How does protracted conflict impact the long-term wellbeing of civilians? : the case of Lebanon

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M a s t e r t h e s i s f o r t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f A m s t e r d a m ( 2 0 1 8 - 2 0 1 9 ) M a r l y B o s

How does protracted conflict impact the

long-term wellbeing of civilians? The case of Lebanon

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How does protracted conflict impact the long-term

wellbeing of civilians? The case of Lebanon

Master thesis Political Science - International Relations (2018-2019) University of Amsterdam

Name student: Marly Bos Student number: 10615415 Supervisor: Dr G.R. Arlen

Second reader: Dr E.A.V Matthies-Boon

Final version: June 21, 2019 Word count: 24486

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Acknowledgements

First of all, I would like to thank my supervisor at the University of Amsterdam, Gordon Arlen, for his constructive feedback and trust in my thesis plans. I am also very grateful to my respondents, who took the time to meet me and trusted me with their life experiences. In addition, special thanks go to Abdallah Hmayed, Danny Khayat, Tony and Youmna Boustany and Yehya Alame for helping me to find respondents and acting as translators; but above all for their friendship. Finally, I would like to express my profound gratitude to my parents and family for providing me with unconditional support and continuous encouragement throughout my years of study and through the process of researching and writing this thesis. I would also like to thank Diederik, my brother and fellow political science student, for his valuable comments regarding my thesis. This research paper would not have been possible without them. Thank you all.

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Introduction

Lebanon has experienced a violent recent history since its 1943 independence. The 1975 to 1990 civil war, in which changing factions were pitted against each other in a series of confrontations, affected Lebanon during a period of fifteen years (El-Khoury, 2019). After a precarious peace agreement and some calm years, despite on-going reciprocal episodic threats on the southern border, Lebanon was startled by a month-long war with Israel in July 2006, which left strategic roads, bridges, much of the south and parts of Beirut in ruins (El-Khoury, 2019). However, scholars have shown that even when direct war ends people cannot easily return to their normal lives (Turner Johnson, 2012). After the 2006 war, the relations between Lebanon and Israel remained hostile, with threats repeatedly issued on both sides (Harel & Issacharoff, 2008; Fisk, 2018). Many people believe that a new war between Lebanon and Israel is inevitable (El-Khoury, 2019). In addition, not much has changed in the political spectrum that hints at progress and change, not even thirteen years after the last war. As I will elaborate on in this research paper, Hezbollah’s power is still largely unopposed and the religious and political divisions that were the reasons for the civil war are still present. For the Lebanese citizens, memories about violence inflicted upon themselves, their loved ones and their environments stay fresh in their minds. In this way, violence continuous to be part of everyday life and the future remains uncertain (Schröder & Schmidt, 2001). In this research paper I will investigate the impact of war on people in the longer term. My research question is: How has protracted conflict impacted the long-term wellbeing of civilians in Lebanon, and

what insights can political scientists draw from this case generally?

Different authors have written about the consequences of war on people. Trauma is an obvious reaction to the horrific experience of war, and has been discussed by numerous authors (Alexander, 2004; Fassin & Rechtman, 2009; Freud, 1959; Green, 2003; Rasmussen & Miller, 2009, Smelser, 2004). In addition, fear and anxiety (Green, 1999; Hermez, 2017; Pearlman, 2016), and justice and victimhood (Bar-Tal et al., 2009; Fassin, 2009; Jankowitz, 2017; Schröder & Smith, 2001) are often consequences that have to be dealt with in the post-war period. Also, individuals often take on a variety of coping mechanisms, whether intentional or unintentional to deal with these fears and uncertainties (Berents, 2015; Giddens, 1991; Hermez, 2017; Jeganathan, 1997; Smelser, 2004).

Studying the long-term effect of war on civilians can tell us much about the resilience of individuals and communities, and can give local and international communities lessons for

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coping with post-war situations in the future (Brown, 2013: 492; Sikkink, 2017: 191). Furthermore, not many scholars have focused on ‘how the broader context of armed conflict, including the concomitant stress and fear, might impact individuals and families immediately and in the long-term’ (Williams et al., 2018: 145). In addition, the impact of conflict in Lebanon has been less studied than its impact on the Israeli side, as El-Khoury (2019) emphasizes (see; Keyes et al., 2014; Palmieri, Canetti-Nisim, Galea, Johnson, & Hobfoll, 2008; Wolmer, Hamiel, Barchas, Slone, & Laor, 2011). Furthermore, a vast amount of studies on wellbeing after conflict focus on war veterans (see Elspeth Cameron, 2015; Finley, 2011; Koren et al., 2005; Kozaric-Kovacic et al., 2001; Novaco et al., 2012). Nevertheless, in recent years the focus on the wellbeing of civilians after conflict has gained more attention (Bhat et al., 2018; Hassan et al., 2016; Weinberg et al., 2017). With this research I attempt to contribute to the literature on the wellbeing of civilians after conflict by examining the understudied Lebanese case.

Lebanon is an appropriate case study because it has dealt with protracted violence for a long time. Lebanon has had episodic outbursts of violence over the past decades and we may assume that memories of the war are still present in the minds of the Lebanese people. As described by Volk (2017; p. 294) for example, and mentioned in Hermez (2017) and Saade (2016), “While actual war might not currently afflict any of the interlocutors, they live with the daily expectation of possible future violence, and the recognition of an unsettled past”. I will specifically focus on south Lebanon, an area that was targeted considerably, especially in July 2006. Furthermore, the proximity of the border with Israel brings along particular threats that are of relevance for my research on protracted conflict.

This paper will proceed as follows. First, I will outline different debates, statements and theories in the field of wellbeing and protracted conflict to provide a context for my own research. In this theoretical framework I will specifically focus on literature regarding fear, anxiety, trauma, injustice and victimhood as consequences of protracted conflict. In addition, I will discuss literature on coping mechanisms. Then I will elaborate on the methodology used for this research. I will justify the choice for the used case study and mention my choices concerning the units of analysis and research methods. I will also dedicate a part to ethics in relation to my fieldwork. In chapter one I will summarize the state of protracted conflict in Lebanon. Chapter two will outline my findings regarding fear, anxiety and trauma. Moreover, I will elaborate on my respondents’ experiences during both the civil war and the 2006 war. In chapter three, I will present my respondents’ attitudes towards justice and victimhood, while chapter four deals with coping mechanisms. Here I will explore the range of coping

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mechanisms people do or do not adopt to deal with uncertainty in their lives. Chapter five will provide a discussion of studies on similar contexts and wider developments relevant for my research, as well as directions for future research and the limitations of my study. Lastly, in the conclusion I will summarize the main findings and implications.

