement with) dissonant Jewish heritage - the ECOC and its practitioners position themselves within Lithuania’s national remembrance landscape and the broader discussion regarding the construction of a ‘European past’ and a ‘European memory’. It hereby approaches the ECOC as a multi-level space of governance, which is characterized by a plurality of actors and uses of – and objectives for – culture; asking whether the ECOC’s own celebratory discursive framing and the plurality of uses of culture within the ECOC, itself, can enable – and even encourage – cities to marginalize and circumvent more dissonant pasts in favor of less contentious and more harmonious ones. As such, it focusses on how the form of the ECOC programme can potentially influence the content of individual ECOC’s, particularly highlighting the increased institutionalization & emphasis on a ‘European dimension’ within the programme – which is often framed in terms of cities narrating their past within a broader ‘European past’ – and arguing that, as such, ECOC projects should be approached as spaced where not only a ‘European past’ and a ‘European memory’ are constructed, but also as a space which is influenced by this larger discussion regarding a ‘European past’ and a ‘European memory’. As such, it focusses on the ways in which the ECOC Kaunas 2022 – and its practitioners – position themselves within; negotiate; and engage with both the national remembrance landscape; the larger discussion surrounding the construction of a ‘European past’ and a ‘European memory’; and the specific frameworks and mechanisms of the ECOC programme itself – researching how these frameworks and this positioning can potentially influence the content of the Kaunas 2022 ECOC programme.
Table of Contents:
Title page………... pg. 1 Abstract……….… pg. 2 Table of Contents……….. pg. 3 Introduction ………... pg. 4 Theoretical Framework ………...…. pg. 8 Chapter 1: The Lithuanian Remembrance Landscape - the Museum of Occupations &Freedom Fights & the Ninth Fort Museum ………... pg. 23 1.1: Lithuanian Remembrance Landscape ………... pg. 23 1.2: Case Study – the Museum of Occupations & Freedom Fights, Vilnius …………... pg. 29 1.3: Case Study – the Ninth Fort Museum, Kaunas ………. pg. 34 Chapter 2: The ECOC Kaunas 2022 – Representing and Engaging Dissonant Jewish
Heritage; Past & Present ……….. pg. 41 2.1: Kaunas 2022 -Constructing an Inclusive & Unifying Past? – Within the
Construction of a ‘European Memory’ and a ‘European Past’……… pg. 41 2.2: Kaunas 2022 – Situating the ECOC in the Lithuanian Remembrance Landscape ... pg. 46 Conclusion ……… pg. 51 Reference List……… pg. 52 Bibliography ………. pg. 52 Resolutions; Communications; Declarations; Laws & Treaties ………... pg. 56 ECOC Documents………. pg. 57 Miscellaneous ……….………...pg. 57 Figures ……….. pg. 58
Introduction:
Between June 25th – 29th, 2018 I took part in the summer school Modernism for the Future in Kaunas, Lithuania - which was part of the European Capital of Culture (ECOC) Kaunas 2022. During this period, I was also writing several short texts on Lithuania’s memorial heritage, for the European Observatory on Memories (EUROM)’ Memorial Heritage Mapping Project – focusing on several memorial museums and the practices & strategies used in their exhibitions. From September 2018 onwards, I have been following the Master Heritage & Memory Studies and the Master European Studies: Identity & Integration. In this period, I became increasingly interested in the intersection between European cultural policies & programmes and the discussion surrounding the construction of a ‘European past’ and a ‘European memory’. These overlapping interests – and experiences - form the
foundation of this Ma thesis, which focusses on the European Capital of Culture programme Kaunas 2022 and delves into the ways in which the programme (and the actors working within it) position themselves - in terms of their engagement with and representation of Lithuania’s dissonant Jewish heritage - within 1) the larger Lithuanian remembrance landscape (in this thesis particularly illustrated through the case studies of the Museum of Occupations and Freedom Fights in Vilnius & the Ninth Fort Museum in Kaunas) and 2) the larger discussion related to the construction of a ‘European Memory’ and a ‘European Past’. As such, this thesis asks: How is dissonant Jewish culture; past & present, represented (and engaged with) within the ECOC Kaunas 2022 and how is this engagement &
representation positioned – by the ECOC and its practitioners – within the Lithuanian remembrance landscape and within the larger discussion surrounding the construction of a ‘European Memory’ and a ‘European Past’?
In order to answer this question, this thesis builds on a methodology that combines critical discourse analysis, site analysis, and semi-structured qualitative interviews. Site analysis was conducted in both June and December of 2018, with the interviews being conducted in December 2018. While site analysis primarily focusses on the Museum of Occupations and Freedom Fights in Vilnius – which is a state sponsored museum, whose existence is
mandated by law – and the Ninth Fort Museum in Kaunas – which falls under the authority of the Ministry of Culture - I also visited several other museums in Lithuania that – directly or indirectly – deal with Lithuania’s history under consecutive occupations, namely: the Vilna Goan State Jewish Museum in Vilnius (particularly focusing on their branch which deals with the Holocaust – The Holocaust Exhibition); the Seventh Fort in Kaunas; and the Vyatautas Great War Museum in Kaunas. This was done in order to get a better sense of the
(institutional) Lithuanian remembrance landscape – especially in terms of the situational nature of the different museums (with the Museum of Occupations and Freedom Fights for example directly referencing the Vilna Goan State Jewish Museum’s Holocaust Exhibition). In terms of the Kaunas 2022 programme, interviews were held with Daiva Citvarienė -Wake it Shake it and Memory Office Curator, Stefanija Paulaskaitė - Fluxus Labs Coordinator, Greta Klimavičiūtė - We The People Community Programme Curator, Žilvinas Rinkšelis - Modernism for the Future Coordinator, and Ina Pukelytė - Creative Team Curator of Yiddishe Mame. Additionally, interviews were conducted with Dovid Katz of the organization
ongoing trial regarding the legacy of Jonas Noreika, and who is similarly connected to the organization Defending History. Critical discourse analysis was mainly used to engage with the bid book, the website, and other relevant documents related to the ECOC Kaunas 2022. In terms of the methodology, a few points are further important to stress. Firstly, an
important caveat of the thesis is the fact that the ECOC Kaunas 2022 is still in an early phase. The thesis is therefore necessarily limited to such materials as the bid book, the projects that are already running, and especially the interviews with the different actors within the ECOC. As such, the conclusions of this thesis are also of a preliminary nature. Secondly, the thesis is limited in its scope due to my inability to read or speak Lithuanian. As such, comparisons of – for example – the English and Lithuanian translations of descriptions in the museums, nor the Kaunas 2022 website, will not be within the scope of this thesis. To a certain extent however, these limitations are mitigated by the approach of the thesis; which is especially concerned with the ways in which the actors within the Kaunas 2022 ECOC position themselves within, both the larger Lithuanian remembrance landscape & the larger discussion regarding the construction of a ‘European memory’ and a ‘European past’. The choice to focus on the ways in which the actors position themselves in the broader – and quite contentious discussion – regarding the construction of a ‘European memory’ and a ‘European past’ should be seen as an attempt to let the actors speak for themselves. In this sense, I also recognize my own positionality coming from a ‘Western’ (Dutch) background, and as such, have attempted to – especially within the theoretical framework – critically engage with preconceived notions regarding the centrality of the Holocaust within a ‘European past’ and a ‘European memory’. The thesis further focusses on the ways in which the actors of the Kaunas 2022 ECOC engage with; negotiate; and react to the structures of the ECOC
programme itself – and thus the ways in which the form of the ECOC programme, potentially influences its contents.
