Closing the gap in migration policy : a proposal for global institutional reform

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Closing the Gap in Migration Policy

a proposal for global institutional reform

Master Thesis Political Science; International Relations Research Project: Global Migration

Submitted by: Wietse Postma (5781256) Supervisor: dr. J.M.J Doomernik

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Chapter 1

1.1 Introduction

Transnational migration is the movement of people from one country to another, with the intent of settling. There are many different forms of migration, and there is no one definition of this phenomenon. Since the origin of mankind, people have migrated from one place to another. In the middle of the seventeenth century, the peace treaties of Westphalia were signed. This can be seen as the origin of the state. Since then, the world has changed drastically. Wars, rapidly growing technology, international trade,

communication and transport have changed the domestic and international political, cultural and economic landscapes. Globalization has made the world a smaller place. However, the state as a mode of ruling has survived all these changes. To this day, the state remains the primary authority over its inhabitants.

Thinking about migration has changed. In modern Europe, immigration has, up to recently, been seen as an exceptional phenomenon (Doomernik et. al. , 2008). In the beginning of the twentieth century, there was a growing gap between a small number of developed and technically advanced countries, and the rest of the world (Schrover, 2008). After 1950, urbanisation in Europe increased, which led to a declination in agriculture. Urban industry was growing, and higher education, mechanisation and productivity and lower prices in agriculture led to an outflow of people from the

countryside to the urban areas (ibid.). Furthermore, demography has changed. Since the second half of the eighteenth century, the white population grew faster than any other. This was no longer the case by the end of the nineteenth century, since the population in Third World countries grew faster than the economy, which led to an increase in

population, but also in massive poverty (ibid.). In Europe, people went to school longer, and there was a low birth rate. This led to an increasing demand for extra labour. Other parts of the world, with high population growth and weak economies, could provide in this demand. Regulations on migration were not strictly maintained, and many people were invited to the West (ibid.).

Migration to Europe during the 1960s and 1970s was generally viewed to be of temporary nature (Doomernik et. al., 2008: p. 20). Labour migrants, referred to as ‘guest

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workers’, were assumed to return to their home country, after having earned money and once their employment was no longer needed. This was not the case. Many migrants stayed, and with their families joining them, created immigrant communities with different ethnicities in the receiving countries (ibid.). In the 1980s, migration to Europe became less predictable. Before that time, migrants came on the base of colonial ties or due to labour recruitment of receiving countries. Now, migrants seem to arrive in a more randomly fashion and in growing numbers (ibid: p. 21). European governments and the people reacted to this. In some countries, the attitude towards immigrants became more negative, and unemployment was often blamed on the immigrants (Schrover, 2008). In the 1980s, labour markets in almost everywhere in Europe deteriorated. Thus, the demand for foreign labour declined. Labour recruitment by West-European countries stopped, and governments discouraged labour migration. The wish to migrate from mostly North-African countries and Turkey remained to exist. This created a tension between possible migrants from sending countries and Europe, who wanted to reduce the number of migrants (van Wijk, 2007: p. 14). At the same time, the number of asylum-seekers in Western Europe expanded rapidly in the 1980s. With this growing number, the ethnicity of seekers changed. In the 1970s, most asylum-seekers came from Eastern Europe and dictatorial regimes in South-America. In the 1980s, the number of asylum-seekers from Africa and the Middle East was growing. At the end of the 1980s, European countries, most notably Germany, were confronted with large numbers of migrants from Western Europe before and after the fall of the Berlin wall (ibid.).

Some developments in Europe had great impact on immigration to Europe. The Schengen agreement came in effect in 1995. The Netherlands, Germany, France,

Belgium, Luxembourg, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece and Austria, and in 1996 Denmark, Finland, and Sweden, agreed to abolish internal border controls of people. Once inside the Schengen area, people could freely move from one country to another.

Illegal/irregular immigrants and asylum seekers could also move more freely within the Schengen area. This led to stricter external border controls, in order to impede entrance to the European Union. The agreement made in Maastricht in 1993 emphasized the strict protection of external borders with the regulation of visa. Furthermore, physical controls of external borders were increased, cooperation between European states was strengthened and the asylum policies were made more unified (van Wijk, 2007: p. 15).

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Similarly, other relatively advanced and rich states such as the United States and Australia adopted stricter immigration regulations (ibid: p. 16).

The increase in regulation complicated the legal movement of people from poor, unsafe or instable countries to the European Union. Thus, people tried to reach Europe in illegal and undocumented manners. The process of migration without

legal/documented consent can be called illegal or irregular migration (van Wijk, 2007: p. 16). More stringent immigration regulation led to increasing irregular migration. This gave opportunities to entrepreneurs such as human smugglers, to whom immigrants turned in order to reach ‘fortress Europe’ (Doomernik et al., 2008 & van Wijk, 2007). Despite measures to control irregular migration, there are a large number of irregular migrants who have entered Europe. Although there are no absolute figures on this matter, it is estimated that 500.000 irregular migrants found their way to Europe in the year 2004 (Laczko, 2004: p. 348).

Later in this thesis, immigration regulations and their effects will be further scrutinized. For now, the preliminary conclusion is that there has been an increase in European immigration regulation in the past decades, and that immigration from countries to the Western world in general and to Europe in particular remains to exist. 1.2 Why do people migrate?

Comprehension of migration requires understanding of the logic of sending and

receiving states, but also of the logic of migrants. What are the reasons of people to leave their home country and move to another? Some basic facts can clarify this phenomenon.

First of all, big parts of the world live in extreme poverty. In figure 1, the poverty headcount ratio at $1,25 a day in 2012 is shown. As we can see in the graph, there is a lot of poverty in the world. Poverty is most concentrated in Africa. A large percentage of people live in severe poverty in a lot of country on the African continent. In figure 2, the same information is shown about poverty around twenty years earlier, in 1993. There is less information about some African countries in that period, but still, most of the worst off countries are located in the African continent. Large parts of the African population live under the poverty line. Building on data from the World Bank from the year 2007, Thomas Pogge presents some facts about poverty and inequality in the world. 830 million people are chronically undernourished. 1.100 million lack access so safe water, 2.600 million lack access to basic sanitation, 1.000 million lack adequate shelter, 1.600 million lack electricity. 2.533 million, or 39,7 percent of humankind, were living in

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extreme poverty in 2004, according to World Bank data. 18 million people die each year from poverty-related causes, which is 50.000 each day, one third of all human deaths (Pogge, 2008: p. 2).