Theoretical Framework

Protracted Violence

Just War theory has traditionally focused on jus ad bellum and jus in bellum, and scholars have devoted significant time to both paradigms. Less time is dedicated to patterns that develop after a war has ended. Ceulemans (2014) and Turner Johnson (2012), amongst others, have therefore argued for the need to include jus post bellum in the scholarly debate as well, which means that they believe that scholars should more carefully study the end and long-term aflong-termath of wars. When direct war is over, due to the signing of a peace-agreement, or when interference between two warring parties is established, it does not mean that life can return to normality easily. Many people in (post) conflict areas have difficulty to recovering from the violent experiences they were subject to (Jayatilaka et al., 2015). Wars furthermore impact not only individuals, but whole communities and other social structures and destroys people’s lives as they knew it before war broke out (Jayatilaka et al., 2015). In many cases, memories of past violence and conflict rests fresh in people’s minds, the future continues to be uncertain and violence remains part of everyday life (Schröder & Schmidt, 2001). Schröder & Schmidt (2001) elaborate on this importance of history in explaining current conflict and violence. They state that prior wars reflect meaning into present acts of violence. According to Hermez (2017), anticipation works from a present to fold the past into the future. However, in many conflict and post-conflict areas, direct violence only erupts occasionally. According to Schröder & Schmidt (2001), even without the direct presence of violent events, however, thousands of people on all sides of the conflicting parties are somehow affected by this violence, even when it does not afflict physical harm to the individual in a direct manner. “Violence as performance extends its efficacy over space and time and gets its message across clearly to the large majority of people who are not physically affected by it (Schröder & Schmidt, 2001: 6).” In this way, protracted conflict often contributes to a state of living ‘in the meanwhile’, a term developed by Hermez (2017; 3). When, on the one hand, memories of past political violence are still fresh, and when, on the other hand, people constantly anticipate future political violence to ignite, it can be difficult

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for them to find a balance between living a normal life, while at the same time being in a constant state of anxiety about what they still might endure in the future (Hermez, 2017: 4). As Hobbes (1651: 96) explained: “war consisteth not in actual fighting, but in the known disposition thereto”. Nevertheless, Kelly (2008: 353) adds to this that in times of (anticipated) violence people are often more occupied with everyday errands, such as going to the market or visiting friends and family, than with fighting or hiding. This shows the intricate relationship between the ‘normal’ and the everyday life and the (anticipated) expression of violence. Despite the fact that people try to live their normal lives, many people in post-war situations keep dealing with fear for political violence, even in areas where direct fighting yet seldom erupts (Hermez, 2017).

Impact on civilians

The impact of conflict is often destructive and enduring. Negative social effects and mental health related issues are abundant and often difficult to address and cure (NATO, 2011). First of all, fear and anxiety can have influential effects on wellbeing, according to Furedi (2007). Pearlman (2016: 24) describes four types of fear for political violence. While the first two types of fear (silencing fear and surmounted fear) indicate a direct link between an action and a reaction, the third and fourth types of fear are perceived as consequences of the unpredictable character of political violence (Pearlman; 2016). The third type, semi-normalized fear, or ‘fear as a way of life’, according to Green (1999), brings the aspect of normalization to the foreground. In the Syrian war, for example, hearing the sound of bombs falling in the distance became part of everyday life. However, not knowing where the next bomb will strike, or if it will hit one’s home, left many people in a constant state of anxiety (Pearlman, 2016). Then, there is a fourth type of fear, as elaborated by Pearlman (2016). Nebulous fear starts when the threat of political violence is gone. In the midst of perceived safety, war survivors still endure injury, the loss of family members and friends, demolished homes, collapsed infrastructure, poverty, and trauma (Pearlman, 2016). This fear stems from uncertainty about the future. But even in situations of protracted violence, people seem to show less fear after some time and realize that life moves on (Hermez, 2017).

Williams et al. (2018) and Steel at al. (2009) point out that the concepts of insecurity, stress and fear are not as well studied in relation to wellbeing as more direct consequences of direct and long-term conflict, such as physical injury, the demolition of the (build) environment, or the loss of loved ones. Williams et al (2018) furthermore elaborate on the fact that both physical insecurity, as well as economic or social insecurity can trigger feelings of

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anxiety or fear. Lechner (1992: 26) has described fear as ‘the perception of a threat that is either real or imaginary’. There does not necessarily have to be a concrete or real event for people to experience fear. Fear can be real and existent without actual events that trigger a reaction (Das, 2007). As Das and Kleinman (2000: 5) state, ‘social violences’ become normalised, ‘central to the moral order’. In many conflict and post-conflict areas, the notion of ‘raw fear’, has become prevalent; an unpredictable kind of fear that cripples the foundations of societal life, even when direct fighting has ended (Parkin, 1986; Bourke, 2005). This type of fear sustains people to anticipate the worst possible outcome and leaves them in a constant fear of being at risk (Furedi, 2007: 6). In the meantime however, normal life must continue (Das and Kleinman, 2000). The term ‘culture of fear’ was first coined by Guillermo O’Donnell (1983), in relation to everyday life during the military regime in Argentina. Since then, the term has been used to describe different situations in which violence produces widespread and deep-rooted fear, such as a culture of fear often experienced in cities (Jeffries, 2014) or a culture of fear based on terrorism (Furedi, 2007).

The experience of (perceived) life threatening situations (Levine, 2005) can also contribute to the development of trauma, such as Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) (Jovanovic et al., 2013). Trauma helps us to connect past violence and current suffering (Fassin & Rechtman, 2009). Peigl (2007b: 23) defines trauma as ‘a toxic condition, a mixture of intense anxiety, absolute helplessness and a loss of control’. The experience of trauma, in addition, often goes paired with a decrease in feeling safe, and habitually increases fear of future violence (Green, 2003; Williams et al., 2018). Some consequences of traumatic events include: sleeping problems, concentration problems, irritation, suspicious for future events, and overreacting (Green, 2003). Rasmussen & Miller (2009) identify two different types of trauma studies. They distinguish between trauma focused advocates and psychosocial advocates. While trauma-focused scholars focus on direct consequences of violent events, psychosocial advocates focus more on the conditions that stem from violent events, such as displacement, water or food insufficiency, or any other indirect condition that affects survival in a post-war society. Psychosocial scholars “see distress rooted largely in the stressful conditions of everyday life in settings of organized violence” (p. 7), while trauma-focused advocates see answers in specific clinical treatment to cure the patient from unambiguous suffering (Neuner & Elbert, 2007). The latter group believes that treating people for traumatic experiences will in the same time teach them to cope more effectively with daily stressors, as mentioned by Rasmussen & Miller (2009). Nevertheless, psychosocial advocates turn this paradigm the other way around. They believe that when people learn to cope with daily

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stressors, their wellbeing and mental health will improve at the same time (Betancourt & Williams, 2008; Rasmussen & Miller, 2009).