This latter point is similarly central in the theoretical framework of the thesis, which delves into the ECOC programme as it fits within a broader European cultural policy. It hereby will showcase how the limited competences the EU still holds in the cultural field have led to specific instruments, which mitigate the limitations & sensibilities that the field is marked by. Similarly, in terms of the ECOC, it will showcase how the programme’s bottom-up
perception and the multiple actors involved are discursively instrumentalized by the EU to lend it legitimacy. Additionally, it will point to the process where the ‘European dimension’ of ECOC programmes is increasingly emphasized and institutionalized, while at the same time, the EU increasingly outsources the ‘filling in’ of this European dimension – a structure of governance Patel has termed ‘integration through interpellation’ (Patel 2013b).
Subsequently, the thesis will argue that the neo-liberal ECOC programme – marked by its multi-level structures of governance; its plurality of actors; and the multiple objectives culture is meant to fulfill – can be an obstacle in terms of addressing dissonant pasts, instead favoring more celebratory and less contentious historical events and narratives. This will come to the fore again in the chapter dealing with the Kaunas 2022 ECOC, in which I argue that such frameworks & discourses of the ECOC programme manifest themselves in the Kaunas 2022 discourse as well, which simultaneously attempts to address dissonant and marginalized pasts, while also attempting to re-integrate such pasts within a unifying, celebratory, narrative.
Due to the ‘local rewriting’ (Iğsiz 335) of the ‘European dimension’ – and its framing, often in historical terms – I will further argue that the ECOC should be seen as a space where a ‘European past’ and a ‘European memory’ are simultaneously negotiated, as well as constructed. Similarly, due to the ‘local rewriting’ of this ‘European dimension’, it becomes imperative to research the ways in which this rewriting process is influenced by the national remembrance landscape. The thesis therefore argues that it is valuable to research the ways in which the practitioners of the ECOC position themselves within; negotiate; and engage with, both the national remembrance landscape, as well as the broader discussion
regarding the construction of a ‘European memory’ and a ‘European past’, further arguing that both these frameworks can influence the actual content of the Kaunas 2022 ECOC programme.
In terms of this ‘European past’ and ‘European memory’, the theoretical framework will briefly detail the ongoing debate – and competition - surrounding this construction of a ‘European past’; especially in terms of the centrality & uniqueness of the Holocaust and the advocacy for more inclusion of the Soviet past and its victims – particularly following the 2004 Eastern enlargement of the EU. As such, it will delve into the ‘double occupation paradigm’ – or even more contentiously the ‘double genocide paradigm – specifically pointing to significant differences between the Prague Declaration of 2008 and the
subsequent adoption of the EP Resolution on European Conscience and Totalitarianism of 2009. It hereby will simultaneously highlight the real issues in regard to problematic uses of the ‘double occupation’ – and especially the ‘double genocide’ – paradigm, while also arguing against a simple conflation between increased EU recognition of Soviet crimes and victims and problematic ‘national’ uses of this paradigm, which emphasize national victimhood and marginalize more dissonant pasts of collaboration & perpetration.
In chapter 1, these themes will consequently be further fleshed out through a historical – and institutional – description of Lithuania’s remembrance landscape in terms of the German and Soviet occupations. More specifically, it will discuss the legally broadened conception of genocide in Lithuania – and the pushback this has received; the controversies surrounding the International Commission for the Establishment of the Crimes of Nazi and Soviet Occupation Regimes in Lithuania; and the disputed and controversial nature of the Genocide and
Resistance Research Center – which will be illustrated through a focus on the ongoing legal battle regarding the legacy of Jonas Noreika (a Lithuanian anti-Soviet hero, who is accused of collaborating with the Nazis). This discussion will further reference the interviews I
conducted with Dovid Katz & Andrius Kulikauskas. As the Genocide and Research center is the institution that runs the Museum of Occupations and Freedom Fights in Vilnius, the discussion will function as a jumping off point for my site analysis of the museum.
The analysis will argue that the lack of attention to the Jewish past is problematic due to the multiple uses the site itself knew under the subsequent occupations; it will show how victims of the Soviet occupation are discursively – and visually – framed in national, affective, and personal ways, while Jewish victims are often represented by general and hollow symbols; it will argue that the museum disconnects the Soviet and Nazi pasts, in order to circumvent more dissonant pasts of Lithuanian collaboration & perpetration – especially when these threaten narratives of anti-Soviet resistance and Lithuanian victimhood; and finally, will argue that due to the lack of awareness to these dissonant
pasts, the emphasis on the Righteous Amongst the Nations – in the small exhibition dedicated to the Holocaust – itself acts to distort and marginalize these dissonant pasts. Additionally, I will point to the importance of conducting site analyses over a longer period of time; highlighting how the museum’s name change from ‘the Museum of Genocide Victims’ to the ‘Museum of Occupations and Freedom Fighters’ was accompanied by the removal of references to the Vilna Goan State Museum’s Holocaust Exhibition; hereby also highlighting the positional nature of the museum in the broader Lithuanian remembrance landscape.
In the analysis of the Ninth Fort Museum in Kaunas, I will highlight the significant differences that exist between the fort part of the museum’s exhibitions and the separate, so-called, Exhibition of Occupations. I hereby argue that the fort part is marked by quite a bit of heterogeneity – with large differences existing between the most recently added exhibition of 2016, which directly addresses issues of collaboration and perpetration, further also highlighting the connections with Lithuania’s anti-Soviet past – and older exhibitions, which continue to marginalize and obscure more contentious pasts. In comparison to the Museum of Occupations & Freedom Fights however, I argue that the fort part of the Ninth Fort Museum is far more advanced in terms of individualizing Jewish victims and
highlighting multiple aspects of their lives. At the same time however, due to overall lack of acknowledgement of issues of collaboration & perpetration, I argue that the fort’s exhibition on the Righteous Amongst Nations titled ‘Lithuanians, the Saviours of the Jews’ further acts to marginalize and distort these difficult pasts. The Ninth Fort’s Exhibition of Occupations continues this marginalization, having removed an entire section on the Holocaust in the exhibition during my two visits to the site. Instead of having an – already small – section dedicated to the Holocaust in Lithuania, the new section dealing with the German Occupation now simply focusses on the deportations of ethnic Lithuanians. The rest of the exhibition similarly details an extremely national narrative of victimhood and anti-Soviet resistance; particularly highlighting religious themes.
