“I can’t believe what you say because I see what you do” : a study of Israeli anti-occupation activists’ experiences and perspectives on the border

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The separation barrier in Bethlehem - © Joppe Gelderloos

“I can’t believe what you say because I

see what you do”

A study of Israeli anti-occupation activists’ experiences and perspectives on the border

Joppe Gelderloos Master thesis Political Science - International Relations Supervisor: Darshan Vigneswaran Second grader: Dimitris Bouris RP: Who belongs where and why? February-July 2019 Word count excluding references: 23325

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Abstract

This research aims to contribute to the understanding of processes of creating borders by analysing the motivations of activists that contest the borders established by their own state. A framework is developed for understanding border contestation by members of the population that enforces the border, and its appropriateness is assessed in the context of the occupied West Bank. This proposed framework combines the perceived appropriateness of the means with which a border is managed, and the way in which activists identify with the population that is primarily affected by the border. Added to these known factors is the extent to which people perceive of bordering practices as having the effect of containing, rather than excluding the target population. Aspects of militant

ethnographic research were employed to explore the applicability of the proposed framework during three weeks of field research in May 2019. It was found that most existing biographical explanations of anti-bordering activism in the Israeli context remain relevant. The relevance of the framework combining the concepts of identification, appropriateness of means, and containment was found to hinge on the visibility of bordering practices and their effects. The exclusion/containment dichotomy was found to be a promising, yet inconclusive factor to consider in further research aimed at

understanding border contestation by members of the bordering population in a context of sedentarization.

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Foreword

I took the picture on the cover of this report in Bethlehem. For three weeks, I conducted fieldwork in Israel. My research engaged with the perspectives on Israeli bordering practices that drive Israelis to mobilise in contesting these bordering practices. During this time I have had the opportunity to join Israeli activists on various occasions. The activities I joined ranged from early morning outings to protect Palestinian shepherds from harassment by Israeli settlers, to touring through Hebron to show the Eurovision crowd the face of Israel that is easy to miss in bustling Tel Aviv. Activities like these brought me to places in Israel and the West Bank I would have never thought of going without joining activists. Many West Bank areas however, including Bethlehem, are off limits to Israelis – which obviously includes Israeli activists. In the last week of fieldwork I found time to go to Bethlehem. I hoped to get a feel for everyday life under occupation. I wanted to see what the wall does.

And on this wall, the wall that was a core reason for undertaking the journey to Israel in the first place, I found the most profound personal lessons of this research unintentionally summarized on 4 square metres of vertical concrete. The graffiti – “I can’t believe what you say because I see what you do” – eloquently captures Israeli activists’ perspective on the very wall this graffiti is written on. The people I spoke to do not believe the occupation is there to protect them – because they see what it does. Israelis that see what the wall does, and choose not to look away, find themselves forced to navigate the crossfire of aggressive marginalization from broader Israeli society and precarious cooperation with Palestinians. Their work is often received with great gratitude by Palestinians, sometimes with indifference or frustration, and many Palestinians fear repercussions by the Israeli army or settlers for being helped by Israeli “traitors”. This is part of the sad reality of the occupation.

And within all this, there is Alad. A taxi driver catering to tourists. Just below the lines that to me capture Israeli activists’ perspective on the wall, written on the wall, he has cleverly occupied a few square metres as advertising space. His words are an act of resilience, defiance, defeat - or simply an ad. Amidst hate, geopolitical struggle, evictions, activism and stone-throwing – everyday life goes on. My deep, sincere gratitude goes out to all the people in Israel and Palestine that reached out their hands to help me in this research, many of whom I can’t name even here. I am extremely grateful for the willingness expressed by activists to let me join their actions, and most of all for the openness demonstrated by all in sharing their perspectives and experiences.

I want to thank Darshan Vigneswaran for trying to steer me clear of complexity before it inevitably came. I thank Ryan for showing me the best hummus in the West bank, Robbie for being a cheerful counter-perspective in this schizophrenic country, and Anouk, for her attempt to meet me at Schiphol airport in the middle of the night while adorably tipsy, and all the other big and little things she does. This leaves one more thing at the table for now. The Israeli-Palestinian situation is too complex for me to side with the boycott, divestment, and sanctions movement without further explanation. I do want to use this space, however, to implore anyone considering a visit to Israel to also spend time in the occupied territories. Israel as a country has two faces, and it is important to see how the wealth, fun, and perceived security you find in Israel’s hotspots obscures the oppression of people hardly ever given second thought by tourists. Enjoy everything Israel has to offer – but realize that someone, somewhere, is paying a different price than you for being where, and who they are.

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1. Introduction

Borders are places of hurting, suffering, killing and dying. They legitimize certain forms of aggression, based on historically contingent distributions of populations and ideas held by populations

concerning these distributions (Paasi, 2012). This research aims to explore challenges to the assumed legitimacy of borders through examining public contestation of bordering practice by members of the bordering population. Bordering practices are provisionally defined as acts by or on behalf of states to bring about a distribution of populations in space.

The study focuses on Israeli activists’ motivations towards engaging in conduct that visibly challenges the border. The Israeli context is chosen as the context for this research because because of

compelling indications that the Israeli/Palestinian border is designed in a way, and has effects, that do not conform to the arguments used to legitimize it (Blank, 2011; Weizman, 2012). I argue that this friction is increasingly relevant in all countries that enforce borders, and that it is hitherto

insufficiently recognized in research that focuses on borders. This research explores the role of this tension in the mobilization of Israeli activism that contests Israeli policy and practices in and around the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT). The great pervasiveness of bordering practices (Gordon, 2008) and dissent (Pallister-Wilkins, 2011) in this setting make the OPT a viable context for

determining dynamics that can later be explored in different contexts. Ultimately, I aim to assess the usefulness of the concept of “containment” in asking questions about the legitimacy of bordering practices. The central question in this research is How does the perception of bordering as

containment, rather than exclusion, feed in to Israeli anti-occupation activism?

The following sections position this research in the rapidly developing field of border studies, building towards a framework highlighting the friction between the exclusionary legitimation and containing impacts of borders. This framework is subsequently applied in an analysis of Israeli anti-West Bank occupation activism, probing its viability towards explaining the ways in which borders are

challenged by members of the population that create them.

