French foreign aid policies in Côte d’Ivoire: a continuance of colonial
legacies and a cause for the Ivorian state’s legitimacy deficit
During and after the First Ivorian Civil War and the Second Ivorian Civil War
Name: Anke Besseling Student number: 11013729
Course: Foreign Aid, Development and the Politics of Legitimation in Africa Readers: Dr. Michael Onyebuchi Eze & dr. Sebastian Krapohl
Date: 24 June 2019 Word count: 8714 words
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Table of contents
Introduction 3 Literature review 5 Theoretical framework 8 Methodology 13Data: case description of Côte d’Ivoire 14
Analysis 18
Conclusion 23
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Introduction
The cartoon from 2010 on the title page of this thesis represents French president Nicolas Sarkozy choosing between two Ivorian ‘products’: presidential candidates Laurent Gbagbo and Alassane Ouattara. France indeed chose one of the two ‘products’: that is, France chose to support Ouattara over Gbagbo. France even helped Ouattara’s forces to arrest Gbagbo on 11 April in 2011. As a result, Ouattara became president of Côte d’Ivoire in 2011.
‘Le France Afrique march encore…’ stands for unequal and exploitative economic relationships between France and (former) French African colonies, which are assumed to still be in place. The term France Afrique was first used in 1955 by the former president of Côte d’Ivoire, Félix Houphouët-Boigny, to describe these ‘good’ economic relationships. That is to say, the France Afrique community received a privileged economic status in France and Europe, France protected African regimes, offered aid packages and supplied African elite leaders with European consumer goods (Bovcon 2009: 283 – 284). This community was used as a political symbol and ideology to authorize development projects of Africa’s natural and human resources, the benefit of which would go to France (Charbonneau 2008: 281; Nantet 2019; O’Connor 1972: 410 – 411; 419).
In short, this cartoon satirically explains former power relations, with France as a colonizer and resource exploiter of Côte d’Ivoire, to be relatively similar. Even though, the political situation has formally changed, with Côte d’Ivoire gaining independence from France in 1960. A large volume of academic literature, however, suggests that the economic relationship between France and the Côte d’Ivoire is very similar to how it was before Ivoirian independence (Alesina & Dollar 2000; Schraeder, Hook & Taylor 1998; Cumming 1995).
This thesis discusses colonial legacies and the state legitimation of the Ivorian state during and after the First and Second Ivorian Civil War (from 2001 until 2012). I aim to answer the following research question: How did French foreign aid policies maintain
colonial legacies and, as a consequence, undermine the state legitimation of Côte d’Ivoire during and after the Ivorian Civil Wars? The focus of this thesis is on French foreign aid and
assistance to Côte d’Ivoire during and after the First Ivorian Civil War and the Second Ivorian Civil War. The present thesis refers to foreign aid as public transfers with development as its main purpose (Cumming 1995: 383).
Development aid during civil wars mostly accounted for creating stability, democracy, sustainable peace, and protecting economic interests. In the case of Côte d’Ivoire, unrest
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started with a coup staged by Robert Gueï in 1999, with support from France (Collier 2007: 95; 129). The French government, subsequently, assumed that Robert Gueï, as he had promised, would organize democratic elections in six months after the coup. Gueï did organize elections, but put himself forward as a candidate and did not reintegrate a great number of northern Ivorian without citizenship due to a law implemented by former president Bédié. Moreover, he banned other popular political candidates (idem: 129). Consequently, civil strife images spurred a French intervention in 2002. As a justification for the
intervention, France stated it wanted to prevent a ‘rebel’ group from taking over Abidjan. France, however, did not solve the conflict by forcing a compromise settlement or putting down the ‘rebel’ group. The French government only separated clashing groups from each other. Leading to the rearming of conflicting groups, and the government groups attacking French forces, while they had assumed France to protect the ‘rebel’ group (ibid.). In the end, the intervention and interference of other political actors in Côte d’Ivoire in 2002 created circumstances for another war over the same issues – citizenship, identity, and landownership – in 2011 (Mitchell 2012: 278).
French involvement and aid during and after these wars, have shown and enhanced a continuance of colonial legacies and, as a result, delegitimizing the struggles of conflicting groups in the process of nation- and state building. This thesis is socially relevant since it examines what decolonization means for both France and Côte d’Ivoire. By doing so, the thesis attempts to reveal the often hidden realities behind the term decolonization. Namely, that even with political decolonization, colonial legacies can still severely affect the political, economic, and social structures within Côte d’Ivoire. Lastly, it will present how French foreign aid undermines Ivoiran state legitimacy, and will suggest what the consequences of such developments can imply on the long-term for the Ivorian state.
The scientific relevance of this thesis is in support of economic decolonization. While a lot has been written about French foreign aid to Sub-Saharan African states, French colonial legacies and French military aid to Côte d’Ivoire has not been studied. Besides, this thesis also gives an insight into how aid and involvement in conflicts can, contrary to the French
intervention and peace talks in the First Ivorian Civil War, contribute to their true goal: helping impoverished communities and victims of war and creating a strong legitimate state.
I will commence with a literature review to present relevant scientific debates concerned with state legitimacy, colonial legacies, foreign aid, and French foreign aid. The literary review is followed by a theoretical framework in which foreign aid, the dependency theory, colonial legacies, and legitimacy are clarified. Following this, the methodology
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section indicates a qualitative case study. Thereafter, the case description presents a historical context of Côte d’Ivoire. After that, the analysis shows how French foreign aid policies are surveyed and related to the legitimacy of the Ivorian state and the possible persistence of colonial legacies. Finally, in the conclusion the research question is answered.
