Israel’s shift in its security approach from a focus on the Iranian nuclear program towards Iranian proxy wars in Syria

University of Amsterdam

Israel’s shift in its security approach from a focus on the Iranian

nuclear program towards Iranian proxy wars in Syria

Student: Dominique Serra Student number: 11137959

Research Project: Researching the Middle East: power, politics and change Supervisor: mw. dr. E.A.V. Matthies-Boon

Second reader: mw. dr. B. Isleyen

Master thesis Political Science: International Relations University of Amsterdam

Abstract

After decades of shared interests and pragmatic cooperations between Israel and Iran, their cooperative relations diminished by the 1990’s and by the following decade, after regional transformations such as defeat of their common enemy Iraq in 2003, both began to view one another as a more direct geopolitical rival. Iran’s continued nuclear activities at that time have especially concerned Israeli officials and for more than a decade they have put in great efforts to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear power. Although characterizing the Iran nuclear program as an existential threat to Israel until recently, with the Iran nuclear agreement becoming a reality in 2015, Israeli leaders quickly removed the Iran nuclear file from their political agenda and shifted their focus on the threat of Iranian activities and its proxy Hezbollah in Syria. The thesis’ main argument for Israel’s shift in its security approach from the Iranian nuclear program towards Iranian proxy wars is that from Israeli policymakers’ perspective Iran’s new financial means following the Iran nuclear agreement in 2015 enabled Iran and its proxy Hezbollah to expand their sphere of influence in Syria by increasing their military capability and successfully establishing a military front at the Golan Heights. At the same time, the strategy shift reflects Israeli policymakers’ concerns about the reduced distance of the Iranian threat through its proxy Hezbollah stationed at the Golan Heights and its ability to attack Israel at its northern borders. Political ideology is also a crucial factor for Israel’s shifted security approach towards Iranian-backed proxy wars in Syria: Iran’s revisionist behaviour in the region and in particular its hegemonic aspirations in Syria challenge Israel’s status-quo approach and its aim to maintain stability in the region, resulting in Israeli efforts to prevent Iran from expanding its power and influence in Syria.

Abbreviations and Acronyms

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

IDF Israel Defense Forces

IRGC Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps JCPOA Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

JPA Joint Plan of Action

NPT Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

P5+1 Five Permanent Members of the UN Security Council plus Germany

UN United Nations

Table of content

Abstract ... i

Abbreviations and Acronyms ... ii

Table of content ... iii

  1. Introduction ... 2

2. Research design ... 5

2.1 Method ... 5

2.2 Data and operationalization ... 7

2.3 Challenges and limitations ... 9

3. Theoretical framework ... 11

3.1 Balance of power theory ... 12

3.1.1 Basic assumptions ... 13

3.1.2 Balancing strategies ... 14

3.1.3 Balancing behaviour ... 15

3.1.4 Criticism and considerations for the Middle East ... 16

3.2 Balance of threat theory ... 18

3.2.1 Balancing vs. bandwagoning ... 18

3.2.2 Sources of threat ... 19

3.2.3 Ideology in alliances ... 20

3.3 Ideological polarity and alliance behaviour ... 22

3.3.1 Balancing in ideologically multipolar systems ... 23

3.3.2 Strategical outcomes in multipolarity ... 25

4. Historical Overview ... 27

4.1 Israeli-Iranian cooperation before the revolution ... 27

4.2 Israeli-Iranian cooperation after 1979 ... 28

4.3 A growing rivalry ... 30

4.4 A new era ... 31

4.4.1 The ascent of Principlists in Iran ... 32

4.4.2 The Arab Spring and increasing Israeli-Iranian proxy wars ... 33

4.4.3 Iran’s nuclear program from 2002-2015 ... 36

4.4.4 The deal and its aftermath - Israel’s perspective ... 38

5. Analysis ... 40

5.2 Balance of threat theory ... 42 5.3 Ideological polarity and balancing behaviour ... 44 6. Conclusion ... 47  

1. Introduction

After more than three decades of pragmatic relations and extensive security cooperations between Israel and Iran, including the time periods before and after the Islamic Revolution in 1979, the cooperative relationship between those two countries diminished by the 1990’s and Israel’s perception of Iran as a threat potential grew increasingly. By the early 2000’s the Israeli-Iranian rivalry became well established with them evolving into more direct geopolitical and military rivals to each other (Parsi 2007: 214-215). Since then, Israel has been one of the main forces in trying to expose and prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear power and moreover, through its increased support of international sanctions and threat of military force it has made its position clear that it will not accept a nuclear-armed Iran (Kaye 2015). It is thus not a surprise that Israel was one of the most vocal opponents of the nuclear negotiations with Iran that at first led to an preliminary nuclear agreement in November 2013 between Iran and the P5+1 states1 (Chubin 2015). Israeli leaders did not hide their unease with the International community normalizing its relationship with Iran through a nuclear agreement. Once the P5+1 and Iran reached a final agreement in 2015, namely the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Israeli leaders quickly condemned the agreement and Israel’s Prime Minister Netanyahu called it a „historic mistake“ (Norman and Peterson 2015). Despite some positive assessments in Israel’s security community about the value of suspending the Iranian nuclear program for another decade, the majority of political and security leaders in Israel remained highly skeptical of the nuclear agreement and Iran’s broader regional intentions (Kaye 2016: 2). Months of contentious debate amongst Israel’s political and security community and Nethanyahu’s handling of the nuclear negotiations created frictions with Obama’s administration and severely tested the US-Israeli relationship. Remarkably, despite all these years of Israel making the Iran nuclear program its top national security priority, once the agreement became a reality in September 2015, the nuclear issue quickly disappeared off the radar in Israel’s political and public discourse (Allison 2016). In the months following the agreement, debates over Israel’s security policies towards Syria eclipsed the Iranian nuclear file. That said, the Iranian threat did not vanish, concerns about Iran just evolved from a focus on the Iranian nuclear program to Iran’s ability to threaten Israel in nonnuclear spheres, particularly through its support for Hezbollah and its growing presence in the Syrian Golan Heights, on Israel’s northern border (Herzog 2015b).

