Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs Leiden University
Violent Radicalization of Lone-Actor Terrorists and Risk
Assessment
Program: Master Crisis and Security Management
Student: van Tergouw, S.R.
Student no.: S1511459
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. J. Vüllers
List of contents
1. Introduction………..2
2. Body of knowledge………..6
2.1. Lone Actor terrorism, hate crimes and mass murder………...6
2.2. Violent Radicalization of lone actor terrorists……….7
2.3. Risk and Vulnerability factors……….9
2.3.1. Ideology………..10
2.3.2. Moral change and exposure to radical settings………11
2.3.3. Loneness of lone actor terrorists……….13
3. Social and psychological processes in lone radicalization……….15
3.1. Peripheral and embedded………15
3.2. Discussion……….. 17
3.2.1. General Remarks………17
3.2.2. Descriptive research………...19
4. The NCTV and Counterterrorism Strategy……….21
4.1. The National Counterterrorism Strategy 2016-2020………..21
4.2. The “Person-orientated” approach………..25
4.2.1. The Staircase-theory and radicalization model………26
4.2.2. Non-security actors……….27
4.3. Discussion………...29
4.3.1. Some general remarks………...29
4.3.2. What constitutes a good frame of reference? ………...30
4.3.2. Frame of reference of risk assessment in the “Person-orientated” approach……...32
5. Conclusion………...34
1. Introduction
Brenton Tarrant, the gunman of the Christchurch shooting shook the world by killing 50 people in two different mosques in 2019. Furthermore, by displaying his violence live through a bodycam, he reached a broad audience. Right before his violent act, he also posted a manifesto online. The attack left a huge impact on society. For days, headlines were filled with information on the attacker. Because the attacker spread out a manifesto, his motives for the attack were for everyone to read. Major news stations, such as CNN or the BBC reported that the attacker acted out of an ‘extreme’ or ‘radical’ ideology. Some newspapers portrayed the gunman as a ‘right-wing terrorist’ or a ‘lone wolf’1.
Brenton Tarrant is one of many perpetrators that are classified within the trend of what in popular terms is called “lone wolf” terrorists. Especially very deadly attacks such as the attack carried out by Anders Breivik on the Norwegian island of Utøya or the attack in dance club Pulse by Omar Mateen dominate the news and social media for weeks, with all media asking the same question: how did law enforcement miss these lone wolves?
While the use of the term “lone wolves” speaks to the imagination, the usage of such words is not as self-evident as they may seem at first sight. Not only in media, also in academic literature these terms are often used very loosely. While much has been written as a result from high-impact events of lone actor violent incidents – a on purpose chosen general description, there is a lot of inconsistency in this field. This has to do with the nature of these concepts and the problematic terminology. Concepts as ‘lone-wolf’ and ‘terrorism’ are all in itself contested concepts (Schuurman et al., 2019, p. 775; Richards, 2018, p. 15). A lot of research on lone actor terrorism or even the broader term terrorism itself often lacks a clear conceptualization and terminology (Ravndal, 2015). Ravndal and Bjorge (2018) argue that all these inconsistencies in the field of lone actor terrorism study are due to a flawed understanding on what the unit of analysis is. This is because some research focuses for example on radicalization of lone actors towards violence and other research focuses on the violent attacks themselves, without stating what effect this has on what conclusions can be drawn from certain indicators. On top of that, 1 https://www.theguardian.com/world/christchurch-shooting; https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/australasia/article/3002438/new-zealand-shooting-terrorist-was-his-way-third-location; https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/03/zealand-mosque-attacks-brenton-tarrant-190316093149803.html; https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-03-23/christchurch-shooting-accused-praised-blair-cottrell/10930632; https://www.axios.com/christchuch-attacks-brenton-tarrant-1552716245-18d37895-d870-4e94-8dd6-0a56eb7a0a5e.html;
Gill (2016) states that that a key problem in this field of study is that there is no academic understanding on what the baseline or starting point for research in this field is.
In the last few years, especially with the creation of the FP7-PRIME database, a lot of more empirical analysis has been conducted, causing some significant changes in the way the academic field sees lone-actor terrorism in general. This scientific progress will surely also affect the way in which governments deal with threats such as right-wing lone actor terrorism. The Netherlands – and specifically the Dutch National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (NCTV) – for the purpose of dealing with this specific threat and the threat of terrorism in general, periodically outlines the Dutch counterterrorism strategy. In this strategy, all government actors that are relevant for tackling terrorism are united in one policy formulation. A small but vital part of this strategy is risk assessing signals of radicalization. The current strategy, the National Counterterrorism Strategy 2016-2020, is based on the previous strategy of 2011-2015, the expected threat assessment and the continuing gathering of knowledge and experience. This means that periodical critical review of the underlying assumptions of such a strategy and implemented policy flowing from that strategy is necessary, especially when a field such as the field of lone-actor terrorism experiences a wave of new research and insights (such as the publications resulting from the FP7 PRIME project).
The strategy of 2011-2015, that lied the foundation for the current strategy, had seven strategic priorities. One of these strategic priorities is the threat of ‘radicalized loners’ (NCTV, 2011). The choice that is made in the strategy of 2011-2015 in relation to this priority is formulated as followed:
‘Early detection and a tailor made approach to tackle the threat of radicalized loners is necessary. The effort is focused on increasing alertness on a local level. Furthermore, further research will be done into the causes of type of threat and concrete directions towards mitigating this threat, such as earlier detection and intervention.’ (NCTV, 2011, p. 109).
This research is focused on examining how this strategic choice has translated into the strategy for intervening in radicalization processes, that is articulated in the National Counterterrorism strategy of 2016-2020. More specifically, the research focuses on the question whether this strategic choice has led to risk-assessment that is tailored to lone actor radicalization. The research question can therefore be formulated as:
To what extent is the proposed focus on lone actors in the Dutch counterterrorism strategy of 2011-2015 translated into the risk assessment of radicalization in the 2016-2020 strategy? Furthermore this thesis will focus on what the implications of recent research are (and should be) for the practice of risk assessing these potentially radicalizing lone actors. Considering all recent research, recent insights by Lindekilde, Malthaner and O’Connor (2019) will be proposed as the basis for a new (theoretical) frame of reference, as a theoretical frame that is concentrated on this phenomenon of lone actor terrorism specifically. The goal of this thesis is twofold. The first goal is to examine whether the current policy has been tailored to (also) assess risk of lone radicalization. By doing so, hopefully – as a second goal – it will become clear where difficulties lie for translating the current knowledge and research into risk assessment tools.