Literature review
Legitimacy
State legitimacy refers to state action that yields within the scope of the law. This is the case when two conditions are met: firstly, when an action results from a legitimate authority – a political institution that is authorized to take action; secondly, when this action does not violate a legal or moral norm. Furthermore, they argue that legitimacy is ultimately founded in public opinion and that this may contradict abovementioned manners that qualify an action as legitimate (Tucker & Hedrikson 2004: 14). In the case of Côte d’Ivoire, a legitimate authority was lacking before the First Ivorian Civil War. Most people living in the North of Côte d’Ivoire had been rejected Ivorian citizenship, and were unable to influence policy nor make claims in the scope of the law. The violations of a legal or moral norm are, then, context dependent.
Colonial legacies
Colonial legacies are nowadays still felt by Africans and African states, because of 500 years of European colonial terrorism on African people due to the enslavement of African humans, colonization and the incorporation of Africa into the European-dominated capitalist world-system (Jalata 2013: 1). Through colonial violence on African people, European colonizers were able to control African political economies, enrich their states and companies and incorporate Africa into capitalism (idem: 28). The supremacy of Europeans in the capitalist world system creates a context in which European powers are still able to exploit, abuse and have control over African states, for instance by imposing authoritarian leadership and stimulating particular persons to take leadership in African states (idem: 29).
Indeed, western domination of the economic system still leads to unequal power relations between European and African states. This thesis further elaborates that economic decolonization or the fact that economic, political, and cultural self-interest of actors in a
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capitalist system leads to unequal and exploitative relationships. Moreover, colonial legacies are argued to be a cause of state delegitimization in this thesis.
Charbonneau (2008) assumes that France is trying to move away from her
neo-colonial tradition by increasingly taking part in multilateral or multinational EU intervention - partly due to international pressure. Although, recent interventions should raise questions to the appeal for an EU intervention (Charbonneau 2008: 279 – 280). An EU intervention will, namely, depend on the willingness of other European -former colonizer - states to intervene and is not more legitimate than a bilateral intervention. Moreover, French and EU security policies have to be understood in the context in which they exist: ‘as interdependent active forces at work in institutionalizing and regulating a liberal world order’ (Charbonneau 2008: 280).
Hiding France in a multilateral intervention - so France as a responsible actor will not be held accountable for wrongdoings in an intervention alone – is assumed to create less neocolonial situations according to Charbonneau (2008). Contrarily, this thesis claims that with aiming to institutionalize and regulate a liberal world order, European states primarily serve their own interests. Such an approach, I argue, will never lead to less neocolonial situations but instead serves to strengthen a neocolonial global order.
Foreign aid
Various scholars, among whom Jeffrey Sachs – advisor to the United Nations (U.N.) and director of the Earth Institute at Columbia University – argue that some states are trapped in a so-called poverty-trap: being unable to become wealthy because of poverty. As neither free-markets nor democracy will do much good, however, they argue that foreign aid provides a solution. According to scholars such as Sachs, foreign aid can break the vicious cycle of the poverty trap as it generates capital for investing in areas that may create more productivity and, as a consequence, higher incomes and an upward economic spiral (Banerjee & Duflo 2011: 3 – 4). This thesis goes against Sachs and others promoting aid. It is not only about breaking ‘poverty traps’, since many inequalities go hand in hand and have to be maintained to ensure, for example, European superiority.
Other scholars, such as Easterly (2008) and Moyo (2009), argue that the current aid system is not working well, and that development is most of the time thought of as being a nonfalsifiable teleological process. Moreover, they argue that aid does more bad than good since aid prevents people from creating solutions. With the allocation of aid, local institutions may be undermined, corrupted, and a self-perpetuating aid lobby establishes (Banerjee &
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Duflo 2011: 3 -4; Easterly 2008: 4 – 5; Moyo 2009: 17). According to these aid pessimists, people will find ways to find problems when markets are free, and incentives are right (Banerjee & Duflo 2011: 4). Easterly (2008) even argues that such a thing as a poverty trap does not exist (Easterly 2008: 14 – 15).
According to Banerjee & Duflo (2011), it is not important whether aid works or not. It is more important to see where the money goes and whether this money helps the poor or not (Banerjee & Duflo 2011: 5). Banerjee & Duflo (2011) are right to say that foreign aid money truly helps the poor. However, whenever conflict arises, it is especially important that foreign aid works. Victims of war may be limited, basic services and infrastructures may remain intact. Hence, this thesis argues more by following the so-called aid-pessimists because the capitalist system creates a context that prioritizes self-interests. The next section focuses on how colonial legacies are maintained in foreign aid policies and, as a consequence, undermine state legitimacy.
Foreign aid, colonial legacies and undermining state legitimacy
Foreign aid can be a product of colonial legacies and, as such, undermine state legitimacy. To illustrate, Dietrich & Winters (2015) argue that international donors and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) nowadays emphasized the developmental projects they fund, so
citizens of a recipient state know that a foreign government is doing something good for them. A negative consequence, however, is that this branding might counteract feelings of
legitimacy towards the recipient state’s government, as the latter is not able to provide for the projects that foreign governments do initiate. It might lead to citizens who do not comply with the government anymore, for example, in terms of paying taxes (Dietrich & Winters 2015: 164). In the case of Côte d’Ivoire, the French army bases, military assistance, and intervention may all lead to a decline in feelings of legitimacy towards the Ivorian government.