1 _{P5+1 refers to the UN Security Council’s five permanent members (the P5), namely France, the}

Obviously the question that immediately arises from this is: what explains that shift in Israel’s security approach that has led to a focus on activities of Iran and its proxy Hezbollah in the Syrian civil war? This thesis will try to take up the question by utilizing different strands of realism, as it seems that this school of thought best reflects the relationships between Middle Eastern states that are often strategic in nature and regional policymakers common emphasis on geopolitics and security considerations. Israeli-Iranian relations throughout the decades have been particularly marked by pragmatic interests and geostrategic considerations, which are expected to be crucial as well for the current state of their relations and Israel’s shifted security and threat perceptions. More precisely, the theories of balance of power, balance of threat and ideological polarity and balancing, concerned with states’ security and strategic considerations, policymaking processes and alliance behaviour, are applied on this particular case. In tandem with a historical overview, highlighting the different stages of Israeli-Iranian relations as well as important political events leading up to the current form of the Middle East’s geopolitical structure and power relations, and Israel’s re-assessment of the current Iranian threat, the following research question will be examined:

How can the shift in Israel’s post-deal security approach from a focus on the Iranian nuclear program towards Iranian proxy wars in Syria be explained?

In this thesis I argue that several factors explain Israel’s shift in its security approach from focussing on the Iranian nuclear program towards Iranian proxy wars in Syria: for one, power considerations play a role, due to Israel’s perception of a regional shifting balance of power in favour of Iran and its proxy Hezbollah and Israel’s fear of Iran from becoming a dominant power in the region. More importantly, Israeli policymakers’ shifted perception of Iranian threat due to its new financial means following the Iran nuclear agreement in 2015 that enhances Iran’s ability to increase its military capability and expand its sphere of influence in Syria and to fight Israel at its northern borders through its proxy Hezbollah, were pivotal for their decision. Last, Iran’s revisionist behaviour in the region and in particular its hegemonic aspirations in the Levant in contrast to Israel’s status-quo approach and its emphasis on stability in the region, marking a huge gap in their political ideology, are also crucial for Israel’s shifted focus on Iranian activities in Syria.

Although this thesis specifically examines the relations between Israel and Iran, still aware of the complexity of this region and the importance of other key players impacting its dynamics, a broader focus would go beyond the scope if this study. Nevertheless, addressing

the research question might still contribute to the enhancement of our understanding of the complex reality of the current regional system of the Middle East, and in particular how the Iran nuclear agreement has affected regional dynamics and power relations among key players. This could furthermore help to comprehend policymakers’ considerations. Moreover, the identification of factors contributing to the current Israeli-Iranian relations and Israel’s strategy focus on Iranian-backed proxies in Syria might also help to improve the theoretical understanding not only of this particular case but as well of the Middle East’s political and power dynamics overall.

How will this contribution to theory and understanding of policymaking be achieved and, more importantly, how can a sufficient answer to the research question be provided? First, the methodology and operationalization will be outlined and a short discussion about the method’s limitations will be provided before the theoretical background of the present thesis will be discussed. More precisely, the theories of the balance of power, balance of threat as well as ideological polarity and balancing will be presented and their limitations will be briefly discussed. Furthermore, the theories will be applied to the particular case of Israel. will be discussed. Next, a historical background of the Israeli-Iranian relations prior to and after the Islamic Revolution and political events leading up to the Iran nuclear agreement and Israel’s new security approach will be provided. Thereafter, the analysis in which the three theories will be applied to the case under scrutiny will be presented. The objective of the present thesis is to apply the theories’ concepts and ideas to the Israel-Iran issue in order to be able to interpret the events that led up to Israel’s shift in its security approach towards Iranian proxy wars. Finally, the results will be interpreted and discussed; and implications for further research are derived.

2. Research design

In this section I will discuss the method used in this thesis, namely explaining outcome process tracing. First, I shortly explain the three variants of process tracing. Then I continue to outline the general ideas underlying as well as the requirements of explaining-outcome process tracing. Next, the data chosen for the analysis and the operationalization will be presented and discussed. Finally, the challenges of explaining-outcome process tracing will briefly be explained.

2.1 Method

Process tracing is a well established method to detect perceptions and motivations of important actors as well as to identify complex causal relations and new variables relevant for a given case (Bennett, 2004: 19). Generally, there are three variants of process tracing, each for a distinct research purpose: First, theory-testing process tracing takes a theory from the existing literature and then tests whether there is evidence for a hypothesized causal mechanism in a specific case. Second, theory-building process tracing has the objective to build a theoretical explanation from the empirical evidence of a given case, resulting in a systematic mechanism being theorized (Beach and Pederson 2013: 3). Lastly, the most common in practice, explaining-outcome process tracing is a case-centric method that tries to provide a minimally sufficient explanation for a given outcome. It is very important to note that the term “causal mechanism” is used in a much broader sense than in the other two variants. Instead of testing or building mechanisms that are applicable for a wide range of cases, crafting a minimally sufficient explanation for a historical outcome demands the use of a combination of systematic (theoretical) mechanisms and non-systematic (case-specific) mechanisms into an eclectic conglomerate (Beach and Pederson 2013: 4). This process is illustrated in the figure further below. For instance, using an eclectic combination of particular theories creates what are in essence case-specific combinations. These combinations are non-parsimonious, meaning that they cannot be exported to other cases (Beach and Pederson 2013: 5). Theorized mechanisms are therefore used as heuristic instruments whose function is to provide the best possible explanation of a particular outcome (Jackson 2011: 140).

Explaining-outcome process tracing most fits the case under scrutiny: Israel’s regional position stands out with its historically political isolation in the Middle East, i.e. the lack of proximate allies and limited political and economic influence in its neighbourhood. Together with stability in the immediate neighbourhood as a key interest for Israel’s security

considerations (concerning its borders and the fragile regional status), Israel’s regional outlook has focused on managing the country’s political isolation, for instance by looking for under the-radar cooperations and ad hoc regional alliances. To give a concrete example, Israel has long-standing peace treaties and rather limited commercial ties with Egypt and Jordan (Berti 2015: 5-6). Based on that, the explanation for the outcome under investigation, namely Israel’s shifted security approach from a focus on the Iranian nuclear program towards Iranian proxy wars in Syria, should not be generalised but rather be case-specific. In the upcoming paragraphs I will provide a more detailed explanation of explaining-outcome process tracing.

As already mentioned before, while explaining-outcome process tracing studies sometimes display similarities to historical scholarship, this type of process tracing still is explicitly theory-guided empirical research (Sil and Katzenstein 2010: 191). Thus, the answer to the research question of this project partly rests upon the defined theoretical framework and its eclectic combination. For this particular analysis, the theories of different strands of realism are utilized in order to provide valuable explanatory factors for Israel’s security approach, namely the theory of balance of power (using concepts and ideas from Kenneth Waltz (1979), Jack Levy (2004) and Thazha Varkey Paul (2004)), balance of threat by neorealist Stephen Walt (1985) and underbalancing in ideological polarity by Mark Haas (2014), who combines realism with constructivist elements.