Figure 1. Poverty headcount ratio at $1,25 a day (% of population) in 2012 (Source: World Bank)

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Figure 2. Poverty headcount ratio at $1,25 a day (%of population) in 1993 (Source: World Bank) While extreme poverty remains to exist, there is a rise in affluence in the rich and

developed countries. Using World Bank data from the period 1984-2004, Pogge found that “the data show a perfect pattern of increasing inequality” (Pogge, 2008: p. 3). In the rich and developed OECD countries, household expenditure per capita rose 56,3 percent during 20 years, while the bottom percentile rose only 9,6 percent during this same period (ibid.). Thus, without going into the causes, extreme poverty remains to exist in the less developed countries in the world, while at the same time affluence is growing in the rich and developed countries. Inequality has been growing in the past decades, and is likely to continue to grow. This gives incentives to people living in the poor regions of the world to try and migrate to the affluent countries, thereby escaping poverty and hoping to share in the wealth elsewhere.

A second cause for migration is political. Figure 3 shows a map of the world and the political stability of its countries.

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Figure 3. The Failed States Index 2007 (Source: ForeignPolicy.com) As the map shows, the rich and developed Western countries are politically relatively stable. As was the case with the figures concerning poverty, Africa is politically the most instable continent worldwide. As the website comments on the release of the 2012 Failed States Index, state failure is an entrenched problem. Despite some political changes in for example the countries of the Arab revolution, the overall image of failed states around the world is rigid and invariably (Foreign Policy).

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Figure 4. Predicted population growth between 2004-2050 (Finnegan, 2011) Figure 4 shows the predicted population growth in the period 2004-2050 (Finnegan, 2011). Although containing different information, the map of the world shows an image similar to that of the former figures. The highest rate of population growth is predicted to be on the African continent.

The information in these figures gives a good general insight in the possible reasons for people to migrate. First of all, people in large parts of the world live in extreme poverty. In other parts of the world, economies are growing and there are good prospects of a relatively prosperous live. This status quo has not changed in the past decades, and is not likely to change in the foreseeable future. On the contrary, global inequality is growing. Secondly, a lot of countries, mostly underdeveloped and poor, have an instable political situation, as is showed in the Failed States Index (Figure 3). Thirdly, the predicted population growth in the coming decades is highest in the poor Third World. This is just a selection of information. Other issues, such as for example health and education, should also be taken into account. Figures of a world map with this kind of information would give a general similar overview of the situation in the rich and poor parts of the world (World Bank). This is to say that a growing number of

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Economic prospects, such as possible employment, are low. The political situation is unstable. In other parts of the world, there is growing affluence and better employment prospects, as well as a relatively stable political situation and better education and health care. To conclude, people in the less well off parts of the world have very good reasons to migrate to the rich and more developed parts of the world.

The work of migration theorist Douglas Massey (amongst others) shows that a good understanding of migration requires the study of its internal dynamics.

Remittances from migrants to their relatives in the country of origin can create new migration. The remittances can make one family in a community economically better off than the neighbouring families. The relative deprivation, caused by the remittances, can be removed by sending members from the other families within a community abroad. Migration runs along already established social ties. Thus, the new migrants follow the initial migrant(s), and are likely to go to the same destination (Massey et al. 1994, 2002). To speak with the words of Massey et al., drawing from a study of a broad selection of Mexican communities:

“Migration tends to increase in prevalence and become more diverse because

transnational movement causes relatively permanent changes in individual motivations, social structures, and cultural milieus, and these changes cumulate over time to change the context within which subsequent migration decisions are made. As information about migrations grows and network connections to the United States ramify, the costs and risks of international movement drop and migration becomes more attractive. As more people are induced to migrate, knowledge and network connections expand further, inducing more people to migrate, and so on. With time, migration becomes a generalized social and economic practice (Massey et al., 1994: p. 1527-1528).”

Obviously, this introduction does not cover everything that can be said about migration and migration theory. The point here is to show that migrants have good reasons to try and reach other, more affluent parts of the world, hoping to obtain better prospects for the future of themselves and their families. Furthermore, migration has a strong internal dynamic that creates flows of migration along social and economic ties. From this we can conclude that migration isn’t likely to diminish in the foreseeable future.

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1.3 Outline thesis

What we have learned so far in this introduction is that since the last past decades, there has been an increasing focus on immigration regulation and control in Western liberal democracies. At the same time, people are still migrating legally and illegally to these same countries. What we know from migration theory is that immigrants have good reasons to try and reach the more developed, affluent Western countries. Migration to these countries isn’t likely to diminish in the foreseeable future. Thus, there is a gap between the Western focus on restrictive migration policies on the one hand, and the reality concerning global migration on the other hand.

Much has been written about the desirability of open borders. Building on

arguments in favour of and against open borders, there will be made a case for a right to mobility or the opening of borders. This plea will be in favour of the opening of borders or the recognition of a Human Right to mobility worldwide. However, the argument is most directly addressed to Western liberal democracies. This has the following reasons. First of all, generally speaking, Western liberal democracies belong to the most

developed, rich and powerful nations in the world. Thus, migration is most likely to take place from poor regions of the world in the direction of Western liberal democracies. Furthermore, since Western liberal democracies are, again generally speaking, the better off countries in the world concerning economic prospects, health, education and so on, these are the countries that might object the most against the opening up of borders. Therefore, these are the countries that should be convinced of the urgency of these policy changes. As will be argued later in this thesis, Western liberal democracies are dominant in the shaping of the global institutional framework. Convincing these countries of the value of changing this global institutional framework will be an important step in the actual realization of these changes. Also, the recognition of the value of Human Rights and liberal democratic values provide good arguments in favour of open borders. Since the origins of Human Rights lie in Western liberal democracies (Donnelly, 2003), and Western liberal democracies are the most probable advocates of liberal democratic values and Human Rights, arguments concerning Human Rights and liberal democratic thinking are logically most compelling when directed against these countries.

It is good to note that I personally endorse liberal democratic values and the value of Human Rights. My conception of Human Rights is universal. In this line of

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thought, my unit of concern is at the individual level rather than a communitarian level. In accordance with Thomas Pogge, it is my view that Human Rights should be

universally valid, applicable to every human being. With this, I could be called somewhat of a cosmopolitan (Pogge, 2008).

Another note is to be made in relation to the argument in favour of open borders. Immigrants are divided into different categories, such as asylum seekers, documented immigrant and irregular migrants. Although the opening of borders would make this categorization superfluous to some extent, most of the arguments in favour of open borders are concerned with irregular migrants. This is because they are the most prominent objects of restrictive migration policies. The EU, for example, accepts the presence of asylum seekers and some other categories of immigrants in the EU, whereas persons who enter or remain in the EU without proper authorisation or legal

documentation are considered to be illegal or unlawful.1

After having argued in favour of open borders, the question is: ‘Why doesn’t this happen?’ When one accepts the moral and practical necessity of open borders, what causes countries to desperately hold on to restrictive migration policies? How and why do policy-makers deal with the earlier mentioned gap between restrictive migration policy and the reality of global migration? Theories about ‘organized hypocrisy’ and the symbolic uses of politics will be applied to Dutch policy-making as well as to practices at the global institutional level in order to answer these questions.

This thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 1 contains this introduction. Chapter 2 contains the methodology and theoretical framework. The chosen method will be set forth and justified. Chapter 2 ends with a description of the theories that will be used in explaining how governments deal with the gap between restrictive migration policies and the reality of global migration. Chapter 3 will consist of the case in favour of open borders. Chapter 4 will explain how and why governments deal with the gap between restrictive migration policies and the reality of global migration, with the use of the theories set forth in the theoretical framework. This is followed by some

recommendations for policy reforms, based on all that is written in the previous chapters. The last chapter, chapter 5, will consist of a conclusion and discussion.

1_{Handbook on European law relating to asylum, borders and immigration, retrieved} from: http://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2013/handbook-european-law-relating-asylum-borders-and-immigration(25 June 2013)

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2.1 Methodology

This thesis tries to answer two related questions. The first is: ‘Is there a case to be made in favour of open borders?’ This question will be answered affirmatively, as chapter 2 will show. As we’ve seen in the introduction, there is a gap between Western restrictive immigration policies on the one hand, and the reality of global migration on the other hand. Namely, immigrants are entering Western liberal democratic countries, and are likely to do so in the future. When one accepts that there is a case to be made in favour of open borders on the base of ethical as well as practical arguments, the second question is: ‘Why do Western liberal democracies not open up their borders?’

These two questions will be answered with a study of relevant literature. Much has been written on the desirability of open borders. On the base of a literature study on this subject, arguments in favour of and against open borders will be scrutinized. The first part of this chapter will focus on the work of Thomas Pogge, who states that

Western liberal democracies are actively violating the Human Rights of the poor people and societies around the world (Pogge, 2008). The argument will be that since we, people and governments in Western liberal democracies, shape the global institutional framework to our advantage, thereby reinforcing inequality and hurting the global poor, share responsibility for the inequality and poverty elsewhere. This does not necessarily demands the opening of borders. Addressing poverty and inequality directly could be achieved without the opening of borders. However, as Veit Bader remarks: “…policies to eradicate poverty directly and policies of fairly open borders are not mutually exclusive alternatives (Bader, 2005: p. 344).” As is mentioned, the argumentation in this thesis is most directly addressing Western liberal democracies, and is grounded in egalitarian liberal thought, calling for distributive justice. Thus, there will be opted for a

combination of redistributive measures and agreements of the opening of borders. This recommendation will be justified in chapter 4.

Further arguments in favour of open borders will be based on authors such as Bader, Carens, Harris, Legrain and others. As Veit Bader puts it: “Migration, the

geographical movement of people in order to settle in other places for longer periods of time, has extensively been analyzed by historians and social scientists…. (Bader, 2005: p. 331).” An overview of the relevant arguments will favour the opening of borders. In combination of with the argument made in line with the work of Thomas Pogge, chapter 4 of this thesis will call for policy reforms concerning global migration and the fulfilment

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of a moral obligation to solve extreme poverty and global inequality to a certain degree. These reforms will be based on authors such as Thomas Pogge (2008) and Raffaele Marchetti (2008). I do not claim that these policy recommendations are complete or encompass every aspect of the problems described in the thesis. They should be seen more as a first step towards a more just world that needs further attention and development.

The second question is about why Western liberal democracies don’t adhere to compelling reasons to open up their borders. As the introduction has shown, there is a gap between policy and reality concerning migration. Why and how policy-makers deal with this gap will be explained with the help of theories about ‘organized hypocrisy’ and the symbolic uses of politics. These theories have an uncommon approach to policy-making and organizational theorization. They will be described in the theoretical framework and will be applied to a case study of Dutch migration policies. Since the state as a mode of ruling remains the primary authority over its inhabitants, a case study is helpful in the comprehension of why restrictive migration policies remain intact. Two reasons underlie the choice for an investigation of the Dutch migration case. The first is that it is a Western liberal democracy. This does not necessarily lead to an investigation of the Netherlands, since there obviously are more Western liberal democracies. The second reason is that the initial plan was to include interviews with policy-makers on the subject of why the restrictive migration policies remain intact, despite argued reasons to open up borders. For the sake of convenience concerning time, space and costs, I decided that the Netherlands would be the best option to realize these interviews. Unfortunately, I didn’t manage to arrange these interviews due to time considerations and non-response from policy-makers. Nevertheless, the Dutch case remains the chosen case study. The application of the theories set forth in the theoretical framework to Dutch migration policies will give insight in how politicians deal with policy-gaps and incompatible demands from society. It is my claim that these findings can be abstracted to the level of migration policies in Western liberal democracies in general.

A last point should be made concerning the theories described in the theoretical framework. They approach policy-making and organizational theory differently than common political theory and organizational theory does. The very nature of these theories has as a consequence that an application of these theories to policy-making

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cannot provide hard facts or evidence. Nevertheless, it is my hope and conviction that the reader will find the theories insightful and helps to understand the phenomenon of migratory policy-making in a way that couldn’t be achieved with more ‘common’ policy and organizational theories.

2.2 Theoretical framework

This section of the thesis will cover the theoretical approaches that will be used. First of all, as we have seen in the introduction, there is a gap between migration policies and the reality of global migration. On the one hand, there is a focus on restrictive migration policies in order to keep unwanted migrants out. On the other hand, migrants, who have good reasons to try and reach more affluent parts of the world, are entering the Western world in legal as well as illegal/undocumented ways. In my opinion, there is a good case to be made in favour of open borders or more liberal policy changes. Arguments on the desirability of open borders will be set out in the next chapter of this thesis. When one accepts that there is a good case to be made in favour of open borders, the next question is why this isn’t the case. This will be explained with the help of a case study, namely migration policies in the Netherlands. For this part, theories will be used that explain political behaviour in instances where environmental and organizational factors require inventive political action. Politics will be scrutinized in an uncommon manner, with the help of theories of ‘organized hypocrisy’ and ‘the symbolic uses of politics’. These theories explain a discrepancy between political talk and political action or actual

policies, and the necessity of the use of this discrepancy. An application of these theories to Dutch migration policies will explain why there is a gap between these policies and the reality of global migration.

In short, organized hypocrisy refers to inconsistencies between talk, decision and action (Brunsson, 1989: p. 194). To describe the concept in more detail, the work of Nils Brunsson, an organization theorist, will be used. This book is The Organization of

Hypocrisy; Talk, decision and actions in organizations (1989). Other scholars that have

used the theory of organized hypocrisy will also be mentioned shortly.