Moreover, states that have the opportunity to appeal for aid might be less accountable to their citizens and civil structures which problematizes their legitimacy. Moss et al. (2005) found a relation between states which receive high levels of aid and raise low levels of taxation (Moss et al. 2005: 12). The authors also found that recipient states which have received uninterrupted foreign aid tend to hinder development (idem: 17). Côte d’Ivoire has received French foreign aid since decolonization, and the Ivorian government may, hence, not stimulate enhancing legitimacy or development. In the argument made by Moss et al. (2005), colonial legacies and the undermining of state legitimacy are not taken into account as a cause of a lack of legitimacy or slow development. This thesis is, thus deepening the argument made
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Finally, Menocal (2011) argues that foreign aid donated to fragile post-conflict states can undermine state-building efforts and state legitimacy in the eyes of a state’s population. It is important that such a state must at least ensure and oversee the provision of aid by other parties. Donors must maintain a mixture of different aid modalities that invest in government capacity building as well as maintain and expand the delivery of basic services, so the state remains legitimate, or to create state legitimacy (Menocal 2011: 1729 – 1730). A successful intervention in a conflict-zone must also entail a successful ending, in the sense that a state can found a legitimate sovereign state. In this thesis, it is argued that France did not aim to found such a state after the First Ivorian Civil War but arguably did after the Second Ivorian Civil War. This thesis, hence, agrees with Menocal (2011), but will elaborate further that a bottom-up approach with the use of what Scott (1999) has called metis creates even more legitimacy.
Theoretical framework
Different production zones: an explanation of the differences in wealth
According to Schwarz (2000) the differences in wealth can be explained through the labor division and spatial inequality around the world by different production zones argued by Johann Von Thünen. Von Thünen, then, argues that all economic, social, and political activity took place around a central market. The more labor division, the larger the distance between the hinterland, and the more productivity, and, therefore, a rise in income (Schwarz 2000: 13).
The closer one lives to a market, the greater economic opportunities. The further one lives away from the market, the more the added degrees of value diminishes (Schwarz 2000: 43). Agricultural activity would, then, distribute itself in circles devoted to a specific good with the use of different production systems. Since land nearby a central market is relatively expensive, mainly services and goods with a high added value are produced nearby and agricultural activity further away in a different circle (idem: 51). Labor intensity, then, is higher in circles relatively far away from a central market, whereas capital intensity rises nearby a central market (idem: 53).
Hence, it can be said that a hierarchy in zones producing goods and services exists. As a consequence, relational inequality can be produced by the global market. Although, this
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inequality is also relative since zones producing goods and services can try to create new central markets (Schwarz 2000: 43). Von Thünen’s theory can, then, validate both the world systems theory (WST) and neoclassical economics (NCE), while it confirms the WST by claiming graduated spatial distribution of agricultural activity to be divided into three rigid zones. Moreover, production systems, labor demand, and the added value to produced goods and services differ with distance from the central market. Von Thünen’s theory also
underlines NCE, since it argues inequality to be relative and no determined position (idem: 54).
Côte d’Ivoire, is just as other (former) colonized territories, incorporated in the capitalist world system by its colonizer and central market, France. The aim of such an incorporation is to benefit from a state its natural and human resources. This economic
unequal and exploitative power relation remains when dominant powers in the central market, as France, determine the value of goods and services and are, ultimately, able to maintain unequal trade. The fact that unequal trade is conserved creates a situation in which former colonized states are still politically influenced by the same dominant powers as in the colonial era. My thesis, hence, supports economic decolonization to create equal trade resulting in equal and reasonable economic chances to develop. In addition, this thesis rejects the NCE argument that inequality is relative and no determined position. The WST argument is equally not argued to be suitable for this thesis since the economic reality is not that static. Côte d’Ivoire, to illustrate, is not interchangeable for another Sub-Saharan state. Moreover, the dominant powers in the central market determine the value of goods and services. The next section, hence, discusses the dependency theory to be more suitable for the case of Côte d’Ivoire.
Dependency theory
According to the dependency theory, the underdevelopment of impoverished states in Africa, Asia, and Latin America is not determined by nations their incapacities to develop but by the constraints of international politics and economics. Relatively rich states continue to block African development by integrating African elites, governments, and leaders into an international social structure that serves the world capitalist economy, but not African economies (Zartman 1976: 325-326).
The contrasting fact that most African states are nowadays worse off than they initially were, is partly because of the aid dependency of African states (Escobar 1992: 412;
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functions or provide basic public services without external financial and informative donors – at least 10% of the Gross National Product (GNP) needs external funding to be aid dependent (Goldsmith 2001: 123; 125).
As a consequence, several dependency theorists argue that foreign aid harms the poor in recipient states and is solely in the benefit of Western interests and a small minority in the aid recipient state. As the allocation of foreign aid is regarded as a continuity of Western predominance in Africa, whereby the West profits of subjecting Africans, dependency theorists perceive development aid as solely a tool used to oppress the population of aid recipient states and gain capital from this oppression (Hayter 1971). Thus, national development for African states becomes inaccessible. In this thesis, French foreign aid is therefore taken as a tool to maintain colonial legacies and undermine Ivorian state legitimacy in the social, economic and political interest of France. To clarify the last sentence, the next section addresses what is meant with state legitimacy within this thesis.
State legitimacy
Goldsmith (2000) argues that most African states suffer from legitimacy deficits that are derived from the fact that they are weak states and, therefore, unable to provide and protect their citizens. Consequently, citizens do not perceive their government as legitimate. After all, a legitimate and responsible government would be able to provide for and protect its citizens and ensure development (Goldsmith 2001: 128; 144).
The observation that African states are weak and lack in state legitimacy is due to the existence of two morally different publics in a state instead of one. Such existence of two publics is a legacy of colonial history (Ekeh 1975: 91). Ekeh (1975) argues this to be the case, while the public realm – the realm that is mostly considered with politics: individual activities concerned with the collective interests of the citizenry – is historically associated with the colonial administration and is nowadays identified with politics in post-colonial Africa. In most states outside of Africa, the private realm has a common moral foundation with the public realm. That is, what is morally right in the public realm, is morally right in the private realm as well. In the majority of post-colonial African states there is no common moral foundation (idem: 91 – 92).