Second, because the aim is to provide a minimally sufficient explanation of a particular outcome, instead of developing a generalizable mechanism, it is therefore essential to include non-systematic mechanisms, i.e. mechanisms that can be understood as case-specific mechanisms for the explanation, also termed as contextual factors (Beach and Pedersen 2011: 22). While scholars, such as Elster (1998: 45) have argued that mechanisms have to be at level of universality that go beyond particular spatio-temporal context, other scholars have contended that mechanisms that are unique to a particular time and place can be certainly used as mechanisms. Wight (2004: 290), for instance, has defined mechanisms as the sequence of events and processes, namely the causal complex that leads to the event. Those non-systematic mechanisms can play a substantial role in explaining a particular outcome. Hence, mechanisms that include non-systematic factors will involve critical events that are case-specific. Referring to Beach and Pedersen’s assessment (2011: 23), in order to provide a minimally sufficient explanation I start from Israel’s security strategy shift and work backwards by tracing the process that led to it. For the definition of case-specific mechanisms, helping to explain the outcome, I therefore have to take into account explanatory factors that create a context, such as Iran’s prior military hostility and anti-Israel rhetoric.

In sum, a minimally sufficient explanation will often be compiled by both composite theoretical mechanisms in an eclectic combination that is specific to the particular case, and non-systematic (case-specific) empirical mechanisms (Beach and Pedersen 2011: 23).

However, the important question is when to stop this process, more precisely how to identify when a minimally sufficient explanation has been achieved. According to Beach and Pedersen (2011: 24) there is no general answer to this question. Determining whether one has a minimally sufficient explanation or not is based upon a subjective assessment: have all of the relevant aspects of the outcome been accounted for sufficiently? At the same time it is important to reflect if one can ensure that the evidence is best explained by the developed explanation instead of reasonable alternative explanations.

Figure I: Explaining-outcome process tracing. Taken from Beach and Pedersen 2013: 20.

2.2 Data and operationalization

As mentioned earlier this research project will investigate Israel’s shift in its security approach towards Iranian proxy wars in Syria. The historical overview will begin with the Middle East’s geopolitical transformation since 2003, that has in addition to the ascent of Iranian principlists/fundamentalists and the Revolutionary Guards, as well as the continued

Iran’s nuclear program, intensified the rivalry between Israel and Iran. Since then a growing potential for a direct and much more dangerous conflict has emerged (Kaye et. al 2011: 56). The present relationship between Israel and Iran can be viewed as a direct competition over geostrategic interests in the current regional environment as well as their ideological nature (Kaye et. al 2011: 58). However, relevant information on the Israeli-Iranian relationship and Israel’s security approach towards Iran prior to 2003 will be first discussed to provide the necessary historical background. Data for this part will predominantly rely upon secondary literature, whereas data for a historical overview from 2003 to 2016 will be a combination of primary and secondary sources (see below). Since this research aims at tracing the processes that have led to Israel’s shifted security approach from a focus on the Iranian nuclear program towards Iranian proxy wars in Syria, the analytical focus will primarily be on state behaviour as well as the perceptions and motivations of policymakers and their strategies. Fewer primary sources are accessible than secondary ones about Israeli-Iranian relations; for the most part I collected primary information on assessments and reports from Middle East analysts (such as Congressional Research Service report) as well as official statements from policymakers and Israel’s security community. In addition, I was able to find one accessible Israeli policy paper, the unclassified IDF strategy paper from 2015, released after the Iran nuclear agreement. In order to provide a good understanding and overview of the relevant events that took place in the Middle East and the development of the Israel-Iran relationship up to now, they will be summarized in a descriptive manner. Furthermore, it is especially important to look closely to policymakers’ and security experts’ perceptions and assessments concerning the issues of identity and ideology.

The secondary literature used for this research will mainly be based on the works (books, research articles) of scholars and policy analysts in Middle East affairs as well as research institutes, such as the Brookings Institution and Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. The works and analyses of those scholars and institutes can provide insights into the dynamics and perceptions of policymakers and other relevant actors about a particular event. For instance, many scholars have talked to diplomats and former members of the Israeli secret service Mossad.

For the explaining-outcome process tracing this is very important, since the provision of a minimally sufficient explanation relies to a great extent on the ability to make compact descriptions of crucial moments as well as perceptions and motivations of relevant actors (Blatter and Haverland 2012: 25). For that reason, it is important to triangulate as much sources as possible.

As already presented in the theoretical framework, three theoretical strands within the theoretical school of realism were chosen as systemic mechanisms in order to analyse the processes that have led to Israel’s shift in its security approach towards Iran. Each of these theories has a different focus. Moreover, these different focuses require a narrative of events. For instance, Kenneth Waltz’ (1979) balance of power theory, derived from a structural realist perspective, requires a description of the development of the Iranian nuclear program as well as the Iran nuclear agreement and its impact on the balance of power in the Middle East, in favour of Iran. Thus, within neorealism the focus of this analysis in particular is to explore aspects such as the balance of power, relative gains in economic power and military strength of Iran. Stephen Walt’s (1985) balance of threat theory, a neo-classic realist approach, demands an insight of Israeli policymakers’ perception of Iranian threat concerning the aspects of geographic proximity, offensive intention and offensive power. Therefore, Iran’s military and financial assistance to its proxy Hezbollah, stationed in Syria, have to be outlined as well as Iran’s overall proxy strategy in Syria has to be discussed. In addition, Iran’s anti-Israeli posture and the assessment of Israel’s policymakers will be addressed. Mark Haas’ (2014) recently developed security theory, a combination of realist and constructivist elements, uses concepts such as domestic identites and ideological polarity of policymakers as well as underbalancing strategies. This requires a narrative of the ideologically multipolar system of the Middle East and its implications for forming alliances, in particular for Israel combat of Iranian proxies, mainly Hezbollah, in Syria.

2.3 Challenges and limitations

The approach of explaining-outcome process tracing requires a historical narrative of the case. In order to prevent political bias, I will try to balance and choose sources from different perspectives to describe historical events and try not to rely on works that use loaded terminology and clearly favour one position. However, the complexity and nature of the Israeli-Iranian rivalry involves a risk to deal with biased information. In the same time, due to the secretive nature of the Israeli government, primary sources such as policy papers, are hardly accessible and therefore I have to mainly rely on secondary literature (i.e. research articles, books and articles from online news portals) as a basis for my analysis. It is not possible to declare with certainty whether the primary sources used in the secondary literature were accurately reproduced or not. The authors might have interpreted these primary sources. Therefore, I cannot simply regard my research results as given. Another challenge lies in the structure of the method of explaining-outcome process tracing itself: the analysis of the process depends on the individual choice of theories and historical events when defining

causal mechanisms that will impact the results of the analysis, meaning that some aspects and events are highlighted whereas others might be neglected. Whether all relevant factors for a particular outcome were detected or not is determined by the researcher: when one is satisfied that the found explanation is able to account for the outcome beyond any reasonable doubt. Yet, explaining-outcome process tracing is very valuable for explaining a particular case, and to a limited extent, it even enables to draw lessons about potential systematic factors that merit further research in other cases (Beach and Pederson 2013: 30).