This research will contribute to the academic field of lone actor terrorism in two ways. First, in current research many factors and indicators that adhere to different phases of the timeline towards a terrorist attack (for example the step of radicalization followed by the step of attack preparation) are unclearly specified. It will be attempted to clear up what factors and indicators a relevant for the purpose of assessing the risk of a potential radicalizing individual. Second, while a lot of the literature is focused on the phenomenon of lone actors itself, little attention is attributed to how the insights from these studies should guide how law enforcements deal with this threat, such as with risk assessment. The attempt to answer the research question will hopefully create a clearer image of in what areas more research should be conducted.
The research will contribute on a societal level as the practice of risk and threat assessment early on has an effect on the physical security of society. If a threat is assessed incorrectly, it could lead to devastating consequences. This is especially the case in lone actor terrorists, as it could be argued that there are fewer chances to detect communication about an imminent threat before attack execution, than when surveilling terrorist groups. Examples of how the wrongful assessment could lead to fatal consequences are in the foiled train attack in the Thalys from Amsterdam and Paris, where three alert American passengers stopped an armed individual from carrying out a terrorist attack. In the aftermath of the foiled attack the news came out that signs of radicalization were known amongst the Belgian security services, but the case was not given urgency2. Another example is the British lone terrorist who carried out an attack in March 2017.
2 https://www.elsevierweekblad.nl/buitenland/achtergrond/2017/11/dader-aanslag-thalys-al-sinds-2012-in-zicht-563042/
The British security services had already done research into the perpetrator, but ‘nothing was found’3. The security services thereafter lost track of him. These examples show how important
risk assessment is in these “low probability, high consequences” cases.
Risk assessment of radicalization in many countries often takes place at the beginning of or before (if assessed as a risk) an individualized case consultation where multiple parties join in to coproduce a what one could name a prevention strategy, where measures are taken to stop the process of radicalization. In the United Kingdom, for example, this practice is called the “Channel Programme” (Home Office, 2018). In Denmark, this is done in so-called SSP, PSP and KSP partnerships, where police interacts with multiple partners such as the probation services or psychiatric institutions (Regeringen, 2016, pp. 12-17). In Belgium (in specific, Flanders), such an approach is done in Lokale Integrale Veiligheidscellen (LIVC), locally (Vlaamse Regering, 2016, p. 7).
As will be outlined further on in detail, in the Netherlands, this approach is called the persoonsgerichte aanpak (PGA), loosely translated as the “person-orientated approach”. It is interesting to select the Netherlands as a case study for lone actor risk assessments within this context since – in contrast to the beforementioned countries – the NCTV has explicitly formulated in its strategy of 2011-2015 and 2016-2020 its focus on lone actor terrorism. This thesis will be structured as followed. First of all, the body of knowledge of the phenomenon of lone actor terrorism will be presented. Furthermore, an overview will be given on what kind of factors and indicators are relevant for the risk assessment of violent radicalization of potential lone terrorists. This literature review will end with focus on one theoretical framework in particular. This framework – proposed by Lindekilde et al. (2019) – is based on two major patterns in and five variations of violent radicalization of lone actor terrorists. After this, the D strategic priorities of th Dutch National Counterterrorism Strategy 2011-2016 and the consecutive strategy of 2016-2020 will be discussed. The focus then will be lied on the “person-orientated” approach for the tackling of radicalization. In this approach, that is based on case-specific consultation with a variety of actors, it will be examined whether the strategic choice of counterterrorism strategy of 2011-2015 is translated into a risk assessment framework of radicalization that is tailored to lone actor terrorism. Chapter 4 closes off with a discussion on this frame of reference in relation to the insights from chapters 2 and 3 and a conclusion.
2. Body of knowledge
2.1. Lone actor terrorism, hate crimes and mass murder
The first thing that stands out when examining the literature is that there is a lot of consistency in how “loneness”, as well as terrorism is defined. There are three major (conceptual and methodological) problems within this field of study.
First, the “loneness” in most studies (except studies published the last couple of years) is highly overstated. There are studies that define loneness as terrorism conducted by an individual who has absolutely no contact with terrorist groups at all. Furthermore, there are studies that define loneness as individuals, dyads, or small isolated groups who commit a terrorist attack but do not belong to radical(ized) groups (Pantucci, 2015, pp. 3-4). The most recent research on lone actor terrorism emerging out of the FP7 PRIME project4 use a more nuanced definition (as studies generated by the PRIME project show that lone actor are not as alone as thought). This recent definition has a high level of agreement amongst scholars, as it appears that the last few years many scholars seem to accept the validity of the EU FP7 PRIME project database of lone actors. In this dataset individuals are included who meet the definition of a lone actor terrorist as an individual who engages in a terrorist activity (or planned to) and within this context operates autonomously and independently, or who has links to a terrorist group but eventually carries out the terrorist attack autonomously (Bouhana et al., 2018, p. 151). Chapter 2.3.3. will outline this aspect of loneness more thoroughly.
Second, as stated in the introduction, terrorism in itself is an “essentially contested concept” (Mudde, 2009). For the purpose of this thesis, analyzing the strategy of risk assessment of the NCTV and its partner, this research will use the same definition as the one given in the National Counterterrorism Strategy that will be discussed in chapter 4.1. The definition of terrorism that is given in this strategy is that terrorism is ‘the use of targeted violence against people, or creating damage that disrupts society, in purpose to undermine and destabilize society, create fear amongst the population or influence the political decision-making process’ (NCTV, 2016, p. 6). In using this definition, it is valuable to state that this means that there is a difference between mass murder, hate crimes and (lone actor) terrorism. While events of mass murder (such as school shootings) and hate crimes may have terrorizing impacts on society, they – without the explicit purpose of undermining society or influencing decision-making – are not terrorist events. This makes it a bit more problematic when intention is not clear. For example,
the attack in Las Vegas where 64-year old Stephan Paddock opened fire on a crowd from his hotel room has not been identified as a terrorist attack, since no links to terrorist groups were found and his intention was unclear5. Therefore, it is noteworthy that this could have consequences for case selection in such a database.
The third and last problematic element in this field of study is that studies of lone actor terrorism are mainly event driven. Because of differing modus operandi over time, there is a tendency to see each major terrorist attack as a new form of lone actor terrorism (for example, the rise of vehicle born attacks in Europe such as in Sweden and Nice). This leads to studies attempting to “re-invent the wheel”, instead of finding patterns of continuity (Schuurman et al., 2019 p. 775). This thesis will address the phenomenon of violent radicalization of lone actor terrorist as a phenomenon since 1990, although the phenomenon has been around longer under names such as “leaderless resistance” (Pantucci, 2015, p. 6). The year of 1990 is for many studies of lone actor terrorism a starting point due to practical reasons of data gathering (Bouhana et al., 2018, p. 151).