In the second chapter, the thesis will focus on the representation of – and engagement with – dissonant Jewish heritage within the ECOC Kaunas 2022. Instead of merely comparing the representation of dissonant Jewish heritage within the ECOC to that in the two museums, the chapter will further highlight the ECOC – and its practitioners – situational positioning within this national remembrance landscape. As such, it will show how actors within the ECOC invoke both museums as sites where these more dissonant pasts are being dealt with; hereby discursively legitimizing their non-inclusion in the ECOC programme. Similarly, I will argue that references – by the actors in the Kaunas 2022 ECOC – to the contentious nature issues of Lithuanian collaboration and perpetration hold in the Lithuanian public (especially within the older generations), can simultaneously be seen as a practical reality and obstacle, as well as a discursive legitimization not to address this dissonance.
Additionally, in this chapter, I will point to some potential discursive contradictions in the Kaunas 2022 programme, whereby attempts are made to both address dissonant and forgotten minority pasts and to construct a unifying narrative for Kaunas; further linking this to the potential limitations of the ECOC structure itself in terms of addressing
dissonance. I will hereby further highlight how the Kaunas 2022 ECOC programme is a space in which a ‘European Past’ and a ‘European Memory’ are constructed, and where the actors within this ECOC actively position themselves in this discussion and react to it.
Finally, the chapter will also stress the important work that is being done by the Kaunas 2022 ECOC, especially in terms of the mapping of dissonant – and marginalized – Jewish heritage. I will further point to an innovative narrative projects of the Kaunas 2022 ECOC, which directly engages with the dissonance surrounding Lithuania’s Jewish heritage and take this dissonance as a starting point – enabling it to be engaged with.
Finally, in my conclusion, I will argue for the necessity of seeing the ECOC programme as not only a space where a ‘European past’ and a ‘European memory’ are constructed, but also as a site which is inherently influenced – and whose practitioners position themselves within; negotiate; and react to – this broader discussion; the national remembrance landscapes they are working within; and the specific frameworks & structures of the ECOC itself. As such, I argue for the necessity of analyzing the content of ECOC programmes through such a situational and contextualized frame.
Theoretical Framework:
As stated in the introduction, this thesis approaches the European Capital of Culture programme (ECOC) as a multi-level space of governance, which is characterized by a plurality of actors and a plurality of uses of – and objectives for – culture. It further argues that this plurality of actors & uses of – and objectives for – culture, connected to the
celebratory discourse and framing of the ECOC programme, results in an ambiguous approach towards – and potential marginalization of – dissonant pasts in the ECOC framework. At the same time however, the increased emphasis on a ‘European dimension’ within the programme – especially when framed in historical terms; the local ‘filling in’ of this dimension; and the opportunity the ECOC offers – especially to post-Soviet countries – to re-construct and re-narrate their own history within a ‘European frame’, results in the ECOC programme becoming a space in which a ‘European past’ and a ‘European
memory’ are being constructed, but in which dissonant pasts holds an ambiguous position. Other than merely being a space in which a ‘European past’ and a ‘European memory’ are being constructed, it also should be considered a space in which these can be negated & contested, and in which multiple dissonant pasts – and their narrations – intersect & compete.As such, it becomes valuable to focus particularly on the representation of – and engagement with – these dissonant pasts & how – in terms of these dissonant pasts – ECOC programmes position themselves both within their national remembrance
landscapes and the broader debate regarding the construction of a ‘European past’ & a ‘European memory’. These arguments will form the basis – and be expanded upon - in the following section.
Both the plurality of uses – and objectives - of culture, especially in economic terms, and the plurality of stakeholders that the ECOC is characterized by, are linked to the broader realities of European cultural policy; which itself is marked by specific sensibilities and limited competences. The European Capital of Culture (ECOC) programme – then the European City of Culture programme - was established on the 13th of June 1985, through Council Resolution
85/C 153/021. The resolution states that the European City of Culture should be “the
expression of a culture which in its historical emergence and contemporary development, is characterized by having both common elements and a richness born out of diversity” – hereby reiterating the EU’s current ‘unity in diversity’ slogan. The resolution further states that the aim of the event is to “help bring the people of the Member States closer together”, while also stressing that “account should be taken of wider European cultural affinities”. It wasn’t until 1992 however, with the adoption of the treaty of Maastricht, that the newly formed European Community established a legal framework for European cultural initiatives and gained specific supranational competences in the field of culture (Sassatelli 2009, 52). Such competences however remained limited and were “carefully delineated, so as to avoid encroaching on Member States’ cultural-policy making powers” (Psychogiopoulou 2017, 265). This careful tone is reflected in article 128 (1)2 of the treaty, which states that “[t]he community shall contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States, while respecting their national and regional diversity and at the same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore”. In article 128 (2), the actions of the community are further largely limited to “encouraging cooperation between member states”. The legal status of the measures that can be adopted under article 128 are further limited to incentive measures and recommendations – neither of which are legally binding (Theiler 70). Similarly,
harmonization of the laws and regulations of the Member States remains prohibited in the treaty. As such, the treaty is indicative of an “approach wherein the nation-state remains by far the principal actor” (Sassatelli 2009, 52). At the same time however, article 128 can be seen as embodying the solidification of “a new interest in a common European culture and memory” alongside that of the traditional focus on political and economic integration (De Cesari 2017, 19); the so-called ‘third wave’ of European integration, where a ‘European’ culture and memory are – simultaneously - constructed and instrumentalized to act as “an identification-marker for European citizens” (Littoz-Monnet 2012b, 1182-1183), and to “imbue the dry bureaucratic and economic processes of European integration with a common identity” (Beattie 2). The treaty therefore can be seen as emblematic of the general tension of European action in the cultural field, which simultaneously, is seen as the “common basis for European unity” (Patel 2013b, 538) and as “particularly sensitive due to its central role for state and identity-building processes in local, regional, and national contexts” (Patel 2013b, 538).