Brunsson states that since modern societies are becoming increasingly differentiated, with a growing number of groups and special interests, organizations have to deal with more that just production (ibid: p. 1-2). A common perspective on organizations is that they exist to generate collective coordinated action and to supply

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products for their environment. The support of the environment depends on the supply of valuable products (ibid: p. 3).

There are many organizations on which this output of products is of little importance, such as schools and universities. For them, there must be other ways of creating support. According to Brunsson, an organization can achieve external support through the reflection of the norms of the environment in its organizational structures, processes and ideologies (ibid: p. 4). An organization can structure itself according to environmental norms (efficient, rational, fair etc.). There are also norms about the processes, which an organization should employ (certified methods within an hospital for example). Ideologies are the views that an organization proclaims. This also can create environmental support (ibid: 4-5).

Organizations have a technical environment as well as an institutional

environment. The technical environment is focussed on the products or output of an organization. The institutional environment evaluates the structure, processes and ideologies of an organization (ibid: p. 6). Producing coordinated action is not always compatible with the environmental demands concerning structures, processes and ideologies. Thus the organization is separated in a formal, institutional organization and an informal organization. One generates action; the other is for display to the outside world. This can produce double standards (ibid: p. 6-7). Institutional norms are often inconsistent. These norms are difficult to combine with organizational action. However, many organizations, such as a governments and parliaments, do not want to avoid inconsistent norms. They generate support and legitimacy from inconsistent

environments. The purpose of the book of Brunsson is to describe and analyse the way in which organizations can cope with inconsistent norms (ibid: p. 8-9).

Without going into unnecessary details, Brunsson makes a distinction between to ideal types of organizations, namely the action organization and the political

organization. The outputs of a political organization are talk, decision and action. These outputs are mutually dependent, and political organizations use them to win legitimacy. In action organizations, these outputs tend to be consistent. Since a political

organization has to respond to different demands in a wide variety of issues, there can be found a lot of inconsistencies between talk, decision and action. When this occurs, it can be called organized hypocrisy (ibid: p. 27).

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demands from its environment is decoupling politics from action. There are four ways of decoupling politics from action. The first is separation in time. This means that an

organization responds to demands for politics on a certain time, and to demands for action at another time. A good example for this is a political party before and after elections. Before the elections, political parties show a high level of conflict. After the election, during the building of coalitions and government, the political party responds more to the demand of action. The organization can also decouple politics from action by issue. Different issues produce more conflict and talk, others more action. The third way of decoupling is separation by environment, depending on the environment with which an organization interacts. Finally, organization can decouple talk and action with the help of an organizational unit. For example, a political organization can divide between politicians and an administrative body. Note that these four ways of decoupling are not mutually exclusive (ibid: 32-38). Another way of meeting external demands is

delegation. Questions of external support can be delegated to administrative units that are less political. Administrative units can form a buffer between management and the environment (ibid: p. 158).

Brunsson describes organized hypocrisy from an organizational perspective. Another theorist, International Relations scholar Stephen Krasner, translates the organizational theory of organized hypocrisy into a realist, actor oriented model (Lipson, 2007: p. 8). Realism can be seen as the conception of politics in terms of

maximizing power between states in a global anarchic structure (Morgenthau, 1948). In his book Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (1999), Krasner makes a distinction between instrumental logics of consequences and cultural/normative logics of appropriateness, in accordance with March and Olsen (1989). In the international arena, logics of

consequences dominate logics of appropriateness. According to Krasner, international institutions are weak, without legitimate authority. To explain it in the words of Michael Lipson, who wrote an article about organized hypocrisy in UN peacekeeping missions: “Logics of consequences correspond to technical, and logics of appropriateness to institutional environments” (Lipson, 2007: p. 8). According to Krasner, the institutions that regulate the international system are weak, and lack legitimate authority. Domestic and international pressures are not consistent. In line with realist thought, the

competition between states, seeking to maximize their power within an anarchic

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logics of consequences are dominant over logics of appropriateness (Krasner, 1999: p. 5 and 238).

To end this part on organized hypocrisy, some must be said about the desirability of the use of organized hypocrisy in political organizations. Michael Lipson states that organized hypocrisy may have positive as well as negative effects. On the positive side, and from the perspective of the organization, it may enable organization “to manage irreconcilable pressures that might otherwise render the organization incapable of effective action and threaten its survival (Lipson, 2007: p. 5).” On the negative side, it can create gaps between promises and resources and undermine actual reforms in the case of decoupling (Lipson, 2007). In the end of his book on organized hypocrisy, Brunsson discusses the morality of the use of organized hypocrisy. He poses the question if the use of organized hypocrisy is a sign of organization dysfunction or something evil that should be prevented (Brunsson, 1989: p. 232-234). He concludes that: “…if norms which are not or cannot be adapted to action are to be advocated, some hypocrisy is called for (Brunsson, 1989: p. 233).”

Brunsson states that it is the task of the state to create legitimacy for its own and societies situation (Brunsson, 1989: p. 133). The actual result of an action is not always the most important (ibid: p. 134). As Brunsson puts is: “Perhaps the role in society of politicians and other leaders often involves something far more important than controlling and redistributing material resources. Their task may instead be to create well-being and happiness, in other words to exert an influence on ideology (Brunsson, 1989: p. 147).” Related to this statement is the work of Murray Edelman, The Symbolic

Uses of Politics (1985). The book builds on an earlier article, Symbols and Political Quiescence (1960), also written by Edelman. The focus of his work is on an uncommon

conception of politics, namely the symbolic use of it. The reading gives a profound insight in this aspect of politics. For this thesis, only a selection of propositions that are relevant for the explanation of political behaviour regarding migration policy will be set forth.

In accordance with the point made by Brunsson, Edelman states that politics is often concerned with symbolic actions rather than concrete action. As he puts it in the introduction of his book: “…the most conspicuously “democratic” institutions are largely symbolic and expressive in function (Edelman, 1985: p. 19).” Only focussing on the allocation of resources and conflicts between different groups with different interest

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would miss a vital part of the political process. A small part of the population is occupied with acquiring resources or benefits, but for the majority, politics is a distant and

abstract phenomenon. The following statement of Harrold Lasswell, used by Edelman, is exemplifying:

“Politics is for most of us a passing parade of abstract symbols, yet a parade which our experience teaches us to be a benevolent or malevolent force that can be close to omnipotent. Because politics does visibly confer wealth, take life, imprison and free people, and represent a history with strong emotional and ideological associations, its processes become easy objects upon which to displace private emotions, especially strong anxieties and hopes (Edelman, 1985: p. 5, Lasswell, 1930: p. 75-76).”