With these considerations in mind, lone actor terrorism is in this thesis defined as the act of an individual who – without the direction of a terrorist group – commits an attack with the purpose of disrupting society, instilling fear on the population and/or influencing the decision-making process. The next section discusses different units of analysis in this field of study, in particular violent radicalization, the focus point of this thesis.
2.2. Violent Radicalization of Lone Actor Terrorists
The most important thing in studying a certain phenomenon is the question: what is it exactly that is the is being studied? Though the importance of this question might seem obvious, there are indications that this is an issue in academic field of studying lone actor terrorism (Ravndal & Bjorgo, 2018). According to them, there are three different units of analysis, or ‘violent outcomes’: violent radicalization, violent events and aggregate levels of violence. The difference of these violent outcomes in research without clarification causes for a lot of the inconsistency in lone actor terrorism research (Ravndal & Bjorgo, 2018, pp. 16-17). Violent radicalization is the route towards the willingness to use violence that individuals experience, thus the time leading up to the violent event itself. There is clearly a distinction between a study of this violent outcome and the study of violent events. The former is about how some
5 https://www.ajc.com/news/national/was-the-las-vegas-gunman-terrorist-under-nevada-law-possibly-under-federal-law-not-exactly/S3Gz798YQGe9mw1BUyek4O/
individuals turn to violence while other individuals (perhaps with the same beliefs) do not. The latter is more about ‘why, how and when specific violent events or series of related events occurred. Unlike violent radicalization, this type of outcome requires explanations that are more oriented towards the situational context of an attack, as well as the attack itself’ (Ravndal & Bjorgo, 2018, p. 16). So where contextual characteristics (location) and the characteristics of an attack (choice of weapon, for example) are of importance for the study of violent events, research indicates that violent radicalization is possibly best explained by social relations and not so much by societal conditions at the macro level (Ravndal & Bjorgo, 2018, p. 16). The third violent outcome is aggregate levels of violence. Research that has this outcome as unit of analysis examines time periods or places that experience more violence than other time periods or regions.
In reviewing the literature on lone actor terrorism, it is very important to check what exactly is being studied, as Ravndal & Bjorgo show that there different units of analysis exists when one speaks of studying lone actor terrorism. Statements about research is only useful if it is known what the statements are exactly about. Therefore, this has to be kept in mind in this thesis. The existing literature and research mostly focus on several issues within the field of terrorism. There are qualitative case studies that focus primarily on motivations. There are studies that are more quantitative (datasets differing form N=25 to N=125). Those studies tend to either have a focus on indicators such as mental health (issues), employment, age, gender, or have a focus on tactics or modus operandi. Since this thesis is focused on the process of violent radicalization, or in other words the willingness to resort to violence as a tactic, the tactics themselves and the modus operandi are not relevant for this purpose of research.
Furthermore, some considerations have to be made when examining radicalization. Again has to be clear that the process itself is the unit of analysis and not the lone actor or the event. A focus on the lone actor could lead to an attempt to profile the lone actor terrorist. However, there is ‘a general consensus in terrorism literature that it is impossible to profile terrorists’ (Pantucci et al., 2015, p. 5). Therefore, this important limitation has to be considered. Although the examination of indicators such as mental health, criminal records or history of traumatic experiences are valuable for gaining insight in certain patterns or prevalence of certain characteristics, one has to be careful with creating typologies based on this data, as profiling in terrorism is deemed to be impossible.
A second consideration that has to be made has to do with what Ravndal & Bjorgo call risk indicators, i.e. ‘i.e. characteristics or experiences that increases an individual’s likelihood of getting involved in terrorism’ (Ravndal & Bjorgo, 2018, p. 15). These risk indicators, or vulnerability indicators – as they are called in other articles (Corner et al., 2017) are not to be mistaken with causal mechanisms (although they might be part of causal mechanisms). The prevalence of certain indicators tells us nothing about individual trajectories or causality and may be irrelevant for one individual while relevant for another (Corner et al., 2019, p. 112). Because of the impossibility of profiling terrorists and the – especially in lone actor terrorism – great variation of trajectories in a relatively small cases (which makes it very hard to find causality), risk assessment of radicalization is done on basis of these risk indicators, as will be outlined further in chapter 4.
Corner divides these indicators into two major groups, those belonging to: ‘susceptibility to moral change’ and those belonging to ‘susceptibility to exposure to radicalizing settings’ (Corner et al., 2017, p. 113). This suggests an interaction between individual characteristics and direct context, which makes the complex dimensions in radicalization very clear (and the impossibility of profiling even more so). Risk assessing of radicalization for these reasons is a complex and hard task, since so many factors have to be taken into account with countless of possible trajectories. As Emily Corner puts it:
‘In the context of risk assessment and management, the challenge is to understand when, how, for whom, and in what circumstances, these factors and indicators might be relevant to an understanding of a person’s move towards, and involvement in, terrorist activities’ (Corner et al., 2017., p. 112).
2.3. Risk and vulnerability indicators
The next section discusses the recent research those risk or vulnerability indicators, i.e. those indicators that increase the likelihood of radicalization towards the use of violence and are relevant for risk assessment. We can divide these indicators into several categories. The two major categories, as stated before, have to do with (1) susceptibility to moral change – I.e. the change towards willingness of the use of violence as a tactic – and (2) the susceptibility to radicalizing settings. This distinction into two categories shows that only being vulnerable to changing moral (the change towards violence as a legitimate and/or necessary action) is not
enough for radicalization. In addition to that, factors that are related to exposure to radicalizing settings are needed (Corner et al., 2017, p. 113).
This chapter is divided in three sections. The first section discusses the role of ideology as an indicator. The second section discusses the moral change and exposure to radicalizing settings indicators. The third and final section discusses the “loneness” of lone actor and is an introduction to the relational approach of violent radicalization of lone actors.
2.3.1. Ideology
In a research conducted by Bouhana et al. on these risk indicators, the conclusion was drawn – perhaps surprisingly – that there is no significant difference between right-wing lone actors and lone actors with a different ideological background (Bouhana et al., 2018, p. 160):
‘perhaps more interesting than these findings, none of which appear to be that counterintuitive, is what our comparative analysis does not reveal: namely, we find no significant differences in terms of the vast majority of indicators, including all those related to motivation, capability, and, quite strikingly, in terms of leakage behaviours and warning signs’ (Bouhana et al., 2018, p. 160).
This indicates strongly that for the purpose of risk assessment, tailoring risk assessment tools to ideology is not necessary (Ravndal & Bjorgo, 2018, p.15), since there is no significant difference in characteristics that increase the likelihood of (further) radicalization.