3. Theoretical framework

This chapter presents the theoretical framework of this thesis and will discuss relevant concepts concerning states security issues, policymakers perception and the impact on security policies and alliance behaviour. The chosen theories for this thesis, namely the theories of balance of power, balance of threat, and ideological polarity and balancing, stem from the realist school of thought. The latter combines realist elements with constructivist elements such as identity. As mentioned in the introduction, this school of thought seems to reflect most current power dynamics and relations between states in the Middle East that are often strategic in nature and furthermore regional policymakers strong emphasis on geopolitics and security considerations. The reasons for focusing on these particular strands of realist theories are its concepts that reflect certain regional developments that might be crucial for the case under scrutiny: the balance of power in the Middle East has been altered by several shifts regarding the position and weight of certain actors, making the relationships that condition the new order not clear-cut. In a region that is also marked by ideological multipolarity, i.e. several rivaling political ideologies, the security challenges have become larger and more complex. Regional powers such as Iran and the non-state actor Hezbollah, for instance, have become a relevant force for shaping regional developments whereas the Unites States lost much of its diplomatic and political influence since the Arab Uprisings in 2011 (Kausch 2015: 2). Especially in the Syrian conflict, the new battleground in the Middle Eastern cold war where regional and international powers use the civil war to accomplish their goals, Iran’s and Hezbollah’s rising influence is visible (Gause 2014: 9).

Concerning the nature of Israeli-Iranian relations, overall it has been marked by pragmatic and geostrategic considerations. Israel’s security approach to the Middle East generally is reflected by a strong emphasis on maintaining the regional stability, especially since the years of instability after the Arab Uprisings that have created a new set of security challenges (UCLA 2016). Geography and politics are deeply intertwined in Israel, and its strategic approach is deeply shaped by geopolitics. It considers its own geostrategic environment as hostile, unpredictable, and potentially threatening (Berti 2015: 6). Geopolitical vulnerability and regional isolation are essential for understanding the country’s mainly realist foreign and security policy. Thus, since the beginning of recent regional transformations, such as the Arab Uprisings in 2011 and the fear of regional instability as well as an overwhelming doubt of the regional potential for democratisation, Israel has therefore implemented a mostly risk-averse and pro-status quo policy (Berti 2015: 7). Therefore, on the basis of that it is expected that the concepts and different focal points of each approach will

provide factors that explain Israel’s security shift from Iran’s nuclear program towards Iranian proxy wars in Syria.

First, the balance of power theory’s core assumptions defined by Kenneth Waltz (1979), one of the founders of neorealism, will be presented. In addition, recent supplements on states alliance behaviour in the Post-Cold War period by experts on alliances such as Jack Levy and Thazha Varkey Paul (2004) will also be discussed. Second, Stephen Walt’s (1985) approach of balance of threat and its assumption of states responding to several sources of threat when forming alliances will be outlined. Finally, this chapter will present Haas’ (2014) approach of ideological polarity and balancing, a concept of security studies that considers the factor political ideology and ideological distribution in a system as crucial for states alliance behaviour. Particularly states behaviour in an ideologically multipolar system will be highlighted due to identified ideological multipolarity of the Middle East.

3.1 Balance of power theory

The balance of power theory is one of the oldest and most fundamental concepts when studying international relations. The concept had its „golden age“ in the 18th and 19th century and although the idea of balance of power lost its relevance after World War I, it re-emerged with the turn to realist international theory after World War II. The works of Morgenthau, Gulick, Claude and Dehio as well as Kenneth Waltz’s development of structural realism were particularly important. The latter approach intended to put realist theory on a more sound social science footing (Levy 2004: 29). While the balance of power concept is one of the most conspicuous ideas in the theory of international relations, it is also one of the most ambiguous concepts (Nexon 2009: 334). Some realists use the concept to describe the actual distribution of power in the international system, while others focus on an ideal distribution of power and still others view the balance of power as a strategy of states rather than an outcome of the international system. Although many realists treat balance of power as a theory, others disagree on key assumptions or propositions of the theory or even on the implications of the theory. Some argue, that balance of power helps maintaining peace, while others state that it rather contributes to the onset of war. Some realists even claim that the theory makes no determinant predictions about war and peace (Levy 2004: 30).

To resolve some of the ambiguities surrounding the balance of theory, addressed by Jack Levy (2004), the chapter will outline the essential features and clarifies its key concepts.

3.1.1 Basic assumptions

Levy (2004: 31) treats balance of power as a theory that intends to explain foreign policy behaviour and the resulting pattern of international outcomes. It was mentioned before, that there is no single balance of power theory, but a variety of different theories within this concept. They are mostly a set of hypotheses, which have not been integrated into a comprehensive theory. Yet, all approaches regarding balance of power theory share the assumption of realist theory: the system is anarchic, the key actors are territorial states, the goal is to maximize power or security and states act rationally to achieve this goal (Boucoyannis 2007: 715).

Yet, balance of power theorists disagree regarding the relative importance of various state goals, but primary goals of states are considered as interrelated and can be understood as a hierarchy of instrumental goals. The primary aim of all states is their survival, defined in terms of their autonomy and territorial integrity. Secondary goals of states can be seen as instruments for the higher-order aim of survival. Most importantly, states aim to avoid hegemony, meaning a situation where one state becomes so powerful that it is able to dominate the other states in a particular system, which would put an end to the multistate system they are in (Levy 2004: 32). Thus, the biggest threat here is the hegemony over the system, not other kinds of threat (Levy 2004: 35). There are further goals used to prevent hegemony such as maintaining the independence of other states and maintaining an approximately equal distribution of power in a system. The latter is defined in terms of a combination of individual state capabilities and the aggregation of state capabilities in alliances. From the perspective of balance of power theorists, the dominance of a single state or an alliance is highly undesirable because the predominant actor is likely to pursue an aggressive behavior. Furthermore, the hegemony of a single power could support a state in its intent to impose its will on others. The theorists imply that peace is generally maintained when equilibrium of power exists among great powers (Paul 2004: 5). In a state of equilibrium, no single state or alliance obtain overwhelming power and thereby the incentive of starting a war against weaker states. Therefore, power balance among states prevents war because, even though risk-acceptant actors might conceive strategies to overcome the advantages of defense, most potential aggressors wisely refrain from offensive action, realizing the limited chances of military victory and the uncertainties of war initiation (Claude 1962: 56). In sum, stability is a key goal of power balancing as a policy instrument. International stability indicates that when a balance of power prevails, no single state becomes dominant and no large-scale war is likely to take place (Paul 2004: 6).