From these specific sensibilities, and limitations in terms of competences, specific EU structures of governance; instruments; discourses; and frames have emerged, which
attempt to mitigate – and to a certain extent circumvent – these sensibilities and limitations. A specific approach has emerged – in terms of EU action in the cultural field – which is marked by a “cautious balancing of the European against the local, in order not to incur any opposition from national sensibilities whilst at the same time not renouncing a highly symbolically charged rhetoric of Europeanness” (Sassatelli 2009, 88). It further follows a “consolidated approach, which mainly financially supports projects of cross-border co-operation and exchange across Europe” (Sassatelli 2009, 54). Following the Lisbon Strategy
1https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:41985X0622&from=GA 2https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:11992M/TXT&from=EN
of 20003 - which aimed to make the Union “the most dynamic knowledge-based economy in
the world” (Staiger in Patel 2013a, 15) and reflects the ‘creative industries’ becoming a “mainstay of cultural policies at EU, as well as at national, regional, and local levels” (Staiger in Patel 2013a, 15) - culture has increasingly been framed in expedient terms (Yudice 2003); particularly in economic terms. As such, a ‘broadening of culture’ has taken place, whereby culture is no longer strictly confined to those DG’s that explicitly deal with culture (EAC & EACEA). Instead, culture is increasingly being instrumentalized for a plurality of objectives, ranging from democracy building to economic competitiveness, with direct or indirect cultural policies being implemented by a wide range of EU DG’s and Agencies
(Psychogiopoulou 2015, 2).It wasn’t until 2007 however, when “heads of government within the European Council acknowledged the potential of the ‘cultural and creative industries’ in contributing to the aims of the Lisbon Agenda” (Littoz-Monnet 2012a, 505), that “culture was given full horizontal recognition on the intergovernmental level” (505-506).As Littoz-Monnet highlights, surprisingly, it was DG EAC that initiated and promoted this new policy agenda - which differed significantly from EAC’s former programmatic discourses which emphasized the specificity of the cultural sector (2012a, 506). Littoz-Monnet links this push by DG EAC to the limited competences that the EU holds in the cultural field, arguing that with the paradigmatic switch to the ‘creativity frame’, “economic concerns have become the core of the justification for the EU’s cultural policy” (506).
Within the context of the limited competences the EU holds in the cultural field, we can thus see the ‘creativity frame’ – and the broader expedient conceptualization of culture – in itself, as a strategy to mitigate the limited competences (and the limited funding) EU cultural action is marked by. In the same vein, we can look at the introduction of the Open Method of Coordination in the cultural field – which was established with the 2007 Agenda for Culture in a Globalizing World4 - as a strategy to mitigate and circumvent the narrow competences of the EU in the cultural field. As Vos states, the OMC acts to achieve “greater convergence in those areas in which member states were hesitant to give up sovereignty” (Vos, 681). It further commits Member States to work together without seeking to
homogenize their policy regimes and institutional arrangements (Hemerijck and Bergman 2004, Zeitlin 2011). With the 2007 Agenda for Culture, the EU has further increasingly attempted to “‘map’ and pull together the rather atomized European networks” (Craufurd Smith in Psychogiopoulou 2015, 13), placing an increased emphasis on and increasingly institutionalizing European networks and European cultural stakeholders within European cultural policy. As Psychogiopoulou argues, the Agenda “opened a new chapter of cultural cooperation at the EU level. For the first time, the European institutions, the member states, and civil society were invited to pool their efforts together on concrete cultural policy goals” (2015, 37). This has further been expanded on with the New European Agenda for Culture5
of 2018, which broadens the structured dialogue with the cultural sector and goes beyond the topics of the cultural OMC (New European Agenda for Culture 9), and is further reflected in the recent instrumentalization of methods of ‘enhanced cooperation’ between EU institutions and European cultural networks. Other than merely strengthening “the advocacy capacity of
4https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2007:0242:FIN:EN:PDF 5
the cultural sector in policy debate at European level” or allowing “a regular exchange of views and a structured dialogue between the Commission and Civil Society stakeholders in the cultural field” (European Commission website6), methods of ‘structured dialogue’ and
‘enhanced cooperation’ and the increased emphasis on civil society stakeholders in the cultural field also creates – what Sassatelli terms - a ‘demand from below’, which itself legitimizes European intervention and support in the cultural domain (Sassatelli 2008, 228). By increasingly formalizing - & institutionalizing - the cooperation with ‘independent’ stakeholders in the cultural field, through instruments such as ‘structured dialogue’, ‘enhanced cooperation’, ‘best practices’
etc., the European frameworks within which this cooperation takes place are themselves legitimizes. Additionally, these instruments and frameworks act to
further a homogenization of the
objectives of the EU institutions and the ‘independent’ civil society stakeholders in the cultural field. As such, a
distinction between ‘bottom up’ and ‘top down’ is increasingly difficult to make. Nonetheless however, the perception of these stakeholders in the cultural field as ‘independent’ and ‘bottom up’ remains crucial to the EU in order to legitimize the furtherance of EU cultural action. The homogenization of content through form, whereby instruments of ‘structured
dialogue’ and ‘enhanced cooperation’ lead
to an increased homogenization of objectives; priority areas; and modes of working, further highlights the importance of analyzing these two as interconnected.
This interconnection between content & form; the increased prominence of the ‘creativity frame’ & expedient conceptualizations of culture; and a ‘bottom up’ framing, are
furthermore key in understanding the ECOC programme itself. In terms of the ‘bottom up’ perception of the ECOC programme, Patel states that “the low-key role of EU institutions is a conscious function of the programme’s public image. Ever since its inception, EU actors tended to downplay the impact of European bureaucracy and minimize its links to ‘official’ European integration” (2013b, 542). Similarly, Sassatelli has stressed how the ECOC
programme allowed the EU to “stimulate an initiative that could be represented as bottom-up, [while] at the same time finding a way to bring lay people into direct contact with an EU programme…without it appearing as a top-down invasion of the sensitive sphere of cultural identities” (2009, 81). This ‘bottom up’ framing is - for example -reflected in a 2009 ECOC brochure titled European Capitals of Culture: The Road to Success from 1985 to 20107,
which frames the origins of the ECOC programme as a ‘latterday legend’ and – incorrectly -
6https://ec.europa.eu/culture/calls/eac-26-2018_en
7
https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/creative-europe/sites/creative-europe/files/library/capitals-culture-25-years_en.pdf
Figure 1: 'Latterday Legend' of the ECOC origins in the 2009 brochure European Capitals of Culture: The Road to Success from 1985 to 2019
presents the idea as naturally flowing from a casual conversation on the Athens airport between “glamorous former actress” Melina Mercouri & “the charismatic” Jack Lang (3). The brochure hereby gives the origins of the ECOC an almost mythical quality; presents the idea as naturally flowing out of a conversation; and as originating outside of any formal EU institutional space.