There also some other concerns that do not advocate for considering ideology when studying violent radicalization and basing assessment tools on that process. Lone actor terrorists tend to create own or adjust existing ideologies to a unique individual “ideology”, combining for example political views, religion and personal grievances (Pantucci et al., 2019, p. 10). This results in a high risk that the individual does not tightly fit into the ideological frame that for example is classified as ‘extreme right wing’. Moreover, in the example of extreme right wing ideology, this also leads to conceptual problems, as there is no uniform definition of extreme right wing ideology. Terms such as far-right, right wing populism, the extreme right or the radical right are used by different scholars, all with – though similar – slightly different definitions. This causes ‘terminological chaos and the absence of a clear and conceptual framework’ (Mudde, 2000, p. 13).
This however does not mean that ideology is insignificant for other purposes. For the study of violent events, for instance, there are differences between lone actors from different ideological
backgrounds. Different tactics are used amongst these subtypes (Jihadist lone actors are more likely to use knives while extreme right wing lone actors are more likely to use guns and tactical gear) and there are also differences in target selection by lone actors with different ideological backgrounds (Bouhana et al., 2018, p. 157). Also, for the purposes of detecting warning signs it is logical that ideology is very relevant. It can be argued that although leakage behavior does not differ significantly amongst lone actors with different ideological backgrounds, the content of their “leak” is of different ideological nature, what might increase chance of detection. Their ideological background of course does also have a relation with the movement with which they are associated. However, for the study of violent radicalization, ideology does not seem to be a relevant indicator.
2.3.2. Moral change and exposure to radical settings
Primarily cognitive capabilities define the susceptibility to moral change. Therefore, factors that are associated with moral change, such as anger, psychological distress or excessive thrill seeking are of importance (Corner et al., 2017, p. 117), or factors that could be an indication of susceptibility or stressor to moral change, such as (recent) unemployment or a history of violence. Susceptibility to exposure is defined by factors that limit or encourage being part of certain settings and personal social preferences for activities within these settings (corner et al., 2017, p. 113). The next few paragraphs sum up the results that were gathered from multiple studies on these kind of indicators.
Almost half of the lone actors in the sample of Corner et al. (2017) had experienced psychological distress recently, a relatively very high percentage (around 40 percent) was diagnosed with a mental disorder, in comparison to the 27 percent of the general adult population (De Roy van Zuijdewijn & Bakker, 2016, p. 8). There is also a stronger relation between mental illness and terrorism in lone actor terrorism than in group-based terrorism (Corner & Gill, 2015, pp. 30-33). As will be discussed later on in this chapter, there are strong indications that this difference is due to social (group) processes that are at play when attempting to join extremist groups (rejection or failed integration in an extremist group). A relatively high (30-40 percent) showed problems controlling anger or showed escalating anger in the period leading up to the attack (Corner et al., 2017, p. 117). A high level of lone actors had prior criminal convictions, with just under half of all lone actor terrorists researched (Gill et al., 2014, p. 428; Bouhana et al., 2018, p. 154; Corner et al., 2017, p. 117). Although there is consensus that abuse in an individual’s childhood is an important cause of later violent
behavior, childhood abuse does not have a high prevalence among lone actor terrorists (Corner et al., 2017, p. 117).
Notably, around half of lone actor terrorists had experienced a personal (psychological) crisis before radicalizing, with even more (close to 60 percent) having a tipping point in behavior identified by others (Corner et al., 2017, p. 117). One of few exemptions on the previous chapter is the side note that this number is lower – around 48 percent – for lone actors that have an extreme right ideological background, as well as a lower percentage for recent stress (Bouhana, 2018. P. 155). Lone actors also have a relatively high rate of substance abuse, obsessive behavior and over two third of lone actors expressed a desire to hurt others somewhere along their radicalization process (Bouhana et al., 2018, p. 156). Some studies that are associated with the FP7 PRIME project have initiated new research into sequential analysis of these indicators, to get a better view on how these stressors relate to each other on the temporal dimension. Research indicates that the process takes months, if not years, which suggests that law enforcement ‘need not necessarily rely on last-minute indicators of an impending strike’ (Schuurman et al., 2018, p. 1198). This is in contrast to what some practitioners of lone actor terrorist prevention policy state in interviews conducted by Parker et al. (2019). They attribute the difficulty of preventing lone actor attacks to the ‘social isolation and online radicalization’ of lone actors (Parker et al., 2019, p. 278).
Another stressor that is often named as source of grievance is unemployment. Unemployment rates for lone actors are found to be around 30-40 percent and lone actors are more likely to be unemployed than group-based terrorists (Parker et al., 2017, p. 280). Perhaps more noteworthy is that:
‘a comparatively small subset of 10.7 percent were within professional occupations during the period in which they became involved in terrorist activity. Whilst it is not clear how this compares to the general population, in comparison with the relatively balanced figures on education, these employment data reflect a greater indication of potential deprivation’ (Pantucci et al., 2015, p. 8).
Amongst scholars, there is general consensus that (relative) deprivation could contribute towards the use of violence and terrorism (Parida, 2007, p. 131).
Furthermore, there is a high level (over half) of social withdrawal amongst lone actors. It is therefore also not very surprising that, with just under 40 percent, there is a prevalence of lone actors living alone. However, this does not mean that they are socially isolated (as the very
existence of the category of exposure to radical settings already might have suggested). Over 60 percent of lone actors had contact with radical or extremist individuals and even 31 percent was once a member of a radical, extremist or terrorist group (Schuurman et al., 2018, p. 1195). Also one third of lone actors have had online interaction with radicalizing individuals, although it is important to note that radicalization solely online (self-radicalization) rarely happens (Lindekilde et al. 2019, p. 24).
These findings suggest that the original view of the lone actor as the isolated individual might not be appropriate, as there seems to be a high level of interaction with other radical influences, both online as offline. The next section discusses this “loneness” of lone actors.