A related assumption that is made and substantiated with psychological research is that many people in society “see and think in terms of stereotypes, personalization, and oversimplifications; that they cannot recognize or tolerate ambiguous and complex situations; and that they accordingly respond to symbols that over-simplify and distort (Edelman, 1960: p. 699).”

Symbolization can reassure people. It makes people believe that the society they live in is organized. Sometimes, a political solution is proposed that in reality doesn’t change much. It reassures the people, and distracts them from other political issues (ibid: p. 699-700).

As we have learned, politicians can reassure the people with symbolic politics. These symbols are no realistic reflection of the actual allocation of resources in society. To use another clarifying quote: “The themes a society emphasizes and re-emphasizes about its government may not accurately describe its politics; but they do at least tell us what men want to believe about themselves and their state (Edelman, 1985: p. 191).” Symbolic politics influence ideology, to refer to the use of language by Brunsson.

An important aspect in the work of Edelman that will be applied to Dutch migration policy is the role of the administrative system. Role taking within

administrative bodies becomes self-fulfilling once it is established and has consequences for policy-making. A consequence is that staff members through routine, aren’t likely to be innovative and find satisfactory solutions for problems, and that they are focussed on pleasing ‘the bosses’ (Edelman, 1985: p. 52-54). Administrative agencies are

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of control or action, thus keeping the public satisfied (Edelman, 1985: p. 56).

Furthermore, the instalment of an administrative agency creates a group that it should regulate. This changed relationship between an administrative body and the focus group changes the behaviour of the group the administrative body is supposed to regulate: they adjust their behaviour to the regulations imposed by the administrative body (ibid: p. 56-57).

Other symbolic uses of politics that can reassure the public are the supposed control of a strong leader (again: role-taking) and the symbolic use of language that doesn’t cover the reality of the allocation of resources, but nevertheless reassures the public. An important aspect of the work of Edelman is that politicians can reassure people, who are not familiar with the complexities of actual politics, and manipulate them with the use of symbolic politics. Thus, politicians can influence the public opinion. A less pronounced, but for the sake of this thesis equally important implication, is that possible political sensitive issues in society have influence on political behaviour. Politicians know that there are policy areas that are sensitive within society. Laws as symbols are thus important, since politicians fear that the removal of these symbols will be contested by certain groups of people in society. Since these people do not always have a clear view of complex, the laws, or the removal or change of those laws, wouldn’t necessarily affect these people in a negative way. This does not matter for the politician. If a large number of voters feel that ‘their shield against a threat’ has been removed, this might turn against the politicians who are responsible for the removal of these laws (Edelman, 1960: p. 702). Thus, in order to keep the people satisfied, politicians need to engage in symbolic politics. The assumption that politicians can influence public opinion and vice versa is one that is in accordance with the basic idea of how democracy works, and is endorsed in this thesis.

An important assumption in this thesis is that nation-states, with representative democracies, are by their very nature primarily focussed on the interest of their own nation. Elected officials, that according to common political thought are supposed to represent the interests of the people it governs (Dahl, 2000), have a mandate of the people to act in accordance with the interest of the country.

The theories set forth in this section may appear very abstract. In chapter 3 of this thesis, these theories will be applied to Dutch migration policy and to a lesser extent to the making of international agreements. With this application, the meaning of the

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theories will become clear. First, the following chapter will argue why there is a good case to be made in favour of open borders.

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3.1 A case in favour of open borders

In this section of the thesis, there will be made a case in favour of open borders. First, the work of Thomas Pogge (2008) concerning world poverty and human rights will be mentioned. This will be followed by other arguments in favour of and against open borders. The arguments are divided in different categories, although they are related and complementary. Some arguments fit in different categories, and the division is somewhat artificial. Nevertheless I have chosen for this design, for the sake of convenience for the reader and myself.

3.2 World poverty and Human Rights

In World Poverty and Human Rights (2008), the German philosopher Thomas Pogge states that Western liberal democracies are actively hurting the poor, less well of societies and people around the world. Since the Enlightenment period, humanity has made significant moral progress in response to horrors such as slavery, autocracy, colonialism and genocide. Moral norms are increasingly constraining and effective, in order to protect the vulnerable and powerless people around the world (Pogge, 2008: p. 2). However, if one examines how these vulnerable and powerless people fare in today’s world, one could be sceptical about this moral progress.

Pogge mentions some facts about world poverty and global inequality: an estimated 830 million human beings are chronically undernourished, more than a billion lack access to safe water, 2.600 million lack access to basic sanitation, a billion don’t have shelter, more than 1.5 billion lack electricity, and so on. According to World Bank data, 2.533 million people or 39,7 percent of humankind were living in severe poverty. Each year, around 18 million people die from poverty related causes. This is one third of all human deaths, 50.000 people each day, including 29.000 children under age five (ibid). At the same time, people in high-income countries live in comparable enormous wealth. The average consumption expenditure in terms of purchasing power is 120 times higher in high income countries compared to the global poor. The more than 2.5 billion poorest account for only 1,67 percent of household consumption

expenditure, little over a billion people in high-income countries account for 81 percent. An estimated $300 billion shift (1/7 of the consumption expenditure of the latter group) from the rich to the poor is needed to escape extreme poverty. However, this shift goes the other way around in reality (ibid: p. 2-3). Poverty is nothing new. However, the

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extent of global inequality is bigger than ever. There is global economic growth, but as data show, the global poor are not participating in this increase in wealth (ibid: 104-106).

Thus, one the one hand there is a presumed moral progress, and on the other hand there is a situation concerning human well-being that can be called catastrophic. On the base of this, Pogge asks two related questions. The first is how it is possible that, despite enlightened moral norms of dominant Western civilization and enormous economic and technological progress, severe poverty for half of the human population remains to exist. The second is why citizens of rich Western states are not morally troubled to live in a world that is dominated by the West and provides for such poverty, inequality and unfair starting positions (ibid: p. 3). It is indeed hard to believe that people in the Western world actually acquiesce in such a situation.

In answer to these questions, Pogge first mentions some arguments that are easily refuted, before formulating a more sophisticated defence of this acquiescence. The defence is the following: ‘that there is nothing seriously wrong, in regard to world

poverty, with our conduct, our policies, or the global economic structures we have forged’ (Pogge, 2008: p. 14). A moral distinction is made between doing and failing to prevent something. It may be morally wrong to actively cause severe poverty and thereby harm foreigners. However, it is not seriously wrong to fail to prevent severe poverty as much as we might. Furthermore, people may give priority to compatriots, especially in the context of a system of competing states (ibid: p. 14-15). It is permitted for politicians to pursue the best interest of the represented within a nation. In this line of thought, it would be bad not to prioritize the interest of compatriots over the interest of foreigners (ibid). Later in this part of the thesis, this argument will be further

scrutinized. For this moment, we will continue with the work of Thomas Pogge.