The ability to portray the ECOC as a ‘bottom up’ initiative is furthermore directly linked to the minimal financial contribution the EU makes to the ECOC events; which according to the Palmer report of 20048 was on average less than two percent of the total income generated for the events (19). Since 2007 – at the end of the monitoring period – ECOC cities can be
awarded the highly symbolic Melina Mercouri Prize of 1.5 million Euro (funded by the Creative Europe programme). This 1.5 million Euro, however, remains only a fraction of the total costs of the events, with most of the funds still being provided by public institutions on local, regional & national levels. As such, the Melina Mercouri Prize largely functions as a ‘kick-off fund’ (Palonen 91). The prominence of national, local, and regional financing of the programme hereby has resulted in good ‘value for money’ for the EU (Fox & Rampton 2015, 7); where the costs for the EU are minimal, but the visibility of the programme quite wide (Palonen 91), as the ECOC programme is considered to be the most established and recognized EU cultural initiative (Patel 2013b, 539; Sassatelli 2009, 79). At the same time however, the prominence of local, regional, and national funding brings risks with it, as changes in government can result in withdrawals of – previously promised - funds and support. Crissafulli, for example, highlights how in the ECOC Vilnius 2009 the global financial crisis and political elections – which replaced a left coalition with a center-right one – resulted in unanticipated cuts to the ECOC’s budget (69). Similarly, in the ECOC Istanbul Garcia & Cox highlight how the national government becoming the supplier of 95% of the ECOC’s funding, led to government also increasingly exerting control over the
ECOC’s programme, leading several independent cultural operators to resign in frustration (Garcia & Cox 97).
This latter example also highlights the – at first sight – minimal EU involvement in the programmatic, operative, and content levels of the ECOC events; which further enable the ECOC programme to appear ‘bottom up’ and ‘participatory’. The programme hereby offers a loose ‘European frame’ to be filled in with contents on the local level (Sassatelli 2009, 82), where the actual content of the programme is “designed and implemented locally and autonomously” (Sassatelli 2009, 83). As Patel notes, this limited EU involvement is also partially tied to the limited competences the EU enjoys in the field of culture (Patel 2013b, 542). Nonetheless, de-emphasizing the ECOC’s links with the EU has “been part of the strategy both institutionally and philosophically insofar as it has been concerned with its public image” (Patel 2013b), the resulting heterogeneity of budgets, programmes, events, stakeholders etc. has further eagerly been “phrased by the EU as perfectly incarnating the unity in diversity of Europe” (Sassatelli 2009, 87).
The plurality of actors & stakeholders involved in the ECOC event, hereby is also directly connected to the plurality of uses of culture & objectives for culture; ranging from the “improvement of material infrastructure and urban revitalization, over the enhancement of
8
cultural life to the alleviation of poverty through increasing employment, and the attraction of more tourists” (Ooi et al. 420). While the ECOC events are therefore still primarily funded by local, regional, and national public institutions, the private sector over the years has also increasingly become involved. This broadening of the programme objectives – and the uses of culture within the ECOC programme - is most commonly associated with the European Capital of Culture of Glasgow 1990, which is seen as having shifted the agenda towards urban regeneration (Gold & Gold 225).While this broadening of objectives was initiated by the host cities themselves, the EU authorities have subsequently also incorporated these broader objectives into the programme itself (Garcia & Cox 47); with objectives related to economic success now being one of the most important aims of the ECOC (Palonen 88). The current website of the European Commission, other than merely pointing to objectives of the ECOC such as highlighting ‘the richness and diversity of cultures in Europe’; celebrating ‘the cultural features Europeans share’; and increasing ‘ European citizens’ sense of belonging to a common cultural area’, additionally also stress that the ECOC is a good opportunity for ‘regenerating cities’; for cities to ‘raise their international profile’; and to ‘boost tourism’ (Website of the European Commission9). The development within the ECOC programme hereby mirrors the developments within a broader European cultural policy, where
“cultural policy is increasingly integrated into a policy agenda dealing with the promotion of creativity, innovation policy, and the fostering of growth and economic competitiveness” (Littoz-Monnet in Psychogiopoulou 25).
This broadening of objectives for - & uses of – culture, by a broad range of stakeholders and actors, however, has also led to concerns regarding the weakness of a ‘European dimension’ within the programme. As Garcia & Cox state, one of the most pervasive challenges for ECOC hosts since the inception of the programme has been to develop a meaningful
‘European Dimension’ (9). In the Commission’s Staff Working Document for the European Capitals of Culture post 201910 it is stated that: “The evaluations have shown that in a lot of past Capitals this European dimension was not well understood and therefore remained too limited or at least insufficiently visible in their programmes” (13). This weak ‘European Dimension’ is further directly linked to the question of the visibility of the EU in the events (13). We see this echoed in the brochure ‘European Capitals of Culture: 1985 to 2010’11,
which states that in past ECOCs the ‘European Dimension’ was “often weak if not entirely absent” (8), thus remaining largely “a composite interregional affair benefitting primarily the city, region and country concerned” (Staiger in Patel 2013a 10).
To mitigate the weakness - or even absence - of a ‘European Dimension’ in ECOC
programmes, the ‘European Dimension’ and the category ‘City and Citizens’ were given mandatory status in the decision establishing Community action for the European Capital of Culture event for the years 2007 to 2019 (Decision No 1622/2006/EC)12. The decision
falls in the so-called third phase of the European Capital of Culture programme’s history; starting in 2005 - with the ECOC officially becoming a Community Action (Garcia & Cox
9https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/creative-europe/actions/capitals-culture_en 10file:///C:/Users/tsjal/Downloads/DOC_1.en%20(4).pdf 11 https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/creative-europe/sites/creative-europe/files/library/capitals-culture-25-years_en.pdf 12https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32006D1622&from=EN
10) - and characterized by a “much clearer operational model and consistent monitoring framework” (Garcia & Cox 33).
Decision No 1622/2006/EC defines the ‘European Dimension’ as aiming to: (a) foster cooperation between cultural operators, artists and cities from the relevant Member States and other Member States in any cultural sector; to (b) highlight the richness of cultural diversity in Europe; and to (c) bring the common aspects of European cultures to the fore. In terms of ‘City and Citizens’, the ECOC should further: a) foster the participation of the citizens living in the city and its surroundings and raise their interest as well as the interest of citizens from abroad; and (b) be sustainable and be an integral part of the long-term cultural and social development of the city (Decision No 1622/2006/EC). In addition, the
establishment of a Monitoring Panel since the 2010 bid process has further enabled influence of early hosting decisions, especially in terms of better addressing the ‘European dimension’ issue (Garcia & Cox 11). In June 2013, the European Parliament furthermore accepted the proposal to establish a European panel of independent experts for the ECOC selection procedure for the years 2020 to 2033, in order to “diminish national influence and to strengthen the European dimension” (Immler & Sakkers 6).