2. Literature review

Borders: from simple lines to complex practice

Engaging with the dynamics around borders is both informed by and requires an assessment of the current understanding of borders in the literature. The literature on borders has undergone far-reaching changes in recent years. The traditional statist assumption on borders as being the lines that demarcate state sovereignty has become challenged in what has been termed “the practice turn” (Côté-Boucher, Infantino, & Salter, 2014). This practice turn has been catalysed by processes associated with globalization. Increased international mobility and interaction have reduced the significance of the border as a definitive boundary, and reified borders as processes applied to people, goods, information, and financial flows, determining whether their or its mobility is

authorized or not (Rumford, 2006; Scott, 2012). The resulting conception of borders on which current bordering research is based can be summarised as follows: “Borders do not simply ‘exist’ as lines on maps, but are continually performed into being” (Parker & Vaughan-Williams, 2012, p. 729). This insight has spurred research that aims to categorize and understand the ways in which borders are practiced. This developing literature has yielded renewed insights into the means and meaning of separating populations.

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6 Bordering practice has in recent years become increasingly defined by the dual funtion of enabling and limiting mobility (Pickering & Weber, 2006). Many borders are in fact no boundaries at all to people or things that are authorized to cross them. Whether a border compromises a boundary or not can only be judged in reference to a specific population that aims to be mobile (Rumford, 2006; Scott & van Houtum, 2009). This implies that bordering practices are always, either deliberately or accidentally, directed against more or less specific populations.

I draw on these developments and characteristics to define bordering practices as all actions by or on behalf of states that bring about a certain distribution of populations. This includes but is not limited to wall building, visa and passport regulations, rejection and deportation of immigrants,

imprisonment, and institutional racism. These actions may be directed against populations as specific as a single individual, or as broad as everyone except one individual. Most relevant to this research are bordering practices in the context of national borders, in which most populations that bordering practices are directed against are defined by citizenship or the lack thereof. Bordering practices that relate to national borders will be from here on simply be called “bordering practices”, unless discussed in conjunction with different contexts of bordering.

The processes that compromise what borders are take place in definite spaces. The concept of the borderscape is a relatively novel addition to the bordering literature lexicon, and is generally used to describe the spatial impacts and context of bordering practices (Brambilla, 2015; Dell'Agnese & Amilhat Szary, 2015). Despite bordering practices leaving physical and non-physical traces (Salter, 2012), I argue that the concept of the borderscape should not be understood as merely the spatial manifestations and traces of bordering practice. I rather follow the definition of borderscaping as a verb: “borderscaping entails practices through which the imagined border is established and experienced as real” (Strüver, 2005). This understanding is more dynamic than the former, allowing us to engage with the ways in which people tasked with establishing and maintaining borders mitigate challenges to their actions posed by terrain, by inhabitation, and by actions of populations that object bordering practices.

Importantly, research into bordering focuses increasingly on spaces other than the topographical, with contributions highlighting electronic bordering practices (Amoore, 2006; Scheel, 2013), and the importance of the actions of people that are tasked with practicing the border (Lahav & Guiraudon, 2006). Individuals employed in bordering practice are found to be crucial in producing borders by utilising their discretionary power: the ability to interpret, bend, enforce or ignore regulations determined in policy (Côté-Boucher, 2015). These research areas are exemplary for the interpretive shift in border studies, which can be understood as a shift from an absolutist, realist IR understanding of borders towards a anthropologic approach, recognizing the importance of discursive and

procedural norms (Côté-Boucher, Infantino, & Salter, 2014; Parker & Vaughan-Williams, 2009). These developments in border studies reflect significant developments in what bordering practices look like, and where they take place. Separating populations increasingly takes place far beyond the geospatial borders of the state, but simultaneously, proliferates in areas well inside nation-states’ territories (Popescu, 2011; Balibar , 2009; Mountz & Hiemstra, 2014; Mountz, 2015). In this context, the concept of deterritorialization is used to describe that bordering practices are

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7 increasingly found to take place in locations other than the geospatial territorial limits they are commonly associated with (Popescu, 2011).

Deterritorialization, however, deserves further attention. Developments in bordering practice, such as far-reaching digitalization, and the intrusion of bordering practices into the physical, personal sphere (Amoore, 2006; Scheel, 2013) illustrate how bordering is, in essence, not about separating territory, but about separating people. I argue that a portion of the bordering as practice literature has a tendency to overestimate the impact of the changes in bordering practice brought about by globalization, digitalization, and the end of the cold war. Yes: what bordering looks like, and where it happens has changed. What bordering is – separating populations – remains the same. This makes concept of deterritorialization somewhat misleading, because deterritorialization implies a

decreasing significance of the concept of territory (Elden, 2005).

This may be problematic, because while it is true that borders are increasingly performed at great distance from territorial boundaries, bordering as a process still carries a legitimacy that is connected to the territorial nation-state norm. This legitimacy is connected to the concept of sovereignty, revolving around the assumption that states have the right to dispose of the polities contained by their boundaries (Biersteker & Weber, 1996). The current development of the places in which and ways through which this demarcation of polities is executed “move” or “become detached” may be understood to not deterritorialize the border – it merely transports its territoriality to a different place. To clarify, the fact that bordering happens in different places than before would only constitute a fundamental change in what bordering practices are, if reasoning from the starting assumption that bordering is “the things that happen at borders”. This assumption obscures what bordering is, similar to how defining football as “the things that happen on a football field” fails to capture what football is.

In other words: Bordering practice always takes place somewhere. The fact it increasingly takes place in locations that are away from the proverbial “lines in the sand” does not alter the dynamic that populations are separated in reference to some form of territorial legitimacy. Drawing on this consideration, I identify a tension in the bordering as practice literature that reflects this

overenthusiastic use of the word “deterritorialization”. This tension is materializes in the tendency of current bordering research to ask critical questions on the where, how, and why of bordering

practices, while remaining implicitly tied to the territorial norm in defining what legitimate bordering practices are. This is reflected in the objects of study in bordering research. Bordering research generally focuses on the state and its actors in studying bordering processes. Key research areas are the actions of bordering personnel (Côté-Boucher, 2015; Ellermann, 2006; Salter, 2008); policy implementation (Lahav & Guiraudon, 2006); visa schemes and deportation (Aas, 2013); barrier-construction (Jones & Johnson, 2016; Pallister-Wilkins, 2016); new technologies and practices employed in border controls (Bourne, Johnson, & Lisle, 2015; Adey, 2009); and new modes for the management of borders (Johnson, et al., 2011).

It is undeniably important to ask critical questions about developments in these areas. However, this line of research may inadvertently contribute to the legitimation of separating populations as a course of action. I argue that focusing on exposing the complications in the legitimation of bordering practices that are not visibly bound to the territorial boundaries of states, arguably distracts from

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8 engaging with the precarious legitimacy of bordering practices that remain spatially bound to these boundaries.