The common moral foundation is merely theoretical in Africa, since there are argued to be two publics – the primordial public and the civic public – with different moral linkages to the public. According to Ekeh (1975), the primordial public is dominated by primordial groupings, sentiments and associates determine and affect individual activities in the public
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realm. The primordial public has a common moral foundation with the private realm (Ekeh 1975: 92).
In contrast to the primordial public, the civic public is associated with the colonial regime and, therefore, based on civil structures such as, the military, the police and other civil services. The civic public has no moral linkages with the primordial public nor with the private realm (Ekeh 1975: 92). What is contradictory is that African political actors are both involved in the primordial public as in the civic public and assume to perform legitimate politics (idem: 93).
These political actors are the result of the colonization of African states by bourgeois Europeans and a bourgeoisie that had emerged because of the colonial experience. Both groups lack legitimacy, since both groups had power and economic influence over a state while lacking in authority and political acceptance (Ekeh 1975: 93).
In Côte d’Ivoire, as Ekeh (1975) argues is the case with most other African states, the concept of legitimacy does not apply, while at least two publics exist instead of one and, hence, a lack in common moral foundation (Ekeh 1975: 91). The primordial public in Côte d’Ivoire exists of multiple different ethnic, religious and social groupings. The civic public in Côte d’Ivoire is the Ivorian government. For example, president Gbagbo and his
administration as well as its civil structures. The civic public in Côte d’Ivoire has no moral common foundation with the primordial public nor with the private realm. Gbagbo, however, did belong to the primordial Bété group with its own sentiments and associates that influenced individual activities in the public realm (Chirot 2006: 68). The Bété group, as being part of the primordial public, has a common moral foundation with the private realm (Ekeh 1975: 92). Gbagbo, when he was part of the civic public, had operated in both the civic as in the primordial public and assumed to be a legitimate president. Colonial legacies and aims are discussed in the next section to better understand the cause of France interference with the Ivorian civic public.
Colonial legacies
‘The political and economic relationship between post-colonial Africa and the West have the same underpinnings and meet the same objective like the relationship in the colonial period: which was based on absolute control over Africa and its human and material resources, and the nourishment western industries and economic with Africa’s produce and markets’ (Alemazung 2010: 63). Moreover, the foundation for socio-economic and political failure in African states to have happened due to colonial legacies, such as the African elite leaders,
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whose leadership was not based on choice, consent, will nor the purpose of the African people. That is to say, most African elite leaders are chosen or pushed forward by (former) colonizers (idem: 62; 64).
In this perspective, a colonial legacy is ‘the inheritance of the state that belonged to the colonial administration from this administration by the post-colonial rulers in Africa’ (idem: 65). The introductory cartoon of this thesis is an example of an assumed colonial legacy, in which the relationship between France and Côte d’Ivoire is thought of to have the same underpinnings as in the colonial period in France Afrique.
When decolonization took place and most African states hoped for prosperity, former colonizers, most of the time, did not leave the independent states untouched. In other words, former European colonizers continued to influence politics and development policies in these states (Alemazung 2010: 64). For Côte d’Ivoire, the influence of France on its politics and development entailed, among others, the formal defense and military cooperation accords organized by France to maintain influence in Africa after decolonization (Wyss 2013: 86).
The former European colonizers argued their help to be for the best of Africa, while even foreign aid with conditions has produced the opposite of what it was said to aim for: helping the poor and escaping underdevelopment. Instead of this assumed aim, most African states are nowadays experiencing despair and dependence on Western powers (Alemazung 2010: 64). The most extreme form of a colonial legacy is ‘path determination’ or the implication that colonial choices determine post-colonial choices or leastwise conditioned post-colonial states in the choices they make. This means that it still remains difficult and costly to depart from colonial patterns (Austin 2010: 11 – 12). In this thesis, path
determination is argued to be the case for Côte d’Ivoire since the unequal power relation between France and Côte d’Ivoire in a capitalist system determine the pursuing of self-interest for every privileged actor. As a result, an unequal and exploitative relationship, benefiting the self-interest of both dominant powers in the central market – which is France for Côte
d’Ivoire – as well as African elite leaders, preserves.
Single story
A colonial legacy can be argued to be a single story. A single story is a one-sided and
incomplete story concerned with a group of people that is repeatedly told, creates stereotypes and make a single story the only existing story; a truth. As Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie states: ‘show a people as one thing over and over again, and this is what they become’ (Adichie 2019). A single story, then, is always to do with power relations. It matters who tells a story,
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when a story is told, how many times a story is told and, ultimately, how a story is told. These aspects of storytelling are all dependent on power. According to Adichie (2019), power is not just the ability to tell the story of a people, but the ability to make a story the only and
definitive story of a people.
Subsequently, a colonial legacy as a single story may justify neocolonial powers in a decolonized state. Especially, when privileged actors, and, hence, (allies of) dominant powers, within capitalism are pursuing their self-interests and define the stories they tell to African citizens. By aiming to fulfill their self-interests, which is for most Ivorian elite leaders to maintain a good economic and political relationship with France, the same unequal and exploitative relationship as in the colonial era maintains.
Consequently, the effect of a single story is that people lose their dignity, are not treated equally, and put emphasis on the differences between people instead of their
similarities. Moreover, experiences of people are made superficial and a lot of stories remain untold and unheard. Adichie (2019), hence, stimulates more different stories to be told, since ‘stories can be used to empower and to humanize, stories can repair human dignity (Adichie 2019).