Trauma can also be settled in a whole community, even when the traumatic events took place decades ago. This brings us to a broader idea of trauma, which goes beyond the idea of trauma as used in a strictly clinical sense. This broader notion of trauma is what Fassin & Rechtman (2009: 2) call ‘an open wound in the collective memory’, and is related more to the political and sociological side of the term. This type of trauma is often called cultural trauma, and appears “when members of a collectivity feel they have been subjected to a horrendous event that leaves indelible marks upon their group consciousness, marking their memories forever and changing their future identity in fundamental and irrevocable ways” (Alexander, 2004: 1). According to lay trauma theory, these traumas have the ability to wreck someone’s (or even a social group’s) sense of wellbeing (p. 2). It destroys basic assumptions in life and destroys feelings of trust within the social group. Smelser (2004: 44) also developed a definition of cultural trauma: “a memory accepted and publicly given credence by a relevant membership group and evoking an event or situation which is a) laden with negative affect, b) represented as indelible, and c) regarded as threatening a society’s existence or violating one or more of its fundamental cultural presuppositions.”

According to Freud & Breuer (1957: 5) trauma particularly generates feelings of anxiety, rather than physical damage. Freud focused most on the negative affects anxiety and fright, as he considered these the most significant reactions to dangerous and imminent situations. According to Freud (1959), anxiety serves as an internal mechanism that stimulates motoric and ideational responses that one can adopt when facing a dangerous situation, something I will discuss more in a later section of this chapter. Affect, so to say, links the personal level (affect) with the social level (response), and establishes itself in daily life. “Affect is not in the first instance primarily a psychological medium but rather one whose primary functional significance is social and cultural” (Parsons 1978: 316). In this way, “experiencing trauma” can be understood as a sociological process that defines a painful injury to the collectivity, establishes the victim, attributes responsibility, and distributes the ideal and material consequences (Alexander, 2004: 22).

However, trauma-related studies do not often deal with long-term consequences of protracted conflict. Trauma-studies usually focus on limited exposure to violence and war (e.g. war veterans), while a large number of people keep suffering the consequences of war for a long time after the war or the direct fighting has ended (Green, 2003). Individuals in this phase often experience continuing threats to their safety, without being able to escape from

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this harmful situation (Green, 2003). Straker (2013) and Matthies-Boon (2017) call this Continuous Traumatic Stress (CTS). Moreover, individuals experience stress when they struggle with loss, or anticipated loss, of highly important (communal) possessions, social status or loved ones (Hobfoll, 1991; Green, 2003).

Justice and victimhood

In the aftermath of war, justice is a much-discussed issue. Human rights perpetrators often go unpunished (Donoso, 2018; Sveaas, 2013). Nevertheless, seeking justice for past violations is an important part in the recuperation process of victims (Donoso, 2018; Hamber, 2009). Finding justice for victims of war and conflict is also a key mechanism for consolidating peace. Acknowledging victims’ feelings, and the harms they endured, as well as holding the perpetrators responsible, are therefore extremely important (Jankowitz, 2017). It is also important to look a little closer to the concept of victimhood in relation to conflict situations. Frequently, people who experienced extreme violence or other life threatening events, take on an active role as victim, as this is often the only way that they are heard (Fassin, 2009). Most groups in conflict settings see themselves as the most important victims, or they even claim exclusive victim status (Jankowitz, 2017). However, in conflict situations, history is remembered differently by different groups and claims to victimhood status are often biased (Jankowitz, 2017; Fassin, 2009). Alexander (2004) states that feelings of revenge are often closely associated with the construction of (national) history.

Jankowitz (2017: 2) has developed the victim-perpetrator paradigm to shed light on how conflicting groups construct an image of innocence and blamelessness for their own group, while at the same time designate the other groups as perpetrators. According to Jankowitz (2017), these two categories are mutually exclusive, which means that groups often forget to look at what really happened and who else could reasonably claim victim status. Bar-Tal et al. (2009: 229) state that often most groups in a conflict believe that, although they may have used violence, they are the real victims of the conflict, denying the other groups’ claim to victimhood. The latter is what Oberschall (2007: 25) calls the ‘double victim syndrome’. While claiming victimhood, groups attach a positive identity to themselves and to their actions (Jankowitz, 2017). Taking all this into account, Quinney (1972) and Jankowitz (2017) elucidate that claims to victimhood and the concept of ‘victim’ in itself are not objective constructions, but socially formed by context, belief and identity.

Moreover, narratives about the past conflict often keep the memory of past violence alive, and trickles down to the younger generations, as Schröder & Smith (2001) and

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Borneman (1992) indicate. Schröder & Smith (2001) have elucidated that memory plays a crucial part in conflict. Memory informs and justifies a groups’ standpoint in a conflict, and therefore memory informs and legitimizes decisions to use violence, according to the groups who uses it. The decision to use violence is in this way a way to build a world that is forthcoming to one’s believes about truth and history. Taking into account this theory about memory by Schröder & Smith’s (2001), a consequence of the victim-perpetrator paradigm is that groups who claim victim status, often legitimise violence against perpetrators in and after conflict. Bar-Tal (2003: 79) furthermore mentions that violence is eventually carried out within a socially constructed system that justifies and legitimises the use of violence in the eyes of certain groups. This can be challenging for efforts aimed at consolidating peace.

Coping Mechanisms

Green (2003) elaborates on certain coping strategies that individuals adopt in the case of heightened stress. She states that certain situations ask for adaptations and adjustments to daily life (p. 18). A large part of the literature on fear is devoted to fear of violence and coping strategies in urban areas. Numerous individuals in cities with high crime rates, for example, see themselves as ‘potential victims’ (Rotker, 2002: 16). Also, Berents (2015: 91) states that ‘the deeply embedded nature of insecurity, violence, and fear in many urban environments has required residents to find new ways of coping with violence and insecurity in everyday life’ (Berents, 2015; 91). These ways of coping are what Koonings and Kruijt (2007: 4) call ‘survival strategies’. In addition, exposure to violence at a young age can have far-reaching consequences later in life (Warner and Swisher, 2014). When people have witnessed direct or indirect violence in their youth, they often turn out to show less confidence in the future (Berman et al., 1996). In addition, anxiety and depression are all part of the wider implication of the exposure of violence on young people’s lives (Berman et al. 1996). More generally, other authors show that people who have been victimized in their past, have to deal with higher levels of fear of violence (Rountree and Land, 1996a), as well as people who have dealt with traumatic events (Frijda, 1993). People are, however, often more resilient to extreme violence and suffering than is often expected (Scheper-Hughes, 2008: 52; Seymour, 2012).

According to Anthony Giddens (1991: 44), ‘people cope with dangers, and the fears that come with them, in terms of emotional and behavioural practices that have come to be part of their everyday behaviour and thought’. Boyden (2010: xi) describes the term ‘agency’ as one’s ‘constructive engagement with hostile public conditions’. Also Hermez (2017) and

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Jeganathan (1997) recognize the ways people adapt their behaviour to uncertain situations. Even in periods without much direct violence, people constantly anticipate future violence; partly because it would merely be a reflection of past incidents, and partly because of repeated narratives of these incidents. There is however confusion in the literature about the difference between coping and defense mechanisms (Cramer, 1998). The two terms are related, in that they both describe methods by which people adapt to wide-ranging issues of living (Haan, 1977: 37). According to Cramer (1998: 924), the difference between coping and defense mechanisms is that coping mechanisms are conscious and intentional, while defense mechanisms are unconscious and unintentional. Defense mechanisms are more focused on changing internal circumstances, while coping mechanisms allow people to act directly on a threat, or because of a threat (Cramer, 1998). Hobfoll (2001) distinguishes several ways of coping as well. According to him, individuals in (anticipated) conflict situations actively try to keep their level of resources, act early when they realize, or get signs, that new violence is approaching, or try to obtain an advantageous position through selection, as is outlined by Baltes (1997). Cherewick & Glass (2018), in their study on the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo found that adolescents use cognitive coping mechanisms such as avoiding and trying to forget the traumatic events, but also behavioural coping mechanisms such as isolation or the increase of hazardous behaviour.