This subtle, but sincere critique on a portion of the bordering literature draws on Abizadeh’s more fundamental critique (2008) on the existing assumptions concerning the legitimation of bordering. Abizadeh argues that the people that are the basis for democratic sovereignty are in principle

unbound, and that therefore, bordering practices should be legitimized to foreign nationals as well as to citizens of the bordering state. Whereas his most radical and influential contribution is the idea of legitimizing a border towards outsiders, this current research is inspired by this other population that is implied to have an impact on the legitimacy of bordering practices: the domestic public. There exists a certain assumption of homogeneity in this domestic polity that is contained by the territorial boundaries that legitimize bordering practices (Hajer, 2003). I argue that this assumption is false, but that it contributes significantly to the territorial legitimation of borders. This study aims to contribute to a critical perspective on the concept of bordering by assessing the relevant dynamics in a situation where this assumption of homogeneity is challenged. Therefore, this study will focus on citizens that criticize the bordering practices pursued by their national states.

Summarizing this literature review, the static interpretation of borders as demarcations of space has yielded to more dynamic interpretations of bordering as a process of separating population,

following developments in the The research that followed this change in perspective has built to profound analyses and criticism of the legitimacy of bordering in the new forms and spaces it occurs in. I have identified that these lines of criticism may distract from critically examining the territorial assumption of legitimacy that bordering practices carry. I identified challenges to the legitimacy of borders from within the populations that produce them to be a promising in the sense that understanding this may contribute to exploring the limits of the statist legitimation of territorial bordering. The following theoretic framework identifies and connects concepts that may help us understand why people engage in border contestation.

3. Theoretic framework – the perception of legitimacy

It is a fairly straightforward assumption that a population that bordering practices are directed against will experience some degree of dissent with bordering practice. If this were not the case, the bordering practice(s) that the bordered population opposes would not have been necessary in the first place. However, dissent cannot be assumed to automatically result in actively contesting the border. Contesting borders by a bordered population happens when people refuse to be subjected to certain bordering practices and act upon this refusal. This may be an immediate act of

non-compliance when confronted with bordering practices. However, border contestation more often follows prolonged or repeated exposure to bordering practice (Bhagwati, 2003). This is because there are costs, or risks involved in contesting the border. These may amount to having to leave behind loved ones, illegality when opting for illicit migration, or putting oneself in harm’s way when

engaging in visible protest. Additionally, besides costs and risks involved, bordered populations may be disciplined into conforming to bordering practice (Walters, 2006). It may take prolonged or repeated exposure to bordering practice before an individual decides to contest the border, and it may even be informed by learning about other people’s experiences with bordering practice (Calavita, 2006). Contesting the border occurs in many forms, ranging from illegal migration (De Genova, Mezzadra, & Pickles, 2015), to street protests, painting slogans on walls and sit-ins (Pallister-Wilkins, 2011), self-immolation, and suicide attacks on border personnel (Murray Yang, 2011)

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9 Bordering practices have no direct material or physical impact on people that contest the borders that are produced by their own state. This is the basis for the research assumption that people that choose to challenge bordering practices pursued by their own states to so because they experience the bordering practices they mobilise against to be illegitimate. Why then, may people come to think that bordering practices are illegitimate? To explore which factors are relevant in this, it makes sense to define a bottom line in which bordering is warranted. This brings us to discussing the initial purpose of borders.

3.1 Belonging

There is more to a border than its conceptual definition as the site of bordering practice. Borders fulfil a function towards societies. Bordering may be understood to serve a dual purpose: to respond to challenges to a spatial sense of belonging held by a given population, and to build cohesion within this population. In the words of can Houtum and Lagendijk: “Bordering rejects as well as erects othering” (2001). Through bordering practices, spatial identities are constructed and projected upon space and identity (van Houtum & van Naerssen, 2002). Borders thus exist in the minds of people that create, and the people that are subject to them. They are informed by clashing senses of belonging, yet in turn sculpt the sense of belonging of bordered and bordering populations by the boundaries placed upon them (Paasi, 2012).

The concept of belonging here captures the notion of preferring to be in one space over another, associated with feelings of security and groundedness (Skey, 2013). Space, in this research project, is primarily understood as physical space, but may also refer to social and/or economic space. Where and how people feel they belong relates strongly to identity (Yuval-Davis & Stoetzler, 2002). Identities can be understood as narratives that are used to define who and what people are to themselves and to others. Who people think they are not is an extremely relevant component of identity, often rooted in a prototypical definition of the identity of a different population (Yuval-Davis, 2006; Hogg & Turner, 1987). Despite identity linking to individual characteristics as well as to collective ones, the individual characteristics relevant to bordering practice as defined in this study will generally relate to self-definitions as part of a collective. In the national contexts relevant to bordering practice, this means that that national identities may inform positive individual self-conceptualizations that are rooted in collective identities. These collective identities are to some extend defined in contrast with constructions of relevant out-groups (Yuval-Davis & Stoetzler, 2002). Borders and boundaries can then be understood to define the space in which members of a given population experience their identities to belong, and establishing this space implies excluding the people that are experienced to be non-members of the constituent identity group (Yuval-Davis, 2006). Ideas about who belongs where, and why, prescribe the location and targets of bordering practices. In the context of bordering practice as conceptualized in this research, nationality and ethnicity are the most important categories towards determining which populations may belong where. However, this is always inextricably tied to assumptions and attitudes towards ethnicity, religion, relative wealth, etc. that inform the ideas about which populations bordering practice should be directed against (McNevin, 2006).

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10 I argue that one reasons for perceiving bordering practices to be illegitimate, in turn contributing to informing the contestation of borders, is when bordering practices are not perceived to be directed against the right population, or not performed in the right place. This has been visible in Dutch society recently. Public outcry over the projected deportation of two Armenian children materialized in a broadly carried petition, resulting in an amnesty arrangement for children of refugees without residence permit in the Netherlands that have lived in the Netherlands for at least five years (HP De Tijd, 2018). The rationale here is that when bordering practice does not represent ideas members of a bordering population have about who belongs where and why, public dissent may follow.

3.2 Appropriateness off the means bordering practice

A different aspect of the legitimacy of bordering practice relates to basic ethical considerations concerning violence. Bordering intrinsically implies violence, because limiting peoples’ mobility entails forcing them to be in places they do not want to be in. This violence takes many forms: physical and verbal, directed and systemic (Jones, 2016). The means employed in bordering practice thus inherently cause harm, which may cause objection to the means of bordering practice. When the actions and tools involved in separating populations are perceived as excessive, either principally, or towards the goal that is pursued through them, this may inform a perception of bordering practice as illegitimate (Ron, 1997; Jackson, Huq, Bradford, & Tyler, 2013). This aspect of legitimacy may result in contestation of bordering practices by members of the bordering population. Examples of this include the emergence of European activist movements that protest against the criminalization of rescue efforts in the Mediterranean (Fekete, 2018), and public indignation in Israel over the extrajudicial killing of an incapacitated Palestinian attacker by an Israeli soldier in Hebron (Haaretz, 2017).