Both instrumental goals addressed above help the formation of balancing coalitions of a potential hegemon. As mentioned before, peace may also be a goal, but in balance of power theory this goal is conditional on the avoidance of hegemony. The argument that the highest goal of states, besides securing their survival and autonomy, is to prevent hegemony does not mean that states intentionally limit their own power. State strategies of maintaining equilibrium of power rather are means to maximize their own security. While some realists, in particular proponents of defensive realism argue that states often limit their pursuit of power to maximize their security; others argue that even if all states aimed to maximize their power, it would result in equilibrium of the system as a whole. In other words, the maintainance of a system is the unintended consequence of states’ behaviour of maximizing its own interests under certain constraints (Levy 2004: 32).

Balance of power theorists speak very vaguely about states balancing, but nearly all treatments strongly imply that great powers do most of the balancing. They argue that small and medium states prefer that the power of an aspiring hegemon be limited, but only great powers have the military capability to intervene. Weaker states are aware that they can have only a marginal impact on outcomes, and given their short-term time horizons and vulnerability, they will either balance or sometimes bandwagon, depending on the context (Levy 2004: 35).

Lastly, it is important to note that Kenneth Waltz and other structuralists argue that neorealist theory only predicts balance of power outcomes and not state strategies or foreign policies, although Waltz is not always consistent on this point. Accordingly, they expect balances of power (defined as non-hegemonic outcomes) to occur naturally. Thus, from this point of view outcome of power balancing does not necessarily require intentional balancing behaviour of states (Waltz 1979: 126). It is true that balanced outcomes and strategies are analytically different and it is possible to have one without the other. Balancing states might no be able to maintain a balanced outcome and prevent hegemony. Moreover, it is possible that no state want to dominate a system and no one feels threatened, which would lead to a balanced outcome without balancing actions of states. Yet, nearly all other balance of power realists argue that a theory that predicts balanced outcome without specifying mechanisms leading to this outcome would have less explanatory power, therefore focussing on both balanced outcomes and balancing strategies (Levy 2004: 36).

3.1.2 Balancing strategies

Structural realists identify dynamics that impact systemic balances of power in the anarchical structure of international politics. These balance of power mechanisms involve familiar

components of Waltz’s theory, where balancing can be viewed as a law-like phenomenon in international politics. The argument is that from the theory, one predicts that states will engage in balancing behavior whether or not balanced power is the end of their acts. One also can predict a strong tendency toward balance in the system. The expectation is not that a balance once reached will be maintained, but that a balance once interrupted will be restored in one way or another. Therefore, balances of power recurrently form (Waltz 1979: 128). Moreover, from this perspective the anarchical orders are governed by principles of self-help, meaning that units (e.g. people, corporations, states) in the condition of anarchy have to expend some of their effort in providing the means to protect themselves against others (Waltz 1979: 124).

Besides that, the distinction between external and internal balancing as a means for self-help is important. External balancing can be understood as the formation of alliances as blocking coalitions against a prospective aggressive state. It also includes territorial compensations, and if necessary, threats of force, intervention and even war. Internal balancing is defined as the internal build-up of military capabilities and economic as well as industrial foundations of military strength. Since self-help systems require states to put powerpolitical concerns before other considerations, anarchy also prepares states to pay attention to changes in capabilities of other states (Goddard and Nexon 2005: 23). However, there have been few attempts to specify the precise conditions when these means are used and how they are combined. What is clear is that alliances play a central role in most approaches of the balance of power theory (Waltz 1979: 127).

3.1.3 Balancing behaviour

Paul (2004: 2) provides an answer for the theoretical gap just mentioned above by presenting three concepts to describe different manifestations of balancing behavior, namely hard balancing, soft balancing, and asymmetric balancing. He states that some criticism could be raised on this expansion of a traditionally understood military-security concept. Yet, he emphasizes that as long as the ultimate purpose of any balancing strategy is to reduce or match the capabilities of a powerful and threatening state, the states’ adoption of different means should be a part of the analysis for a better understanding of today’s balancing strategies. Traditional balancing through alliance formation and military buildups is crucial; yet it reflects only one single form of balance of power behaviour (Paul 2004: 3).

1. Hard balancing is a strategy often used by states who are engaged in intense interstate rivalry. These states thus choose strategies to build and update their military capabilities, as

well as create new and maintain established alliances and counter-alliances, to align their capabilities to those of their key opponents. The traditional realist and neorealist ideas of balancing are mainly limited to hard balancing.

2. Soft balancing comprises tacit balancing of short formal alliances. This behaviour occurs when states develop limited security agreements with one another to balance a potentially threatening state or a rising power. It is often based on a limited arms buildup and ad hoc collaborations in regional or international institutions. These policies may be adapted to open, hard-balancing strategies in case of an increasing security competition and if the powerful state becomes a threat.

3. Asymmetric balancing refers to efforts by states to balance when facing indirect threats posed by non-state actors such as terrorist groups that do not have the ability to use conventional military capabilities or strategies to challenge key states. Asymmetric balancing also refers to efforts by non-state actors and their state sponsors to challenge and weaken established states by using asymmetric means such as terrorism (Paul 2004: 3).

3.1.4 Criticism and considerations for the Middle East

The basic problem with all balance of power theories is that the theory and its central arguments about balanced strategies and balanced outcomes are presented as universal and applicable to all international systems. However, the scope conditions of balance of power are generally implicit rather than explicit (Levy 2004: 37). The balance of power theory is derived from experiences in Europe and the assumptions of theory reflect a Eurocentric bias: the system is Europe and the basis of power is that the system is military power; the key actors are great powers of Europe. Furthermore, a great-power bias and balancing propositions are detected in literature. Balance of power is mainly concerned with rivalries and clash of great powers (Levy 2004: 38-39). Levy (2004: 45-46) also emphasizes that one has to be careful in applying theory drawn from experiences of great power in Europe to contemporary regional systems, including the Middles East, Asia and Africa, where some premises might not fully hold. He refers to the assumption of anarchy in particular: There are likely differences between the dynamics of power of an autonomous system and nonautonomous system. The latter, usually regional systems (such as the Middle East), is often influenced by powerful external states (e.g US or Russia). This does not mean that balancing does not occur in regional systems, but only that one cannot assume that traditional balance of power can be automatically used in such systems.