Methodology
A case study is a detailed and intensive study of one specific location; an organization or a community (Bryman 2016: 22 – 23; 29). The case itself, therefore, is the research object. Within this thesis the research object equals the legitimacy of contemporary Côte d’Ivoire as a result of legacies of colonialism in French Foreign Aid. In a case study, the researcher aims to give an in-depth examination of the case (idem: 23).
The data that is used in this thesis mostly consists of historical writings. Most of the time these sources of data are secondary sources – ‘materials that are produced after an event happened’ and were not witnessed by the producer of the material (Halperin & Heath 2012: 329). These materials, therefore, have been interpreted, commented on, analyzed or processed to some extent. As a consequence, these materials can not be used as unproblematic facts (idem: 330). The sources have to be approached critically by including an analysis of patterns across different historical writings on a related topic, looking for regularities that appear on different accounts and by taking alternative perspectives of the sources I will use into account
14 and by justifying my choices of sources (ibid.).
The data is, moreover, analyzed in an iterative-inductive manner. Data collecting, writing and analyzing are, therefore, no separated phases within this research, but can be changed during the research and are inherently connected to each other (O’Reilly 2012: 30). In this thesis, a more idiographic approach will be used to show the unique features of both cases and contributes with an alternative theory to existing scientific literature. By comparing the two cases, however, this research also faces a nomothetic component – trying to generate statements that can be applied to both cases regardless of time and space (Bryman 2016: 23).
Data: case description of Côte d’Ivoire
History
Chirot (2006) argues that Côte d’Ivoire was, compared to neighboring states, economically successful from independence of France in 1960 until 1970 under president Félix Houphouët-Boigny (1960 – 1993). The Ivorian president was the closest French ally in Africa and the first to promote market capitalism combined with attracting foreign capital as a way to stimulate economic development (Chirot 2006: 63). Côte d’Ivoire became the world’s largest cacao exporter and, hence, created labor demand from neighboring states (Bellamy &
Williams 2011: 829). As leftist critics argued from the beginning, this economic form was neo-colonial and would not create sustainable, long-term development (Chirot 2006: 64). The years after 1970, then, the economy had started to decline (ibid.).
In the 1980s, most European powers had assumed democracy to solve a major part of problems in African states. The French government, as a consequence, expected French aid recipient states to reform governments and create democracies. Houphouët had always mentioned democracy to be dangerous, was convinced easily and announced multiparty elections in 1990 (Chirot 2006: 67). The opponent of Houphouët was Laurent Gbagbo – a leftist history professor who was opposed to neocolonialism and autocracy and belonged to the Bété group. Houphouët belonged to a group hostile to the Bété; the Baoulé. He, however, was more popular and, therefore, won the elections of 1990 (idem: 68).
In 1993 Houphouët had died in his office and Henri Konan Bédié – also from the Baoulé group – took over presidency. Bédié changed a law that created a limited citizenship of people who were able to proof that both parents were born in Côte d’Ivoire. Most of the
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time, Northern people were asked to proof their Ivorian citizenship and were not able to do so, since colonial borders had differed or no documents were available nor existing. As a result, many people were not allowed to vote in the 1995 elections and Bédié won (Chirot 2006: 68 – 69).
This resulted in an increasing polarization within Côte d’Ivoire and a coup by Robert Guéï in 1999. He was celebrated by a major part of the Ivorian population and said to support free and fair elections as well as the reintegration of people who were stripped of their Ivorian citizenship (Chirot 2006: 70; Collier 2007: 127). France believed him and, hence, had
supported his coup. He, however, never integrated all Ivorian citizens, since he had assumed he would win the next election by maintaining a limited citizenship. Moreover, he did not get the army under control and lost the elections of 2000 to Laurent Gbagbo (Chirot 2006: 70).
Gbagbo had used violence against, and had suppressed people who were mostly stripped out of citizenship, since some people who were stripped out of citizenship protested, because they had not been able to vote and called for new elections. The new president, Gbagbo, was converted to a militant form of Christianity and saw Islamic people – who most of the time were stripped out of their citizenship – as a threat and a group he had to fight. He replaced a lot of people in government functions with his own supporters (Chirot 2006: 71).
Conflict: The First Ivorian Civil War
As a result, a coup was aimed at by a mainly Muslim group in charge of army officers from Burkina Faso. The First Ivorian Civil War started, since pro-Gbagbo militia killed people supporting the Muslim ‘rebel’ group in territories with a lot of Gbagbo supporters, on the one hand, and the Muslim group killed Gbagbo supporters in territories which mostly supported the Muslim group, on the other hand (Chirot 2006: 71). In short, the war was about contested citizenship claims (Bah 2010: 598).
France, consequently, intervened in 2002, while the Muslim group was about to take over Abidjan and France could not deny her historical responsibilities and her ‘expertise’ in dealing with African conflicts (Charbonneau 2008: 282; Chirot 2006: 72). The intervention, however, did not entail
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a sustainable solvation of the war. France, namely, tried to save the Gbagbo government by solely separating fighting groups, and protected French citizens living in Côte d’Ivoire (Chirot
2006: 72; Collier 2007: 129). In January 2003 France
had tried to solve the war by organizing a peace talk in Paris for all political actors. The present political actors signed a power sharing peace agreement stating a the formation of a coalition under Gbagbo as president (Chirot 2006: 72). The day after the agreement was signed, Gbagbo’s military groups attacked French forces and citizens, since they had assumed France to protect the Muslim group (Chirot 2006: 72 – 73; Collier 2007: 129).