Smelser (2004: 45) developed a model exposing different mechanisms for defense. The first one is “to block the threatening intrusion”. According to Horowitz (1976: 4) denial of certain events is a much-used coping strategy. Many people react to trauma according to this strategy; hoping that the traumatic event will eventually fade away from their minds. However, the indelible character of trauma often blocks this aim (Smelser, 2004). The second model that Smelser (2004) emphasises is “the reversal of the threatening intrusion into its opposite”. People who experienced a traumatic event often transform the event into a valuable experience instead of seeing it as a horrendous and often inexcusable attack on their body and mind. The third model includes the shifting of the reference of the threatening intrusion, meaning that people who experienced a traumatic event often blame others, as a way to cope with their negative affects. The last mechanism Smelser (2004: 45) recognized was the intention “to insulate the threatening intrusion from its associative connections”. Gill (1961) furthermore emphasises the fact that people often adopt multiple of these defense mechanisms at the same time.

In this theoretical framework I tried to outline the essential literature on impacts of war or on-going conflict on the lives and bodies of civilians. Even in cases were direct war has ended

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people still suffer from their lived experiences and the effect of long-term chaos on their countries’ social fabric and institutes (Green, 2003). Fear, anxiety and even trauma are common responses to violence and uncertainty. In times of protracted conflict, fear can amongst others be a consequence of experienced loss (Hobfoll, 1991), or uncertainty about the future (Pearlman, 2016). Fear in situations of protracted conflict is also often normalized, making it a central part of the social system (Das, 2007; Das & Kleinman, 2000; Pearlman, 2016). Another reaction to conflict, outlined in this theoretical framework, is trauma. Both clinical trauma and cultural trauma are discussed. I stipulate amongst others the difference between trauma-focused advocates and psychosocial advocates; both groups consider different sources and treatments for trauma. Furthermore, I showed how a cultural trauma could destroy someone’s or even a whole community’s feeling of wellbeing (Alexander et al., 2004).

Another direction that was explored in this theoretical framework focuses on justice and victimhood. Important parts in this section include the fact that war criminals often go unpunished (Sveaas, 2013), and the active ‘role of victim’ that people in conflict often adopt (Fassin, 2009). Further, theories such as the victim-perpetrator paradigm (Jankowitz, 2017) and the double victim syndrome (Oberschall, 2007), which construct a sense of innocence for in-groups and a sense of culpability for out-groups, are discussed.

In the knowledge of these real, imagined and potential attacks and injustices on the bodies and lives of civilians, people adopt coping and defense mechanisms; which are both intentional and unintentional, and behavioural or cognitive, and part of their everyday lives (Giddens, 1991). The selection, optimisation, compensation theory by Baltes (1997), the

conservation of resources theory by Hobfoll (2001) and Smelser’s model for coping mechanisms (2004), discussed in this theoretical framework, all focus on mechanisms that

people adopt when confronted with heightened stress or (potential) conflict.

In the following chapters I will refer back to these theories and literatures in relation to my own research. However, I will first specify the methodology used for this research.

Methodology

Research Design and Case Selection

This research is based on a qualitative research strategy, whose focus is capturing “thick, context-filled descriptions of social realities as they are experienced by real, complex and

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contradictory human beings” (Volk, 2017: 294). According to Bryman (2012: 399), qualitative methods are used to capture the attribution of meaning to events, which is essential for this research. To thoroughly study the impacts of protracted conflict on people in the longer term, I chose to conduct an explorative case study. I will use the case of south Lebanon for different reasons. First of all, (south) Lebanon as a geographical area meets the criteria necessary for conducting research on protracted conflict, as much time has passed since the last war, which makes people carry on with their daily lives, although we may assume that memories of the wars are still present in the minds of the Lebanese people. Secondly, the on-going security situation with Israel and the presence of a United Nations interim force (UNIFIL) confirm the protracted character of the conflict situation in south Lebanon. By selecting this case, I will be able to truly capture the effects of protracted conflict on the lives of people after a longer period of time. I will specifically focus on south Lebanon, as this region has been affected with violence and war most directly and extensively, especially in the 2006 war; and where the proximity of the border with Israel brings along particular threats, which are of relevance for my research on protracted conflict. Most of my interviews were conducted in the Tyre area (see map page 16).

Concepts

Wellbeing is described by Diener & Suh (1997: 200) as follows: “subjective wellbeing

consists of three interrelated components, life satisfaction, pleasant affect, and unpleasant affect. Affect refers to pleasant and unpleasant moods and emotions whereas life satisfaction refers to a cognitive sense of satisfaction with life”. To demarcate the limits of my research,

the concept of wellbeing that is used in this research, is mostly focused on the negative affect, in accordance with Freud’s idea that the most obvious reaction to dangerous and imminent situations is anxiety and fright. In this way I will mostly look at wellbeing in close relation to fear and trauma, in which the focus on the latter is on cultural trauma predominantly. Smelser (2004: 44) defines cultural trauma as: “a memory accepted and publicly given credence by a relevant membership group and evoking an event or situation which is a) laden with negative affect, b) represented as indelible, and c) regarded as threatening a society’s existence or violating one or more of its fundamental cultural presuppositions”. I will also give some thought to the positive affect in relation to conflict, although this direction will be studied less extensively.

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Image 1: Map of geographical dispersion of Lebanese sectarian groups. Source: Sergey Kondrashov (via Reddit).

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Further, in this research I will link several of my results to a phenomenological intersubjective notion of trauma (see Bracken, 2002 (post-psychiatry)), as used by Matthies-Boon (2017) in her study on youth activists in Egypt. The phenomenology part of the concept points to the “experience of a shattering worldview” and the anxiety related consequences (Matthies-Boon, 2017: 623). The intersubjective part of the concept hint at the social foundations of ones world, and that healing from traumatic experiences takes place within this social context (p. 623). According to Matthies-Boon (2017), this concept gives space to both an individual as well as a cultural understanding of trauma; both notions having the ability to influence each other. Further, when pointing out trauma or PTSD symptoms I will refer to how the term is described by the National Health Service (NHS, 2019).

The goal of this research is not to generalise my findings to all (post) conflict situations or to come up with new theories. I rather aim to reflect on people’s wellbeing and behaviour in times of protracted conflict in the particular context of the south Lebanese society, and add my findings to the existing literature on people’s wellbeing and behaviour in situations of protracted conflict, in order to broaden the knowledge on this topic.