Nonetheless however, what this ‘European dimension’ precisely details, remains highly ambiguous. As Fage Butler argues: “the suggestions relate mainly to ‘how’ to include European elements... ‘what’ is meant by European culture remains largely unspecified” (4). Or as Patel states: “the ‘European dimension’ is primarily broken down into formal settings, routines and procedures – but not much in substance” (2013b, 550). It is thus exactly also within these formal settings routines and procedures, that the ‘European dimension’ has been increasingly emphasized & institutionalized, and that the EU does attempt to
influence a (procedural) control on the ECOC programmes; hereby once again
highlighting the important interconnection between content & form. Patel has identified this as a subtle form of governmentality he terms ‘integration through interpellation’ (2013b, 539). As Patel states: “the programme does not identify a clear-cut, content-driven agenda through this rather vague expression, but leaves it to the stakeholders of the ECOC action to fill in this ‘European dimension’ with precise meaning” (539). In addition, Patel argues that the increasing role of transnationally networked experts in monitoring and arbitrating the filling in of this ‘European Dimension’ has acted to re-emphasize the programme’s bottom-up perception and is “more sophisticated than earlier attempts at creating an EU cultural, symbolic or identity policy, some of which pushed for an essentialist approach and a specific meaning of Europeanness in a top-down manner” (539). Palonen further argues that this structure, which allows for a simultaneous promotion of both Europe, the EU, the nation state, the region, and the city itself, ties the different levels to a common cause, where at each level “they would be fixing meanings of what the ECOC would be about - for them” (105). In the ECOC programme it is therefore not the EU directly, but rather the stakeholders of the host cities and the ‘independent transnationally networked experts’ - with the job to
“safeguard the ‘European Dimension’ (Patel 2013b, 549) - that ultimately fill in the
‘European Dimension. The commission, according to Patel, “sees itself only as a ‘facilitator’, putting Europe and Europeanness on the agenda, but leaving it to others to fill this notion with precise meaning” (Patel 2013b, 550). Patel hereby highlights a key paradox, where the ‘European dimension’ is increasingly emphasized & institutionalized, while at the same
time the ‘filling in’ of this dimension is increasingly ‘outsourced’ or ‘locally rewritten’ (Iğzis 335).
Broad definitions – which act as a form of ‘best practices’ – however are given by the EU, as reflected in 2015 publication European Capitals of Culture: 30 Years13, which frames the ‘European added value’ in terms of both “collaborations, co-productions, and exchanges between artists and cultural organizations across Europe” (especially if based on “pre-existing geographical, historical or more personal links” between the regions involved), and through the development of “European themes and issues or celebrating aspects of European history, identity, shared values and heritage” (European Capitals of Culture: 30 Years
Brochure, 6-7). Further stating that: “Sometimes this has taken the form of presenting old themes in fresh ways or revealing hidden aspects of a European connection — or even tackling difficult themes that resonate across the continent” (7). Important to emphasize here is the celebratory discursive framing of projects dealing with ‘European history, identity, shared values and heritage’, while simultaneously pointing to the possibility of ‘tackling difficult themes’. The question thus arises: how do difficult themes – and difficult pasts – fit within this celebratory discursive framing?
Patel similarly has remarked that the language of the 2006 Decision, which made the ‘European Dimension’ mandatory, stresses ‘richness’ and ‘common aspects’ but “tends to gloss over the darker, violent, exclusivist and fragmented sides of the European past and present” (2013b, 449-450). As such, dissonant pasts have an ambiguous – and
uncomfortable – position within the ECOC framework & discourse itself. This additionally should be connected to the plurality of actors & stakeholders and uses & objectives of/and for culture within the ECOC’s neoliberal framework; with dissonant – and contentious pasts – (generally) being less suitable and attractive topics for objectives such as ‘urban regeneration’; ‘building cities international image’; and ‘tourism’(although the rise of different forms of tourism dealing with dissonant & difficult pasts raises and important caveat here). In terms of the ECOC’s neo-liberal context, Iğzis goes further still, arguing that
depoliticization is embedded in ECOC projects (336-337), further emphasizing that cultural recognition within ECOC projects remains “confined to the granting of some cultural rights, whereby visibility and display are conflated with recognition, without necessarily opening up spaces to contest disparities, injustice, or power” (337).
At the same time however, Immler and Sakkers have stressed that the ‘European Dimension’ is most visible when “ECoC candidates reflect their own history as part of European history, particularly when hinting at their involvement with the major ideologies of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries such as National Socialism, communism and colonialism” (16). Turşie further argues that the opportunity the ECOC offers in terms of constructing & re-narrating a cities past within a European framework, was especially appealing for cities from ex-communist countries – once they were eligible for the title (124). Turşie further highlights how the eligibility of these cities from ex-communist countries put the ‘European dimension’ to the test, as the ECOC’s was primarily framed as a tool aimed at influencing the cultural unity of a renewed Union, but at the same time was “a real challenge for cities
coming from peripheral European positions, ex-non democratic countries, to overcome their
inferiority complexes of belonging to old or new Europe, and to highlight their European identity dimension and their contribution to the richness and diversity of European cultures” (124). As such, Turşie importantly highlights the ECOC’s position as a space where cities simultaneously re-narrate and re-construct their own past, and by doing so within this European framework, also contribute to the construction and narration of a ‘European past’ and a ‘European memory’. While Turşie herein places the emphasis on the opportunity the ECOC offers ex-communist countries, in terms of “re-narrating their past in a European context, to which they belong’ (125), I would like to be slightly more cautious in my optimism and question what pasts are and are not included in this re-narration. And how certain pasts are narrated. Whereas Turşie further focusses solely on the communist past as the dissonant pasts that should be overcome, I would instead argue – within the Lithuanian context – this dissonant Communist past is inherently intertwined with a dissonant Jewish past. As such, a more nuanced approach is necessary that highlights the ways in which both these dissonant pasts – and their narrations – are interconnected and often compete. While Tunbridge & Ashworth, thus – broadly speaking – refer to dissonant pasts as those pasts where there is a contrast in meaning and value systems between past & present (Tunbridge and Ashworth 1995), Nauert further argues that dissonance consequently: “also suggests a discordance of different narratives that co-exist and inconsistencies regarding the representation of a certain heritage” (18). In the Lithuanian case, I would argue that the situational & entangled nature of Soviet and Jewish heritage is key. Additionally, it is important to stress that while dissonant Soviet heritage has been instrumentalized to emphasize national narratives of victimhood & anti-Soviet resistance, Lithuania’s Jewish heritage clashes exactly with this narrative, as it is inherently connected to more
contentious pasts & sensitive issues of ethnic Lithuanian collaboration with the Nazi occupiers; anti-Semitism in Lithuania; and even ethnic Lithuanian perpetratorship within the context of the Nazi occupation. While – to a certain extent – Lithuania’s Soviet past therefore has been instrumentalized and narrativized in a national narrative of victimhood & resistance, Lithuania’s Jewish past – with its difficult connection to ethnic Lithuanian collaboration & perpetration – exactly within the context of this narrative, has become extremely difficult to reconcile and deal with.