3.3 Exclusion and containment

As identified in the literature review, a core premise of sovereignty is the notion that states have jurisdiction, or right of disposal over the population that constitutes the polity contained by the borders it practices (Biersteker & Weber, 1996). This informs the right of states to refuse certain populations to entry their territory (Parker & Adler-Nissen, 2012). However, while bordering is legitimized as excluding populations from spaces, bordering practices may have different effects than just excluding. However, if the effect of a border is not necessarily refusing entry into territory the state has sovereignty over, but containing a population in an area the state has no (recognized) sovereignty over, this does not sit well with the assumption of legitimacy that is rooted in the territorial norm. I argue that this tension corresponds with a visceral public sense of unease with carceral forms of population control that is identified in the bordering literature (Mountz, 2015).

Exclusion

Bordering as exclusion in its simplest terms would mean a population denying a different population access to a specific area, with both population and area being defined broadly. Most types of at-face exclusionary bordering practices commonly researched in the current bordering literature are practices by states aimed at preventing inbound mobility. For example, the construction of physical boundaries, i.e. walls, is concerned with limiting inbound mobility very concretely. However,

exclusionary bordering practice also occurs through visa regimes, work permits, or limiting the ability for foreigners to buy a house and send their children to school.

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Containment

However, bordering practice may also limit outbound mobility. This entails limiting a population to leave a certain space. I argue that many instances of bordering practice that are assumed to be exclusionary in nature, in effect amount to bordering as containment. The basic motivation for containing populations, is, in many ways, the same as towards bordering as exclusion. Like bordering as exclusion, bordering as containment is concerned with limiting the fulfilment, through mobility, of the sense of belonging of a population (sometimes as specific as certain individuals). Drawing on the purpose of borders as responding to a sense of belonging identified earlier, this is done because the influx of this population is experienced to threaten the sense of belonging of the population engaging in bordering practice. Importantly, one can argue that in many instances of bordering practice as containment, the belonging that the bordering practice aims to prohibit being fulfilled, is brought about by the practice of bordering itself: prisoners, for example, only experience a strong desire to be “out” because of the fact they are “in”.

3.4 Sedentarization

The distinction between exclusionary bordering practices and bordering practices that amount to containment strongly connects to the concept of sedentarization. Sedentarization implies a process in which the mobility of a population is limited, forcing or enticing members of this population to stay where they are. Recent contributions call for research into the so-called distributive regime: A

constellation of (implicit) convictions, norms, and practices that inform policymakers and policy-executors globally to sculpt their actions in accordance with a global narrative concerning a “desired” distribution of populations (Punter, van der Veen, van Wingerden, & Vigneswaran, 2019).

Herein, a notion of what I describe as “cumulative bordering” helps to explain the way in which in the context of sedentarization, exclusionary bordering practice and bordering as containment are only different because of their impact on the targeted population, and not because of a type of action pursued. A population being denied access to one country can be seen as an instance of exclusionary bordering practice. However, when all countries except one’s country of origin deny access, the very same actions by bordering personnel, and the very same policies pursued by individual countries have a profoundly different impact. Instead of being denied the right to move towards a specific place, all mobility for certain populations from a specific place, is made impossible.

Additionally, we should note that the bordering processes that impact mobility are not

fundamentally different from the bordering processes that impact settlement. This idea is based in the plain consideration that to dwell somewhere, one should have the ability to go to this particular place. Inversely, not being allowed to move in a particular location makes it hard, or impossible to live there (Punter, van der Veen, van Wingerden, & Vigneswaran, 2019). An important consideration here is that for populations already sedentarized through bordering practices, measures that limit their ability to dwell in the areas these populations are contained in are very problematic. This is especially relevant towards the context in which this study takes place, which will be further explored in the section 4.1.

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3.5 Combined framework

The following Venn-diagram visualizes the relationship between the aspects of the perception of bordering practice as legitimate that are discussed in this theoretic framework. There is a certain overlap between the various concepts. Note that the different aspects of the perception of

legitimation may very well influence one another. An example of this would be citizens of country A to feel the means employed in keeping population B out of their country are excessive, which may cause them to identify with the population B, consequently affecting their ideas about whether they feel population B should be excluded in the first place. Note that this framework is not meant as a guide to assessing the legitimacy of bordering practices; it is a heuristic to aid in asking questions that allow for ultimately zooming in on the exclusion versus containment aspect of the perception of legitimacy.

If the exclusion versus containment aspect of the interpretation of legitimacy appears to be a relevant factor in determining the interpretation of the legitimacy of bordering practice by members of the bordering population, this could influence the way we perceive of all borders when seen in the context of sedentarization. This would imply that if a sedentarizing regime were to exist (Punter, van der Veen, van Wingerden, & Vigneswaran, 2019), or rather, if popular awareness of this regime were to increase, the assumed legitimacy of exclusionary bordering practices by all states would be undermined.

To summarize this theoretic framework: We know people tend to care if other populations suffer unduly through bordering practice. We also know that people tend not to like it when bordering practice excludes people they identify with from accessing certain spaces. What we know little about, is whether public realization that bordering might be more about keeping people where they are, than about keeping people anywhere but in a given territory, may influence public perception of the border as legitimate or not. If this appears to be a crucial factor in the perception of bordering practice as legitimate, or even, as a crucial factor in mobilizing dissent into protest, this insight could be transported to researching the assumptions concerning legitimacy among other populations than the populations studied in this current research.

Bordering practice reflects sense of belonging Bordering as exclusion, rather than containment Means of bordering practice are acceptable Bordering practice perceived as legitimate

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3.6 Visibility of bordering practice

Crucial public perception of bordering practices is the word perception itself – whether people see bordering and its effects or not. This holds true for all three facets of legitimation of bordering practice that are described in the previous sections. In the context of Australian immigration policy, Mountz (2015) shows that bordering practices simultaneously de-visualize and hyper-visualize different facets of Australian migration issues. Negative phenomena that are associated with migration issues in Australian public discourse are consistently communicated to the public, while simultaneously, the reality of mass detention of immigrants is kept from public view. Mountz argues that this practice can be considered key to the legitimization of securitized Australian migration policy. In the context of this research I expect the (in)visibility of the effects of bordering practice on the Palestinian population to play an instrumental role towards the perception of bordering practice as legitimate. Additionally, I expect activism that contests bordering practice to utilize this dynamic, resulting in forms of protest that visualize bordering violence.