Units of Analysis

The units of analysis consist of people who lived in (south) Lebanon during the 1975 - 1990 civil war and the 2006 Lebanon-Israel war. I tried to include a variety of different respondents to be able to analyse any differences or similarities in their answers. Although my aim is not to generalize, differences or similarities may still be interesting to observe. Furthermore, I included a small sample of younger people to see how they perceive of the situation nowadays.

The selection of respondents was carried out through purposive, non-probability sampling (Bryman, 2012: 419) and snowball sampling (Bryman, 2012: 418, 424). By using the purposive non-probability sampling method, the researcher chooses his or her units of analysis based on their accessibility and relatively easy access. Snowball sampling refers to the method in which the researcher asks his or her respondent to bring him or her into contact with potential respondents. The results are processed according to one to one transcriptions, from which the most relevant information is directly cited and/or paraphrased in my research paper. Furthermore, I don’t want to see my respondent’s answers as merely data, but as peoples’ stories and lives; that is why I find it important to give space to citations, to make this research more engaging for the reader and to emphasize my respondents’ lines of thought.

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The timeframe for this research was nearly five months. The data collection took place during two weeks, in which I was able to interview eighteen people. Out of the eighteen respondents, only four were women. Most respondents were in between the age of 35 and 70, although there are some respondents who are older and younger. In addition, eight of my respondents indicated to have a low income. Five respondents reported a middle income, and five reported a higher income. The ones reporting a low income were all shop owners or students (all Shia Muslim). The ones reporting a middle income were working as shop owner (3), lawyer or retired garment dealer. The shop owners were Christian and Sunni Muslim, and another one lived in Europe for a long time. The lawyer and the garment dealer identify as communists. The respondents who indicated to have a higher income had professions such as dentist (2) (both Shia Muslim), doctor (Christian), banker (Christian) or politician (Shia Muslim). Most of the people I interviewed were Shia Muslims, as can be expected because of the geographical location (see map on page 16). Three respondents were Christians and one lady was a Sunni Muslim. Furthermore, the two people that did not indicate their religion consider themselves to be communists.

Research Methods

For this research I used semi-structured in-depth interviews. By using semi-structured interviews I left room for respondents to include and talk more about topics that they found important, while still allowing me to follow the same interview guide with all the respondents. In this way, I do not exclude answers or attitudes that are important in the context that I am researching.

The interview questions were developed in accordance with the scope of my research question and the extent of the theoretical framework. Most questions link to the definition of wellbeing that I used for this research. The interview questions that were used in this research were divided in five categories. The first category consists of general questions about the person. The second category comprises more general questions about the civil war and the 2006 July war. The third category focuses on the personal link to the past wars. Category four focuses on the current situation, and is composed of three subcategories. The first subcategory treats questions related to daily life and fear. This is followed by another subcategory which focuses on the way people cope with their situation The last subcategory emphasises peoples’ ideas about Lebanon. The last category of the interview guide explores the militarisation of everyday life. For the complete interview guide see appendix two.

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Ethics

The interviews were partly conducted in English and partly in Arabic. When interviews were conducted in Arabic, the language barrier brought with it some concerns regarding transparency. First of all, through the use of a translator, the meaning of my questions, as well as the respondents’ answers, could have been transformed slightly. Second, the presence of a translator could have influenced the level of trust during the interview, for both better or worse. As the civil war has shown, the sectarian situation in Lebanon has produced mistrust between different sects. In the cases that my translator was from a different sect than the interviewee, this could have reduced the openness of the interviewee. In some cases my translator was from the same sect as the interviewee, which, on the other hand, could have played an encouraging role vis-à-vis the trust-level. In appendix two I included a list of my respondent’s personal details as well as information about the interviews, in which this kind of information can be found. Another detail that could have reduced the level of openness is that people are still suspicious due to the security situation in the past decades, although most people were very open and interested to talking to me.

Two important points have to be addressed. The first is that most of the people I interviewed satisfied the criteria for the units of analysis. However, there were some exceptions. First of all, I was only able to interview four women. This means that the gender distribution for this research is skewed. However, as my main objective is not to generalize my results, the negative effect of this abnormality stays limited. In my limitation section in the discussion I will come back to this. Second, due to cultural constraints I was not able to ask about the religion of the interviewees directly. In most cases my translator was able to tell me the interviewees’ religion after the interview, due to personal bond or by knowing the name of the interviewee from which the religion can be detracted. In this research I will work with that information.

During and after my fieldwork I made sure to maintain the anonymity of my respondents. The names that I use in this research paper are all made up.

Chapter One

This chapter describes the state of protracted conflict in Lebanon in more detail, and serves as a background chapter for my own research.

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1.1 The civil war

This section will be mainly based on the 1998 book Civil War in Lebanon, 1975-1992 by Edgar O’Ballance.

The war started with the killing of members of the Maronite Phalangist party by Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) members, close to a church where Pierre Gemayel (leader Phalangist party) was attending a ceremony on April 13, 1975 (O’Ballance, 1998: 1). Later, a bus with PLO backups (according to the Phalangists) was attacked by Phalangist members, killing around a dozen Palestinians (p. 1). According to the PLO however, the bus was merely dropping off families to a neighbouring Palestinian refugee camp. After that, fighting erupted between Phalangists and Palestinians, which turned parts of Beirut into warzones (p. 1). A couple of days later, Prime Minister Solh announced a ceasefire, agreed upon by all sides (p. 3). In the summer and early fall of 1975 however, violence erupted between different groups on a regular basis (p. 12). Beirut was again the stage of widespread fighting, killing more than 2000 people and injuring many more. In late September 1975, a Syrian diplomat came to broker a ceasefire, which was accepted by both sides (p. 19). Nevertheless, hostilities between different factions continued. Fighting centred along the Green Line, which separated Muslim West Beirut from Christian East Beirut (p. 24). Christian groups wanted to keep the status quo, in which they hold a supreme political position; the Muslims on the other hand wanted more power (p. 26-27). The Palestinians sought a way to consolidate their presence in Lebanon, and the Syrians, via proxy militia Saiqa, wanted to broaden their sphere of influence in Lebanon (p. 27). Despite different ceasefires, hostilities continued, in which Christians and Muslims came to openly fight each other (p. 29). Banks shut down temporarily, schools closed, foreigners were advised to leave Lebanon, and thousands of people became unemployed (p. 23). On April 9, Syria first intervened in Lebanon and joined the Christian factions against the Muslim National Democratic Movement and the Palestinians (p. 49). The direct involvement of Syrian troops on Lebanese soil was perceived as a threat by the Israelis, who established a security zone in southern Lebanon (p. 50). In October 1976, the Arab League authorized the Riyadh Peace Plan, which established an Arab Deterrent Force (ADF), under Syrian command (p. 59). In the following weeks Syria occupied most parts of Lebanon, under the pretence of the ADF, and terminated the first part of the civil war (p. 59). Nonetheless, disarmament remained difficult, as both the opposing groups did not want to hand in their arms before the other group had done it (p. 61).