As shown in the above presented cartoon, France tried to create peace in a top-down manner between the two conflicting groups. Although France tried to do good, both conflicting groups turned against France by the end of 2004. Both groups felt as if France was against them and felt resentment against their former colonial power and started to use violence against French expatriates in Côte d’Ivoire (Chirot 2006: 73). As a consequence, France forced French citizens to leave Côte d’Ivoire (Bovcon 2009: 284). Thereafter, South-African president tried to create peace by a new election that would have found place in October 2005. This planned election did not take place even though, since the state was still unstable (ibid.; Collier 2007: 185). As a consequence, the United Nations (U. N). tolerated Gbagbo as a president for one more year. During this year elections had to be planned and a coalition government had to be appointed
(idem: 74). In January 2006, Gbagbo was not
planning to give up his power. Soldiers attacked military bases and U.N. offices, troops and personnel. These attacks symbolized a protest against the U.N. decision to dissolve Gbagbo from presidency. The U.N. secretary general was angry and blamed Gbagbo for the attacks (Chirot 2006: 74). Gbagbo’s air forces also killed nine French peacekeepers. France reacted by destroying Gbagbo’s air forces, confiscating the key airport in Yamoussoukro and deploying armour nearby Gbagbo’s home. Thereafter, political process stagnated and elections were repeatedly delayed (Bellamy & Williams 2011: 831).
In 2007 some progress was made though. With the 2007 Ouagadougou Peace Accord the citizenship struggle for primarily northern people was resolved (Bah 2017: 8). Finally, in 2010 new elections were called and Alassane – Gbagbo’s opponent – won the elections. Ouattara was recognized as the new president of Côte d’Ivoire by among others, the Economic Community of West-African States (ECOWAS), The European Union (EU) and the U.N. Unfortunately, Gbagbo was still not
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ready to give away his power and started to terrorize supporters of Ouattara. Ouattara reacted with a military offensive in March 2011 (Simonen 2012: 364).
Conflict: The Second Ivorian Civil War
The Second Ivorian Civil War started when Ouattara launched a military offensive in March 2011. In April the U.N. Operation Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) undertook a military operation to prevent the use of heavy weapons against civilians and to protect U.N. peacekeepers (Pigeaud 2017: 1 – 2; Simonen 2012: 364). France also intervened, since, according to France, the U.N. secretary general requested France to intervene (France Diplomatie 2019). Pro-Gbagbo
forces, however, continued attacking Abidjan, U.N. peacekeepers, Ouattara forces and civilians. Gbagbo’s forces even attacked the place where Ouattara was under UNOCI
protection. In response to this action, UNOCI started an operation against pro-Gbagbo forces. Finally, on 11 april 2011, Gbagbo was arrested, with the help of the French army, by Ouattara forces (Pigeaud 2017: 1 – 2; Simonen 2012: 364).
Before the elections, pro-Gbagbo supporters had threatened migrants in the cacao regions – mainly the north of Côte d’Ivoire – with the expropriation of their land once
Gbagbo would lose. As a result, a lot of migrants fled Côte d’Ivoire before or with the results of the elections (Mitchell 2012: 278). The election results, additionally, lead to a lot of violence against people seen as migrants through the eyes of Gbagbo supporters (idem: 279). According to Mitchell (2012), the military conflict is won while the political challenge is not. The new challenge for Côte d’Ivoire is to redefine citizenship, identity and solve the
landownership issue in rural areas. Since citizenship, identity and landownership are central causes of the Second Ivorian Civil War, Côte d’Ivoire has to address these issues to rebuild itself politically and economically (idem: 279 – 280).
What does French foreign aid consist of in Côte d’Ivoire?
Most donor states allocate foreign aid by political and strategic considerations. France gives significantly more aid to former colonies (Alesina & Dollar 2000: 32 – 33; Bräutigam & Knack 2004: 274 – 275). It is proven that France allocates significantly more foreign aid to former colonies as well as to states underscoring their economic strong ties with France, despite the political or economic regime of the state. These economic ties, as a consequence, are ascribed by maintaining as well as enhancing social, political and economic ties in the so-called France Afrique or Afrique Francophone (Schraeder, Hook & Taylor 1998: 301; 318 – 319; Cumming 1995: 392). Other factors influencing choices for donating aid, such as poverty
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levels or political-economical regimes are apparently less relevant (Alesina & Dollar 2000: 33 – 34). In other words, French foreign aid mostly consists of strong economic ties resulting in the enhancement of social, political and cultural ties as well.
Moreover, it is argues that France allocates foreign aid by following her own
interests. Cumming (1995) states that it seems as if France is reluctant in giving a ‘clear sign of commitment or support to African opposition parties’ (Cumming 1995: 391). French interests may, therefore, influence the French interventions in Côte d’Ivoire and might have affected French support for one group over another in the First and Second Ivorian Civil War.
France has always remained a neocolonial power in Sub-Saharan Africa, especially in the military domain. The French have used Africa for international prestige and a possibility to influence economic or political actors to its interests (Utley 2005: 26). After the
decolonization of African states, France made sure to maintain influence in her former Sub-Saharan colonies, by entering into formal defense and military cooperation accords. These accords enabled France to keep military bases and to intervene militarily in the states
concerned when French hegemony or territorial stability is threatened. France also influenced national defense policies and armies in Afrique Francophone by way of military advisors, training and equipment (Wyss 2013: 86).
The fact that France has military bases in Côte d’Ivoire and influenced national defense policies and armies, creates a possibility for France to easily take back control or affect military armies. Moreover, by still maintaining influence in Côte d’Ivoire and other former French colonies, France arguably delegitimizes these states. This may be considered a colonial legacy.
Analysis
How do French foreign aid policies maintain colonial legacies in Côte d’Ivoire during and after the Ivorian civil wars?