2.3.3. Loneness and lone actor terrorism
The increase in interest – in media and policy – in terrorist acts executed by perpetrators who (seemingly) work alone has caused for some waves of academic research into the phenomenon of lone actor terrorism. The term ‘lone wolf’ is very popular in this context, posing these actors as quiet, introvert and isolated people who carry out their attacks without command and control structure in a bigger organization. The connotation in this terminology is that these perpetrators are difficult to detect and prevent. The Dutch National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (NCTV) defines this kind of individual as a violent loner: a loner who, without cooperation with other individuals or groups, form a threat to society (NCTV, 2013, p. 5). This definition is focused on the loneliness of the violent loner (not only terrorists). The NCTV states that these loners are difficult to detect and that the best approach to prevent violent loners from violent action is to create awareness amongst close ones and “first-lines” professionals such as teachers or health-care employees. The aim is to transform the unknown threat into a known threat (NCTV, 2013, p. 6). Although this connotation of the isolated loner is present in a significant part of media reports, official policy and research, there are more and more indications that the term ‘lone wolf’ is conceptually flawed, as lone actors are not as alone as previously thought (Gable & Jackson, 2011; van Buuren, 2018; Schuurman et al., 2018). This statement is based on multiple arguments. Firstly, both online as offline social ties appear to be critical in the ideological radicalization and the capability to carry out an attack. The social-psychological processes that come into play are, when using the term ‘lone wolf’ neglected. Secondly, ‘it is because of these social ties that lone actors are not the undetectable
threat they are often portrayed as’ (Schuurman et al., 2018, p. 2). Research suggests that the ties to a larger community play a large role in the justification of violence, which is an internal barrier that has to be overcome before carrying out an attack. In addition, in almost 30 percent of lone actor cases of terrorism, these “lone” actors received – although perhaps minimal – help in preparing in one way or another. Furthermore, many lone actors are lone because of mental health issues or personality traits they are forced to be so. Overall, they seem lone only in respect to the fact that they carry out the attack alone (Schuurman et al., 2018, p. 3). For example, in examining the violent radicalization of such an individual, the focus on “being alone” or being a “lone wolf” could lead researches astray in researching how those individuals radicalize, as the social ties are neglected. The term “lone” in itself implies that the perpetrator acts in some sort of social vacuum. The perpetrator always has to be placed in a social context where – direct or indirect – “enablers” have to be taken into account. This fact makes it fairly obvious that the term lone wolf or actor is too narrow a term to capture the complex social interaction influence these (Spaaij & Hamm, 2015, pp. 169-171). The difference with terrorists officially affiliated with groups might be that where these terrorists are subject to command and control links, the connection “lone” terrorist have with these enablers are better described as external influence. While the former group of individuals is part of a bigger group, the lone actor perhaps has contact with a small number of others, possibly online (Spaaij & Hamm, 2015, p. 170). Furthermore, Spaaij argues that a number of lone actor terrorists have problems with social skills (in some cases possibly because of mental issues) that inhibit them to access a group. Their difficulty in succeeding to enter a radical group is seen to be an important driver to act alone, as will be discussed later on.
Lindekilde and colleagues (2019) for these reasons classify “loneness” of lone actor terrorists as the outcome of social processes and not as a given quality. These social processes are shaped by ‘individual personalities and capacities for social interaction’ and are specifically important for analyzing radicalization of lone actor terrorists (Lindekilde et al., 2019, p. 22). This theory on social and psychological processes of lone (violent) radicalization will be outlined further in the next chapter.
3. Social and psychological processes in lone radicalization
3.1. Peripheral and embedded
As argued before, lone actor terrorists are not isolated (in an absolute way, rather in a relative way), but more often appear to be at the margins of radical environments. In analyzing patterns in the interaction at these margins and violent radicalization, Lindekilde et al. find two distinct categories of lone actor terrorists: peripheral and embedded (Lindekilde et al., 2019, p. 22). Those two categories are further divided in five types of lone actor terrorists. The base for the creation of these subtypes is a relational approach, where individuals are not passive recipients of radicalization influences but interact actively. According to the literature, multiple settings exist in which radicalization is possible. The first setting is a neutral setting, such as sport clubs or schools. Although these settings are not the source of extremist thought, they offer the chance for individuals to meet each other and possibly exchange these thoughts. Another setting is an open setting, such as religious gatherings or political associations. These settings are not extreme or radical, but are politicized and interactions with more extremist actors often take place around such settings when there is weak supervision (Lindekilde et al. 2019, p. 24). The last two settings are radicalizing magnets, settings that are known for their extreme views and practices (though not necessarily illegal) and radicalizing micro-settings, private or even clandestine small settings with intense socialization and radical views. Apart from these offline settings, there are of course also online settings. These online settings often serves functions as confirmation of beliefs and motivation, but, as stated before, these settings are rarely the driving factor and online self-radicalization almost never happens (Lindekilde et al. 2019, p. 24). The two categories (and five subtypes) are based on patterns of how lone actor terrorists interact with these settings. The interaction is defined by for example personal abilities to engage in and sustain social relationships within these settings (Lindekilde, et al., 2019, p. 26). In most cases, the lone actor remains at the margins or the periphery of a radical setting. The distinction between the two categories is that with the peripheral lone actor, the lone actor attempts to enter a radical setting but fails – mainly because of a lack of social skills or mental issues/illnesses. The embedded lone actor does has a close relation with a radical group or setting, but in the end carries out (and prepares) the attack alone (Lindekilde et al., 2019, pp. 26-27).
Although the different types within the peripheral category follow the same pattern of radicalization, very different characteristics adhere to these types. These characteristics can
either lead to the individual unable to integrate within a group or setting (because of social skills for example) or to the group not accepting the individual due to traits or history that can cause a risk for the groups “operational security”. This can be because of the impulsiveness or hot-headedness of the individual, or because of prior convictions, as terrorist groups prefer ‘recruits with clean records as they are unlikely to raise red flags among the security community’ (Gill, 2014, p. 428). This would explain the higher percentage of prior criminal convictions amongst lone actor terrorists compared with group-based terrorists. With operational security is meant the meticulousness and discretion one operates with. Within the peripheral pattern, the personality traits that can be seen are either introvert and withdrawn or social aversive (Lindekilde et al., 2019, p. 27). The three variations within the peripheral pattern are “Withdrawn”, “Anti-Social” and “Volatile”.
In the second pattern, the lone actor is embedded in a movement or group, but eventually carries out the attack alone. This can happen either voluntarily (because of more radical views or because of a desire for more immediate action) or involuntarily, for example because of the group or movement falling apart, or the individual being pushed out. Returning foreign fighters that turn into lone actors may well fall under this category (Lindekilde et al, 2019, p. 33). The two variations within the embedded pattern are “Formerly embedded” and “Autonomous”.
Table 2. Variations of embedded lone actor radicalization (Lindekilde et al., 2019, p. 22) The tables – which Lindekilde and colleagues created based on their case studies – show the different variations of lone actors, their individual characteristics and their links to movements, groups or settings.
3.2. Discussion
3.2.1. General Remarks
In these tables, multiple things stand out. In the peripheral pattern of radicalization, the withdrawn peripheral lone actor is completely different from the anti-social peripheral lone actor. Furthermore, these two variations differ completely from the autonomous embedded lone actor. Their characteristics of self-doubt, anti-social skills and good social skills, as well as their different relations to a radical group or setting makes these cases nearly incomparable.
Keeping these patterns and variations in mind, we are presented us with some analytical problems. The great differences that display themselves in these tables make it very hard if not impossible to draw any logical conclusions about the violent radicalization process of the lone actor terrorist, as there is not one single radicalization process to be found.