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In February 1977, members of the Lebanese Front (Phalangists combined with smaller liberal parties) marched south to fight Jumblatt’s National Democratic Movement militias in the border area. Israel assisted the Christian Lebanese Front with air support (p. 66). When the ADF wanted to intervene, Syria refused, as it was afraid it would lead to a clash with Israel (p. 66). When the Palestinian and Muslim counteroffensive arrived, they were backed by Syrian forces, which marked a change in Syrian support (p. 67). It allowed Palestinian groups to position themselves close to the border, which was reacted upon by Israeli bombings on Palestinian bases in southern Lebanon (p. 67).

The Chtaura talks resulted in the decision that the Palestinian groups were to leave the Lebanon-Israel border, although the Syrians did not agree (p. 70). The withdrawal period was postponed several times and was met with counterarguments and refusal by the Palestinians, not in the least because an Israeli proxy under the leadership of Major Saad Haddad was still active in southern Lebanon (p. 71). This conflict developed into a rocket war between the Palestinians and Israelis (p. 71). On 11 March 1978 Palestinian militias raided the Israeli shore, and killed many on their way to Tel Aviv (p. 74). The only thing the people in south Lebanon could do now was to wait for the anticipated retaliation attacks by the Israeli army. Operation Litani started on March 14 (p. 74). An army of 20 000 soldiers, supported by tanks, heavy weapons and combat aircrafts invaded Lebanon, shooting at everything that could be seen as a threat. The Christian militias sided with the Israeli’s. Thousands of Muslims were forced to the North (p. 75). At this time, the UN Interim Force in Southern Lebanon (UNIFIL) was created, and the UN had issued Resolution 425 ordering Israel to withdraw from Lebanon (p. 76). By mid June most Israeli forces had withdrawn from Lebanese soil. In the meanwhile, new fighting erupted in Beirut between Christian and Muslim militias (p. 78). On April 23 1978 the leaders of the different factions came together and agreed upon the eviction of all militias (p. 78). As a consequence, the army were to be restructured along non-sectarian lines, although this was met with heavy protesting from both Christians and Muslims, who felt that all changes in the army structure neglected the position of their own group (p. 80). Heavy clashes between Christian militias and Syrian ADF troops occurred after the Christians accused the Syrian troops of killing 30 Christians in the Bekaa Valley (p. 80). Not long thereafter, other militias joined the fighting. Several militias accused the ADF under Syrian leadership to be an occupation force and wanted these troops out of Lebanon (p. 80). In addition, in the whole country kidnappings proved a key issue, knowing that all militias had underground prisons in which barbaric torture methods were used (p. 91).

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In southern Lebanon fighting continued. The Christian Major Haddad, an Israeli ally, announced his ‘Lebanese Free State’ in the border area; his main aim was to free Lebanon of the PLO, the Syrians and the UNIFIL (p. 87). Many Muslims fled northwards when Haddad forcefully expanded his territory, in combination with constant provocation from the Israelis (p 89). Haddad also openly attacked UNIFIL troops.

In June 1982, the Israeli invasion, under the codename Operation Peace in Galilee, became reality (p. 113). A strong Israeli army marched northwards without facing difficulties, although they clashed with PLO militias and ADF troops (p. 113-114). After a couple of days they controlled the Beirut – Damascus highway and besieged parts of Beirut, cutting people of from electricity, water and medical care (p. 114). Warning pamphlets were spread in the streets of (mainly West) Beirut, advising civilians to leave (p. 114). Some of my respondents decided to take up weapons themselves. “When I was young, I saw the Israeli airplanes

killing our families and everyone was silent, in Europe and more. When I saw this, I couldn’t keep silent, we were dying a slow death, so I carried a weapon facing Israel to protect our land (Danny, 60’s).

France proposed a resolution in the UN Security Council (UNSC) to withdraw all Palestinian and Israeli forces from Lebanon, but the United States vetoed (p. 114). Shortly thereafter however, an evacuation plan was agreed upon by the different parties to the conflict, and many PLO militias positioned themselves in other Arab states (p. 115). The Syrian ADF forces withdrew as well. The siege of West Beirut lasted 73 days. Nevertheless, after the withdrawal of the PLO and ADF, the Israeli armed stayed in Lebanon and even expanded its territory (p. 117). Intersectional fighting continued as well. On September 17, Christian Phalangists supported by Israeli troops massacred hundreds of people in the Palestinian Shatila and Sabra camps, what became known as the Sabra and Shatila massacre (Norton, 2000; O’Ballance, 1998: 119). Suicide bombings became common, amongst others the bombing of the US embassy in Beirut, killing over 60 people, and the bombings of the US and French military bases, leaving more than 300 soldiers dead (p. 123). A state of terror apprehended the country. Different attempts to reach a peace agreement between Lebanon and Israel failed; however, the much-negotiated Withdrawal Agreement came into force on May 17, 1983, forcing all Israeli troops to leave Lebanon (p. 124). Nonetheless, a security zone in southern Lebanon was agreed upon (p. 125). This agreement was met with heavy fighting and the relations between Israel and Syria deteriorated even further (p. 125). Around this time Hezbollah entered the stage (p. 132-133). While the Lebanese Army regained some of its strength, the Israelis finally agreed with a withdrawal plan (p. 151). By early June, most

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Israeli troops had left Lebanon, with the exception of a security zone near the southern Lebanese border (p. 160). Hezbollah had obtained a huge amount of followers, outnumbering Amal (p. 170). After again some failed peace plans, the Syrians occupied large parts of Beirut, intending to expand their control southwards (p. 174).

In the autumn of 1988 general Aoun created a military cabinet, opposing the regular cabinet and the Syrian occupation, and making it more difficult for peace plans to find common ground (p. 187). Eventually, the Taif Accords were agreed upon by all members, except for general Aoun (p. 194). This peace agreement called for political reform, such as an equal distribution of power between Muslims and Christians, disarmament, and the gradual withdrawal of Syrian troops (p. 194). General Aoun opposed the peace agreement and large scale fighting erupted between his mainly Christian Lebanese army troops and the Christian Lebanese Forces militia (p. 199). Aoun was defeated by Syrian troops in October 1990 (p. 205-206). Shortly thereafter, the different militias, anxious to be attacked by the Syrians, retreated to their traditional bases outside Beirut (p. 207). The fact that many Palestinians, as well as members of Amal and Hezbollah returned home (to the south), alarmed the Israeli’s, who started another round of bombings on southern Lebanon (p. 207). After the Accords, both the PLO and Hezbollah kept their weapons, assuring the cabinet that they merely needed these arms in case of an Israeli attack (p. 210). The Civil War was now finally over. In the summer of 1991 amnesty was bestowed to almost all parties who had participated in war crimes (p. 213). The result of the fifteen-year bloody civil war was the death of at least 144 000 people, many more injured and more than 17 000 people missing (Ghosn & Khoury, 2011).