Yet, according to Miller (2004: 241) balancing can be considered as a dominant feature of the regional politics of the Middle East that is dominated by a variety of regional conflicts, civil wars, and external interventions. Great powers such as the United States and Russia are heavily engaged in the region due to interests in oil, the strategic location of key actors, alliances, as well as economic incentives. Therefore, regional systems are not purely anarchic and autonomous because of the influence of great powers. These powers can play different roles in regional politics, for instance a protector or guarantor (Miller 2004: 241). However, in case of great powers disengaging from a particular region an autonomous regional system is indeed able to arise. He argues that such regions are likely to be those where no great power has important interests or where interested great powers lack the necessary resources to intervene to impact the regional balance of power. In all other regions, the great powers have a crucial influence on the regional balance. They are well equipped for influencing regional balances because of their superior capabilities and the local actors’ dependence on stronger allies (Miller 2004: 242). For instance, they can provide arms supply, financial aid and investment, sanctions, and technology transfers. Arms subsidies help the regional states to manage the costs of balancing their regional rivals and to continue in costly protracted conflicts (Miller 2004: 242). The Middle East is a good example of how a balance of power was maintained during the Cold War, both on the superpower and regional state level, by preventing the emergence of hegemony. The United States has become a hegemonic power in the Middle East after the end of the Cold War and has since then created several alliances with regional actors. At the same time, rising revisionist threats also have further incited balancing (Miller 2004: 244). Yet, as mentioned the geopolitical equilibrium in the Middle East is being changed by a number of larger structural shifts regarding the position and relative weight of specific actors: for instance the balance of power has been shifted in favour of Iran and subsequently regional rivalries resurged (e.g. Iran-Saudi Arabia) introducing a new Arab cold war. Moreover the political and diplomatic influence of the Unites States is declining since the Arab Uprisings in 2011 whereas a rising political power of non-state actors such as Hezbollah (backed by Iran) can be detected. They now increasingly shape regional developments and power dynamics, and further pose new security challenges by adopting new deterrence strategies and changing the form of warfare in the Middle East. As a result it has become more difficult for a regular army to defeat those groups (Curtis 2012: 28). In summary, current political events and dynamics in the Middle East suggest that power politics is still a dominant strategic feature of the regional system. Thus, in the current Israeli-Iranian rivalry this might be the case as well, where Israel might consider balancing

against Iranian backed forces in Syria, in order to prevent them from increasing Iran’s sphere of influence in the Levant and maintain the regional status quo. This indicates that some of the presented concepts and ideas presented by balance of power theorists might be fruitful to provide some factors that explain Israel’s shift in its security approach towards Iranian proxy wars in Syria. Especially the supplements and adjustments to Waltz’ notions made by Paul (2004) and Levy (2004) seem suitable. The analysis will trace if focal points of the theory, such as external and internal balancing strategies as well as modes of balancing behaviour apply to Israel and its shifted security strategy for Iran.

3.2 Balance of threat theory

Contrary to the balance of power approach, the balance of threat theory argues that states do not mainly ally in response to power, but rather against the most threatening state (Walt 1987: 21). This theory was built as an adjustment to the balance of power theory and created to improve on the insights of structural realism. Stephen Walt holds on to the primacy of security concerns and defines threat as threats to the security of a threatened state, much as realists, such as Kenneth Waltz, have described balancing as a necessity in order to prevent any state from achieving hegemony, therefore threatening the security of other states. While material power may be considered as a source of threat, additional factors are important as well (Tomashevskiy 2008: 3).

3.2.1 Balancing vs. bandwagoning

Walt points out that, although alliances are mainly viewed as a result of threat, there is yet a disagreement as to what that response will exactly be. When entering an alliance, states may either balance (ally in opposition to the main source of threat) or bandwagon (ally with the state that poses the biggest threat). These divergent hypotheses describe very different worlds and the policies that follow from each are distinct (Walt 1985: 4-5). Balancing behaviour implies joining alliances in order to avoid domination by stronger states, which is based on assumptions of the traditional balance of power theory. According to this hypothesis, states join alliances to protect themselves from states or coalitions who could pose a threat. States decide to balance for two main reasons: First, states risk their own survival if they fail to stop a potential hegemon before it becomes too powerful. It is argued that, instead of allying with the dominant power, it is safer to join with those who cannot easily dominate their allies (Walt 1985: 5). Second, joining the weaker side increases the new member's influence, because the weaker side needs more assistance. Joining the stronger side, by contrast, reduces the new member's influence and makes them dependent on its new partners. Hence, alignment

with the weaker side is the preferred choice (Waltz 1979: 127).

On the other hand, bandwagoning behaviour implies that states ally with the dominant side. Two motives can be identified: First, by aligning with the threatening state or coalition, the new member may hope to avoid an attack on himself. Second, a state may align with the dominant side in war in order to share the benefits of victory. However, these two motives for bandwagoning are quite different. In the first, bandwagoning is chosen as a means of maintaining independence in the face of a potential threat. In the second, a bandwagoning state decides to join the dominant side in order to obtain territory (Walt 1985: 6-8).

3.2.2 Sources of threat

Walt (1985: 8) point out that using balancing and bandwagoning solely in terms of power is seriously flawed, because it ignores other factors that state leaders will consider when identifying potential threats and potential allies. As previously mentioned, power is an important factor for states when determining strategies, but it is not the only one. Because balancing and bandwagoning are more accurately viewed as a response to threats, he argues, that it is important to consider all the factors that will affect the level of threat that states may pose. He identifies four factors impacting the perception of threat which will be subsequently explained (Walt 1985: 10-13):

1. Aggregate power: States with greater total resources (i.e. population, industrial and military capability, technological standards) may pose a greater potential threat to other states. The overall power that states can use is therefore an important component of the threat they can pose to others. However, power can be threatening, but it can also be prized. Powerful states are able to either punish enemies or reward friends. Therefore, another state's aggregate power may be a motive for either balancing or bandwagoning behaviour.