Colonial legacies in Côte d’Ivoire are inheritances of the French colonial administration and arguably have the same political and economic underpinnings and objectives as in the colonial period (Alemazung 2010: 63; 65). The incorporation of Côte d’Ivoire in the capitalist world system makes a similar unequal power relations possible while European powers, such as France, dominate this economic system. The domination of the economic system creates the
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possibility to determine the value of goods, services, and, more importantly, the pursuance of economic, political and cultural self-interest of privileged people and states in the system. These relations, then, benefit the self-interest of Europeans and African leaders and justify similar policies which serve to maintain inequality and exploitation. Colonial legacies, hence, are maintained by self-interests of privileged actors in the capitalist system.
It is argued that France allocates foreign aid for its own interests and aims to influence economic and political actors (Cumming 1995: 391; Utley 2005: 26). French Foreign aid policies in Côte d’Ivoire are mainly concerned with French hegemony, the protection of French citizens and stability (Wyss 2013: 86). The French colonial legacy of dictatorship – from different chosen or pushed forward presidents by France – in multi-ethnic Côte d’Ivoire resulted, by the law implemented by president Bédié in 1995, in unequal treatment in
citizenship. Following, the marginalization of ethnic groups and the fight for citizenship is assumed to be the cause of protest and the First Ivorian Civil War in Côte d’Ivoire (Bah 2010: 600 – 602). Leading to the intervention of ECOWAS, the African Union (AU) and the U.N. in 2002. These actors saw the conflict as a serious regional security problem. France intervened as well, since it had economic and security interests in Côte d’Ivoire. Despite these
interventions and the resulting separation of conflicting groups, however, the peace talks organized by ECOWAS and France in 2003 failed, since too little attention was paid to
citizenship (idem: 605).
As a result, the tension between the groups was never resolved until the Ouagadougou Peace Accord that allowed northern Ivorian people to have citizenship. Although, equal political access was still denied to northern Ivorians (Bah 2017: 13 – 14). The elections of 2010 lead, even though, to the victory of Ouattara and the loss of Gbagbo. When Gbagbo did not want to give up his power, another war broke out. Pro-Gbagbo forces attacked civilians, U.N. peacekeepers and Ouattara forces. This resulted in the assistance of the French army for the Ouattara forces, which arrested Gbagbo in April 2011 (Pigeaud 2017: 1 – 2; Simonen 2012: 364).
The fight for citizenship in Côte d’Ivoire is no exceptional issue, but a challenge for a great number of migrants in Sub-Saharan Africa, its surrounding states and, essentially, a challenge of state- and nation building. The challenge of state- and nation building of Côte d’Ivoire is also a colonial legacy, while France, together with other colonizing powers,
determined states without taking different people into account. With the interventions in 2002 and 2011 in Côte d’Ivoire, the French government has stimulated a new government to be in power. Although it can be doubted if the by Europeans determined state will succeed in
20 nation- and state building.
The civic public is a colonial legacy as well. France had interfered and still is
interfering with the civic public. To illustrate, Laurent Gbagbo was under control of France, protected by France in the First Ivorian Civil War and, finally, removed from presidency in 2011 by Ouattara’s military forces, France and other international organizations (Chirot 2006: 72; Collier 2007: 129; Simonen 2012: 364).
In short, it is costly and difficult for Côte d’Ivoire and related privileged actors in the capitalistic system to break colonial legacies and give up their pursuance of self-interest, hence, the relationship with France. Therefore, it can be argued that Côte d’Ivoire lacks agency to become fully independent and is determined by the structure in the, for a great part, European dominated capitalistic system. The choices Côte d’Ivoire makes are, then, always influenced by the choices France has made as a colonizer and makes as a dominant actor in the capitalistic system (Austin 2010: 11 – 12).
In addition, colonial legacies are enhanced by single stories. In the case of a state, the focus on the differences between people and states may result in certain policies, such as foreign aid policies, to be justified while France may be argued to be inherently different – with different skills and capabilities – than Côte d’Ivoire. Moreover, foreign aid as a continuance of a colonial legacy, and single story, might undermine and justify the
undermining of the Ivorian state legitimacy. A possible nuance in colonial legacies can be made with the use and stimulation of more and different stories of the state and nation(s) of Côte d’Ivoire. As a result, colonial legacies may be nuanced and state legitimacy may be enhanced.
How do French foreign aid policies undermine Ivorian state legitimacy during and after the Civil wars?
Firstly, foreign aid founded in colonial legacies may be causing a deficit in state legitimacy. Such as military assistance and training offered by France, undermine Ivorian state legitimacy since they are branded as not being provided by the Ivorian state, but by France (Dietrich & Winters 2015: 164; Wyss 2013: 86). Moreover, the allocation of foreign aid is in French economic and political interest (Wyss 2013: 86).
The allocation of foreign aid, then, again has to do with unequal and exploitative relationships, whereby France profits of being a privileged power in the capitalist system and central market. As a consequence, France, together with other dominant powers in the
21
Determining the value of goods and services means determining trade successes or losses, which can result in dependency of foreign aid. Consequently, France is able to influence the Ivorian politics to her own interests. In short, French foreign aid is taken as a tool to maintain colonial legacies and undermine Ivorian state legitimacy in the social, economic and political interest of France.
A way in which French foreign aid policies obviously have undermined the state legitimacy of Côte d’Ivoire is by intervening during the war. As Branch (2011) argues, intervention equals the rejection of state sovereignty, undermines state legitimacy and reduce state capacities. Intervention in a weak state, then, most of the time creates even weaker states after an intervention (Branch 2011: 26). France did intervene in both Ivorian civil wars and both times showed that France has more control in the situation than the actual state does. Of course, it is important that citizens are protected in times of war, but by intervening with threat to economic or security interests does not create strong states in the long term.