3.7 From dissent to contestation

Border contestation by the bordering population is argued to be connected to the perceived

legitimacy of bordering practices. However, the perception of bordering practices as illegitimate may not automatically translate into border contestation. Just as it does to an external population, contesting the border imposes a certain risk or cost upon a domestic population, only in a different way. At the very least, people expend time, but may be subject to prosecution, or suffer social consequences. Drawing on equity theory (Adams & Freedman, 1976), I argue that there could be a certain threshold in the perception of bordering practice as illegitimate, beyond which people

perceive the possible cost or risk involved with contesting the border less important than acting upon their feelings of dissent. This research aims to explore if this is so, and whether the

exclusion/containment framework could aid our understanding of mobilizing activism. This would be in line with current work on Israeli activist motivations, in which family and professional life are understood to make it impossible to engage in activism.

3 Methods

4.1.1 Case selection

The case selection for this research builds on the tension in bordering practice that is explored in the previous sections. This tension could be summarized as follows: There exists a certain inherent legitimation towards nations denying people access to their territory. This legitimation is based in the principle of state sovereignty. If we, however, see the effects of bordering practice as a state telling members of a different collective identity that they are not to leave a certain area that this first collective identity has no inherent sovereignty over, this conflicts the sovereignty-based legitimation of bordering practices. If this tension is a relevant factor in motivating border contestation by members of a bordering population, this supports my claim that the bordering as practice literature should consider this in criticizing bordering practices.

To find this out, we need a case in which there is demonstrable sedentarization, and in which members of the bordering population contest the practices that cause this. This is why this research focuses on Israeli anti-occupation activism in the West Bank. The Israeli-Palestinian context is

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arguably the most contentious example of sedentarization in recent history. Palestinians are typically extremely limited in their ability to cross the separation barrier, a unilateral measure by Israel that is legitimized as a security response to the second intifada (Gregory, 2003; Sorkin, 2005; Blank, 2011), which has since its inception come under increasing (international) criticism (Bakan & Abu-Laban, 2009; Wedgwood, 2005). Besides the denial of the right to leave the occupied territories into, Palestinians typically do not have internationally recognised travel documents, if any (Gordon, 2008; Perugini & Gordon, 2015; Weizman, 2012).

In addition, the Israeli-Palestinian case speaks back to the identified tension in the bordering

literature, relating to inadvertent legitimation of harmful forms of bordering practice. I argue that by criticizing bordering practices that are spatially visually detached from their territorial origins, this may distract from issues concerning the legitimacy of bordering practices in the first place. In this context, consider that the most tangible of Israel’s bordering practices in the West Bank, the separation wall, has come under significant international critique. This critique often focuses on the location of the West Bank Barrier, as it does not conform to the generally accepted “Green line” in most places. The specific place in which, and form in which this barrier has been erected have become criticized (Barak-Erez, 2006)because these do not contribute to the “official purpose” of the wall, which would be to fulfil Israel’s duty and its right to safeguard security (Weizman, 2012). However, virtually no critiques towards the barrier questioned this motivation, and its associated means of erecting a barrier in the first place. I follow Blank in arguing that in a sense, the focus on the specific iteration of this separation barrier in fact undermines the ability to question the legitimacy of the concept of sovereignty and the barrier in its realized and conceptual entirety (Blank, 2011). Regarding the identification of Israeli activists that contest bordering population as members of the bordering population in this research, I recognize that this identification is contentious. A relevant argument is to be made in stating that if members of a population feel that bordering practices pursued by their country do not represent them, they may not belong to the bordering population at all (Popescu, 2011). I argue that this tension can be resolved by stating that in liberal democracies, all policiy can be argued to represent at least de jure their constituent democratic polities. In other words, members of a bordering population are all people the bordering practice is claimed to represent, either explicitly, or implicitly. This makes all Israeli citizens members of the bordering population in the Israeli/Palestinian context – whether they like it or not.

In theorizing how different facets of the perception of legitimacy of bordering practice may inform border contestation by the bordering population, I consider the Israeli/ Palestinian context to

constitute an extreme case (Gerring, 2006). Containment as a concept is extremely visible and salient in the Israeli-Palestinian context. Additionally, I argue that Israeli/Palestinian context compromises an extreme situation of border contestation from within the bordering population. This is illustrated by the gravity of tactics adopted by Israeli activists. Members of the bordering population commonly to place themselves in harm’s way, using their vulnerability and citizenship as tools in preventing aggression (Pallister-Wilkins, 2011; Gordon & Perugini, 2015). If the proposed building blocks towards theorizing the legitimacy of bordering practice as perceived by the bordering population appear fruitful in explaining activist involvement after exploring them in the Israeli/Palestinian context, steps could be made to transporting them to other contexts.

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4.1.2. The West Bank and Gaza – similar, but different

Processes of separating Palestinians and Israeli can be crudely divided into two distinct geographic areas: The Gaza strip and the West Bank. At the timeslot available for field research, intense violence in and around Gaza make this specific area unsuitable as a research context because of multiple considerations. Firstly, it is reasonable to assume that the dynamics between Israeli activists and bordering practice may be significantly distorted by the rhetoric and logic of armed conflict. While possibly extremely relevant within the focus of this research, I believe investigation in to the effects of current bordering practice towards the perception of legitimacy of it should be pursued after current intense hostilities have ceded. This consideration is based in diversionary war theory, which highlights the mechanism of populations “flocking to the flag” in times of armed conflict (Smith, 1996), blurring enquiry into the perception of legitimacy of bordering practice. A different reason not to engage with Gaza would be an ethical consideration. I consider people engaging with the conflict to have more important things on their mind than talking to an aspiring researcher – more so than in the West Bank. The majority of the few activist initiatives that focus on Gaza are emergency relief efforts, and the urgency of these projects made researcher involvement inappropriate during the data gathering period. Despite not focusing on the Gaza strip with its current and salient hostilities, the possible impact of current conflict in Gaza should be taken into account during data collection nonetheless.