Therefore, where in the field of lone actor terrorism there is already confusion of what indicators to use for different units of analysis, there is now reason to believe that the unit of analysis violent radicalization is not a homogeneous phenomenon. It could be argued that the original view of the lone actor terrorist as the secretive and deceptive lone wolf is only partly visible in one of five variations: the anti-social peripheral lone actor. The fact that recent research has tackled so many of the original preconceptions of the lone actor terrorist is not surprising when one sees the other variations.
On the other hand, this also means that – without acknowledging that these different variations exist, it is very difficult to attribute meaning to several indicators of violent radicalization. For example, one of the most stable factor in studies of violent radicalization is prior criminal history. However, without taking into account that this could be true for some variations of lone actors but not for other variations, leads to a wrong conclusion that this is an indicator for all types of lone actors. It also has implications for the assessment of risks. For example, in research conducted by Corner et al. (2019), multiple indicators are found to be valuable when assessing risk of radicalization, such as the indicator self-isolation (Corner et al., 2019, p. 124). This is not an illogical statement, as in the model of Lindekilde et al., it is true for the withdrawn peripheral and the autonomous embedded lone actor. It however presents us with the danger that risk assessors of radicalization do not take into account that the volatile peripheral lone actor does not isolates himself but is isolated because of his personal untrustworthy traits. Another example is the indicator of leakage behavior and operational security. As research from Bart Schuurman (2018) indicates, only 26 percent of lone actors undertook measures to maintain a level of operational security, i.e. undertook measures to avoid being caught. This leads to a portraying of the lone actor as an individual who has disregard for operational security, while it is can be carefully assumed that this is more prominent in some variations or types than others (volatile peripheral vs autonomous embedded). For risk assessors, by assuming that lone actors tend to treat their operational security carelessly some signals are overlooked. By creating an awareness amongst risk assessors that there are variations in which operational security is high, they might be more alert on other indicators that are associated with the variation in which operational security is high. This, in theory, would reduce the chance that such an individual is misinterpreted. Those who do tend to care for operational security should be of particular interest for law enforcement as they are the ones who are amongst the most dangerous lone actors when it comes to the amount of victims and how hard it is to detect them (Schuurman, 2018, p. 1196). Other reasons why it is so hard to attribute meaning to risk indicators are discussed in the next subchapter.
Furthermore, as stated before, Bouhana et al. found little or no significant differences between extreme right wing lone actors and other lone actors. It could very well be that by focusing on ideology, the difference between types of lone actors does not become visible and if focused on social processes from a relational perspective such as the one used by Lindekilde, there are differences. This argument corresponds with Bouhana and colleagues’ most recent publication in which a shift for the analyst from who and why to who and where (settings) is proposed
(Bouhana, 2019). This shift makes sense if one looks at what cases are classified under what variation. Ideology does not seem to be divided under different types of lone actor radicalization patterns.
3.2.2. Descriptive research
A major issue within the current study of risk indicators is that it is very hard to indicate causal relations. The current use of statistical methods leads to a failure to indicate causality Furthermore, ‘these approaches also concentrate on subsets of variables theoretically linked with the observation being investigated. However, in some cases, this is not sufficient as they may only be explained by combinations of loosely related variables that potentially remain untested’ (Alrajeh & Gill, 2015, p. 2). For example, potentially untested variables could be protective factors. Protective factors, factors that stop one from radicalizing, might be just as important for risk assessment as factors that (in lack of a better term) “encourage” radicalization (Gill, 2015, p. 3). Moreover, often it is not researched how the existence of one indicator – or non-existence – effects the outcome (Alrajeh & Gill, 2015, p. 2). This is even more inhibited because of missing base rates in lone actor terrorism research. As Gill states:
‘Without a sense of base rate, we can’t measure with any certainty how reliable any one indicator is, either in isolation or in combination with other indicators. Instead, we can only sample on the dependent variable which is not great practice’ (Gill, 2015, p. 2) Most studies on lone actor terrorism, as seen in the literature, are primarily descriptive and do not contribute a lot to the understanding of causality of lone actor terrorism (Bouhana et al., 2016, p. 9). This descriptive research mainly focuses on personal characteristics and/or behavioral factors, while often the link to the radicalization settings is only briefly named or mentioned, but not intensively researched (Bouhana et al., 2016, p. 11). The underrepresentation of radicalizing settings, i.e. the situational aspect, shows how individual factors and individual behavior is still overvalued in research with respect to lone actor terrorism. For example, indicators such as mental illnesses can in itself not state anything about causality if they are not studied in a relational and situational approach (Bouhana et al., 2016, p. 28). As the literature review showed, if studied in such an approach, it becomes clear that there is a causal relation to be seen when mental illness prevents an individual from integration in a group or when mental illness causes rejection from a group. This however is one of the few
instances where causality is visible in this field of work. The majority of research sums up to a list of indicators that have a prevalence with lone actors.
As Bouhana et al. (2016) explain in their framework for the beforementioned FP7 PRIME Project, the descriptive analysis what the statistics are on lone actor terrorism, but not the causality. These statistics only indicate a prevalence or relation, but not what it means. The framework states:
‘While observations about lone actors and their behaviour have multiplied in recent years, few, if any, meta-models or theories of lone actor radicalisation and lone actor extremist behaviour have been put forward, which articulate systematically how the kinds of factors discussed in the prior literature review interact to produce one or the other, and which are able to differentiate between those factors which may act as indicators (needed for the design of detection and mitigation measures) of LAEEs, and those which may be considered causes (needed for the design of prevention and disruption measures)’ 6 (Bouhana et al., 2016, p. 45).
Although a lot of progress in this area is being made, the unfortunate reality is that, research in this field is not far enough to generate this kind of far reaching theories that can distinguish between indicators (for detection) and causes (for prevention). This means that preventing radicalization from happening most definitely is not a reality to be seen very soon, although the FP7 PRIME project is still resulting in interesting publications and making significant progress. Fortunately for risk assessment, as is seen in the previous chapters, there has already been a surge of research into the statistics that are needed to construct risk assessment models that are used as tools to establish whether radicalization is taking place. However, the a great obstacle to overcome in risk assessment, as stated before, is the interpretation of these risk assessment models. In the future, more research into causality will need to be done to perfect the interpretation of indicators.
The next chapter focuses on the Dutch policy of the National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (NCTV) and in particular, the “person-orientated”-approach, in which a risk assessment of individual cases is made. The chapter will address how risk assessment of radicalization is done in accordance with this strategy and how the interpretation of risk indicators (frame of reference) is structured. The chapter will end with a discussion on this risk assessment of radicalization in relation to lone actor radicalization in particular.
4. The NCTV and counterterrorism strategy
4.1. National Counterterrorism strategy 2016-2020
This chapter will discuss the current counterterrorism strategy of the NCTV in relation to the previous counterterrorism strategy of 2011-2015, followed by a examination of the “person-orientated approach” mentioned in the introduction.