During the First Ivorian Civil War, it seemed as if France was not well informed about a substantial cause of the conflict, namely, citizenship. As a reason, the conflict was not resolved completely, although conflicting parties were separated and France tried to created peace by organizing peace talks (Bah 2010: 600 – 602). These peace talks in Paris in 2003 were also organized in a top-down manner and delegitimizing the struggle of conflicting groups in process of nation- and state building. In the end, France, together with other influential capitalist actors, among whom Ivorian elite leaders, made a compromise which was broken the next day by Gbagbo supporters in Côte d’Ivoire. It can therefore be argued, that France acted in a top-down manner by following a single story, and by doing that, had undermined the Ivorian state legitimacy, the process of nation- and state building and the struggle for citizenship (Adichie 2009).
Moreover, most African rulers did not have any legitimacy without colonialism and, in some cases, without French foreign aid. Hence, these leaders have undermined their own legitimacy to a certain extent with a by colonial powers implemented state apparatus (Ekeh 1975: 103). Moreover, French foreign aid focused on adopting the French legal system and French education may also cause a legitimacy deficit, while the civic structure may be even more assumed with the colonial administration (Global Security 2019; OECD 2017).
Contrary to the undermining of the Ivorian state legitimacy and the enhancement of the civic structure by France, foreign aid and involvement in a conflict area may enhance state legitimacy when treated equally to other political actors. When little to no emphasis is put on state legitimacy, a weak state and difficulty in state functioning may persist (Menocal 2011:
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1719; 1722). According to Menocal (2011), establishing a legitimate government based on an inclusive democratic government in a fragile post-conflict state is assumed to be the best corrective policy to found peace. The foundation of a legitimate state with an inclusive democracy may, unfortunately, be hard to achieve with the existence of weak governance structures. Moreover, informal institutions, rules and processes often are seen as more
legitimate than formal ones, especially in post-colonial African states with a primordial public (Ekeh 1975: 92; Menocal 2011: 1726).
Particularly, with the allocation of foreign aid to post-conflict states, state building efforts and state legitimacy may be undermined in the eyes of a state’s population. According to Menocal (2011) it is, hence, important that such a state must at the least ensure and oversee the provision of aid by other parties. Donors must maintain a mixture of different aid
modalities that invest in government capacity building as well as maintaining and expanding the delivery of basic services, so the state remains or even creates legitimacy (Menocal 2011: 1729 – 1730).
In the First Ivorian Civil War, French foreign aid, intervention and assistance undermined Ivorian state legitimacy by separating two conflicting groups in the state and organizing peace talks in Paris. Besides the fact that France undermined Ivorian state legitimacy, France did not solve the conflict as well. With the Second Ivorian Civil War, France has acted more by following conflicting groups, and especially with Ouattara supporters and military. This has created a situation in which Ouattara clearly has won the military challenge and Ivorian citizens may assume the state to be more legitimate than in the First Ivorian Civil War.
To create a strong state and sustainable peace, the Ivorian state must at least ensure and oversee the rebuilding of the state by other actors to create government legitimacy. Rebuilding and creating state legitimacy can be more effective when a state uses metis. Metis stands for practical local knowledge which can be used in specific situations and times, in contrast with authoritarian technical knowledge imposed on a society (Scott 1999: 311). States cannot be well informed about all particular needs in every corner of its territory, while local experts can. The need for safety and landownership of assumed-migrants before and after the elections in 2010 could, for example, have prevented people from fleeing Côte d’Ivoire for Gbagbo-supporters. When these people were protected and Gbagbo supporters were prevented from using violence and expropriate cacao landowners supporting Ouattara, a more direct shift towards state- and nation building could have been a result.
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Conclusion
In this thesis is a qualitative literature case study is done about how French foreign aid policies have maintained colonial legacies and, as a consequence, undermined Ivorian state legitimacy during and after the Ivorian civil wars. This thesis is in support of economic decolonization and contributed to an insight of the meaning of decolonization for a colonizer and a colonized state. It is argued throughout this thesis that political decolonization has not changed unequal and exploitative power relations. Solely political decolonization, without economic decolonization, in the, for a great part, European dominated capitalist system may even lead to a more unequal and exploitative relationship by the pursuance of self-interest of dominant actors. This, however, might be a suggestion for further research.
As a conclusion, French foreign aid policies are inherent in the, for a great part dominated by France and other former colonizers, capitalist system. By the pursuance of self-interest, of African elite leaders and the French government, and, the possibility of dominant powers in the capitalist system to determine value, creates the maintenance of unequal and exploitative relationships as well as the dependence of foreign aid. Côte d’Ivoire, then, is still economic, politically and socially influenced by France. Colonial legacies, hence, are
maintained by self-interests of privileged actors in the capitalist system. As a result, the Ivorian state legitimacy is undermined with the pursuance of self-interest by influential actors and, hence, the maintenance of an unequal and exploitative relationship. Hence, it is argued that Côte d’Ivoire suffers from the forced economic, political and social structure by her former colonizer.
Another continuation of a colonial legacy in French foreign aid is the enhancement of the civic public and the stimulation of France to have a government in a by European powers created state. Côte d’Ivoire, however, is still in process of nation- and state building. The enhancement of the civic public and a government in Côte d’Ivoire, delegitimize the political state-related processes.
Post-conflict Ivorian state legitimacy may, however, be enhanced by founding an inclusive government and ensure, as well as oversee, the rebuilding of the state by other actors aiming to create a legitimate state. Moreover, colonial legacies may be nuanced with the spreading of more and different stories of Côte d’Ivoire. As a consequence, state legitimacy may also be enhanced.
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