In addition, other than merely focusing on how these dissonant pasts intersect & compete on a national dimension, it is also important to focus on how they are entangled (Delanty 2016; 2018) with the larger European dimension. To view these “national histories as themselves products of transnational encounters” (Delanty 2016, 129) and as inherently entangled with these transnational dimensions – highlighting the “frictions at play” (De Cesari & Rigney 2014, 4). As such, this entangled nature – and approach – is central to understanding how narrations and constructions of the past in the ECOC programme don’t merely react to and compete with other national narratives & contexts, but also interact with; compete with; are influenced by; and negotiate constructions of a ‘European past’ and a ‘European memory’ on a transnational European level. This is further particularly important as the construction of a ‘European past’ and a ‘European memory’ – especially within the formal EU institutions – have been marked by a process of ‘uploading’ national claims and narratives - particularly after the 2004 EU enlargements (Neumayer 346) – and vice versa, the EU’s mnemonic accession criterion leading up to these enlargements, directly was aimed at influencing the national memorial landscapes of the countries hoping to join the EU
(Neumayer 346). To properly understand the mnemonic accession criterion and the uploading of national claims within the European institutions however, it is important to briefly give a historical overview regarding the construction of a ‘European past’ and a ‘European memory’ and the competition that has emerged – especially regarding the centrality of the Holocaust within this past & memory.
In 2005, Tony Judt famously stated that: “Today the pertinent European reference is not baptism. It is extermination. Holocaust recognition is our contemporary European entry ticket” (803); hereby directly pointing to the mnemonic accession criterion, and the acceptance of World War II – with the Holocaust placed at its core – as Europe’s negative foundational myth, which it implied. As Sierp stresses, a consideration of the Holocaust as Europe’s foundational, seminal event (Diner 36), is only possible from an ex post perspective (Sierp 110); as the immediate aftermath of the Second World War was marked by silence regarding the destruction of the European Jewry, which “at the time didn’t even have a name yet” (Levy & Sznaider 93). Instead, the destruction of the European Jewry – at that time - was conceived of as “part of a larger practice of war crimes in an almost endless list of Nazi cruelties” (Levy & Sznaider 94). When the first steps of the EU were set up, the eradication of European Jewry was therefore hardly a reference at all and was often excluded from commemoration, with the focus instead being placed on anti-Nazism & anti-fascism (Probst 54). As Probst remarks, this focus on anti-Nazism & anti-fascism had a very practical dimension to it as in the ‘West’ a focus on anti-Nazism enabled many countries to place sole responsibility on Nazi-Germany – hereby suppressing more difficult realities linked to
collaboration, anti-Semitism, and even support for the deportation of Jews – and in the ‘East’, the narrative of anti-fascism functioned as the foundational myth supporting their supposed ‘liberation’ of ‘Eastern Europe’ (54). In addition, in the ‘West’, “the suffering caused by the liberation process – through bombing, looting and sexual violence – was brushed aside by the Allies in favour of ‘triumphalist narratives’ that could compete with the Soviets” (Stone 4). It was thus not until the period between the 1960’s and 1980’s that “the foundations for the iconographic status of the Holocaust were established” (Levy & Sznaider 95), with the Holocaust increasingly being regarded as “unique with reference to the past and universal for the future” (Levy & Sznaider 96). The iconographic status of the Holocaust at this time however – generally – was not linked to the process of European integration. As Probst remarks, in the years between 1950 and 1989, “when the ongoing process of West European integration was accompanied by many political and intellectual debates about the future of the European project, the Holocaust – as a central point of reference or even as a founding act – was hardly mentioned” (54). It was therefore not until after – or at least at the end of - the Cold War, that the Holocaust became increasingly intertwined with the process of
European integration. The end of the Cold War hereby was “a decisive turning point for the possibility of the normative formation and institutionalization of cosmopolitanized
memories” (Levy & Sznaider 96-97). Levy & Sznaider further stress that it is no accident that the Holocaust – with its presumed status of an unquestioned moral value – emerged to
prominence exactly within this context (96-97). This further directly overlaps with the so-called ‘third wave’ of European integration where a ‘European’ culture and memory are – simultaneously - constructed and instrumentalized to act as “an identification-marker for European citizens” (Littoz-Monnet 2012b, 1182-1183), and to “imbue the dry bureaucratic and economic processes of European integration with a common identity” (Beattie 2). As
such, the construction of a ‘European past’ and a ‘European memory’ is directly linked with the increase of European cultural action – which became a primary arena where this ‘European past’ and ‘European memory’ was constructed.
From the late 1990’s onwards “references to the Holocaust as the ultimate evil against which Europe itself was defined, became increasingly common in the EU’s discourse. Defining the Holocaust as unique in its monstrosity became the only acceptable way of referring to the event” (Littoz-Monnet 2012, 1183). Levy & Sznaider further stress that the historical backdrop of the Balkan crisis and the unsuccessful demands for NATO intervention in Bosnia “helped establish the link and thus the centrality of the Holocaust as a measure stick for international politics and a transnational value system” (98). As such, the Holocaust was transformed into “the paradigm or template through which other genocides and historical traumas are very often perceived and presented” (Assmann 14). The emphasis on values within this paradigm, hereby enabled the Holocaust to discursively be constructed as simultaneously unique, as well as relevant, invocable, and applicable in a wide array of contexts. In the same vein, the Holocaust has been simultaneously ‘Europeanized’ and ‘Internationalized’; whereby the emphasis on values within the Holocaust framework point to its invocability & applicability in terms of an international context, while at the same time – since the 1990’s – European elites within the European Parliament and
Commission have started “referring to the crimes of Nazism as crucial to Europeans’ very understanding of human rights and democracy and, as such, as central to the definition of European identity” (Littoz-Monnet 2013, 490); hereby portraying the EU as embodying “a unique, historically grounded conception of democracy that is derived from its unique experience with the crimes of Nazism” (Littoz-Monnet 2013, 490).