1.2 1990-2006

In the years after the civil war, hostilities between Lebanon and Israel continued (El-Khoury, 2019). Between the mid 1980’s and 2000 around 4000 Katyusha rockets were fired from Lebanese soil onto Israel (Luft, 2000: 14). However, the security zone prevented Hezbollah from firing rockets from its most efficient spots, reducing the negative impact the rockets could have in Israel (Dassa Kaye, 2002/2003). Israel did not refrain from retaliation attacks, which in April 1996 resulted in a strike, killing 106 civilians who were hiding in a UN compound in Qana (El-Khoury, 2019). After the civil war, the Israeli security zone in southern Lebanon remained, as the widespread consensus was that UNIFIL was not up to the job of preventing the attacks (Dassa Kaye, 2002-03). Israel finally withdrew from the security zone in Lebanon in May 2000, after Barak became the newly elected prime minister of Israel

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(Norton, 2000). At this time the Blue Line was created, behind which Israel should retreat (O’Shea, 2004). It was more or less quiet in Lebanon until 2005. On February 14, Prime Minister Hariri was killed when a suicide bomber detonated his bomb in a car when Hariri’s convoy passed (Harel & Issacharoff, 2008). The Lebanese immediately pointed their fingers to Syria and shortly after the attack the Lebanese united in what became known as the Cedar Revolution, demanding the withdrawal of the remaining Syrian soldiers in Lebanon (Harel & Issacharoff, 2008). Two weeks later the pro-Syrian government resigned and around two months later, the last Syrian forces left Lebanon (Harel & Issacharoff, 2008).

1.3 2006 war

This section is based on the 2008 book 34 Days: Israel, Hezbollah, and the War in Lebanon by Harel and Issacharoff.

The July war in 2006 started with the attack on an Israeli border patrol and the abduction of two Israeli soldiers (Harel & Issacharoff, 2008; Henriksen, 2012; Mousavi, 2015). The Israeli army was quick to respond, and launched a retaliation attack on Hezbollah strongholds within two hours from the abduction (p. 12). Hezbollah made clear that they were not aiming to deteriorate the situation, but the Israeli’s were already planning an offensive and blamed the Lebanese state, of which Hezbollah was part, to have started a war against Israel (p. 76). President Olmert even announced to “put Lebanon back 20 years in time” (McGreal, 2006). Foreign Secretary of the United States, Condoleeza Rice requested that the Israeli army would not attack Lebanese President Siniora and that the Israelis would not attack civilian infrastructure (p. 81). In the weeks that followed, civilian targets were attacked several times (p. 81-82).

On July 12, Israel decided to go to war (p. 86). Israel executed strikes on rocket launchers in civilian areas in the south and in Beirut (p. 92). In return, Hezbollah responded with launching Katyusha rockets at targets in northern Israel (p. 92). More than 15 000 Lebanese civilians tried to flee to Syria, but the crossing was hit by an Israeli airstrike (p. 97). In the first week of the war more than 150 people, mainly civilians, were killed, leaving many more wounded (p. 97). Support for Hezbollah diminished significantly, until the Israeli’s hit the neighbourhood of Dahia, were Hezbollah’s headquarters was situated (p. 101). The strike on Dahia prompted anger by Hezbollah and the group threatened with grandiloquent rhetoric that more attacks could be expected (p. 102).

In the meanwhile, the United Nations was trying to broker a ceasefire and peace agreement, but did not succeed to make much progress as mostly Israel refused to agree on

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certain points, such as the transfer of the Sha’aba Farms to UN control (p. 11). In the second week of the war the death toll has risen to 240 (p. 117). The south was most heavily attacked by the Israelis, causing the destruction of thousands of homes (ICRC, 2006). According to Harel & Issacharoff (2008; 117), some of the villages in the south “looked like they were struck by an earthquake”. The Lebanese authorities estimated that the Israeli airstrikes had resulted in 500 000 people fleeing their homes (p. 117). The people who stayed in their villages and towns had to deal with a lack of water, gas and food (ICRC, 2006). According to Haydar (80), one of my respondents, “the only movement on the streets was journalists, the

Red Cross, and militants”.

An Israeli ground raid started on July 17 (p. 122). On July the 27th, Hezbollah eventually agreed on the seven-point plan, proposed by President Siniora, as they feared Israeli attacks could worsen if President Siniora decided to resign after another defeat (p. 157). Bombings on both sides continued however. One of these attacks, on a house in Qana on the 23rd of July, resulted in the killing of almost 60 civilians, of which 21 were children (p. 159). This atrocity prompted strong reactions from the international community, and the prospect of a peace agreement was immediately gone (p. 162, 165). On August 7, Siniora realized to find support from all fronts to deploy the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in south Lebanon (p. 182). The first draft version of a peace agreement, written by France and the US, was not accepted by Israel, who did not see any of their wishes translated in the document (p. 207). President Olmert gave green light for a big operation that had to be concluded before a renewed ceasefire would start (p. 206). A reason for Israel to proceed with the attack was that they were not sure if Lebanon would eventually agree with the ceasefire (p. 217). However, even with the part about the Sha’aba Farms removed, Lebanon still accepted the resolution that would end the war (p. 216). The Security Council voted for the resolution around eight o’ clock on Friday evening August 11 (p. 218). Resolution 1701 was adopted with all votes in favour (p. 218). On Saturday evening, August 12, Lebanon agreed on the ceasefire, and on Sunday morning Israel followed and retreated its forces (p. 235, 236).

Shortly after the agreement, displaced people from the south returned to their demolished homes. In total around 1100 people (one third of them children) lost their lives in that month of fighting (p. 249). More than 3500 people were wounded, and more than 100 000 homes were partly or completely destroyed (p. 249). The estimation is that around a million people were forced to flee their homes (p. 249).

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1.4 Current Situation

The recent situation is mainly influenced by Hezbollah - Israel relations, especially in the south. According to Harel & Issacharoff (2008) the horrendous escalation of the July 2006 war shocked all parties to the conflict. The authors also wonder whether the war in Lebanon made the conditions for a new war more likely. In the years after the conclusion of the July 2006 war, the relations between Lebanon and Israel remained hostile. In the past decade Hezbollah has repeatedly used threatening language directed at Israel. In a speech in 2016 Nasrallah spoke about a chemical plant in Haifa as a hypothetical target, and mentioned Hezbollah’s capacity and willingness to strike hard, in case Israel would attack Lebanon once again (Tahhan, 2017). In September 2017 Israel launched a military exercise close to the border with Lebanon, after accusations that UNIFIL in southern Lebanon would not act adequately enough to stop a Hezbollah build-up of arms (Tahhan, 2017). Accusations and threats were issued on both sides. In October 2018, Israel accused Hezbollah of hiding missile stations in Beirut (UNSC Report, 2018), and in April 2019 they sent a sharp message to the Lebanese government, through US Secretary of State Pompeo, to stop the construction of a plant for developing precision rockets (Times of Israel, 2019). In January 2019, Al Manar, a Hezbollah affiliated news station, accused Israel of provocative building activities alongside the border (2019). The Lebanese government even filed a complaint in the UN Security Council, stating that with these activities Israel is violating the 1701 Resolution (Middle East Monitor, 2019). Also recently, in December 2018, Israel launched an operation to destroy six tunnels from Lebanon to Israel, which were supposedly dug by Hezbollah to transport fighters and arms in case a new conflict would emerge (Al-Jazeera, 2018). The UN condemned the existence of the tunnels and called them a violation of the 2006 agreement (UNIFIL, 2018). Further, Trumps recent move to recognize Israeli control over the Golan Heights, seized from Syria in 1967, is worrisome for the fate of the Sha’aba Farms, which was occupied by Israel in 1967 as well (Daily Mail, 2019).