2. Proximate power: Walt argues that the ability to project power declines with distance, meaning that states that are nearby pose a greater threat than those that are far away. As a consequence, states will align in response to threats from a proximate dominating state. As with aggregate power, proximate threats can result in a balancing or a bandwagoning response. When proximate threats cause a balancing response, alliance networks are the likely result. When a threat from proximate power results in bandwagoning, then a sphere of influence is created. Small states bordering a powerful state may be too vulnerable, so they choose to bandwagon rather than to balance,

especially if their powerful neighbor has demonstrated its strength before.

3. Offensive power: States with substantial offensive capabilities are more likely to provoke an alliance than those who are either militarily weak or capable only of defending themselves (Jervis 1978: 182). The effects of this factor vary however: on the one hand, the immediate threat posed by such capabilities might result in states allying with others. On the other hand, when offensive power enables a rapid defeat of enemies, vulnerable states may see little hope in resisting. Balancing may seem not a good idea because one's allies may not be able to provide support quickly enough. Therefore, states bordering those with large offensive capabilities, and who are not potential allies, may be forced to bandwagon because balancing alliances are not possible. It is more likely that great powers will balance while weak states seek protection by bandwagoning more frequently.

4. Offensive intentions: Finally, states that have an aggressive appearance are likely to provoke others to balance against them. Even states with modest capabilities may cause a balancing response if they are perceived as especially aggressive. Indeed, perceptions of intent play an especially important role in alliance choices. When a state is believed to be constantly aggressive, it is unlikely that other states will bandwagon. If an aggressor's intentions are impossible to change, then balancing with others is considered to be the best option in order to avoid becoming a victim. In short, the more aggressive or expansionist a state appears to be, the more likely it is to cause an opposing alliance.

Walt concludes, that by refining the basic hypotheses to consider several sources of threat, a more complete picture of the factors is gained that state leaders will consider when making alliance choices. However, one cannot generally say in advance which sources of threat will be most important in any given case, only that all of them are likely to play a role (Walt 1985: 13).

3.2.3 Ideology in alliances

The term „ideological solidarity“ refers to alliances that result between states sharing political, cultural, or other characteristics. According to this hypothesis, the more two or more states have in common, the higher is the likelihood of an alliance. Although realist scholars agree that this represents at best a secondary explanation for alliances, the assumption that ideological similarities are critical often appears in the rhetoric of state leaders seeking to

justify alignment with one side or opposition to another (Walt 1985: 19). Aligning with similar states may be seen as a means of defending one's own political principles. Moreover, states with similar characteristics may fear each other less, because they will find it harder to imagine an attack from the same side. Lastly, an alignment with similar states may enhance the legitimacy of a weak regime, by demonstrating that it is part of a large alliance (Liska 1962: 37).

Yet, the question is if ideological solidarity is an important cause of alliances after all. Besides that, what conditions increase or decrease its significance? Although these questions are difficult because ideology is one factor among many, several pieces of evidence were found. First, states are more likely to follow their ideological preferences if they feel secure. If a state faces great danger, it takes whatever allies it can get. In particular, the factors that are likely to make states more secure should increase the significance of ideology in alliance choices (Walt 1985: 21).

Second, it is argued that the importance of ideology can be exaggerated by the perceptions of state leaders and the policies that they choose as a result. If state leaders believe that ideology determines international alignments, they will consider similar states as potential friends and opposite ones as potential enemies. A positive reaction towards the former and hostile towards the latter will encourage good relations with one and will increase the others opposition (Walt 1985: 24).

Third, the significance of ideology may be exaggerated by taking the rhetoric of state leaders too seriously. For internal and external reasons, state leaders are likely to emphasize this factor in discussions about national obligations. It helps to convince opponents from the strength of an alliance, but domestic support will also be increased if the public believes that goals and values are shared with one’s allies. Walt states, that although ideology does play a role in alliance choices, it is usually a subordinate one (Walt 1985: 25).

Walt faces some criticism for his approach: Keohane (1988:172), for instance, says that examining the ideas and concepts of the balance of threat theory requires a great amount of information about policymakers perceptions, that is not always accessible. He further argues that the balance of threat approach has relatively little theoretical power of its own. Others criticised Walt for drawing wrong conclusions on alignment decisions, in particular on alliance behaviour of small states (Labs 1992: 385).

Overall, the emphasis of this theory on the importance of different sources of threat stimulating states balancing strategies seems promising to provide explanatory factors for Israel’s shift in its security strategy from focusing on Iran’s nuclear program towards Iranian

proxy wars in Syria. Regional developments such as the increased Iranian hostility towards Israel since Ahmadinejad’s presidency and the ascendance of fundamentalists, Iran’s strengthened ties to Syria and its proxies stationed at the Golan heights at the Northern border of Israel are indicators for that. In practice, the focal points for the analysis for balance of threat therefore will be focused on aggregate power, proximity, offensive capability and offensive intentions in relation to Israel’s refocus on Iranian threat through its proxies in the Syrian conflict.

3.3 Ideological polarity and alliance behaviour

Mark Haas (2014: 717), a scholar in security studies, focuses on how ideology shapes perception and what effects these perceptions have on policy choices and forming alliances. Contrary to Walt’s approach of ideology in alliance formation he combines realism with constructivism in this conceptualization. He does not describe the content of particular ideologies, but rather the difference among them. First, he argues that ideological distributions are very important when determining which states are primary threats to others security interests. He takes the approach that the greater the ideological differences between leaders within a state is the higher is the perceived threat to their interests. Conversely, the more leaders share their ideological point of view, the lower the perceived threat to core interests. When political leaders are part of a shared identity, the wellbeing of other members will be part of their own (Wendt 1999: 229). Accordingly, when identities of state leaders extend and are shared with those of other states, they will evaluate one another’s interests as interdependent. Thereby, cooperation and alliances are likely to happen (Haas 2014: 718).

Yet, the argument that identities are central to individuals’ perceptions and policies does not explain which identities are decisive for these outcomes. Haas (2014: 718) argues that policymakers’ domestic identities and ideological beliefs in particular are central to their international security choices. He further states, that domestic identities are the key to the formation of collective identity at an international level. Domestic identities can be based on a great number of characteristics including factors, such as shared language, religion, values, and ethnicity. However, Haas’ understanding of domestic identity is more restrictive, he refers to the principles of governance to which political leaders are committed to. Again, he focuses on how the ideological dimension of state leaders’ domestic identities impacts their foreign policies. Firstly, leaders’ ideological identities by their nature are likely to be crucial when forming their political decisions (Haas 2014: 718). He points out that it is important to investigate through an empirical analysis which combination dominates leaders’ interests, perceptions and actions in a given area of social interaction and that it cannot be decided

beforehand. However, values and norms regarding questions of governance are likely to shape identities in the field of the domestic or international politics (Risse-Kappen 1995: 506). Secondly, several analyses have documented that leaders’ identities, such as their ideological beliefs, have a profound impact on their perceptions and foreign policies, meaning that leaders who have similar identities tend to have low threat and cooperative relations whereas ideologically distant decision-makers have the reverse (Rousseau 2006: 69).