Additionally, unlike the West Bank obstacle, the delimiting line of the Gaza fence was negotiated and agreed upon, as part of the Israeli-Palestinian interim agreement of 1995 (State of Israel, PLO, 1995). This makes the location of the border contentious, rendering less visible the implications of the spatial aspects of its practice towards it being perceived as legitimate. This is not the case for the contested West Bank barrier, which is a unilateral effort by the Israeli state. To complicate the matter, Israel’s official policy standpoint is that the green line is in effect not a border, since territory on both sides of the border should be considered Israeli (Gordon, 2008; Rogers & Ben-David, 2008). A different reason for this research not focusing on the Gaza strip is the fundamental difference in the bordering situation between the West Bank and Gaza. Israeli bordering practices around Gaza amount to a near-complete lockdown, often interpreted to be a siege (Winter, 2016), whereas Israeli bordering practices in and around the West Bank constitute an occupation (Weizman, 2012). This is an important distinction in the context of this research. Israeli activist perceptions of bordering practices in and around the West Bank are more likely to include the notion that Israeli bordering practices may be driven by something else than merely excluding Palestinians from Israel proper. Despite severely limited in their movements, Palestinian labourers that have permits are allowed to cross the barrier. In addition, there are strong religious, electoral, and economic incentives towards protecting Israeli settlements in the West Bank (Gordon & Perugini, 2015; Hever, 2010).

Furthermore, Israelis are able to enter areas in the West bank, as opposed to Gaza, facilitating interaction with Palestinians and thereby influencing the way in which Israelis perceive of “the Palestinian other”. Despite the separation barrier in general contributing to a demonized image of the Palestinian other (Busbridge, 2013), the fact that limited travel is possible is more likely to contribute to activists experiencing a degree of sameness over otherness in reference to West Bank Palestinians, compared to Gazans. This touches upon the concepts of identification and belonging that are explored in the context of the perception of legitimacy in the literature review.

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4.1.3 The occupation: West Bank bordering practices

There is a myriad of processes and practices involved in separating populations in and outside of the West bank. An in-depth description and analysis of what these practices are and how they came to be is beyond the scope of this research. I refer to comprehensive works by Weizman (2012), Shafir (2017) and critical contributions by Gordon and Perugini (separately and jointly) to inform a solid overview of Israeli bordering practices. The overview presented here is a necessarily summary overview of the most important forms of bordering practice in the West Bank, paying special attention to those forms that are opposed by the activists that are included in this research.

- The separation barrier

The most acutely physical representation of Israeli bordering practices is the wall that separates the Palestinian West Bank from Israel proper. Israeli policymakers describe this wall as the “security barrier” or “- fence”. Contestants of the wall tend to refer to the “separation fence” or “apartheid wall” (Rogers & Ben-David, 2010). Construction of this structure started off as a response to intense violence in the second intifada, based on initiatives of opposition labour parties in the Knesset. The right-wing establishment, notably Likud leader Ariel Sharon, did not want to commit to placing a wall because it might become a definitive delimitation of Israeli territory, thwarting expansionist goals (Weizman, 2012). The wall was supposedly constructed on the Green line, the internationally recognized border between Israel and Palestine defined in the 1949 armistice. It is very well documented that this is hardly ever the case, with the majority of the barrier built a considerable distance to the east of the Green line, effectively annexing Palestinian terrain (Busbridge, 2013; Weizman, 2012).

Figure 1 - The wall in Bethlehem. Note the "skunk gun" - a “less-lethal” weapon for crowd control ©Author

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17 - Checkpoints, permits, West Bank mobility

Israel maintains a network of checkpoints to control mobility in and from the West Bank. As of early 2017, 98 checkpoints existed in the West Bank. 39 of these operational checkpoints are defined as points of entry into Israel, and are located in the separation barrier. Palestinians, with the exception of children and the elderly, need permits to cross these. Permits are distributed via a

non-transparent bureaucratic system, and are haphazardly revoked in response to minor transgressions (Irus, 2012). Many checkpoints however, are not positioned on the separation barrier, but deep into West Bank territory. These checkpoints divide the West Bank into scattered islands and enclaves, mobility between which is severely constrained (Kotef & Amir, 2011). In addition to permanent checkpoints, there is the practice of mobile checkpoint. These typically exist of military vehicles and tire-puncture strips, that force passing cars to stop at random to be subject to vehicle searches and document checks (B'Tselem, 2017). Such “flying checkpoints” further constrain Palestinian mobility not only through the checking itself, but also by creating a permanent sense of unease because of the contingency of being stopped and searched (Keshet, 2006). Furthermore, checkpoints have a vast influence on Palestinian West Bank mobility not because they are so ubiquitous, but rather because of their strategic positioning. Checkpoints are installed at roads and junctions in a network that renders 43% of West Bank territory inaccessible to Palestinians (Hammami, 2019). This “matrix of control” (Halper, 2000) is understood to be designed in order to cordon off zones around settlements that are free of Palestinians.

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18 - Planning, construction, demolitions

In the second Oslo accords, the Palestinian territories are divided into sectors in three distinct

categories, known as area A, B, and C. Area A is under Palestinian security and administrative control, Area B is under Palestinian administrative control, and under joint Israeli-Palestinian security control. Area C is under Israeli civil and security control. This division was originally intended to last a

transitional period of five, years, before handing over administrative power over to the Palestinian authorities. Area C compromises 61% of West Bank territory, and its vast majority of its agricultural and yet undeveloped land. In the current situation, Israel retains planning and zoning control, including infrastructure and residential planning (B'Tselem, 2019). This means that in order to do any construction, Palestinians need to obtain a building permit from Israeli authorities. Such permits are issued extremely incidentally (Hanafi, 2009). The extreme unlikelihood of being granted a permit, needed even for minor adaptations to structures, causes many Palestinians not to bother even applying for one. The situation forces Palestinian to build and expand homes and businesses without permits, exposing them to the constant risk of demolition (Meade, 2011). Demolition orders are issued frequently, often with short notice, giving Palestinians little time to appeal. Additionally, demolitions have been carried out as a method of collective punishment in response to Palestinian attacks on Israelis (B'Tselem, 2017).

Other ways in which Israeli planning and zoning rights impact Palestinian livelihood is the fact that large swathes of land are designated military firing zones, nature reserves and national parks (Hass, 2014), effectively slating for demolition all Palestinian construction, including existing buildings. This has resulted in entire villages being levelled to the ground. In and around the South Hebron Hills, this practice has extended to the destruction of natural caves that small traditional communities used as homes (Shulman, 2007).