Logically, one could attack the sophisticated defence by showing that there is no moral significant difference in actively hurting someone or allowing hurt to be done. Pogge admits that this moral distinction is significant. However, he claims that

governments of Western liberal democracies (and through representation the citizens responsible for electing those governments) are actively hurting the poor. This is the main point in World Poverty and Human Rights. Western governments have created a global institutional order that does not meet the requirements of minimal fairness or justice. When groups are in competition, pursuing their interests within a framework of

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rules, the rules themselves become object of competition. The outcomes from this competition can be morally unjust. Prioritizing compatriots and pursuing national self-interest can only be justified is the institutional framework that structures this

competition is minimally fair (ibid: p. 14-15).

To understand the emphasis of Pogge on fair institutions, it is worthwhile to shortly mention the influential work A Theory of Justice (1972), written by John Rawls, a former teacher of Thomas Pogge. Social-liberal Rawls ask himself what a just society should look like. He formulates his answer with the help of a hypothetical situation, the

Original Position. From this position, people within a society should decide amongst

themselves what the basic institutions of their society should look like. In the original position, people are unaware of their position in the actual society, regarding wealth, skills, race, and other personal traits. In the words of Rawls, people shape their

institutions from behind a veil of ignorance. Because of this ignorance, people will shape the basic institutions of their society in such a way that they have the highest possible minimum as outcome. Although inequality may exist in actual society, increase in wealth of the rich should never be at the cost of the less well of people in society (Rawls, 1972: p. 3-22 and 60-65).

John Rawls applied these ideas at a national level, and stated in another work,

The Law of People (2001) that it shouldn’t be applied to the international level. In

accordance with what Peter Singer stated before in his book One World (2004), Pogge claims that there is no logical explanation for adopting a double standard in the moral assessment of domestic and international institutions (Pogge, 2008: p. 114-118). In short, domestic and international institutions should be shaped in such a way that they have the highest possible minimum, as if they were shaped from behind a veil of

ignorance.

Pogge’s statement about the Western practices that actively hurt the poor is dependent on whether our global institutional framework is unjust. This raises

questions about the origins of poverty. Pogge denies domestic causes of poverty as the sole explanation of poverty in certain parts of the world. National and local factors do play a significant role, but this withdraws the attention from foreign and global influences on the development of poverty (ibid: p. 17).

The question is: “how do Western liberal democracies actively hurt the poor”. The answer to this question is: “through the creation of an unjust global institutional

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framework”. Governments of Western liberal democracies have vastly superior

bargaining power and expertise. They use this in bargaining settlements at for example the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). These settlements are to the advantage of the rich countries, and to the disadvantage of the poor countries. These settlements place a heavy burden on poor countries, and reinforce poverty and inequality. As Pogge puts it: “…our negotiators must know that, the better they succeed, the more people will die of poverty” (Pogge, 2008: p. 27).

To exemplify this statement, an article in The Economist, a magazine that can be called liberal and certainly has no bias against institutions such as the World Trade Organization, will be mentioned here. In the article White Man’s Shame2_{, the unknown}

author criticizes the role the Western countries played in the Uruguay round. This agreement was supposed to be ‘the last big push towards global free trade’ (unknown author, 1999). However, America and Europe, who preach in favour of the opening of the markets of developing countries, do their best to keep out as many exports from poor countries as they can. Rich countries cut their tariffs less than poor countries did in the Uruguay round. Furthermore, rich countries are most protective in sectors where developing countries have the best chance to actually compete, such as agriculture, textiles and clothing. The enormous subsidies on agriculture in the European Union are a good indicator of this as well. According to a study, the tariffs on manufacturing

imports from poor countries are four times higher than those on imports from other rich countries (Hertel & Martin, 1999). If rich countries would open up their markets, this could lead to an increase in export from developing countries to rich countries worth billions of dollars (unknown author, 1999). The Western dominance in expertise also contributes to unjust institutional agreements.

According to article 25 of the Universal Declaration “everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care”. Article 28 of the same Declaration states that “Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.3_{The global institutional} 2_{Article retrieved from:}_{http://www.economist.com/node/325062/print}_{(June 24} 2013), listed in Bibliography as ‘Unknown author’

3_{Universal Declaration of Human Rights to be found at:} http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/ (June 24 2013)

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framework is shaped in such a way that it inhibits the realization of these Human Rights. Thus, the governments of Western liberal democracies, and the citizens of these

countries, are actively violating Human Rights on a global scale, thereby hurting the poor, less well of societies and people around the world. Thus, human rights are a cornerstone in assessing whether the global institutional framework is minimally just (ibid: p. 18-32).

There is another way in which the global institutional framework is hurting the poor societies in the world. Pogge accepts that ‘nationalist explanations’ of the

development of poverty are partly correct. Indeed, flaws in a country’s political and economic institutions, and corrupt, oppressive and incompetent elites in poor countries do play an important role. However, the global institutional order does plays an

important role in explaining the development of culture, history, natural environment, the domestic institutional order, as well as the behaviour of the ruling elite, economic growth and income distribution (ibid: p. 117-118).

Two important concepts in explaining how this comes about are the resource privilege and the borrowing privilege. A group that is internationally recognized as the legitimate government has the privilege to borrow money in the name of the country (international borrowing privilege), and is free to dispose (sell) natural resources (international resource privilege). Pogge draws an analogy with a warehouse. When someone succeeds in overpowering the guards of a warehouse, and sells the stolen goods, the buyer of these goods becomes the possessor, but not the legal owner of these goods. If a group overpowers an elected government and seizes power over the country, this group can sell goods such as natural resources to other countries or corporations. In this case, and in contrast with the case of the warehouse, the purchaser acquires all the rights and liberties of ownership, which are internationally recognized and enforced by states (ibid: p. 119).

This international resource privilege creates incentives towards civil wars and overthrowing governments in resource-rich countries, since governments can get access to huge profits. In Nigeria for example, military officers who took power by force have ruled the country during 28 of the last 38 years. The profits they made from selling resources enabled them to buy means of repression. These rulers were not reliant on popular support, and had little incentives towards making productive investments, eradicating poverty and stimulate economic growth (ibid: p. 118-119). When in power,

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leaders should keep the opposition satisfied in order to keep peace and remain in power, thereby reinforcing corruption. Similar points can be made about the

international borrowers principle. Both principles create turmoil in poor but resource-rich countries. It stimulates coup attempts, and withholds governments from

stimulating the national economy, eradicate poverty and make good investments. Although this does not diminish the responsibility of dictators, warlords and corrupt officials, it does show that the West, through these international principles, shares moral responsibility (ibid: p. 120-123).