In addition, Hezbollah’s capacity has increased since they started to be involved in the Syrian war, worrying Israel and putting them on high alert. This process shows a typical demonstration of the security dilemma (Foreign Policy, 2019).

I added this chapter to my research to indicate the state of protracted conflict in Lebanon from a historic and a more recent perspective. First of all, this summary of events demonstrates the complexity of the civil war. The fact that the Lebanese fought the Lebanese, that alliances could change per day and that people could never feel safe or trust one another, made this

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conflict highly unpredictable and uncertain; crippling the society’s social and cultural foundations for many years to come, as will be clear from next chapters.

Further, the 2006 war divided the country even more along, basically, pro- and anti-Hezbollah groups. anti-Hezbollah emerged in the early 1980’s in opposition to the Israeli invasion. Iran played a major role in the emergence and development of Hezbollah, and aided the organisation with money for weapons and social services (Levitt, 2019). Throughout the years Hezbollah’s popularity has risen and fallen (Porter, 2018). Some parties would love to see Hezbollah disarm, however, Hezbollah has always said it is the only group in Lebanon able to resist and oppose Israeli future attacks (Norton, 2007). Besides, the party remains very popular in south Lebanon, where it provides its followers with social services and security (Haddad, 2006; 24). This is also the feeling I obtained from a significant part of my respondents. Especially the two young people I interviewed were openly very happy with Hezbollah’s presence in (south) Lebanon. Most of the older generations were more hesitant in expressing their views. In recent years, Hezbollah’s developed into a more legitimate political actor, something to keep into account when reading this research paper.

In addition, the amnesty law that exculpates war criminals from their deeds, and the fact that some of the leading figures in the civil war are important political figures now, stirs a debate about justice, which I will return to in chapter three.

A last important element of this summary of events is the displaying of the constant threat that the Lebanese civilians are subject to. The last section of this chapter specifically demonstrates the threatening rhetoric and actions that are issued by both Lebanon (Hezbollah) and Israel.

In the next chapters I will process my findings on wellbeing in south Lebanon, taking into account this context of protracted violent.

Chapter 2 Fear and Trauma

While chapter one provides a more descriptive outlook on the past wars in Lebanon, the first section of chapter two will provide an overview of my respondent’s memories about the violence that they have endured in the past. This section offers a contextual, but personal background for the next sections, in which I will elaborate more on the effects that the wars and past violence, discussed in chapter one, still have on people in south Lebanon. As the 2006 war is most fresh, most people spoke to me with this war in their mind. According to

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Khoury (2019), the 2006 war will serve as the new point of reference in relation to trauma and wellbeing for many people in the south. However, there were respondents that talked about the civil war as well.

2.1 Personal side of war

2.1.1 Destruction

When the 2006 war ended, people returned to their demolished houses and lands. Sadiq, a 64-year-old man who now holds an important political position in the parliament as a deputy for the Amal Movement, told me about what he encountered when he returned to his village near the border with Israel:

“When we returned to the village, more than 70% of the buildings were destroyed or vanished. My village is a small village. At that time, my village was maybe five to six thousand people. But if you talk about bigger villages or towns such as Bint Jbeil or even the Christian villages or Marjayoun, you feel that the destruction of the buildings is so huge. Millions of houses were destroyed in 2006” (Sadiq, 64).

Some of my respondents came very close to being killed in a bomb attack on their houses in 2006. Menna, a 52-years-old lady from Sidon told me that she had to leave behind all her possessions, even her identification card and her money. The only thing she took when her family fled was the clothes she was wearing. Zahra (20), another girl who was forced to flee her house, came back two weeks later, only to witness that the whole building had vanished. Aliya’s 25-years-old son left his house just before it was completely destroyed by two rockets:

“We were shocked. We were just getting some food from out of the house, and here is our house and here is the building (points), and Israel put two rockets… the building, about six or seven floors, has been destroyed. We were wounded so badly… everyone.”

2.1.2 Fear

The civil war and the 2006 war brought destruction and chaos to Lebanon. I could see despair and grief in the eyes of most of my older respondents when I asked about the wars. Two of them asked for a short break and cried when their memories became too much. Different

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people told me about the dead bodies that were piled up alongside the roads, and the empty streets in their towns, where every movement would be encountered by a gunshot. Danny, a man in his 60’s who had been fighting for the Shia cause in the civil war told me:

“I was a soldier (shows wounds of injuries he got during the war). I was a leader. The hardest thing wasn’t the war, the hardest part was seeing people carrying their children, and running down the streets, having no home, no place to go... That is something that makes me cry. I saw Israel killing small children, and these small children were shaking their mother, but she was dead. And a small girl, telling her father that she is having something that hurts her, but her father is already dead. This makes you feel sad. And the war, it is ok. I know myself that I may die or not. I was well trained to fight, but normal people weren’t. I am sad about normal people. I gave myself to the country; it didn’t matter if I died” (Danny, 60’s).

Most of my respondents indicated that they experienced high levels of fear and anxiety during the past wars. Aliya, a 52-years-old-woman said she cried all the time, while Maryam (49) said she lost 7 kilo’s because of the stress. In addition, Mohsin (48) became very sensitive of noise. Although there was not much direct fighting in Tyre, Israeli helicopters firing rockets to adversary troops on nearby hills were positioned above the old centre of Tyre, the area where I conducted most of my interviews.

“For the first twelve or fourteen days I was here in this neighbourhood. For the first time there was nothing going on were we lived, but around us we could see the rockets from airplanes from both sides. The helicopter was above us; we could see it. And it opened fire to the mountains. And this time, we stayed for two or four mornings to watch what happened. Suddenly, I saw nobody in the streets. Our area was being evacuated. We started to feel fear and we started to feel that something dangerous was coming. One day, they did a ceasefire, and we fled to Jbeil. It was too dangerous to do it without ceasefire […] The holes from the rockets were very big, like the diameter of the street. We put a white flag on top of the cars: to not be bombarded. They told us that we should put this flag. People were so afraid while they were being evacuated, but I was not. In Marjayoun they bombarded a convoy of evacuating cars. I believe that destiny will play its role, without any interference. If we are going to die, we will die” (Tony, 37).