The current Dutch counterterrorism strategy is formulated in the National Counterterrorism Strategy 2016-2020, that was created by the National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (NCTV). This organization, that is part of the ministry of justice and security, is an organization that coordinates cooperation between numerous government agencies and sometimes private organizations. Its task of preventing terrorist attacks is just one of many, as it also coordinates within the area of crisis management, cyber security and makes periodical threat assessments. The counterterrorism strategy is the fundamental formulation of policy on which other government agencies and other actors base their policy, creating one integral approach.
In order to fully compare what we know of (lone actor) terrorism in academics with the strategy outlined by the NCTV, it is only logical to compare definitions. The counterterrorism strategy states its conceptual basis very clear in its chapter scopes and definitions. It is stated that the strategy limits its scope to extremism and terrorism. The chapter outlines the following definitions.
Extremism: ‘the phenomena in which persons or groups, from an ideological motivation, are willing to a serious degree break the law or conduct activities that undermine the democratic rule of law’ (NCTV, 2016, p. 5)
Terrorism: ‘the use of targeted violence against people, or creating damage that disrupts society, in purpose to undermine and destabilize society, create fear amongst the population or influence the political decision-making process’ (NCTV, 2016, p. 6) The NCTV acknowledges that multiple types of extremism exist, such as Islamic extremism, right-wing extremism, left-wing extremism and environmental- or animal welfare terrorism. In terrorism, there must be an ideological motive. Radicalization is, in their definition, the road from activism to extremism to terrorism (NCTV, 2016, p. 6). This is very similar to the concept of violent radicalization discussed earlier. Because it is not unlawful, activism is not part of the counterterrorism strategy. Also not part of this strategy is societal tension or polarization.
Although they can contribute to terrorism, this strategy is focused on the direct factors that contribute to and are part of terrorism. Societal tension and polarization are more important when aggregate levels of violence is the focus of analysis or policy (as explained earlier) and not when violent radicalization itself is the unit of analysis. The ministry of interior and Kingdom relations and the ministry of social affairs and employment base their strategy on these indirect societal factors (NCTV, 2016, p. 6).
Five pillars constitute the basis of the National Counterterrorism Strategy 2016-2020, or ‘intervention areas’, in a literal translation (NCTV, 2016, p. 4). These pillars are the five elements of the strategical framework: (1) procure, (2) prevent, (3) defense, (4) prepare and (5) prosecute. The pillar of procurement contains the goal of acquiring timely what the threats are. The second pillar is focused on preventing terrorism and extremism and foiling terror attacks. The third pillar is concentrated on ‘defending people, objects and vital processes, both online and offline’ (NCTV, 2016, p. 4). The fourth pillar is about being prepared in case an attack does take place. The fifth is focused on maintaining the rule of law. These pillars are closely related. Furthermore, the first pillar is the fundamental base for all other pillars. The strategy, as a whole, works as a plan for collective cooperation and the sharing of information. The strategy distinguishes two kinds of commitment, “fixed” commitment and flexible commitment. The fixed commitment consists of measures on policy and management level (from 2016-2020), whereas flexible commitment is based on threat assessments, so-called DTNs (Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland). These measures consist of actions such as small projects on a set timeline (NCTV, 2016, pp. 3-4).
The strategy stresses the importance of detecting signs of radicalization early:
‘We have to prevent that a person, group or network commits an extreme of terrorist attack. This means that we have to detect and tackle radicalization early, before someone actually resorts to extremism or terrorism. That is why we work intensively in a multidisciplinary approach. (…) The special quest of the counterterrorism policy is to track down potential perpetrators before they commit a terrorist attack.’ (NCTV, 2016, p. 9).
This main goal of detecting and tackling radicalization is particularly visible in the first two pillars. The third, fourth and fifth pillar are more applicable when the process of violent radicalization is (almost) completed. Therefore, for our research question, mainly the second
pillar is of importance. The first pillar will however also be shortly discussed because of it is fundamental to all pillars.
For this first pillar of acquisition, intelligence and information are the basis. Central in this policy is that every actor (government agency, police, intelligence service) must realize that information can be of meaning for another actor. The information can stem from internal (i.e., all counterterrorism “partners”) intelligence and information gathering, context information and scientific research. Internal intelligence can come from for example shared databases such as Interpol, or information about terrorism networks, finances, big data, or travel itineraries. Information also can come from professionals on both national and local level (NCTV, 2016, p. 11).
Context information can be gathered from local networks, such as the educational system, the (mental) healthcare system, the immigration services or the social security system. Likewise, information on societal developments, trend-analyses that lead to tensions are part of this kind of information.
The third part of information gathering in the first pillar is scientific research. The NCTV is investing in further research into radicalization, the use of digital means and in knowledge on the extreme right and other forms of extremism (NCTV, 2016, p. 12).
In the pillar prevention, the NCTV distinguishes four different tasks. The first is the prevention of fear for extremism and terrorism in society. The second is the prevention of extremist or terrorist groups gaining support. The third is disrupting threats and the last task is the foiling of attacks. Obviously, the second and third are most affiliated with violent radicalization.
These tasks are performed by deployment that is threat orientated and that is tailored to each individual case, as radicalization is an individual process that is very dynamic and comes in many shapes and sizes (NCTV, 2016, p. 13). In order to intervene in an individual process, the strategy uses local partners (municipalities, educational institutions, associations and “first-line” professionals) to detect worrisome behavior. Of course, the strategy sets out how to disrupt threats of terrorists by freezing assets of groups, targeting terrorist organizations and disrupt terrorist networks and so on, but these are less relevant for lone actor terrorists. On how to counter the threat of lone actor terrorists – or, in the terms of the NCTV, potentially violent loners – the strategy document states:
‘Recognizing potentially violent loners early on and assessing their willingness to resort to violence is a difficult task. Detecting and tackling potential violent loners is primarily done on a local level with mental health care, police and intelligence services.’ (NCTV, 2016, p. 14).
The NCTV acknowledges the attraction terrorist or extreme networks have on individuals. What is important to note is that the NCTV implies in its entire counterterrorism strategy that these potential violent loners are potential terrorists: they do not discuss the difference between lone actor terrorists and for example school shooters hate crime perpetrators that might have the same terrorizing result, but differ in their motivation.