To summarize, rich Western liberal democracies are hurting the poor, less well of societies in the world. Through bargaining settlements at the global institutional level that are to the advantage of the powerful and rich countries, poverty and

underdevelopment are reinforced in the already poor and less developed countries. Furthermore, the international resource and borrowing privileges create incentives for coup attempts in resource rich countries, thereby destabilizing politics and economic growth.

Pogge provides some institutional solutions to the mentioned problems. These will be explained in a later section of this thesis. This thesis is about migration. The point here is basic in principle. One the one hand, the rich countries in the world are

dominating the global institutions and shape them to their advantage. These

international regulations worsen the situation of already poor and underdeveloped countries and people around the world. To put it simple, the West benefits from international regulations that reinforce inequality and poverty, with catastrophic consequences for the most vulnerable groups in the world. With this, we share

responsibility for this unjust situation. On the other hand, rich and developed countries close their borders for people from outside. These people come here with good reason: some have truly hopeless prospects for the future, and hope to benefit from the riches in the West. But the countries that create unjust global institutions and actively hurt the poor, deny access to these same people. When put in this straightforward manner, it is very hard to deny that injustice is being done, and that there is no moral obligation to change this situation. Later in this thesis, possible solutions for this problem will be mentioned. For now, let us continue with some more arguments in favour of and against policy changes regarding transnational migration.

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The war on irregular migrants claims several thousands of lives a year. They are very expensive, but also very ineffective. America tries very hard to keep migrants out. Still, some 500.000 migrants succeed in slipping through the defences built up against them. In Europe, some 800.000 migrants per year enter the so-called ‘fortress’ of Europe (Legrain, 2007: p. 35). One could say that tougher controls would diminish the number of irregular migrants. This would cost much more money. Also, it is highly unlikely that it would really stop migrants from trying and succeeding in migrating. In America, the budget on border security has quintupled since 1993, and the border patrol has tripled in size. This didn’t have a noticeable effect on the flow of irregular migrants (Legrain, 2007: p. 40). From the perspective of the migrant this is not illogical. When you find yourself in a hopeless situation, and the possible benefits of migration are very high, it seems very logical to give it a try. Thus, a practical argument against border controls and in favour of open borders is that border controls are very costly, but not very effective in keeping immigrants out.

A likely practical argument against open border would be that the opening of borders would lead to enormous and uncontrollable flows of people worldwide, leading to chaos. Borders protect rich receiving states from opportunists from poor countries. Removing the restrictive migration policies that act as barriers would assumedly lead to mass migration. Admittedly, nobody, including politicians, scientist or the common people, can tell exactly what the effects of open borders would be on the movement of people. However, it is highly unlikely that everyone around the world would

immediately migrate to another country, should it be legal. As the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees stated: “It may be assumed that, unless he seeks adventure or just wishes to see the world, a person would not normally abandon his home and country without some compelling reason.”4_{A more practical refutation of this argument} against open borders can be made with case of the European Union. With every step of enlargement, with the entry of a new member in the EU, there was fear of massive migration. This, however, was not the case when free movement was possible within the EU (Pécoud & Guchteneire, 2006: p. 76). Admittedly, inequality between soon to be 4Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951

Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, UNHCR,

HCP/IP/4/Eng/REV.1, Chapter 1, article 39, retrieved

from:http://www.unhcr.org/3d58e13b4.html(June 24 2013), in bibliography listed under UNHCR

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members of the EU and the EU is smaller than inequality between the worst of parts of the world and the EU or other developed countries, making incentives to migrate to these areas more substantial. Thus, the argument that free mobility might create

practical problems in receiving countries should be taken into account. In a later section of this thesis, recommendations for global institutional reforms will be made, that take this consideration into account. One should note however, that the legal status of migration does not stop people from trying to immigrate. As mentioned, there are restrictive migration policies. Nevertheless, people are migrating, regardless of these policies. Thus, restrictive migration policies do not withhold people from migrating, whereas more liberal policies would reduce the dangers to which immigrants currently are exposed (ibid.). Furthermore, as Cornelius points out, the more restrictive the migration policies, the harder it is for people have to move freely. Mexican migrants to the United States tend to stay longer or settle permanently, since it is very difficult to cross the border (Cornelius, 2001). Restrictive migration policies thereby can withhold immigrants from returning to their country of origin.

3.4 Egalitarianism and Human Rights

In this section, arguments in favour of and against open borders will be handled from an egalitarian and Human Rights’ perspective. Although the argumentation of this section is about open borders in general, this thesis is most directly directed to the Western world, that proclaims liberal and egalitarian values, and can be seen as the founder and most prominent proponent of Human Rights. With regard to this line of thinking, some arguments in favour of open borders can be made, and some arguments against open borders can be refuted.

First of all, there is an uneven distribution of the privilege of mobility. Citizens of developed countries have little or no trouble to travel and settle anywhere in the world. Citizens from undeveloped countries require hard-to-obtain visas and residence

permits. As Carens states, citizenship is a birthright that is hard to justify (Carens, 1992). Furthermore, a distinction is being made between high and low skilled workers. From a liberal egalitarian perspective, people should have equal opportunities. With these distinctions being made, this is not the case. A division between rich and poor people, and skilled and unskilled people and a corresponding difference in mobility

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people.

Related to the division between high and low skilled workers is an argument against the opening of borders. One could claim that the opening of borders would have as a consequence that high skilled workers in less developed parts would migrate to the developed parts of the world, thereby causing a so called ‘brain drain’ (Legrain, 2007: p. 180). The developed countries, however, are far more liberal in their policies when it comes to high-skilled workers (Doomernik et al., 2008; Legrain, 2007). Although a policy reform that would open up borders should take ‘brain drain’ arguments into

consideration, a division between high and low skilled workers with more liberal immigration policies for the former group would seem to encourage a brain drain as well.

Article 13-2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: “Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.”5_{It seems} strange that the acknowledgement of a Human Right to leave isn’t accompanied by a right to enter another country. Beside this crooked design of article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, there are other problems concerning Human Rights and restrictive migration policies.

A problem concerning Human Rights is asylum. According to the principle of asylum, all human beings are entitled to enter a country when seeking protection from (political) prosecution. On the other hand, borders are closed for irregular migrants, who are not supposed to enter a certain country. This encourages irregular migrants to pretend to be asylum-seekers, hoping to obtain residence. This makes procedures more difficult, and affects the ability of refugees to seek asylum (Pécoud & de Guchteneire, 2006: p. 72).

Another threat to Human Rights is human smuggling and trafficking. Since many people are unable to migrate in a legal way, they seek to migrate in other ways. In this way, they stimulate criminal businesses. The tighter the border control, the more difficult it is to enter a country. And the more difficult it is to enter a country, the more money is to be made of such illegal businesses. This leads to a circle: border controls

5_{Universal Declaration of Human Rights to be found at:}

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encourage smuggling, and smuggling calls for more control (Andreas, 2000).