In addition to forced illegal construction impacting Palestinian livelihoods, there is the problematic distribution of water and electricity. As infrastructural planning in Area C is the right and

responsibility of the Israeli government, powerlines, wells, and piping are constructed in ways that benefit Israeli settlements. This is more than just a nuisance to Palestinians, as it considerably favours the ability for Israeli settlers to provide in their livelihoods over Palestinian ability to do so. This impacts the claim that both types of communities have towards lands, as laws are in place that make it possible to file for legal ownership of plots after having consistently cultivated an area for a certain amount of time. The fact that Palestinian communities expend more time and resources having to organize their water supply, and can’t leverage the power of electricity to automate house- and agricultural tasks impacts their relative ability to work lands, resulting in land ownership being assigned to

- Anti-activism bordering practices

I argue that in the Israeli context, there is a well-established separate category of bordering practices, which could be defined as anti-activism bordering. Activist movements and their ability to engage in specific forms of activism are limited in various ways, both in the West Bank and in locations in Israel proper. An example of this is the recent law that forces Israeli NGO’s that receive more than half of their funding from abroad (i.e. – all prominent Israeli peace organizations) to disclose that they receive funding from “foreign entities” prominently in all official communications, including their websites. The law only includes donations from public organizations and governments from being

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19 included in the sum of donations to be considered in compliance to this law (The Times of Israel, 2016). This is problematic, as pro-settler and pro-occupation organizations tend to be funded by equally foreign private individuals, rather than public organizations. The “transparency law” is therefore internationally understood to be a way of cracking down on Israeli left-wing NGO’s (the Guardian, 2016).

The most ubiquitous way in which anti-activism bordering takes place in the West Bank is to declare areas in which activists aim to aid Palestinians a closed military zone. This makes it illegal to be in such areas. It is especially problematic that these closed military zone warrants are typically only enforced against left-wing activists, and not against settlers that are in the same areas (Belhassen & Uriely, 2014; Hallward, 2009). A different military tactic would be to set up road-blocks in

anticipation of activists, without explicit judicial support towards doing so. Figure 2 depicts such an instance witnessed during fieldwork. The military vehicle was parked askew across the road, blocking the path of the bus taking activists towards a Palestinian community in the South Hebron hills. There was no closed military zone warrant in place yet. Nonetheless, activists had to continue on foot rather than in their vehicle – considerably cutting the time available to do the construction work planned for that day.

4.1.3 Anti-bordering activism in Israel

Israeli activism focusing on West Bank bordering practices takes many forms. Actions may take place in the West Bank, or in a different place altogether. Actions may be focused on mitigating the effects of Israeli bordering practices for Palestinians, on contesting bordering practices directly (Pallister-Wilkins, 2011), or on influencing public opinion in Israel or abroad (Baum, 2006). These objects of

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20 action often overlap. This overlap be further elaborated upon in the “results” section, as my

understanding of this overlap materialized during the data analysis.

The name used for Israeli anti-bordering activism is as contentious as the movements themselves. Some choose “radical-left-wing”, “anti-authoritarians”, others say “solidarity networks”, “peace groups”, or “human rights organizations” (Nasie, Bar-Tal, & Shnaidman, 2014), but the most

prevalent term in recent years is that of anti-occupation activism. I argue that this term fits well into this research, as the bordering practices challenged by the activists this study is concerned with effectively comprise the situation of West Bank occupation. Israeli anti-occupation activism has been around for a long time, with early initiatives dating as far back as the end of the 1967 six-day war. However, anti-occupation activism has become more radical (in the sense of being in fundamental opposition of societal and governmental consensus (Fitzgerald & Rodgers, 2000)) since the apparent failure of the peace process after the violent outbursts of the Al-Aqsa intifada in 2000. Israel

responded in force, quelling protests, imposing curfews, and as of 2003, building the separation barrier. These and related measures forced many people in the then-existing peace movements in Israel to realize that peace was unattainable unless civil society would contest (Gordon, 2003). New organizations were established, organizations merged, and new tactics and strategies took shape in response to Israeli bordering, or, occupation practices. Tactics nowadays include monitoring and providing testimony to human rights violations, criticizing Israeli policy in media outlets,

educational initiatives, protest rallies (Ziv, 2010), joint Palestinian/Israeli solidarity projects and protests (Pallister-Wilkins, 2009), humanitarian work benefitting Palestinian communities, and protecting Palestinians from harassment (Shulman, 2007). In line with its radical character, Israeli activism that contests West bank bordering practices has become increasingly marginalized in Israeli society since the second intifada. This marginalization has been identified as a crackdown on peace organizations in Israel (Baum, 2006; Shulman, 2007; Ziv, 2010). I argue that these developments may be assumed to enlarge the social burdens and risks associated with engaging in activism.

4.1.5 Sampling

The population relevant for this research consists of Israeli citizens that contest bordering practice in Israel. Extremely useful work towards identifying a viable sample population has been done by Rogers and Ben-David (2008), by their mapping of Israeli organizations that contest the separation barrier surrounding the West Bank. Their identifications were used to find leads towards

organizations, and people in organizations, that could be approached to probe for willingness to contribute to this research. From here on, snowball sampling was used to generate a viable pool of respondents. Initial response was meagre, however, once first contacts had been made and a certain level of trust was established, activists were generally very willing to refer me to friends,

acquaintances, or key people outside of their everyday networks (in response to my specific request) in order to help me along. To aid respondent spread, I made explicit that I wanted to include as wide a range of perspectives on activism and the occupation as possible in my research. This was done in an attempt to correct the obvious disadvantage of snowball sampling – the notion that respondents are likely to refer to people in the same network, creating significant bias in the respondent group (Sadler, Lee, Lim, & Fullerton, 2010). I argue that this has not been an extremely relevant issue in this current research, as Israeli anti-occupation activists comprise an rather small, and relatively close-knit group (Rogers & Ben-David, 2008). Additionally, I feel fairly confident in claiming a degree of

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21 first-hand expertise on the current composition of Israeli activist networks, that allows me to assess the adequacy of the sample group in representing the research population. The adequacy of the sample population is further supported by the purpose of this study and resulting sampling

requirements. The goal in data collection has first and foremost been obtaining theoretic saturation concerning aspects and sources of activist motivation for contesting Israeli bordering practices. This goal has been met. A further concern in the sampling of respondents is the language barrier. I do not speak Hebrew, limiting my enquiry to people that speak at least some English. I argue this not to invalidate research findings, as Israeli anti-authoritarian activists have typically enjoyed higher education (Nasie, Bar-Tal, & Shnaidman, 2014).

Table 1 displays the organizations that activists included in this research are active in. It also includes a brief description of the main characteristics and activities of these organizations, based on

information gathered during fieldwork, and existing research that discusses the organizations, where applicable.

Table 1 - Activist organizations represented in the research sample

4.2 Setting up the data gathering process

4.2.1 Operationalizing Israeli activism

Existing research into Israeli activism provides extensive information on the organization, tactics, and spread of Israeli anti-bordering activism. Little work has been done, however, towards identifying the reasons why activists do what they do. Ground-breaking research into the topic has been done by

Ta’ayush, (Living together) Grass-roots organization. Accompaniment, preventing demolitions, and humanitarian construction efforts, monitoring settlement expansion (Shulman, 2007).