According to Owen (2010: 4-5), ideological identities of state leaders are likely to be under threat when two conditions are met: First, state leaders disagree on what the best form of government is. Second, one or more states in the system are instable and vulnerable to regime change (ideological), either due to intense domestic ideological conflicts and or war. This threat to policymakers’ ideological ideas leads to what Owen calls „ideological polarization“, which means that the identification of their interests with those states that share their ideology increases and further declines with interests of rival states.

Finally, when analysing how ideologies have an impact on leaders’ foreign policies, it is also important to know which ideological principles matter most to particular policymakers. According to Peter Katzenstein (1996: 24), identities cannot be stipulated deductively, they rather have to be examined empirically in actual historical settings. Thus, although Haas (2014: 720) defines leaders’ ideological identities as their principles of governance, he argues that any principle that organizes state-society relations can be part of these beliefs.

3.3.1 Balancing in ideologically multipolar systems

Ideological distributions to a great extent determine leaders’ understandings of which states pose the greatest threats in the system and how big these perceived dangers are. Ideological polarity shapes how elites balance these threats by influencing leaders’ ability to form and maintain international alliances. Realists focus on potential permutations of ideological polarity: that is, whether a system is unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar depending on the number of existing powers (Haas 2014: 724). Ideological unipolarity is a condition in which all great powers of a system have similar ideological beliefs, ideological bipolarity occurs when great powers are divided into two main ideological groups and ideological multipolarity represents an era in which great powers are divided into at least three different ideological groups. To clarify, all three forms of ideological polarity can appear in systems that are multipolar in terms of power, depending on the amount of different ideologies that define the key states in the system. The number of ideologies, not the number of great powers dedicated to any particular set of ideological beliefs, determines the level of ideological polarity in a system. (Haas 2014: 725). Haas (2014: 728) emphasizes that alliance and therefore balancing

dynamics are the most complex in ideologically multipolar systems. On one level, incentives for alliance behaviour are likely to be similar to those of ideological bipolarity: cooperation among ideological partners and hostility toward members of rival ideological groups. If great powers are divided into three main ideologies, one likely outcome is the states’ formation of three alliances based along their ideological beliefs. Nevertheless, beyond this similarity to bipolar systems, ideologically multipolar systems display key differences compared to ideologically bipolar ones.

To begin with, the overall ideological hurdles to forging alliances will be greater in ideological multipolarity than bipolarity. In ideologically bipolar systems, ideological group A faces only one set of ideological hindrances to alliances. In contrast, in ideologically multipolar systems, ideological group A faces ideological barriers to ally with at least two other groups. Therefore, with all other things being equal, a change from ideological bipolarity to multipolarity will create a more difficult situation for at least some states to form alliances because there are likely to be fewer ideologically acceptable alliance partners in the system (Haas 2014: 729). The greater the obstacles to alliance formation in a system, the less efficient the balancing process will be against potential threats. Consequently, the incentives to buck-pass are likely to be much more increased in a situation of ideological multipolarity than bipolarity. The existence of several ideological opponents in a system from ideological group A’s perspective makes them optimistic that these opponents will balance each other while group A remains a bystander and stays outside of the conflict. The ideal situation is not so much that other powers will pay the costs of balancing, as neorealists argue. Haas (2014: 729) argues that instead, leaders have the hope that representatives of other ideologies will do the dirty work of balancing threatening states. The likelihood of two or more rival ideologies balancing one another while another remains largely on the sidelines is one that is not possible in a situation of ideological bipolarity. Thus, in a situation of ideological multipolarity comes a significant increase in the incentives to adopt buck-passing policies (Owen 2010: 99).

Hence, Christensen and Snyder (1990: 143) have argued that although there are greater opportunities for external balancing in ideological multipolarity than bipolarity, the conditions in multipolarity prevent leaders from taking advantage of them and instead trigger a buck-passing behaviour. Multipolar systems create incentives for underbalancing because state leaders of the key states identify that there are other countries that are able to balance threats. In this situation, the temptation of different states’ policymakers will be high to pass the costs of countering threat to other countries. Again, state leaders hope that others take the

costs of balancing while they receive the benefits. Because all states will be tempted to adopt buck-passing policies in multipolar systems, the result will be an ineffective balance of power against shared international threats (Christensen and Snyder 1990: 144).

3.3.2 Strategical outcomes in multipolarity

As Haas (2014: 731) has already empasized, contradicting these forces for inefficient balancing behaviour, is the fact that alliance formation to a certain extent is less difficult in ideologically multipolar systems. Although the overall obstacles for forming alliances are higher in ideological multipolarity than bipolarity, the likelihood of an alliance among ideological rivals, somewhat paradoxically, is greater in ideologically multipolar than bipolar times. He argues that this outcome increases the probability of efficient balancing against threats.

He further explains that the increased probability of inter-ideological alignment in ideologically multipolar systems is not just a consequence of greater opportunities for this type of cooperation under this condition. Instead, certain forces impacting alliances among ideological rivals are systematically stronger during periods of ideological multipolarity than bipolarity. In ideologically multipolar systems state leaders of different ideological groups are more likely to have important common interests that enhance the chances of lasting security cooperation (Haas 2014: 732). Remarkably, state leaders of ideological groups A and B, despite some significant differences, maybe share the assessment of ideological group C to be the enemy. This joint interest may propel A and B into an alliance based on this logic: the ideological rival of my ideological rival is my friend. For example, A and B could view C as the most urgent subversive threat to their domestic interests or the most aggressive threat because of exceptionally distinct ideological beliefs. In these cases, ideologies are still an important determinant of state leaders’ foreign policies, even if these policymakers are cooperating with an ideological rival for a short period of time (Haas 2014: 732).

This set of ideological relationships, namely mutual animosity towards a third ideological group in an ideologically multipolar system, prevails over other ideological hostilities. In sum, ideological multipolarity creates incentives for both more and less efficient balancing in contrast to ideological bipolarity. Furthermore, when ideological incentives for balancing align with power ones, the threat will be perceived high and thus balancing will likely be effective: the state with the greatest military capability in the system will also be perceived having aggressive intentions and the ability to destroy. However, there are times in which power and ideological threats do not coincide. Ideological multipolarity, because of the greater amount of different ideological groups in a system, increases the possibility of this