Furthermore and very important, migration controls endanger the lives of many migrants. Although it is hard to present precise figures, as is the case with human smuggling and exploitation, many people die in attempt to cross borders. It is estimated that at least one person a day dies at the border between Mexico and the U.S (Cornelius, 2001). Eschbach et al. (1999) estimated 920 deaths of migrants trying to reach Europe between 1993 and 1997. This problem isn’t limited to Western countries, and leaves migrants around the world vulnerable to exploitation and endangers their lives. There is an unrecognized connection between restrictive migration policies, human smuggling and the vulnerability of migrants (Pécoud & de Guchteneire, 2006: p. 73-74).

Related to the violation of human rights through immigration controls is a point made by Joseph Nevins. Recognizing a right to mobility wouldn’t entail the adding of another Human Right to the already existing list of Human Rights. We live in an

economic globalized world with enormous social and economic inequalities. The Human Rights of free choice of employment, codified in article 23 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the right to an adequate standard of living, codified in article 25 of the Declaration6_{, are hard to imagine without migration opportunities. Thus, the} recognition of a right to mobility is necessary in order to make the fulfilment of other rights possible (Nevins, 2003).

Detention controls, as a by-product of restrictive migration policies, infringe Human Rights as well. In her book Open Borders: The Case Against Immigration Controls (2004), Teresa Hayter provides a good insight in the Human Rights violations in the Campsfield detention centre. More recently, in the Yearbook of 2013, Amnesty

International reports that the world is becoming increasingly dangerous for migrants and refugees around the world. The use of detention centres violates the Human Rights of migrants around the world.7

6_{Universal Declaration of Human Rights to be found at:}

http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/ (last visited on 4 June 2013)

7_{Yearbook Amnesty International 2013, retrieved from:}

http://amnesty.org/en/annual-report/2013/downloads#en(June 27, 2013), listed in bibliography under Amnesty International

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3.5 Economic arguments

When you look at productivity per capita, people in rich countries are far more

productive than people in less developed countries. This is because the more developed countries have more capital, including machines, infrastructure, technology, and so on. It is not that people in less developed countries work less hard. They just don’t have the same opportunities to increase their productivity as people in the developed world have. If there is a gap in productivity between large parts of the world, then there are huge possible gains to be made in productivity (Legrain, 2007: p. 64).

With this simple idea in mind, some economics have done research on the potential gains of free migration. In 1984, Hamilton and Whalley found that opening up borders would lead to a doubling in the size of the world economy (Hamilton & Whalley, 1984). Two decades later, two other scholars examined the same issue further, and estimated a $55,04 trillion in possible gains from freer migration. With some

adjustments to make this estimation more realistic, the opening up of borders could have enormous economic benefits (Moses & Letnes, 2004). Thus, the deployment of people where they are most productive, made possible by free migration would bring huge economic benefits to the world as a whole.

Free migration would also be consistent with liberal theory. At this moment, there is freedom of movement goods, services and capital around the world, but not of people. Recognizing a Human Right to mobility across borders could not only have huge economic benefits for the world as a whole but is also consistent with classical liberal theory.

An argument against open borders concerns jobs. It is said that migrants take the jobs of local inhabitants (Legrain, 2007: p. 66). In this context, it is good to mention that people not only take jobs, but also create them. Furthermore, immigrants work at low wages, thus creating jobs that wouldn’t exist when these wages were higher. For example, when a nanny costs half of your hourly salary, you probably wouldn’t take a nanny. But if nannies were a lot cheaper, more nannies and thus more jobs would exist.

What’s more, immigrants differ from local inhabitants in skills, education and knowledge. Therefore, they apply for different jobs. Low-skilled labourers can feel threatened by immigrants, thinking that they compete for the same jobs. However, an African migrant coming to for example the Netherlands can never compete with a local inhabitant who masters the Dutch language. The argument that immigrants take ‘our’

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jobs is therefore invalid.

In relation to this point, one should keep in mind what kind of jobs immigrants do. Most immigrants do work natives in Europe and the United States don’t want to do. There is a rise in education levels in the Western world. Few people in the U.S and Europe leave school without a qualification, and many people continue their education at a university or other educational institutions. This can be said for the majority for countries in the West, including the U.S, Canada, Australia, England, Germany and France (Legrain, 2007: 72-74). This higher level of education naturally is accompanied by higher aspirations. People with high qualification are less willing to do low-skilled work. Nevertheless, low-skilled work still needs to be done. When you keep in mind that the populations in much of the rich countries get older, labour-intensive sectors such as nursing-care is likely to increase. Low-skilled workers in sectors such as the agriculture can be, and largely are, replaced by machines. But not every sector is receptive to this degree of automation. Low-skilled work still exists, and people in rich countries are less willing to this type of work. Why wouldn’t the West let migrants in to do this work? It is beneficial for the immigrants, as well as for the West. One could say that it demeaning to let immigrants do the dirty work. Nigel Harris gives a good response to this possible remark: “To insist on protecting someone’s welfare by not allowing them to work when they are willing to, the work needs to be done and people gain both in the country where the immigrant works and where he or she is from, is perverse…. One might as well argue that native workers should be less educated so that they would be willing to do the lousy jobs” (Harris, 2002: p. 62).

3.6 Conclusion

This section has provided ethical, practical, economic arguments and arguments from an egalitarian and Human Rights perspective that favour the opening of borders. Much more has been written on the desirability of open borders, and it is neither the aim nor the claim that this section provides a complete overview of all arguments. The claim is, that on the base of these arguments, the opening of borders should be considered. At this moment, the world knows an unjustifiable amount of inequality and poverty. Through the shaping of global institutions, the Western world actively violates the

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Human Rights of the less developed parts of the world and reinforces inequality. The opening of borders would resolve Human Rights violations associated with restrictive migration policies. It would be consistent with Western liberal thought, and could have huge economic benefits to the world as a whole. Furthermore, and very importantly, the opening of borders would create a more equal and just world. Later in this thesis, some recommendations for global institutional changes will be discussed. First, the next section will answer why this plea for open borders isn’t put in practice from the perspective of a Western liberal democracy.

Chapter 4

4.1 Immigration and the state: Dutch migration policy

The question in this section is: ‘how and why do Western liberal democracies deal with the gap between restrictive migration policies on the one hand and the reality of

migration on the other hand?’ This question will be answered with the help of a study of Dutch migration policies. The organization of Dutch migration policy will be described. After this, the theories of ‘organized hypocrisy’ and the symbolic uses of politics will be

Closing the gap in migration policy : a proposal for global institutional reform