Machsom Watch, (Checkpoint Watch)

Grass-roots, female organization. Originally only monitoring checkpoints, increasingly active in educational activities and permit assistance. (Braverman, 2012)

Breaking the Silence (Shovrim Shtika),

Former soldiers. Collecting and sharing testimonies about (West-Bank) and military service.

Torat Tzedeh, (Torah of Justice) Religious, Jewish, humanitarian. Accompaniment, preventing demolitions, monitoring settler behaviour

Yesh Din Documenting and (legally) contesting human rights violations in the OPT.

Comet-ME Humanitarian infrastructural assistance. Solar and wind energy, water provision for Palestinian communities

Mesarvot Grass-roots organization. Assisting conscientious objectors to army service.

ACRI (Association for Civil Rights in Israel)

Focuses on Israeli and Palestinian civil rights. Legal assistance for Palestinians suffering from occupation practice.

Women in Black Grass-roots organization. Weekly anti-occupation vigils in various locations in Israel.

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22 Nasie, Bar-Tal, and Shnaidman (2014), exploring biographical, social, and ideological factors that inform motivations towards getting involved in anti-authoritarian peace activism. Peace activism These activists have been found to typically have leftist backgrounds, with family members often being critical of Israeli government in general. They tend to be aware of bordering practices and life under occupation in the West bank. Political engagement among activist has commonly been

encouraged from older towards younger generations in families. Activists tend to have been active in one of Israel’s many youth movements, therein consolidating leftist, peace-oriented views, while simultaneously learning about political engagement and mobilisation (Nasie, Bar-Tal, & Shnaidman, 2014). Activists that do not have a leftist background typically have been exposed to information that contradicts or nuances the securitized discourse in Israeli society with regards to the occupation. This requires activists to have been susceptible for accepting this information (Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2009). There are indications that suggest that this openness may be triggered by specific traumatic

experiences in childhood that develop people’s likelihood to experience empathy (Nasie, Bar-Tal, & Shnaidman, 2014).

Activism is additionally theorized to play an important role in people’s identity. Activists may be proud of their activist involvement, informing a positive self-conception. They may find a group that they are able to identify with in organizations or movements that they join, and create a social environment in which they feel secure and appreciated. This is especially important considering marginalization of activists in broader Israeli society (Nasie, Bar-Tal, & Shnaidman, 2014). This current study is an attempt to contribute to bridging the gap between IR theory on state legitimacy and the role of perceived legitimacy in anti-bordering activism. This implies moving beyond the existing identifications of aspects of Israeli activist motivation by notably Nasie, Bar-Tal, and Shnaidman, while remaining mindful of their observations while carrying out fieldwork.

4.2.2 Empirical questions and research instrument

The questions that drive the data collection process are derived from the theoretic framework that proposes the perception of containment to be a relevant factor in motivating activism. Additional empiric questions are developed to connect this research to the minimal literature that focuses on the motivations of Israeli anti-occupation activists specifically. The empirical questions aim to identify contextual factors in activist motivation, building towards exploring the relevance of the proposed constituent aspects of activists’ perception of the legitimacy of Israeli bordering practices. These empirical questions are presented in conjunction with examples of interview questions that were used to help answer the empirical questions. Following guidelines for semi-structured interviewing, these questions are used to direct conversation, rather than to dominate it, allowing respondents to self-identify themes as much as possible (Barriball & While, 1994).

Why do activists do what they do?

- What are we doing? Why do you feel this is important? What do you want to accomplish by doing …?

How are biographical factors relevant in this?

- Can you tell me about your upbringing? Are many of your friends activists? Can you tell me about your time in the army?

What factors are relevant in forming activists’ perspectives on the legitimacy of Israeli bordering practices?

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23 - You appear to feel strongly about ... . What makes you feel like that? How do you see

Palestinians? Why?

What is the significance of the concept of containment in this?

- What do you think of the impact of the wall on Palestinians? Why do you choose to help Palestinians, and not deprived Arab Israelis?

4.2.3 Fieldwork setting

Data gathering happened over a three-week period in May 2019, in various locations in Israel. This specific period was a particularly turbulent time in Israel. Coalition talks were underway after the Knesset elections in April. The elections had primarily been a contest between right- wing ruling party Likud and right-wing contender Blue and White. Both these parties have shown little intent to commit to Israeli-Palestinian reconciliation efforts, instead advocating for expansion of existing settlements in the West Bank and strong military response towards any act of terrorism. Note here that terrorism is a term with serious implications, which will be explored in the data analysis. In the context of post-election interparty negotiation, intense rocket firing from the Gaza strip had

prompted Israeli military responses in the weeks and days before the data gathering period in Israel (NY Times, 2019).

In addition, four important days of commemoration fell during the data gathering period, being International Holocaust remembrance day, Yom HaZikaron (the day on which Israel remembers its fallen soldiers, and victims to terrorism), Israeli independence day, and Nakba commemoration day. Furthermore, Ramadan fell in the month of May. During Ramadan, many Palestinians visit

Jerusalem’s old city for prayer, prompting security measures and increased tension. Garnishing this contentious cocktail is the Eurovision song contest, hailed by some as an opportunity for Israeli to show its fun-loving character, but shunned by others for being a case of whitewashing the

occupation of the West Bank, the Gaza siege, and treatment of Arabs in Israel in general (The

Guardian, 2019; Haaretz, 2019). I argue that the period of data collection to fall in a specifically tense period does not compromise the relevance of this study. On the contrary, I argue that the ongoing movement towards hawkish, repressive policies in Israel directed both against Palestinians and Israeli activists (Human Rights Watch, 2019) enlarges the likelihood of situations of increased tension in the future. This supports the purpose of this study as contributing to an understanding of Israeli activism in the current deteriorating context.

4.2.4 Approach – militant etnography

The data collection process combined aspects of militant ethnography with more traditional approaches to structured interviewing. Interviews were conducted in prearranged semi-structured sit-down contexts, and in more impromptu settings while joining activists in their activities. This combined strategy of data gathering is inspired by Juris’ (2007) guidelines for

conducting militant ethnographic research. Militant ethnography is an explicitly politically committed means of gathering data that involves actively engaging in an anti-authoritarian movement. The aim of research is therefore twofold: to generate insight into the dynamics and practices of movements, while simultaneously attempting to contribute, in one way or another, to the goals of this same movement. The extent of involvement of the researcher in the movement he or she is attempting to study may vary. Whereas some researchers choose to adopt a very central position in a movement, for a prolonged period of time (Apoifis, 2017), others may choose to sustain some level of distance.

“I can’t believe what you say because I see what you do” : a study of Israeli anti-occupation activists’ experiences and perspectives on the border