Just like the current strategy, the previous strategy of 2011-2015 contained the beforementioned five pillars. However, as mentioned in the introduction, the strategy of 2011-2015 also displayed several new “strategic choices”. These choices represent change that will be initiated in the years after 2011. The strategic choices that are presented are focused on international jihadism, migration and flows of travel, technology and innovation and continued development of surveillance and protection systems. This leads to seven strategic priorities:
1. Jihadist combat areas
2. Jihadist discourse/propaganda 3. Migration and flows of travel 4. Technology and innovation 5. Internet
6. CBRN/E
7. Radicalized loners
8. Security awareness and performance
For the seventh strategic priority, as also cited in the introduction, the choice is formulated as followed:
‘Early detection and a tailor made approach to tackling radicalized loners is necessary. The effort is focused on increasing alertness on a local level. Furthermore, further research will be done into the causes of type of threat and concrete direction towards mitigating this threat, such as earlier detection and intervention.’ (NCTV, 2011, p. 109).
Commissioned by the NCTV under the 2016-2020 Counterterrorism strategy, radicalized loners or – as called in the 2016-2020 strategy – potential violent loners are countered with what the NCTV calls a “person-oriented” approach, in which measures are tailored to the individual and the possible network the person is affiliated with or attracted to (NCTV, 2016, p. 8). Of
importance here is that this approach is used for potential lone actor terrorists, but is not exclusive to this type of potential radicalizing individual.
In the “case consultations” of these individuals, the threat of an individual is assessed and dealt with. For this approach a model agreement that describes the legal issues surrounding these consultations and has been set up, together with a guide that describes the processes of such an approach in accordance with the counterterrorism strategy. The next section will describe this approach further.
4.2.The “person-orientated”-approach
The guide ‘person-orientated approach to prevent radicalization and extremism’ is a guide for municipalities, police, the public prosecutor and “chain” partners that divides duties and presents a description of how the procedure of this approach works. This guide can be found in multiple official archives of municipalities, signed by multiple parties (police, municipality, etc.) around the fall of 2017. The next few paragraphs will give an outline of how this procedure comes to practice.
The starting point of the process and procedure is initiated by certain signals. These signals can come from own intelligence services, but also from close ones or relatives of an individual. Many signals also come from “first-line” professionals. For example, these professionals work in education, social care of (mental) health care. These professionals are also being trained in recognizing certain signals that are worrisome and might indicate an individual is radicalizing. These signals are analyzed by what is called a “weegploeg”, loosely translated as an assessment team. This team assesses the signals whether they are indication for concern and therefore “case worthy”. The team also assesses the priority of the case and what parties should be involved. This assessment team consists of representatives of the municipality, police and the public prosecutor.
The “weegploeg” or assessment team has three consecutive decisions to make in the process of assessing signals of potential risk. The first decision is that of “case worthiness”. The second is that of deciding what parties should be involved; the third is concerning informing the subject or not, which is legally obligated except in some circumstances where security concerns require discretion (Handleiding persoonsgerichte aanpak voorkoming radicalisatie en extremisme, 2017, p 5). The first decision, the assessment of signals, is done with certain tools (risk
assessment models). The use of a particular kind of model is not obligated. Two risk assessment models are mainly used, the – on behalf of the NCTV created – Dynamisch Beoordelingskader (DBK), and the IR-46, which is created by the National Police. The DBK consists of 74 indicators, where the IR-46 unsurprisingly consists of 46 indicators. The (DSP Groep, 2017, p. 29). Although the exact indicators within models is due to security considerations not openly available, both models are similar (NCTV has also adopted the IR-46) and, more importantly, are both based on Moghaddam’s Staircase theory (DSP Groep, 2017, p. 30). The risk assessment models, the creators emphasize, are tools and cannot be the deciding factor of allocating a risk classification. Users (risk assessors) of the models furthermore state that the models sometimes indicate a higher risk, while their experience tells them that that is a wrong conclusion. Perhaps even more surprising, users estimate that in most cases, due to lacking data of the case to use the risk assessment models, they use the theory of Moghaddam as a guide, since it is more manageable with less information (DSP Groep, 2017, p. 30). This Staircase theory of Fatali Moghaddam and how it is translated into the a assessment frame of reference will be discussed in the next chapter.
4.2.1. The Staircase Theory as a frame of reference
Moghaddam (2005) uses the metaphor of a narrowing staircase to describe the process of violent radicalization. The staircase to terrorism is visualized as containing a ground floor and five more layers or levels, each level having its own psychological characteristics (Moghaddam, 2005, p. 162). The ground floor is the floor where the majority of population is. The psychological factors that are prominent at the ground floor are perceptions of fairness, or ‘psychological interpretation of material conditions’ (Moghaddam, 2005, p. 162). The focus here is on perceived injustice. This injustice can be perceived on several or multiple levels, such as economic injustice or a perceived threat to (collective) identity.
On the first floor, two major psychological factors play a role. First, the perceived options or ability for personal mobility and, second, their perception of procedural injustice. Research suggests that when for an individual personal mobility seems more an option, that individual is less likely to resort to ‘nonnormative actions’ (Moghaddam, 2005, p. 164). With procedural justice is meant how fair an individual perceives the “system”. This factor is primarily of importance in non-western societies.
The second floor is where displacement of aggression forms. This includes a strong us-versus-them thinking. In the third floor, an own morality begins to form. In this stage, the terrorist – in his/her view – becomes morally engaged, while the “enemy” is morally disengaged. Between the third and fourth floor one is recruited or has joined the world of terrorist organizations. On this floor, the categorical thinking of them and us is solidified. This leads to ‘in-group favoritism and out-group discrimination’ (Moghaddam, 2005, p. 165). This process is even further strengthened because of internalizing of traditions and socialization into the organization. On the fifth floor, the attack is carried out.
This staircase theory is based primarily on group terrorism stemming from non-western countries. The radicalization model in the person-orientated approach uses the psychological factors and processes to create its own 4-stage model. These four stages are the preliminary phase (1), the phase of social alienation (2), the phase of accepting violence as a means (3) and last the phase of willingness to personally resort to violence (4). These phases are being developed in two areas, in ideology and in social context. The area of ideology indicates the intention the individual has, the social context his/her capability and willingness.
Within this framework, focus lies on indicators in nine different “development areas” (Handleiding persoonsgerichte aanpak voorkoming radicalisatie en extremisme, 2017, p. 17):
▪ Suspicious or striking contacts ▪ Behavior
▪ Ideology
▪ Violence and crime
▪ Grievance and dissatisfaction ▪ Propaganda
▪ International contacts ▪ Social cause for worry ▪ Training
4.2.2. Non-security actors
The guide further does not disclose how and to what extent these areas are relevant for assessing the gravity of certain signals. For a number of these development areas, law enforcement is dependent on non-security services. Interviews conducted by Parker et al., (2019) also suggest that within law enforcement, there is need to use a broad spectrum of actors, including non-security actors (Parker et al., 2019, p. 279). These non-non-security actors, organizations, firms or individuals that are not primarily concerned with security, are for example teachers, mental care, mosques, educational systems, or for example the individual’s acquaintances or