While the European Parliament in 1993 had already adopted the ‘Resolution on European and International Protection for Nazi Concentration Camps as Historical Monuments’, this
resolution neither mentioned the word ‘Holocaust’, nor made any mention of the Jews, and dealt primarily with the concentration camps and not the death camps were the Holocaust largely took place (Kucia 102). It was therefore primarily between 1995 and 2000, that the ‘Europeanization’ and ‘Internationalization’ of the Holocaust – on an institutional level – really ramped up. In 1995, the EP adopted the ‘Resolution on a Day to Commemorate the Holocaust’ & the ‘Resolution on the Return of Plundered Property to Jewish Communities’; in 1996, it adopted the ‘Resolution on Auschwitz’; in 1998, the ‘Resolution on Restitution of the Possessions of Holocaust victims’; and in 2000, the ‘Resolution on Countering Racism and Xenophobia in the European Union’ & the ‘Declaration on the Remembrance of the Holocaust’ – hereby “making the Holocaust the central topic of the EP’s memory agenda” (Kucia 102-103). Important to stress hereby is that while the EU between 1995 and 2000 counted 15 Member States, these EP Resolutions & Declarations additionally addressed – either directly or indirectly - other European states, in particular the EU candidates from Eastern Europe (Kucia 103). These resolutions hereby called on these candidate countries to “perform their duty of ‘coping with their past’, either as perpetrators of or accomplices to racist crimes committed during World War II, before they could join the EU” (Littoz-Monnet 2013, 490) – hereby thus establishing a mnemonic accession criterion for their EU accession.
At the same time - in terms of the ‘Internationalization’ of the Holocaust – in 1998, the Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research (ITF, since 2003 the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance - IHRA) was
established. While being an international organization, the EU and its Member States still dominate the organization (Kaiser & Storeide 801); and as such, the organization is also highly intertwined with the ‘Europeanization’ of the Holocaust. Radonić hereby also directly links the interest & support of the Task Force to the EU attempts to move beyond an
economic & monetary Union and to construct a common myth for the EU around the Holocaust (515).The ITF/IHRA’s Stockholm Forum of January 2000 – which led to the Stockholm Declaration – hereby marked the breakthrough of the organization and established it as an international norm entrepreneur (Kaiser & Storeide 801).
The Stockholm Declaration hereby stated that “[t]he Holocaust (Shoah)
fundamentally challenged the foundations of civilization” and that the “unprecedented character of the Holocaust will always hold universal meaning” (Article 1). In addition, it stressed that with “humanity still scarred by genocide, ethnic cleansing, racism, antisemitism and xenophobia” the international community must “strengthen the moral commitment of our peoples, and the political commitment of our governments, to ensure that future generations can understand the causes of the Holocaust and reflect upon its consequences”. As such, it once again reflects both the uniqueness & the invocability & applicability of the Holocaust. Importantly, the declaration further pledges to strengthen “our efforts to promote education, remembrance and research about the Holocaust, both in those of our countries that have already done much and those that choose to join this effort”, further calling for the establishment of an “annual Day of Holocaust Remembrance”. Radonić hereby points to how this ‘invitation’ to join the ITF/IHRA – and implement a Holocaust Remembrance Day - was especially directed to post-communist countries, and as such was a (first)14 step
towards a European memory standard (515). Radonić thus states that “[w]hile no official political pressure was applied during the eastern enlargement of the EU in 2004, these standards seem to have been internalized by the future member countries, not in the sense of implementing defined policies or guidelines, but as a set of conventions about depicting certain subjects in a similar vein to western policies” (515) , additionally specifically pointing to Hungary’s Holocaust Memorial Centre in Budapest, which was “opened a few weeks before the country joined the EU – despite no permanent exhibition having been installed at that time” (515).
As such, due to the rise of the Second World War – with the Holocaust at its center – as Europe’s foundational myth; the ‘Europeanization’ and institutionalization of this myth; and the soft power invocation of future member states to similarly commemorate the Holocaust in the period leading up to the 2004 enlargements, commemoration of the Holocaust became the normative context within which Eastern European states sought accession to the EU. Pakier & Wawrzyniak hereby state that the mnemonic accession criterion functioned as a ‘mnemonic pathology’, in which “East European postcommunist societies have to catch up with the West European models of remembering the past” (1). As such, this mnemonic pathology constructs a temporal notion of progress – in relation to notions of ‘dealing with’ or ‘working through’ the past – where ‘Eastern’ Europe is lagging behind its ‘Western’
counterparts; which further highlights the unequal power dimensions in the construction of a ‘European past’ and a ‘European memory’. The Europeanization of Holocaust memory, in this sense, posed “a double challenge to the post-communist nations of Eastern Europe – to develop their own Holocaust memories and to join in the European (and
global/cosmopolitan) memory of the Holocaust” (Radonić 515).
At the same time however, the Holocaust-centered ‘Western’ European - and EU - narrative of the Second World War started to become increasingly questioned and
contested; especially following the 2004 and 2007 Eastern enlargements – where the new ‘Eastern’ European Member States started to promote an alternative version of a
‘European past’ and ‘European memory’ in which Nazi & Stalinist are comparable and should as such “occupy an equally significant place in EU commemoration and identity politics” (Littoz-Monnet 2013, 490). This ‘double occupation’ paradigm hereby
“challenged the core of the historical narrative that had prevailed in Western Europe at the time” (Neumayer 345). In this sense, Neumayer argues that the EU enlargements in 2004 “paved the way for the uploading of some remembrance claims from domestic to European venues” (346), additionally arguing that – to a certain extent - the “mounting pressures to manage the Communist past can also be interpreted as a reaction to the ‘mnemonic accession criterion’ imposed by the EU on its future member states” (346). Similarly, Mälksoo point to the Baltic States and Poland, which emerged as the vanguard of the ‘new European’
commemorative politics, emphasizing that their claims to a ‘right to memory’ on a European level point to their “escape from the restrictions inherent in their ‘memory work’ during the EU and NATO accession processes” (2009, 656). Additionally, these political elites lobbied for EU support “for influencing Russia to acknowledge its responsibility for the crimes of the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet occupation in the Baltic States”
(Mälksoo 2009, 655). This Russian component is especially important due to Russia’s unwillingness to - unambiguously – acknowledge the Soviet occupation – instead of supposed ‘liberation’- of many of these states following the end of the Second World War. As such, the memory of Europe’s past has thus “become the object of a policy conflict among EU Member States, with various issues at stake: the status of new states in the EU, the playing out of domestic memory and identity struggles, and the definition of the nature of the EU project itself” (Littoz-Monnet 2013, 490). The EP herein has been the primary – but certainly not the only - policy venue in which Eastern European MP’s “have attempted to establish an alternative memory narrative in the EU’s discourse” (Littoz-Monnet 2013, 494). Important hereby is not to simply fall within the dichotomy of ‘Eastern’ vs ‘Western
Europe, as Neumayer importantly stresses, such a binary would “downplay the ideological dimension of the conflicting assessments of the former Communist regimes” (348); stating that “throughout the continent, European-level legitimization of the totalitarian interpretation of the communist past would indeed provide the Conservatives with a permanent symbolic advantage over the Left” (348).
This policy conflict has been especially prominent in the 6th term of the EP (2004-2009), in which the EP adopted several resolutions calling for recognition of Communist crimes and commemoration of their victims. Arguably, the most contentious elements of this period have been the so-called ‘Prague Process’ of 2007; the Prague Declaration of 200815; and the
